


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AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCHUMAN PLAN

Introduction

On May 9, 1950 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, announced his Government's proposal to merge the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, together with those of any other European country, in a single market. His announcement was a major development in the political and economic life of Western Europe.

Mr. Schuman's invitation to develop a treaty was extended to all European nations. Five nations accepted his invitation—Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, and Western Germany. These five nations, together with France, have now developed a detailed treaty in implementation of the original proposals; except for a few remaining issues which have been held in abeyance for negotiation among ministers of the six countries, the treaty is now ready for ratification by national parliaments. The treaty proposes that any necessary governmental powers over these industries be vested in new institutions akin to those of a federal government. The keynote in the administration of these industries would be the elimination of national barriers to trade and of private restrictive agreements. The discriminatory devices heretofore frequently employed in the sale of coal and steel in member country markets would be removed. Coal and steel products and coal and steel workers would move freely among the member countries. When critical shortages or other crises required governmental controls, these emergencies would be developed and administered by the new supranational institutions.

The single market, created by these provisions, would not be isolated from the rest of the world. Nonmember producers would also have access to the market, without any increased trade barriers being interposed to the import of their products.

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press March 21]

The United States Government welcomes the action taken by the six Western European countries in initialing the provisions of the Schuman Plan treaty last Monday in Paris. In developing this unprecedented agreement, the six countries have provided dramatic evidence of their will to merge their national interests in order to contribute to the peace and well-being which are the objectives of the free nations of the Western World. The United States is confident that, in the same spirit, the six countries will be able to settle any remaining issues on which agreement must be reached before the Schuman Plan can be put into actual operation.

Furthermore, countries which import from producers in the single market would be assured equitable treatment and reasonable prices.

These revolutionary agreements and institutions deserve the most careful study. The summary which follows indicates the chief provisions of the plan and how it can be expected to operate.

Historical Background

Throughout the present century, the coal and steel industries of France and Germany have had an important effect on their political and economic relations. One reason why these two basic industries have figured so prominently in French-German relations has been their location. The bulk of the coal and steel industry of France and Germany lies in a compact area close to the border dividing the two countries, an area which includes Lorraine, the Saar, and the Ruhr.

Within this small area, divided by the French-German border, lie the raw materials essential for the development of a modern steel industry. The iron ore on which the French and German industries were originally built lies largely in Lorraine, an area which was a part of France

until the Franco-Prussian War of the 1870's, which Germany controlled until World War I, and which France thereafter regained. The coal deposits which initially led to the creation of the French and German steel industries lie largely in the Ruhr area, and to a lesser extent in the Saar region; both of these areas are close by the western German border, and the status of the latter area has frequently been in dispute between the two countries.

The explosive nature of French-German relations in the past century led each of these countries to use her possession of raw materials, which the other needed, as a prime bargaining weapon and retaliatory device.

From the end of World War I until the time of Mr. Schuman's proposals, the one development which might have been characterized as French-German cooperation in the field of steel production was the creation of the European Steel Cartel in the middle 1920's, an organization which enjoyed a checkered but increasingly significant role up to World War II. The European Steel Cartel, however, was basically a negotiated truce among the steel industries of the Western European countries. Particularly in its later versions, it was an agreement among producers and sellers of steel on the terms under which each national group would sell in the markets of any other group and in the market of third countries. The emphasis was primarily on avoiding market situations that would cause a decline in the price of steel. Far from promoting increased efficiency and wiping out national barriers, the cartel froze Europe's steel industry and national markets into a rigid mold, which was a major reason for the inefficiency which has handicapped the industry since. After the initial enthusiastic reactions to the cartel, which were expressed in 1926 and 1927, little was heard of its contribution to political harmony between France and Germany.

Schuman's proposals were broached at a time when, with a revival in her industrial capacity, Germany was seeking to be freed of any restraints imposed upon her freedom of action. Meanwhile, most of the Western World was becoming increasingly convinced that the long-run solution to the German problem lay in the closer integration of the German economy with the West, rather than in isolation and restraint. Accordingly, Schuman's proposals, which are based upon the principle of a pooling of German resources on a basis of equal-

ity with other Western European countries, were greeted by large segments of the Western World as a welcome and courageous development in French national policy.

Schuman Plan Principles

The principles of the Schuman Plan, as enunciated in the French Foreign Minister's statement of May 9, 1950, were without precedent. A group of supranational institutions would be created and would be endowed with broad powers of a sovereign nature over the coal and steel industries of the member countries. The basic purpose of these institutions would be to achieve the elimination of all elements of nationalism in the conduct of the coal and steel industries of the member countries; among other things, this arrangement would mean the elimination of all barriers to trade among the member countries. The new institutions also would have the means of encouraging the modernization and improvement of mine and plant facilities. They would also be charged with improving and equalizing the living standards of coal and steel workers. Finally, provision would have to be made for transitional measures to ease the shock of merging into a single market area the coal and steel economies of countries with widely varying cost structures.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The constitution of the Schuman Plan reflects the delegation of sovereignty through a number of basic provisions. An executive body will be created under the agreement with power to enforce most of the substantive provisions. The members of this executive body, known as the High Authority, will be elected for a 6-year tenure by the member governments acting together, from a slate of nominees drawn up by them; and no member of this Authority would report to or receive instructions from the national Government of any participating country.

The powers proposed for the High Authority are extensive. They include the right to tax the production of enterprises under their jurisdiction to issue directives relating to coal and steel which are binding on the individual enterprises and states to which they are addressed; to fine enterprises in violation of their orders and to offset the effects of any illegal acts by member states by fine on the production of the enterprises in their area

to borrow and to lend; and to make studies and suggestions to the enterprises and states under their jurisdiction. Member states are bound to use their respective police powers to enforce the directions of the High Authority.

The High Authority will report periodically to a Common Assembly, made up of representatives drawn in agreed proportions from each of the member countries. The Assembly will review the Authority's work annually. By a two-thirds vote, the Assembly will be able to censure the Authority and compel its members to resign. The Assembly also will have the right to review and approve, as a whole, an annual budget proposed by the High Authority.

A third institution basic to the Plan is the special Council of Ministers. The concept of a Council arose out of a need to find some means whereby the work of the High Authority in the coal and steel sectors of the economies of the member countries could be tied in closely with the measures being taken by these Governments in the rest of their economies. The impact of actions by the High Authority in coal and steel upon such national problems as the maintenance of an adequate defense, the control of inflation, the balance of external accounts, and similar problems, was recognized early in the negotiations.

Accordingly, the Council of Ministers, which is to consist of ministers drawn from the Governments of each of the signatory countries, will be endowed with the powers necessary to insure this coordination. For example, the Council will have the right to initiate proposals and will have a voice in the determinations of the High Authority whenever the question of market control is involved, such as the possibility of the fixing of maximum prices or allocations to meet a shortage situation. The Council of Ministers also will be directly concerned in the process whereby the tariff rates of the six countries applicable to coal and steel shipped in from outside sources are set.

Another element in the structure created by the Schuman Plan is the proposed Court of Justice. In most typical intergovernmental agreements, differences over interpretation ordinarily are settled by agreement among the signatory Governments, with provisions sometimes included for the right of appeal by Governments to the International Court. The Schuman Plan provides for its own Court to deal with the juridical problems arising out of the relations among the constituent

organs created by the plan and arising out of complaints by aggrieved Governments, enterprises, or individuals. The Court's membership will be determined by very much the same process as that provided for the membership of the High Authority. The Court's most important power is the right to nullify the decisions of the High Authority, in much the same way and on much the same grounds as the courts of the United States may declare laws of Congress unconstitutional or nullify the decisions of administrative bodies of the Government. In short, if the Authority were exceeding its powers under the treaty or were acting capriciously, the Court would have a basis for reversal. The Court could also nullify acts of the Council of Ministers or the Common Assembly, where these bodies were exceeding their powers.

The system of institutions is completed with one final organ, the Consultative Committee. The Committee is to provide a direct link between the High Authority, on the one hand, and producer, labor, and consumer groups, on the other. It will consist of 30 to 50 representatives, drawn in equal numbers from the three groups, and will have advisory functions of a general character.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR REMOVING TRADE BARRIERS

The dominant principle of the Schuman Plan is that the coal and steel industries of the member countries are to be treated as if no national boundaries existed among them. The countries of Western Europe are to abandon their efforts to be self-sufficient in coal and steel and are to allow these industries to develop in a common market embracing all the member countries.

Accordingly, the principal operative provisions of the plan deal with the elimination of existing national barriers to trade. They call for the immediate suspension of virtually all tariffs applicable by any member country to the coal and steel products of any other member country. The provisions also require the suspension of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports of coal and steel products among the member countries, and the elimination of various other restrictive or discriminatory devices.

These proposals, which are not unlike those typically associated with a customs union, are supplemented by more revolutionary provisions with respect to restrictive arrangements among producers of coal and steel. Any agreements among

producers which restrict competition, whether by fixing prices, allocating customers, limiting the introduction of new technology, or other means, are outlawed. Joint selling agreements or agreements among companies to promote specialization in the manufacture of particular products may be permitted in some circumstances; however, any such agreements would require the prior approval of the Authority, which is only to be granted if the Authority has found that the agreement would make a positive contribution to the efficiency of the enterprises in question and would not significantly affect the degree of competition in the markets concerned.

Additional provisions are aimed at reducing the possibility on the part of enterprises in the single market, through stock ownership, interlocking directorates, and similar devices, to circumvent the prohibition against restrictive business practices. Transactions which, in effect, would merge or affiliate previously independent enterprises in the area under the Authority's jurisdiction, require the prior approval of the High Authority, which must act under standards similar to those by which it judges joint selling and specialization agreements.

Under the High Authority's general powers to prevent or offset governmental measures which have a discriminatory effect upon the coal and steel enterprises in its jurisdiction, the High Authority can bring about a change in discriminatory freight rate structures imposed by the public carriers operating in the area. The negotiating countries intend that the High Authority would exercise this power early in its life, thereby ending a long-standing source of friction.

Once the provisions were in force, it is expected that producers in the common market would be exposed to a considerable degree of price competition. The expectation is that the long-run impact of this release of competitive forces would be to increase productivity, cut costs, and lower prices of coal and steel in the single market. Unless some safeguards were provided, however, the danger would exist that producers might develop pricing practices which generally fall under the head of "unfair competition." They might, for example, seek to drive competition out of a local market by selling temporarily in that market alone at a greatly depressed price. Another possibility is that producers might follow the practice of favoring customers of one nationality over those

of another. Possibilities such as these have led to provisions vesting in the Authority the power to impose rules which would govern the pricing practices (not the prices) of the producers in the area. The general objective of the Authority would be to enforce a nondiscriminatory pricing pattern without unnecessarily inhibiting price competition and price flexibility.

The provisions of the agreement also allow for more direct intervention by the Authority in the market for coal and steel under certain special circumstances. Current European thinking on the subject of coal and steel is, of course, greatly influenced by the recurrent shortages of recent years and the strong inflationary pressures which such shortages have created. Accordingly, provision has been made for dealing with such situations; the agreement would permit the High Authority, acting in concert with the Council of Ministers, to impose price controls or to initiate a system of allocations for coal and steel in periods of shortage. At the other extreme, the Authority, acting together with the Council of Ministers, is empowered to limit production and to introduce minimum prices in a period of "manifest crisis."

Relations With Outside Countries

At present, each of the prospective members of the pool has undertakings to many countries outside the pool to grant the latter most-favored-nation treatment in trade matters; that is to say, each of the prospective participants is now bound by agreements which require them, for example, to apply the same tariff rate to coal or steel imported from the United Kingdom or the United States as is applied to coal or steel imported from other countries participating in the Schuman Plan. The participating countries will have to negotiate for the modification of these commitments in order to be able to eliminate coal and steel tariffs among themselves while continuing to apply them to imports from nonparticipating countries. Until the negotiations associated with these waivers are completed and the terms of the waivers are known, any discussion of the commercial relations of the Schuman Plan countries with outside countries is bound to be tentative in nature. Meanwhile, the High Authority is not empowered to take any measures inconsistent with the international obligations of the participating countries.

Despite the unresolved state of the trade rela

tions between the six countries and the outside world, a few basic points are clear. Although the dominant theme of the Schuman Plan is the creation of a single market among the participating countries, the agreement also stresses the principle that the single market should not be an area which enjoys heavy protection from the coal and steel exports of the rest of the world. This intention will be put to the test initially in connection with the process of harmonizing the tariff structures of the participating countries. This problem of harmonization is an unavoidable consequence of the agreement to suspend tariffs on coal and steel among the participating countries. If Germany imposed a very much higher tariff rate on imports of British steel than Belgium imposed on its imports of British steel, German importers of British steel would be likely to bring their products through Belgium and thereby avoid the high German tariff. Similar problems would arise if the countries had very different policies regarding other types of import restrictions. To deal with these problems, therefore, member countries would have to develop arrangements whereby the import restrictions which each of them applied to outside countries were not sufficiently different to encourage needless transshipments among them.

The member countries would reserve one important right to the High Authority, however, which might in some circumstances reduce the import of the products of other countries. In the event that a "manifest crisis" developed, justifying the imposition of production quotas on coal or steel in the single market area, and, in the event that imports were being effected in such relatively increased quantities and under such conditions as seriously to injure producers of competitive coal and steel products in the single market, the Authority would be authorized to impose import quotas. This power, it should be noted, is directly analogous to the so-called escape-clause rights which participating countries reserve to themselves under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The treaty says little regarding the treatment to be accorded by the pool to outside countries which import their coal and steel. Such provisions as exist, however, are of a constructive nature. The objective of the group is to be the development of sales practices which would produce equitable prices for exported coal and steel. Among other things, the Authority will have the means of pre-

venting companies in its jurisdiction from "dumping" coal or steel abroad, that is, selling these products at a price below their sale price in the single market or below their cost of production.

Influencing Coal and Steel Investment

In general, competitive forces are expected to determine the location of coal and steel facilities in the single market and to encourage the expansion and modernization of these facilities. The High Authority will have no direct power to close down high-cost mines or steel plants, nor can it compel investments in added coal or steel facilities; in these fields, the Authority will have to rely upon market forces to bring about the results it desires.

On the other hand, the Authority could influence the pattern of investment in several other ways. To begin with, the Authority could veto a proposed investment in coal or steel facilities which a company proposed to finance from funds other than its own reserves, if the Authority concluded that the proposed facilities could not be expected to survive without subsidies or other artificial means of support. In addition, the Authority could make loans to enterprises to help in the expansion of their facilities. Finally, the Authority will have the obligation of making continuing studies of the coal and steel facilities of the complex, to point out the needs and opportunities for added investment in the area.

Protecting Labor's Interests

In the course of negotiating the provisions of the Schuman Plan, it became increasingly apparent that the project for a single market might well involve shifts in coal and steel facilities among the participating countries. These shifts, in turn, might require the migration or displacement of some workers engaged in those industries. Accordingly, the High Authority was given responsibility for assisting workers in the readjustments which might be involved. This assistance may take any of several forms. It may include liberal separation pay, retraining courses, or payment of resettlement expenses and similar payments. It might also include the financing of new industries in the affected areas which could absorb the displaced workers.

The High Authority's obligations with respect to labor also have certain more positive objectives.

One of the High Authority's major purposes is to eliminate the deliberate use of wage reductions as a technique of competition. One provision of the treaty prohibits any reduction in wages, except in certain defined circumstances, such as when living costs also had declined. In addition, the Authority may enter into consultation with Governments with a view to correcting abnormally low wage situations already in existence.

The treaty also contains other commitments which have few precedents in international labor history. The participating countries will be committed to the development of a detailed agreement to eliminate virtually all restrictions in the hiring of experienced steel and coal workers who are nationals of any of the other countries. Particular efforts are to be made to eliminate barriers to the reemployment of workers displaced in other countries. Any discriminations practiced against coal or steel workers of other member countries, whether they are experienced or not, also will have to be eliminated by the treaty.

Transitional Measures

From the first, the drafters of the plan considered that certain special measures would have to be taken, during a relatively short period at the outset of the plan's operation, in order to deal with the differences in costs which existed among the coal and steel industries of the various nations. It appeared that free trade among the coal and steel industries of the six countries might force shifts in production in the merged area on so large a scale as to be intolerable for some of the countries concerned. The most difficult problems in this category are those presented by the relatively high cost Belgian coal industry and by the Italian steel industry.

To deal with the Belgian coal problem, provision is made for the operation of a so-called coal equalization fund which would operate during a transitional period of 5 years. The fund would be raised by levies on the coal and steel produc-

tion of the low cost producers in the area and would be paid to the highest cost segment of the Belgian producers. These subsidies would taper off at a rapid rate, the exact pace depending on the speed with which Belgian industry can adjust itself to the situation.

The solution for Italian steel takes a different form. The negotiators concluded that for technical reasons it was not practicable to operate an equalization fund for the steel industry. Accordingly, if the High Authority considers it necessary, the Italian industry can be protected by tariffs during the transitional period. However, the duties involved cannot in any case be higher than those which prevailed at the beginning of the plan and would be reduced by some fixed percentage in each of the transitional years, until the duty was eliminated.

Next Steps

Six countries have participated in the development of the Schuman Plan treaty—Belgium, France, Western Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg. Ratification by the parliaments of the signatory Governments will put the plan in operation. The discussions on ratification will raise political issues of the first importance in most of the countries concerned. Each country is bound to test the plan for its impact on its domestic economy and to explore the effects of participation on other international issues.

Ratification of the plan will be a tribute to their imagination and courage. It will represent an experiment in new concepts of sovereignty and of international organization, which will help to knit the free nations of the world with stronger and more enduring ties.

NOTE.—The Schuman Plan Constituting a European Coal and Steel Community: Draft Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community and Draft Convention Containing the Transitional Provisions has been printed by the Department of State as publication 4173 and is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at 55¢ a copy.

Report of the Air Coordinating Committee for 1950¹

I. INTRODUCTION

History and Background

The Air Coordinating Committee (ACC) is a Federal interdepartmental committee which was established by interdepartmental agreement in 1945, and subsequently formalized by the President under Executive Order 9781, September 19, 1946, with responsibility for coordinating Federal policy in the field of aviation. The Committee is authorized to

examine aviation problems and developments affecting more than one participating agency; develop and recommend integrated policies to be carried out and actions to be taken by the participating agencies or by any other Government agency charged with responsibility in the aviation field; and, to the extent permitted by law, coordinate the aviation activities of such agencies except activities relating to the exercise of quasi-judicial function.

It coordinates interdepartmental views and recommends general policy directives and instructions to the Department of State for the guidance of the United States representatives to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The ACC is also responsible for making recommendations to the President concerning major aviation policy and for submitting to him for decision any disagreement on important aviation questions.

The ACC is concerned with many aspects of aviation policy, including both highly technical policies and problems, such as involved in the all-weather-flying program and the longer-range economic and industrial problems, such as are found in the mobilization of the Nation's air power. Major attention is given to civil-aviation matters with military or international implications, but the facilities of the Committee are available for the coordination of any aviation problem affecting more than one of its member agencies. Since recommendations of the ACC can be made only by unanimous agreement, its member agencies are assured of an opportunity for full discussion and consideration of all aviation matters affecting them. The means is thereby provided for the

achievement of an integrated and coordinated Federal aviation policy.

Aviation policy matters may be submitted to the ACC by individual Federal departments and agencies, States and other non-Federal jurisdictions, the aviation industry, and the United States representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization. These matters are then referred to an ACC committee or subcommittee or one of the member agencies for study and analysis and the preparation of a position which will be acceptable to the member agencies and carried out by them. The complete coordination of all interested areas of the Government is in this fashion assured.

The Air Coordinating Committee membership at present includes the Departments of State, Navy, Air Force, Treasury, Post Office, Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics Board, National Security Resources Board, and the Bureau of the Budget, a nonvoting member. The representatives of these departments are from the sub-Cabinet level. All major policy decisions are made by the members of the Committee (appendix A).² On questions affecting the interests of nonmember Federal agencies, their representatives are consulted and given full voting participation. The ACC employs a system of standing committees (divisions), panels, subcommittees, ad hoc committees, and working groups, to perform its work, possessing varying degrees of responsibility. Technical, legal, economic, and other personnel in a wide variety of fields, drawn from the member agencies, make up the subcommittees which provide the basic study and coordination of a problem before it is referred to the Committee. In limited cases, however, where it is consistent with sound administration, direct authority to take final ACC action has been conferred upon certain committees, panels, or subcommittees. There are approximately 24 standing subcommittees and several special purpose committees. (See list, appendix B.)² A permanent secretariat under the direction of the Executive Secretary provides facilities and services necessary to the performance of the Committee's functions.

¹ Message from the President of the United States transmitting the annual report of the Air Coordinating Committee for the calendar year 1950. H. Doc. 55, 82d Cong. Feb. 8, 1951.

² Not printed.

Organizational Changes in 1950

A new Chairman was selected for the Air Coordinating Committee on September 27, 1950, with the appointment of Mr. Delos W. Rentzel, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Mr. Rentzel succeeded Mr. Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., former Chairman of the CAB, who resigned July 8, 1950.

Mr. E. H. Foley, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury, was appointed Vice Chairman on August 28, 1950, and presided at ACC meetings during the interval between the resignation of Mr. O'Connell and the appointment of Mr. Rentzel.

Mr. Thomas W. S. Davis, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, was appointed as Commerce member to succeed Mr. C. V. Whitney, former Under Secretary of Commerce.

The National Security Resources Board was added as a member of the ACC in recognition of the increased emphasis on air-mobilization planning. Participation by the NSRB extends and strengthens coordination of aviation policy in the Government in accordance with the Executive order.

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES OF 1950

The year 1950 provided numerous opportunities for the coordination of Government-wide aviation policy and the development of agreements on both domestic and international matters by the member agencies of the ACC.

The Committee considered various technical aspects of domestic air navigation.

The all-weather-flying program conceived by the SC-31 Report of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics can be realized and speeded up because of the establishment of operational policies and detailed operational needs for the integration of air-traffic-control operations within the United States, to permit a safe and orderly transition to the common system.

The member agencies developed and recommended a national policy and program with regard to the selection and establishment of long-distance aids to air navigation.

In response to a request from the President's Communications Policy Board, the Committee developed a broad policy statement covering current United States aeronautical communications, including indications of unsolved problems in this field.

A continuing large volume of decisions were reached with regard to air-space utilization.

Member agencies approved and recommended to Congress proposed legislation for security control of the air space by positive identification of all aircraft in certain zones, enacted in Public Law 778, Eighty-first Congress.

The Committee considered problems of aircraft production and air transport mobilization planning. In an effort to promote United States

leadership in the production of new and improved turbine-powered aircraft, a program to provide Government assistance to aircraft manufacturers for the testing of certain prototypes was formulated and became Public Law 867, the Prototype Testing Act.

To prevent impairment of the civil air transport industry as a result of expanding military aircraft production, a policy was recommended to the National Production Authority whereby spare parts and new equipment necessary for the proper functioning of civil air transport would be given equal priority with military production.

The member agencies on the basis of a previous agreement between the ACC and the NSRB continued working on mobilization plans and studies of the Nation's civil air resources to provide adequate aeronautical potential for an emergency. During the current year a series of detailed mobilization plans for the air transport industry were completed and transmitted to NSRB.

In the field of international air policy the Committee continued to perform the ground work for United States participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization and to develop answers for technical, economic, and legal policy problems.

The Committee cleared United States positions of policy relative to the development, adoption, amendment, and implementation of the technical annexes (Standards and Recommended Practices) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in the following fields: personnel licensing; rules of the air; aeronautical charts; dimensional units to be used in air-ground communications; operation of aircraft—scheduled international air services; airworthiness of aircraft; aeronautical telecommunications; air traffic services; search and rescue; aircraft accident investigations (AIG); and aerodromes, air routes and ground aids (AGA). In addition, United States positions for the 1950 session of the Icao Assembly and for other Icao meetings were developed and coordinated. At these meetings many matters of major importance to national and international aviation were considered, the majority of which were technical in character.

The Committee continued to work on the economic policy problems involved in international rights to fly under article 5 of the Chicago convention, international air mail, burdensome taxation on international airlines, facilitation of international air travel, and the provision of international air-navigation facilities.

An important area in which the Committee was particularly active was the establishment of a policy to reduce deficiencies in international air navigation facilities. The Committee developed a current listing of important facility deficiencies and indicated possible methods of implementation required for United States flag carriers whose operations along certificated international routes are vital to national interests.

The major endeavor in the legal field centered upon efforts to revise the Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface. Other problems in international law were considered, and positions were prepared on the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relative to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw convention) and the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions.

A statement of policies to cover landing and parking fees at CAA-operated airports in the Pacific area was submitted by the CAA to the Committee for coordination. The attention of the Committee centered primarily around the provision of a standard landing charge. It was decided, that this charge should be fixed at 16 cents per thousand pounds of aircraft weight.

The ACC continued its review of United States civil air policy for Germany and other occupied countries, deciding, among other things, that air service for Germany should be restricted to the minimum required for economic recovery.

IV. INTERNATIONAL AIR POLICY

The international air policies which are followed by the United States Government are an important phase of our foreign policy. For this reason the work of the Air Coordinating Committee, which combines and reflects the views of the various governmental departments and agencies in assuring full support and coordination of the policy eventually advanced by the Department of State on behalf of this Government, continues to be one of its major assignments.

A. International Civil Aviation Organization

The United States is one of 58 states which are members of the International Civil Aviation Organization, and one of the 20 states which sit on its Council. The Assembly of all member states of ICAO meets annually and is concerned with major policy matters. The Council, which is the Organization's permanent executive body, is in session about 7 months of the year, and the three major committees of the Council—Air Navigation, Air Transport, and Joint (Financial) Support are in session concurrently with it. The Legal Committee of ICAO meets twice a year, subject to approval of the Council. There are 13 specialized divisions which are responsible to the Air Navigation and Air Transport Committees, and there are meetings for 10 different air-navigation regions. The United States participates in the work of ICAO through its resident representatives and through special delegations.

The part that ACC plays in United States participation in ICAO is twofold: first, developing the United States position on matters being considered by the Organization; and, second, coordinating

the development of an integrated program for the implementation by the agencies of this Government of decisions reached by ICAO.

In addition to formulating policies for the use of the United States representative on the ICAO Council, the Committee during 1950 developed the United States positions to be presented at 16 ICAO conferences. (A list of these conferences is attached to this report as appendix C.) The Committee also made recommendations to the Department of State on the composition of the United States delegations to the ICAO conferences.

TECHNICAL POLICY DECISIONS

The Convention on International Civil Aviation, under which ICAO was organized and now operates, was ratified by the United States and has the effect of law. Under the convention each contracting state undertakes to promote the highest practicable degree of uniformity in technical standards and procedures. To this end, the convention provides that ICAO shall adopt and amend from time to time international standards and recommended practices (technical annexes), and provides further that any state having standards or practices differing from those established under the convention shall so notify ICAO. The position of the United States Government on cooperating with ICAO in establishing uniform standards and practices is reflected in the following memorandum which the ACC issued:

The ACC favors and encourages compliance in all respects with the Convention on International Civil Aviation and recommends that ICAO standards and recommended practices and other pertinent ICAO decisions be applied to United States national aviation practices as soon as practicable after adoption, except when it is impracticable to do so because of any of the following reasons:

- (a) Implementation would be detrimental to the national interest;
- (b) Implementation cannot be effected without obtaining new or amended legislation;
- (c) Necessary funds are not available;
- (d) Implementation would work a substantial hardship on the various aviation activities of the United States;
- (e) Existing national practices provide a greater degree of safety.

The ACC recommends that insofar as is compatible with the national interest, agencies exert every effort to remove obstructions to the application of any ICAO standard or recommended practice which cannot be applied immediately.

During 1950 the ACC continued to perform a large volume of work in connection with the development of United States positions concerning the adoption, amendment, and implementation of the technical annexes to the Chicago convention. Positions regarding the amendment of existing annexes (international standards and recommended practices) were developed, as well as positions with regard to the adoption of four new annexes. A large volume of work was also performed by the ACC in connection with United States preparation for ICAO divisional, regional,

and other technical meetings and approval of their recommendations. Further technical policy coordination was accomplished in the preparation of replies to letters from ICAO on many air-navigation questions.

FOURTH SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY (JUNE 1950)

The fourth session of the ICAO Assembly was held in an atmosphere of international good will and understanding. Several of the participating nations expressed the hope that ICAO would serve as a much-needed example for international cooperation in other fields.

Through its examination of the annual report of the Council and through its debate on specific technical, economic, legal, and administrative items appearing on its agenda, the Assembly reviewed all phases of the Organization's work. Resolutions adopted by this session of the Assembly provided policy guidance and directives to the Council on such matters as amendment of the Chicago convention, activities of ICAO and obligations of contracting states in the field of accident investigation, recognition of certificates of airworthiness for the purpose of import and export, the ICAO aviation training program, the role of ICAO in the United Nations expanded technical assistance program, commercial rights in international air transport, and a new Draft Convention on Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface.

As in the case of previous sessions of the Assembly, the position of the United States on all items appearing on the provisional agenda was drawn up and cleared with all United States Government agencies concerned through the mechanism of the interdepartmental Air Coordinating Committee. Definite instructions on all agenda items, either with or without latitude for the delegation to use its own discretion, were given to the chairman of the United States delegation prior to departure for ICAO headquarters in Montreal, where the Assembly was held. Members of the United States delegation, with few exceptions, consisted of those who regularly represent their agencies in the various components of the Air Coordinating Committee. The United States position was completely or substantially sustained on most of the agenda items.

RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL CERTIFICATES OF AIRWORTHINESS

At the fourth session of the Assembly of ICAO, the United States proposed that national certificates of airworthiness conforming to ICAO standards should be recognized by all other member nations of the Organization as being valid for purposes of export and import of aircraft. This proposal is still under consideration by ICAO, and the ACC is consequently still concerned with the problem.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Another proposal of significance was made by the United States at the fourth session of the ICAO Assembly. This involved discussion of the interpretation of article 26 of the Chicago convention with relation to aircraft-accident investigations and the obligations of the member nations thereunder. The ACC is still occupied with formulation of United States positions for international negotiations on this subject.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION

Under the terms of the Chicago convention, rights of one country's scheduled international services to fly into another country are dependent upon special arrangements between the governments concerned. In framing article 5, the Chicago Conference attempted to secure freedom of the air, subject only to limited restrictions, for the various types of aircraft engaged in other than scheduled services, including those engaged in both commercial and noncommercial operations.

A major effort has been made by ICAO during the past year to reach a basis for agreement on the meaning and application of article 5. In connection with United States participation in this work in ICAO, recommendations have been made by the Air Coordinating Committee toward defining "scheduled international air services" as well as formulating concepts thereof for use in the practical application of the definition. It is hoped that a definition can be obtained which will neither open the door to destructive competition with scheduled services on the one hand nor unduly restrict the development of valuable types of auxiliary services on the other.

INTERNATIONAL AIR MAIL

For some time ICAO has been studying various aspects of international air-mail service and has recently received a request from the Universal Postal Union (UPU) to present views on the principles for setting international air-mail-transportation charges. This matter is of great importance to international air carriers, to postal administrations, and to the users of air mail. A proposed reply to UPU was submitted to ICAO member states for consideration and comment. Major topics of discussion involved separation of mail costs from other costs, principles of categorizing air-mail services, "all up" air-mail services (sending all first-class (LC) mail by air without surcharge up to some specified distance where an improvement in delivery time would thereby be effected), and the resultant patterns of transportation charges.

The Air Coordinating Committee has reviewed the proposed ICAO communication to UPU and has recommended among other things that the average level of UPU rates should be maintained at present in view of the fact that practically without excep-

tion international airlines are operating under deficit conditions which may well be intensified by the present trend of increasing costs. Under the circumstances there is no apparent justification for lowering foreign mail transportation charges. The United States, in accordance with a decision of the Air Coordinating Committee, has also suggested to ICAO that the existing category system be retained until definite substitute arrangements can be agreed upon.

BURDENSOME TAXATION ON INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES

During 1950 a joint United Nations-ICAO Secretariat working group undertook a study for the purpose of (1) expanding the factual and legal background material on multiple, discriminatory, and unduly burdensome taxes levied on international air carriers and (2) analyzing and interpreting the material and problems presented from the point of view of international taxation theory and practice. The United States along with other ICAO member states, was requested to submit views on certain of the problems involved. These views and the results of the joint Secretariat study were the basis of final recommendations of the ICAO Air Transport Committee to the ICAO Council.

Particular attention has been given by the ICAO Council to three forms of taxation on which action by ICAO appears justified: (a) Taxation of aircraft fuel, lubricants, and similar supplies; (b) taxes on income and property of airlines; and (c) taxes related to the sale or use of international air transportation. Recommendations formulated by the ACC were designed to remove the most onerous practices found to exist in these three forms of taxation.

FACILITATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT

The ACC has continued its efforts in connection with the removal of barriers, such as certain procedures required by customs, immigration, public health, and quarantine authorities which were preventing full exploitation of international air transport.

One of the most outstanding achievements of the ACC was its work in obtaining approval and implementation by the United States Government of practically all of the provisions of annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The value of this annex in the facilitation of international air transportation is already reflected in the reduced cost of operating the United States airlines through savings in man-hours and reduction in the number of forms used in connection with international flights. As member states in the International Civil Aviation Organization implement to a greater degree the provisions of annex 9, further savings to all carriers may be expected.

To lend impetus to this effort, the United States is endeavoring, through ICAO, to influence other

states to take more expeditious action to remove obstacles which are preventing the elimination of deviations in the implementation of annex 9 in areas under their control.

CHARGES FOR THE USE OF AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES

During 1950 the Air Coordinating Committee, after consultation with airlines, airport operators, and other interested parties, recommended that the United States take an active and constructive role with other members of ICAO in attempting to reach a satisfactory solution to the many outstanding issues involved in establishing a program of international airway-user charges as a prelude to the formulation of an international policy. Many substantial problems remain to be solved before such a policy can be obtained or satisfactorily administered. The ICAO Council is continuing its consideration of the principles underlying such charges. The United States does not favor adoption by ICAO of an international policy until these many problems have been solved.

A statement of policies to cover landing and parking fees at CAA-operated airports in the Pacific area was submitted by CAA to the Air Coordinating Committee for coordination. The attention of the Committee centered primarily around the provision of a standard landing charge. It was decided that this charge should be fixed at 16 cents per thousand pounds of aircraft weight.

PROVISION AND MANNING OF AIR-NAVIGATION FACILITIES

The ICAO Assembly in 1948 requested the Council to establish a program for providing and manning indispensable air-navigation facilities arranged in the order of their priority to international air transport. The various contracting states were requested to specify their own national programs for which they would individually assume the costs. During 1950 a review of the facilities to be provided by and requirements of the United States has been made by the Air Coordinating Committee in 4 of the 10 ICAO regions. This has involved a comprehensive study of all facilities in territory controlled by the United States that were recommended for installation, improvement, or retention as well as an indication of apparent deficiencies. Studies of other areas are presently under way.

JOINT INTERNATIONAL FINANCING OF AIR-NAVIGATION FACILITIES

The Convention on International Civil Aviation provides that member nations should insofar as practicable furnish facilities and services required in their territory for safe, regular, efficient, and economic international civil aviation. The convention further provides that when the individual nations are unable to furnish such facilities and services the ICAO Council may arrange for their

joint support (joint international financing) by the nations benefiting therefrom.

Joint international operating or financing arrangements are now in effect for (1) North Atlantic Ocean stations, (2) air-navigation services in Iceland, and (3) air-navigation services in Greenland and the Faroes. Recently considered was the removal of the main meteorological station from Reykjavik to Keflavik, Iceland. Necessary weather services at Keflavik have been provided by the United States Weather Bureau using its own funds. The Air Coordinating Committee agreed that the Weather Bureau should phase out its activities at Keflavik and recommended that the United States representative to ICAO advocate that Keflavik be designated the main meteorological office, rather than Reykjavik; also that it be included in the joint-support project for Iceland.

During 1950 Switzerland agreed to join the group of user nations contributing toward the cost of operating the North Atlantic air-safety services under ICAO auspices. To the extent that these and similar projects can be made the subject of joint support the cost to the United States, as the principal user of the air routes of the world, will be reduced.

A bilateral arrangement with Canada for the establishment and maintenance of a minimum number of ocean stations in the North Pacific has been agreed upon and the United States contribution thereto is now being implemented within the limits of available funds. This network of ocean stations has been and still is under constant revision in order to meet requirements in the area.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONVENTIONS

During 1950 a substantial portion of the legal work of the Air Coordinating Committee was centered upon the Draft Convention on Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, the so-called Rome surface-damage convention. It was the major legal item on the agenda of the fourth session of the ICAO Assembly and the United States positions on the problems involved were prepared in the ACC. In preparing these and later positions, the assistance of various non-governmental experts and interested organizations was invited and received, and public meetings were held at which many helpful views were expressed. The convention was not finalized at the fourth session of the Assembly as had been hoped, but a new draft was adopted by the Legal Commission of the Assembly, and has been placed on the agenda of the seventh session of the ICAO Legal Committee convening in Mexico City on January 2, 1951. United States positions were prepared for the delegation to this session of the Legal Committee and for the delegates to two subcommittees of the ICAO Legal Committee which were created to work on the insurance and the jurisdictional problems of the convention.

United States positions were also prepared on revision of the Warsaw convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions for the fourth session of the Assembly, although work on the Rome convention placed these two conventions in the background. However, consideration of the Rome convention necessarily involved detailed analysis of the collisions convention in order to make the two consistent in their treatment of collisions situations involving damage to persons and property on the surface.

PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

In addition to the private international air-law conventions mentioned above, the ACC took action on other problems in the international law field. In response to a request from the Shipping Coordinating Committee for advice concerning changes in the United States law which would be advisable if proposed international regulations for preventing collisions at sea were adopted, a draft bill was forwarded to the Shipping Coordinating Committee covering the aviation aspects of the problem. Termination of the 1935 Air Navigation Agreement between the United States and Great Britain was approved after determination that all provisions of this agreement of any value to the United States were covered by the Chicago convention. Proposed ICAO procedures for reporting of breaches of, or noncompliance with national laws and regulations were formulated for submission to the ICAO Council by the United States representative and are being coordinated for ACC approval. The United States position on a United Kingdom proposal for amendment of article 94 of the Chicago convention was established, and alternative courses of action open to the Assembly in dealing with proposed amendments to the Chicago convention under the existing article 94 were presented. The legal implications of a 200-mile offshore zone of interception were investigated.

B. Other International Air Policy

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS

The Air Coordinating Committee has continued to advise the Export-Import Bank regarding proposals for financing by the bank of foreign air services and the export of aeronautical equipment. This is in accordance with established policy where pertinent aviation problems have been involved.

CIVIL AVIATION POLICY IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

The Air Coordinating Committee early in 1947 undertook the development of a civil-aviation policy for Germany, giving consideration to the part civil aviation could have in the economic recovery of that country but keeping within the

dictates of security interest. In 1948 and 1949 agreement was reached with the British and French, substantially in accord with earlier policies developed by ACC, making the policy with respect to civil aviation in Western Germany uniform. In 1950 the ACC reviewed a proposed law drafted by the Tripartite Civil Aviation Panel regarding participation of Germans in aviation activities. It was determined that the panel's proposal conformed with the United States policy with respect to aviation in Germany.

In 1950 a United States policy with regard to civil aviation in Austria was formulated.

1950 ICAO Conference

[APPENDIX C]

- Jan. 5 to Jan. 21— Fifth Session, Legal Committee—Taormina, Rome.
- Feb. 14 to Mar. 25— Third Session of the Meteorological Division—Paris.
[BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 236]
- Mar. 21 to Apr. 7— Africa-Indian Ocean/Middle East Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting—Paris.
- Mar. 21 to Apr. 11— Africa-Indian Ocean and Middle East Special Meeting on Fixed Services—Paris.
- Apr. 11 to Apr. 27— Caribbean/South American/South Atlantic Regional Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting—Havana.
- Apr. 11 to May 2— Second Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting—Havana.
- Apr. 18 to May 10— South East Asia Regional Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting—New Delhi.
- Apr. 24 to Apr. 28— Informal Altimeter Setting Meeting, European-Mediterranean Region—Paris.
- May 30 to June 17— Sixth Session, Legal Committee—Montreal.
- May 30 to June 20— Fourth Session of the Assembly—Montreal.
- June 6 to June 26— European-Mediterranean Regional Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting—Paris.
- Sept. 14 to Oct. 2— Airworthiness/Operations Meeting on Performance—Paris.
- Oct. 17 to Nov. 7— Second Middle East Regional Air Navigation Meeting—Istanbul.
- Nov. 8 to Dec. 1— Special MET Meeting for AFI, EUMED, and NAT Regions—Paris.
- Nov. 14 to Dec. 13— Fourth Session, Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control (RAC Division)—Montreal.
- Dec. 4 to Dec. 8— Meeting of the Subcommittee on Insurance and Other Security—Paris.

U.S. and France Agree on New Air Routes

[Released to the press March 21]

The Franco-American aeronautical negotiations which have been taking place in Paris since the fifth of February have been concluded today.

The two delegations, after a careful examination of the results experienced by the carriers of the two countries in accordance with the Franco-American agreement of March 27, 1946, have expressed the satisfaction of their respective Governments with the conduct of past operations.

Looking to the future, the representatives of the two Governments expressed their conviction that the principles of the agreement will insure the continued orderly development of international air transport. They agreed that such principles, combined with the mutual confidence of the two Governments, will effectively promote the best interests of the carriers of both countries in the spirit of the agreement.

Since this objective can be obtained only through more frequent contacts, the American delegation and the French delegation have recognized the desirability of more frequent consultations between the aeronautical authorities of the two countries.

The routes, the commercial operations of which have been previously granted by one or the other of the two parties to the companies of the other party, have been subjected in the light of experience to a new examination.

The Government of the United States has authorized the inclusion of Houston as an intermediate point on the route between France and Mexico, via New York, as well as the establishment of a new route between Martinique and Guadeloupe and New York, a route which will permit French air services to connect metropolitan France with the French Department in the Caribbean through New York.

On its part, the French Government has authorized the substitution of Rome for Milan on one of the authorized United States routes which will permit the operation of services from the United States across the North Atlantic and Spain, via Marseilles or Nice, and beyond, via Rome to Southern Europe, the Near and Far East.

Alonzo G. Morón Named U.S. Caribbean Commissioner

On March 19, President Truman appointed Alonzo G. Morón as a United States Commissioner on the Caribbean Commission for a period of 2 years. The Caribbean Commission is an advisory and consultative body on social and economic matters to the Governments of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and their 15 non-self-governing territories in the Caribbean.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During March 1951

United Nations:		
Trusteeship Council: Eighth Session	Lake Success	Jan. 29-Mar. 16
Economic and Social Council:		
Twelfth Session	Santiago	Feb. 20-Mar. 21
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Seventh Session.	Lahore	Feb. 28-Mar. 7
Economic Commission for Europe: Transport Committee, Working Party on Statistical Information.	Geneva	Mar. 5-9
ICAO Council: Twelfth Session	Montreal	Jan. 30-Mar. 22
Motion Picture Festival	Punta del Este, Uruguay . .	Feb. 15-Mar. 15,
*NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Working Group of North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: Second Meeting.	Washington	Mar. 12-16
ILO Governing Body: 114th Session	Geneva	Feb. 26-Mar. 10
Agricultural Machinery Show	Paris	Feb. 27-Mar. 4
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): Meetings of International Telegraph Consultative Committee Study Groups.	Geneva	Mar. 6-22.
*Third Inter-American Conference on Social Security	Buenos Aires	Mar. 12-31
IMO (International Meteorological Organization): Extraordinary Conference of Directors.	Paris	Mar. 15-17
Interparliamentary Union, Meeting of Council	Monaco.	Mar. 7-30

In Session as of March 31, 1951

United Nations:		
General Assembly: Fifth Session	Lake Success	Sept. 19-
Collective Measures Committee	New York	Mar. 5-
Peace Observation Commission	New York	Mar. 16-
Economic and Social Council: Social Commission	Geneva	Mar. 19-
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
Third Set of Tariff Negotiations of the Contracting Parties	Torquay	Sept. 28-
Special Session of Contracting Parties	Torquay	Mar. 29-
International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26-
Council of Foreign Ministers, Meeting of Deputies	Paris	Mar. 5-
Four Power Conference on Swiss Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5-
First Congress of the World Meteorological Organization	Paris	Mar. 19-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Airworthiness Division: Fourth Session	Montreal	Mar. 20-
Operations Division: Fourth Session	Montreal	Mar. 27-
Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States.	Washington	Mar. 26-
Lyon International Trade Fair, 33rd	Lyon	Mar. 31-

Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1951

Cannes Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 2-
First Meeting of the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.	Washington	Apr. 2-
South Pacific Quarantine Conference	Suva, Fiji Islands	Apr. 2-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

*Tentative

Calendar of Meetings—Continued
Scheduled April 1–June 30, 1951—Continued

United Nations:

Economic and Social Council:		
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Slavery: Second Session	New York	Apr. 2–
Economic Commission for Europe:		
Timber Committee	Geneva	Apr. 9–
Sixth Session	Geneva	May 29–
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Sixth Session	Lake Success	Apr. 10–
Human Rights Commission: Seventh Session	Geneva	Apr. 16–
Population Commission: Sixth Session	Lake Success	Apr. 23–
Commission on the Status of Women: Fifth Session	Lake Success	Apr. 30–
Fiscal Commission: Third Session	Geneva	May 7–
Statistical Commission: Sixth Session	Lake Success	May 7–
Economic, Employment and Development Commission	Lake Success	May 14–
Economic Commission for Latin America: Fourth Session	Mexico City	May 28–
Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Conference of Plenipotentiaries.	Geneva	May 28*–
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Fourth Session.	Geneva	June 18*–
Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations		
Agenda Committee	Lake Success	June 19–
International Law Commission: Third Session	Geneva	June 26–
Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: Fifth Joint Session.	Geneva	May 15–
Trusteeship Council: Ninth Session	Geneva	June 5*–
Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany (Continuation of Fourth Phase).	Lake Success	June 11–
	London	Apr. 3–
IRO (International Refugee Organization):		
Executive Committee: Ninth Session	Lake Success	Apr. 4–
General Council: Seventh Session	Geneva	Apr. 9–
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, Third Meeting.		
	London	Apr. 23
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Meeting of Experts on Payments by Results	Geneva	Apr. 10–
Coal Mines: Fourth Session	Geneva	May 7–
Joint Maritime Commission	Geneva	May 21–
Governing Body: 115th Session	Geneva	May 28–
Nutrition, Fao/Who Joint Expert Committee on: Second Session	Rome	Apr. 10–
XXIX International Milan Fair	Milan	Apr. 12–
Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Working Party on Fertilizers: First Meeting	Bogor, Indonesia	Apr. 14–
Council: Twelfth Session	Rome	June 11–
Rubber Study Group: Eighth Session	Rome	Apr. 16–
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: Sixth Session	Geneva	Apr. 16–
International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Sixth Plenary Meeting.	Geneva	June 5–
Pan American Sanitary Organization, Thirteenth Meeting of Executive Committee.	Washington	Apr. 23–
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Air Navigation Commission Communications Division: Fourth Session.	Montreal	Apr. 24–
Fifth Assembly	Montreal	June 5–
UNESCO:		
International Committee of Bibliographic Experts	London	Apr. 24–
General Conference: Sixth Session	Paris	June 18–
South Pacific Commission: Seventh Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Apr. 28–
Textile Exposition, International	Lille	Apr. 28–
Second Inter-American Indigenist Exposition	Rio de Janeiro	April
Festival of Britain, 1951.	England	May 3–
Arts and Modern Architecture, Ninth International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial.	Milan	May 5–
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Fourth World Health Assembly	Geneva	May 7–
Executive Board: Eighth Session	Geneva	June 4–
First Pan American Congress on Medical Education	Lima	May 14–
Third Regional Seminar on Social Affairs	Porto Alegre, Brazil	May 14–
First Pan American Congress on Veterinary Medicine	Lima	May 20–
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Meeting of the Executive and Liaison Committee	St. Gallen, Switzerland	May 21–
Technical Transit Committee: Second Meeting	Pontresina, Switzerland	June 6–
Caribbean Commission: Twelfth Meeting	Barbados	May
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels	June 5–
Military Medicine and Pharmacy, Thirteenth International Congress	Paris	June 17–
Fifth Session of the International Wheat Council	London	June

*Tentative

1950 World Economic Situation

*Statement by Isador Lubin
U. S. Representative to ECOSOC*¹

I. Introduction

Since the Economic and Social Council made its review a year ago, major changes have taken place in the world economic situation.² Today, one basic fact dominates the world economic situation. That fact is the world political situation.

During World War II and the 5½ years that have elapsed since that war ended, people everywhere have hoped and prayed that all Governments would cooperate, through the United Nations, in maintaining the peace of the world and in promoting economic and social progress. Thus far, these hopes and prayers have been in vain.

Why does the fear of war dominate the minds of people today? The answer lies in the fact that people everywhere see aggression and threats of aggression—in Korea, in Tibet, in Malaya, in Yugoslavia. Only yesterday it was Berlin, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. In the face of these threats, what alternatives are there to the free peoples of the world? Are they to sit back supinely and accept aggression and the sacrifice of their freedom as inevitable? Or are they to assert their determination to remain free and be masters of their own destiny?

They have chosen to be free. They have determined to undertake once again the painful task of building up their military strength so that they can deter and, if necessary, resist and thwart further subversion and aggression.

This is an unwelcome task. But it is a necessary one.

The United Nations, in the face of Soviet objections and despite the intervention of the Chinese Communist military forces, has acted to repel Communist aggression in Korea. Free countries, acting under the United Nations Charter, are today cooperating in establishing mutual defense

arrangements through the Inter-American defense pact of 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, and in many other ways. These free countries are determined to preserve their national freedom. They know that their liberties and the liberties of their children are at stake. They know that if they are threatened by force they must be prepared to meet that threat.

The free nations of the world know that their combined resources are greater than the sum of their individual resources. They know that, acting together, they have the moral, the economic, and the military resources to meet any threat of aggression. They know that a threat to one free country is a threat to all free countries. To paraphrase the great philosopher of the North American Revolution, Benjamin Franklin, they know that to act separately is to hang separately.

If those who seek by aggression to control and dominate the lives of free mankind are confronted with the combined and effective military and economic power of those whom they seek to dominate, there is hope that they will choose the course of wisdom and cease their aggression and subversion. The way would then be open for all nations to join together in programs of disarmament and peaceful economic cooperation within the spirit and framework of the United Nations. In these happy circumstances, the costs of defense mobilization that will have been borne by the peoples of the free world will indeed turn out to be small when compared with the infinite gains that will result from a world freed from the threat of slavery and war. But if, on the other hand, those who seek by aggression and subversion to control and dominate the lives of free mankind should choose to continue their course of imperialistic conquest and aggression, they should know from experience that the free world will resist.

There is only one way by which the free nations can avoid the cost of war. That is by assuming the burden of rearmament. If there are any who

¹ Made before the Council at Santiago on Mar. 1 and released to the press by the U.S. mission to the U.N. in New York on Mar. 6.

² For the 1949 review by Assistant Secretary Thorp, see BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1950, p. 407.

hope that they can avoid this burden and at the same time be assured against aggression, one can only conclude that they are, alas, being guided by wishful thinking.

II. Economic Situation in United States

Since the middle of 1950, under the impact of Communist aggression in Korea and the threats of aggression elsewhere, there have been important changes both in the economic situation in the United States and in the economic program of the United States Government. These changes grow out of our policy of rebuilding our defenses.

Let me make it clear that our program has only one purpose. That purpose is to prevent war. Our program is based on the premise that a rapid building of defenses by the free nations can act as an effective deterrent to aggressors; can serve as a basis for negotiation with those who respect only force; and, if necessary, can serve as a protective shield against their possible further aggressions.

We do not assume that war is inevitable, nor do we seek to develop a war economy.

This fact governs our economic policies, both in the domestic and in the international fields. We are striving rather to create defensive strength for an uncertain but possibly long period ahead. We conceive of defensive strength in the very broadest sense. We conceive of it not only in terms of mobilized armed forces but also in terms of reserves of manpower and capacity to produce. We conceive of defensive strength in terms of an alert, productive citizenry, and an expanded economic plant in all the free nations.

The long-range defense program, upon which the United States and other free nations have now embarked, necessarily changes the priority of many desirable programs and the pace at which they can be pursued. But because our program is a defense program and not a war mobilization program, it not only permits but calls for our continuing concern for long-range economic and social progress both at home and abroad.

We are confident that we can continue to carry out such a long-range program of economic progress. This confidence is based upon the recent record of our economic growth. Without going into too much detail, I should like, Mr. President, to sketch the magnitudes of growth recorded during the decade of the forties.

GROWTH DURING THE 1940's

During the decade from 1940 to 1950, a decade of both war and peace, the total output of the United States economy rose by more than 50 percent. Gross national production, measured in 1950 prices, rose from 184 billion dollars in 1940, to 280 billion in 1950. Civilian employment increased by over 12 million—from less than 48 million to 60 million—and our civilian workers had

far better tools and equipment to work with. Oil-refining capacity increased by 40 percent. Electrical power capacity increased by 65 percent. Steel capacity rose by 20 percent—to over 100 million tons. In 1950, United States farmers had two and a half times as many tractors and more than twice as many trucks as they had in 1940, and the proportion of farms that had electricity rose from 34 percent of the total to 86 percent.

The gains registered during the second half of the 1940's, that is, in the 5 years from the Japanese surrender to the Communist aggression in Korea, were especially impressive particularly in view of the many forecasts of depression which all of you heard so much about.

After the Japanese surrender, the United States demobilized with dramatic speed. In the space of 1 year, from 1945 to 1946, we cut our armed forces from a peak of over 12 million to 2½ million—a cut of 9½ million. By 1947 our armed forces were down to 1.3 million. These millions of people were absorbed into peacetime jobs by a rapid expansion of civilian economic activity.

Hand in hand with the absorption of these workers went tremendous investments in plant and equipment by private business. Between 1945 and 1950, total manufacturing capacity increased by more than 25 percent. In some basic industries, expansion far exceeded this rate.

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN EARLY 1950

The moderate recession in 1949, which some people feared—and, indeed, some even hoped—would become a major depression, was short-lived. The economy exhibited considerable resiliency and recovery was well under way when 1950 began.

This recovery was partly a result of Government policies. As the Secretariat's report points out in discussing the economic situation in the United States during the second half of 1949,

While the decline in business investment in plant and equipment also continued, there was a sharp upturn in residential construction, owing in part to the reduction in costs of new housing, but mainly to the easing of terms of down payments, the reduction in interest rates, and other credit policies which were furthered by the liberalization of the National Housing Act. (p. 15 of the Secretariat's report.)

The Secretariat's report goes on to say that:

In the first half of 1950, economic activity rose considerably over the level of the preceding half year and, in fact, reached a new postwar peak.

The fact is that, in the second quarter of 1950, gross national production exceeded the level in the peak quarter of 1948 by about 4 percent, after adjustment for price changes.

Before midyear, industrial production had also surpassed the previous postwar record, established in the highest months of 1948. The index, which had reached 195 percent of the 1935-39 average in October and November of 1948, rose to 199 by June 1950.

Civilian employment had also recovered from the reduced levels of 1949. By June 1950, it was more than 1¾ million above June of 1949. It was also above June of 1948.

In short by June 1950, recovery was well on the way toward completion.

It is worth emphasizing that this recovery was not built upon an expansion of exports. Indeed, as made evident by the Secretariat's report, this recovery took place in the face of a drop in exports of goods and services. In the space of 1 year, our exports fell by an annual rate of 5 billion dollars—a cut of nearly 30 percent.

Nor was it caused by an accelerated defense program. Before the aggression on South Korea by the North Korean forces, the economy had reached the highest levels in its peacetime history. Far from providing a support for our national economy, the new defense burdens subjected it to unwanted strains.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY SINCE MID-1950

The North Korean aggression, then, found the United States in excellent economic health. The next 6 months was a period of rapid economic adjustment to a grave international situation. The people of the United States were jolted into full comprehension of the dangers confronting both themselves and all other democratic peoples. In recognition of their responsibilities, they moved rapidly to play their part in the security program which the new circumstances demanded of the free world.

The new international developments were quickly reflected in our economic activity. Although the money actually spent by the Federal Government on national security programs, both domestic and international, increased by an annual rate of only about 2 billion dollars from the whole fiscal year 1949–1950, to December 1950, the response of business and consumers was much greater than the increase in defense spending alone would account for. The reason for this response was that both sellers and buyers were anticipating scarcities and higher prices.

There was a 6 percent rise in the physical quantity of total national output between the second and fourth quarter of 1950. Between June 1950 and January 1951, industrial production rose by about 10 percent. Between the second and fourth quarters of 1950 private domestic investment in construction, equipment, and additions to inventory rose rapidly, reaching an all-time record of 60 billion dollars at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. This level of new private investment was equal to one-fifth of our total national production.

During this period, personal incomes also rose. Despite rises in retail prices and Federal taxes, there was a modest gain in consumer's real purchasing power. Wages and salaries and other labor income rose throughout 1950. In many cases, the gains achieved by organized labor

through collective bargaining considerably exceeded the increase in the cost of living. From June to December, average weekly earnings for manufacturing industries as a whole, after adjustment for the rise in the cost of living, rose by 4 percent.

The spread of pension and other welfare plans through free collective bargaining, which had been particularly noteworthy in the first half of 1950, also continued during the second half.

The improvement in welfare was further greatly reinforced by legislation liberalizing the Social Security Act, enacted by an overwhelming vote of the United States Congress. Under this new legislation, benefit payments have been raised on the average by about 78 percent. The average husband-and-wife benefit for aged couples was raised from \$41 to about \$75 a month. The increases enacted by Congress range from a 50 percent rise for the groups that were getting the highest benefits to a 100 percent rise for those who were receiving minimum benefits. In addition, 10 million more people were brought into the Old Age and Survivors Insurance system, raising the number covered from about 35 million workers to about 45 million, that is, nearly three-quarters of the civilian labor force. Let me point out that there are also 7½ million people, including railroad workers, employees of Federal, State, and local governments, and others, under other public retirement systems.

The new amendments to the Social Security Act also increase the amount of Federal funds available for state and local maternal and child health services, for services to crippled children, for child welfare services, and for care of the disabled and blind.

Let no one be deceived by the distorted charge that our rearmament program is undermining our Government social welfare services.

III. The Task of Defense

SIZE OF IMMEDIATE DEFENSE EXPANSION

I have already pointed out that, at the end of 1950, expenditures by the United States Government for defense and directly related purposes, both at home and abroad, were running at the rate of about 20 billion dollars annually. This rate represented about 7 percent of the total national output. By the end of the calendar year 1951, it is expected that such expenditures may be absorbing goods and services at a rate in excess of 45 billion dollars a year, an amount equal to about 15 percent of our total national output; although, the authority of the President to obligate funds for defense purposes will be much larger. According to the President's Budget Message, we expect to achieve a virtual doubling of our pre-Korea army, an increase of more than one-half in our active naval fleet, and an expansion in the air force from 48 to 84 wings.

Despite the size of our present defense program, may I point out that we are in a position to expand it much more if total war should make that necessary. The proportion of total output which we expect our defense program to absorb is considerably smaller than the proportion absorbed by our military effort during World War II. Within a year after Pearl Harbor, we were devoting about 38 percent of our national output to the war and, at the peak, 45 percent. This is in marked contrast to the 15 percent which we expect defense to absorb by the end of this year.

Even though the current defense program in the United States is far from what total mobilization would require, it will nevertheless have a great impact on our economy. During the next 2 or 3 years, production for defense will have to be increased faster than we can expect to increase total production. As a result, substantial cuts will have to be made in certain goods and services available for nondefense uses. In short, our defense program will involve very substantial shifts in the use of many resources. It will involve strong inflationary pressures. It will involve—as the people of the United States clearly recognize—sizable sacrifices throughout the economy.

IMPLICATION OF LONG-RANGE SECURITY PROGRAM

In addition to the immediate implications of our defense program, there are certain longer-range implications that must be considered.

First, the free world must increase its power to deter or, if need be, to resist aggression until there is reasonable assurance of lasting security. If the threat of aggression subsides, a larger proportion of the free world's growing resources can then be devoted to economic progress and development.

Second, security over the years ahead implies not merely the maintenance of a given stock of weapons and of personnel capable of using them. It requires also a constant improvement in these weapons and a manpower reserve trained to use them. This in turn implies an economy with the utmost stamina, constantly renewing and expanding its productive plant and resources.

Thus, the defense program requires not only growing and effective military forces in the free nations, for as long a period as they may be needed; it also requires the development of an industrial capacity which will permit the rapid enlargement of such forces, in the event that the would-be aggressors are not deterred and the world is again plunged into total war. Accordingly, we are placing great emphasis on investment in an enlarged productive capacity—large enough for any eventuality.

As a result, cuts will be required in nonessential civilian production during the period immediately ahead. These cuts will be greater than would be necessary simply to build up the immediately planned defenses.

Third, the basic purpose of any security program among free nations must be to protect their free institutions, to preserve their opportunity to develop these institutions, and, through them, to advance their social and economic well-being. At the same time, the constant improvement of these free institutions, and continued social and economic progress, are essential to long-run security. Thus, the development and strengthening of political liberty and the widespread extension of education and improvements in health, have great security significance for all of us. And for exactly the same reasons, programs to aid the improvement of productive facilities and techniques—in both developed and underdeveloped countries—are fundamental elements of common strength, even where the fruits of such programs may not be expected to materialize immediately. Security is neither solely military nor solely short-range.

Of course, this is not to say that all economic and social needs are equally important, nor does it imply that everything can be done at once nor that all peacetime social programs can go forward unimpeded. It is to say, however, that in assigning priorities among various needs, simple classifications into military and nonmilitary, or into short-range and long-range programs will not suffice. Military and nonmilitary programs are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and programs serving social needs do not necessarily have to be shelved. To attain our objectives, the assignment of priorities must be much more selective than any oversimplified distinction between defense and welfare.

[Mr. Lubin continued with a discussion of the domestic economic program of the United States.]

V. International Aspects of U.S. Economic Policies

I turn now to the international aspects of our economic policies. In framing the economic program to build up our national strength, we are keenly aware that our own strength is bound up with the strength of the other free nations. This is true both for the immediate future and for the long run. Our economic program is being formulated in the light of the combined military programs of all the free nations and of their combined needs, productive resources, and potentialities.

With our economic resources strained by the burden of defense, every use of these resources implies the sacrifice of some alternative use. We must be certain that our foreign aid program, like our democratic program, serves high-priority purposes. Accordingly, these programs must be kept under continuing review and adapted to changing conditions. We are fully aware that the joint strength of the free nations requires not only military strength but also moral strength, economic strength and above all, unity of ultimate purpose.

All of these factors must be taken into account in determining the priorities among various programs.

The immediate need for stronger defenses, and the greatly increased strain on the resources of the free world, make it necessary to reappraise and, in some cases, to alter some of our assistance programs. In some respects, we shall not be able to go as fast as we should like in aiding others, just as we cannot make progress as rapidly as we should like in certain domestic fields. I should be misleading you, if I failed to make this clear. It is the consequence of the fact and the threat of Communist aggression.

Recent events have conclusively shown that this threat is a threat to all free nations. This is a hard fact. It must be recognized. Without military strength to resist this threat, there can be neither progress nor common security and freedom. Wishful thinking that halfway defense measures are enough, will only make more difficult the task of establishing real security. Honest differences of views in the free world on this subject must not blind us to these basic truths.

EXPANDING PRODUCTION

The first problem facing us is to expand the production of commodities which will be scarce in relation to vital demands. This means concentrating on expansion programs which yield quick results in the form of many military items and raw materials. In some cases, it means projects which will yield their results only after a few years. In still other cases, the expansion of production, even of goods unrelated to military strength can, by improving economic and social conditions, contribute to the common security.

All free countries can make a substantial contribution to the common strength. The development of their productive capacity is a vital factor, both directly as a source of goods required for the defense effort and indirectly as a means of improving their economic strength and increasing their stake in maintaining the free way of life.

In recognition of this fact, the United States Government is prepared to provide technical and financial assistance to help expand production in other countries.

UTILIZING RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY

The second problem facing us is to utilize existing resources efficiently. Even with vigorous efforts to expand foreign and domestic production, there are certain to be some cases of severe shortages, sharp price rises, and maldistribution of supplies. For some commodities, these conditions are already with us. To improve the distribution of important products in short supply, so that nonessential uses in some countries do not interfere with essential uses in others, international collaboration is needed.

For this purpose, we have joined in creating an International Materials Conference. It includes representatives of both producing and consuming countries most concerned with the particular commodities in question. The first of these committees, concerned with copper, lead, and zinc, is meeting in Washington. It includes Australia, Belgium (acting for herself, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), Canada, Chile, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A Sulphur Committee is also meeting to be followed by meetings of committees on cotton and cotton linters; tungsten and molybdenum; manganese, nickel, and cobalt; and wool.

Altogether, at least 23 countries will take part in putting the production and distribution of one or another of these important materials on an international cooperative basis. The creation of additional committees for other scarce materials is under consideration.

We, in the United States, recognize that the commodity requirements of other countries will have to be taken into account in the operation of our domestic controls. This is most clearly the case in connection with our export controls. Export controls are being used by the United States to protect the national security and to limit the inflationary impact on the domestic economy of exports of commodities in short supply. During World War II, it was the policy of the United States to help friendly countries maintain their economic stability by recognizing and providing for their essential needs, on the basis of equal and proportionate consideration with our own needs. In the present emergency, the needs of friendly and cooperating countries will again be given full consideration. Insofar as such nations are dependent on the United States for their supplies, every attempt will be made to assure that export licenses are available, to the extent permitted by the common defense and other security requirements.

At the same time, we shall continue our present policy of restricting exports in cases where the importing country is shipping identical or equivalent goods to aggressors and potential aggressors.

Priorities and allocations within our domestic economy also will be coordinated with the commodity requirements of friendly countries. We shall limit nonessential domestic use of some commodities in the United States not only to meet high-priority requirements at home but also to give positive assistance in meeting the high-priority needs of other countries. We shall use domestic priority or allocation controls, where necessary, to avoid taking more than our fair share of world imports, and to make goods available for necessary exports. To the extent permitted by security and supply considerations, we shall make available those commodities required by other friendly nations to help increase their productivity and help maintain their stability.

The international aspects of our economic policy are also affected by the trend in the prices of the goods we import. The rise in these prices has been much greater than the rise in the prices of our exports. From the Korean outbreak to early February 1951, tin had risen 139 percent, rubber 162 percent, and wool tops 107 percent. Coffee had already approximately doubled in price during the year preceding the Korean outbreak. In terms of average unit values, which lag far behind current market prices, the average price of United States imports rose 23 percent between the first half of 1950 and last December. Unit values of exports had risen much less. The increase between the first half of 1950 and December for all exports was only 11 percent, and, for finished manufactured goods alone, it was only 9 percent.

The United States is prepared, through the international commodity control arrangements I mentioned earlier, to participate in negotiations with the producing and consuming countries, in order to limit the price increases for important scarce commodities during the present emergency.

It is obvious that, if inflationary rises of goods moving into international trade are to be restrained, action to restrain them must also be taken by individual national governments. The United States has recently undertaken to fulfill its obligations in this respect by establishing control over the prices of most goods and services, in the form of a freeze, based upon prices prevailing in the period December 19, 1950, to January 26, 1951. This freeze applies not only to domestic goods sold at home but also to goods that are exported and, to the domestic resale of goods that are imported.

I should like to emphasize the levels at which export and import prices have been frozen in the United States.

I have several times called attention to various respects in which the present defense program differs from a war program and have pointed out how misleading it would be to assume that the economic effects of the defense program will necessarily repeat those of World War II. The fact is, that when prices were frozen in the United States in 1942, the prices of raw materials important in world trade were at a relatively low level. When they were frozen 6 weeks ago, the level of most of these prices was at, or close to, their historical peaks.

Moreover, the ratio between our average unit values of import and export prices, at the time of the recent price freeze in the United States, also appears to have been very favorable to foreign suppliers, judged by any past standard. For our foreign trade as a whole, the December 1950 ratio of import-to-export unit values was 46 percent more favorable to suppliers of our imports than in 1943, the war year most favorable for them. It

was 11 percent more favorable than in the first half of 1950.

When the average unit values of our imports of crude materials and crude foodstuffs on the one hand are compared with the unit values of our exports of finished manufactures on the other hand, we find that their ratio in December 1950 was nearly twice as favorable to foreign suppliers in such trade as in 1943, and 19 percent more favorable than it was in the first half of 1950.

The present price ceilings in the United States will undergo changes, mostly in the form of refinements designed to meet the special problems of particular commodities. I can assure you that, whatever changes are made, we intend to control prices of exports as long as prices for domestic sales are controlled.

It is to be hoped that other Governments will do the same. A factual study of export-price control in the United States during World War II shows that much of the increase that consumers in other countries had to pay for goods imported from the United States resulted from increased margins charged on these goods after then had left our shores.

The problem of the immediate future will not be merely one of prices. Equally important will be the availability of certain types of goods. Concern has already been expressed by representatives of underdeveloped countries concerning the ability of such countries to get capital goods. On this score, there are great differences between the outlook for the next few years and the situation in World War II. I have already indicated the attitude of the United States Government regarding exports of goods in short supply. But I should also like to question the assumption that shortages will be as acute as they were during the war period. Here, too, I am afraid we are likely to be misled if we simply assume that the conditions of World War II will be duplicated in the next few years. There are many important differences. To me, they suggest that the situation may be far less difficult.

First, may I repeat that the proportion of United States resources which will be devoted to defense is expected to be far smaller, under present plans, than the proportion than devoted to war. Moreover, the absolute level of the gross national product that we expect to attain in the next few years will exceed the absolute levels prevailing during World War II.

Second, most of the countries of Western Europe are also in a better position to export capital goods than during World War II. Their resources were then fully devoted to war. Industrial plants were very severely damaged. Some countries were occupied by the enemy. Furthermore, during World War II, the industrial output of Germany and Japan was unavailable to the underdeveloped countries.

A third difference is in the shipping situation.

No difficulties comparable to those of World War II are expected. Ships themselves are not so scarce. Sea lanes are open. And, if we succeed in our efforts to deter aggression, they will remain open.

Fourth, some of the underdeveloped countries themselves have a greater industrial capacity than they had 10 years ago. This reduced their dependence on imports of some commodities.

Taking these considerations into account, it seems doubtful that there will be as serious a decline of essential imports into the underdeveloped countries as might at first appear. So far as one can judge at the present time, the general availability of goods is likely to be much greater than it was in World War II.

I do not want to leave the impression that these factors will make sacrifice unnecessary. They will not. There will inevitably be shortages. The common defense requires both common sacrifice and common effort—getting along with less and contributing more.

The costs of defense will be very great not only in terms of time and money but even more in the disruption of peaceful pursuits, and the slowing down of social progress. This disruption and slowing-down results solely from the Communist threat to peace. And let us, at this moment, remember the sacrifices that the thousands of men, under the United Nations banner, are making in Korea.

Security has the prime claim on our economic resources, and it will require more of these resources.

We look forward to the time when it will be possible to devote a greater portion of our common efforts to speeding up the process of economic development and raising standards of living. The sooner certain countries free the world from the fear of aggression, the sooner can we all take from our shoulders the heavy burdens of armament. Then, we of the United States of America, feel that we and many other members of the United Nations will be in a position to join in a greatly expanded program of development.

We think our economic and political system is well-suited to this purpose. Our system is called "capitalistic." It is. But, paraphrasing the words of a great American philosopher, our brand of capitalism is the servant of our democracy. To us, it means an abundance and wide distribution of material goods. More important, it means individual opportunity and individual choice, for men at the bottom, as well as the top, of the economic and social scale.

Our beliefs set us against authoritarianism. They are suited for men who have in some degree acquired tolerance, good will, and a sense of personal responsibility to society. We may not always live up to these beliefs. In fact, we know we do so imperfectly. But we aspire to our beliefs, we criticize ourselves by them; we try to live up to them. And we will make whatever sacrifices are necessary—pay whatever price we must—to preserve our freedom to do so.

Investigation of Forced Labor Conditions in U.S.S.R. and Satellites Urged

*Statement by Walter Kotschnig
Deputy U. S. Representative to ECOSOC¹*

On August 15, 1950, I had the honor to address this Council on the subject of forced labor in certain parts of the world and to introduce, together with the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, a resolution on that subject. This resolution provides for the establishment, jointly with the International Labor Organization, of an *ad hoc* Committee on Forced Labor to undertake an impartial inquiry into the existence and extent of forced labor in the contemporary world. The resolution is now before the Council for action. In order not to abuse the time of the

Council by repeating earlier statements, I have taken the liberty of distributing to the members of the Council the text of my earlier remarks on this subject.

I would greatly prefer to rest our case at this point and to let the Council reach its own decision without any further debate. However, there are certain elements in the situation which make it necessary to enter once again upon the substance of the matter before us.

First, the Council has had no indication whatsoever that the U.S.S.R. and the states within its orbit are willing to permit an impartial inquiry. This forces us to establish a *prima facie* case in this Council in the hope that the Soviet Union and its satellite states may yet be willing to de-

¹ Made before the Economic and Social Council at Santiago, Chile, on Mar. 15 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

fend themselves before the conscience of the world by more than denials or irrelevant and spurious counter accusations. In other words, we still hope that the Soviet Union and its followers will, in their own interest, not refuse to participate in an impartial inquiry.

Second, there is every evidence that the evil of forced labor, far from receding, is actually spreading to every new country in the Soviet orbit. Forced labor appears to follow wherever the Red flag is hoisted.

Third, no time is to be lost if this Council is to do its share in saving from their own folly additional potential victims of Communist propaganda. Speaking from personal experience, I remember all too many men and women in various parts of the world, but particularly in Europe, who espoused the Fascist or Communist creed and who paid with their happiness, or even their lives, for the assistance which they lent to Fascist and Communist propagandists and leaders. Some of them may have had justifiable grievances which made them vulnerable to Fascist or Communist blandishments. Others may have been prompted by idealistic and humanitarian motives only to discover that Fascist or Communist reality is worlds apart from Fascist or Communist propaganda. We have to do everything possible to show those who at this time may be flirting with totalitarian disaster the ugly realities of Fascist or Communist rule—and there are few realities as ugly as the concentration camps which are the tools both of Fascist and Communist dictatorship.

Fourth, by turning the searchlight of public discussion on prevailing conditions in the Soviet bloc we might, I say, we might help to alleviate the sorry plight of the victims of forced labor in those countries.

Fifth, it is essential for all of us to recognize that we are dealing here with basic issues on which no compromise is possible. Here is an evil which cannot be overcome or bypassed by formulas or pious resolutions. We have to face it squarely and frankly, or we shall rightly be accused by succeeding generations of having failed in upholding the great and sacred values on which our civilization is built.

These are considerations which compel me to speak when I would much rather remain silent. It is out of deep compassion for all the peoples of the world who have gone through so much suffering during the last 40 years that I am lifting my voice, that my Government is lifting its voice to challenge the present rulers of the U.S.S.R. for having instituted on their territories, and those of the countries under their control, an inhuman system of forced or corrective labor which is employed as a means of political coercion or of punishment for holding or expressing dissident political views and which is on such a scale as to constitute an important, nay, an essential element in their economy. These are grave charges to be leveled against any member of the United Nations,

and we are fully conscious of our responsibility in making them.

Examples of Forced Labor in U. S. S. R.

Let me first explain what we mean by forced labor in the U.S.S.R. In a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union, a considerable amount of coercion exists in the relationship between the state as the almighty employer and the individual worker. I will give but a few examples of such coercion for the purpose of demarcating the field of this investigation.

First, compulsory inductions are made for the vocational training system. The decree of October 2, 1940, establishing labor reserve schools specifically authorizes the use of the draft if the number of volunteers falls below the desired quota. To what extent compulsion is used to provide students for the factory-training schools is shown by the following quotation from the *Moscow Bolshevik* (February 14, 1947):

There is an increasing desire among Soviet youth to enter these schools, as is proved by the fact that during the last call-up more than one-third of the trainees were volunteers.

In other words, almost two-thirds were pressed into the system. However, this is not the forced labor we propose to study.

Second, graduates of the labor reserve schools as well as of universities and other specialized schools are compelled to work for a specified number of years—3 or 4, as a rule—at whatever job is assigned to them by the authorities. Again, I exclude this type of involuntary work from our examination.

Third, a Soviet worker may not leave his job without a specific authorization by his employer, in other words, the state. The decree of June 26, 1940, which continued in force after the war and is still in force, forbids under threat of imprisonment

... the voluntary departure of wage earners and salaried workers from State, cooperative and communal enterprises and institutions, and also voluntary transfer from one enterprise to another or from one institution to another. Only the director of an enterprise or the chief of an institution may permit departure from an enterprise or institution, or transfer from one enterprise to another, or from one institution to another.

But workers forced to stay on jobs they have reason to quit, are not included in any definition of forced laborers in the sense of this inquiry.

Fourth, large numbers of peasants are conscripted annually to do obligatory work in repairing roads and the like. This remnant of the Middle Ages will be omitted from our inquiry.

Fifth, punishment for absenteeism in factories may consist in compulsory work at a low wage in the same enterprise for up to 6 months. We exclude also this type of forced labor.

Sixth, persons who, for some reason or other,

have incurred the wrath of the regime, may be exiled to some remote place inside the U.S.S.R. Working opportunities in such a place may be limited to a single factory or mine; the exile becomes automatically a forced laborer. Still, cases of this type are not being considered here.

When we speak of forced labor we have in mind only those unfortunates who, for political or economic reasons, are confined to prisons and concentration camps and who are compelled to work in or near their enclosures. They are the people who have fallen victims to the provisions of the corrective labor code of the Russian Federalist Socialist Soviet Republic as approved on August 1, 1933, and to similar laws enacted before and since that date.

Number of Forced Laborers in U.S.S.R.

There are, of course, evildoers everywhere in the world, and society has to protect itself against them. My country, for instance, publishes exact statistics on the prison population which show that roughly one person out of 1000 or approximately 150,000 people out of a total population of 150 million are in jail. If we apply the same percentage to the U.S.S.R., we would arrive at a prison population of around 200,000 people. I am fully aware that in the eyes of every good Communist this calculation does injustice to the motherland of socialism. Aren't we told—and I am quoting an article which appeared some time ago in *Bolshevik* (No. 4, 1947, p. 54) that—

Under conditions of bourgeois society crime is inevitable . . . The victory of socialism signifies the liquidation of the main source of crime, private capital ownership . . . The elimination of capitalism in our country has led to a sharp decline in the types of crime most typical of capitalist society, to the dying off of such "professions" widespread in bourgeois society as the card-sharper, gigolo, procurer, safebreaker, etc. . . .

By now, Russia has been educated in the spirit of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin for fully a third of a century; as a result, we should expect a prison population of far less than 200,000. The Soviet Government, unfortunately, does not see fit to publish statistics on its prisoners, and so the outside world has to rely on its own computations. These calculations differ among themselves, but they have one thing in common: not a single estimate places the number of Soviet prisoners at less than several million people.

The most cautious observers, those who prefer to err on the lower side are of the opinion that there are at least 2-3 million forced laborers in the Soviet Union; 5 years ago, a generally conservative student of the Soviet economy came out with an estimate of 5-7 million people; one scholar thought that certain discrepancies in Soviet statistics pointed to a prison labor force of 13 million; others believe that there are more than 20 million forced laborers.

I do not pretend to know the exact figure; it

must have varied over the years, and the divergence in estimates reflects to some degree the different periods to which they refer. But I am impressed by the height of even the most cautious estimates. If the number of forced laborers were only 2 to 3 million, it still would be 10 to 15 times as much as can be found in what the Communists call a rotten bourgeois society. And, if the maximum estimate were correct, the difference would be a hundredfold.

CONTRAST WITH TSARIST REGIME

Since we do not believe that the incidence of crime among the Russian people differs much from other nations, there are only two explanations for this unsavory Soviet world record. One is that the Soviet regime in its infinite bounty punishes with forced labor people who under cruel capitalism would, at worst, be fined or called to order. The second explanation is that the Kremlin detains millions of people on purely political grounds. Again, let us keep the magnitudes in mind. It is well known that under the Tsars political opponents were dealt with in a way that made the Western World shudder. According to a Soviet source, namely, the *Small Soviet Encyclopedia*, published in 1936 (vol. 5, col. 361), Tsarist penal labor reached its highest point in 1913 with 33,000, of which 5,000 were political prisoners. The number of people confined in regular prisons reached a maximum, in 1912, with 184,000 on the authority of Andrei Vyshinsky (in his book *Prisons in Capitalist Countries*, Moscow, 1937, p. 54). This figure includes common criminals and political prisoners. The highest number of political exiles reached in prerevolutionary days was 17,000 in 1907 (according to *Soviet Penal Repression*, Moscow, 1934, p. 108). Please note that this is a Soviet publication. I am the last person to defend tsarism, but Tsarist Russia was a free country compared to what it is now.

EVIDENCE CITED

What evidence do we have of forced labor on a large scale in the U.S.S.R.? I will divide my materials into two parts. In the first part, I will rely entirely on printed Soviet sources; the second one will consist of statements by persons who escaped Soviet prisons and concentration camps. Before turning to the first part, I would like to direct a warning to my distinguished colleagues from the Soviet bloc. It has become routine with them to accuse me of "scandalous slander" and "malicious calumnies"; as long as I am quoting Soviet sources, their potshots will fly past me at the heads of Soviet lawmakers, writers, and statesmen such as Andrei Vyshinsky.

"For every outspoken and honest word in Russia" and I am now quoting Lenin, "a person may be seized by a single edict of the police and thrown into prison, or deported to Siberia without court

trial and investigation". Lenin's words refer to Tsarist Russia. But they are equally true of Soviet Russia. Fact is that the Soviet police is authorized by law to imprison individuals in so-called "camps of corrective labor," to exile them to a specific community somewhere in the U.S.S.R., or to bar them from residence in certain areas. These are facts which were brought out in earlier discussions of this Council and they have never been denied, let alone refuted.

During the farm collectivization drive in the late twenties and early thirties and during the many purges that have characterized the Soviet political scene, there was ample opportunity to fill the prisons and the many concentration camps through administrative processes only and in circumvention of the courts. Collectivization alone cost millions of persons liberty and life. In Russia, you may recall, a well-to-do peasant had the derogatory name of kulak, or "fist," and the Government's policy was the "liquidation of the kulak as class." In practice, everybody was considered a kulak who had antagonized the local Communists. What the elimination of the kulaks meant in terms of social disruption and human suffering has been revealed by the great Andrei Vyshinsky himself, who, in his book, *The Law of the Soviet State*, has pointed out that kulaks represented not less than 12.3 percent of the Soviet population in 1913 (p. 117) and probably not fewer in 1928 when their "extinction" (p. 669) began. In the course of this drive for extermination, says Vyshinsky "many kulak families disintegrated. Some of the kulak children entered an honorable life of toil" (p. 669). One cannot escape the horrifying significance of Vyshinsky's offhand observation that of the millions of kulak children only "some" were allowed to work their way back to "an honorable life."

Soviet publications occasionally give a glimpse of what happened to those kulaks, who were not immediately killed during the collectivization drive, and to other political prisoners. On March 8, 1931, Molotov tried to refute foreign charges of forced labor in the U.S.S.R. in a report to the All-Union Congress of Soviets; in his paper, he admitted, however, that there were "about 60,000 persons" performing corrective labor on three highways, a railway, and the White Sea-Baltic Canal. That this figure was too low was revealed in 1933 when, on completion of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, about 72,000 of the prisoners who had worked on the project were freed (12,484) or received shortened terms (59,516) by governmental decree (*Pravda*, August 5, 1933). Similar decrees in 1937 released 55,000 prisoners who worked on the Moscow-Volga Canal and 10,000 who

worked on the double-tracking of the Karymskoye-Khabarovsk railway. But those released were a fraction only of the corrective labor force, as evidenced by the official Soviet economic plan for 1941.

SOVIET ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1941 REVEALED

This 1941 plan,² which the Soviet authorities marked confidential, is a most revealing and incriminating document and is in the hands of the United States Government at this moment. This plan presents official data on the contribution of forced labor to economic activities in the U. S. S. R. as planned for 1941. Let me limit myself here to a few significant statistics. According to this plan, the total volume of capital construction in the U. S. S. R. for that year is fixed at 46-47 billion rubles expressed in 1926-27 prices. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, NKVD, now renamed Ministry, MVD, in other words the agency assigned to administer the prison camps, is responsible for 6.81 billion rubles' worth of capital construction. This means, more than 14 percent of the capital construction planned for the U. S. S. R. in 1941 was to be the work of forced labor. No other People's Commissariat listed in the plan, has such a high share. Of those 6.81 billion rubles, the largest portion, namely 2,675 millions, was assigned to the so-called Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps, abbreviated Gulag. Gulag constructed camp buildings, mining facilities, logging camps, military buildings, and some housing. The Main Administration of Railroad Construction, abbreviated Glavzheldorstroy, another part of the NKVD, had the responsibility for 1,350 million rubles' worth of capital construction. It built railroad lines through isolated regions of the Soviet Union. There are indications that the NKVD farmed out some of its forced labor to the construction organs of the Commissariat (and now Ministry) of Transport with the result that capital construction based on forced labor was financed by funds beyond those allotted to the NKVD which means that the share of forced labor in total construction went beyond 14 percent. This remark applies also to a third Main Administration under the NKVD, namely the Main Administration of Paved Highways, Gushodor. Its plan for 1941 provided 550 million rubles' worth of capital construction.

It is, of course, impossible to give in this context more than a few highlights of the 1941 plan. Let me quote from the official Soviet document. The U.S.S.R. planned to produce 291 million cubic meters of industrial timber and firewood of which the NKVD share was 34.73 million or 12 percent. The NKVD share of railroad ties to be produced was 22.5 percent. It is, of course, understandable that the NKVD plays a large role in timber production; the timber is cut in remote

² *Gosudarstvennyi plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR a 1941 god* (State Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1941), Supplement to Decree No. 127 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. Council of the People's Commissars, January 17, 1941.

regions with a harsh climate, and unskilled labor can be copiously used. For the same reasons, it is not surprising that NKVD laborers were supposed to launch 17 percent of all the timber floated in the U.S.S.R. and were planned to have a 25 percent share in Arctic freight towing. These Arctic operations were under the direction of Dalstroï, a huge police administration in the Soviet Far East. Dalstroï workers are said to have produced about three quarters of the Soviet gold extracted in the last years before the war, but this figure is not based on official Soviet data; in fact, the 1941 plan does not indicate the NKVD goals in the gold industry. Nor does it say much of the ore mining activities of the NKVD in general. It only states that Gulag, the aforementioned Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps, was mining chrome ore and was expected to provide 40.5 percent of the total Soviet output of that ore.

The NKVD also had a production quota of certain types of machinery, much of which was intended for its own activities. Gulag, for instance, was assigned production of auto-tractor trailers, and other organs of the NKVD were responsible for the manufacture of road equipment and metal testing machinery. The NKVD was, furthermore, active in the fishing industry; it operated farms and food processing plants to supply many of its own consumption needs; and it had a considerable share in the production of certain consumers' items such as divans and mattresses, stoves and ovens, film cassettes, and spoons. When our distinguished colleague from the U.S.S.R. is home again and resting in his bed or eating his soup, well may he ponder as to who were the hapless wretches whose toil produced his mattress or his spoon.

Mr. President, I could produce many more details from this Soviet economic plan—the NKVD share in other fields of production, the distribution of its output by regions, etc. but our time is limited. One final word only: let nobody call this statement calumny and slander. It is the Government of the U.S.S.R. itself which, in its official economic plan, has revealed the enormous extent to which police-controlled labor contributes to Soviet production.

In the years after the war, NKVD, now MVD, has maintained its economic functions especially in the field of capital construction. It is no coincidence that the leading engineers of some of the most important power, railroad, and canal projects of recent years are well-known forced labor specialists spawned by the OGPU, the NKVD, and the MVD. The whole Soviet economy is shot through with police activities. Projects, proclaimed as evidence for the Kremlin's love for peace and progress, are actually directed by forced labor specialists, and slave labor has become part and parcel of the Soviet economic life.

Testimonies of Victims of Soviet Slave Labor

What does all this mean in human terms—in terms of Pavel, Mikhail, Dimitry, and Igor, the inmates of the so-called corrective labor camps?

A prisoner's lot is tragic, even under the most favorable conditions. Even a golden cage is a cage. But the Soviet concentration camps are not places where lawbreakers are given useful work to do under humane conditions until they are re-educated into useful citizens. A large number of former inmates of Soviet prisons and concentration camps have testified about the harsh, the cruel conditions, the starvation, overwork, and misery that characterize these places. This type of education has an appalling death rate. I freely admit that, among the thousands of witnesses against the Soviet forced labor systems, there may be some liars; quite a few may have exaggerated their suffering and that of their fellow prisoners, some intentionally, some unconsciously. But there are enough honest men and women among these ex-prisoners; there are enough eyewitnesses whose accounts have the ring of veracity. And their voices combine to a horrible chorus of accusation.

I shall try not to take up too much of your time with the stories of these eyewitnesses. Their accounts are infinitely moving if you really try to understand what they went through, and, yet, if you listen to many of them, your feelings will become blunted because it is time and again the same story of people punished without having committed a crime and without having been tried by a court, of people starved, sick, freezing to death, and, above all, mercilessly exploited.

Listen, first, to some of the witnesses of the Rousset trial. It will be remembered that Rousset, a French writer who had suffered for years in a German concentration camp, denounced the Soviet forced labor system out of compassion with concentration camp inmates anywhere. When a French Communist paper accused Rousset of having falsified his evidence, he brought a libel suit against it and vindicated his honor in a trial which took place in Paris in November and December of last year.

It was the common experience of Rousset's witnesses that they were either sentenced to forced labor without a trial and often without knowledge of their "offense" or that they were accorded only a most summary trial before judges without the benefit of defense. Let me give just a few examples.

Mrs. Buber-Neumann, who with her husband had sought refuge in the U.S.S.R. in 1935, told of her experience with Soviet-style trials. Her husband was arrested in 1937 and—

my turn came in 1938. I was condemned to serve five years of forced labor. The whole trial—if one can speak of a trial when only judges were present—lasted about two minutes.

Valentin Gonzales, who, under the nickname *El Campesino* (The Peasant), was a general of

the Spanish Republican Army during the Civil War, added further evidence to the arbitrariness of the Soviet legal system when he testified that—

I will not insist on my own personal case because it is only part of the grim story. Here, I am in France before a tribunal, and I think back and realize that in the Soviet Union a piece of paper is enough to condemn thousands and thousands in complete disregard of the existence of laws, of courts and judges.

What Rousset's witnesses tell about life in Soviet labor camps follows the familiar pattern of hunger, cold, and overwork. Elinor Lipper recalled conditions in the Kolyma gold fields in northeastern Siberia where she spent more than 10 years although under sentence for only 5:

Up there they work twelve to fourteen hours a day in temperatures of 15 degrees below zero . . . [Even] during the eight months of winter the men work and dig in the mines . . . [and] the women are also used as diggers or cut wood, up to the waist in snow, and the little piece of bread that you receive each day depends on the work that you have done. If you haven't completed a sufficient amount of work, you receive less bread; when you receive less bread, you become weak and you do less work. Thus, you end up in one of the large hospitals where the majority of people die of starvation.

During the hearing on December 16, Jerzy Gliksman, a former leader of the Jewish Socialist Bund in Poland, described his rude awakening to the realities of Soviet camp life. He mentioned that as a tourist in Moscow in 1936 he had been shown a model camp staged for naive persons like himself. He soon lost his naiveness after the Soviet authorities had arrested him in 1939 during the partition of Poland and sent him to a camp near the Arctic Circle. Thousands of Jews he testified,

. . . were deported to the camps under terrible conditions in cattle cars during the winter under deplorable hygienic conditions. After several months in prisons, they sent us to the camps. What we got to eat depended on what we produced. Then, there were the barracks with swinging hammocks for beds, without covering, without cushions, without mattresses or pallets, you slept in your clothes . . . And then twelve hours in the forests and then sickness.

Tikhon Charikov, a Ukrainian woodcutter, evoked the memory of similar experiences. He said that the food ration was 1,000 grams of bread and a little soup when the work quota was fulfilled by the prisoner, but only 600 grams of bread when the quota was not fulfilled. Clothes were a pair of pants, a light jacket, and shabby shoes. "Re-education," Charikov added, "was simply annihilation of prisoners."

I now pass on to the case of the Rev. Julius Jihkental, former minister of St. Charles, Tallinn, Estonia. He made a solemnly sworn deposition on July 7, 1948, at the London Legation of the Republic of Estonia. Together with many of his countrymen and without being accused of any violation of Soviet laws, he was shipped to a lumber camp in northern Russia which his group reached after harrowing marches. I will now

quote the Reverend Jihkental without any change of his somewhat awkward English:

Finally we arrived in a remote lumber camp in the north. First of all we saw there a few rows of plain wooden crosses. We were told that these belonged to the Poles who had died while working there. It was late in the autumn and as on the last lap of our journey we had to move along a fire lane we were scarcely able to move on at all. The ground was so soft that it was almost impassable. Then in a wet and muddy hollow we saw a small group of huts. Two of them were to accommodate our group of 250 men. The first day we spent in making bunks and settling down. Next day the work began. As I have said before, we had no proper footwear. Only those who had nothing to put on were given flimsy sandals made of bark. They were not waterproof at all although we had to wade in water the whole day long. For food we got 800 grams of bread and 2 plates of soup per day—one in the morning and the other in the evening. One can be sure it was most insufficient for such a hard work we had to do there. I must add that the supposed to be soup was only two plates of boiled water. Our work was to fell trees, the hardest toil the majority of us had ever done under such poor conditions and under such an enormous pressure. As to sanitary arrangements and hygiene none whatsoever were made. No doctor was on the spot, only a female nurse who seemed to have no medical training. Medicines were missing. Even that poor arrangement that had been made was a matter of form as they had no intention and no interest in looking after our health and well-being. Their only interest was to get out of us the greatest possible amount of work. There was an incredibly high fixed standard of work for each of us to be done daily and if one failed to do it his food was cut accordingly. It was clear that in the long run we could not possibly put up with those inhuman conditions. Our health deteriorated day by day. Bodily strength and in connection with that our spiritual strength and willpower diminished to such an extent that in about 2 months' time we were looking like human wrecks and skeletons. Even those who had been doing physical work throughout their whole life could not stand it. As already said in 2 months' time we were so exhausted and our health was so much undermined with insufficient food of the worst quality and unbelievably high pressure of work that death began his work. It was quite common that every day 4-6 of us died. The main diseases which ended with death were pneumonia and dysentery. We had to work 12 hours per day—from 6 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening. That winter was extraordinarily cold. It was not exceptional and happened often that the temperature was -50° C. There was an order that if the temperature was -30° C. there was no working in the forest, but that order, however, was not applicable to us.

It is really difficult for me to describe the most pitiable sights I saw there how every morning persons who were seriously ill were forced to go to work being beaten and otherwise ill treated, how a row of tired and exhausted creatures was stumbling to their working places, how coming back from their work in the evening many of them fainted and collapsed on their way.

You have heard before that the Soviet Government looks at such concentration camps as educational institutions. This is what Juhkental has to say about their education, an education which, I hasten to add, was entirely free:

It was a horrifying trial in what way they wanted to find out our political mentality and reeducate us to become loyal Soviet subjects. One political meeting followed another, ordinarily called at nights, at which we were threatened to be shot if the output of our work would not reach the target expected from us, or not to be allowed to return home if we would not change our political views regarding the Soviet Union and Communism.

In concluding this part of my exposition, I shall add only one further testimony from a very different kind of source. It fully corroborates the earlier testimony which I have cited and eliminates all doubt that the cancerous evil of forced labor has become a basic element of Soviet economy. In December of last year, 13 Japanese nationals who had only recently been repatriated from the Soviet Maritime Province or from newly acquired Soviet territories in the Far East made sworn depositions before the Consul of the United States at Tokyo.

These illustrate the reliance on forced labor in the U.S.S.R. to settle new areas and develop new industries. Not only did these Japanese citizens see hundreds of Soviet convicts doing heavy labor but they themselves were forced to remain in the Soviet Union and to perform designated work against their will. Some were prisoners of war captured during the last phases of the Second World War, others were fishermen and other types of workers living in Southern Sakhalin or the Kuriles and a few who had migrated to the Soviet Union under contract to work only a year. The delay in returning both the civilians and the prisoners of war to Japan was not caused by a shortage of ships, as claimed, but by the shortage of labor in the Soviet Far East and by the desire of Soviet officials to indoctrinate these foreigners with Communist ideology for transplantation to their homeland.

I shall read to you as a sample only one of these 13 Japanese affidavits:

Affidavit

JAPAN
CITY OF TOKYO
AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE } SS.

Before me, James V. Martin, Jr., Consul of the United States of America in and for Tokyo, Japan, duly commissioned and qualified, personally appeared Yoshiyuki Ikehara, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I, Yoshiyuki Ikehara, was a soldier in the Japanese Army. I was taken prisoner by the Russians at Komozan, Korea, on August 26, 1945, and was repatriated on August 20, 1948. While a prisoner of war I was confined in Voroshilov from April 5, 1946, to March 14, 1948, and in Churkina (near Vladivostok) from March 14, 1948, to August 20, 1948.

While at Voroshilov, I worked in a brick factory, along with some 400 other prisoners of war. This work was forced, as if we did not work we received no food. We were not paid for our work. Before the prisoners of war went to work in the brick yards, the work was done by Russian convicts. We had a production norm but I cannot remember the particulars except that we could not quit work until it was reached and that often we were required to work 12 hours to reach it.

At Churkina, most of the prisoners of war were employed in or in connection with a cannery. This cannery handled various types of fish including crabmeat. I was employed in making barrels for the use of the cannery. There were altogether about 1,000 prisoners of war working in or about the cannery. All these were working under compulsion, as if they did not work they received no food. The production norm was said to be based on Russian standards, but it was very hard for us to keep up with it. When we did not we got less food. We received no

pay for our work. We were supposed to have Sundays off, but actually only had every other Sunday as a holiday. If we were sick, we were examined by a Japanese doctor who decided if we were fit to work or not, but the finding of the Japanese doctor had to be approved by a Russian doctor, who often disagreed with the finding; in this case no matter how sick the man was he had to work. When we tried to rest at work, we were often beaten by Russian guards.

In addition to the Japanese prisoners of war, there were about 200 Russian civilians employed in the cannery. I do not know their pay or condition of work. In busy seasons, there were also employed gangs of 50 to 60 Russian convicts, who worked temporarily.

When I was repatriated there were still about 200 Japanese prisoners of war working in the cannery.

(YOSHIYUKI IKEHARA)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this fourteenth day of December, A.D. 1950.

(SEAL)

JAMES V. MARTIN, JR.

Consul of the United States of America

Gentlemen, enough of this utterly depressing story, this chorus of Poles and Germans, Lithuanians and Ukrainians and Japanese, who like actors in a Greek tragedy voice the anguish and the despair of the millions behind barbed wires in the Soviet Union whose voice is muted.

Every nation has its prisons and prisoners; in a civilized country, they form an insignificant segment at the periphery of society. But, in this particular case, we are faced with a dictatorship which has imprisoned an abnormally large portion of the population; we deal with a society which relies on forced labor for an important percentage of the national product. Under such circumstances, we are inclined to ask: who are the real criminals, the innocent victims of the forced labor camps or the jailers themselves? Who is in need of a reeducation, those who are mercilessly starved and exploited or those who have invented this system and are now spreading it all over their sphere of influence?

Forced Labor Conditions in Satellite Countries

It is this latter aspect, the spreading of the disease, which I have to dwell on shortly. It is well-known that the countries under Soviet control are being patterned after the Soviet model and that the Soviet forced labor system is one of the institutions which have been copied. In my remarks last summer, I specifically referred to Rumania, which according to the WFTU is a paradise of the people, to Czechoslovakia, and the Eastern zone of Germany. Today, I shall limit myself to giving a few additional facts.

Bulgaria introduced forced labor camps by two decree-laws of January 20, 1945. These regulations, which underwent minor changes in later years, were finally replaced by the law on the People's Militia (i. e. police) dated March 25, 1948. In its section 69, it deals with what is euphemistically called "communities for educational labor." Subject to confinement in such camps are "politically dangerous persons," namely people who have

manifested an "anti-popular" attitude, and also blackmailers, defrauders, procurers, prostitutes, gamblers, etc. It is one of the characteristics of both Fascist and Communist legislation that political opponents are defamed and debased by lumping them together with common criminals. Under the law, the period of confinement in Bulgaria is at least 1 year, and it is the Minister of the Interior who is authorized to condemn a person to forced labor; in political cases, he needs the concurrence of the chief prosecutor. The law of March 25, 1948, also introduced the "internment (of politically dangerous persons) in a new place of residence," i. e., banishment to a remote locality.

There exists, incidentally, another Bulgarian law, dated April 30, 1946, which establishes special labor camps for persons "who have taken to loafing and vagrancy and spend most of their time in saloons, coffee houses, bars, pastry shops, and the like." It was broadened on May 9, 1949, to include men and women "fit for work who do not perform socially useful work." According to its section 9, "appropriate measures shall be taken for their systematic enlightenment and re-education." I need hardly point out that any person who, for some reason or another, has antagonized the Communist authorities can easily be accused of frequenting a coffee house and avoiding socially useful work. Even members of this Council have frequently been seen in coffee houses. Again, it is the Ministry of Interior who is authorized to condemn such a person to "systematic enlightenment."

Czechoslovakia has one distinction. The Czechoslovaks are honest enough to speak of forced labor without throwing up a smoke screen about "re-education" or "communities for educational labor." Their law of October 25, 1948, concerning forced labor places the camps under the Ministry of the Interior. Again, confinement takes place through administrative procedures. In each province, the so-called People's Committees, i. e., Communist-controlled administrative authorities, appoint a special board which may condemn persons to forced labor from 3 months to 2 years. Liable to such confinement are, among others, persons who "threaten the establishment of the people's democratic order or economic life," a definition broad and vague enough to cover any possible political opponent.

On July 12, 1950, a new criminal code and a new code of administrative criminal law and administrative criminal procedure were adopted in Czechoslovakia. They provide for forced labor, either as a result of the judgment of a court or of the decision of a People's Committee. It is a specialty of the new penal laws that they confer the authority to punish certain offenses entirely upon the People's Committees. These committees have jurisdiction in cases of offenses against the present economic order, economic planning, economic operations, against health and social insurance, price control regulations, against public

authorities, offenses against culture and social life, and the general safety. In all such cases, the People's Committees may impose confinement in prison for 6 months. If, however, the People's Committee finds that the offender manifested, or had the intention to manifest, his enmity against "the people's democratic order or against the establishment of socialism," it is authorized to confine him for a period up to 2 years in a forced labor camp—and I again emphasize that this is the term which the Czechoslovaks themselves are using. It is, as a rule, the Security Division of a County People's Committee which decides such cases, and it is worth while mentioning that a hearing is not mandatory before these purely political bodies.

If you read the Czechoslovak press, you will find numberless reports of heavy sentences imposed by courts and People's Committees on persons who objected to farm collectivization along the customary Soviet lines or who showed any lack of enthusiasm for similar Communist activities. On a single day (September 30, 1950), it was reported that in Vlasim 24 persons were sentenced from 1 to 25 years of imprisonment because they "obstructed rural development," while in Moravsky Krumlov 13 farmers were sentenced up to 7 years each for "agricultural sabotage."

Points in U.S.-U.K. Draft Resolution Emphasized

Mr. President: These quotations and citations could be continued ad nauseam. In deference to the heavy schedule of work still before the Council, I shall desist from introducing any additional data. Besides, and as stated earlier, my task at this point was only to establish a *prima facie* case. I feel certain that the Council will agree with me that such a case has been established. Conditions have been brought to light which constitute a blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the moral and legal obligations solemnly assumed by all members states of the United Nations. We cannot become accessories to these alleged crimes against humanity by remaining silent.

This brings me to the resolution jointly sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States. This resolution was introduced last August, and, in order to save time, I take the liberty of referring the Council to the explanations which I offered at that time and which can be found in my mimeographed speech of August 15, 1950. I shall confine myself to a few major points which require emphasis and indicate our thinking as to the implementation of this resolution if it is passed—and, I am sure, that it will be passed.

The rational approach to the solution of any problem is first to obtain the facts, all the facts. The resolution therefore proposes the establishment of a fact-finding committee in cooperation with the ILO which has an obvious and direct interest in the struggle against forced labor.

A committee of not more than five independent members is proposed as allowing adequate representation of the type of professional experts—juridical, labor, social science—required. It would certainly be unwise to go beyond five members if the committee is to work effectively. As a matter of fact, it may well be found that a committee of only three members would be more satisfactory for the simple reason that it may be difficult to secure the services of as many as five persons with outstanding personal qualifications who would be able and ready to give the major part of 1 year to their work. Much of the effectiveness of the committee will depend on the persons who compose it. They should be internationally known for their concern with and devotion to human welfare. Their reputations for expert knowledge, personal ability, and impartiality should be beyond the shadow of a doubt. We are thinking of such men as Mr. Spaak of Belgium, Judge Aung Khine of Burma or Sir Ranaswami Mudaliar of India, Justice Sundstrom of Sweden, Mr. Aranha of Brazil, or Dr. Ralph Bunche of the United States. I am not making any nominations, and I am afraid that several of the persons mentioned would not be available. I am simply citing the names of these men as illustrative of the high international standing that the members of this committee must enjoy.

The selection of the members of the committee is not a matter of election but of careful selection to secure persons possessing those high intellectual and moral qualifications required to examine the problem in complete objectivity. The best readily available method of selection is to leave the naming of the committee to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the International Labor Office, in whose experience and judgment the Council has complete confidence. To arrange for the joint election of the committee by the Council and the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization would be a prolonged and difficult procedure.

The resolution provides that the committee "survey the field of forced labor . . . in any part of the world." There is, hence, no geographic limitation. The committee will be free to survey forced labor anywhere in the world. There are, however, certain restrictions. The resolution provides that the committee "assess the nature and extent of the problem at the present time." The survey is not to be concerned with historical developments but with the existence of forced labor "at the present time."

Furthermore, the committee is asked to inquire, in particular, into systems of forced labor "which are on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a given country." This phrase coupled with the earlier phrase which speaks of "systems of forced or corrective labor which are employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing po-

litical views" clearly indicates the intent of this resolution. While the inquiry envisaged is to extend to all parts of the world, it is evident that little useful purpose would be served if the committee dissipated its efforts in tracking down isolated cases of forced labor which may be found here and there as remnants of earlier economic or social practices and mores. This is particularly important in view of the fact that the Council has already at work a committee which deals with the remnants of slavery. Any overlapping of functions of that committee with the function of the committee here contemplated should be avoided.

It will be noted that the resolution does not provide specific instructions as to how the committee should perform its work. Any such group of internationally distinguished persons, as proposed here, should be left to organize itself in a manner which it considers most appropriate for the task to be performed. The committee would decide for itself such matters as the place and time of its meetings; the nature of its proceedings, private and public; whether or not to establish panels; the nature of the evidence to be examined, both written and oral; which witnesses to be heard; the on-the-spot investigations to be made by the committee or its staff, and all other related matters. On-the-spot investigations would be made, of course, only with the consent of the Government concerned.

In the opinion of my Government, the committee might do well to begin its work by the collection and a searching juridical scrutiny of all available texts, laws, decrees, administrative orders, etc. in order to get a clear idea of the juridical basis, if any, on which the systems of forced labor are built.

At the same time, it is evident that, as has been so forcibly brought out by the distinguished representative of India in an earlier discussion, constitutions and laws are frequently a very poor indication of what actually exists in a country. Constitutional safeguards and laws frequently are not applied or blatantly violated. Any inquiry, therefore, which does not attempt to get at the application of laws and at prevailing administrative practices is bound to remain sterile or might even become misleading. Therefore, as a second step the committee, in the opinion of my delegation, would have to assemble and analyze all available data regarding prevailing practices.

After the completion of these first two phases of the inquiry, it will be up to the committee to decide to what extent it should obtain additional evidence by way of hearings or by other methods. We still hope that the Communist countries will be willing to allow on-the-spot investigations. Any refusal to do so will, I am sure, be taken by world opinion as an obvious confession of guilt.

The committee will need an able and competent staff which could undertake much of the basic

research needed for the work of the committee. We assume that this staff would be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the International Labor Office, with the concurrence of the members of the committee. The expenses of the committee would also be shared equally, I assume, by the United Nations and the International Labor Office in a manner to be agreed by the Secretary-General and the Director General. In this connection, it appears to my delegation that the financial estimates provided by the Secretary-General in document E/L.104/Add.1 are utterly inadequate. They provide for a total expenditure of only \$21,000 at the most, which would hardly be enough to investigate conditions in a county jail. If the committee is to accomplish its purpose, it must meet for more than 2 months. It might, in fact, have to meet for 6 to 8 months over a period of a full year. The \$25.00 subsistence allowance proposed for members of the committee may have to be supplemented by consultants' fees. No provision is made in the estimates for the travel expense and subsistence allowance of possible witnesses. A larger specialized staff than the two substantive staff members referred to in the financial estimates will be required, with higher transportation and subsistence costs. This will be especially true if the committee decides to conduct hearings or investigations in the field. Provision should be made for wider distribution of the report or summaries thereof and in more languages than is contemplated in the Secretariat's estimates. While details of the organization and operations of the committee cannot be set forth at this time, it is clear that, for the success of the committee's work, adequate funds are essential. The United States delegation therefore would be willing, in view of the transcending importance of the task of the committee, to support financial estimates for the calendar year 1951 of up to \$150,000 to be divided between the United Nations and the International Labor Office. We would hope that, with the help of such funds, the work of the committee could be pushed sufficiently vigorously as to allow the committee to submit at least an interim report by the time of the fourteenth session of the Council.

There is just one further point to which I should like to draw the attention of the Council. In document E/1884, the Secretary-General distributed to the Council the text of a letter received from the Director General of the International Labor Office. This letter shows that the Governing Body of the International Labor Office has already decided by an overwhelming majority to cooperate with the Council in implementing the arrangements envisaged in the joint United Kingdom-United States resolution.

Mr. President: In conclusion, I should simply like to repeat what I said last August. I com-

mend this draft resolution to you and to my distinguished colleagues on this Council. I commend it for your careful consideration.

Peace Observation Commission's Role in Universal Collective Security

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
U.S. Representative on Peace Commission¹*

The creation of the Peace Observation Commission is a step in the strengthening of the United Nations. It is an important part of the growth and development of the collective security system. The Commission should not be viewed merely as a thing in itself, but in conjunction with the other elements of the uniting-for-peace resolution.

It is only by strengthening the United Nations collective security machinery that world peace can be assured. This is so because peace rests upon three things—agreement to refrain from aggression, the willingness to carry out that agreement, and the means to prevent violations of the agreement. The Charter embodies such an agreement in its most solemn form. The free world is united in its determination to carry it out. We are today taking another step in the effort to develop means for preventing or deterring violation.

The uniting-for-peace resolution contains three major elements: preparation, investigation, and action. These are the elements which should be found in an effective collective security system, as they must be found in an effective government or in any effective enterprise for the furtherance of the objectives of a community.

The element of preparation is contained in two provisions of the uniting-for-peace resolution. The first of these is the invitation to member states to create and maintain armed forces so that they can promptly be made available for service as United Nations units. The second is the establishment of the Collective Measures Committee, which has now started its study of methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.

The element of investigation in the uniting-for-peace resolution is, of course, this Peace Observation Commission.

The element of action is the provision in the resolution that, if the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly can meet in emergency special session within 24 hours and make appropriate recommendations to the members for collective measures.

These elements are part of the framework of the collective security system we are building in the

¹ Made before the Peace Observation Commission on Mar. 16 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

United Nations. That system, my Government believes, should serve both as a deterrent to further acts of aggression and, should aggression unfortunately recur, as a means of meeting it. The elements serve different but related functions; thus, the elements of preparation and investigation are preventive medicine in the international society, while the element of action is the surgery which becomes necessary if preventive medicine fails.

Under its terms of reference, the Peace Observation Commission is to be used by the Security Council, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee to—

observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Thus, its substantive activities are to be initiated by one of these principal organs. Because its function is preventive, its use would not necessarily imply any belief on the part of the members of the United Nations that aggression was imminent. International tension is widespread today. There are areas of tension where observation might prove to be useful. The decision to take preventive action is concerned as much with the needs and interest of the world community as it is with the individual area or problem concerned. The mere presence of United Nations observers can, in itself, help to make aggression unlikely. This Commission, we believe, should, therefore, be prepared to provide promptly for the dispatch of such observers at any time of need.

Previous United Nations experience with observer groups shows how useful they can be. The decision by a United Nations body to send observers to an area indicates at once the interest of the world community in that area. This was very much the case, for example, in Greece, where assistance was being given from neighboring countries to the forces attempting to overthrow the Greek Government. The sending into the area of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans demonstrated that the United Nations was concerned about the tension in this area. The presence of the Committee, giving tangible evidence of this concern, was, in itself, a source of comfort and support to the Greek people. Its presence was, no doubt, a deterrent to aggression from beyond the Greek borders.

Our experience with the United Nations Commission on Korea provides another example of the usefulness of observers. In this case, aggression did occur. The United Nations Commission was on the spot and immediately reported the facts. On the basis of these reports, the Security Council could and did act promptly in recommending to the members that they take steps to restore peace and security to the area. Without the prompt action which followed upon the receipt of this information from the observers on the spot,

the Republic of Korea might have been overrun. Because of the prompt action and the prompt response of United Nations members, the attack was met and repulsed.

These two examples, I think, show the potentialities of the Peace Observation Commission and suggest why the General Assembly voted to establish on a permanent basis the observation functions of the United Nations.

One final word. The Peace Observation Commission, like the other elements of the uniting-for-peace resolution, is a part of a universal collective security system. It is aimed against no power or group of powers. It is designed to guard against and report upon the outbreak of aggression no matter what its source.

Central Group of International Materials Conference Enlarged

The International Materials Conference (Imc) announced on March 22 that the enlarged Central Group met on that date for the first time. The new, permanent Central Group now constituted is composed of the three Governments originating the temporary Group—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus the Governments of Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Italy and the Organization of American States and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

The new members were welcomed by the United States representative, Edwin T. Gibson, who was asked to act as temporary chairman. He expressed the appreciation of the three Governments forming the temporary Group at having the cooperation of the five new countries and two large regional organizations. He referred to the valuable studies of the problems of scarce raw materials which have already been made by the OEEC and the OAS. Mr. Gibson cited the purposes and aims of this new international body, the Imc, and emphasized the urgency of the matter. The Committee will meet again on Friday, March 30.

The meeting was composed of the following:

- AUSTRALIA—F. A. Meere, First Assistant Comptroller General, Department of Trade and Customs
- BRAZIL—Walter L. Sarmanho, Minister, Brazilian Embassy
- CANADA—John H. English, Commercial Counselor, Embassy of Canada
- FRANCE—M. J. Vacher-Desvernais, Commercial Counselor, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
- INDIA—P. Vaidyanathan, Economic Attaché, Embassy of India
- ITALY—Egidio Ortona, Chief, Italian Technical Delegation, Embassy of Italy
- UNITED KINGDOM—Viscount Knollys, Minister in Charge of Raw Materials, British Embassy
- UNITED STATES—Edwin T. Gibson, Defense Administrator, Defense Production Administration

OAS—Dr. Alberto Lleras, Secretary General
OEEC—P. Storrs, Administrator
IMC—C. W. Jeffers, Executive Secretary; René Larre, Assistant Executive Secretary; J. Hubert Penon, Assistant Executive Secretary

U.S. Delegations to International Meetings

Fourth Airworthiness Session (ICAO)

On March 20, the Department of State announced that the fourth session of the Airworthiness (AIR) Division of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) convened on that date at Montreal, Canada. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegate and Chairman

George W. Haldeman, Chief, Aircraft Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Advisers

John Boshar, Structural Loads Engineer, Aircraft Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

John A. Carran, Chief, Aerodynamics Section, Aircraft Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Philip Donely, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, Langley, Va.

Hugh B. Freeman, Aeronautical Engineer, Airworthiness Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Franklin W. Kolk, Manager, Aircraft Analysis Division, American Airlines

W. Edmund Koneczny, Chief, Airworthiness Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Raymond B. Maloy, Chief, Engineering Flight Test Branch, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Joseph Matulaitis, International Airworthiness Adviser, Aircraft Division, Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

David Posner, Chief, Installation Section, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Harry Press, Aeronautical Research Scientist, Dynamic Loads Division, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Langley, Va.

Robert Rosenbaum, Chief, Dynamics Section, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Stephen H. Rolle, Chief, Power Plant Engineering Branch, Aircraft Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

William T. Shuler, Chief, Structures Section, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

M. B. Spaulding, Jr., Assistant Director of the Engineering Division, Air Transport Association

Burdell L. Springer, Deputy Chief, Airframe and Equipment Engineering Branch, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Omer Welling, Deputy Chief, Aircraft Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

The Airworthiness Division is one of ten technical Divisions of the Air Navigation Commission, as established by the ICAO Council. These Divisions are responsible for formulating for the Commission and eventual Council action recommenda-

tions on standards, procedures, and facilities which appear to be necessary or desirable for the safety, regularity, or efficiency of international air navigation. The Divisions function in practice as technical or specialized conferences open to delegations from all ICAO contracting states. The third session of the Airworthiness Division was held at Montreal from February 22–March 29, 1949.

The principal objectives of this meeting are the consideration of power plant items as proposed by the AIR Division at its last session; the exchange of views on structures and flight subjects related to the advent of high speed, high altitude airplanes equipped with reciprocating and turbine engines; and the preparation of proposals for waterload standards for seaplanes. In addition, discussions will be continued with respect to performance requirements for transport category type airplanes, a subject which has proved to be the most difficult of all items relating to the international airworthiness standards.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Directory of Building Research Organizations in Europe. E/ECE/121, IM/HOU/BR/3, September, 1950. 108 pp. with annexes. mimeo.

Trade Trends and Policies of Latin American Countries. E/CN.12/165, May 1, 1950. 133 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance for Economic Development. Report by the Executive Secretary. E/CN.12/171, May 15, 1950. 33 pp. mimeo.

Draft of Resolutions on Economic Development and Anti-Cyclical Policy. Approved by Committee I. E/CN.12/194, June 18, 1950. 4 pp. mimeo.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Approved Plans of Operations for Asia. E/ICEF/153, October 20, 1950. 65 pp. mimeo.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Approved Plans of Operations for Latin America. E/ICEF/154, October 24, 1950. 44 pp. mimeo.

Disposition of Agenda Items. Tenth Session, February 7–March 6, 1950. E/INF/38, August 31, 1950. 147 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Congressional Resolution Urging Just and Lasting Peace Endorsed

The following is the text of a letter from Secretary Acheson to Senator Tom Connally, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, dated March 20, 1951.

Your letter of February 9, 1951, gives me opportunity to endorse explicitly and emphatically the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution reaffirming the abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union.

I wish to commend the legislative initiative in this vital matter. I hope that it will prove possible to have favorable action completed by the Congress in the near future. I am sending a similar letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

Three aspects of the resolution impress me particularly.

The first is the voicing of the American people's fervent, profound desire for peace. The resolution well expresses this as our goal now and ever. After taking note of the "terrible danger to all free peoples" as the circumstance compelling us reluctantly to rearm, the resolution affirms that we "desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war." It notes our preference "to devote our energies to peaceful pursuits." It finds cogent support of this in our willingness "to share all that is good in atomic energy, asking in return only safeguards against the evil in the atom."

I note that the resolution proclaims our aim not simply in the word "peace" but as "just and lasting peace." It links this with "the dignity of man" and "the moral principles which alone lend meaning to his existence." This concept is echoed in a reference to our determination to defend freedom.

It is well that the resolution makes clear that while we covet peace, we will not sell our souls for it. The peace we seek is not simply the absence of war but a sound and free collaboration among nations in a pattern of responsibility based on mutual respect. Peace in the first sense might be obtained by moral capitulation. Peace in the sense of our seeking can be achieved and held only by long, hard effort. We and our allies with us are determined to create that kind of peace. The goal would be brought incalculably nearer with

help rather than hindrance from the Soviet Union.

That brings me to the second point of special significance. It is well that in affirming our friendship for all peoples the resolution specifies the peoples of the Soviet Union. That special concern to express our friendship extends, I am sure, to all other peoples in Europe and Asia, including China, now suffering the tragedy of life behind the iron curtain. The great structure of peace which the United States and its allies are building will never be complete until all the peoples now under domination by the Kremlin participate in full partnership. Here, however, we speak specifically of the peoples within the Soviet Union proper.

Were the truth available to them and were they free to speak their minds and register their will, I am sure they would answer us in the same spirit.

They are capable and hard-working peoples who love their homeland. We recall with fresh admiration their sacrifice and courage under the ordeals of the Nazi invasion. We are in constant awareness of their gifts to civilization and of their potential for still further gifts to enrich other cultures. The wall which the Soviet rulers, impelled by inward fears, maintain around their dominion represents tragedy for those within it. To those outside it represents real and deep deprivation.

It will be well if the peoples within can be caused to know that those beyond regard them, not with hostility as represented to them by their rulers, but with an inherent friendliness. It will be well for them to know that we understand the heavy burdens they bear, particularly in the circumstance that the course determined upon by the group in control bars them from the fruits of the secure and steady peace which they have so greatly earned.

As the third point of special significance, I refer to the closing lines of the resolution expressing the idea—

That the Congress request the President of the United States to call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to acquaint the people of the Soviet Union with the contents of this resolution.

These words point to the opportunity which the men of the Kremlin have for setting affairs on a

better course. No others are in such a position to say the words and perform the acts which can either strengthen or confound men's hopes.

In a curious way they mirror themselves in their interpretation of the outside world. As monopolists of power, they profess to see in other governments the evil of monopoly. Dominated by hostility toward all contrasting systems, they profess to see that characteristic reflected in the systems they fear and hate. Maintaining in readiness armaments of such excess as to be explained not on a basis of defense but only by the desire to intimidate others, they pretend to regard other nations as bent upon aggression.

If the men of the Kremlin could but conquer their inward fears and resolve their contradictions, if they could but bring themselves to the comity which is the foundation of peace, great burdens would be lifted from the shoulders of peoples everywhere.

A start could be made by letting the truth flow freely into and within the Soviet Union. This would mean an end to the practice of systematically distorting to the peoples of the Soviet Union the policies and intentions of governments free of its domination and the conditions of life beyond the Soviet orbit. It would reduce the dangerous disparity of public information now obtaining as within and beyond the span of Kremlin control.

In our own country, for example, the press, radio and television are free to present all sides of every issue. The Soviet case is fully reported. Attitudes and pronouncements originating in the capitals of the Soviet system are made freely available to our people, who are left free to resolve their wills on the basis of full possession of essential facts. In contrast, the monopolistic system of information within the Soviet area makes available only the ruling group's side of every issue. There, truth is made the servant of policy rather than policy the servant of truth.

It is significant, for illustration, that the plan for international control of atomic energy, approved in the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1948 by a vote of 40 to 6, was never imparted to the peoples who get their information through the Soviet monopoly. This plan for placing atomic energy under international control, limiting its uses to peaceful purposes and establishing an adequate system of inspection and control to neutralize its destructive potential, was opposed by the governments of the Soviet system. This fact has been withheld from the peoples within that system.

The same occurred with respect to the General Assembly Resolution on the Essentials of Peace, reaffirming the principles of the Charter and endorsed in 1949 by a unanimous vote of all nations other than those within the Soviet orbit. Its principles and the implications of the clear division

on them have never been explained to the peoples behind the iron curtain.

The same applies to the action of the General Assembly last fall in support of the Resolution on Uniting for Peace. This plan for strengthening the General Assembly with respect to security matters, supported by 52 nations, drew implacable hostility from the Kremlin and the governments under its control. The facts and their enormous implications have not been imparted by the Kremlin to the peoples whom it professes to represent.

These three examples chosen from many instances illustrate that the walls impeding the flow of information are also obstacles of crucial importance in the course to a sound and lasting peace.

A Declaration of Friendship From the American People to all the Peoples of the World, Including the Peoples of the Soviet Union

WHEREAS the goal of the American people is now, and ever has been a just and lasting peace; and

WHEREAS the deepest wish of our Nation is to join with all other nations in preserving the dignity of man, and in observing those moral principles which alone lend meaning to his existence; and

WHEREAS in proof of this, the United States has offered to share all that is good in atomic energy, asking in return only safeguards against the evil in the atom; and

WHEREAS this Nation has likewise given of its substance and resources to help those peoples ravaged by war and poverty; and

WHEREAS terrible danger to all free peoples compels the United States to undertake a vast program of armaments expenditures; and

WHEREAS we rearm only with reluctance and would prefer to devote our energies to peaceful pursuits: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Members of this Congress reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, by declaring—

That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the U. S. S. R., and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of America's desire to live in friendship with all other peoples, and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood; and

That the American people desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war; and

That although they are firmly determined to defend their freedom and security, the American people welcome all honorable efforts to compose the differences standing between them and the Soviet Government; be it further

Resolved, That the Congress request the President of the United States to call upon the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to acquaint the peoples of the Soviet Union with the contents of this resolution.

Expanded World Economy Urged in Report of International Development Advisory Board

[Released to the press by the White House March 12]

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

The following letter was sent by the President from the Little White House, U. S. Naval Station, Key West, Florida, to Nelson Rockefeller, chairman of the International Development Advisory Board.

I am impressed by the report of the Advisory Board on International Development. It demonstrates, clearly and forcefully, the reasons why a lasting peace can be attained only by a wise combination of strong military defenses and an effective campaign of international economic development.

A broad program of economic development is necessary, as I pointed out in my inaugural address, to carry out this country's international objectives of peace and freedom. Since that address, international problems have become critical and we are now engaged in a tremendous mobilization program. More than ever, greater production, particularly in the underdeveloped areas, is essential to the stability and freedom of those areas and to the peace of the whole world. Recent events in economically underdeveloped areas have demonstrated that men will defend the cause of freedom when they know from experience that it is the true way to economic and social progress. Economic stagnation is the advance guard of Soviet conquest.

The Point 4 concept, properly carried out, is essential to the successful defense of the free world. In the words of your report, "strengthening the economies of the underdeveloped regions and an improvement in their living levels must be considered a vital part of our own defense mobilization."

Moreover, economic development is the spearhead of the forces of freedom. The building of military strength is not enough to win the peace we seek. We must press the attack in the battle of raising the living standards and fulfilling the hopes of mankind for a better future.

The task, as you have pointed out, is one that the United States cannot undertake alone. We depend, in many respects, on the other free nations, and they on us. International partnership is

necessary to build an expanding world economy in which all can have a fair share.

It is a great satisfaction to me that a non-partisan group, such as your Board, representing labor, education, business, agriculture and other aspects of our national life, should reach unanimous agreement on matters of such concern to the future of our country. I am sure that your report will do a great deal to put the problem of international economic development in its proper perspective.

In the near future, I shall send recommendations to the Congress concerning the legislation required for foreign defense and economic assistance for 1952. I know that your report will be of great help in enabling the Congress and the Executive Branch to develop the kind of program which is needed to carry out our national objectives.

I am sending your report immediately to the chairmen and the ranking minority members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and I hope that you will be able to give them further information on this important subject, if they so desire. I am also directing the Government agencies concerned to give your report their immediate consideration.

Please accept my deepest personal appreciation for the task which your Board has accomplished and the leadership which you have contributed to it. You, your Board, and your staff can take great pride in the contribution which you have made toward a solution of some of the critical problems which this Nation faces.

LETTER TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Copies of the report of the International Development Advisory Board, accompanied by letters from the President, were sent to Tom Connally, chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; John Kee, chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Alexander Wiley, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; James P. Richards, House Foreign Affairs Committee; and Charles A. Eaton, House Foreign Affairs Committee.¹ The text of the President's accompanying letter follows.

You will recall that on November twenty-fourth, I appointed the members of the International Development Advisory Board established by the Congress under Section 409 of the Act for International Development. I nominated Mr. Nelson Rockefeller as the Chairman of the Board.

At that time I requested the Board to undertake as its first task a consideration of the proposals of the Gordon Gray Report concerning our policy toward the underdeveloped areas. The International Development Advisory Board has now completed that task and has submitted a report to me, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith.

I am sure you will find, as I have, that this is a most thoughtful and stimulating report. In this report, the group of distinguished citizens who make up the Board has done us all a great service by analyzing the ways and means of making the economic part of our foreign policy more effective in building the strength of the free world. I know this report will be most helpful in completing the legislative recommendations on foreign aid I shall shortly submit to the Congress. I am sure that you and the members of your Committee will find it valuable in your consideration of the economic aspects of our foreign policy. I have asked Mr. Rockefeller to supply you with any further information and background about the work of his Board that you may desire.

LETTER TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The following letter of transmittal accompanied copies of the report sent to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; to the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization; and the Administrator, Defense Production Administration.

I am sending you herewith the Report of the International Development Advisory Board on Foreign Economic Policy for the Underdeveloped Areas. You will recall that I asked this Board on November 24, 1950, to undertake as its first task a study of the recommendations on this subject made by Mr. Gordon Gray in his report on Foreign Economic Policy.

I am also sending you a copy of the letter I have written to Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board.

The recommendations made by the Board will, I believe, prove of great value in the task of preparing the Foreign Aid Program.

¹ The report of the International Development Advisory Board also was transmitted to Alben W. Barkley, Vice President of the United States, and to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

THE DEPARTMENT

Charles E. Bohlen Confirmed as Counselor

On March 12, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be Counselor of the Department of State.

Herschel D. Newsom Confirmed to Public Advisory Board

On March 12, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Herschel D. Newsom as a member of the Public Advisory Board of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

On March 12, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Ellsworth Bunker to be American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Argentina.

On March 12, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Rudolf E. Schoefeld to be American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Guatemala.

On March 21, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Richard C. Patterson, Jr., to be American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Recent Soviet Pressures on Germany. European and British Commonwealth Series 18. Pub. 4123. 4 pp. Free.

A background summary.

The Joint Defense of Western Europe. European and British Commonwealth Series 19. Pub. 4126. 22 pp. Free.

Statements by Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee, February 15 and 16, 1951.

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The Department of State bulletin

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APR 26 1951

Address by President Auriol of France to the Congress of the United States

The following is the text of an address made on April 2 by Vincent Auriol, President of the French Republic, to the Congress of the United States. The address was released to the press jointly by the Embassy of France and the Department of State on April 2.

[Translation]

I am deeply moved by the exceptional honor you are rendering me in allowing me to appear before this Assembly and to address you from this glorious rostrum. It will touch the heart of the people of France to whom, through me, this homage and this warm welcome are directed.

I am the more deeply moved that my visit is the first one made by a President of the French Republic, in the name of France to the Republic of the United States and that it recalls to me two historic visits to our country made by two of your illustrious statesmen: Benjamin Franklin in 1776, and, a century and a half later, after the First World War, President Wilson.

It gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to your heroic young men who under the command of their glorious leaders twice rushed to our ravaged country to share with our own sons in the fight.

These memories illustrate our common history, and this history already long and always friendly is a history of freedom.

In recalling these memories in the presence of the Congress of the great American democracy, I want to express our constant and heartfelt sympathy to all the families whose sons have died for our common ideal and are resting forever in French soil, side by side with the sons of France and of the other Allied nations. Through you representing the 48 States of the Union, I wish to tell the American people of our grateful and loyal friendship and of our unshakable attachment to the great human principles France has always proclaimed—principles embodied both in your Declaration of Independence and in our Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, principles which, 3 years ago, after so many trials and contests, have received the unanimous consecration of the United Nations.

These sacred achievements of man which are not only the most precious values in our civilization but also the conditions for all future improvement, for all individual and social progress, are

today threatened—we are sorrowfully obliged to admit this—only 6 years after our two peoples made sacrifices never before equaled in history, for the attainment and organization of a just and tranquil peace.

Confronted with this situation, far different from what we had wanted and expected, with our security threatened, any nation worthy of her freedom must face reality and take stock of her own responsibilities. Today I have come to tell you what France thinks and what France seeks.

Gentlemen, you are the representatives of a people who insist upon truth. Your opinions are based on facts and your judgments on acts and not on words.

This is why I will ask you this question: When in the defense of her independence and the sacred cause of liberty a nation has lost, 357,000 men from 1914 to 1918, 575,000 dead from 1939 to 1945—(240,000 perished in uniform in the first and the last battles for freedom—112,000 were shot or were killed by bombing—182,000 died deported to Germany for belonging to the underground, and 40,000 died in enemy labor camps); when, for the same cause, the same nation, fighting at the door to Southeastern Asia, in Indochina, a war which has

[Released to the press by the White House
March 29]

The President of the French Republic outlined to the President of the United States conditions in France, the progress of the French rearmament program and the present situation in Indochina where French forces and the forces of the Associated States (of Indochina) are successfully opposing Communist aggression.

The remarks of the President of the French Republic included a statement that the French people were determined to defend themselves against foreign aggression and that, in this spirit, they are giving all out support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He emphasized that all these efforts were directed toward the maintenance and strengthening of peace.

The President of the United States stated that he was encouraged by President Auriol's remarks and expressed his confidence that peace could and would be maintained and that the democratic peoples would preserve unshakable unity in pursuit of their great objective; peace for all the world.

lasted more than 4 years, does not hesitate to reaffirm her faith in international law by sending to Korea officers and men whose heroism makes them the worthy comrades of your officers and men; then I ask you, who could seriously question her determination? In fact, what nation has ever proved better her love for independence and for peace and her will to defend both?

The attitude which has been given the barbarous name of "neutralism" has always been foreign to the French soul, not only because it is a moral absurdity—can anyone be neutral between servitude and liberty, between good and evil?—but because it is geographical and historical nonsense. Our people have experienced the frailty of their exposed land and sea frontiers. Almost alone in 1914 and again in 1939 they have met the first shock of armies so powerful that each time it has taken 4 years of ceaseless effort and a coalition of the world's forces to defeat them. Therefore they know that right without might is powerless. They know that isolation is death. They know that neutrality, whether declared, armed or disarmed, has protected neither Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway nor Denmark and that an aggressor would never stop at a frontier post, even should it be surmounted with a dove holding the branch of an olive tree!

Finally, they know that France is not simply the western extremity of Europe in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, but that the French Union extends its influence and civilization to all parts of the world and that in the common strategy for freedom and peace, France has courageously accepted the tasks and responsibilities of a great world power. They know also that once France has fallen, the whole of Europe will be in chains with all her potential strength in the service of the invader and that the whole world, indeed civilization itself, will be in mortal danger.

I shall always remember the clear warning when, in 1919, as a young deputy, I heard it stated from the rostrum of our own Parliament by the President of the United States that France still stands at the frontier.

... here is where the blow fell because the rulers of the world did not sooner see how to prevent it ... they know that the only way to do this is to make it certain that the same thing will not always happen that has happened this time, that there never shall be any doubt or waiting or surmise, but that whenever France or any free people is threatened, the whole world will be ready to vindicate its liberty ...

Because they did not establish this union in time, because they did not organize soon enough and at the most vulnerable points a collective defense prepared for instant action, the democratic nations with their decisions delayed by the interplay of their institutions or by the scruples and indiscipline of freedom were once more thrown into the most destructive of wars. One after the other, nations fell which would have been saved had they joined their forces. And France herself

who entered the fight faithful to her word, was wounded on the ramparts, imprisoned for 4 years and almost destroyed.

If our people had given up, if for a single moment they had hesitated between resistance and collaboration with the enemy, if they had not been willing to subject themselves to an implacable oppression, had not chosen to destroy, often with their own hands, their properties and their tools, rather than work for the enemy, if they had permitted him at times when the fortunes of war were in the balance to have a free disposition of their remaining resources and forces in Metropolitan France and in her overseas territories, what would Europe and the world be today?

After such common fights and sacrifices, the achievement of the final victory must not make us forget the perils to which we were led by an uncoordinated diplomacy and strategy. It is the very old story of the Horatii and the Curiatii. For the goal to be reached is not to liberate a Europe which may once more be occupied, enslaved, exploited and ravaged and whose name, you may be sure, would only recall the final ruin of a civilization, but rather, by shielding her against aggression, to protect the whole community of the free nations and in this way to save peace.

In putting into practice an effective union, in which risks as well as efforts must be shared, France has a clear understanding of her duties and of her rights.

Her contribution to the defense of freedom and of peace is first of all her own recovery.

Undoubtedly, Gentlemen, our people are sometimes disparaged and they are sometimes guilty of self-disparagement. But those of you whom we have had the joy of welcoming in our country have been able to see the road covered since the liberation.

In 1944, the country was bled white, the state disrupted, 90 percent of our departments were in ruins, our lands were laid fallow, our industrial equipment was pillaged or obsolete, our ports, our means of communication were in shambles, more than two million houses were destroyed or damaged, our economy and our finances were ruined.

In 1951, there is an increased population, republican institutions are reestablished, our production has been raised to the level of 133 as compared with a 100 in 1938, our commercial balance is in equilibrium and our currency stabilized before the rise in prices of raw materials could compromise the equilibrium thus gradually attained, our homes have been built again and the specter of social troubles and of despair has been pushed aside.

Gentlemen, it is with pride that I speak of the accomplishments of our workers, of our engineers, of our leaders of enterprise, of our farmers, of our administrators, of all Frenchmen and of their representatives. The generous aid that you have given us through the Marshall Plan, for which I am happy to thank you today publicly, has not been extended to us in vain. In giving a decisive

impulse to our paralyzed economy, it has again opened for us the way to work and to hope, and by driving away the threat of unemployment and misery, it has preserved us from those social upheavals which are the breeding ground for adventure and tyranny.

Though a great deal remains to be done, this first balance sheet of our recovery testifies to the courage of our people, supported by your brotherly assistance.

Our next contribution to the cause of freedom and peace is our rearmament effort which our Parliament has voted by a huge majority without hesitation or reservations. This has been done in spite of the already enormous burden of our reconstruction and reequipment and of our military expenditures. It is certainly not the fault of our two nations if world collective security has not been organized, though we consider this failure as merely temporary. The spirit of aggression is foreign to both Americans and Frenchmen. But in the face of threats of totalitarian expansion and the formation of certain mighty groups of powers whose policies and armaments are not subject to the free control of the people, we have turned thoughtfully and inflexibly to regional pacts and especially to the regional pact of the North Atlantic which, conforming to the statutes of the United Nations, has but one aim—to deter aggression and to strengthen the peace. Thus, by our reciprocal undertakings that we shall from now on pool together our resources of arms and troops at all threatened and strategic points, we have made the Atlantic community a solid foundation of our common security and of peace.

For us, indeed, the effort for peace and the effort for defense are not contradictory; they complement each other. With the prudence and firmness dictated by our said experience, we shall never cease to answer negation, procedural obstructionism and propaganda in the language of right, of truth and of sincerity.

Let us not fail to speak clearly, frankly and firmly. Let us put at the service of peace and freedom, side by side with our material forces as long as those are needed, the invincible moral forces which always animate free people aware of the righteousness of their cause.

We shall not tire, on our part, of repeating the conditions that are necessary for the reestablishment of trust and cooperation among all peoples. Does everyone sincerely want peace? In that case, everyone must respect the commitments subscribed to in the Charter of the United Nations by all the allies of yesterday; in that case, certain countries must stop interfering in the internal affairs of others in an effort to weaken their freely chosen regimes, to provoke troubles, to paralyze production and to pour daily insults upon their Governments.

In that case, international and permanent control by the United Nations Organization of armaments, of all armaments, in all countries, must be

accepted, in order to limit fairly and later to destroy all classic or atomic weapons.

In that case, the national armies must be progressively replaced by a United Nations army as provided by the common Charter.

In that case, every country must agree to the free movement of wealth, ideas, and persons as well as the free and sincere expression of view, under international control of peoples on whom regimes have been imposed by force.

Here are, among so many others, the questions to which answers must be found. And so that they may be answered clearly, I am asking them here, clearly and publicly, before the Legislature of a great nation which is ridiculously accused every day, as is ours, of warmongering, and I am certain that I speak in the name of all the men who want peace with liberty, the only peace worth living for.

Finally, our effort to unite and organize Europe must be considered a contribution to the defense of peace and liberty by all who believe that it is not sufficient to guarantee the security of nations and of individuals but that we must also, by assuring welfare and justice, enrich their existence and increase their attachment to society.

France is working toward this goal by the creation of communities of production of which the coal and steel pool, that bears the name of its moving spirit, President Schuman, is but a beginning and a preface for others that we are preparing. France is working toward this goal through the Council of Europe and the Strasbourg Assembly which she initiated. She is working toward it in seeking the formation of a European army—the nucleus of a future international army—to take its place, first of all, in the great Atlantic army whose illustrious leader General Eisenhower I wish to salute here today.

Passionately devoted to the realization of a European federation which will put an end to secular antagonisms, France has put aside her legitimate resentment against the enemy of yesterday, demanding of it only that it bring to the cause of cooperation the admission of its responsibilities as well as the proof of its redemption through the repudiation of its old regime and the sincere attachment to the cause of democracy. Convinced of the need for supranational institutions, France has declared herself prepared to grant to those bodies, in conformity with her Constitution and under condition of reciprocity, part of her sovereignty. And she hopes to convince the still hesitant nations that they will not curtail their sovereignty but on the contrary strengthen it by associating it with others, by uniting their resources and labor to increase their forces, by developing and coordinating their industrial and agricultural economies, by widening their markets, by raising the standard of living of their workers, in a word, by making of the old divided Europe, slow of decision, torn with antagonisms,

(Continued on page 575)

FOURTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AMERICAN STATES

Cooperation in World Struggle for Freedom

Address by the President¹

It is an honor to open this meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. I am happy to extend to you a wholehearted welcome to our country and to our capital city. On behalf of the United States, I hope that this will be a most satisfactory and successful meeting.

This is the fourth meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. This meeting, like the earlier ones, is held at a time of international danger. When the first meeting was held, in 1939, war had just broken out in Europe. As that conflict spread to nation after nation and threatened to extend to all parts of the world, the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held two more meetings, in 1940 and in 1942, to plan a common course of action against the common danger.

As a result of our concerted efforts, our countries did not become a theater of war. The nations of this hemisphere succeeded in protecting the American continents from invasion. And, as a result of our common efforts, the people of the Americas were able to contribute power and resources which turned the tide against aggression and brought victory to the forces of freedom.

Today, we meet again to consider our common defense. We meet again to work out ways and means by which our united strength may be employed in the struggle for freedom throughout the world.

The Heritage of Common Principles

The American republics all owe their national beginnings to the same set of ideals—the same concepts of human and international freedom. We

have all followed and we will continue to follow two basic principles. First, we believe that international affairs should be based upon cooperation among free and independent nations, and not upon coercion or force. Second, we believe that the aim and purpose of government is to promote the welfare of all the people—not just the privileged few.

These principles have long been the basis of relations among the American Republics. The same principles are now embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, where they have become the foundation of a new society of nations. The statesmen of the American Republics have shown their continuing devotion to these principles by the great and constructive work they have done in creating and strengthening the United Nations.

Today, these principles are under relentless attack from a center of power which denies the whole concept of human freedom—whether it be spiritual freedom, or economic freedom, or political freedom.

World Threat of Soviet Expansion

Communist imperialism attacks and undermines national independence and international cooperation. In their place, it substitutes the rule of force. Communist imperialism also seeks to destroy the system of government that serves the welfare of the people. Instead, it sets up a system under which the people exist only to serve the purposes of the government. As a result, the Soviet system is one of unbridled power, imposing slavery at home and aggression abroad.

The aggressive expansion of Soviet power threatens the whole world. In Europe, we see it trying to engulf the nations from which we have drawn our cultural heritage. If Soviet subversion and Soviet armed force were to overthrow these nations, the consequences for all of us in the Western Hemisphere would be disastrous. We would

¹Made before the opening session of the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Washington on Mar. 26 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

lose those cultural and religious ties which mean so much to us. The international trade on which we are so dependent would be violently disrupted. Worst of all, we would be confronted by a hostile power on the shores of the Atlantic, capable of using the great economic resources of our conquered friends to strike across the ocean at our own independence.

We must not and will not let that happen. We in the Western Hemisphere must help the free men of Europe who are resisting Soviet expansion.

In the Far East, Communist imperialism presents us with another threat. There, we see many new nations emerging, as our own countries once did, from colonial status to full independence. For these new nations, we of the Western Hemisphere have the greatest feeling of fellowship. But Communist imperialism has fallen upon these new nations with its weapons of internal subversion and external attack. It seeks to overpower them before they are strong enough to stand alone.

If Soviet communism were to be successful in this venture, it would be a terrible blow to the bright promise of the principles of freedom and peace which we uphold. The great manpower of Asia would become one of the instruments of the aggressive expansion of the Soviet system toward our own hemisphere.

Both to the East, therefore, and to the West, we are confronted by great perils. Our future progress, our very survival, lie in the defense of the world order of free nations of which we are a part. Our very existence depends upon the success of those principles which our countries stand for, and which we have supported in the United Nations. There is no safety for any of us in abandoning these principles. There will be no security in the world without the United Nations. Powerful and productive as the Western Hemisphere is, we cannot make it safe by building a wall around it.

Instead of withdrawing into our hemisphere in a hopeless attempt to find security through retreat, we must concert our defenses and combine our strength in order to support men in Europe and Asia who are battling for freedom. That is the only course that can lead to security or peace or freedom for us or for men anywhere in the world.

Recognition of this fact lies behind the aid the United States has given to the rebuilding of Europe. It lies behind the struggle the free nations are now waging in the hills of Korea. The resistance of the United Nations to aggression in Korea—a resistance that has the firm approval of all the nations represented here—is of momentous importance. It has shown that the free nations are determined to defend their ideals of national independence and human welfare.

The issue in Korea is the survival of the principles on which we have built our countries. The principle of national independence and self-government is at stake there, as well as the principle that government shall be for the welfare of the

people. If justice and order do not prevail in Korea, they will be in danger everywhere.

Heroic sacrifices are being made in Korea to check the forces of aggression and protect us against the terrible destruction and vastly greater sacrifices of a world conflict. By standing firm in Korea and by preparing to meet aggression elsewhere, we are doing our best to prevent a third world war.

Steps To Establish World Peace

This meeting in Washington, therefore, must consider not only what should be done to improve the defense of this hemisphere but also what measures we can best undertake to support and strengthen the United Nations in its effort to establish world peace.

We meet here as a region which has already, in the solemn treaty of Rio de Janeiro, announced its intention to defend itself through cooperative action. We are pledged to resist the common foe.

We must now plan as a primary task for the strengthening and the coordinated use of our defense forces in this hemisphere. We must also consider how we may best use our strength to support the cause of freedom against aggression throughout the world.

The success of our defense program depends upon our economic strength. In these troubled times, defense production must have prior claim upon our economic resources. We shall have to increase the production of strategic materials. We shall have to divert manufacturing capacity to defense purposes.

These necessities will create many difficult practical problems for our countries to solve. There will be shortages of basic materials and other commodities. There will be limitations on certain kinds of capital expansion.

The first step in solving these problems is to face them in a spirit of cooperation. We must recognize that we are engaged, as good neighbors, in a common enterprise that is vital to our survival as free and democratic nations. We must establish the principle of sharing our burdens fairly. We must act together to meet essential civilian needs, and, at the same time, we must act together to be sure that scarce supplies are limited to essential uses. We must try to prevent wild and speculative price movements in our international trade, whether in raw materials or manufactured products.

Our defense needs are not, of course, limited to the things that go into the making of weapons. We need to build up our economic strength in a much broader way. It is essential to our security that we constantly enlarge our economic capacity. Our defense needs include, in many areas, more food, better education, and better health services. They include, in certain cases, the building of roads, dams, or power plants.

We must remember that the real strength of the

free nations lies in the will and determination of their peoples. The free nations stand for economic progress and social advancement. They grow in strength by going forward along the road of greater economic opportunity for all.

Over the last 10 years, our countries have made great economic progress. In most of the countries represented here, national income is at least twice what it was in 1939.

An important factor in our advance is the program of technical cooperation which we have joined together to carry out. Joint projects for spreading technical knowledge have already made notable achievements in improving the health, education, and living standards of our people. We intend to press on with this kind of activity.

The American Republics are full of breathtaking possibilities for future economic development. These possibilities can be made realities only if we work and plan together for a long time ahead. I like to think, for example, of the possibility of developing vast areas of wilderness, such as the eastern slopes of the Andes, and turning them into new and fertile farm land.

I like to think of a project about which I talked to the President of Chile, which contemplates the diversion of water from those high mountain lakes between Bolivia and Peru for making a garden on the coast of South America to the west for Chile and Peru, and in return, giving Bolivia a seaport on the Pacific.

I had a very pleasant conversation with the President of Chile on that subject, and I like to think of the development of the Parana, Paraguay, and Uruguay rivers. Think that wonderful possibilities are in those great waterways for development, and those are only samples, for all over the continent of South America there are greater resources undeveloped than were ever in these United States of America. And I know that we can develop them for the welfare of the whole world, as well as for ourselves.

I like to think of the possibilities of industrial development in your countries. I remember with pride the part which this country played, even during the troubled times of the last war, in helping to create a steel industry in Brazil. I think with satisfaction of the progress that has been made by Chile and other countries in setting up factories and hydroelectric projects in recent years.

Our countries do not have unlimited resources to devote to creative developments such as these. We cannot do as much, in the midst of a defense emergency, as we could in normal times. But we must do all we can.

Our Goal—A Better World

It is the genius of our democratic type of society that we are constantly creative and constantly advancing. We hold out to all people the prospect of bettering their condition, not in the dim

Agenda

[Approved by the Council of the Organization on February 7 and 14, 1951]

I. Political and military cooperation for the defense of the Americas, and to prevent and repel aggression, in accordance with inter-American agreements and with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of that organization.

II. Strengthening of the internal security of the American Republics.

III. Emergency economic cooperation :

a) Production and distribution for defense purposes.

b) Production and distribution of products in short supply and utilization of necessary services to meet the requirements of the internal economies of the American Republics; and measures to facilitate in so far as possible the carrying out of programs of economic development.

future, not after some terrible and bloody upheaval, but steadily through the years, in the simple activities of their daily life.

In our countries, we do not measure our prosperity by the power of the state. We do not measure the progress of our society in terms of military might. We do not measure our advancement in terms of the profits or the luxuries of the few. Our yardstick is the welfare of the many. We think in terms of the average man—how he lives, what he can buy, and the freedom he enjoys. These are the standards by which we measure our development.

And, by these standards, we are marching steadily forward. We shall continue that march!

Our vision of progress is not limited to our own countries. We extend it to all the peoples of the world.

We know that people are very much alike in their basic aspirations, wherever they may be or whatever language they may speak. We recognize that the people of Russia, the people of the Soviet satellite states, are very much like us in what they want for themselves and their children. We hope that some day they will find it possible to turn their leaders from their present path of tyranny and aggression.

Our goal is self-development, not imperialism.

Our goal is peace, not war.

Our goal, not only for ourselves but for all peoples, is a better world—materially, morally, and spiritually.

EDITOR'S NOTE: João Neves de Fontoura, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States of Brazil then replied to President Truman. For text of a translation of the Foreign Minister's address, see news release 2, March 26, of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States.

Freedom—the Key to Hemisphere Solidarity and World Peace

Address by Secretary Acheson¹

I look forward with considerable pleasure to the prospect of working closely together with my colleagues of the Americas in this important meeting.

Our distinguished Brazilian colleague, Minister Neves da Fontoura, has already eloquently set before us the significance of this meeting in terms of our long inter-American tradition. That tradition dates back to the first International Conference of the American States to which this country had the honor to be host 60 years ago. Since then we have managed, by our determination, to preserve and greatly strengthen our freedom in spite of all perils.

More than that, we have built up a brotherhood of nations that time has tested. In the course of the decades, the foundations of our system have had time to set. Can anyone doubt that the men who worked to bring us together in the first Washington Conference would find their vision more than vindicated by the great Organization of American States as it exists today?

The significance of this meeting is appreciated, I believe, by free men all over the world.

It rests not alone on the work we have come together to do, as important as that is to our future and to theirs. Even more important than this is the fraternal way in which the American Republics have grown accustomed to working together.

We meet freely. We talk frankly, as people who understand each other and like each other. We have problems between us, and some of them are difficult. But there are no problems between us that will not yield to the good will and friendship we all bring to this meeting.

It is our hope that our consultations here and our cooperative actions will have a dual effect.

We hope that what we do here will produce sound and constructive results. We hope also—

indeed we know—that this meeting, as a demonstration of the kind of friendship among nations which may someday prevail universally, will convey inspiration and encouragement to men everywhere.

Partnership of the Free World

The larger significance of our meeting arises from the fact that we are a part, inescapably, of the partnership of the free world.

What is the partnership of the free world? It is something new in the world, and its meaning should be made clear to all.

Is it an alliance, like those which crisscrossed Europe in the last century? No, it is not like the old alliances, because it is not directed against anyone, nor does it aspire to rule or to conquest.

Is it a sphere of influence arrangement or a satellite system? No, it most assuredly is not, for no rulers in a master state dictate to the free nations.

The partnership of the free world is something different from any of these. It is a spiritual confederation of peoples as well as nations. It is a partnership which encompasses many differences. The states in it do not all have the same political or social institutions. They do not conform to any standard pattern. They do not have a single "way of life."

Each has its own set of hopes and anxieties, its own domestic problems, its own national traditions and desires.

What binds the nations of the free world together into a partnership is that they have a powerful interest in common: their concern for freedom.

Freedom is the key. This is what free nations have, and other nations do not. This is the heart of the matter, for without freedom, neither real peace, nor real security, nor any real progress is possible.

To the nation, freedom means national independence, freedom to work out its destinies in its own ways.

¹Made before the opening regular session of the fourth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States at Washington on Mar. 27 and released to the press on the same date.

To the people, freedom is not only the very breath of life itself but it is also the gateway of opportunity. Free men have the opportunity to better their lives, to abolish poverty, and to live in human dignity.

Freedom is the climate in which men can work to fulfill all the affirmative aspirations and values of their lives.

When people ask us, "What is it you are for, you men of the free world?" Then we say, "We're for freedom, because freedom is the key to everything else we want."

Where there is freedom, we can make peace prevail, we can govern ourselves the way we want, we can improve our land and grow more food. We can live side by side with people who think differently, who worship differently, who talk a different language—so long as they and we are both free, we have that one important thing in common.

This is not to say that any of us has fully realized our ideals of a free society. Our progress toward this goal is not always even, from week to week, or from month to month. But it is the ideal and the objective toward which, over the decades and the generations, we have been moving steadily forward.

The Communist Threat to Freedom

And now this freedom of ours is faced with a mortal threat.

The small group of men who rule the Soviet Union and pull the strings of the international Communist movement have a doctrine which is opposed to freedom.

Their doctrine is a blueprint for a Communist world, governed from the Kremlin.

This is the new imperialism. Its instruments are a formidable machine of war and the international Communist movement. With one or the other, and sometimes both, the new imperialism reaches out for more power and for rule over more people.

Never before have we faced a menace of this magnitude. Never before has there been so great a challenge to our determination to preserve our independence as nations.

But it is not only against the independence of governments that this new imperialism is directed. The freedom of people, of the individual man, is also its target.

Although the Communists have played upon the hopes of people for a better life, they have in practice been the enemies of progress. The new imperialists have contributed nothing but propaganda to the great cooperative efforts to improve standards of living among the peoples of the world. Instead, they use human misery as a political tool, callous to the cost.

This is the threat which jeopardizes freedom. It is a threat which has for us the greatest urgency, a threat which calls upon us as people and as nations to defend our freedom.

It calls upon us for action now.

No free man anywhere can safely disregard this threat. There is no free nation anywhere, large or small, whose freedom is secure. Freedom does not come in different sizes. Large states do not have more of it, nor small states less, according to their size. The defense of freedom is an obligation which falls upon all who are worthy of it.

And it is in this sense that the partnership of the free world is a spiritual confederation among those who value their freedom, and each, according to his capacity, will do his utmost to defend it.

This is the meaning of the great effort which the free nations are making. Its purpose is to assemble sufficient force to make it plain in advance that further aggression will not succeed.

In the face of the challenge of the new imperialism, the rapid increase of this deterrent force is the only real road to peace—the kind of peace in which the survival and growth of our free institutions will be possible.

The task is a great one. To perform it, each must do his full share. We are well begun, but the greater part lies still ahead of us.

Progress in the Defense of Freedom

In Korea, the principle of collective security has been put to the test. It has stood the test. Aggression has not been allowed to succeed. This is a history-making battle, a landmark, we may hope, on the road to world peace.

The forces of the United Nations are fighting a battle which is of vital significance to the security of all free nations. The cause of freedom owes a great debt to the men of many lands who are bearing arms in Korea and making heavy sacrifices under the banner of the United Nations. And the lessons learned in the defense of Korea should enable the United Nations to develop a collective security system that will be better prepared to meet aggression in the future, if it occurs.

Heartening progress is also being made in another sector in the defense of freedom: in recent months, major steps have been taken toward strengthening the defenses of free Europe. The work that is now going forward to build an integrated and effective defense organization under General Eisenhower contributes to the security of this hemisphere.

It is a happy and a significant coincidence that the visit of the President of France, M. Auriol, to this country comes while this meeting is in progress and that we shall have the pleasure of hearing him address this assembly. This fortunate circumstance symbolizes to the world the relationship between our efforts in this hemisphere and those of our brothers in Europe, in behalf of our common aspirations for peace and freedom.

Impact of Mobilization on Economy

In this country, the mobilization of our strength is beginning to have a substantial impact upon our

economy and upon the lives of our citizens. By last week, the size of our armed forces had been doubled over the level that prevailed before the attack upon Korea, and many more young men and women are being called into military service.

Although total production is increasing, the requirements of defense are such that curtailment of many goods and services has been necessary. The burden of taxation is being heavily increased. We are seeking to hold in check the strong inflationary pressures which have been generated by the defense program.

It is our intention to prepare an economic base that will have the stamina to sustain this substantial defense program over as long a period as may be necessary, and which would be capable of further rapid expansion if war should be forced upon us.

The scale and complexity of this endeavor, side-by-side with the changes wrought throughout the hemisphere by the defense mobilization, inevitably creates many difficulties for us all.

We in the United States have been mindful of the many difficult questions raised for our neighbors of this hemisphere by our mobilization program.

Looking ahead to the intensification of this program in the future, it is evident that the closest working relationship must be established among all of us in the Americas in order that our common effort for our common defense may realize the best that is in all of us. Together, we must seek ways of avoiding any uncontrolled and unfair distribution of the sacrifices that our peoples face.

With this in mind, on the day that the United States entered upon its emergency program of economic and military preparedness, it made known its proposal that this emergency meeting of consultation be held.

We have before us, at this meeting, a realistic agenda that sets forth the questions to which we, the American Republics, must jointly find the answers.

We shall find these answers in the spirit of cooperation that is basic to our inter-American tradition. We are cooperators. Our great tradition illustrates the principle that the spirit of cooperation and the spirit of bargaining are mutually incompatible. They exclude each other. For in bargaining, each man tries to reap advantage for himself to the detriment of the man he deals with. It is the genius of our inter-American system—and the effectiveness of our defense rests on it—that mutual cooperation, instead, has been the means by which all have benefited.

This is the spirit with which we address ourselves to the problems on our agenda.

Measures Necessary for Defense

One question which each of us faces, in the light of our hemispheric position, is: In what way can each of us best develop our military capabilities

in order that we may have the most effective individual and collective self-defense against armed attack?

We may wish to consider measures which can be taken by our respective Governments to enable the Inter-American Defense Board to carry on its functions most efficiently and to prepare, at the earliest possible time, a coordinated defense for this hemisphere.

In considering the military defensive strength of the hemisphere, it is evident that any disturbances to the peaceful relations among the American Republics can only have the effect of weakening our total defensive capabilities. As part of the effort to bulwark our defenses against aggression, it may serve a useful purpose for us to strengthen our determination to make fullest use of available machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In view of the effect upon our hemispheric security of the danger of aggression in other parts of the world, a related question requires our attention. That is, how we, the American Republics, can best support the United Nations in strengthening its capacity to deal with aggression.

The interests of the Republics of this hemisphere in the building of a world of law and order are greatly served by the progress which the United Nations has been making in strengthening its collective security system. The success of this effort depends upon our willingness to back up the United Nations.

Our deliberations here will measurably strengthen our common security if they lead to action on the part of the American Republics in helping to fulfill the purposes of the uniting-for-peace resolution of the United Nations.

The use of subversion and other forms of indirect aggression by the international Communist movement requires us, as a vital part of our defense program, to examine carefully our present internal security procedures and improve them where necessary.

It is equally important that we should consult as to the practical steps we may take, together and individually, to insure the maximum protection and strengthening of our basic democratic institutions. They are the heart of what we are seeking to defend against Communist undermining, and to safeguard these institutions, while we prevent their abuse, requires our constant vigilance.

These are some of the matters which are involved, either directly or indirectly, in strengthening our military security.

Economic Problems

The economic problems before us pervade our whole effort and touch upon the life of every individual in the hemisphere. We must gather up our joint economic forces for the common defense, not only in one country or some countries but throughout our interlocking economic community.

This means vital adjustments for all of us. These would fall to us even though some among us did not participate in our endeavor. For the sacrifices that the United States and its people are now making inevitably have their effect upon all whose economies are related to our own.

Are these effects, then, to fall indiscriminately and without control on peoples everywhere? Or are we going to provide, by cooperation, that the essential needs of all our peoples are met; that production for defense is pushed to a level which will serve to accomplish the purpose of averting a third world war; and that the sacrifice of unessentials is fairly distributed? The Government of the United States had this question very much in mind when it requested the convening of this meeting.

In this country, we are already allocating materials required for defense production so that they will be available only in limited quantities for normal civilian demands.

Your countries, I know, are also facing the problems of increased production for the defense of our hemisphere, production on which the survival of freedom for every one of us depends. In most cases, your chief problem is to effect emergency increases in the production of essential materials without, at the same time, inviting disaster when a more normal situation returns. The United States understands this problem. We do not underestimate it. Certainly, we must consider what practicable means there may be, within the terms of our great purpose, to deal with this risk together.

The problem of curbing inflation is no less important to each of our countries and to our common purpose. The danger of uncontrolled inflation in any country threatens its people. It also weakens the economic stability of the hemisphere as a whole. We must make the most strenuous effort together to take the steps that are necessary to keep inflationary tendencies under control. This must be done not only by international action but by each of our Governments within its own jurisdiction.

Undoubtedly, we shall not be able to foresee all the measures which our respective Governments will find it necessary to take in dealing with the economic defense program. As much as circumstances permit, we should endeavor to consult with one another and act cooperatively in this field, particularly, to our mutual and our common benefit.

In his address to the meeting yesterday, President Truman spoke of the concern felt by this country for the need of carrying forward the programs of economic cooperation.

It is my hope that we shall all continue to give as much support as we can to these measures by which our people are enabled to improve the conditions of their life.

The programs of economic development and

Pan American Day, 1951¹

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS April 14, 1951, will mark the sixty-first anniversary of the founding of the Pan American Union, which now serves as the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States; and

WHEREAS the Organization of American States has demonstrated its effectiveness in the maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere; and

WHEREAS the inter-American system may serve as an example of progress in the achievement of peace, security, and cooperation; and

WHEREAS the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States will convene at Washington on March 26, 1951, to consider action to be taken in the common defense of these republics and of the free world:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Saturday, April 14, 1951, as Pan American Day, and I direct the appropriate officials of the Government to arrange for the display of the flag of the United States on all public buildings on that day.

I also invite the Governors of the States, Territories, and possessions of the United States to issue similar proclamations for the observance of Pan American Day. And I urge all interested organizations, and the people generally, to unite in suitable ceremonies commemorative of the founding of the Pan American Union, thereby testifying to the close bonds of friendship existing between the people of the United States and those of the other American republics.*

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-third day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-one, and of the Independ-

[SEAL] ence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-fifth.



By the President:

DEAN ACHESON

Secretary of State.

¹Proc. 2920, 16 Fed. Reg. 2697.

technical cooperation, in many ways, effectively support the emergency defense program. Such programs as those which increase food supply, combat disease, increase the output of materials in short supply, and improve working conditions and labor standards are of double importance in this period.

Insofar as we can, we must seek to fulfill both the immediate requirements of the defense program and our long-range objective of economic development and social progress.

High Purpose of Meeting

We must always keep our goals in mind. While we work together here to find solutions for these difficult problems with which the rapid development of our political, economic, and military strength confronts us, we must never allow ourselves to forget the real nature of the endeavor which brings us together.

Our cause is above all the cause of freedom, of international morality. It is, therefore, the cause of peace, and of the well-being of man himself.

So that the world at large and our own peoples shall not mistake the greatness of our purpose, it is my hope that this historic meeting will create a declaration of the principles for which we stand and which we are determined to defend.

May our meeting send forth a beacon of hope and inspiration from the New World to all mankind.

Draft Resolutions

Project on Internal Security

Doc. 35
Submitted Mar. 27, 1951

Submitted by Bolivia, Ecuador, United States, and Uruguay

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics

CONSIDERING:

That the American Republics at the Ninth International Conference of American States with specific reference to "the preservation and defense of democracy in America" resolved to adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent activities directed, assisted or instigated by foreign governments, organizations or individuals tending to overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats or by any other means, the free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations;

That, to complement measures of mutual cooperation which may assure the defense as well as the economic and social well-being of the people, it is necessary to adopt laws and regulations for internal security;

That in their concern to combat the action of international communist imperialist action, they are deeply conscious of and desire to reaffirm their determination to preserve, strengthen and safeguard the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American Republics which the agents of international communist imperialism are attempting to abolish through the exploitation and abuse of the self same democratic freedoms which they seek to subvert;

That, within each of the American Republics there exists a vast body of laws laboriously worked out over generations, designed to assure its political defense;

That it is in accordance with the highest interests of the American Republics to assure that each of them may be able to meet the special and immediate threat of international communist imperialism;

That, since international communist imperialism recognizes no boundaries, the present emergency requires, in addition to strictly internal measures, a high degree of international cooperation among the American Republics, looking to the eradication of any threat of subversive activity menacing the free and democratic way of life of the American Republics;

Recommends:

That, mindful of their unity of purpose, each of the American Republics examines its respective laws and regulations and puts into effect those modifications which it may consider necessary to assure that subversive activities of the agents of international communist imperialism directed against each respective American Republic may be effectively prevented and appropriately punished; and

Resolves:

a) To recommend that, in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, they enact the necessary measures in the respective American countries to regulate transit across international boundaries of those aliens who there is reason to expect will attempt to carry out subversive acts against the defense of the American Continent; and

b) To bear in mind, in the application of this resolution, the necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most efficacious means the rights of the human person as well as their firm determination to preserve, defend and safeguard the basic democratic institutions of the people of the American Republics;

c) To request the Secretary General of the Organization of American States that, for the purpose of facilitating the fulfillment of the ends of this resolution and, in accordance with Articles 51, 83f and 84 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, be set up within the administrative framework of the Secretariat a technical staff with the following duties:

1. To make technical studies concerning the definition, prevention, and punishment as crimes, of sabotage and espionage with respect to acts against an American Republic and directed from abroad or against the defense of America;

2. To make technical studies of measures by means of which the respective American Republics may better protect, maintain and defend their national security against treason, sedition and other subversive acts directed from abroad or against the defense of America;

3. To make technical studies concerning measures to prevent the abuse of freedom of transit within the hemisphere including clandestine and illicit travel and the misuse of travel documents, designed to weaken the defense of America.

This technical staff will transmit the reports and conclusions resulting from its studies to the Council of the Organization of American States, which in turn will transmit them to the respective American States; if one of these States so requests and the Council by a simple majority of votes so decides, a specialized conference of the governments of the American Republics will be called on the matter in conformity with the terms of Article 93 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.

Examination of Defense Resources

Doc. 42
Submitted Mar. 27, 1951

Submitted by Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Paraguay, United States, and Uruguay

WHEREAS:

The American Republics, as Members of the United Nations, have pledged themselves to unite their efforts with those of other States to maintain international peace and security and take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression;

International peace and security has been threatened by the acts of aggression in Korea, and the United Nations, pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, has taken action to restore peace in that area; and

In order to ensure that the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly on November 3, 1950, adopted the resolution entitled "Uniting for Peace",

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States

Declares:

That the present world situation requires the positive support by the American Republics of: (1) The collective defense of the Western Hemisphere through the Organization of American States. (2) The prevention and suppression of aggression in other parts of the world through the United Nations; and

Recommends:

1. That each of the American Republics should immediately examine its resources and determine what steps it can take to contribute to the defense of the Western Hemisphere and to United Nations collective security efforts and to the accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the General Assembly.

2. That each of the American Republics should give particular attention to the development and maintenance of elements within its national armed forces so trained, organized and equipped that they could, in accordance with its capabilities and constitutional processes, promptly be made available, for (1) the defense of the Western Hemisphere and (2) for service in support of action taken by the United Nations.

Inter-American Military Cooperation

Doc. 45
Submitted Mar. 27, 1951

Submitted by Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay, United States, and Uruguay

WHEREAS:

The American Republics have assumed obligations under the Charter of the Organization of American States and in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to assist any American State subjected to an armed attack and to act together for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent;

The peace and security of all the American Republics are threatened by the expansionist designs of international communism; and

It is urgently necessary for the sovereign states of America to develop their military capabilities for individual and collective self-defense against armed attack in order to be in a position to contribute effectively to action by the Organization of American States against aggression. The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States

Resolves:

That the American Republics, in accordance with their capabilities and constitutional processes, should so direct their national military policies that, through self-help and mutual aid:

I. Each will strengthen those armed forces and resources best adapted to the collective defense and maintain those armed forces in such status that they could be deployed promptly in the defense of the hemisphere, and

II. Each will cooperate with the others in military matters to the end that the necessary collective strength of the hemisphere is developed to combat aggression.

Requests:

The Inter-American Defense Board to present promptly to the Governments plans for the preparation of the armed forces of the American Republics for effective collective defense of the hemisphere, and

Agrees:

That each American Government should support actively the work of the IADB and should consider promptly all plans and other recommendations of that body, and

That the respective Delegations of the American Republics to the IADB shall carry on such consultations as may be necessary to facilitate approval and implementation by the Governments of the Board's plans and other recommendations in the shortest possible time.

Importance of Peaceful Relations Among American States

Doc. 57
Submitted Mar. 28, 1951

Submitted by Mexico and United States

WHEREAS:

It is desirable that the energies of each American Republic be devoted to strengthening its ability to contribute to international peace and security in the Western Hemisphere and to the prevention and suppression of international communist aggression, and

Any breach of friendly relations among the American Republics can only serve to provide aid and comfort to the leaders of such aggression as well as to weaken the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States

Reaffirms:

The solemn obligations undertaken by all the American Republics to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means; and

Resolves:

That the American Republics will make every effort to settle any disputes between them which threaten friendly relations, in the shortest possible time, by direct bilateral negotiations, and will promptly submit such disputes as they may be unable to settle by negotiation to other available procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and

Declares:

That the faithful observance by the American Republics of the commitments not to intervene in the internal or external affairs of other States and to settle any disputes among them by peaceful means makes it possible for each of the Republics to concentrate the development of its capabilities upon the tasks best adapted to the role each is most qualified to assume in the collective defense against aggression.

U.S. Delegation

On March 26, the Department of State announced the United States delegation to the fourth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, which convened at Washington on that date, as follows:

Member

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State

Principal Adviser

Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State
 Willard L. Beaulac, United States Ambassador to Colombia
 Henry G. Bennett, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State
 W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Officer in Charge, Central American and Panama Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State; *Secretary General*
 Merwin L. Bohan, United States Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council
 Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board
 Winthrop G. Brown, Director, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State
 Paul C. Daniels, United States Ambassador to Ecuador
 John C. Dreier, United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States
 Ralph Hilton, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
 Edward A. Jamison, Officer in Charge, Special Political Problems, Office of Regional American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
 Richard N. Johnson, Foreign Trade Policy Adviser, Office of the Special Assistant to the President
 Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor
 Charles F. Knox, Jr., Consul General, Curaçao
 John M. Leddy, Deputy Director, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State
 William McChesney Martin, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
 Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State; *Press Relations Officer*
 Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles, USN, United States Delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board
 Rafael Pico, Member, United States Section, Caribbean Commission
 Fred J. Rossiter, Associate Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture
 William Sanders, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
 H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State
 Kenneth Iverson, President, Institute of Inter-American Affairs
 Hobart A. Spalding, Intelligence Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
 Lynn U. Stambaugh, Member, Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank
 Leroy D. Stinebower, Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
 Charles A. Sullivan, Office of International Programs, Munitions Board, Department of Defense
 Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State
 Francis A. Truslow, Consultant, Department of State
 Maj. Gen. Robert L. Walsh, USAF, United States Delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board
 Ivan B. White, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
 Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
 Frederick Winant, Director, Foreign Coordination Division, Defense Production Administration
 Herbert A. Woolley, Chief, Trade Analysis Branch, Financial Policy, Trade Development Division, Economic Cooperation Administration
 George Wythe, Director, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
 Thomas C. Baker, Chief, Foreign Branch, Supplies Division, Department of Interior
 William E. Foley, Chief, Internal Securities Section, Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

President Confers With Irish Foreign Minister, Sean MacBride

[Released to the press by the White House March 23]

Sean MacBride, Minister for External Affairs for Ireland, today paid a courtesy call on the President at the White House prior to his return to Ireland. President Truman and Mr. MacBride had a friendly discussion concerning the present state of relations between the United States and Ireland. The Secretary of State was present during the interview.

Mr. MacBride has been on an unofficial visit to the United States since March 10. The primary purpose of his trip was to address the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick at Philadelphia on St. Patrick's Day. While in Washington, Mr. MacBride saw various Government officials and attended an official luncheon given in his honor at Prospect House.

Letters of Credence

Uruguay

The newly appointed Ambassador of Uruguay, José A. Mora, presented his credentials to the President on March 26. For a translation of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 228 of March 26.

Auriol—Continued from page 565

distrustful of herself, a new and harmonious organism animated by one soul and adapted to the needs and exigencies of the modern world.

Patiently and untiringly, we shall pursue the realization of these United States of a free Europe which, with full respect for the independence and dignity of all nations, will join the United States of America to work still more effectively for the welfare and peace of the world. In this way, we shall translate into actuality the prophecy of Victor Hugo who said, 75 years ago, on the eve of the Philadelphia Exhibition:

The Future is already foreseeable. It belongs to a united and peaceful democracy. And you, our delegates to the Philadelphia Exhibition, you are beginning under our eyes the superb realization which the Twentieth Century will witness: the union of the United States of America and of the United States of Europe . . . Go, workers of France, go, workers of Paris who know how to think, go, girl artisans of Paris who know how to fight, useful men, brave women, go and carry the good news, go and tell the New World that the Old World is young. You are the ambassadors of fraternity. The two continents will exchange not only their products, their trade, their industries, but also their ideas and the progress they make in justice as well as in prosperity.

Gentlemen, I would be happy if, today, I could have been one of those useful ambassadors of friendship and of peace.

Essentials of a Peace With Japan

by John Foster Dulles¹

I AM GRATEFUL to Whittier College for giving me this opportunity to make a progress report on peace in the Pacific. That subject is, I suppose, of particular interest to Americans who live on our west coast. Actually peace in the Pacific is equally important to all of us, for danger and effort can no longer be localized.

Two principal postwar goals of the Soviet Communists are Japan and Germany. If Russia's rulers could exploit the industrial and human potential of either Japan or Germany, it would be a sad day for peace. That would involve such a shift in the balance of world power that these new imperialists might calculate that they could start a general war with good prospect of success. They know that Japan, even alone, was able seriously to menace the free world in the Pacific and they imagine vast possibilities out of a combination, under their direction, of the Asiatic power of Russia, China, and Japan.

Fortunately the Japanese people do not want that combination, which would make them the front line of a new aggression which in the end would mean disaster far greater than that which they have already suffered. They are in a mood to reject militarism in all of its aspects, and they want fellowship with the nations which genuinely seek peace through collective security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. Thus there is the opportunity to make a Japanese peace which will not only end the old war but give new strength and hope to those who strive to prevent another war.

To achieve that kind of peace is the President's mandate to the mission which I have the honor to head, and President Truman, Secretary Acheson, and Secretary Marshall are each of them giving this effort their close personal attention, to the end that this great goal shall be achieved.

Since our mission was established last January,

we have had a busy time. All or some of us have been to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and England. We have consulted in Washington with ambassadors of other nations and also with the many in the executive and legislative branches of our Government whose wisdom, judgment, and special knowledge can be helpful. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, its Far Eastern subcommittee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House have extended the utmost cooperation. As a result of all this, we have seen the possibility of formulating peace terms which should command general support here at home, which should involve no insoluble differences with our allies, and which should be acceptable to Japan, which we consider has now earned the right to be consulted.

So this week we have begun to discuss, with our allies principally concerned in the Pacific war, actual texts which might be incorporated in an eventual treaty. These texts are still "working papers," tentative and suggestive only.

We contemplate a simple document, limited to the essentials of peace.

PREAMBLE

Our present thought is to have a preamble to the treaty which would afford the Japanese people the opportunity to express their intentions as to matters which are important but which for one reason or another do not lend themselves to absolute contractual undertakings.

For example, Japan might indicate its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations. There is no doubt about the reality of that intention, but we think that Japan's application for membership, when it comes, should bear the unmistakable imprint of Japan's own desire without the slightest taint of external compulsion. Similarly the Japanese may want to express their

¹ Address made at Whittier College, Whittier, Calif. on Mar. 31 and released to the press on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4171.

intention to carry forward the new ideals as to human rights and like matters which are largely embodied in Japanese legislation under the occupation and which are the subject of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They may want to declare their intention, in public and private trade and commerce, to conform to international accepted fair practices.

Japan's intentions in these respects are vitally important and go to the heart of our future relations. But except as these matters have already been spelled out in international conventions which Japan could and would adopt, they do not lend themselves to peace-treaty obligations, which should only be such as can be precisely formulated so that the parties will clearly know just what are their rights and duties.

TERRITORY

The treaty proper would prescribe the territory over which the Japanese will hereafter be sovereign. It is contemplated generally speaking that Japan's sovereignty should be limited in accordance with the agreed surrender terms. That would mean sovereignty over the four home islands and minor adjacent islands. There would be a renunciation by Japan of all rights, titles, and claims to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Antarctic area. Also the treaty might contemplate that in the Ryukyu and Bonin islands there could be United Nations trusteeship and continuing United States administrative responsibility.

The South Sakhalin and Kurile Islands were allotted to Russia at Yalta and are actually in Russian possession. Any peace-treaty validation of Russia's title should, we suggest, be dependent upon Russia's becoming a party to that treaty.

SECURITY

The security of Japan itself should, we think, be worked out through individual and collective self-defense arrangements authorized by the United Nations Charter. Thus the peace treaty itself need only affirm that, upon the coming into force of the peace, Japan would in fact possess what the Charter of the United Nations refers to as the "inherent right" of sovereign nations in these respects.

COMMERCIAL

As regards commercial arrangements, we do not think that the treaty of peace should itself at-

tempt to define what should be the future permanent relations between the allies and Japan. These might better be left for subsequent negotiation between a free Japan and other friendly nations. However, to prevent confusion and to minimize discrimination immediately following the coming into force of the treaty, Japan might, for such a period as 3 years, agree to accord most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied Powers, except that Japan would not, in any matter, be required to extend more favorable treatment than is accorded it. Similarly, as regards civil air-traffic rights, Japan might for 3 years, and pending the conclusion of civil air-transport agreements, grant the Allied Powers not less favorable conditions than those prevailing at the time of the coming into force of the treaty.

PROPERTY AND CLAIMS

With respect to property and claims, the treaty of peace might give the Allied Powers the right generally to vest, retain, and dispose of Japanese property within their territory, while Japan should return prewar allied property in Japan and validate prewar claims belonging to Allied Powers and their nationals.

The foregoing matters can, we believe, now be dealt with with considerable precision. There are others which are still subject to exploration and development.

JAPAN'S SECURITY

Since Japan is now thoroughly disarmed and materially and legally unable to maintain armed forces, there is need for provisional security measures. Accordingly, with the authority of the President, and following conversations with committees of Congress, I stated publicly in Japan that, if the Japanese wanted it, the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States armed forces in and about Japan, so that the coming into force of a treaty of peace would not leave Japan a vacuum of power and, as such, an easy prey to such aggression as has already shown itself in nearby Korea. This suggestion of mine was warmly welcomed by the Japanese Government and the people generally so that it is now in order to study the implementation of such an arrangement.

Since Japan is an island, its security is strongly influenced by sea and air power—power which the United States is in a position to exercise in the Pacific. The defense of Japan need not require, either now from the United States or ultimately from Japan, as large ground forces as

might be thought to be necessary if Japan had common land boundaries with militaristic powers.

PACIFIC SECURITY

Bound up with the problem of Japan's security is the broader problem of security in the Pacific. Japan should hereafter make some contribution of its own to security, but this should never be the pretext for militarism that could be an aggressive threat. Thus the problem has a dual aspect.

No nation able to make a dependable contribution to security should get a "free ride." In our Senate, the Vandenberg Resolution has laid down for the United States the basic proposition that collective-security arrangements should be based upon "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The United Nations Charter also establishes that all peace-loving states should stand ready to contribute armed forces, assistance, and facilities for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. That is one aspect of the problem. The other side of the problem is that Japan should never again develop armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The peace we seek is one which will for all time liberate Japan's neighbors and indeed the Japanese people from the nightmare of militarism.

When we were in Canberra, Australia, our mission had significant discussions on this subject with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand. They made convincingly clear the attitude of their peoples on this subject. Now we are working actively to find the ways to secure the desired results.

We believe that out of our discussions, which are now well advanced, there will emerge a series of arrangements which on the one hand will enable the Japanese to make their own indispensable contribution to preventing their nation's being forced into the service of the new imperialism that ominously threatens from the mainland and which on the other hand will effectively assure that there will be no unbridled rearmament which could become an offensive threat.

The United States is able and daily growing more able to exert a mighty influence for peace and to make peace in the Pacific more secure than it has ever been before. We can see the way to remove the pall of fear which results from Japan's past conduct and from the present Communist menace. But that is not a task which we would or should undertake single-handed and alone. In the Pacific, as elsewhere, security is a cooperative enterprise. Those who wish to cooperate for security can share the protection of immense deterrent power which, in the words of the United

Nations Charter, "shall not be used, save in the common interest."

Since the arrangements for peace and security in the Pacific will in part be outside of the peace treaty and since the whole problem is not yet fully explored, we consider that any presently suggested treaty provisions are to be supplemented in the light of the outcome of the promising exchanges of views which are now taking place and to which we attach the utmost importance. No one should assume that the United States takes this problem lightly or that we shall accept a solution that will be illusory.

REPARATIONS

As regards reparations, the United States does not question the inherent justice of the proposition that Japan should make good the damage done to others by its aggression. Reparation is, however, not merely a matter of what is just but of what is economically practicable, without disastrous consequences. We have closely examined this problem. Considerable industrial machinery has already been removed from Japan and given to countries having reparation claims. Also there is substantial Japanese property within allied countries which, as indicated, should be applicable to the satisfaction of claims. It is, however, not easy to see the possibility of Japan's providing future reparation out of her remaining capital assets or as a surplus from her current economic activity over coming years.

One of the gravest problems which confront Japan, and it equally concerns the reparation creditors, is whether Japan, deprived of its formerly owned sources of raw material and with a population of 85 million on four relatively small and barren islands, can maintain the standard of living and employment necessary to prevent widespread social unrest. This, if it occurred, would inevitably give rise to dangerous expansionist and explosive tendencies, which Japan's Communist neighbors would joyously exploit.

The United States, to prevent social and economic unrest within Japan since the occupation began, has advanced about 2 billion dollars for relief and economic assistance. That is a realistic measure of how seriously the United States views this problem and its responsibility as principal occupying power. However, the United States is not prepared after the occupation ends to continue indefinitely such economic relief. Neither is it willing in effect to pay Japanese reparations by putting into Japan what reparation creditors would take out. The United States considers indeed that its postwar advances have a certain priority status.

We doubt that it is practicable to get the essential over-all and long-range results which are sought, if the treaty also seeks to extract repara-

tion payments other than in terms of the Japanese assets already received from Japan or within the territory of the Allied Powers. However, the United States has not closed its mind on this subject, and it is, with an open mind, actively exchanging views with countries which were most grievously damaged by Japanese aggression.

ECONOMIC DISABILITIES

Some suggestions have been made as to imposing upon the Japanese economic disabilities as, for example, requiring a dismantling of a part of Japan's industrial plants, particularly her ship-building capacity. As experience in Germany has shown, such provisions cannot be carried out without arousing great public bitterness. If the peace treaty required the first postwar Japanese Government physically to decimate Japan's industrial equipment, it would impose an almost inhuman burden, and the consequences would almost surely be against the best interests of the Allied Powers.

FISHERIES

It has been suggested, particularly along the Pacific coast, that the treaty of peace might itself attempt permanently to regulate the problem of Japanese participation in high-seas fisheries. To attempt that would almost surely postpone indefinitely both the conclusion of peace and the obtaining of the results which are desired.

There is, I believe, a considerable possibility of agreement between the United States and Japanese fishing interests. However, the treaty of peace is not a treaty merely between the United States and Japan; it is a treaty which we hope will be signed by all of the 53 allies. Most of these nations have their own fishing problems and their own theories of solution, which differ widely. No quick results can be won by attempting to make the peace treaty into a universal convention on high-seas fishing.

When I was in Japan, the Prime Minister advised me that the Japanese Government stood ready to negotiate fisheries agreements as soon as peace restores to Japan the possibility of independent sovereign action. He said that in the meantime the Japanese Government would prohibit Japanese nationals and Japanese vessels from going into conserved fisheries in all waters, and he mentioned specifically those off the coasts of the United States, Canada, and Alaska.

The Japanese now see the importance of avoiding practices which in the past brought Japan much ill will, and, if we can hold to our tentative timetable, there can, I believe, be an early and equitable settlement of this thorny problem.

A PEACE OF RECONCILIATION

From the foregoing it can be seen that the Japanese peace settlement we seek, while it would confirm the cut-back of Japan's territory to her home islands, would contemplate that Japan would be a sovereign and sustaining member of the free world. She would contribute in due course to collective security in accordance with her means but without developing armament which could be an offensive threat. Also, from an economic standpoint, Japan would be expected to get along without such subsidies as the United States has been providing during the occupation. On the other hand Japan would be restored to a position of equality, free of burdensome and discriminatory conditions. In essence the peace would be one of reconciliation.

That is not the kind of peace which victors usually grant to a vanquished nation which has committed armed aggression on a vast scale. It is not surprising that some, made bitter and distrusting by Japan's past conduct, would like to impose upon Japan continuing burdens and restrictions. Some of these taken separately seem to have justification, and perhaps no one of them alone would be of decisive historical significance. In the aggregate, however, they would fundamentally change the character of the peace settlement.

The major objective of any Japanese peace treaty is to bring the Japanese people hereafter to live with others as good neighbors. That does not require that the Japanese people should be pampered. It does mean that the victors should not take advantage of Japan's present helpless state to impose for the future unequal conditions. It means that the peace settlement should restore the vanquished to a position of dignity and equality among the nations.

The peace would be a peace of trust, not because the past justifies trust but because the act of extending trust usually evokes an effort to merit trust. It would be a peace of opportunity, in that it would afford the Japanese people the same opportunity to develop peacefully their domestic economy and their international relations as are enjoyed by most of the other free nations of the world.

UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY

In proposing that kind of peace, the United States assumes a serious responsibility, for the results cannot be guaranteed. We have, however, a duty to exercise our best judgment as to the kind of peace which will endure. Circumstances have made our duty inescapable.

In the great war in the Pacific, we had valiant allies who, through long, hard years, poured out

life and treasure according to their means. But the United States possessed most of the means required for victory in the Pacific. The United States has carried the responsibility of occupation, and the accomplishments of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander represent a moral investment to which his countrymen cannot honorably be indifferent. The United States has contributed the economic aid which has prevented the postwar misery which would have exposed Japan to capture by communism. The United States is the member of the free world which possesses large present and prospective military power in the western Pacific, and today we are the principal contributor to the United Nations effort in Korea, which fends off danger to Japan, to our Pacific allies, as well as to ourselves.

These are some of the circumstances which require the United States to exercise an initiative for peace; to do so while there is still time; and to shape that initiative with all of the wisdom and all of the vision that is available. For a misjudgment as to timing or as to substance can bring incalculable disaster to all mankind.

The United States does not consider that it has any monopoly of responsibility nor any monopoly of experience, wisdom, and enlightenment that are required. We have no desire to "go it alone," nor have we the slightest thought of dictating. We continuously have sought and shall seek the views of others, and indeed our present suggestions are a composite, not deriving from any single source. They reflect the ideas of many, and the United Kingdom and Australia are two important sources of actual language that we accept. However, in the last analysis the United States cannot, in justice to our own people or indeed to others, become cosponsor of a peace settlement which in our judgment, made after ample consideration without arrogance and in humbleness of spirit, would throw unnecessary and intolerable burdens of a military or economic character upon the United States and jeopardize the lasting peace that the war was fought to win.

NO VETO

Happily the exchanges of views which have taken place have, with one exception, been altogether cordial, and no basic disagreements have developed. The Government of the Soviet Union is perhaps an exception. For 3 months its representative joined with us in full and frank discussions. But now that a peace treaty with Japan seems actually to be in the offing, the Soviet leaders seem to have taken fright. The Soviet Government has publicly announced that it will not resume discussions with us.

When peace is far off, the Russian leaders speak lovingly of peace. But when peace comes near, they shun peace like the plague.

We continue to hope that the Soviet leaders will join in a treaty of peace which would cost them nothing and which would start a relaxing of tensions which would be felt all around the globe. We are ready to give scrupulously full consideration to any views they may express. We shall steadily urge that they join in the Japanese peace.

Fortunately, however, Soviet participation is not indispensable. The Soviet Union has no legal power to veto. It has no moral due bills, for its vast takings in Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles repay it a thousandfold for its 6 days of nominal belligerency. Japan, unlike Germany and Austria, is not divided by zones of occupation.

In relation to Japan there is the opportunity to show which of the Allies of World War II now have the genuine will for peace. There is the opportunity for them to make peace so righteous that the example will hearten and uplift men everywhere. That is the opportunity; and to its challenge we are determined worthily to respond.

Procedure for Filing Claims Against Closed Institutions in Japan

[Released to the press March 27]

The Closed Institutions Liquidation Commission (CILC), an agency of the Japanese Government, has invited the filing of certain types of claims arising outside Japan against closed financial institutions now being liquidated by the CILC. This invitation relates only to a limited class of claims against approximately 800 institutions which are undergoing liquidation, and claims received by the CILC no later than July 16, 1951, will be paid in yen to the extent permitted by available assets. The closed institutions are in general banks, development companies, and wartime financial institutions concerned with colonial or other overseas expansion or war production. The complete list of institutions against which claims may be filed appears in the *Official Gazette* of the Japanese Government for January 24, 1951, No. 1446, English language edition, which is available in the United States in approximately 225 college, university, and public libraries, and other public and semipublic institutions. In addition, the Department has available a limited number of copies of the January 24 issue of the *Official Gazette*.

Depositors, debenture holders, and stockholders are specifically requested by the CILC not to file, since their claims are known and will be paid in accordance with CILC procedures without the filing of a claim. Unnecessary filing of known claims, it is felt by the Japanese agency, would merely serve to encumber its machinery for processing claims.

No information is available as to the extent to which realizable assets may permit the satisfaction of claims now to be received. It should be noted, however, that whereas this category of claims includes those originating outside Japan, the resources available to the CILC are necessarily limited to the assets in Japan of the financial institutions which it is liquidating.

Neither the Department of State, the United States Political Adviser for Japan, nor the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is equipped to be of any assistance in the filing of claims. It should be clearly understood by persons having claims that any previous filing of papers with any United States, Allied, or Japanese agency does not constitute a proper filing for the purpose of obtaining payment under the CILC procedures.

All communications regarding these claims should be sent directly to the Closed Institutions Liquidating Commission, Tokyo Office, Sanwa Building, No. 2, Marunouchi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ward, Tokyo, Japan, or to the Osaka office of the Commission, Bank of Tokyo, Osaka Branch Building, No. 5 Kitahama 5-chome, Higashi-ward, Osaka, except that claims against the Taihei Lumber Co., Ltd., should be sent to the C. I. Taihei Lumber Co., Ltd., Liquidation Office, No. 7 Komagata 1-chome, Asakusa, Daito-ward, Tokyo, and claims against the Japan Publications Distributing Co., Ltd., to the Liquidation Office of that company, at No. 9 Awaji-cho 2-chome, Kanda, Chiyoda-ward, Tokyo.

The substance of the information made available by the CILC is summarized below:

1. Pursuant to Imperial Ordinance 74 of 1947 and implementing Ministerial Ordinances, the CILC has been effecting liquidation of Japanese closed institutions. Such liquidation is limited to the realization of assets in Japan and the payment of the liabilities of offices of closed institutions in Japan. In these liquidations, provision is made for the payment of all known legitimate claims to the extent permitted by the realization of available assets. Known claimants have not been required to file their claims. Claimants other than depositors, debenture holders, or stockholders have been requested to file their claims with the CILC in a period of two months following public invitation by the CILC for such filing, in order to assure consideration of their claims in the event that they are not known claimants or if the amount of claim is in dispute.

2. Prior to amendments to Imperial Ordinance 74 and its implementing Ministerial Ordinances, issued and effective December 26, 1950, the area of recognized claims payable in the liquidation of closed institutions was limited to claims against the respective offices in Japan pursuant to transactions which had occurred in Japan and were payable in Japan in Japanese currency. Recent amendments have expanded the area of recog-

nized claims payable in the liquidation of the Japanese closed institutions. This expansion has occasioned a renewed invitation by the CILC for the filing of claims in the expanded area. Claims are to be filed with the CILC no later than July 16, 1951.

3. It is emphasized that, although claims against offices in Japan expressed in foreign currency will now be recognized, settlement of such claims can currently be made by the CILC only in yen. Recipients of such settlement who desire the conversion of yen into foreign exchange will be required to follow procedures established by the Japanese Foreign Exchange Control and Foreign Trade Control Law.

4. The newly recognized area of claims against Japanese closed institutions which will hereafter be paid to the extent permitted by realizable assets is as follows:

A. Claims against offices in Japan which were payable abroad.

B. Claims against offices in Japan which were expressed in foreign currency.

C. Claims against offices in Japan which were payable in Japan, originating from transactions abroad.

(1) Goods purchased abroad.

(2) Services performed abroad.

(3) Loans made abroad.

D. Claims against overseas offices of closed institutions secured by assets in Japan.

5. The treatment of claims in the newly recognized area will be similar to that accorded to previously recognized claims. All known claims will receive consideration whether or not filing is made. Depositors, debenture holders, and stockholders are requested not to file, since their claims are known. Other claimants should file with the CILC no later than July 16, 1951, to insure consideration of their claims. Unknown claimants who file at a later date will receive consideration only after full payment has been made, to the extent permitted by realizable assets, to all other claimants whose priority in liquidation is higher than that of debenture holders and stockholders, namely, secured claims, preferred claims, claims originating from transactions subsequent to August 10, 1946, and general claims.

6. The amount of compensation and the date of settlement which claimants in the newly recognized area of claims can anticipate cannot be predicted at present. Newly recognized claims will have to be integrated subsequent to July 16, 1951, for each closed institution with previously recognized but as yet unsettled claims. Thereafter, the amount of compensation will depend upon the ratio of the total valid claims to the total realizable assets. The date of settlement will depend upon the liquidity of assets. It is currently estimated that most existing claims against closed institutions will have been settled by August 1952.

The nature of the claim statement desired by the CILC is as follows:

1. Name of the closed institution against which claim is to be filed.
2. Name and location of the office against which claim originated.
3. Date at which claim originated.
4. Description of claim, with full particulars. Principal and interest should be clearly distinguished, and the period for which interest is calculated should be stated.
5. Description and present location of any public bonds, debentures, stocks, shares, or other items which were offered as security.
6. Listing and description of any documentary

evidence (deeds, passbooks, contracts, certificates, acknowledgement of claims, etc.) which claimant may wish to attach in verification of his claim.

7. Amount of claim. If the claim is expressed in a foreign currency, it should be stated only in that particular foreign currency, without recalculating to yen or other currencies.

8. The claimant may submit any other information which he considers necessary.

9. The claim should include the full name and address of the creditor, and a statement along the following lines:

The undersigned hereby declares that the statement given above is true and correct, and acknowledges that no payment or settlement of the above-mentioned claims has been made up to the present.

Communist "Land Reform" in North Korea Brings Disillusionment

[Released to the press March 28]

A recently completed study has brought to light the workings of the North Korean "land reform" program, some details of which had long been known to the Department. The study involved an on-the-spot check of farm conditions in North Korea, interviews with farmers, and an analysis of a mass of decrees and land laws issued by Soviet and Pyongyang authorities from 1946 to 1950. Its objective was to discover just what the North Korean farmers got out of the land distribution plan, and what the average farmer thought of it.

Effect of Totalitarian State on Land Reform

The answer to both questions is summarized in a single statement: Landless farm laborers and poor tenant farmers, the chief beneficiaries of the program, found that land ownership in a totalitarian police state was largely a delusion. There was no margin of profit and a heavy margin of compulsory unpaid labor by the farmer and his household for the benefit of the Communist regime.

In place of the former landlords, mainly Japanese, who got rentals of 55 to 60 percent in kind annually, but paid for in cash, the Communist regime and its countless subsidiaries confiscated as much or more in various forms of tax-in-kind, assessments, and "voluntary" contributions. In addition, the farmer found that instead of one boss he had many—township and county and provincial petty officials, plus the ever-present police, who told him what to do, what to raise, and how much. At the end of the crop year, ex-

cept for subsistence, the farmer and his household had worked harder than ever, with nothing to show for it, not even enough to purchase their quota of cotton goods from the Communist-run mills.

Above all, the study reveals the unremitting efforts of the Communist regime, in the course of 5 years, to remove the last shreds of independence from the new class of farm "owners" and ruthlessly force them to become cogs in the lumbering machinery of the planned state economy. In 1950, the last step—collectivization—appears to have been in the offing. Thus, in the long range, North Korean "land reform" would have been found to be a complete delusion, not only in that the farmers' economic condition had not improved but also in that even technical ownership of the land would have proved only a transitory phase. In the end, the whole of the farming class would have been made an agricultural proletariat.

Soviet "Land Reform" Policies

This is how "land reform" under Soviet occupation and the Pyongyang regime worked:

At the end of the war, in August 1945, when the Soviet authorities clamped down an iron curtain over North Korea, they began almost at once to consider the farm problem both for political and economic reasons. The problem of Korean farm tenants and farm workers, who under 35 years of Japanese rule had been reduced practically to peonage, was common to all Korea.

In 1945, about one-half of the 3 million farm

households in Korea owned no land at all and an additional one-third rented part of the land they tilled. Only 17.3 percent owned all the land they cultivated. Because of the exorbitant farm rentals, the average tenant, after expenses connected with cultivation, had left as little as 20 to 25 percent of his total crop for maintaining his household until the next harvest.

In North Korea, the proportion of tenancy was somewhat less than in the South, where the highly productive irrigated rice paddies offered more profitable returns to absentee landlords. But in the North, the bait of "land ownership" held out by the Communist authorities was a necessary ingredient of the whole Soviet economic program.

By transforming landless farm workers and poor tenants into private landowners, in theory at least, the Soviet authorities expected to win the allegiance of the largest "depressed" class. More important, farm production could be geared to the rest of the program, farm income would be tapped for a major part of government expenditures, and farm labor would offer a reservoir from which to draw labor for industry.

The first Soviet land-reform decree, issued in March 1946, stated that the purpose of the program was to destroy the "feudalist land system of thousands of years standing" and replace it with one "based on individual management by independent farmers."

Under this decree, all Japanese land holdings were confiscated, as well as all the tenant-worked land of Korean landlords. Also confiscated were the land of farmers in excess of five *chungbo* (12.3 acres) and the land of religious institutions exceeding the same amount of tillable land. Altogether, some 2,800,000 acres of land were confiscated and distributed to almost 800,000 landless farm workers, tenant, and part-tenant farmers. The average size of the plots distributed was slightly more than three acres, but the grants varied according to a schedule based on the labor power and consumption of each household.

Since the land redistribution brought "free" land to more than 70 percent of North Korea's farm population, half of the total population of the region at one stroke was given to believe that they had a stake in the regime.

Land ownership was the bait, but the real purpose of the reform was to lay the foundation for a rigid system of controls over the farmer and his output. The first step was to secure control at the village level. In every village, a "people's committee" was set up to work out a local land distribution plan. These special committees were made up exclusively of former hired laborers and tenant farmers. The previous village headmen were kept out of the committees and prevented from exercising any further authority. Korean landlords were either removed to a different county, where they were permitted to work a small plot of land under surveillance, or they were driven to day labor in the cities.

The new land proprietors were given certificates which stated that their parcels of land were permanently given to the recipients, but the land could not be bought, sold, rented, or mortgaged. Their right to the land, therefore, was confined to its utilization, and, for this by the first decree, they paid a tax-in-kind of 25 percent. In 1947, the land tax was fixed at 27 percent on paddy land, 23 percent on dry land, and 10 percent on "fire fields" or untilled land.

Results of False Promises

The Soviet authorities made much of the low tax rate for propaganda purposes, but the effective rate was far higher than the book rate. This was because the total assessment for all farms was computed by the central authorities in order to determine the rural share in financing the whole economic plan. Starting from the top, the assessment was broken down by province, county, township, and village, and at each level a "people's committee" set the amount to be collected by the units within its jurisdiction.

By the time the assessment rate reached the village, it was already inflated—since it was based on unrealistic estimates of expected yields—and this inflation was passed on to the individual farmer. The farmer's rate of tax-in-kind was further inflated by the fact that he was required to deliver only the best quality grain or other produce. In other words, in terms of value, he paid a higher rate. In addition, the tax was collected on his entire output, including vegetables, livestock, and industrial crops, regardless of the small amount of any one product grown.

An inflated land tax, however, was only part of what the farmer had to deliver. There were special taxes, assessments and "voluntary" contributions; his ox and cart were taxed, and he paid taxes for irrigation, schools, the army, local autonomy, and whatnot. Besides the increasing burden of grain collections, the Korean farmers in 1950 were compelled to purchase their allocated share of the national bond issue.

Farmers in North Korea consistently expressed the opinion that, contrary to official figures, the total agricultural production under the Communist regime did not reach preliberation levels and fell far short of the ambitious goals set by the regime's central planning. Nevertheless, the pressure on the farmer was stepped up in every conceivable way. In the beginning, the farmer was free to dispose of his output in the free market, but as collections became more severe, his marketable surplus above consumption gradually disappeared. In 1949–50, there was increasing pressure on the farmer to dispose of a large share of marketed crops through government channels at prices lower than in the free market.

Under the national economic plan, the individual farmer became merely a producing unit subject to rigid state supervision. Farmers were told

what crops to plant, what the yields should be, how much fertilizer to use, and when to complete the planting and harvesting. Assessments kept pace with the growing season, and the crop could not be harvested until the last of three assessments was completed.

As assessments fell short of over-all goals, the crops were reassessed to the planned levels, regardless of the farmers' ability to meet them. In theory, a farmer could protest his assessment, but since the case was always decided against him and the result would be a higher assessment for the following year, protests ceased to be made.

The Communist machinery of planned production and pressurized collections required a horde of officials for its operations. In addition to inspectors from township, county, and provincial authorities, the police played an increasing role not only in enforcing the central government's decrees but also in checking on the loyalty of farmers to the regime.

County police chiefs relayed to the township police stations under their jurisdiction instructions regarding the assessment program and the ideological trend of the village committees. Local police conducted secret investigations of village assessments and collections, inquired what the farmers thought of the tax program, and looked for signs of sabotage or activities by unreliable elements.

Demand on Farmers for Public Labor

But grain was not all that the Communist regime extracted from the North Korean farmers; it also needed their labor on projects outside of farming. The farming community offered the largest pool of labor for executing the regime's economic plan. Each farm household, therefore, had to contribute 1 or 2 months of voluntary labor time for local construction projects, such as roads, bridges, and schools. In addition, the entire farm population, between the ages of 18 and 55, excepting invalids and pregnant women, was subject to 20 days of compulsory, uncompensated labor service a year in national construction projects or nationalized mines and factories.

So great was the regime's demand for free labor that compulsory devices increased as time went on. There were cases of farmers mobilized for 20 days' labor in nearby mines who had to stay on the job for 6 months.

Beginning in 1949, the regime launched an intensive campaign to induce members of farm households to migrate to industrial centers, especially unmarried young women and widows. Special agents of the Ministry of Labor were sent on recruiting campaigns to the villages, where posters and radio broadcasts promised a "livelihood for two winters" to those who engaged in factory work. Under a directive issued in 1949, all free labor on farms and all farmers working dry land with an incline of 15 degrees were ordered to the

cities as permanent factory workers. The farmers, however, clung to their dry, rolling acres and the order produced meager results.

Five Years of Disillusionment

Up to the opening of hostilities in 1950, the Communist regime approached the question of collectivization cautiously. It had created a new class of small land holders without great difficulty, but it would not be easy to force these yeomen into the collective pattern. There were a few state farms, three to six, derived from submarginal land formerly held by Japanese, but larger agricultural units called for mechanization and agricultural machinery was at a premium in North Korea.

There is evidence that the Pyongyang regime planned to introduce collective farms on the heels of the projected conquest of the Republic of Korea. In 1950, professional writers in the Literary League were assigned to picture the advantages of collective farming, and lecturers on agriculture extolled the collectives and national farms of the U.S.S.R. as models for Korea. The Communist authorities believed that the new farming class, deprived of the "profit motive" by its inability to accumulate any margin over the barest subsistence, would voluntarily give up its shadowy claims on the land and surrender the last of its slender independence to collective dictation. The roar of United Nations guns halted this grandiose program.

The testimony of the North Korean farmers interviewed was conclusive: None of them wanted to see the return of the outworn system of absentee landlordism with its usurious rentals. Their experience with Communist "land reform," on the other hand, left them bitterly disillusioned. The new masters had inflicted unbearable burdens and had reduced them to slaves of the soil and victims of a ruthless bureaucracy. Their promised "independence" had not materialized. They were herded into unpaid labor for the regime and their households threatened with dismemberment by conscription into industrial servitude. Five years of heartbreaking, unrewarded labor had taught them the true meaning of the Communist dictatorship.

Japanese Treaty Discussed With American Officials in London

John M. Allison, deputy to John Foster Dulles for Japanese peace-treaty matters, departed on March 19 for a brief visit to the American Embassy, London. The purpose of Mr. Allison's trip was to bring the Ambassador and Embassy staff up to date on the exchanges of views which have been taking place with respect to a treaty of peace with Japan.

Workshops of Liberty

*Remarks by Dr. Henry G. Bennett
Technical Cooperation Administrator¹*

It is a useful and comforting thing for us to remember that we are living in the stream of history. The great issues of our time were handed down to us through many generations, and we, in turn, will hand them on. We cannot hope to decide these issues—I doubt if they will ever be finally decided. But we can make it our solemn duty to keep these issues alive and to throw our full weight to the side that we believe is right.

The issue I have in mind to discuss with you today was probably best stated a hundred and twenty-five years ago. It concerns our place, as Americans, in the world community. And the remarkable thing, as I see it, is that as long ago as 1826, when this young Republic was faced with tremendous domestic problems, a leading American was thinking of his country's obligation of leadership to the world's people.

On January 23, 1826, James Madison wrote to a friend:

Our country, if it does justice to itself, will be the *Officina Libertatis* (workshop of liberty) to the Civilized World, and do more than any other for the uncivilized.

Challenging Questions

"The workshop of liberty": let's explore the meaning of those words. Most of us think of America as the home of liberty; we regard ourselves as the defenders of liberty. Madison deliberately called upon our country to be a workshop of liberty. Thus, he challenged Americans to become artisans, continuously experimenting and faithfully fashioning the great idea of human freedom into a reality. Have we accepted that challenge? Are we accepting it today?

I do know that the opportunities for our country to be a workshop of liberty are greater today than ever before. The people of other countries

are aware that we have something to offer the world—not just dollars or the products of our farms and factories—but something infinitely more valuable. We can extend a helping hand to those who want to help themselves—something they can accept with confidence and self-respect and friendship. And they are reaching out eagerly to clasp that helping hand. They are looking to America as a workshop of liberty.

Desire for Technical Assistance in Africa

A few days ago, I received an envelope containing several letters, all of them from a place I had never heard of before—the town of Ogbomosho in Nigeria, West Africa. These letters are so expressive of the hope with which people in far-off places look to the United States that I want to read you excerpts from one of them:

We the undersigned, representing the Baptist Pastors of Ogbomosho, Nigeria, West Africa, seize this opportunity to communicate you for the first time at the inception of this New Year, 1951.

Over a century ago, the Gospel message was brought to Nigeria from the Southern Baptist Convention of the United States of America. We are grateful unto God and our thanks to the Missionaries who helped in the past, who help now, and who will help in the future. . . .

For the past five years, the Baptist Churches of Ogbomosho, the Missionaries, and the town-people have been contemplating on improving the agricultural resources of the town. . . . Joy filled our hearts when we learned of the plan of the American Government as regards the development scheme for certain remote parts in the world, which is entrusted to your care. We hereby appeal to you to "Come over into Macedonia (Ogbomosho) and help us." We shall be grateful if Ogbomosho will be included in your programme in developing the agricultural resources of the town.

This need is felt by all the populace of Ogbomosho. Here is our call from Ogbomosho to America through Dr. H. G. Bennett as we have been privileged to obtain spiritual security through the Gospel of Christ brought from America to us in Africa, we earnestly crave for help for economic security.

"Economic security." To most Americans, that means earning enough money to live comfortably, and saving enough to live on in our old age. To

¹ Made before the Forum on "Great Issues," Tulane University, New Orleans, La., on Mar. 28 and released to the press on the same date.

millions of people in other parts of the world, economic security means something much more immediate and urgent. It means their daily bread—where the next meal is coming from. They don't want charity from us—they want our help in learning how to produce more food and other necessities for themselves. Whether they are going to receive that kind of help—enough of it and in time—is one of the great issues of our day.

And these people are concerned not only with improving their material welfare, with getting enough food to eat. They also feel a spiritual and intellectual hunger, and they are reaching out for help to satisfy those wants as well.

Visit to South American Training School

I recently returned from a short trip to 10 of our neighboring countries to the south, in Latin America. I saw and learned many things of interest and value, but one of the things I will remember longest is an incident that occurred in a little village high in the Andes.

There, I went to see a training school conducted by a few American educators for teachers who serve the schools in that area. The surrounding country is 2½ to 3 miles above sea level and, to all appearances, is a cold, bleak, hostile land. Yet, people live there by choice and endure hardships in order to make their home there. They are pure-blooded Indians and have lived in that environment for generations and have adjusted to it.

Near the building in which the training center was held was another building, about half completed. That was a handsome new school, which the people of that community were building on their own initiative, with their own resources, so that their children could enjoy opportunities for a better education. Each of them contributed a peck of potatoes, a sheep, or something else from their scant production, from time to time, to the building fund.

While we were there, a delegation of the village elders called on me—the chiefs, the leaders of their people. They were simply dressed in the costume of the country, and their faces showed the patience and stoicism of their race. But they were anything but stolid in arguing the case for their school.

One of the older chiefs, speaking through an interpreter, said he had begun to work for the new school 38 years ago and foretold then that someday a stranger would appear and offer to help the community with the project. Now, he felt that his prediction was coming true. He said he would die happy if he could see the roof put on the new school.

It was a moving occasion, and I felt that the least I could do was to respond that, as a representative of President Truman and as an elected chief of the Comanche tribe, I had come to offer the cooperation of the United States in their effort to achieve a better life.

Further Facts on American Aid

A few miles from that school is an experiment station, where local technicians under the direction of an American agricultural scientist are carrying on research on land provided by the Government. The progress that has been made there in only 2 years convinced me that this cooperative project, if continued and expanded, can revolutionize farm life in this region and make life better for the people even in that forbidding environment.

These were some of the things I saw and experienced on my trip, the purpose of which was to get some first-hand knowledge of the work being done by about 175 American technicians in those 10 Latin American countries under President Truman's Point 4 Program.

We call this work "technical cooperation." Let me give you an idea of what those words mean. To understand them, we must remember, first, that these neighbors of ours to the south have for generations been burdened with intense poverty, with epidemic disease, and with lack of educational opportunities. There you have people living among rich mineral and agricultural resources. But those resources are still largely untapped and unused for their own benefit.

There, you have people who are hungry living among fields that could yield abundant food. I am convinced that the food supplies of Peru, Bolivia, and other countries I visited could be doubled within 5 years—with the application of water, improved seed, and more modern methods of tilling and preserving the soil, and bringing more land under cultivation.

There, you have people who are intelligent, alert, and thirsty for education. But, because they don't have adequate schools and teachers, the majority of them cannot read or write.

Against this background, a handful of American technicians are carrying on a work of technical cooperation. First of all, they are helping the people to stamp out disease. That is a basic need. Clean water is the first requisite, and it takes only the skill of a sanitary engineer and some simple, inexpensive equipment to show people how to build a safe water system. Once that is done, you have practically wiped out typhoid and dysentery.

It takes the same sort of skill and a little more equipment to show people how to build modern sewage systems. A community in Chile recently celebrated the completion of a sewage system, built with the help of a young American sanitary engineer. The townfolk had a ceremony. They raised the American flag and unveiled a tablet commemorating what was for them a great event.

American technicians are demonstrating other kinds of health practices. They are helping to set up clinics among people deep in the jungle who have never known medical care. They are training nurses and midwives, who, in turn, are teaching women how to bear and raise healthy children.

Now, second, American agricultural specialists are helping these neighbors of ours to grow more food. They are showing them the advantages of improved seed, contour plowing, of crop rotation, and of growing legumes to enrich their soil. They are helping the people to organize farm extension services and 4-H Clubs. I had the rare pleasure of meeting with a group of youngsters and their own 4-H leader—not an American—but one who had profited by the knowledge of an American extension man.

Having been in the business of agricultural education most of my life, I got the greatest thrill out of this work of helping people fight hunger. And what I saw convinced me that these neighbors of ours to the south can not only feed themselves adequately and well within a very few years—they can help to feed the world.

We hear a lot these days about the importance of strategic materials. Well, food is the most important of all such materials. It is the key to individual productivity. It provides the energy to work, to get ahead, and to build a better life.

Health, food, and education: these are three of the keys to economic development which is the aim of the Point 4 Program. As I watched this work of technical cooperation, which is nothing more or less than helping people to help themselves, I realized that these Point 4 projects are really miniature workshops of liberty. They are helping people to free themselves from the bondage of poverty, ignorance, and disease.

Now you may say: "These are fine words." Let us explore exactly what they mean and do not mean. American technicians do not go out to other countries to preach democracy. They do not think of themselves as salesmen of the American way of life. Their job is to work with people who are ready and eager to profit by certain kinds of knowledge and certain skills which they have. Their job is to help people do the things they want to do.

The Psychological Moment for Point 4 Program

The method of the Point 4 Program is cooperation. The subject matter of this cooperation may be a problem in health, food supply, education or mineral development, or to survey the economic needs of a whole country. The immediate purpose of this cooperation is to enable people to become economically self-supporting and independent of outside help.

Economic self-support and independence is a basic and essential ingredient of liberty. The sense of opportunity and hope that comes with economic independence is another essential ingredient of liberty.

We speak of the free world. But those words have little reality where people are captives of habitual hunger, disease, and ignorance; where a child cannot expect to live beyond the age of 30;

where a farm family cannot by its combined labors expect to feed itself decently.

It is a good thing to have individual liberty written into a constitution. It is a necessary thing to have laws which safeguard the rights of the individual.

But the practice of liberty begins with hope and a sense of growing independence. These are among the products of the workshops I have described.

The Point 4 Program is not confined to Latin America. Today, there are American technicians at work in some 30 countries whose Governments and people have expressed a desire to cooperate with the United States. In Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia this growing cooperation acts as a kind of yeast, stimulating a new growth of economic and social progress.

The ferment had already begun when Point 4 came along. The people were ready for change. They were ready to break out of the vicious circle of poverty, disease, and ignorance. This ferment was a good and healthy thing, and we welcomed it. It took the form of a drive for national independence. We understood this drive, and we have given it a helping hand where we could.

It is taking the form also of a search for new skills, new tools, and new ideas. We understand this search, and we welcome it too. The Point 4 Program comes at a psychological moment. We Americans have no monopoly, but we are relatively well equipped with skills and tools. Moreover, we have had some experience in experimenting with ideas—most important of all, with the idea of liberty.

So, I believe, we have an opportunity here to take up the challenge that Madison offered to our country. What we do now may not decide the issue in our generation. But we can, at least, make certain that workshops of liberty are kept in operation for generations to come.

Civil Defense Mutual Aid Agreement With Canada

The United States and Canada exchanged notes which constitute a Civil Defense Mutual Aid Agreement between the two countries. Simultaneous announcement of the agreement was made on March 27 in Washington and Ottawa by Millard Caldwell, Federal Civil Defense Administrator of the United States, and by Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare of Canada.

March 27, 1951

SIR, I have the honour to refer to the conference held in Ottawa on February 21, 1951, of Civil Defence authorities of the Governments of the United States of America and Canada.

Pursuant to the unanimous recommendation of that conference, I am instructed by the Canadian

Government to propose that an agreement in the following terms be concluded between our Governments:

As far as possible, Civil Defence activities in the United States and Canada should be co-ordinated for the protection of persons and property from the result of enemy attack as if there were no border. The following arrangements are made to ensure such co-ordination in matters of Civil Defence.

Except as regards matters of broad government policy, for which the diplomatic channels would be appropriate, the normal channel of communication between the two countries with regard to civil defence matters will be between the Co-ordinator of Civil Defence in Canada (or any successor authority) and the Administrator, Federal Civil Defence Administration in the United States (or any successor authority), referred to hereafter as the "Federal Civil Defence Authority" or "Authorities." This will not prevent the use of other channels where appropriate, or as may be authorized by the Federal Civil Defence Authorities, but in the event of other channels of communication or agencies of co-operation being used, the Federal Civil Defence Authority in each country will be informed immediately.

The Federal Civil Defence Authority in each country will keep the other informed about developments under consideration and action taken regarding:

- (a) Organization, legislation and regulations (including federal, state and provincial) for Civil Defence.
- (b) Material, equipment, supplies and facilities (research, development, standardization and availability).
- (c) Training (schools, courses, pamphlets, methods, etc.).
- (d) Arrangements with state, provincial and municipal authorities and other agencies.
- (e) Public information and education.

The Federal Civil Defence Authority of each country will:

- (a) Exchange personnel at a working level.
- (b) Offer training facilities to students designated by the other country.

So that all civil defence supplies, equipment and facilities (including medical, hospital, fire-fighting, police, rescue, evacuation, welfare, transportation, communication and other similar services) may be utilized to the fullest extent in connection with civil defence preparations, exercises and action, appropriate legislation will be sought, regulations made or instructions given in connection with customs, immigration, integration of services and facilities and other matters whether under federal, state, provincial or municipal jurisdiction.

State and provincial Civil Defence authorities in adjacent jurisdictions will be authorized by the Federal Civil Defence authorities to confer together to insure co-operation between them on civil defence. Similarly, state and provincial authorities will be empowered by the Federal Civil Defence authorities to authorize co-operation between border municipalities to co-ordinate planning and provide for immediate warning and action in the event of attack. Such co-operation will be in accordance with the policy laid down in each country by the Federal Civil Defence Authority.

The cost of civil defence assistance furnished by one country in connection with an attack upon the other country shall be reimbursed by the country attacked. The Federal Civil Defence Authorities will co-operate in recommending to their respective governments a detailed financial agreement to give effect to this policy.

A Joint United States/Canadian Civil Defence Committee is hereby established. The Committee will consist of the Federal Civil Defence Authorities and such other members as may be designated by them. The Committee may establish, from time to time, such working groups and sub-committees as may be necessary. This Committee will recommend, jointly, to their respective governments

such action as is considered desirable to insure the closest co-operation.

If this proposal is acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply will constitute an agreement between our two Governments on this subject which shall enter into force on the date of your note and which may be terminated on six months notice by either Government.

Accept [etc.]

H. HUME WRONG

March 27, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note No. 161 of March 27, 1951 containing recommendations for civil defense cooperation which have been agreed upon by the civil defense authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada.

The proposals contained in your note are acceptable to the Government of the United States of America, and it is agreed that your note and this reply thereto shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments on this subject which shall enter into force on the date of this note and which may be terminated on six months notice by either Government.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

U. S.-Liberian Agreement Provides Amateur Radio Communications

[Released to the press March 20]

By means of an exchange of notes between the American Embassy in Liberia and the Liberian Department of State, dated November 9, 1950 and January 8, 1951, a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Republic of Liberia directly affecting licensed amateurs of the two countries has been concluded. Under the terms of this agreement, amateur radio stations of the Republic of Liberia and of the United States may exchange international messages or other communications from or to third parties provided:

1. No compensation may be directly or indirectly paid on such messages or communications
2. Such communications shall be limited to conversations or messages of a technical or personal nature for which, by reason of their unimportance recourse to the public telecommunications service is not justified. To the extent that in the event of disaster, the public telecommunications service is not readily available for expeditious handling of communications relating directly to safety of life or property, such communications may be handled by amateur stations of the respective countries.

(Continued on page 592)

ECA and Schuman Plan Advance European Recovery

THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF ECA

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 2]

On this third anniversary, it gives me great pleasure to congratulate you who have carried out so well the aims of the European Recovery Program.

When General Marshall first made his proposal, the shadow of economic collapse, with its attendant evils of unemployment, of hunger and political unrest, hung over the countries of Western Europe. The great question in 1947 was whether free institutions could survive.

Today, thanks primarily to their own efforts, the people of Western Europe, together with our help, have rebuilt the economies of their countries and have developed a new spirit of confidence in themselves and in their free institutions. To my mind, this spirit, this rising confidence in the hearts of the people, is one of the greatest sources of strength in the free world.

By working together, economic recovery has been substantially achieved. However, with the present threat to world peace, new tasks have been imposed upon us. The free nations are now combining to convert their resources into military strength to preserve the peace and defend our freedoms.

The splendid organization which has been developed under the Economic Cooperation Administration can make an important contribution in helping develop this strength. Accordingly, I intend to recommend to the Congress that ECA be maintained on a continuing basis to help carry out the programs essential to the security of the free world.

There is much to be done in Europe, in Asia, and in other parts of the world, to help the free countries build their military, economic and spiritual defenses against aggression from without and subversion from within. One of our essential objectives is to develop, in cooperation with other free nations, an expanding world economy, the benefits of which can be shared by us all.

On this anniversary, I extend to all of you my sincere thanks for what you have done. I am confident that in its new tasks the ECA will continue to make a vital contribution in helping to build the strength of the free world upon which security and freedom rest.

Remarks by Secretary Acheson¹

One of the most inspiring developments of our time is the phenomenal progress made by the people of Europe in recovering from the ravages of war.

This recovery, although it may be measured or described in material terms, is above all a triumph of the spirit. The character and determination of the people, the courage and vision of their leaders—this is what the recovery of Europe is built on.

The importance of this recovery to the rest of the world was foreseen and stated for us by President Truman and General Marshall in 1947. They foresaw that it was not only the well-being of the people of Europe which was at stake but it was something even more. It was also world peace which was hanging in the balance, for the power of Europe is crucial to the peace of the world.

The Economic Cooperation Administration, built upon this vision, today celebrates its third anniversary. It is a matter of pride to the people of America that we have been able, through the Economic Cooperation Administration, to play a role in supporting the great achievements of the people of Europe. By assisting in the return and further growth of economic vitality in Europe, we have measurably advanced our common security.

It is fitting, on the occasion of this anniversary, that we should honor the distinguished Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schuman. Truly a

¹ Made at Washington at ceremonies commemorating the third anniversary of the European Cooperation Administration on Apr. 2 and released to the press on the same date.

statesman, in the fullest sense of the word, M. Schuman stands at the forefront of the leaders of Europe whose creative imagination and courageous initiative helped to spark the miracle of European recovery.

As the father of the plan for the pooling of coal and iron production in Europe, M. Schuman has pointed the way toward a solution of Europe's most grievous and most critical problem—the rivalry which has existed between his country and Germany.²

More than this, the Schuman Plan, when it has been converted into reality by the favorable action of the parliaments of the six participating countries, will help to further the process whereby the people of Germany may be brought more closely within the European community as equal partners with the people of other nations.

The plan of M. Schuman carries forward the fundamental concept of the European Recovery Program—a joint effort among the nations of Europe toward greater freedom of trade, leading to higher standards of living for their people.

For this vision, and the leadership which has inspired the development of this plan, the name of Robert Schuman deserves and receives our profound respect.

*Address by Robert Schuman
French Foreign Minister³*

A happy coincidence has afforded me the honor of attending this celebration of the third birthday anniversary of ECA, and of addressing this meeting in the name of the European countries which are the beneficiaries of this splendid American initiative.

First, as Minister of Finances, and then as Prime Minister, I have taken part in the negotiation, later in the signature of the agreements and arrangements which were concluded on this subject between the United States and France.

Before going further, I wish to render grateful homage to the man whose name will be forever associated with the policy of international solidarity. Having prepared the ground for economic cooperation between the nations of the two continents, he is now again the leader of a military cooperation for Atlantic defense. General Marshall belongs to that line of American statesmen who never seek to avoid their country's call, nor to shirk difficult international duties even though it would seem that their past great accomplishments and personal considerations would entitle them to decline such an accumulation of responsibilities and sacrifices.

The Marshall Plan has been more than a gesture of human brotherhood. It has been the expression

of a farsighted policy. You have never wanted the countries of Europe to sink in misery and in despair. Having saved them from Hitlerism, you have protected them from communism. You have clearly understood that should Western Europe be lost for our civilization, a sinister threat, perhaps beyond remedy, would overwhelm all of humanity. Whoever rules Europe rules the world. Without a free Europe, there is no assurance of liberty for any other country.

Our destinies are obviously bound together. We must, in the same way, be bound together in our efforts and sacrifices. No country can be saved in spite of itself. No country can be saved unless it cooperates, unless it participates in the struggle, unless it contributes all its resources and energies for its own salvation.

In order to be effective, the American aid could not and should not have been merely a generous gift of alms. It was conceived as the initial endowment of a vast plan for European recovery.

You did not bring us merely financial help, but also an idea, a program of which we were to be not only the beneficiaries but also the artisans. The aim was not only to help us through a critical period but also to provide us with protection from further crises, to make us strong enough to face and overcome them by our own means. In a word, your aim was to provide again to our ruined and devastated continent the possibility of living by its own labor, in free cooperation with other Nations.

After its political liberation, Europe was thus able to recover the freedom of its economic initiative. Here is the deep and durable meaning of the Marshall Plan. The people of Europe have understood it.

Today, we are proud to say that not only have you saved us from starvation and unemployment by sending us bread and raw materials, but that you have enabled us to rebuild a Europe fully capable of supporting itself by its work and its commerce.

Indeed, other problems have meanwhile been added to the earlier ones. In 1948, our task was to adapt our activity to the normal needs of the country. The urgent requirements of security and the rise in the prices of raw materials are upsetting the equilibrium that we were on the point of achieving.

Furthermore, the future of underdeveloped countries for which we are responsible must more and more become the object of our concern and of our planning, as President Truman has stressed.

Europe is not discouraged by the new effort which has been asked of her. The results already achieved, thanks to the implementation of the Marshall Plan, in improving our economic situation over the last 3 years permit Europe to envisage her future with confidence.

Europe feels herself regenerated not only because of the effort put forth by each individual

² For an article on the Schuman Plan, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1951, p. 523.

³ Made on Apr. 2 upon the occasion of the third anniversary of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

country, but because the European nations are organizing and uniting among themselves. This is again a result of the Marshall Plan.

The European Organization for Economic Cooperation was created in aid of the execution of this plan. It groups the 18 free countries of Western Europe in a common endeavor of reconstruction, modernization, and expansion. It is the body which most represents the whole of European production.

In addition to this continental organization, regional initiatives remain possible and desirable, provided they are in accordance with a general coherent plan. In this framework appears the imminent creation by six European countries, comprising 160 million inhabitants, of a single market for coal and steel, under the control of an independent supranational authority. The objective is to increase production, to produce and to sell at the lowest possible prices, to improve at the same time the general welfare, especially that of the workers of every category.

In place of a divided Europe, exhausting herself in isolation and sterile rivalries, we are progressively substituting a United Europe, animated with a European spirit.

In the course of two centuries, you Americans have forged your own unity. Our wish is that, at the side of a strong America, the citadel of world freedom, and in a close friendship with her, a Europe conscious of her own destiny should arise, a Europe determined to develop fully, and to share, all its material and spiritual resources, in a freely organized European community.

Together, we will thus pursue the work undertaken 3 years ago, faithful to the spirit of those who have conceived and implemented it. This will be the best way in which we can express our gratitude, this will be for them the supreme reward.

*Remarks by A. Averell Harriman
Special Assistant to the President*

[Released to the press by the White House April 2]

It is a great satisfaction for me to be here today with my old colleagues of the ECA. You men and women and your associates abroad have contributed so greatly to the success of the Marshall Plan.

It is good to have with us Paul Hoffman, who gave us all such inspired leadership. And we are especially fortunate in the presence of the Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schuman. With his broad vision and human understanding, he has given effective leadership to the cause of European unity.

The Marshall Plan will go down in history as a great accomplishment in cooperation among free nations and free men. On the material side, there have been outstanding achievements. But of even greater importance has been the development of the sense that men of many nations can work to-

gether for common purpose—for common welfare. I think it is no exaggeration to say that the strong bonds which today unite the nations of the North Atlantic community, would not exist had it not been for the successful experience of working together during these last 3 years under the European Recovery Program. This unity, this sense of interdependence in the North Atlantic community, is one of the greatest assets of the free world as a whole in its present struggle.

You men and women can take great satisfaction in the part that you have played in these events.

Export-Import Bank Loan to Spain for Temporary Wheat Purchases

*[Released to the press by the Export-Import Bank
March 16]*

Spain has been granted a credit of up to 5 million dollars by the Export-Import Bank with the approval of the Economic Cooperation Administrator on the basis of an authorization in title 1, chapter XI of the General Appropriations Act of 1951.

The present credit is to permit the purchase of wheat and, thereby, ameliorate the temporary shortage of wheat prevailing in Spain prior to the harvests.

Of the four credits previously established by the Bank, three were for the purpose of assisting Spain to revive her agricultural output, thus enabling her to be less dependent on foreign sources for foodstuffs by providing her with an increased supply of fertilizers, tractors, and spare parts; the fourth credit was for raw cotton to be used in the major industry of the country for production both for the domestic market and for export.¹

Food Situation in India Critical

[Released to the press March 30]

The Department has received a report from the American Embassy at New Delhi underscoring the critical food situation in the densely populated rural areas of northern Bihar Province in north-eastern India.

According to this report, Clifford C. Taylor, Counselor of the Embassy at New Delhi, visited Bihar Province during the past week on a personal tour of the area inspecting conditions there and discussing the situation with Indian officials in the province. Taylor personally inspected ra-

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1951, p. 380.

tion shops, stocks of foodstuffs in Indian Government warehouses, crop conditions, and privately owned stocks.

In the northeastern district of the province, Taylor found that drought had reduced the rice crop by 50 percent. In the Purnea area, in the northeast corner of the province which is most acutely affected by the drought, Taylor found extremely meager stocks of recently harvested rice. Barley and wheat were being harvested, but yields—due partially to unimportant acreage—but chiefly due to drought conditions, ranged between 150 to 300 pounds to the acre. Farmers and officials of the area pointed out that no important crop harvest was possible before December of this year. Moreover, the soil was found to be too dry to plant corn.

Taylor observed that although an 8-ounce ration had been authorized for the most needy portion of the population in the Purnea district, stocks available in ration shops were insufficient to meet half this meager ration. Supplies on hand, Taylor found, consisted mainly of grain sorghums, purchased and imported from the United States, and wheat imported from various sources. The American grain sorghums, Taylor found, were very popular among the local population of the area.

The seriousness of the situation, Taylor was informed, lay in the fact that this heavily populated area, stricken by drought and with inadequate reserve supplies of foodstuffs available, was becoming increasingly dependent upon imported supplies. Officials emphasized that this condition, already serious, might become critical unless sufficient supplies could be imported to tide over the population until the next harvest. And it was pointed out that the monsoon season with its torrential rains would begin in June when roads would become virtually impassable. Consequently, Taylor was informed, supplies must be imported and distributed before the monsoon season sets in.

Immediate Legislation Urged To Provide Grain for India

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House March 29]

India has an urgent need for grain to prevent suffering and starvation. This I pointed out in my message of February twelfth to the Congress.¹ My views have not changed. We can, at some sacrifice, spare the grain. We should do so—first, to save human lives and, secondly, to strengthen freedom and democracy in an important area of

Asia. Moreover, we should provide the first million tons promptly as a grant. We can then explore in greater detail the situation with respect to the remaining million tons.

India must have 6 million tons of grain in order to meet the famine conditions caused by severe drought. India has made arrangements to buy 4 million tons through ordinary sources including United States suppliers. To pay for the additional 2 million tons of grain would place too great a strain on the financial resources of India and would prevent the carrying out of its essential development program. In addition, with the provision of grain to India as a grant, the Indian Government will deposit the local currency coming from the distribution of the grain to the Indian people into a special account which can be used for agricultural development projects in India agreed to by us. These projects will help alleviate the recurrence of such conditions as the present.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee carefully investigated this matter and, on March fifth, favorably reported a bill to provide the grain to India. This bill has bipartisan support. It reflects the desire of the American people to help the Indian people in their present emergency.

Prompt action is vital. The monsoon season occurs in India during the summer. Many roads are then made impassable and grain shipments to remote areas are greatly impaired. Each day's delay after April first in starting shipments will leave a serious gap in India's food supply later this summer and cause great suffering. I hope, therefore, that the Congress will enact the necessary legislation as soon as possible after its recess.

U.S.—Liberia—Continued from page 588

3. This arrangement shall apply to all the continental and insular territory of Liberia and to the United States and its territories and possessions, including Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and to the Panama Canal Zone. It shall also be applicable to the case of amateur stations licensed by the United States authorities to United States citizens in other areas of the world in which the United States exercises licensing authority.

4. This arrangement shall be subject to termination by either Government on 60 days notice to the other Government, by further arrangement between the two Governments dealing with the same subject, or by the enactment of legislation in either country inconsistent therewith.

As a matter of related interest, amateur stations licensed by the Federal Communications Commission heretofore have been able, under and in accordance with the terms of the previously effected arrangements, to exchange international messages or other communications from or to third parties with amateur stations of Canada, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1951, p. 349.

The Provisional Frequency Board in Retrospect

AN EFFORT TO SATISFY MODERN NEEDS FOR RADIO FREQUENCIES

by Marie Louise Smith

One of the most significant postwar efforts to satisfy equitably modern world needs for radio frequencies was that of the Provisional Frequency Board (PFB). Little known outside technical circles, the activities of this Board constituted one of the quietest yet most important chapters in the continuing effort to finalize a new world-wide radio frequency list covering that portion of the spectrum which has been opened for use to date. Although the Board did not fully achieve its objective of preparing a draft list, for reasons beyond the control of any international body in the present restive world, the concept embodied in its formation has special significance to international relations in the telecommunication field. It represented a new approach to the baffling task of finding some means for a fair sharing by all countries of available radio frequencies—an item in scarce supply. Under this approach, nations would obligate themselves to the predetermined usage of every frequency in the radio spectrum.

The Board's technical task was unprecedented, in view of the almost unbelievable advancement in the science of electronics during the last decade with resulting increased uses and corresponding claimants for space in the radio spectrum. These increased demand for frequencies could not be met under the outmoded system¹ for registration of frequency usage provided for at the Cairo Radio

Conference in 1938. The limited achievements of the PFB have been under study by member countries of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) during the last 9 months, and its findings and conclusions will largely determine the next step toward the finalization of a new international radio frequency list—for which a 1951 tentative target date has been set.

Background

At the initiative of the United States, the PFB was created by the Atlantic City Radio Conference in 1947 to continue the work commenced by one of the Conference committees.² Comprised of the technical experts of the radio world, the PFB was assigned the task of reengineering operating radio frequency assignments throughout the world to conform with the new table of allocations adopted at Atlantic City, thereby conserving spectrum space and eliminating interference. The Atlantic City table allotted blocks of frequencies to each type of radio communication, including fixed services, aeronautical and maritime services, and amateur, standard band and high frequency

¹ Under this system, countries notified the Bern Bureau of the ITU of frequency assignments to stations, relying upon a rather ill-defined priority system as the determining factor in cases where more than one national administration claimed the same frequency. Also, there was no machinery to determine in advance whether assignments registered were likely to create international interference.

² Committee 6 of the International Radio Conference of Atlantic City in 1947 undertook to prepare plans based on engineering principles for use as a guide in making frequency assignments to the radio stations of the various services and, based upon these plans, to compile for the approval of the Conference the first edition of the Official International Frequency List. The List would cover frequencies up to 30,000 kc. Because of the delay in obtaining an accurate indication of each country's circuit and frequency requirements and the time required to complete necessary technical studies concerning the engineering phases of the project, it was necessary to establish a special Board to carry on the undertaking.

broadcasting. The PRB was to transfer existing and projected radio services of all countries to the bands of frequencies allotted for each service by the new table. In so doing, the PRB was to try to make adequate provision for future development of new radio services and expansion of existing services so that all countries might improve and increase their radio communications to the fullest extent practicable. Communication services interrupted by World War II were to be treated on the same basis as existing services. Special consideration was to be given to the needs of countries where natural development had been impeded, especially as a result of the war.

The PRB was to deal specifically with the assignment of frequencies to fixed, tropical broadcasting and land stations within the frequency band included between 10 kilocycles and 30 megacycles. Starting with requirements submitted by the various national administrations at Atlantic City, the PRB had authority to request from any country additional information regarding the operation of any circuit, if deemed necessary in furtherance of its work.

In cases which could not be resolved satisfactorily on a sound engineering basis, the PRB was to give consideration to the dates of notification to the Bern Bureau as well as to the priority of establishment of the circuits under consideration. Any such frequency assignment, which the PRB was unable to settle satisfactorily, was to be dealt with by the extraordinary conference.

In order to relieve the PRB of some of the work involved in this prodigious undertaking, the Atlantic City Conference assigned certain frequency bands to be dealt with by special conferences concerned with standard band broadcasting, high frequency broadcasting and the aeronautical services, and by IRTU regional conferences to deal with the geographic apportionment of frequencies. Any assignment bands prepared by the service and regional conferences were to be turned over to the PRB as a package for incorporation into the draft of the new international frequency list. Once a complete draft list was prepared, it would then be submitted to an extraordinary administrative radio conference, to be convened by the IRTU for the purpose of approving the new list and establishing appropriate machinery for its implementation. The PRB was scheduled for dissolution upon the date the new list was accepted.

The PRB convened on January 15, 1948. Originally scheduled to complete a draft list by November 15, 1948, the deadline was extended twice, and, after 25 months of continuous work, the Board ceased operations on February 28, 1950. Although the task was not entirely completed, the PRB compiled frequency lists for certain bands.³ In other bands, where the requirements were so excessive as not to fit within the allotted space, the PRB prepared for transmission to the extraordi-

nary radio conference a tabulation of channels and accompanying sharing plans.

Obstacles

From the outset, PRB was beset by serious difficulties in carrying out the Atlantic City directives. As in the case of the Copenhagen, Mexico City, and other international conferences dealing with radio frequency matters, political considerations were interjected into an essentially technical undertaking; east-west differences arose to complicate relations among the delegations; unrealistic and padded requirements were submitted by participants; and there was no willingness to make the concessions necessary to reach agreement. Some of the countries whose services had been impeded during the occupation and others where radio development was in its infancy seized upon the directives, which were designed to protect legitimate services and used them to submit inflated requirements based upon national prestige interests and the pipe dreams of their technical administrations. Delegates lacked authority to reduce national statements of frequency requirements and could not agree upon principles for their consolidation. Disgruntled and wearied by months of futile debate, delegates, at times, lost patience with efforts to reconcile stated requirements within the confines of the allotted bands of the spectrum, and, on several occasions, moves were initiated by dissident groups to call for dissolution of the PRB.

While the PRB was working on the new list, the IRTU continued to register frequency assignments in conformity with the Cairo radio regulations. Parallel notices of these registrations were sent to the PRB. The extraordinary conference will have to determine the procedure for incorporating into the international list new assignments, which were activated during the period between the closing date for submission of country requirements and the convening of the extraordinary conference.

The work of the Board was seriously handicapped by refusal of the Soviet Union to submit a statement of radio circuit requirements since the U.S.S.R. is a large user of the spectrum. In view of the absence of any Soviet report of requirements, the PRB considered no frequencies for the U.S.S.R. except those required to complete existing international circuits with other countries ter-

³ World frequency lists suitable for study by the extraordinary conference were developed only for the portion of the spectrum lying between 9 and 27.5 Mc/s. Although a list was developed for the portion near 5 Mc/s, the value of this list is largely nullified since no results were obtained in the regions immediately above and below. The PRB did not get around to preparing recommendations on the procedure to be followed in order to give effect to the new list nor the manner in which additional requirements submitted by administrations after the closing date of February 25, 1948, should be incorporated into the list.

minating in the U.S.S.R. and those which the Board had reason to believe were in operation domestically. The Soviet delegation walked out of the PRB in October 1949 after protracted debate on every issue raised. Their formal break followed a decision by the Board to proceed with its frequency engineering task under the international radio regulations adopted at Atlantic City in 1947. Even though the U.S.S.R. participated in the adoption of these regulations, at Geneva they advocated instead that the old priority system of operating assignment be retained, using the 1939 Bern list wherein they have an excessive number of frequency registrations.

The United Kingdom maintained a large and very active delegation at the PRB from the beginning until about June 15, 1949, at which time the United Kingdom delegation was temporarily withdrawn. This action came during the most trying period of the Board's work. At this point, considerable sentiment developed that the final compilation of an acceptable list was an impossible task. There was substantial support for a proposal calling for gradual shifting of all services now operating outside the allotted bands to in-band frequencies, using the lists prepared as a guide wherever possible and notifying the ITU. The ITU would then study each shifted operation case by case and accord registration status if it determined that no harmful interference would result. This evolutionary procedure would take from 5 to 20 years for completion.

The United States, which was the leading advocate for the PRB concept of obtaining advance international agreement on frequency lists for all radio services, led the resistance to this line of thinking. After lengthy discussion, the Board decided to continue work toward its objective of a draft frequency list and to inform the ITU Administrative Council that, in those portions of the spectrum where the requirements exceed the allotted space by a substantial amount, the Board could not complete frequency assignment plans because the reduction of requirements to the necessary amount was beyond its scope.

Scientific Value

The work of the PRB has made a substantial contribution to the world's technical literature. Not only will its studies contribute materially to the enlightenment of students in the field of radio communication but, until further contributions are made to man's technical knowledge, the reports of the PRB will also be used extensively by all national administrations in the study of their communication problems. The reports, partial plans, and completed plans of the PRB, which indicate the frequency bands and areas of the world in which congestion is most pronounced, have laid the groundwork for future attempts to produce an entirely new list. Its experiences point up the

difficulties which must be overcome before a new international frequency list can be evolved.

The PRB succeeded in concluding lists only in those instances in which there was less pretext for political manifestations. Where plans have not been finalized it has been due in good part to the selfish national interests of participating countries. It is unfortunate that these elements figure so prominently in an undertaking that has an immediate bearing upon the safety, welfare, and cultural benefits of man. The PRB has left an indelible impression—the recognition that a scientific approach is essential to achieve orderliness in the spectrum. Among those who are close to the problem, a grim realization exists that without such orderliness the only alternative is chaos in the radio spectrum.

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United States Delegations to International Conferences

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

The Department of State announced on March 29 that the first meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries will convene at Washington on April 2. The United States Government will be represented at the meeting by the following delegation:

Commissioners

Hilary J. Deason, Chief, Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior
Bernhard Knollenberg, Chester, Conn.
Francis W. Sargent, Director, Division of Marine Fisheries, Department of Conservation, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston

Advisers

Edwin H. Dahlgren, Chief, Section of Marine Fisheries, Branch of Fishery Biology, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior
Fred H. Taylor, Foreign Affairs Specialist, Fisheries and Wildlife, Department of State
Mary B. Trenary, Division of International Administration, Department of State
Richard T. Whiteletter, Assistant Chief, Branch of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Adviser and Secretary

Edward Castleman, Chief, Section of International Agreements Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

The northwest Atlantic fisheries are the oldest in the Western Hemisphere, having been harvested for more than 300 years. They have, during that whole time, been especially important in the econ-

omy of New England and, recently, have shown increasing evidences of depletion, with especially acute declines in the banks off the New England shores.

Recognition of the existing and potential depletion of fish, not only in the western Atlantic but also on the European side, prompted the convening of three conferences, held at London in 1937, 1943, and 1946, to seek remedies for the problem. None of the agreements concluded at those conferences has as yet entered into force.

The United States Government, which had taken the position that the northwest Atlantic should for conservation purposes be considered as separate from the northeast Atlantic, did not participate in the 1937 conference and was represented simply by observer delegations at the 1943 and 1946 conferences. On its own initiative, the Senate of the United States voted \$25,000 for the fiscal years 1948 and 1949 for the study by the Department of State of the desirability of a new fisheries convention. As a result of this study, a conference was held at Washington in January 1949 of those nations having an interest in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. That conference resulted in the opening for signature on February 8, 1949, of the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries and in the adoption of a final act wherein the United States Government was charged with the duty of convening, as soon as possible after the entry into force of the convention, of the first meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

The Commission, in accordance with the terms of the convention, will provide the machinery for international cooperation in the scientific investigation and development of the fishery resources of the waters off the west coast of Greenland and the east coasts of Canada and New England. While the Commission is given no direct regulatory powers, it may make recommendations to the respective Governments regarding regulatory measures which it considers necessary for maintaining the stocks of fish which support the international fisheries in the convention area. Upon approval by the Governments directly concerned, regulations will become applicable to all member countries.

The convention entered into force on July 3, 1950, after the deposit of instruments of ratification by four signatory Governments (Canada, Iceland, U. K., and the U. S.). It entered in force on December 14, 1950, with respect to Denmark, on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification. It has not yet entered into force with respect to the following other signatory countries: France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Spain.

Invitations have been extended, accordingly, by the United States Government to the parties to the convention and also to those countries which have signed but not yet ratified the convention to participate in the first meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

Invitations have also been extended to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.

The first meeting is expected to be primarily organizational in nature. Rules of procedure for the Commission will be adopted. Officers of the Commission will be elected. A headquarters site and an executive secretary for the Commission will be selected. A Panel will be organized for each of the five subareas defined in the convention in order to keep under review the fisheries of that subarea and all scientific and other information relating thereto. In addition, since many fishery research biologists will be in attendance, it is possible that one or more informal technical seminars will be scheduled apart from the formal sessions of the Commission in order to discuss such general topics as "What scientific knowledge is lacking in the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic and how should such knowledge be acquired?"

U.S. Contribution to U.N. Relief Works Agency for Palestine

[Released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. March 20]

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, acting representative of the United States to the United Nations today announced the contribution to the United Nations of a check for \$5,250,000 representing further contribution to the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The contribution brings the total of United States contributions to \$24,450,000, out of \$27,450,000 pledged for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951.

The contribution is separate and distinct from funds being sought for relief and integration of Palestine refugees in the Near East in negotiation conducted by a special committee of the General Assembly.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of United Nations command, has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers:

S/2010, February 14; S/2011, February 14; S/2014, February 16; S/2019, February 21; S/2020, February 21; S/2022, February 26; S/2023, February 27; S/2024, February 27; S/2035, March 13; S/2036, March 13.

The United States in the United Nations

[March 23–April 5, 1951]

General Assembly

Committee of Twelve.—This Committee, which was set up by the General Assembly to consider the advisability of merging the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, held its third meeting on March 28. At the outset of the meeting, the chairman, Djura Vucic (Yugoslavia) paid tribute to the late R. G. Riddell (Canada) who had been serving as permanent rapporteur of the Committee. Dr. J. M. A. H. Luns (Netherlands) was unanimously elected to replace Mr. Riddell.

The United States representative, Frank C. Nash, citing President Truman's statement on United Nations Day, as evidence of United States willingness to persist in the effort to solve the problem of armaments, stated that the United States intended to submit proposals on coordination of the two Commissions in line with the President's views. These proposals would deal with the status, membership, terms of reference, and the program of work of such a new committee or commission. He suggested that the Secretariat prepare a summary of the experience of the League of Nations in the field of disarmament. However, the Committee agreed to defer a decision on this suggestion until the next meeting, which will be held following the distribution of the United States working paper.

Collective Measures Committee.—The 14-member Committee held its third meeting on March 30. After general debate, the chairman, Mr. Muniz (Brazil) appointed a temporary 5-member subcommittee (Brazil, France, U.K., U.S., and Yugoslavia) to draw up a concrete plan to submit to the full Committee within 10 days. It was also instructed to draft recommendations on the question of addressing a communication to United Nations members to indicate what consideration they have given toward implementing the collective security provisions under section C of the uniting-for-peace resolution. These provisions recommend: (1) That member nations survey their resources to determine the nature and scope of aid they can give the United Nations in maintaining peace and security; (2) that member nations maintain special armed units for United Nations service.

Economic and Social Council

Transport and Communications Commission.—The Commission concluded its fifth session, March 3, after adopting (10-0-3) its final report to the

Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc). This report contains a summary of the discussion on the various agenda items covering international travel, road transport, and shipping matters; a review of the Commission's past activities and accomplishments, and problems which are expected to continue in the future; and the following 11 resolutions: (1) Driver Licensing—Recommends to the Council that a small committee of experts be set up to advise the Commission whether the establishment of uniform minimum proficiency requirements for the licensing of motor vehicle drivers is desirable and to what extent it is possible. (2) Pollution of Sea Water—Recommends that the Governments possessing the necessary technical facilities be invited to undertake scientific studies on the subject and to communicate the results to the Secretary-General for appropriate handling. (3) Discrimination in Transport Insurance—Requests the Secretary-General to conduct a survey on the extent to which such restrictions are being applied and recommends that the Council ask the Governments to adopt "in so far as possible" a policy of nondiscrimination. (4) Unification of Maritime Tonnage Measurement—Recommends that this should be among the first problems to be considered by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Imco) when it has started to function. (5) Imco Convention—Notes "with satisfaction" that an inquiry would be made by the Secretary-General among the Governments which had not so far ratified the Convention. (6) Transport Statistics—Recommends that a statistical series on tonnage of goods loaded and net ton-kilometers performed by road motor vehicle transport be added to the existing statistical series. (7) Road accident statistics—Requests the Secretary-General to coordinate the work done on road accident statistics by various United Nations bodies. (8) Customs formalities for international road transport and touring—Recommends that the Secretary-General circulate to the Governments invited to the United Nations Conference on Road and Motor Transport held in Geneva in 1949 the draft International Customs Convention on Touring and request them to submit their views at the Commission's next session on the desirability of considering the conclusion, on a world-wide basis, of two conventions relating to customs formalities. (9) Transport of Dangerous Goods—Requests the Secretary-General to consult with all the organizations, both national and international, which are concerned with the subject to examine the various aspects of the problem such as classification, labeling, and packaging, with a view to making specific suggestions as to uniform regu-

lations in this matter covering the whole field of transport. (10) Coordination of Inland Transport—Requests the Secretary-General to make available to all regional bodies of the United Nations the results of the various studies made on this problem. (11) Passports and Frontier Formalities—Notes the report prepared by the Secretary-General and requests that he continue to follow the progress made in this field. In addition, that any general inquiry to the Governments on these matters should be postponed until after the Commission's sixth session.

Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery.—The special committee on slavery set up by the General Assembly in 1949, at the request of the Economic and Social Council, opened its second 4-week session on April 2. The four members on the Committee are Prof. Moises Poblete Troncoso (Chile), chairman; Senator Jane Vialle (France), Charles W. W. Greenidge (U.K.), and Bruno Lasker (U.S.). The following agenda was adopted: (1) Study and definition of slavery and other institutions or customs resembling slavery; evaluation of the nature and extent of these problems at the present time; (2) suggestions as to methods of attacking and resolving these problems; (3) adoption of the Committee's report to be submitted for consideration of the Council at its thirteenth session.

The Committee sent out a questionnaire on slavery to 83 nations and has received replies from 49 countries, 33 of which are members of the United Nations. In addition, the Committee will have at its disposal extensive information supplied by non-governmental organizations and private individuals. The remainder of the session will be closed.

Security Council

At the meeting on March 30, the Security Council adopted, by a vote of 8-0-3 (India, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia), the revised United Kingdom-United States resolution on Kashmir submitted on March 21. Sir Benegal N. Rau (India) stated his Government had no objection to a new United Nations representative visiting India and Pakistan "to make a fresh attempt to assist, by suggestion, advice and mediation, in determining how the proposals regarding demilitarization under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be implemented, with due regard to the assurances given to my Government in connection therewith." However, his Government could not accept the resolution as a whole. He particularly objected (a) to the Preamble statement that the projected Kashmir Constituent Assembly in the Indian-controlled area of the state, and any action by this Assembly to pass upon the question of Kashmir's affiliation would be in conflict with the parties' commitments; (b) to the arbitration paragraph of the revised resolution, claiming it was a violation of the resolution of August 1948.

Statements strongly favoring the resolution

were made by the representatives of Brazil, Turkey, the Netherlands, Ecuador, France, and China, all of whom supported the concept of arbitration as a logical step in order to settle unresolved issues between the parties.

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross stated that the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions provided a framework, not a complete plan, for accomplishing demilitarization and a plebiscite. The parties still had to develop and consider with the United Nations representative the details in order to honor their commitment to settle the issue of Kashmir's accession to India or Pakistan by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. "If the parties do not agree upon these details in filling out the framework established by the two United Nations Commission resolutions," Mr. Gross said, "it will be because the parties give differing interpretations. In such a case, there must be some way of resolving the dilemma, and we have suggested arbitration as that way." The commitment of the parties and the legitimate interest of the Security Council in seeing this dispute settled did not stop with the two UNCIP resolutions, Mr. Gross declared. "They are not the end of the road." A procedure had to be found to enable "the parties to carry out their basic and ultimate commitment . . . to create the conditions whereby the people of Kashmir can vote without fear of intimidation upon the question of accession. If resort to arbitration of any matters which stand in the way of this result is objected to, how can the dangerous deadlock be broken?" The resolution, he said, had been offered in the "sincere belief that the Security Council must aid the parties to advance toward a solution of the dispute, by providing reasonable means through which issues, which the parties cannot themselves resolve, may be brought to a speedy and mutually acceptable solution."

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) explained that his Government's approach was to concentrate on the principle that the future accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be settled by a United Nations plebiscite, held under conditions enabling a vote free from improper influence. He doubted that it would be fruitful for the Council to consider the Indian claim that legal accession had already taken place, since both parties had agreed to settle the accession question by a plebiscite. He urged that arbitration provides the only suitable means of determining points of disagreement between the parties.

Following the adoption of the resolution, Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) advised that he had been instructed to accept the resolution on behalf of his Government and to voice its determination to afford the fullest cooperation to the United Nations representative and, if differences arose, to the arbitration formula.

Ambassador Daniel J. von Balluseck (Netherlands) continues as President of the Council during the month of April.

Irregularities at Hong Kong Post— Four Foreign Service Dismissals

[Released to the press March 27]

Over a year ago, the Department of State received reports of irregularities in connection with the issuance of visas and citizen certificates at Hong Kong.

The then Deputy Under Secretary, John Peurifoy, sent inspectors to Hong Kong to look into the matter. Despite careful investigation, no evidences of irregularities were turned up. However, the post was kept under constant scrutiny by the Security Division and the Foreign Inspection Corps. Later, last summer, a second report came in to the Department from Consul General James R. Wilkinson, indicating that he felt that there were irregularities taking place and involving the office of Vice Consul John Wayne Williams but that he had not been able to develop evidence to substantiate his suspicions. The Consul General asked for help from the Department.

Deputy Under Secretary, Carl Humelsine, deputized Julian F. Harrington, a veteran Foreign Service officer, who has had wide experience in consular work, and sent him to Hong Kong to stay until the case was resolved one way or the other. As a result of Mr. Harrington's inspection, an admission of bribery was obtained from John Wayne Williams in that he had accepted money in the form of gifts or presents from persons outside the consulate to expedite visas to Chinese to visit the United States or transit the United States enroute to some other country. Mr. Harrington obtained a full confession from Mr. Williams, including the fact that he had accepted bribes and that the presents he had accepted totaled in the neighborhood of \$10,000.

In the course of Mr. Harrington's investigation, it developed that there were homosexual aspects to this case. In addition to Mr. Williams, three other homosexual cases were uncovered in Hong Kong. None of these three persons were found to be involved in the visa irregularities. After the Department secured their confessions, they were discharged.

Mr. Williams was immediately suspended in Hong Kong and ordered back to the Department. Upon his arrival in Washington, November 24, 1950, he was met by agents of the Security Division of the Department of State and interrogated by them for several days. A fuller confession was obtained from him, after which his services as a Foreign Service officer was terminated December 1, 1950.

On November 28, 1950, Deputy Under Secretary Humelsine turned this matter over to the Department of Justice for action and possible prosecution. The matter is under the jurisdiction of that Department and is being actively pursued.

In addition, the details were reported by Mr. Humelsine to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Subcommittees on Appropriations, Senator Pat McCarran and Representative John J. Rooney. Full details of the matter have been made a matter of record with the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee during the recent hearings under the chairmanship of Representative John J. Rooney.

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The Department of State

bulletin

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MAY 1 1951

Preventing a New World War

Address by President Truman¹

I WANT to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communist Threat to Freedom

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot—and will not—sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how?

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one.

If they had followed the right policies in the 1930's—if the free countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the dictators, and if they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression

was small—there probably would have been no World War II.

If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.

This is a lesson that most people in this country have learned thoroughly. This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And since the end of World War II we have been putting that lesson into practice—we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by the aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency.

The Communist Plan for Conquest

The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made.

The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia.

I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which came to us after the attack. It is a report of a speech a Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs last May, one month before South

¹ Broadcast from the White House at 10:30 p.m., e. s. t., Apr. 11 and released to the press by the White House on the same date. Also printed as Department of State Publication 4195.

Korea was invaded. The report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully prepared plot. Here is part of what the Communist officer, who had been trained in Moscow, told his men: "Our forces," he said, "are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June. . . . The coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia."

Notice that he used the word "liberation." That is Communist double-talk meaning "conquest."

I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: "In order to successfully undertake the long awaited world revolution, we must first unify Asia. . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets. . . . The United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States."

That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and that is what they have been trying to do.

They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin.

This plan of conquest is in flat contradiction to what we believe. We believe that Korea belongs to the Koreans, that India belongs to the Indians—that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East and everywhere else.

The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. The Chinese Communists massed 44 well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean Communists were beaten.

Stopping Short of General War

The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task.

But so far it has been successful.

So far, we have prevented World War III.

So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding and bringing on a general war. And the ability of

the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight and that they will stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the timetable of conquest.

In Korea itself, there are signs that the enemy is building up his ground forces for a new mass offensive. We also know that there have been large increases in the enemy's available air forces.

If a new attack comes, I feel confident it will be turned back. The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well equipped. They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world.

The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The Communist rulers may press the attack against us. They may take further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow. The Communists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which could lead to a general relaxation of tensions in the Far East. The decision is theirs, because the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the conflict if possible.

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war—not to start one. The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

The Best Course to Follow

But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China?

It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong—tragically wrong—for us to take the initiative in extending the war.

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.

Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea—and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

Avoiding Confusion Over U.S. Policy

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy.

I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: the fighting must stop.

Two: concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: there must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective—to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

FOURTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AMERICAN STATES

Final Act: Signed at Washington on April 7, 1951¹

Excerpts from Doc. 145
Dated Apr. 6, 1951

I. Declaration of Washington

WHEREAS:

The present Meeting was called because of the need for prompt action by the Republics of this Hemisphere for common defense against the aggressive activities of international communism;

Such activities, in disregard of the principle of non-intervention, which is deeply rooted in the Americas, disturb the tranquility of the peoples of this Hemisphere and endanger the liberty and democracy on which their institutions are founded;

All the said Republics have stated, in formal acts and agreements, their will to cooperate against any threat to or aggression against the peace, security, and territorial integrity or independence of any one of them;

It will be impossible for such cooperation to be effective unless it is carried out in a true spirit of harmony and conciliation;

In view of the common danger, the present moment is propitious for a reaffirmation of inter-American solidarity;

That danger becomes more serious as a consequence of certain social and economic factors;

In this last connection there is now, more than ever, need for the adoption of measures designed to improve the living conditions of the peoples of this Hemisphere; and,

On the other hand, in any action for the defense of the Hemisphere and its institutions, the essential rights of man, solemnly proclaimed by the American Republics, should not be lost sight of,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Declares:

1. The firm determination of the American Republics to remain steadfastly united, both spiritually and materially, in the present emergency or in the face of any aggression or threat against any one of them.

¹ The first portion of the document contained list of representatives, officers, and agenda. The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was elected permanent president of the meeting, and William Manger, Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, served as Secretary General. The following is the statement of reservation made by the United States:

With regard to references in this Final Act to the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees, the United States wishes to call attention to its reservation to that Charter which was stated and explained at the time of the adoption of that document at the Ninth International Conference of American States.

2. A reaffirmation of the faith of the American Republics in the efficacy of the principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States and other inter-American agreements to maintain peace and security in the Hemisphere, to defend themselves against any aggression, to settle their disputes by peaceful means, improve the living conditions of their peoples, promote their cultural and economic progress, and ensure respect for the fundamental freedoms of man and the principles of social justice as the bases of their democratic system.

3. Its conviction that strong support of the action of the United Nations is the most effective means of maintaining the peace, security, and well-being of the peoples of the world under the rule of law, justice, and international cooperation.

II. Preparation of the Defense of the American Republics and Support of the Action of the United Nations

WHEREAS:

The American Republics, as Members of the United Nations, have pledged themselves to unite their efforts with those of other States to maintain international peace and security, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and to take effective collective measures to prevent and suppress acts of aggression;

International peace and security have been breached by the acts of aggression in Korea, and the United Nations, despite its efforts to find a peaceful solution, was obliged, pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, to take action to restore peace in that area; and

In order to ensure that the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly, on November 3, 1950, adopted the resolution entitled "Uniting for Peace",

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States

Declares:

That the present world situation requires positive support by the American Republics for: (1) achievement of the collective defense of the Continent through the Organization of American States, and (2) cooperation, within the United Nations Organization, to prevent and suppress aggression in other parts of the world; and

Recommends:

1. That each of the American Republics should immediately examine its resources and determine what steps it can take to contribute to the defense of the Hemisphere and to United Nations collective security efforts, in order to accomplish the aims and purposes of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of the General Assembly.

2. That each of the American Republics, without prej-

udice to attending to national self-defense, should give particular attention to the development and maintenance of elements within its national armed forces so trained, organized and equipped that they could, in accordance with its constitutional norms, and to the full extent that, in its judgment, its capabilities permit, promptly be made available, (1) for the defense of the Hemisphere, and (2) for service as United Nations unit or units, in accordance with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.

III. Inter-American Military Cooperation

WHEREAS:

The military defense of the Continent is essential to the stability of its democratic institutions and the well-being of its peoples;

The American Republics have assumed obligations under the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to assist any American States subjected to an armed attack, and to act together for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent;

The expansionist activities of international communism require the immediate adoption of measures to safeguard the peace and the security of the Continent;

The present grave international situation imposes on the American Republics the need to develop their military capabilities in order, in conformity with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance: 1) to assure their individual and collective self-defense against armed attacks; 2) to contribute effectively to action by the Organization of American States against aggression directed against any of them; and, 3) to make provision, as quickly as possible, for the collective defense of the Continent; and

The Ninth International Conference of American States, in its Resolution XXXIV, charged the preparation of collective self-defense against aggression to the Inter-American Defense Board, which, as the only inter-American technical-military organ functioning, is the suitable organ for the preparation of military plans for collective self-defense against aggression,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

1. To recommend to the American Republics that they orient their military preparation in such a way that, through self-help and mutual aid, and in accordance with their capabilities and with their constitutional norms, and in conformity with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, they can, without prejudice to their individual self-defense and their internal security: a) increase those of their resources and strengthen those of their armed forces best adapted to the collective defense, and maintain those armed forces in such status that they can be immediately available for the defense of the Continent; and, b) cooperate with each other, in military matters, in order to develop the collective strength of the continent necessary to combat aggression against any of them.

2. To charge the Inter-American Defense Board with preparing, as vigorously as possible, and keeping up-to-date, in close liaison with the Governments through their respective Delegations, the military planning of the common defense.

3. That the plans formulated by the Inter-American Defense Board shall be submitted to the Governments for their consideration and decision. To the end of facilitating such consideration and decision, the Delegations of the American Republics to the Inter-American Defense Board shall be in continuous consultation with their Governments on the projects, plans, and recommendations of the Board.

4. To recommend to the Governments of the American Republics: a) that they maintain adequate and continuous representation of their armed forces on the Council of

Delegates, on the Staff of the Inter-American Defense Board, and on any other organ of that organization that may be established in the future; b) that they actively support the work of the Board, and consider promptly all the projects, plans, and recommendations of that agency; and c) that they cooperate in the organization, within the Board, of a coordinated system of exchange of appropriate information.

IV. Importance of Maintaining Peaceful Relations Among American States

WHEREAS:

It is desirable that the energies of each American Republic be devoted to strengthening its ability to contribute to international peace and security in the Western Hemisphere and to the prevention and suppression of international communist aggression; and

Any breach of friendly relations among the American Republics can only serve to provide aid and comfort to the leaders of such aggression as well as to weaken the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere.

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Reaffirms:

The solemn obligations undertaken by all the American Republics to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means;

Recommends:

That the American Republics will make every effort to settle any disputes between them which threaten friendly relations, in the shortest possible time, by direct bilateral negotiations, and will promptly submit such disputes as they may be unable to settle by negotiation to other available procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and

Declares:

That the faithful observance by the American Republics of the commitments not to intervene in the internal or external affairs of other States and to settle any disputes among them by peaceful means makes it possible for each of the Republics to concentrate the development of its capabilities upon the tasks best adapted to the role each is most qualified to assume in the collective defense against aggression.

V. Provisions Concerning Military Conscription of Students

WHEREAS:

The strengthening of the cultural ties between the American countries is one of the most effective means to promote their knowledge of one another, and therefore, sentiments of union and friendship among them;

Student exchange has proved to be a positive contribution in the realization of this high purpose;

Likewise, the exchange of professional men and women, technical experts, and skilled workers who are to carry out advanced studies in scientific or industrial establishments, is equally desirable not only because of the cultural ties thus created, but also because of the benefits accruing therefrom to the development of productive activities in the various countries; and

In order to continue providing encouragement and facilities for this exchange, which is contemplated in various Pan American instruments and bilateral treaties, this exchange should be carried out under conditions which would make it more effectual and continuous rather than hindering it,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Recommends:

1) That the Governments of the American Republics

consider in connection with programs of military service the desirability of adopting or continuing measures to assure that students from other American Republics who have enrolled in duly recognized centers of education may be permitted to continue their programs of studies without interruption;

2) That the Governments of the American Republics consult among themselves regarding their respective legal provisions concerning military conscription to assure, insofar as possible, that these provisions will not affect advanced studies being carried out in scientific or industrial establishments in one American country by students, trainees, teachers, guest instructors, professors and leaders in fields of specialized knowledge or skills of another, when their stay is temporary and has as its purpose the above-mentioned professional or technical training objectives;

3) The recommendations contained in the two foregoing paragraphs in no way change the obligations arising under the Convention on the Status of Aliens, signed at the Sixth International Conference of American States.

VI. Reaffirmation of Inter-American Principles Regarding European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas

WHEREAS:

The first Meeting of Consultation, held in Panama during October 1939, approved Resolution XVII, which contains provisions to be applied in case of a transfer of sovereignty in geographic regions of the Americas under the jurisdiction of non-American States;

At the Second Meeting of Consultation, held in Habana during July 1940, the Governments of the American Republics signed the "Act of Habana", which provided emergency measures to determine the action those Republics should take in the face of any situation that might, because of World War II, affect the status of non-American possessions located in this Hemisphere;

At that Second Meeting of Consultation the "Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas" was also signed, which later entered into force as prescribed in the Convention; and

The American Republics declared, in Resolution XXXIII of the Ninth International Conference of American States, the Continental aspiration that colonialism would be brought to an end in the Americas,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Declares:

The firm adherence of the American Republics to the following principles adopted at the First and Second Meetings of Consultation:

1. The non-recognition and non-acceptance of transfers or attempts at transferring or acquiring interest or right, directly or indirectly, in any territory of this Hemisphere held by non-American States, in favor of another State outside the Hemisphere, whatever the form used to accomplish this purpose;

2. That in case it should be necessary to apply the measures prescribed in the "Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas", the interests of the inhabitants of those territories should be taken into account, so that the gradual development of their political, economic, social, and educational life may be promoted.

VII. The Strengthening and Effective Exercise of Democracy

WHEREAS:

Topic II of the program of the Meeting is "Strengthening of the internal security of the American Republics", and, for the achievement of that purpose and the appli-

cation of the proper measures, it is essential for each Government, as the mandatory of its people, to have their confidence and support;

In order to achieve such identification of the people with their government, it is imperative that each country have an effective system of representative democracy that will put into practice both the rights and duties of man and social justice; and

The American Republics and their origin and reason for being in the desire to attain liberty and democracy, and their harmonious association is based primarily on these concepts, the effectiveness of which it is desirable to strengthen in the international field, without prejudice to the principle of nonintervention,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Declares:

That the solidarity of the American Republics requires the effective exercise of representative democracy, social justice, and respect for and the observance of the rights and duties of man, principles which must be increasingly strengthened in the international field and which are found in Article 5 (d) of the Charter of the Organization of American States and Resolutions XXXII (The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America) and XXX (American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man) adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States; and

Resolves:

1. To suggest that the Tenth Inter-American Conference consider, within the framework of Articles 13 and 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the provisions necessary in order for the purposes stated in Resolutions XXX and XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American States to acquire full effectiveness in all the countries of America.

2. To instruct the Inter-American Council of Jurists to draw up, as a technical contribution to the ends contemplated in the preceding paragraph, draft Conventions and other instruments; and, to that end, likewise to instruct the Inter-American Juridical Committee to make the pertinent preliminary studies, which it will submit to the said Council at its next meeting.

3. To urge the Governments of America, pending the adoption and entry into force of the aforementioned provisions, to maintain and apply, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, the precepts contained in the aforementioned Resolutions XXX and XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American States.

VIII. Strengthening of Internal Security

WHEREAS:

The American Republics at the Ninth International Conference of American States, with specific reference to "the preservation and defense of democracy in America" and using as a basis Resolution VI of the Second Meeting of Consultation, resolved to condemn the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international Communism or any other totalitarian doctrine, and, consequently, to adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent activities directed, assisted or instigated by foreign governments, organizations or individuals tending to overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life, or to disturb, by means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats or by other means, the free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations;

To supplement those measures of mutual cooperation assuring collective defense as well as the economic and social well-being of the people, upon which the vitality of political institutions so much depends, it is necessary to adopt laws and regulations for internal security;

In their concern to counteract the subversive activity of international Communism, they are imbued with the desire to reaffirm their determination to preserve and strengthen the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American Republics, which the agents of international Communism are attempting to abolish through the exploitation and abuse of the democratic freedoms themselves;

Within each one of the American Republics there has been and is being developed through democratic procedures a body of laws designed to assure its political defense;

It is in accordance with the high common and individual interests of the American Republics to ensure that each of them will be able to meet the special and immediate threat of the subversive activities of international Communism; and

Since the said subversive activities recognize no boundaries, the present situation requires, in addition to suitable internal measures, a high degree of international cooperation among the American Republics, looking to the eradication of any threat of subversive activity endangering democracy and the free way of life in the American Republics,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

1. To recommend to the Governments of the American States:

(a) That, mindful of their unity of purpose and taking account of the contents of Resolution VI of the Second Meeting of Consultation in Habana and Resolution XXXII of the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, each American Republic examine its respective laws and regulations and adopt such changes as it considers necessary to ensure that subversive activities of the agents of international Communism, directed against any of them, may be adequately forestalled and penalized;

(b) That, in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions, they enact those measures necessary to regulate in the countries of the Americas the transit across international boundaries of those foreigners who there is reason to expect will attempt to perform subversive acts against the defense of the American Hemisphere; and

(c) That, in the application of this resolution, they bear in mind the necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most efficacious means the rights of the individual as well as their firm determination to preserve and defend the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American Republics.

2. To instruct the Pan American Union, for the purpose of facilitating the fulfillment of the objectives of this resolution, to assign to the proper Department, which might be the Department of International Law and Organization, with the assistance, if deemed advisable, of experts on the subject, the following duties:

(a) To make technical studies concerning the definition, prevention, and punishment, as crimes, of sabotage and espionage with respect to acts against the American Republics and directed from abroad or against the defense of the Americas;

(b) To make technical studies of general measures by means of which the American Republics may better maintain the integrity and efficacy of the rights of the individual and of the democratic system of their institutions, protecting and defending them from treason and any other subversive acts instigated or directed by foreign powers or against the defense of the Americas;

(c) To make technical studies concerning measures to prevent the abuse of freedom of transit, within the Hemisphere, including clandestine and illicit travel and the misuse of travel documents, aimed at weakening the defense of the Americas.

The Pan American Union shall transmit the reports and conclusions resulting from its studies to the Ameri-

can Governments for their information, through their representatives on the Council of the Organization of American States, and should any of the said Governments so request and the Council by a simple majority of votes so decide, a specialized conference on the matter shall be called pursuant to the terms of Article 93 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.

IX. Improvement of the Social, Economic, and Cultural Levels of the Peoples of the Americas

WHEREAS:

In the name of their peoples, the States represented at the Ninth International Conference of American States declared their conviction that the historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations, and for that reason they set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as one of their basic principles that of promoting, through cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development;

The aforesaid Charter entrusts to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and to the Inter-American Cultural Council the promotion of such well-being in their respective fields, and these Councils, in turn, should carry out the activities assigned to them by the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

It is a right of man to obtain the satisfaction of the economic, social, and cultural needs essential to his dignity and to the free development of his personality;

The failure to satisfy this right produces a discontent that may mistakenly lead men to accept doctrines incompatible with their own interests and the rights of others, the security of all, the general well-being, and democratic ideals,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States

Resolves:

1. To recommend to the American Republics that, in order to strengthen their internal security, they act with due decision to forward the great undertaking of raising the social, economic, and cultural levels of their own peoples, taking care that, to the greatest degree possible, they satisfy the rights set forth in this regard in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees.

2. To recommend to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and to the Inter-American Cultural Council that, within their respective spheres, they prepare as soon as possible plans and programs of action for promoting effective cooperation among the American Republics in order to raise the economic, social, and cultural levels of their peoples. These Councils shall present periodically to the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, for the same ends, a report on the execution of the aforesaid plans and programs, and their opinion regarding any changes that might be made in them.

3. The aforesaid plans, programs, and reports shall also be transmitted to the American Governments through the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

X. Economic and Social Betterment of the Working Classes

WHEREAS:

The democratic institutions that have been inherent characteristics of the American Republics since the beginning of their life as free States are based upon the principles of human equality and solidarity and upon the principle of the welfare of their inhabitants; and

The propagation of ideologies alien to the spirit of America and its civil liberties finds favorable development in materially and culturally underdeveloped coun-

tries, for which reason it is necessary to fight poverty and ignorance as an effective means of protecting Democracy and the Rights of Man,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

To repeat and broaden the resolutions adopted at previous inter-American meetings in such a way that in the measures introduced during the present international emergency, as well as in permanent peacetime economic programs, the economic and social betterment of the working classes of America shall be a matter of constant concern, by securing for them a satisfactory wage level, protecting them from unemployment, and making every effort to assure the progressive improvement of their culture and the hygienic and sanitary conditions in their homes and places of work.

XI. Betterment of the American Worker

WHEREAS:

Many Resolutions adopted by the American Republics in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth International Conferences of American States as well as Resolution LVIII of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, have manifested the great concern of the Governments to raise the standard of living of their peoples;

The objective proposed is of transcendental importance because the internal security of the American Republics, based on the proper functioning of a representative democracy, cannot be permanently strengthened unless it is based on an increasing production, the yields from which are distributed equitably among the members of the community; and

The Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees, approved at Bogotá, establishes, in general terms, the minimum standards governing the conditions under which American workers shall carry out their work,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Recommends:

1. That those American nations that have not already done so, and within the limitations imposed by their respective Constitutions, adopt in their respective legislations appropriate measures to give effect within each such country to the principles contained in the Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees approved at Bogotá.

2. That each American nation inform the Inter-American Economic and Social Council annually of any legislative and administrative measures it has put into effect.

XII. Economic Development

WHEREAS:

The present international state of emergency and the dangers it contains for all free countries demand efficacious cooperation among the American Republics for the effective defense of the Hemisphere;

One of the most serious factors in social decline, one that best suits the purposes of aggression, is the existence of low standards of living in many countries that have been unable to attain the benefits of modern techniques;

It is therefore necessary to establish rational bases that will make it possible to maintain the equilibrium and, to the extent that the emergency permits, the development of the economies of the underdeveloped American Republics and to improve the standard of living of their peoples in order to increase their individual and collective capacities for the defense of the Hemisphere and contribute to the strengthening of their internal security; and

The programs of economic development and technical cooperation have proven to be the most successful instruments for strengthening internal economies and improving living standards; and the present emergency situation and the greater needs for defense that it imposes are

additional and urgent reasons for increasing international cooperation in this field of activity,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Declares:

That the economic development of underdeveloped countries should be considered as an essential factor in the total concept of Hemisphere defense, without disregarding the fact that it is the prime duty of the American States in the present emergency to strengthen their defenses and maintain their essential civilian activities; and

Resolves:

1. That the American Republics should continue to collaborate actively and with even greater vigor in programs of economic development and programs of technical cooperation with a view to building economic strength and well-being in the underdeveloped regions of the Americas and to improving the living levels of their inhabitants.

2. To this end, the American Republics shall supply, subject to the provisions of Resolution No. XVI, the machinery, mechanical equipment, and other materials needed to increase their productive capacity, diversify their production and distribution, facilitating in appropriate cases financial and technical cooperation for carrying out plans for economic development.

3. Such financial and technical collaboration shall be carried forward with the purpose of modernizing agriculture, increasing food production, developing mineral and power resources, increasing industrialization, improving transportation facilities, raising standards of health and education, encouraging the investment of public and private capital, stimulating employment and raising managerial capacity and technical skills, and bettering the conditions of labor.

4. During the present emergency period, preference among economic development projects should be given in the following order: Projects useful for defense purposes and projects designed to satisfy the basic requirements of the civilian economy; projects already begun, the interruption of which would entail serious losses of materials, money, and effort; and other projects for economic development.

5. Each American state will take steps to coordinate its respective plans and programs for economic development with the emergency economic plans, bearing in mind its own tendencies and possibilities, for the continuity of its development.

XIII. Increase of Production and Processing of Basic and Strategic Materials

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

That the American Republics should adopt in their respective countries practical and feasible measures for increasing the production and processing of basic and strategic materials required for the defense emergency, for the essential needs of the civilian population, and for operation of basic public services. To achieve this end they undertake:

a) To accord one another, by means of administrative measures, the priorities and licenses required to obtain necessary machinery and material to increase the production, processing, and transportation of these necessary basic and strategic materials;

b) To render one another special and adequate technical and financial assistance when necessary and appropriate, by means of bilateral negotiations or multilateral agreements, when necessary, or through special joint organs, in order to increase the production, processing, and transportation of these basic and strategic materials;

c) To be prepared to enter into long-term or medium-term purchase and sale contracts at reasonable prices for these basic and strategic materials, and in conformity

with any international agreement of general scope in which they might have participated.

XIV. Production, Utilization and Distribution of Scarce Essential Products

WHEREAS:

Some nations have sponsored the creation of international organizations for the purpose of obtaining the cooperation of the free countries, in order to increase the production of scarce essential products during the present emergency situation and to make the best distribution and use thereof; and

The activities of those organizations will of necessity affect the economy of the Western Hemisphere, for which reason the American Republics should have suitable and adequate representation therein,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Declares:

That the American States shall have suitable and adequate representation in any international organization created during the emergency to deal with the production, utilization and distribution of scarce essential products, it being necessary that the different geographical regions and the relative importance of their production and population be taken into account.

XV. Defense and Security Controls

WHEREAS:

It is essential for the American Republics, as a part of the free world, to build up their economic strength relative to that of the forces supporting international aggression,

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Declares:

1. That the American Republics agree to cooperate fully with one another in the adoption of effective measures of economic defense and security controls in the field of their international economic relations, including measures to increase the availability of products in short supply to the countries of the free world.

2. That where one country imposes security controls which affect activities of private entities located in another country, full opportunity for consultation shall be afforded between the two countries with the purpose of developing cooperative measures to attain the objective of the security controls with a minimum of economic dislocation in the country where the affected private activities are carried on or the respective asset is located.

3. During the emergency and the period of adjustment following it, the principle of relative equality of sacrifice shall apply in the reduction or limitation of civilian needs, and an endeavor shall be made not to impair the living standards of the low-income population groups. Allocations and priorities for elements of production and consumption shall be established, in accordance with the principles contained in the General Statement of this Resolution, in such a manner as not to impair productive activity and economic development unnecessarily, or jeopardize political and social stability and effective collaboration among the American nations.

4. When producer countries establish export allocations to meet essential foreign requirements, such countries should adopt effective administrative measures to facilitate the fulfillment of such allocations for export.

5. Once export quotas have been established, it shall be the responsibility of the importing country to determine the essentiality of the use of the products and to control their distribution. It shall be the responsibility of the exporting country to distribute the quota among exporters from the exporting country. In case of conflicts or diffi-

culties in the operation of the controls, there shall be consultation between the interested Governments.

XVI. Allocations and Priorities

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

General Statement

That in order to meet the emergency situation and the subsequent period of adjustment, the American States shall do all in their power to provide one another with the products and services necessary to sustain the common defense effort, and declare that the maintaining of essential civilian activities and public services and the economic development of underdeveloped countries are considered as an essential element in the total concept of defense of the American Hemisphere, without disregarding the fact that the strengthening of their defenses is the principal duty of the American States in the present emergency.

Specific Principles

Whenever the emergency situation makes it imperative to apply the system of allocations and priorities, the American States will observe the following principles:

1. The essential needs for the functioning of civilian economic activities should be met.

2. In the case of products which are the subject of allocations, or priorities affecting their domestic consumption and export, priority be given to the utilization of such products for defense production in the common cause, including the maintenance of adequate stockpiles of strategic materials, pursuant to the principles of the General Statement.

3. The Governments of the American Republics shall accord one another ample opportunity for consultation concerning the effect of the establishment of substantial revision of allocations and priorities on international trade. Whenever, owing to special circumstances caused by the emergency, it is impossible for an American Government to hold a consultation before establishing allocations or priorities, such measures shall be discussed, after their adoption, immediately upon the request by any country for their re-examination on the ground that its interests are adversely affected, for the purpose of endeavoring to make an adjustment by mutual agreement.

XVII. Prices

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

1. That the Governments of the American Republics should adopt adequate internal measures and controls, including reciprocal measures to make them more effective, in order to prevent inflationary tendencies which would endanger the common defense program and basic economic stability and which would be detrimental to mutual economic relations. In addition, they will consider those international actions or cooperative measures which may be necessary to mitigate inflationary pressures.

2. That, with a view to assuring the proper administration of price regulations in such a way as to provide equitable treatment for both imported and exported products subject to controls, any American Republic which maintains a price control system will afford to any other member nation full opportunity to be heard with reference to any measures of price control affecting its products, and shall give consideration to such adjustments as may be pertinent, on the basis of data submitted by the member nation, but without being limited thereto. Such information may include increases or decreases in the cost of production (including the cost of manufactured articles, raw materials, wages, and any other elements making up an integral part of the cost of production), in the cost of

transportation, and in the margin of profit, and the effect of the price regulation on the supply available to the country of importation.

Whenever, owing to special circumstances, it is not feasible for an American Government to hold consultation prior to the establishment of such price controls, such measures shall be the subject of consultation, after their adoption, immediately upon the request by any country for their re-examination on the ground that its interests have been prejudiced.

3. When a Government adopts a general price control system, it should apply such controls to the prices of raw materials as well as to those of manufactured products, and if it applies them to imports, it should also apply them to exports.

4. The establishment and administration of price controls, whether general or selective, shall conform to the principles of national and most-favored-nation treatment.

5. With respect to policies governing price controls during the emergency period, there should be taken into account the desirability of establishing in international commerce an equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials, foodstuffs, strategic materials, and the price of manufactured products. It is understood that the obligations under this resolution are directed toward international consultation regarding appropriate means of solving such problems. As a result of such consultation it may be agreed to take appropriate measures to solve those problems.

6. That, having in view the maintenance of the purchasing power of the currencies of the American Republics and the real incomes of their peoples, recognition should be accorded to the principle that price stabilization measures should be continued so long as the threat of serious inflation persists.

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council should convoke as soon as possible and *ad hoc* committee of technical experts from central banks, treasuries or similar fiscal agencies, which, in collaboration with the appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations, should study, making pertinent recommendations to the Governments of the American States, the problem of maintaining the purchasing power of their currencies and monetary reserves.

7. That the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, in collaboration with the appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations, should study, making pertinent recommendations to the Governments of the American States, the continued operation and administration of systems of price control instituted by the American Republics, their effect on the economies of the American Republics, and the need for appropriate adjustments in the operation of such systems.

XVIII. Study Groups on Scarce Raw Materials

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

1. To recommend to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, which will hold an Extraordinary Meeting within two months following the closing of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation, the special consideration of the different basic aspects imposed by the present emergency situation on the future economy of the countries of the Americas, and particularly the policy to be followed by the American countries with respect to the International Materials Conference.

2. To instruct the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to make a preliminary study of the status of those raw materials that are of particular importance to the American Republics, in their capacity as exporters or importers, in order to determine whether it is desirable:

(a) In the case of raw materials for which an international committee already exists, to establish an Inter-American Study Group for each one, to draft

recommendations whenever necessary for transmittal to the pertinent international committee;

(b) In the case of raw materials for which there is no international committee, to establish Inter-American Study Groups to decide whether the Central Group of the International Materials Conference should be sent a recommendation on the establishment of the pertinent international committees.

3. To recommend that the Inter-American Economic and Social Council convoke the necessary Inter-American Study Groups, in accordance with the considerations of paragraph 2 above.

4. To recommend that for this purpose the Inter-American Economic and Social Council decide that the members of the said Study Groups may be the members of the Organization of American States having a substantial interest as producers of the corresponding scarce raw materials or indicating that they have a national interest in the consumption of those materials.

5. To recommend that the Inter-American Economic and Social Council request the interested Governments to appoint technical representatives to the Inter-American Study Groups on scarce raw materials that are organized pursuant to this resolution, so that the work of those Groups may be done on a sound technical level.

6. To suggest to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council that the recommendations made by the Study Groups referred to in this resolution be transmitted to the Central Group by the representative of the Organization of American States thereto, and in the case of recommendations to any Commodity Committee, that it be requested to call a Special Meeting or a series of meetings so that a representative of the appropriate Study Group may have an opportunity to present such recommendations personally and with all the necessary details.

XIX. Transportation

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

1. That the American States shall collaborate to ensure the availability and most efficient utilization of inter-American transportation facilities and cooperate in their improvement when necessary.

2. That the Inter-American Economic and Social Council be requested to undertake immediate studies in order to prepare and recommend to the Governments of the American Republics, for their adoption, in case of an emergency, measures leading to the most effective equitable utilization of all transportation facilities of the Americas. In particular, such measures shall include information as to the availability of transportation facilities, the minimum requirements for the defense program and for the essential civilian needs of each Republic.

3. With a view to maintaining the equilibrium necessary to the economy of the maritime transportation system, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, through appropriate channels, shall study the system of freight and insurance rates applicable to inter-American trade, and make recommendations on the pertinent problems and their solution.

4. If the state of emergency causes difficulties in the trade of the American States, bilateral and multilateral adjustments shall be made to assure as far as possible the flow of exports from the countries supplying raw materials and foodstuffs, and the correlative importation of essential materials.

5. If the state of emergency should make it necessary to establish transportation quotas, not only shall the volume of their trade be taken into account to assure such quotas, but also the special characteristics of the principal export products used to maintain their trade and monetary equilibrium, so that, in so far as possible, the means of transportation that may be counted on will be adequate to their particular national needs.

XX. Gradual Absorption of Production Factors Applied to Activities of a Temporary Nature

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Resolves:

That the Inter-American Economic and Social Council study measures to assure that once the emergency is over, production factors applied to activities of a temporary nature will be gradually absorbed in permanent activities.

XXI. Temporary Nature of Restriction and Control Measures

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Declares:

That the emergency restriction and control measures contemplated in various resolutions of this Fourth Meeting of Consultation should be considered as temporary measures required because of the common defense effort, and therefore recognizes the advisability of their being eliminated as soon as the circumstances that gave rise to their establishment no longer exist.

XXII. Liquidation of Emergency Stocks

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Resolves:

To establish a common policy so that the return to normalcy will not cause dangerous disturbances in the markets and prices of the products of American countries accumulated by the Governments during the emergency. The liquidation of the emergency stocks shall be carried out gradually and step by step, in consultation with the producer countries, in order to avoid abnormal disturbances in the world markets of the aforesaid products.

XXIII. Study on the Shortage and Distribution of Newsprint

WHEREAS:

The scarcity of newsprint gravely affects the normal development of the organs of the press in the American countries, which is the foundation on which freedom of expression must rest;

It is necessary to join forces to give every possible facility to the newspapers of America, in order that they may participate in the struggle to perfect the democratic system in America;

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Recommends:

1. That the Secretariat of the Organization of American States prepare, with the advice of the newspaper organizations of the Western Hemisphere, a technical report containing recommendations for facilitating the access of newspaper publishers to the sources of production and distribution of newsprint under price conditions that are equitable for all the American countries, with no discrimination whatsoever. The conclusions of the said study shall be submitted to the American States for consideration.

2. That governmental measures for the distribution and transportation of newsprint must be applied with due regard for the social function of journalism and with the same fundamental sense of general sacrifice as that underlying the system of allocations and priorities, and without preference or limitation that would affect the freedom of the press.

XXIV. Plants Producing Synthetics

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Resolves:

In disposing of Government-owned industrial plants for the production of substitute or synthetic products built for defense purposes, due consideration should be given to the effects of the terms of such disposal upon the countries producers of natural materials, in order to avoid unfair competition.

XXV. Manufacturing Plants and Rubber Plantations

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Recommends:

That the Inter-American Economic and Social Council study and submit reports to the interested American Governments dealing with the increase of natural-rubber production in the Hemisphere and the encouragement of plantations of rubber-producing trees and plants; and with economic and technical assistance for: (a) the establishment of plants manufacturing tires, inner tubes and other articles of rubber whether or not they have the raw material for meeting the needs for these products; (b) the expansion of manufacturing plants in the American countries that already possess such plants; and (c) the installation and extension of plants producing natural-rubber goods.

Emergency Economic Cooperation

Draft Resolutions Submitted by the United States

Doc. 8
Submitted Mar. 24, 1951

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The United States representative to the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States hereby submits for the consideration of his colleagues the following draft resolutions:

1. Draft General Declaration
2. Draft Resolution on Emergency Economic Cooperation
3. Draft Resolution on Economic Development and Technical Cooperation Programs

In presenting these documents, the United States representative makes the following explanatory statement:

During the period of more than 3 months since the United States took the initiative to convene the present Meeting of Consultation, and indeed prior to the taking of such initiative, the United States Government has consulted with a number of other Governments with regard to their aspirations and concerns in the economic field, with particular regard to preoccupations arising from the effect of the current rearmament program on the rate of economic activity and of economic development in the countries of this hemisphere. The Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting in Washington preparatory to the Meeting of Consultation, has made studies concerning the economic aspects of the Conference.

In order to facilitate the undertaking of discussions of the economic items of the agenda, the United States Government, having in mind the points of view expressed to it by Governments of the other American nations, and the pre-Conference consultations above referred to, and in the work of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and having also in mind the substantial curtailment of civilian consumption in the United States as a result of the rearmament effort upon which the United States has been required to embark in defense of our mutual liberties, has prepared and transmits herewith the attached drafts of resolutions. In preparing these drafts, the United States has made a determined effort to reconcile the various points of view, harmonizing them into a set of principles and policies which can serve as a basis for economic relationships during this emergency period.

In a real sense, therefore, the United States representative hopes that the attached drafts may be looked upon as reflecting in so far as possible the common viewpoints of the American Republics.

ECONOMIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

Proposed General Declaration

CONSIDERING:

1. That the American Republics and other countries of the free world are confronted with the immediate necessity of strengthening their defenses against the forces of International Communist Imperialism;
2. That the common defense of their political sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their human liberties is of vital concern to each, and all, of the American Republics;

3. That strengthening the defenses of the American Republics requires the maximum production, distribution, and utilization of defense materials, the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economies, and the development of essential productive facilities;

The Fourth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics
Declares:

That the American Republics solemnly pledge, each to the other, and in the interest of the free world, their mutual cooperation in strengthening their common defense by effective measures of economic cooperation.

ECONOMIC RESOLUTION NO. II

Draft Economic Resolutions (Under Sub A and B)

CONSIDERING:

1. That the imperialistic design of the leaders of international Communist aggression has as an objective the dislocation and subversion of the economic systems of the free world as a prelude to the imposition of political and military control;

2. That resistance to this inimical design is of vital concern to the American Republics;

3. That it is necessary for each American State to play its full part in contributing to the common defense and in sustaining the economic stability of the free world;

4. That the mutual effort in the common defense may occasion economic adjustments requiring appropriate measures and controls to prevent serious inflation;

5. That the mobilization of economic resources, goods, and services to assure their maximum production, distribution, and utilization, and the adoption of measures of economic defense, are essential to the common purpose of achieving security.

The Fourth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics

Agrees:

INCREASED PRODUCTION

1. That the Governments of the American Republics should facilitate in every practicable way, including the adoption of necessary and appropriate internal measures, increased production of basic materials needed for defense programs and for essential civilian requirements.

2. That special financial assistance should be provided on reasonable terms where such assistance is necessary to increase emergency production of basic materials in short supply which are needed in the common defense effort.

3. That where it may be necessary to induce producers of basic materials in short supply to undertake an emergency expansion of production, the Governments of the importing countries should be prepared to undertake medium or long-term commitments with producers for the purchase of such basic materials at reasonable prices and consistent with any broad international allocation agreements.

ALLOCATIONS AND PRIORITIES

1. That the minimum requirements for the operation of essential civilian economic activities must be met.

2. That in reducing or limiting less essential civilian needs, the principle of relative equality of sacrifice among countries should prevail, and accordingly, each country should make its full contribution in reducing its demand for such products.

3. That where producing countries establish export allocations to meet essential foreign requirements, such countries, should, if necessary, adopt positive administrative measures to facilitate the fulfillment of such allocations for export.

4. That in the case of those products which are made subject to allocations or priorities affecting their domestic consumption and export, highest priority must be given to the utilization of such products for defense production in the common cause, including the maintenance of adequate strategic stockpiles.

5. That Governments should cooperate, through such international arrangements as may be established, in the adoption of measures looking toward the allocation of basic commodities in order to assure their most effective distribution and utilization.

6. That in the administration of allocations related to development programs, measures of special supply facilitation should be granted for materials and equipment required to maintain or increase the production of basic materials essential to the defense program. Other economic development programs should proceed to the extent that materials and equipment can be made available without reducing other more essential requirements.

PRICE CONTROLS

1. That the Governments of the American Republics should adopt appropriate internal measures and controls to prevent inflationary tendencies which would endanger the common defense program and basic economic stability and which would be detrimental to mutual economic relations.

2. That each Government should recognize the reciprocal benefits deriving from controls designed to prevent inflation and be prepared to cooperate with other Governments which impose price controls on imports or exports with a view to the adoption of corollary measures designed to make such controls more effective.

3. That each Government adopting a system of price control should apply controls both to the prices of raw materials and manufactured goods. If price controls are imposed on imported products they should also be imposed on exported products. Price policies should be such as to accord to imported products treatment no less favorable than the treatment accorded like domestic commodities.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION

1. That the Governments of the American Republics will provide each other with full opportunity to consult with regard to the effect of emergency controls on international trade. It is recognized that consultation in advance of the imposition of controls will not always be possible owing to circumstances arising out of the emergency.

2. That the American Republics agree to cooperate fully with one another in the adoption of effective measures of economic defense and security controls in the field of their international economic relations, including measures to increase the availability of products in short supply to the countries of the free world.

3. That the Inter-American Economic and Social Council is requested to study, on a continuing basis, the resolutions of emergency economic cooperation approved by this Fourth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in the interest of reviewing the cooperation achieved by the American Republics with regard to those resolutions.

TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

1. That the American States should be prepared to take prompt action to insure the continued availability and most efficient utilization of Inter-American transportation facilities.

2. That the Inter-American Economic and Social Council is requested to undertake immediate studies for the formulation, and recommendation to the Governments of the American Republics for their adoption, in case of emergency, of measures for the most effective equitable use of all Inter-American transportation facilities. In particular, these measures should include information on the availability of transportation facilities, the minimum traffic requirements for the defense program and for essential civilian needs of each of the Republics.

ECONOMIC RESOLUTION NO. III

Economic Development and Technical Cooperation Programs

CONSIDERING :

1. That the true faith of the peoples of the free world in their future and in the democratic way of life requires evidence that steps are being taken to improve their economic and social welfare through concrete measures to help them help themselves.

2. That programs of economic development and technical cooperation have proven to be among the most successful instruments in providing the conditions and facilities which are necessary to expand production, raise living standards and fulfill the hopes of mankind for a better future.

3. That the present emergency situation constitutes an additional and urgent reason for increasing international cooperation in these fields, within the limitations imposed by the defense responsibilities of the American Republics.

The Fourth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics

Recommends.

1. That the American Republics, with increased vigor, should continue to collaborate actively in programs of economic development and technical cooperation with a view to building economic strength and well-being in the economically underdeveloped regions of the Americas and to improving the living levels of the people therein.

2. That such collaboration should be carried forward, through planned and integrated programs, including those having joint application to more than one country, which are designed to modernize agriculture and increase food production, raise standards of health and education, develop mineral and power resources, increase industrialization, improve transportation facilities, encourage the investment of private capital and the use of related managerial capacity and technical skills, and better the conditions of labor.

3. That during the present emergency period, priority should be given, within the limitations imposed by the emergency, to the immediate execution of projects for expanding the production of food, for increasing the output of materials in short supply, for improving nutritional standards and reducing the incidence of communicable and infectious diseases, and for bettering working conditions and labor standards.

Outstanding Achievements

Informal Remarks by Secretary Acheson¹

Mr. President, Your Excellencies—we come to the end of our meeting. And it falls to my lot, as your President who has received such outstanding remarks of kindness at your hands, to utter the final words.

I can do no better at this moment than to be inspired and guided by the four notable addresses which you have heard from our colleagues this morning. At the outset of this meeting, I ventured the hope, a hope in which I had a great confidence, unlimited confidence, that this meeting would have a dual success. That, in the first place, what we did here, our actual accomplishment, would make a great contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.

I also ventured the hope that the manner in which we conducted this meeting, the great demonstration of democratic and brotherly approach to common problems and of the cooperation in solving common problems, would be an inspiration in a world in which there is all too little of that. You have heard from the addresses this morning how gloriously our hopes have been achieved. So far as our work is concerned, our agreement, the conclusions which are embodied in our final act, the judgment upon those will be made by our peoples and by the peoples of the world and by history. It is not for us to utter that final judgment, nor is it for us to overpraise what we have done. I am happy to see already that the judgments, which are being reached about our work, are that it has been outstanding. I am sure that will be the continued judgment. But, I may perhaps say a little about the method in which our work has been conducted and the example which has come from our work to this troubled world.

And I might pause at this moment, before our final farewell, to examine for a moment why it is that we have been able to work upon these problems, difficult problems which have come before us, in such a cooperative and brotherly way. Why

is that? There are two great reasons. We meet here in a meeting of Consultation as Foreign Ministers. But Foreign Ministers are also men. So let us examine for a moment our duties and our efforts as Foreign Minister and then our association as men. As Foreign Ministers, every person at this table has come to this meeting and has acted throughout this meeting in devoted loyalty to the interests of his country. And, in examining the interests of his country, each one of these Foreign Ministers has found, as their predecessors have found and as their successors will find, that fundamental in the interests of each of our countries is devotion and loyalty to our common American system, to our common American ideals, to our common American interests, and to our common American organization.

Therefore, we find, as we work, that we are bound together with such bands of iron that no individual interests can ever tear us apart. And, therefore, as Foreign Ministers, we find ourselves inevitably colleagues, working as colleagues at common problems which are common to all of us, the solution of which is necessary to all of us. And, therefore, as we work, we have worked as colleagues. There has been no rivalry between us. In a gathering such as the one we have had there are no stars and no satellites. There have been no issues where there are victors and vanquished. There have been no points at which there are winners and losers. We have all won. We have all won through a great achievement because we are colleagues and because our fundamental interests are common interests.

But, we are also men, as well as Foreign Ministers. And the relations between men are, in my judgment (and I am sure you will agree) founded, if they are to be successful, upon mutual respect and mutual regard. Those emotions cannot be pretended. They must be founded on reality.

During this past 2 weeks, our mutual respect has grown because of the performance of every

¹ Made before the closing session of the meeting on Apr. 7.

single Minister at this table. Each of you, I know, could do what I could do. And that is to look around this table and point out instance after instance where every single one of Your Excellencies has contributed with great ability and with great skill to the solution of some thorny problem or to easing the way over sticky points.

And so, as we have worked together, we have a solid foundation for respect. We have seen performances here by every one of you which inspire respect, and our mutual respect has grown in these weeks to great height. But respect is not enough. In addition to respect, to have the proper relationships between men, there must be regard. And during these 2 weeks that, in turn, has grown.

Many of us here are old friends. Some of us here are new friends. But, in every case, during these weeks, we find that the warmth of our regard has grown. It has grown and it has flourished, so that as we return home and communicate with one another, and as we come to the final formal closing words of diplomatic correspondence, and we read, each one to the other, those

words "Accept Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest regard" that will mean to us something real.

It will mean that it is the communication from a friend who really has high regard and for whom we each have high regard, and we will know that we are communicating with friends.

I said that we have come to the end of our meeting, but we have not come to the end of our work. Our work never ends. We turn now from our agreement upon future action, which we have reached so unanimously here in Washington, to the carrying out of that action each in his own country. And each of us will encounter difficulties—that is inevitable. But all of us, as a band of brothers, will have our hearts and minds going with each person here, sympathizing in his difficulties, anxious to be helpful for their solution, watching, always hopefully, for his greater and greater success.

We have come to the final moment: Your Excellencies—no, that word is too cold for this final moment. May I say to you, "my friends," I bid to each one of you a most affectionate farewell.

U.S. Solicits Opinions of American Republics on Japanese Settlement

*by Ambassador John Foster Dulles
Consultant to the Secretary¹*

We are living in dangerous days. It is a time when each of us has the obligation to contribute to the preservation of peace with justice. The contributions to be made are not merely material—military and economic. There is a moral contribution to be made, because only as our cause is righteous will it prevail.

It is in this respect that our sister Republics of the Americas can make a great and a distinctive contribution to the cause of the free world. The very fact that you have no selfish interest in Europe, Asia, and Africa enables you to bring to bear a clarity and a purity of judgment which is welcomed by a nation such as the United States which, as set out in the opening sentence of our Declaration of Independence, possesses "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind."

The United States invites the opinion of all of the American Republics with respect to its international policies, because we recognize that those

opinions reflect the type of public opinion by which international policies ought to be judged.

You, your Governments, and your people, predominantly accept a religious view of the world. You believe that there is a Divine Creator Who is the ruler of men and of nations and that He has established a moral order, disregard of which sooner or later, but inexorably, brings disaster. You believe that there are external verities of truth, mercy, and justice and that law, national and international, ought to reflect those verities rather than the self-will and self-seeking of man.

It is in this matter that there exists the greatest gulf between the Communist world and the free world of those who believe that man has his origin and destiny in God. The Communist world, following the precept of Stalin, refuses to evaluate human and national conduct by standards of "eternal justice" and considers that law, national and international, is merely the means whereby those in power achieve their political ends and destroy their class enemies.

The United States has, I repeat, a "decent respect" for the opinions of others, but it is not interested in opinions which derive from this athe-

¹ Summary of remarks made before the World Trade Committee of the Washington Board of Trade in honor of the Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors of the American Republics at the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers on Apr. 3 and released to the press on the same date.

istic view of our world. We are interested in opinions which reflect a moral judgment.

That is why the United States welcomes the important voice which the American Republics have in the United Nations. That is why we always consciously try to make our policies such as will commend themselves to your opinion.

The Soviet bloc constantly charges that there is unity between the United States and our sister Republics because you are "dominated" by our power. Only those who are fully blind to reality could make such a charge. If there is unity, and I am happy to say that there generally is, it is because the United States has a respect for your opinion and because we consciously seek to win its approbation.

That is one of the reasons, in fact the principal reason, why I welcome this opportunity to talk with you about the possibilities of peace with Japan. There are, of course, other reasons. All of you showed your solidarity with the United States by entering the war against Japan. All of you joined the economic effort that was required to win that war, and one of you made an appreciable military contribution in the Pacific. Therefore, in this matter you are more than an academic audience. You represent Governments which, I hope, will be parties to a peace.

There is a group of nations which, by common consent, have a special interest in the Japanese peace settlement. Those are the nations represented upon the Far Eastern Commission which was set up in 1945 and which has been responsible for the over-all occupation policies. Three other nations in the western Pacific area have come into being since 1945 and they have a similar concern. We are having preliminary talks with these Governments and with Japanese leaders. I assure you they are only preliminary. They are, however, not secret talks. The whole world knows what we are talking about, and we welcome and receive advice from all who are sincerely and legitimately concerned.

Perhaps the most difficult single problem is that of security—security for Japan and security against a possible revival of militarism in Japan. We believe that that should be worked out as far as possible in accordance with the collective security principles of the United Nations. The Japanese Government and people want that also. Japan, undoubtedly, will apply as promptly as possible for membership in the United Nations. But their application may be vetoed, as has been the application of Italy and other peace-loving states.

This is an aspect of the problem which I am sure you will want to consider, both as belligerents in the Japanese war and as members of the United Nations. It is becoming increasingly intolerable that the Soviet veto is preventing the realization of the United Nations Charter provision that membership should be open to all peace-loving states

which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and which are able and willing to carry out those obligations. Denial of membership to such nations makes it difficult to develop a genuine collective security system, such as is needed in the case of Japan. I believe that the United Nations Assembly should, at an early date, give consideration to how this problem can be practically resolved.

Erroneous Versions of Japanese Peace Treaty in Foreign Press

[Released to the press April 6]

It seems that there are appearing in the press abroad versions of a draft of Japanese peace treaty attributed to the United States.

As previously announced, the United States some days ago did hand confidentially to representatives of Allied Powers a tentative and suggestive draft of a peace treaty which it was understood was a working paper, subject to alteration and changes which the United States itself might want to propose and, of course, subject to considerations advanced by other Governments. Since this first tentative draft was circulated, the United States has itself decided to recommend certain changes and additions so that texts presently circulated, although in general substance reflecting the type of treaty which Ambassador Dulles described in considerable detail in his Los Angeles address of March 31,¹ do not in respect to details and concrete language necessarily reflect the final views of the United States, much less those of other Governments whose comments are now being awaited.

Philippine War Damage Commission Completes Task on War Claims

[Released to the press by the White House March 29]

The President today sent the following letter to each of the three members of the Philippine War Damage Commission on the termination of the activities of the Commission.

DEAR -----: As the Philippine War Damage Commission terminates its work, I wish to commend you and the other members of the Commission on the outstanding manner in which you have discharged your responsibilities. It is particularly noteworthy, and something all too rare in government annals, that the Commission, in advance of the time prescribed by Congress, has been able to complete the tremendous task of con-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 9, 1951, p. 577.

sidering 1,248,901 claims and paying out more than \$388 million at an administrative cost well below that provided by law.

The program which your Commission undertook following the passage of the act of Congress of April 30, 1946 represented something new in the history of the United States because this Government had never before assumed the responsibility of restoration of private property destroyed in time of war. The program was one, however, that the American people, who were themselves still mourning the loss of some 300,000 of their own sons and daughters and who then, as now, were confronted with staggering post-war problems, never questioned. In recognition of the loyalty and friendship of the people of the Philippines, all were agreed that we should assist them in getting a firm start on the road back toward the reestablishment of a normal economy. Your Commission has played a vital role in helping the people of the Philippines in this task. Your program has strengthened the Philippine economy, it has helped restore many important buildings and facilities throughout the Islands, and it has enabled thousands of people to reestablish themselves in business, in agriculture, and in other pursuits.

The Philippine and American people have been closely associated for more than fifty years and it is my earnest hope that the two nations will continue that close association and cooperation in meeting the great problems which confront all freedom-loving people today. I believe that the work of the Commission has contributed materially to the realization of that hope.

In accepting your resignation on completion of a task well done, I wish to express my personal appreciation for your outstanding services as a member of the Philippine War Damage Commission, and to commend the Philippine and American members of your staff for their splendid contribution.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Following is the text of the letter to the President from the members of the Commission.

March 26, 1951

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is our privilege to transmit to you the Ninth Semiannual and Final Report of the Philippine War Damage Commission.¹ This report, as required by statute, has also been sent to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It contains an account of the activities of the Commission since its inception.

The Commission received 1,248,901 claims valued by the claimants at \$1,225,000,000. All of these claims have now been adjudicated, with an average rate of disallowance of 55.7 percent. Total payments have aggregated \$388,150,000. As prescribed by law, all claims approved for \$500 or

less were paid in full, and all claims approved in excess of \$500 were paid that amount plus 52.5 percent of the remainder. Small claimants have restored their homes and equipment, thus becoming more productive and hence more useful citizens. Claimants with claims approved in excess of \$25,000 received \$100,000,000 from the Commission, but invested \$500,000,000 in the Philippine economy.

The task of the Commission has been concluded in advance of April 30, 1951, the termination date fixed by Congress. Moreover, the Commission is able to return to the United States Treasury \$2,500,000, most of which represents administrative funds which were not required because of economy in administration. The cost of administration was less than 2.5 percent of the total sum appropriated.

For the payment of war damage to public property, the Commission was allocated \$56,800,000. Of this sum \$55,250,000 has been distributed for reconstruction. The remainder was used for administrative expense at a ration of 2.5 percent. Through this phase of the rehabilitation program, hospitals were provided for 3,200 bed patients, schools for 3,200,000 students, and waterworks for 6,700,000 people. In addition, appropriate buildings were reconstructed for the Philippine Congress, the Supreme Court, certain executive departments of the national Government and provincial and municipal Governments. The University of the Philippines was given substantial aid, as were the Cullion Leper Sanatorium and the Quezon Institute for tuberculous patients.

Although the funds authorized and appropriated were inadequate fully to repair the ravages of war in the Philippines, they were of tremendous assistance. Without them the very existence of the new Republic would have been endangered. Yet, despite supplemental appropriations by the Philippine Government, much rehabilitation remains to be done. The Commission is pleased to report, however, the deep gratitude of the Philippine people for this unprecedented act of generosity by the people of the United States.

Now that the work is concluded, we, the members of the Philippine War Damage Commission, offer to you our resignations, to become effective at the close of business March 31, 1951. In so doing, we wish to express our deep appreciation of the opportunity accorded us to serve the Philippine and American people, and to acknowledge our indebtedness for your able leadership and unfailing support. You have our best wishes for continued health, happiness, and success.

Respectfully,

FRANK A. WARING
Chairman

FRANCISCO A. DELGADO
Commissioner

JOHN A. O'DONNELL
Commissioner

¹ Available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

Second Anniversary of NAT Marks Progress

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 3]

On the second birthday of the North Atlantic Treaty, it is appropriate that we take stock of our progress.

The most encouraging fact which stands out today is that Europe is stronger and in a better position to defend itself than it was a year ago.

This stems from the determination of the free peoples of Europe to help themselves. Their determination as well as their strength has been increased by the assistance which we have been able to give them. Even more important, our joint efforts have acquired greater effectiveness through the establishment of General Eisenhower's unified command. For the first time in history, there exists in peace an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength. Six years ago, General Eisenhower led such a force to victory, but we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.

The armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty countries will grow more rapidly in the future as stepped-up training and production programs begin to bear fruit. An enormous military production program is under way in the United States, and our allies, despite limited facilities and resources, have already more than doubled their rate of military production.

Just as important as the forces which we are building together is the spirit of cooperation and joint effort which has been greatly strengthened. This is a solid achievement which will bring rewards of happiness and prosperity to our peoples long after the passing of the present emergency.

The events of the past 2 years have proved beyond question the wisdom of the course we adopted in signing the North Atlantic Treaty. Developments since the war have made it more clear than ever before that no nation can find safety behind its own frontiers—that the only security lies in collective security.

While we have reason to take pride in our accomplishments, we cannot forget that the road ahead is still long and hard. The people of the

United States and the people of Europe must accept heavy burdens with both determination and patience. I am confident that we will march forward together with speed and vigor. Above all, I feel certain that we will not relax the great effort which is now under way.

Message From Secretary Acheson to Chairman van Zeeland

[Released to the press April 4]

Following is the text of a message from Secretary Dean Acheson to Foreign Minister Paul G. van Zeeland of Belgium, Chairman of the Council of NATO, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

On this second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, I wish to extend to you, as Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the sincere greetings of the Government and people of the United States.

Two years ago, 12 nations of the North Atlantic community joined together in a great cause—the cause of peace and security. These nations have reason to take pride in the progress which has been made since that time. We are proving once again that free people possess the spirit, the courage, the skill, and the capacity for cooperation which, in the long run, will make them far stronger than any would-be aggressor.

Today, the people of the United States have undertaken the greatest peacetime defense program in their history. In accepting the burdens and sacrifices which such a program inevitably requires they are comforted and inspired by the knowledge that 11 other free nations are also contributing their skills and resources to the common purpose. The future will demand continued efforts and sacrifices from all of us, but I am confident that we will succeed in meeting these demands. Upon our success depends not only the peace and security of the peoples of this generation, but also the preservation of freedom, human dignity, and social justice for future generations.

U.S.-U.K.-France Announce Agreement on Industrial Controls in Allied Zones of Germany

[Released to the press April 4]

Attached is the text of an agreement concerning industrial controls in the French, United Kingdom, and United States areas of occupation in Germany, which was announced April 3 in Frankfurt by the three Allied High Commissioners.

This agreement replaces the agreement concerning prohibited and limited industries of 1949.¹ Also attached is the text of a letter from the High Commission to Chancellor Adenauer summarizing the provisions of the new agreement.

These documents have been released in Germany and in Washington, Paris, and London.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT CONCERNING INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS

The High Commissioners of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, hereby conclude on behalf of those Governments the following agreement concerning industrial controls in the French, United Kingdom, and United States Areas of Occupation in Germany.

Article I

1. The provisions of this Agreement shall be reviewed on the request of any two of the Governments parties to the Agreement and in any event not later than 31st December, 1951.

2. Except as may be subsequently agreed among the Governments parties to this Agreement, the prohibitions laid down in this Agreement shall remain in force until the peace settlement.

3. Except as may be subsequently agreed among the Governments parties to this Agreement, the limitations laid down in this Agreement shall remain in force until 1st January, 1953, or until the peace settlement, whichever is the earlier, and thereafter as may be agreed.

Article II

Except with the authorisation of the Allied High Commission the manufacture, production, installation, import, export, transport, storage, possession, ownership or use of any of the following articles or products is prohibited:

- (a) items listed in Annex A to this Agreement;
- (b) primary magnesium.

Article III

Materials, products, facilities and equipment relating to atomic energy shall continue to be subject to Allied High Commission legislation.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 24, 1949, p. 526.

Article IV

1. The manufacture of electronic valves shall be unrestricted in respect of types included in a list of permitted types as established, and modified as required, by the Allied High Commission. These permitted types shall not exceed 50 watts anode dissipation, or a frequency of 250 megacycles per second.

2. The manufacture of electronic valves included in the categories listed in Annex B to this Agreement is prohibited. This Annex is subject to review and revision by the Allied High Commission.

3. The manufacture of all other categories or specific types of electronic valves is prohibited except under license from the Allied High Commission.

Article V

1. Control shall be maintained over capacity in the following industries:-

- (a) Steel
- (b) Electric arc and high frequency furnace steel
- (c) Shipbuilding
- (d) Synthetic rubber
- (e) Synthetic petrol, oil and lubricants, produced directly or indirectly from coal or brown coal
- (f) Ball and roller bearings, except equipment only capable of producing non-precision bearings.

2. No enterprise shall be permitted, except under license from the Allied High Commission, to increase the productive capacity of any of its plant or equipment that is engaged or partly engaged in the industries listed in this Article, or of the industry as a whole, whether it is proposed to effect the increase by extension of existing facilities, the construction of new facilities, or the addition of new equipment. Such licenses shall not be granted unless the Allied High Commission are satisfied with the arrangements made for the disposal of the capacity replaced.

Article VI

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article the production of crude steel shall be limited to 11.1 million tons a year.

2. The Allied High Commission will allow crude steel to be produced outside the foregoing limitation where this will facilitate the defence effort.

Article VII

1. The construction and acquisition of ships which include the military features, characteristics and equipment listed in Annex C to this Agreement and the modification of ships to include such features, characteristics and equipment shall be prohibited except under license from the Allied High Commission.

2. The term "acquisition" as used in this Article includes bare-boat chartering.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as impairing or reducing the powers with which the Military Security Board is vested.

Article IX

This Agreement shall come into force from the date of signature and shall replace the Agreement concerning Prohibited and Limited Industries approved by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States and signed by the Military Governors of the French, United Kingdom and United States Zones of Occupation in Germany in April, 1949.

Annex A

Group I

(a) All weapons including atomic means of warfare or apparatus of all calibres and natures capable of projecting lethal or destructive projectiles, liquids, gases or toxic substances, their carriages and mountings.

(b) All projectiles for the above and their means of projection or propulsion.

(c) All military means of destruction including but not limited to grenades, bombs, torpedoes, mines, depth mines, depth and demolition charges and self-propelled charges, all types of fuses therefor and all apparatus for the guiding, control and operation thereof including timing, sensing and homing devices.

(d) All military cutting or piercing weapons.

Group II

(a) All vehicles specially equipped or designed for military purposes including but not limited to tanks, armoured cars, tank-carrying trailers and armoured railway rolling stock.

(b) Armour of all types for military purposes.

Group III

(a) Instruments and devices of the following classes, designed for military purposes, irrespective of the form of energy or the part of the spectrum used:

(i) Range-finding apparatus of all kinds;

(ii) Aiming, guiding and computing devices for fire control;

(iii) Locating devices of all kinds;

(iv) Instruments for observation of fire;

(v) Instruments for the remote control of objects.

(b) All signalling and inter-communication equipment and installations specially designed for military purposes; all apparatus intended specifically for the purpose of producing radio interference.

Group IV

(a) Warships of all classes. All ships and floating equipment specially designed for war purposes including the servicing of warships. All ships designed or constructed for conversion into warships or for military use.

(b) Special machinery, equipment and installations which in time of peace are normally used solely in warships.

(c) Submersible craft of all kinds; submersible devices of all kinds, designed for military purposes. Special equipment pertaining to these craft and devices.

(d) All military landing devices.

(e) Material, equipment and installations for the military defense of coastal areas and harbours.

Group V

(a) Aircraft of all types, heavier or lighter than air; with or without means of propulsion, and all auxiliary equipment, including aircraft engines and component

parts, accessories and spare parts specifically designed for aircraft use.

(b) Ground equipment and installations for servicing, testing or aiding the operation of aircraft, including but not limited to catapults, winches and beacons. Material for the rapid construction or preparation of airfields.

Group VI

All drawing, specifications, designs, models and reproduction directly relating to the development, manufacture, testing or inspection of the war material, or to experiments or research in connection with war material.

Group VII

(a) Machine tools or other manufacturing equipment specifically designed for the development, manufacture, testing and inspection of weapons, ammunition or other war materials listed in this Annex.

(b) Attachments, devices, tools or other objects having no normal peacetime use and specifically designed to convert or adapt machine tools or other manufacturing equipment to the development, manufacture, testing and inspection of weapons, ammunition or other war materials listed in this Annex.

Group VIII

(a) (i) Explosives and accessories.

(ii) Double base propellants (i. e. nitrocellulose propellants containing nitroglycerine, diethyleneglycol dinitrate or analogous substances).

(iii) Single base propellants for any weapons.

(iv) Nitroguanidine.

(v) Chemicals particularly useful as poison war gasses (including liquids and solids customarily included in this term).

(vi) Hydrogen peroxide of 37% concentration or higher.

(vii) Hydrazine hydrate.

(viii) Alkyl nitrates.

(ix) Other chemicals particularly useful as rocket fuels.

(x) Highly toxic products from bacteriological or plant sources, with the exception of those bacteriological and plant products which are used for therapeutic purposes.

(xi) White phosphorous.

(xii) Incendiaries and incendiary compositions, including but not limited to thermites and gell fuels.

(b) All special means for individual and collective defence used in peace exclusively by Armed Forces.

Group IX

All apparatus, devices and material specially designed for training and instructing personnel in the use, handling, manufacture and maintenance of war material.

Group X

Spare parts, accessories and component parts of the articles and products listed in this annex.

Annex B

Categories of Electronic Valves the Manufacture of which is Prohibited

(i) Velocity modulated valves, e.g. Klystrons.

(ii) Magnetrons.

(iii) Valves employing direct coupling of the electron stream to the output circuit.

(iv) Valves designed mechanically to fit wave guide, cavity, coaxial or parallel wire line resonant circuits or having such circuits built into the valves.

(v) Memory or storage valves.

(vi) Triggered spark-gap valves.

(vii) Subminiature valves (i. e. valves capable of being passed through a hole one-half inch in diameter, or specially designed to withstand great acceleration or the shock of departure of projectiles).

(viii) Cathode ray tubes, except those specifically designed and produced for television receiver purposes.

(ix) Germanium, silicon, and other semiconductor crystal rectifiers, or modifications thereof capable of operation at radio frequencies.

(x) Special purpose valves having no known commercial application or valves designed for optimum performance above 250 megacycles.

Annex C

Features, Characteristics and Equipment which may not be Constructed or Installed in any Ship except under License from the Allied High Commission

(a) Any special features or characteristics which render it readily convertible:—

(i) for amphibious assault operations;

(ii) to an aircraft carrier or for operating aircraft;

(iii) to a repair or depot ship for submarines, aircraft or coastal forces craft;

(iv) to a fighter direction vessel;

(v) to any other combatant or naval auxiliary type of vessel.

(b) Any of the following weapons, equipment and material:—

(i) all items listed in Annex A of this Agreement (except radio direction and position finders and radar equipment of normal commercial marine type);

(ii) paravanes;

(iii) minesweeping gear of any description;

(iv) catapults for aircraft launching;

(v) rocket or missile launching devices, except such as may be in normal commercial usage for emergency signalling and rescue purposes;

(vi) smoke-making equipment or apparatus of special devices for concealment purposes;

(vii) high concentration hydrogen peroxide or special submarine fuels or supplies;

(viii) depth sounding gear and radio and gyrocompass equipment which do not conform to normal commercial marine types.

(c) Any special fittings or special structures readily adaptable for mounting, carrying or storing any of the items listed in paragraph (b) above.

(d) Any of the following machinery or features of ship design, and provisions therefor, which in relation to the type of vessel in which they are installed, do not conform to normal commercial marine practice, or which in time of peace are normally used solely in warships, and which in the opinion of the Military Security Board also constitute a security threat:—

(i) main and auxiliary machinery, notably that with characteristics such as would give abnormally long range in miles at speeds other than service speed or that which would result in speed substantially greater than that normal to the type of vessel and for the services intended;

(ii) gas jet propulsion or atomic propulsion;

(iii) auxiliary electrical generating machinery and equipment of capacity in excess of that normal to the type of vessel;

(iv) cargo lifting gear in excess of that normal to the type of vessel;

(v) subdivision significantly different from that normal to the type of vessel;

(vi) evaporators of capacity in excess of that normal to the type of vessel and for the services intended;

(vii) fuel and fresh water capacity in excess of that normal to the type of vessel and for the services intended;

(viii) hull and deck openings in excess of those normal to the type of vessel;

(ix) unobstructed deck space in excess of that normal to the type of vessel.

TEXT OF LETTER FROM ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION TO CHANCELLOR ADENAUER

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, following upon the decision taken by the three Foreign Ministers in September, 1950 to institute a review of the Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement, my colleagues and I have today signed an Agreement on Industrial Controls. I enclose a copy of this document which shall, as from today, replace the Agreement concluded between the three Military Governors in April, 1949.

2. You will observe that the new agreement, which is subject to review at the request of any two of the signatory Governments, and in any event, not later than December 31, 1951, relaxes a number of limitations hitherto imposed on industry in the Federal territory and will facilitate production in Germany of items and materials for common defense by the West.

3. By the terms of the Agreement, limitations and restrictions hitherto in force upon the size and speed or tonnage of merchant ships built or otherwise acquired by Germany, primary aluminum, synthetic ammonia, chlorine, styrene, and upon machine tools of types listed in annex "B" to the former Agreement are removed. In addition, the High Commission will be willing to authorize the production of crude steel outside the limit of 11.1 million tons per annum where such production will facilitate steel being provided for the common defense effort. The prohibition on the production of synthetic oil and rubber is removed, and restrictions upon the capacity of these and of the ball and roller bearing industries are now modified. Control is retained, but in modified form, over the production of electronic valves.

4. The three Governments do not desire to hamper technological progress or to prevent the modernization of production leading to the reduction of costs and economies in raw materials, power and fuel. Consequently, in those few industries where the limitation of capacity is maintained the High Commission will be prepared to authorize the substitution of more efficient equipment, the rearrangement of machinery and the introduction of new processes or other technical changes even though this may involve a minor increase in the capacity of the factory or the equipment in question.

5. In authorizing the rehabilitation of plants (including the installation of new equipment) and the utilization of new processes for the production of synthetic rubber and synthetic oil the High Commission will, as long as solid fuels are in short supply, grant licenses only to the extent that additional consumption of coal and coke necessary for the production contemplated does not affect the satisfaction of the needs of solid fuel importing countries. Nevertheless, applications outstanding for use of the plants at Bergkamen, Viktor, Scholven and Ruhröl will be granted forthwith.

6. Whilst the necessity for obtaining license to manufacture machine tools listed in schedule "B" of the old Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement is not maintained, my colleagues and I require that a system of declaration of manufacture by the producer (indicating the intended destination of each machine) and of reporting on the quantities of such machines in Germany shall be put into operation.

7. The coming into force of the Agreement on Industrial Controls will entail certain amendments to High Commission Law 24 and to ordinances which your Government has issued in respect of the various items concerned. It is not intended that the coming into effect of the new Agreement shall await completion of all administrative processes involved in these amendments, and instructions have been issued to the Military Security Board to treat applications from industry in the spirit of the new Agreement pending the issue of the necessary amendments.

U.S.-Sweden Discuss Financial Policies on Transfer of Dollars

[Released to the press April 5]

During the years 1947, 1948, and 1949 the United States Government and the Government of Sweden concluded a series of understandings which temporarily modified the quantitative and nondiscriminatory commitments of the trade agreement of 1935 between the two countries. These modifications were necessitated by the drain on Sweden's gold and foreign-exchange holdings which became apparent in 1946 and threatened to reduce these holdings below the minimum levels required to carry on international trade. Because of this situation, and on the basis of the relevant understandings, the Swedish Government instituted temporary controls over trade and payments with a view particularly to limiting uses of Swedish-held dollar exchange to purposes considered essential to that nation's economy.

The understandings modifying the 1935 trade agreement were last renewed on June 27, 1949, for a period ending June 30, 1950, or on the date Sweden became a contracting party of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, whichever was earlier. As a result of Sweden's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an agreement was signed May 25, 1950, by which the 1935 trade agreement was terminated effective June 30, 1950. Therefore, from that date, commodity trade between Sweden and the United States has been subject only to the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, although Sweden actually became a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on April 30, 1950.

The modifications contained in the 1949 understanding expired on April 30, 1950, and with respect to payments ("invisible" transactions), there existed after June 30, 1950, no general financial arrangements comparable to those in the 1935 trade agreement. This situation will continue presumably until Sweden becomes a member of the International Monetary Fund or enters into an alternative financial agreement as provided in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for contracting parties not members of the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, there remain certain funds whose transfer into dollars was deferred by the Swedish Government on the basis of the understandings which have expired.

The United States Government has discussed these circumstances with the Swedish Government in the light of the improvement which has been noted in the Swedish balance of payments and the Swedish gold and foreign-exchange holdings during the past 18 months. As a result of these discussions, it has been learned that the

Swedish Government is prepared to liberalize restrictions on the transfer of current dollar payments accruing in the future and to undertake the early reduction of blocked funds which have accumulated as a result of the deferral of dollar payments by Sweden following the 1948 and 1949 understanding mentioned above. The United States Government will continue to discuss with the Swedish Government, on the basis of equity or the anticipated membership of Sweden in the International Monetary Fund, the policies governing the transfer of payments between the two countries.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission; which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTEENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 1-15, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2053
Dated Mar. 26, 1951

I herewith submit report number 15 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 February, inclusive.

General.—During this period our strategic plans to cope with the new situation created by Communist China's entry into the war have continued to produce the desired results. By breaking contact with the enemy and rapidly withdrawing to the south when our advance of 24 November exposed the secret build up of Communist Chinese forces in the forward battle area south of the Yalu River, the enemy, following in pursuit, was forced to extend his lines of supply over 300 miles. Each mile of this forward extension rendered him increasingly vulnerable to air attack, expanded correspondingly our power by maneuver to overcome the handicap of numerically superior ground forces and terrain favorable to the enemy tactic of infiltration, and reduced proportionately our own logistical difficulties. Resulting from this more favorable balance, our air and ground forces have inflicted losses upon the enemy reaching major proportions, kept him off balance and denied him any extended enjoyment of the tactical initiative. Of possibly greater significance during this period has been the exploding of the myth, built up by enemy

propaganda, of the invincibility of Communist military power and the clear demonstration that the allied soldier crusading for freedom is more than a match for the Communist soldier fighting to serve neither ideal nor spiritual purpose.

Our operations have been characterized by a most complete and effective co-ordination of the combined arms—land, sea and air—and an integration of the units of the several nationalities involved, spiritually and physically, with few parallels in military history. It is in every respect a unified command of high morale and marked battle efficiency, with every unit and individual invincibly bound together by a singleness of high purpose.

On 13 February after visiting the western sector of the Korean battle front, I issued the following public statement on the military situation: "What the future has in store in Korea continues to be largely dependent upon international considerations and decisions not yet known here. Meanwhile, the command is doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it. Our field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to weaken the enemy's supply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destructiveness of our air power, has worked well. In the development of this strategy the Eighth Army has achieved local tactical successes through maximum exploitation of the air's massive blows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies, but in the evaluation of these successes sight must not be lost of the enemy's remaining potential for reinforcement and resupply. We must not fall into the error of evaluating such tactical successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat just as many erred in assessing our strategic withdrawals in the face of Communist China's commitment to war as a decisive defeat inflicted upon us.

"We are still engaged in a war of maneuver with the object of inflicting as heavy a punish-

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on March 23. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN, of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470.

ment upon the enemy as possible, striving constantly to keep him off balance to prevent his obtaining and holding the tactical initiative while at the same time avoiding the hazards inherent in his numerical superiority. The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved, and the relatively small force which could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such strategy would insure destruction of our forces piecemeal. Talk of crossing 38th Parallel at the present stage of the campaign except by scattered patrol action incidental to the tactical situation is purely academic. From a military standpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority of our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in undeclared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage of sanctuary protection upon Chinese soil for his military potential against our counter attack before we can seriously consider conducting major operations north of that geographic line.

"Meanwhile, however, the complete coordination of our land, sea and air forces and the consequent smooth synchronization of their combined operations, with each arm contributing its full part, continues to inflict terrific losses upon the enemy. General Ridgway is proving himself a brilliant and worthy successor to General Walker in command of the Eighth Army, and with Admiral Struble in command of the Fleet, and General Partridge in command of the Air comprise an ideal trio of field commanders."

Summary of Operations—Hard-driving United Nations forces scored advances of twelve to twenty-five miles along the entire front against stubbornly resisting enemy forces. Some of the most intensive fighting of the war took place in the Anyang and Yangpyong areas south and east of Seoul. Chinese Communist and north Korean forces, comprising the North Korean I Corps and the Chinese Communist 50th and 38th Armies, in an aggregate of eight divisions, fought tenaciously in the Anyang, Kyongan, Yangpyong areas to protect the main route of approach to Seoul, but United Nations forces took Anyang on 7 February and advanced three miles north of the town on the following day. By 10 February the battered enemy in this area had been driven north across the Han River, and United Nations forces had taken possession of the Port of Inchon, Kimp'o Airfield, and the south bank of the Han, to the south and west of Seoul. Enemy attempts to recross the river were repelled on 12 February.

Heavy fighting continued throughout the period in the area south of Yangpyong. The Chinese Communist forces of the 38th Army were forced back five to six miles on both sides of the Yaju-Yangpyong axis, and sustained heavy casualties.

However, enemy resistance remains firm to the south and east of Yangpyong, and intensive action continues. Meanwhile, the enemy is maintaining his Han River bridgehead between Seoul and Yangpyong.

In the central portion of the front against light to moderate resistance United Nations forces took Hoengsong on 2 February and advanced nine miles to the north by 11 February. On the night of 11-12 February the enemy launched a heavy counter-offensive north of Hoengsong with two Chinese Communist armies on a ten mile front, the 40th and 66th Armies in conjunction with the north Korean V Corps in an aggregate of five to eight divisions. In this effort, the enemy penetrated our positions in several places, principally against the Republic of Korea 3d and 8th Divisions, achieved extensive infiltrations, and forced United Nations units to withdraw several thousand yards to a new defensive line south of the town. Our forces evacuated Hoengsong on 13 February and withdrew to the vicinity of Wonju for further operations.

In eastern Korea, enemy resistance was spotty as United Nations forces advanced up to twenty-five miles. By 7 February Kangnung on the east coast was taken, and Chumunjin fell on the following day. By 10 February, United Nations forces had advanced several miles northward toward the 38th parallel.

In the Uihung area, almost 100 miles south of the main front, United Nations forces continued vigorous action to suppress relatively strong north Korean remnants and guerrilla forces. In repeated engagements of battalion and regimental size, the enemy forces invariably withdrew after a few hours of fighting. Guerrilla forces in this area are now almost constantly on the defensive and have lost the initiative.

Front lines at the end of the period ran generally from Inchon on the west coast to Seoul, southeast to Kwanju, east to the Han River below Yangpyong, east to Wonju or north thereof, northeast to Kanyong, and thence to Chumunjin on the east coast.

United Nations Naval Forces conducted patrol and reconnaissance operations which continue to deny to the enemy the waters surrounding Korea. Air and gunfire support were furnished by naval units which maintained station in extremely severe winter weather conditions. Heavy naval gunfire support missions along both coasts blasted the enemy ahead of the United Nations ground forces as they advanced while United Nations Naval and Marine air units contributed to the close air support effort and to strike against the enemy in the rear areas. The bombardment of the Kangnung area on the east coast and of the Inchon area on the west coast were particularly effective.

Check minesweeping operations and destruction of mines were continued along the coasts of Korea to clear the waters used by gunfire support ships

and transport. Drifting mines constitute a constant menace to shipping in Korean waters and in the Japan Sea. This mine menace was highlighted by the sinking of a sweeper engaged in check sweeping operations.

Air operations have followed the pattern of previous periods with the close integration of the air and ground efforts enjoying marked tactical success. Both on the main battle position and in United Nations rear areas where guerrilla activities have been a source of annoyance, the offensive ground action has served to increase the number of suitable air targets by forcing the enemy to concentrate and to reveal his location as he is driven from one area to another. Air drops of hundred of tons of ammunition and other combat equipment, by removing the requirement for surface resupply, have granted to many army units a flexibility contributing materially to tactical successes.

Armed reconnaissance aircraft continue sweeping the North Korean roads and railroads of vehicles and rolling stock while destruction of bridges, marshalling yards and tunnels render the enemy resupply problem a gigantic one. Relatively heavy southbound traffic through Hamhung in the northeastern sector received the brunt of attacks during several days early in February and later the traffic in the western areas received the heavier effort.

Improved equipment and procedures have increased substantially the effectiveness of not only the night sweeps along lines of communications, but also the close support effort where the battle area can be brilliantly lighted by high candle power flares.

Air engagements have been few, the enemy refusing to operate except by sneak attack in areas other than those immediately adjacent to his Manchurian Sanctuary.

In addition to the prisoner of war enclosures in the vicinity of Pusan, an additional enclosure of Camp No. 1 has been opened on nearby Koje-Do Island at a site selected with due regard to the health and welfare of the prisoners. In accordance with Article 23 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, the coordinates of the new enclosure have been transmitted to the enemy through the international committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland.

During this period, the United Nations Command has made still further improvements at all enclosures of Camp No. 1 furnishing United States Army immersion type heaters for sterilizing mess gear, installing new oil-fed ranges and continuing the issuance of large additional quantities of warm clothing, bedding, and mess gear.

Since the submission of my last report the flow of refugees in the forward areas has been negligible. Controlled movement of refugees has been negligible. Controlled movement of refugees has been permitted but in general regulations issued

by the United Nations Command have held the local population in their home communities. The redistribution of refugees away from Key Korean communication centers such as Pusan continues for humanitarian reasons and of military necessity. Every effort is being made by the United Nations Command to provide food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance for these unfortunate people.

Although some cases of sickness have been reported, it is noteworthy that there has been no general outbreak of disease of epidemic proportion in the areas under control of the United Nations forces. Active measures are being taken to prevent such an occurrence, including continuation of the DDT dusting program, expansion of the immunization program to include typhus, smallpox, and typhoid immunizations for the entire South Korean population estimated at 20 million persons and improvement and reestablishment of medical facilities. For example, since my last report four hospitals have been placed in operation on Cheju-Do.

To date, I have knowledge of sixteen United Nations member nations whose generous contributions with those of United Nations organizations and voluntary relief agencies total over \$14,500,000. Of this total, approximately \$8,500,000 has been delivered in Korea. These contributions are of immeasurable assistance in alleviating the suffering of the war-ridden Korean civilian population and in the attainment of the United Nations objectives in Korea.

Through combined use of the media of radio broadcast, loudspeaker transmissions and air dropped leaflets, United Nations forces are endeavoring to control the movement of civilian refugees in Korea in order to prevent needless loss of life. Broadcasts from airborne loudspeakers, accompanied by air drop of special leaflets, have been used to channel refugee groups along roads that will take them out of the immediate combat zone. Radio broadcasts have instructed civilians to stay out of the city of Seoul during the current operations in that area. Simultaneously, intensive dissemination of leaflets to enemy soldiers continues at a high level, with primary emphasis on instructions concerning methods of surrender, and on reassurance of their good treatment as prisoners of war in United Nations camps. More than 230 million United Nations leaflets have been disseminated. Daily United Nations radio broadcasts are now reaching a larger audience through the installation of mobile and stationary loudspeaker relay systems in several Korean cities.

SIXTEENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 16-28, 1951

U.N. doc. S/2053
Dated Mar. 26, 1951

I herewith submit report number 16 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for

the period 16 to 28 February, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués, numbers 802 through 808, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Stubbornly resisting a vigorous United Nations offensive, enemy forces during this period were pushed northward seven to sixteen miles on a ninety-mile front extending from Seoul to Chongson. The enemy employed large numbers of his tactical reserves, particularly in the Seoul-Hoengsong area. However, this move was not only unsuccessful but resulted in tremendous losses both in men and matériel. In this action the enemy's Han River bridgehead between Seoul and Yangpyong was eliminated, and he had been forced to relinquish his deep salient between Wonju and Chongson by 25 February. As a result, United Nations lines are now relatively straight and unbroken over the entire front.

United Nations forces had driven the enemy north of the Han River at Yangpyong by 19 February, but met heavy resistance immediately north of this town. Heavy fighting continued in the Chipyeong area to the end of the period, as United Nations forces advanced about ten miles and drove a shallow salient into enemy lines four to six miles north and northeast of Chipyeong. Strong enemy forces were driven out of Hoengsong by 24 February, but continued stubborn resistance to the north and west of the town.

In the Pyongchang area, enemy forces held the initiative until 20 February, and forced United Nations units to make limited withdrawals from 16 to 19 February. During this period heavy fighting took place seven to ten miles north of Chechon, twelve miles east of Wonju, and in the area south of Chongson. Having overcome these strong local attacks, United Nations units began vigorous offensive action, and by February 24 the enemy had been forced to retreat ten to seventeen miles. Minor clashes took place in the Kangnung area, near the east coast.

Front lines at the end of the period ran northeast from Inchon to the Han River, along the Han to Yangpyong, east to Hoengsong and Chongson, and thence northeast to Kangnung.

Guerrilla forces in the Andong-Uihung area have been considerably less active during the period 16-28 February and have dispersed after short skirmishes with United Nations policing forces. It is estimated that United Nations action has now reduced the over-all strength of guerrilla forces in South Korea to about 30,000, representing a decline of about 15 percent during the past two months.

Constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval Forces continued to deny to the enemy the use of Korean waters. Surface units provided effective gunfire support to United Nations ground units on both coasts of Korea, particularly in the Inchon-Seoul area. Other surface units carried out a devastating program of interdiction by naval gunfire of the east

coast railroads and highways, concentrating the main efforts on bridges and tunnels near Wonsan, Tachon and Songjin. Republic of Korea Marines, supported by United Nations surface forces, occupied the islands of Ung-Do, Yo-Do and Sin-Do in the approaches to Wonsan to facilitate naval bombardment operations in the vicinity of that port. Amphibious elements of United Nations Naval Forces assisted in the reopening of the port of Inchon.

Drifting mines continued to menace shipping in Korean waters. Check minesweeping operations were continued along the east coast of Korea in waters used by the gunfire support ships.

Intermittently poor weather with low clouds, rain, sleet and snow hindered air operations, but good days saw the United Nations Air Forces mounting their greatest efforts of the Korean conflict. Generally rising temperatures and rain over South Korea have made the thawing ground a quagmire severely restricting normal resupply to front line units. Under this condition the capabilities of United Nations cargo aircraft on air landing and air-dropping supplies have been fully realized, contributing greatly to the success of current operations.

Enemy lines of supply were repeatedly attacked between the Manchurian border and the front lines. The numerical advantage of the enemy has been considerably offset by the constant choking of his lengthy supply channels. Bridges and marshalling yards continue to be the focal points of the strangulation attacks though dumps, tunnels, warehouses, and barracks are attacked whenever a degree of importance to the enemy is indicated. An increased number of vehicles and trains have provided remunerative targets.

Several multi-plane attacks by MIG-15s upon small formation of bombers and upon single planes have resulted in negligible damage.

The close support rendered to ground forces by all elements of United Nations tactic aircraft continues to be a decisive factor in each day's operations.

Since the submission of my last report, the liberation of additional areas of South Korea has necessitated an increase in the number of civil assistance teams and the availability of local governmental officials to reinstitute civil government in these liberated areas. Action currently is being taken to dispatch a newly formed civil assistance team to the province of Cholla Namdo and to augment teams whose area of responsibility has increased. Government officials and police of northern areas of South Korea have been alerted for re-entry into their respective areas when the military situation will permit.

It has been necessary to continue the control of movement of refugees, and to hold the local population in home communities. Return of refugees to their home communities is permitted whenever practicable, however, military operations and con-

(Continued on page 633)

Further Efforts To Solve the India-Pakistan Dispute

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

When I last spoke in the Security Council concerning the India-Pakistan question, on February 21, I said that the United States believes the Council should exercise its responsibility to narrow further the area of disagreement between the parties.² We think this responsibility can best be performed by effecting the demilitarization of Kashmir in order that a plebiscite can be held under United Nations auspices. The draft resolution, introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States, proposed to deal with the principal issues arising in this area of disagreement by establishing machinery which we believed would capitalize on the experience of the past 2 years of repeated attempts to implement the August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The United States, in acting with the Government of the United Kingdom to offer this draft resolution last month, did not believe that the machinery provided by the resolution was the only means of helping the parties advance toward settlement of this dispute. However, we thought it was a reasonable proposal, and, like any suggested device for helping solve a complex issue, it was always open to amendment designed to improve the suggestion while retaining the essential minimum necessary, in our belief, to help advance the dispute toward a reasonable solution acceptable to both parties.

The Governments of both Pakistan and India have voiced objections to the resolution as submitted. The Government of Pakistan would prefer a resolution by which the Security Council would order the United Nations representative to implement the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 and would give the Council's representative the power to remove or

disband all military forces, to exercise effective supervision over the state authorities in assuring a fair and free plebiscite, and to arbitrate all points of difference between the parties arising from implementation of these two resolutions.

The Government of India declared they were wholly unable to accept the draft resolution because they conceived the resolution, in many respects, went beyond the terms of the August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949 United Nations Commission resolutions. The representative of India mentioned particularly the reference to Sir Owen Dixon's demilitarization proposals and the possibility that United Nations troops might be used to facilitate demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite.

Amendments to the Resolution

In accordance with our concept that the draft resolution submitted last February 21, might be improved by revision—as long as the objective remained of providing machinery to help the parties advance toward a reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the dispute—the United States has joined with the United Kingdom in sponsoring amendments to the February 21 draft resolution. These amendments take into account objections made by both parties, the most important of these being the insistence by the Governments of both India and Pakistan on holding firm to the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The amended text is, in my opinion, the irreducible minimum in this case, if the Council is to provide machinery which will aid the parties to carry out their commitments as members of the United Nations to settle their disputes by peaceful means.

These amendments have four principal effects:

First, the United Nations representative would now be charged with the duty of effecting demilitarization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir on

¹ Made before the Security Council on Mar. 21 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1951, p. 394.

the basis of the two United Nations Commission resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. This does not mean that we believe the United Nations representative should disregard the efforts of more than 2 years in attempting to implement these two resolutions, as experienced by General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon. This experience forms a part of the Security Council record, and neither can nor should be ignored.

In this connection, we believe that both parties should be led, by virtue of their attitude toward the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission, to give the United Nations representative their detailed plans for implementing these resolutions. We are most pleased to note the reaffirmation by the representative of India of his Government's firm adherence to these two resolutions and his statement that they contain adequate provisions for a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. We cannot, however, agree with Sir Benegal Rau's emphasis that the Government of India cannot make any further "concessions." This is not a matter of making concessions but of giving effect to a commitment. The responsibility of the Government of India and of the Government of Pakistan, under their international commitment in accepting these two resolutions, is to cooperate in settling the question of accession to India or Pakistan by a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. The United Nations Commission's resolutions provide merely a framework which must be filled in; these resolutions do not set forth a complete plan for accomplishing demilitarization and a plebiscite. The parties will have to develop and consider with the United Nations representative the details which fill out the framework in implementing their commitment—details over which the Governments of India and Pakistan have disagreed for more than 2 years. Neither party can stop short, merely reaffirm the two resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, and say that it cannot make further "concessions," thereby blocking further progress.

The parties, moreover, are committed to permit the people of Kashmir to decide the question of accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan. That commitment is not, as the distinguished representative of India has said, "To give the people the right to decide whether they would remain in India or not." To phrase the plebiscite question in this latter formulation would be to disregard the binding agreement accepted by both parties. The Security Council has, from the beginning, held that the issue of accession is one which is to be settled by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices, and both parties, in the language of their commitments, have accepted this view. I am confident that Sir Benegal Rau did not intend to suggest a contrary interpretation.

I emphasize this now to make clear the position

of the United States Government in this vital matter. It is a position which rests upon the belief that the most fruitful approach, which the Security Council can take at this stage in this dispute, is to provide the parties with machinery for its solution.

The second of the four principal effects of the amendments is the complete elimination of paragraph 4 of the February 21, 1951 draft resolution. This change results from the thesis that the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions should be set forth clearly as the basis upon which the United Nations representative is to effect demilitarization. The suggestions offered in paragraph 4 of the original draft were intended only to provide helpful guideposts to the United Nations representative in his efforts to work out a reasonable and mutually satisfactory solution of the Kashmir dispute. However, in view of the objections of both parties, they have been excised from the text.

Thirdly, if he has not effected demilitarization or, at least obtained agreement to a demilitarization plan, the United Nations representative is to report to the Council, within 3 months from the date of his arrival on the subcontinent, those points of difference between the parties, in regard to both interpretation and execution of the agreed August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions, which he considers must be resolved in order to enable demilitarization to be carried out. This formulation by the Council's representative of these essential points of difference is important not only in focusing the attention of the Security Council on the principal issues between the parties but also because of the revised paragraph 6 and its arbitration proposal.

Paragraph 6 contains the fourth principal change proposed by these amendments. While, as previously, it calls upon both parties to accept arbitration upon such outstanding points of difference as may remain after concluding discussions with the United Nations representative, it is now changed to declare that arbitration should be accepted upon those points as they are reported to the Council by the United Nations representative. Furthermore, the arbitration proposal now provides that the arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, is to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties, instead of by the Court as a whole. This latter change, which is more in accordance with the international practice, will serve to expedite the arbitration process if resort to it should become necessary.

The Government of the United States regards this arbitration proposal as one of the key elements of this resolution. The representative of India has not rejected the concept of arbitration but has said that under the guise of arbitration issues cannot be reopened which have already been closed by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 and by the assurances given to India by the United

Nations Commission. I trust that, if it becomes necessary to give effect to this arbitration provision, the Government of India will find itself able to accept the arbitration provisions of this resolution. The commitment of both parties in this dispute is to settle the question of accession by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations supervision. It is the parties' commitment, under the Charter of the United Nations, to seek a solution by all manner of peaceful means of their own choice. When other peaceful means have been exhausted and interpretation must be made of the commitments entered into by both parties under the two resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, then arbitration is logical in order to settle the issues preliminary to actually holding the plebiscite.

Legal Jurisdiction of Indian Government

The members of the Security Council will note that the February 21 resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States remains the same in an important respect: the language in the preamble concerning the Kashmir National Conference has not been changed. In my speech on February 21 in support of the draft resolution, I expressed my Government's concern about the action which the authorities in the Indian-controlled area of Kashmir are undertaking to determine the future shape and affiliation of the state. I wondered whether it might interfere with a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices in the entire state. I associated myself with the anxiety expressed by Sir Gladwyn Jebb in this regard and hoped that, if the Security Council received an explanation, we would find ourselves reassured that the action of the Kashmir National Conference would not prejudice the prior commitments of the parties.

The representative of India, in adverting to this problem, declared that, so far as the Government of India is concerned, the Constituent Assembly is not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in the Council's way. He subsequently stated that, while the Constituent Assembly may if it so desires express an opinion on the question of accession, it can make no decision on the question. However, the representative of India also said that the Kashmir State Government is a unit of the Indian Federation, subject to federal jurisdiction in regard to defense, external affairs, and communications, but completely autonomous in almost all other matters. Sir Benegal Rau emphasized the autonomous nature of the Kashmir State Government, affirming that the state is entitled to frame its own constitution and to convene a Constituent Assembly for this purpose. In discussing the question of supervising the activities of the Kashmir State Government for purposes of a plebiscite, the representative of India emphasized that the authority

of the Government of India over the Government of Kashmir is limited to certain subjects; outside that sphere it can only advise and cannot impose any decision.

In addition to this careful statement of the Government of India's limited control over the Government of the state of Kashmir, there have been a number of statements recently which bear directly on the problem before the Security Council made by ranking leaders of the Governments of India and Kashmir concerning the Constituent Assembly and its purpose. One of such statements was made by Sheikh Abdullah, as recently as February 25, when he said that the Constituent Assembly would decide the question of accession of the state as well as its form of government. The Government of the United States, therefore, believes the situation requires that the Security Council place on the record its attitude toward the Constituent Assembly and toward any attempts that the Constituent Assembly might make to determine the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir.

Settlement Necessary to Peace in South Asia

The United States believes that the Security Council can and should affirm what the parties have agreed upon—that final disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir will be made by the will of the people as expressed through a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices. We believe that it is important that the Security Council hold firm to this language as a minimum statement of its attitude toward the proposed Constituent Assembly and toward the obligations of the Government of India in respect to this Constituent Assembly. The matter of the final disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is an international question, a matter which this Council has had within its purview for over 3 years. It clearly falls within the field of external affairs, and Sir Benegal Rau has told the Council that the external affairs of the Government of Kashmir are within the control of the Indian Government. The Security Council, therefore, should be entitled to assume that the Government of India will prevent the Government of Kashmir from taking action which would interfere with the responsibility of this Council.

Members of the Council will note that paragraph 8 of the amended draft resolution calls upon the parties to take all possible measures to insure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favorable to the promotion of further negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement. This language is similar to that used in previous Security Council resolutions in the course of this dispute. The Government of Pakistan and the Government of India have both condemned appeals to force to settle the Kashmir dispute which have been made

by irresponsible and intemperate elements. Continued efforts by the parties to discourage such appeals to force will help insure and maintain an atmosphere which is favorable to promoting further negotiations and to refrain from action likely to prejudice a peaceful settlement.

Let me close my remarks by repeating the deep concern of my Government that the Security Council should give serious and prompt consideration to the amended draft resolution. The proceedings before the Security Council since February 21, 1951, have indicated clearly the degree to which the Kashmir dispute continues to be an irritant prejudicing friendly relations between the Governments of these two great powers, India and Pakistan, and the extent to which this dispute blocks the restoration of the friendship and mutual esteem which is necessary for the peace and security of South Asia. I believe that the Security Council must assist the parties to reach a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution of this long-lasting dispute. The resolution, as it is proposed to be amended, offers a reasonable device to help the parties solve a complex issue. It is offered in the sincere belief that the present frame of mind of both parties requires that the Security Council aid them in attempting to advance toward a solution, rather than leave them to their own devices. As I said last February, the time and the situation demand that the Council give the parties practical aid and give this aid with the earnest hope that it may, in those old and meaningful words, "speak to their condition."

Paris Selected as Site for Sixth Session of General Assembly

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
Deputy U.S. Representative to United Nations*¹

When the question came up in December of the selection of a site for the sixth session of the General Assembly, my Government abstained in the vote. We did so because we felt that as host government and as the country having the honor of furnishing the site for the United Nations headquarters an abstention on our part seemed to be the proper course to take.

We did not wish to appear to avoid the responsibilities resting upon the host government nor to take advantage of the obvious economies, efficiency and general convenience which would flow to us as well as a number of other countries, by reason of having the sixth session take place in New York. I stress those three factors of considerations of economy, efficiency, and convenience. It seems to us wholly appropriate to

consider the question of economies, not merely as loyal members of the organization, but as one of the large contributors to its budget.

We agree with the comments that have been made by some of the preceding speakers that, in a sense, the general policy question was put at rest by the decision which was taken by the General Assembly on December 14. And it is not my purpose now to reopen that decision nor to question the policies which underlay it, particularly, because of the factors which lead us to abstain and which I have just outlined.

The matter of financial implications of the proposal embodied in the resolution before us is one which I am sure will cause concern to all of us and which for a variety of reasons causes particular concern to my Government as well as to some of the others around this table.

We also are very much concerned, as I imagine all members are, with the administrative problems which have been mentioned in very clear terms by some of the preceding speakers.

What in fact would be the effect upon the work of the United Nations organs and specialized agencies by reason of this new element which has come into the situation, which is the element of the rather late date which the Government of France suggests or advises us is the earliest date upon which it can conveniently make the necessary arrangements?

While I am sure that this is not the time or place to engage in general political polemics, it does seem to me that there may be varying interests in the work of these specialized agencies. Some of us participate in the work of those agencies wholeheartedly. Others, at this table, see fit not to participate in that work and, therefore, perhaps they might be excused if they do not take into account the necessity for efficiency and orderly operations which those very constructive agencies perform.

Therefore, I think it is relevant and indeed rather important for the Assembly to be advised by the Secretary-General, if he would be gracious enough to do so, what in his opinion the effect upon the work of the other agencies and other organs of the United Nations would be, by reason of the date problem presented to us by the note, which we have received from the Government of France.

Finally, I think there also arises the question of general convenience, efficiency of operations as to which the viewpoint of the Secretary-General, as the responsible executive of the organization, would also be most welcome to my Government, and I imagine to other Governments around the table as well. Therefore, before my delegation would feel in a position to act upon this matter, we would be most obliged if the distinguished representative of France would find it possible to indicate to the Assembly whether it is within the

¹ Made before plenary session of the General Assembly on Mar. 20 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

Text of Resolution

U.N. doc. A/1792
Adopted Mar. 21, 1951

The General Assembly,

HAVING BEEN INFORMED that the French Government, desirous of responding to the wish that has been expressed to it on several occasions, has decided to welcome the General Assembly to Paris for the duration of its sixth session.

1. *Decides*, in pursuance of its resolution 497 (V) of 14 December 1950, to hold its sixth regular session in Paris;

2. *Decides* that, notwithstanding the provisions of rule 1 of its rules of procedure, the sixth session shall commence not later than 6 November 1951;

3. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to conclude with the French Government the necessary agreements for holding the sixth session of the General Assembly in Paris, provided that the total estimated cost of holding the sixth session in Paris (including such meetings as may be arranged after 1 January 1952) shall not exceed the amount of \$2,350,400 provided in the 1951 budget, plus such additional amounts as may be authorized by transfer from other sections of the 1951 budget by the Secretary-General with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

concept or plan of the Government of France to provide the necessary facilities in such form and in such manner as would leave the United Nations without the necessity for incurring any expense additional to that amount which appears in the approved budget for 1951, perhaps with some small addition that might be decided upon by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Budget Advisory Committee—by that I would assume a small amount on fact upon which we would all agree would be a small amount—whether that would fit within the general approach of the Government of France as it has surveyed the problem. Then, also, as I have said before, if the Secretary-General would be kind enough to give us an appraisal of the administrative implications both with regard to the efficiency of operations and the impact upon the work of the other organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.

U.N. Command Operations—Continued from page 628

ditions of liberated areas have precluded mass movement of refugees to the north.

The program of extensive DDT dusting and immunization referred to in my last report is being prosecuted vigorously in order to prevent an outbreak or spread of communicable diseases. Although scattered cases of smallpox and typhus continue to be reported, there has been no general outbreak of diseases of epidemic proportions in the areas under control of United Nations forces. With continued military progress, it is anticipated that there will be an increasing demand for medical supplies in the war-damaged areas to care for

the wounded and to prevent the spread of disease.

Contributions to date by United Nations member nations are valued at approximately 15 million dollars. Since it is of vital importance that relief supplies continue to flow into Korea in order to prevent disease, starvation and unrest, member nations are urged to continue their contributions in order that the humanitarian responsibilities imposed upon the United Nations may be accomplished.

In the dissemination of United Nations leaflets to enemy troops in Korea, increased emphasis is being placed on safe conduct passes, which explain to the soldier the humane treatment guaranteed him by the United Nations in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and urge him to cease resistance. In addition to a message to the enemy soldier in either Chinese or Korean, these leaflets contain English and Korean instructions to United Nations soldiers, directing them to treat the bearer as an honorable Prisoner of War, and take him to the nearest officer. Prisoner interrogation reports show that such leaflets are influencing many enemy soldiers despite Communist efforts to intimidate them with false allegations concerning United Nations treatment of prisoners. Approximately 250 million copies of some 133 different leaflets have now been used in Korea. The schedule of United Nations radio broadcasts to Korea has been augmented with the addition of three new informational programs designed to stimulate listener interest and bolster Korean morale.

Conclusion. As I pointed out on my last inspection of the Korean battle front, I am entirely satisfied with the situation at the front where the enemy has suffered a tactical reverse of measurable proportion. His losses have been among the bloodiest of modern times. As these are from Communist China's finest troops, it will be difficult to adequately replace them. The enemy is finding it an entirely different problem fighting 350 miles from his base than when he had this "sanctuary" in his immediate rear, with our air and naval forces practically zeroed out. He is paying now for the illusion, so falsely but effectively propagandized when Communist China initiated undeclared war that he had decisively defeated these same forces. Our strategic plan, notwithstanding the enemy's great numerical superiority, is indeed working well and I have just directed a resumption of the initiative by our forces. All ranks of this international force are covering themselves with distinction and I again wish to especially commend the outstanding teamwork of the three Services under the skillful direction of their able field commanders, General Ridgway, Admiral Struble and General Partridge. Our successes are in great part due to the smooth synchronization of the power of the three arms. This, indeed, is the most vital factor in modern war.

International Materials Conference

RULES OF PROCEDURE ADOPTED

[Released to the press by IMC April 2]

At the second meeting on March 30, the permanent Central Group of the International Materials Conference (IMC) decided upon its rules of procedure.

This enlarged, permanent Group is composed of the Governments of the three originating countries—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus those of Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Italy and the Organization of American States and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Six earlier meetings have been held by the temporary Group, making this the eighth meeting of the Group since its formation.

The chief function of this new international body, the International Materials Conference, will be to formulate and coordinate international policy relating to the production, allocation, conservation, distribution, and utilization of certain strategic raw materials. The solution of commodity shortages, which will be world-wide in scope and effect, is one of the most important and critical problems facing the free world today.

The Central Group in its rules, adopted on March 30, allowed for the establishment of additional commodity committees as situation and circumstances warrant. Meetings of the Central Group will be held at regular intervals as is decided by the Central Group or at the call of the chairman or at the request of any two members to the secretary.

Although the seven commodity committees thus far established by the Central Group have complete autonomy in conducting their work, the Central Group will work out with the chairman of individual committees any procedures which will facilitate the coordination of those committees in their approach toward common problems.

The Group elected for its permanent chairman, Edwin T. Gibson of the United States. Two vice chairmen also have been provided for, but they have not yet been selected. The chairman and vice chairmen will be allowed when in the chair to continue to represent their respective Governments. Their terms of office will be for a period of 6 months. The executive secretary of the IMC, Charles W. Jeffers, will be the secretary of the Central Group.

COMPOSITION OF THE WOOL COMMITTEE

The International Materials Conference (IMC) announced on April 2 that the Wool Committee met for the first time on that date. Ten nations were represented. Of the seven commodity com-

mittees which have thus far been established, six are now holding sessions. Yet to convene is the Pulp and Paper Committee. The date of its convening will be announced later. Composition of the Wool Committee is as follows:

AUSTRALIA

Representative: J. V. Moroney, Assistant Secretary, Department of Agriculture and Commerce

Alternates: R. E. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Australian Wool Realization Commission; Eric P. McClintock, Assistant Government Trade Commissioner, Australian Trade Commission, New York City; R. B. McMillan, Wool Economist, Department of Commerce and Agriculture

BELGIUM (Representing BENELUX: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg)

Representative: Pierre Jaspar, Economic Counselor, Belgian Embassy

Alternates: Léandre Maréchal, Commercial Attaché, Belgian Embassy; J. Teppema, Commercial Secretary, Netherlands Embassy

FRANCE

Representative: Robert Kahn-Scriber, Managing Director, Mooch and Odelin, Paris

Alternates: Eugène Dyant, Vice-Chairman of the French Central Wool Committee; Raymond Forestier, French Supply Office, Embassy of French Republic; Léon Laroy, Manager, French Groupement of Wool Importation

GERMANY

Representative: Nikolaus H. Schilling, Managing Director, Bremer Wollkammerei, Bremen

Alternate: Alexander von Imhoff, Corporation Lawyer, Verein Deutscher Kammgarnspinner, Frankfurt

ITALY

Representative: Renato Lombardi, President, Associazione dell'Industria Laniera Italiana, Milan

Alternate: Dr. Roberto Dodi, Consultant, Associazione dell'Industria Laniera Italiana, Rome

NEW ZEALAND

Representative: E. J. Fawcett, Director-General of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture

Alternate: Not yet designated

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Representative: W. A. Horrocks, Commercial Secretary, South African Embassy

Alternate: Rees Davies, Agricultural Attaché, South African Embassy

UNITED KINGDOM

Representative: J. L. May, Assistant Secretary, Board of Trade

Alternates: E. Atherton, Assistant Economic Attaché, British Embassy
H. O. Hooper
G. E. M. McDougall, Counselor, British Embassy

UNITED STATES

Representative: Richard H. Roberts, Deputy Director, Office of Requirements and Allocations, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

URUGUAY

Representative: Washington P. Bermúdez, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Uruguay

Alternate: Not yet designated

The United States in the United Nations

[April 6-12, 1951]

General Assembly

Collective Measures Committee.—At the Committee's fourth meeting, on April 12, the Chairman, João Carlos Muniz (Brazil), presented the subcommittee's suggested program of work, and a draft communication to be sent to all United Nations members requesting information on action taken, or contemplated, by them under section C. of the uniting-for-peace resolution.

The program of work was approved and the Chairman appointed, without objection, the following three study groups: Military Experts Panel—Canada, France, and Turkey; Economic and Financial Measures—Australia, Egypt, Philippines, United States, and Venezuela; Political Measures—Belgium, Burma, Mexico, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

The draft letter was approved with the revision stressing the urgency of receiving the data requested, even if on a preliminary and tentative basis, in view of the need for the Committee to report to the General Assembly by September 1, 1951.

The Chairman, Mr. Muniz (Brazil), in answer to points raised by Ambassador Mahmoud Fawzi Bey (Egypt) with regard to the economic aspects, stated that while he agreed on the need for economic and financial security, he thought the creation of such strength was the work of other United Nations organs. The Collective Measures Committee was charged with the responsibility for organizing collective security. The United States deputy representative, Howard F. Baneroff, stressed that time was short and that the momentum generated by the adoption of the uniting-for-peace resolution should be maintained.

ECOSOC

World Health Organization (WHO).—The Special Committee on International Sanitary Regulations began a 4-week Conference at Geneva on April 9. All WHO member states, as well as observers from nonmember states such as Germany and Spain and observers from international organizations including maritime and aircraft groups, have been invited to attend the Conference. The purpose of the Conference is to revise and consolidate several international sanitary conventions now in force and to prepare for their replacement by a single code of procedure applicable on a world-wide basis to all means of international transport.

The Committee will make a detailed technical

and legal analysis of the proposed international sanitary regulations prepared by the WHO Expert Committee on international epidemiology and quarantine and will revise them, giving full consideration to the recommendations submitted by member governments. The final draft will be submitted for adoption by the Fourth World Health Assembly (legislative body) which will convene in Geneva on May 7. The new regulations will come into force 15 months after their acceptance by the Assembly.

The United States delegation comprises: Chairman, Dr. Joseph A. Bell, Chief, Section of Epidemiology, National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service; Charles I. Bevans, Assistant for Treaty Affairs, Department of State; Howard B. Calderwood, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State; Lt. Col. Louis G. Kossuth, USAF, Chief, Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Air Force, Europe; Paul Reiber, Assistant General Counsel, Air Transport Association; Knud Stowman, Ph.D., Division of International Health, Public Health Service, and Mrs. Jeanne Ende, Technical Assistant, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State.

Dr. Pierre Dorolle, WHO Deputy Director-General, who addressed the opening session, said he hoped that "without aiming at unattainable perfection the delegates would be able to achieve a just and reasonable balance between the technical minimum necessary to avoid the spread of disease and the administrative maximum which it is possible to impose without unnecessary hampering of international traffic, an essential element in the economic and social life of the world today."

In the general debate on April 10, Dr. J. A. Bell (U.S.) stated that the draft WHO regulations should take more fully into account the present world situation and be more flexible to meet changing conditions. In view of the reduction of the number and size of centers of epidemic diseases as well as new discoveries against such diseases, he advocated limitations and control measures primarily in ports which were sources of world infection. He thought that simple precautionary measures, if effectively applied, should enormously reduce the need for quarantine procedures in the rest of the world.

United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.—The 15-member Commission opened its sixth session which is expected to last about 2 months at United Nations Headquarters on April 10. The following officers were unanimously re-elected: A. N. Sattanathan (India), Chairman; Oscar Rabasa (Mexico), Vice Chairman; and Samuel Hoare (U.K.), Rapporteur. The Com-

mission adopted (10-3 (U.S.S.R., Poland, Yugoslavia)-1 (India)) the proposal made by the United States representative, James N. Hyde, to postpone debate on the U.S.S.R. draft resolution to invite a representative of the People's Republic of China to be seated as the Chinese member until the next regular session of the Commission. In this connection, he drew attention to the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1950, and stated that it would be "unwise and unsound" to attempt to decide the issue independently of the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc).

The two major questions that will be given consideration are (1) steps for bringing into force an interim agreement to limit the production of opium to medical and scientific needs, and (2) a single convention to replace existing international instruments for the control of narcotics. The proposal for an interim agreement aims at limiting the production of opium to the amount required to meet the world's medical and scientific needs. For this purpose, there would be established an international monopoly through which the trade in opium would be conducted. The draft convention on international narcotics regulations is designed to incorporate the provisions of several older conventions, agreements, and protocols, as well as existing practices, into one legal instrument in order to simplify and strengthen international control of narcotics.

The Council, at its recent twelfth session at Santiago, adopted two resolutions which "approved the plans prepared by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs for the further elaboration during 1951 and the early part of 1952 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs," and "urged the Commission to make every possible effort during its sixth session to find a basis acceptable to the governments principally concerned on which an international agreement to limit the production of opium to medical and scientific needs could be formulated."

Ad Hoc Committee on Reorganization of the Council and its Functional Commissions.—This Committee, which was authorized under the resolution adopted August 16, 1950, at the eleventh session of the Economic and Social Council, began its second meeting on April 10 at Lake Success. It will review the organization and operation of the Council and its Commissions and submit a report and recommendations thereon to the thirteenth session of the Council. The Committee will consider the replies received to the inquiry previously sent out to all member governments asking for their observations on the functioning of the Council.

The Committee membership consists of Australia, Brazil, China, France, India, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and the United States. Hernan Santa Cruz (Chile) was elected Chairman.

Security Council

United Nations Commission for Indonesia.—The Commission, on April 6, submitted its report to the Security Council covering its activities from the date of the transfer of sovereignty, December 27, 1949, from the Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, to the present. In the conclusion of its report, the Commission informed the Council that since the problems arising from the military agreements reached at the Round Table Conference held at The Hague, August 23, 1949 to November 2, 1949, are now virtually solved, the Commission has decided that, while continuing to hold itself at the disposal of the parties, it will adjourn sine die.

United Nations Cemetery Dedicated at Pusan

The first permanent United Nations cemetery, where soldiers killed in United Nations action against aggression in Korea lie buried, was formally dedicated in a ceremony held on April 6 at Pusan. Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, unfurled a large United Nations banner at the mast in front of poles bearing flags of all the 16 countries which have military units in action in Korea—Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and the Republic of Korea.

General Ridgway paid tribute to the heroic dead who gave their lives in freedom's fight. He said, "Fearlessly they died, defending to the last the dignity of the individual, the rock on which our fight for freedom rests. We seek today to express the honor in which they are held. We shall seek through all the future to keep the state they so fully kept, and having kept passed on to us in trust."

Correction

The February 26, 1951, issue of the BULLETIN contained a statement that Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, United States representative in the Trusteeship Council, advised the Trusteeship Council that responsibility for the civilian administration of the trust territory of the Pacific Islands had been transferred as of January 8, 1951, from the Navy Department to the Department of the Interior. This account of Ambassador Sayre's statement was incorrect. Ambassador Sayre informed the Trusteeship Council that Elbert D. Thomas assumed the office of High Commissioner of the trust territory of the Pacific Islands on January 8 of this year. Responsibility for the administration of the trust territory remains with the Department of the Navy, but plans are being made for the transfer of this responsibility to the Department of the Interior on July 1, 1951.

THE CONGRESS

Senate Passes Resolution Authorizing U.S. Troops in Europe

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House April 5]

The adoption by the Senate of Senate Resolution 99 is further evidence that the country stands firm in its support of the North Atlantic Treaty. It reaffirms the basic principle of our foreign policy—that the security of the United States is intimately bound up with the security of other free nations.

The clear endorsement of the appointment of General Eisenhower and the plans to assign troops to his command shows that there has never been any real question but that this country would do its part in helping to create an integrated European defense force.

Our main task now is to get on with the job of building our own strength and help to build the strength of the free world—a job which we all agree should continue to be carried out through collaboration by the executive and the legislative branches of the Government.

TEXT OF SENATE RESOLUTION 99¹

Resolved, That—

1. the Senate approved the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. it is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

¹ Adopted by a vote of 69 yeas, 21 nays, and 6 not voting. The Senate also adopted S. Con. Res. 18 which is similar to S. Res. 99, except for last part of par. 9 which reads: “. . . and other resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, . . .”

4. it is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that “by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid” they will “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,” specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned;

5. the Senate herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraph 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received;

6. it is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe, but it is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval;

7. it is the sense of the Senate that the President should submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than 6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be made available for this purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

8. it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty with Italy which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance by Italy of her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe;

9. it is the sense of the Senate that consideration should be given to the revision of plans for the defense of Europe as soon as possible so as to provide for utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany and Spain, but not exclusive of the military and other resources of other nations.

Legislation

Cultural Convention With Brazil. S. Doc., Executive X, 81st Cong., 2d sess. Message from The President of the United States transmitting the Cultural Convention between the United States of America and the United States of Brazil, signed at Washington on October 17, 1950, 6 pp.

Emergency Relief Assistance to Yugoslavia. H. Rept. 3204, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 4234] 5 pp.

Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 3224, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 108] 2 pp.

Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. H. Rept. 14, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1612] 30 pp.

America's Campaign of Truth Goes Forward

INFORMATION ADVISORY COMMISSION SUBMITS REPORT

[Released to the press April 7]

The United States Advisory Commission on Information today praised the effectiveness of a world-wide Campaign of Truth being waged by the Department of State.

In its fourth semiannual report¹ to Congress, the Commission stated that the international information program is being efficiently and skillfully guided by Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett and his staff.

Agreeing with Secretary of Defense George Marshall that the present world situation is more dangerous than it was 6 months ago, the Commission urged Congress—

to keep right on providing enough ammunition and manpower with which to wage the war of ideas.

The Commission, which is headed by Erwin D. Canham, editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, expressed satisfaction that its major recommendations to the State Department and Congress have been largely carried out.

The Commission gave these as its basic conclusions:

That the program is being efficiently administered.

That its personnel has been greatly improved, and is being steadily enriched by specialists of larger experience and talent.

That the expansion authorized by the 81st Congress as the Campaign of Truth is being effectively carried forward.

That most of the recommendations made by this Commission have been put into effect.

That a great deal more can be done, and must be done, before the United States will be adequately waging the war of ideas.

That the evaluation techniques through which the Department tests its programs need further strengthening, as much as possible through independent sources.

That grave doubts exist whether major structural changes, such as taking the program outside the State Department, will be an improvement. We are aware of the advantages of a separate agency, but we are more impressed by the disadvantages of divorcing policy-making from operation, and of setting up almost inevitably conflicting representation in foreign countries.

That channels which have been opened up to bring American private expertness into the pro-

gram in advisory and consultative capacities show great promise of effective results.

In expressing doubt as to the removal of the information program from the Department of State, the Commission pointed out that the members felt that it was important that the "United States should speak with a single voice" abroad. If the program were divorced from the State Department, the report said,

there would seem to be two policies, the official State Department one and the one promulgated by the information people.

However, the Commission recommended that the subject be investigated.

In addition to Mr. Canham, the report was signed by Philip D. Reed, chairman of the Board of the General Electric Company; Mark A. May, director of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University; and Justin Miller, president of the National Association of Broadcasters. The newest member of the Commission, Ben Hibbs, editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, did not sign the report since he was not officially confirmed by the Senate as a member of the Commission at the time the report was issued.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN URGES RADIO FUNDS

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 5]

There is now pending before the Congress a request for funds to build a world-wide network of radio broadcasting facilities. These facilities are needed to help us win the battle for the minds and hearts of men. They would help us hold our own in the vital communications field in the event of war. I understand that some Members of Congress advocate sharply reducing funds needed for these facilities. I find it hard to believe that this report could be true since it would constitute a complete reversal of the House Appropriation subcommittee's action last summer when the entire broadcasting-facilities plan was put before the Committee. In approving the first segment of

¹ Publications Division, Department of State.

the total plan at that time, the Committee stated that:

The Committee is firmly convinced of the absolute and immediate necessity of these appropriations which are so closely connected with our national defense and security.

These facilities would help us hold our own in the vital communications field in the event of war.

While it had been expected to request funds for the world-wide network of radio facilities over a period of three fiscal years, I directed the State Department that it should request funds for the entire project immediately in order that it might be completed as soon as possible in the interest of national security. The completion of this radio-facilities expansion program is necessary to insure the delivery by radio of our campaign of truth to the people behind the iron curtain. The facilities program has been developed since the initiation of Soviet radio jamming which seriously interfered with American and other free-world broadcasts; the program was worked out with leading electronics scientists in Universities and private industries as well as in Government.

SOVIET BIG LIE VS THE CAMPAIGN OF TRUTH

[Released to the press April 3]

Moscow propaganda long has applied the big-lie technique, developed by Adolf Hitler, in its attacks upon the free nations of the world. The United States Government, in its information output, has sought to counter the big lie by sticking to factual reporting. This policy is based on the conviction that, in the long run, the truth will prevail.

A recent telegram from the United States Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, is indicative of the success of this policy. The telegram reported that the cultural attaché of the Embassy, in a recent visit to the town of Bolu, in northwest Turkey, asked Presat Aker, former mayor and a respected elder of the community, whether the villagers listened to the Voice of America.

He replied:

Yes, indeed. We advise those among us who have radios to listen to the Voice of America if they would hear the truth. Some of us listen to Moscow radio too, so we can tell our people how the Russians are lying. The people have been aware of Radio Moscow's tactics ever since it reported the entire Turkish brigade in Korea had been wiped out, including General Yazici. When letters kept coming from friends in Korea, our people knew the Russians were lying. We tell them the Voice of America tells the truth about the Korean war, including accurate casualty figures, and that they can believe it.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Merwin L. Bohan Named to Inter-American Economic Council

Merwin L. Bohan took the oath as United States representative to the Ia-Ecosoc on March 20, 1951, and was given the personal rank of Ambassador by the President.

Consular Offices

The American consulate at Geneva, Switzerland, has been designated a consulate general, effective April 2, 1951.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Charles A. Coolidge as Deputy Director of International Security Affairs, effective March 22, 1951.

John H. Ferguson as Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, effective April 2, 1951.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Diplomatic List, March 1951. Pub. 4145. 166 pp. 30¢. a copy. Subscription price, \$3.25 a year domestic; \$4.50 foreign.

Monthly list of foreign diplomatic representatives in Washington, with their addresses.

The Washington Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics. International Organization and Conference Series II, American Republics 7. Pub. 4149. 8 pp., map. Free.

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The Department of State

bulletin

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MAY 4 1951

Libya—Symbol of Hope for a New Era in North Africa

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN AMBASSADOR CLARK AND PRIME MINISTER SHAQISHLI

[Released to the press April 12]

Following is the exchange of remarks between Ambassador Lewis Clark, United States representative on the United Nations Council for Libya, and Muhammad Shaqishli, the Prime Minister of Cyrenaica, on the occasion of Ambassador Clark's presentation to the King Designate of Libya, Amir al-Sayyid Idris al Sanusi, on April 10 at Benghazi, Cyrenaica.

TEXT OF AMBASSADOR CLARK'S REMARKS

Mr. Prime Minister, Gentlemen: First I should like to express my appreciation of the kind remarks that have just been made by His Excellency the Prime Minister. The words of friendship and of welcome he has voiced I take to be a token of the sentiments of the Cyrenaican Government and people for the Government and people of my country.¹ I should like to reciprocate, if I may, and express at the outset to you and through you to the Libyan people the strong sentiments of friendship and affection which I and my Government feel toward the Libyan people. It has been a real privilege to work in Tripoli with such outstanding Cyrenaicans as Ali Bey Jerbi, my colleague on the United Nations Council, Omar Bey Shanib, Vice President of the National Assembly and Minister of Defense of the Libyan Government and Khalil Bey Galal, and others, to name only a few. I am glad, therefore, of the opportunity once again to have the privilege of visiting Cyrenaica itself and of seeing for myself that you have many more sons of capabilities and charm equal to those you have sent to Tripoli.

I have looked forward to this visit because I know from experience that the traditional hospitality of the East has never been more clearly exemplified than here in Cyrenaica. When I was here before I felt that I was one of you. I sin-

cerely hope that my assumption is justified. I find your people sympathetic. You laugh at the same things at which I laugh and weep on similar occasions. I have looked forward also to this opportunity to tell Your Excellency and the people of Cyrenaica that the Government and the people of the United States are deeply interested in the future of the Libyan state.

We are all keenly aware that in Libya today we are participating in developments of supreme significance not only to Libya but to the world at large. A great experiment is being conducted here. You gentlemen are more fully aware than most that the United Nations was founded only 5 years ago. That historic organization was dedicated, among other things, to an abiding principle—respect for the dignity of the human being. In that principle lies the fundamental difference between Soviet communism and civilization as we know it in my country and, for that matter, in all countries outside the Soviet Union and its satellites. It is the principle on which both Christianity and Islam are founded. All of us are privileged to share the conviction—ingrained in our minds through centuries of religious development—that the individual is not destined to serve the state but that the state is created to serve the individuals. It is respect for the dignity of the individual that distinguishes us from those who have come under Soviet dominance. It was that community of conviction which found us fighting together in the recent war against the similarly alien Fascist and Nazi philosophies and now that our convictions with the help of God have triumphed, it is only fitting that the United Nations should in every way possible help the people of Libya to establish a sovereign and democratic nation.

It is also fitting that my country, the United States of America, should play a leading part in assisting the Libyan people to achieve a stable and lasting independence. I should like to repeat that

¹ Cyrenaica is one of the parts of the proposed Libyan federation. Under United Nations aegis, a provisional Government of Libya has been established in anticipation of Libya's independence by January 1, 1952.

the founding of a Libyan state is a historic experiment. Already in the five short years since the United Nations Organization was founded, at least nine new independent states have come into being. We all hope and we believe that Libya will very soon take her rightful place in their midst. Libya is unique, however, in that it is the first country for which the United Nations has declared itself specifically responsible. Libyan independence has been earned by the efforts of Libyan patriots, but in the preservation of that independence and in the steady elevation of Libya's standard of life the United Nations has assumed special responsibilities and has sent, and will continue to send, men highly qualified in all fields to carry out those responsibilities.

No one can fail to recognize that Libya will be faced with more problems than most countries. There are few known natural resources and distances between its centers of population are great—great even as they were in my country in its early days of independence. I should like to digress here for a moment, if I may, to say that in the early days of my country the framers of our Constitution found it necessary to require a lapse of 4 months' time between the election of our President and his assumption of office solely to permit him to travel from his home to the seat of government.

There are many other similarities between the problems which confront the framers of your constitution today and those which confronted the fathers of my country. But I shall not go into those today. Our task and your task will not be easy. Nevertheless, the goal of my country, and I am sure the goal of the United Nations is the same, is to see growing up in Libya a stable and peace-loving nation where there will be steadily increasing economic well-being and where every citizen can be sure that his hopes and his holy prerogatives are recognized.

Since I last came to Cyrenaica, much has happened. The National Assembly has met and made great progress with its tasks. His Highness the Amir has been acclaimed King of the future state. A provisional federal government has been named, and, already, the powers of state are being transferred to the Libyans themselves in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. Much credit in this, it seems to me, is due to the spirit of friendly cooperation that has so happily been demonstrated by our mutual friends in the United Kingdom, in France, and in Italy. The readiness of the administering powers, both the United Kingdom and France, to facilitate in every appropriate way the transfer of powers to the provisional government that has been established and the visits here to Benghazi of the representatives on our council of France and of Italy have given, it seems to me, evidence on the part of those powers not only of good will toward the Libyan state but also of friendship for

His Highness the Amir and of confidence in the ability of His Highness to conduct the affairs of an independent Libya wisely, efficiently and in a manner best serving the interests of all of the people of Libya.

I shall look forward, therefore, to the final steps in the constitutional development program, to the drawing up of the constitution, the declaration of independence, and the assumption of the throne by His Highness the Amir as King of the Libyan nation.

For its part, the United States is eager to witness that great event and to welcome a new friend into the family of nations. Libya was 2,000 years ago the site of a great culture and 1,200 years the site of another. Let us hope that we are on the threshold of a new era in North Africa. It is fitting at this time to pay tribute to the Libyan patriots who did not live to see their country take its place as an independent nation. Were they alive today, I am sure they would be proud of the nation which is being born and of the man who has been selected by the Libyans to be their ruler. I should like once again, therefore, to express to you and through you to His Highness the Amir the sincere friendship of the Government and people of the United States for the Government and people of Libya and our most sincere hope and anticipation that the future will, under the wise guidance of His Highness, witness a steady improvement in the well-being and happiness of the Libyan people.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER SHAQISHLI'S REMARKS

Your Excellency and Gentlemen: It is a great honour and pleasure to have Mr. Clark, Ambassador of the United States of America, amongst us as guest of His Majesty the King in the capital of Cyrenaica.

The people of Cyrenaica have been eagerly awaiting this auspicious visit in order to welcome one who is liked and admired all over Libya, one of our closest friends and one who has devoted his energies honestly and sincerely in serving the cause of our country and in helping our people to move forward toward constitutional reform, a matter the people themselves chose and planned of their own free will according to the decision of the United Nations Organization.

The time spent by you in Libya, during which you were the interpreter of friendly feelings of the American people, a fact proved on many an occasion by different aspects of kindness and friendliness toward the Libyan people, must have given you a true impression of feelings of our people to your own people and of our people's aspirations toward a free, democratic and independent life, a life of dignity and self-respect, a life in which a nation can plan its own future

for itself under the aegis of our beloved King, the symbol of our aspirations and protector of our Fatherland.

Your Excellency will no doubt have noticed how a young Libyan people is striving to awake from its slumber and is shaking off the dust of a hated past. Your Excellency will also have admired this people's longing to achieve their objective and their devotion to their King, and their sacrifices to achieve their national aims, with a view to enjoyment of freedom and independence, and in order to play their part with free nations in the establishment of world peace.

Your Excellency, the Libyan people, being guardians of a great legacy of extreme spiritual value, believe it to be a heresy to deny the truth of such a spiritual legacy, a heresy which must be fought. With such a belief it finds itself nearest to the free democratic nations and is proud of their close friendship, first among which is its friendship with the generous American nation. This friendship has emerged as a result of honourably defending a sacred cause, a responsibility which the gallant American nation has now assumed with all their tremendous potentialities in the vanguard of all free nations in the defence of the free world and of the true democratic principles which are now endangered by the greatest menace history ever knew.

Your Excellency, we appreciate the noble feelings of the American people and admire their devotion to their humanitarian duty. Despite their safety at home and the fact that they need not fear others, since of their own ample strength they can defend themselves against any attack, this noble and humanitarian feeling caused them to adopt an active role in combatting this danger which is threatening world peace, and induced them to leave their homeland and their security, so as to take the responsibility of fulfilling a sublime historical mission. A mission, the banner of which is being carried by most of the free nations, including especially the people of the United Kingdom, who are also defending this sublime principle.

What causes rejoicing, however, is that the world is witnessing today signs of joint cooperation between the American nation and the rest of the free nations of the world to cope with the present critical situation which requires an immense effort on the part of the big democratic powers so as to prevent a third world war which may shake the foundations of our present civilization. And what brings confidence is the prevailing belief that the establishment of a spirit of cooperation and the strengthening of such a spirit between the great democratic powers and the rest of the free nations is the best guarantee for the safety of the free world and the preservation of the principles for which they stand from the threat of any danger, especially at this critical period, in which the forces of the free nations come under the banner of the United Nations organiza-

tion, are waging a fierce struggle in support of a free life: Free from fear, and free from humiliation for the coming generations. We also firmly believe that as long as the free nations entertain such a belief, and are confident of the energies and potentialities of the big democratic powers, then no danger whatsoever can threaten independence and freedom and the ways of life and thinking of the free world. We are full of hope that the sun of that day, in which the United Nations forces will be able to restore peace, will shine in the very near future.

Your Excellency, may I, in my capacity as Prime Minister of the Cyrenaican Government, and with this true faith and this shining hope, welcome you heartily as a guest of our King, and extend to you on behalf of the Cyrenaican people, a sincere and friendly greeting, trusting that Your Excellency may have a happy sojourn amongst us. For my part, I extend to the generous American people my best wishes and regards.

And lastly, may I conclude this speech by wishing a long life to our King Idris the Great and to President Truman, the honourable President of a friendly state, and may long friendship reign between our two peoples.

May peace and mercy of God be upon you.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

- Amending the Tariff Act of 1930 so as To Extend to Flaxseed and Linseed and Flaxseed and Linseed Oil the Privilege of Substitution for Drawback of Duties. H. Rept. 27, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 2192] 2 pp.
- Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 91, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 49] 57 pp.
- Providing for the Expeditious Naturalization of Former Citizens of the United States Who Have Lost United States Citizenship Through Voting in a Political Election or in a Plebiscite Held in Italy. H. Rept. 92, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 400] 8 pp.
- Providing the Privilege of Becoming a Naturalized Citizen of the United States to All Aliens Having a Legal Right to Permanent Residence. H. Rept. 93, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 403] 4 pp.
- Clarifying the Immigration Status of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 118, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 2339] 6 pp.
- Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 28, a resolution authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such committee. H. Rept. 127, 82d Cong. 1st sess. vii, 77 pp.
- Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 158, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 6] 2 pp. Also, H. Rept. 159, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 7] 2 pp.

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U.S. Reiterates Demand to U.S.S.R. on Lend-Lease Settlement

Following is an exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador to Washington concerning the request of the United States Government of February 7, 1951, that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly return to the United States all vessels loaned to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the terms of the master lend-lease agreement of June 11, 1942.

UNITED STATES NOTE OF APRIL 6

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note No. 22 of March 21, 1951 concerning this Government's request of February 7, 1951 that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly return to the United States all vessels loaned to the Soviet Union under the terms of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.

In your note you declare that agreement had already been reached between our two Governments for the sale to the Soviet Union of all the merchant ships and part of the naval ships received under Lend-Lease and that this Government's note of February 7, 1951 "violates" this agreement.

By "agreement" it is presumed that you have reference to this Government's notes of February 27, 1948, September 3, 1948 and August 8, 1949 which dealt with the disposition of lend-lease vessels.¹

With respect to the thirty-six war-built merchant vessels this Government's note of February 27, 1948 stated:

The agreement of your Government concerning these vessels resolves tentatively one of the several points necessary to a satisfactory comprehensive settlement of the obligations under the agreement between our two Governments of June 11, 1942.

... Your attention is invited to the fact that at the first meeting of the Working Groups on May 3, 1947, United States Representatives stated that since the object of the negotiations was to achieve a satisfactory comprehensive settlement, agreement reached on any particular subject was tentative and subject to agreement on all issues necessary to a general settlement. The Soviet representatives indicated their concurrence. Accordingly, the first paragraph of the *Outline of Main*

Points of Settlement Proposed by the United States Side in keeping with the above-mentioned understandings reached by the representatives of our two Governments on May 3, 1947 reads in part as follows: "As both sides have understood from the outset, the reaching of agreement upon any one issue is tentative and subject to the conclusion of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement."

With respect to pre-war-built merchant vessels and tugs, this Government's note of August 8, 1949 stated in part:

The Government of the United States considers this amount (\$13,000,000) satisfactory as the cash price for the sale of the vessels, effective as of September 2, 1945, it being understood that the sale will be consummated only upon conclusion of the over-all Lend-Lease settlement. Agreement on this point resolves satisfactorily another of the several points of a comprehensive settlement, but the Government of the United States will continue to reserve its rights under Article V of the agreement of June 11, 1942, to require the return to the United States of the pre-war-built merchant vessels and the tugs as well as other Lend-Lease articles until such time as a mutually satisfactory over-all settlement agreement is reached.

With respect to naval vessels, this Government's note of September 3, 1948 stated in part:

Provided a mutually satisfactory Lend-Lease settlement is promptly agreed upon by our two Governments, the Government of the United States is willing, at agreed prices, to sell to the Soviet Government as a part of such settlement and in accordance with the surplus property procedures outlined to representatives of your Government on June 25, 1947, the following naval craft . . .

Moreover, on other occasions this Government has made perfectly clear to the Soviet Government its position concerning the disposition of lend-lease vessels. In this Government's note of May 7, 1948 which referred to the conditional nature of the agreement concerning war-built merchant ships as set forth in this Government's note of February 27, 1948, it was stated:

... the position of the Government of the United States is that, if a comprehensive lend-lease settlement is not concluded promptly, the Government of the United States under Article V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942, will require the return to the United States of the lend-lease merchant vessels now remaining in the possession of your government.

In this Government's note of September 3, 1948 in connection with the need for a prompt and satisfactory settlement, it was stated:

¹ Not printed.

Therefore, notwithstanding certain offers which this Government has made in connection with its settlement proposals, unless a mutually satisfactory settlement is promptly agreed upon by our two Governments, this Government will have no alternative but to withdraw its offers to transfer full title to certain lend-lease articles to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and will be obliged to exercise its rights under Article V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942 by requiring the return of such articles to the United States. This is particularly applicable to all merchant and naval vessels. It applies also to military vessels and to certain other lend-lease articles which would be of use to the United States.

From the above it is clear that the agreement referred to in your note of March 21, 1951 consists of a series of tentative offers by the Government of the United States which have been explicitly conditioned upon the conclusion of a prompt and satisfactory lend-lease settlement. In the current conversations on the subject of a lend-lease settlement, Ambassador John C. Wiley has repeatedly called to your attention the fact that the Soviet Government by avoiding the reaching of a prompt and satisfactory over-all settlement clearly has failed to meet the conditions for the sale of any of these vessels. Therefore, this Government is free to withdraw its conditional offer to sell such vessels and this was done in this Government's note of February 7, 1951.

Your note of March 21, 1951 advances as a second reason for not returning lend-lease vessels the argument that the vessels are not needed by the United States. Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942 is clear and specific on this point, reading as follows:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President of the United States of America, such defense articles transferred under this agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

This article places upon the President of the United States alone the responsibility for the determination of the usefulness of lend-lease articles to the United States. The point raised in your note of March 21, 1951 that certain vessels of the United States may have been disposed of to third countries bears no relationship to the obligations of your Government under Article V and is not subject to discussion between our two Governments.

On July 7, 1948 the President of the United States of America determined that the emergency relative to the lend-lease program had been terminated and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was so notified on October 7, 1948. On this date the Soviet Government was also notified of the determination by the President of the United States that 3 icebreakers, 28 frigates and 186 other naval craft were of use to the United

States and their return was demanded. The Soviet Government has returned only the frigates and one icebreaker. On February 7, 1951 the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was informed that the President of the United States of America had determined that all merchant, military and naval lend-lease vessels remaining in Soviet custody are of use to the United States and the prompt return of these vessels was duly demanded. Therefore, the obligation of the Soviet Government to return the vessels listed in this Government's note of February 7, 1951 is clear and unequivocal.

With reference to the statement in your note of March 21, 1951 that United States naval vessels in Soviet custody are "badly worn out and for the most part unfit for navigation in the open sea," I wish to emphasize that title to these vessels remains in the Government of the United States regardless of their condition. I therefore repeat the request made in this Government's note of February 7, 1951 that representatives of the Government of the United States be permitted to examine all unserviceable vessels in order to determine their ultimate disposition.

The demand presented in this Government's note of February 7, 1951, that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics immediately return to the Government of the United States all the naval and merchant vessels as well as military watercraft which were transferred to it under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942 is hereby reiterated.

A prompt reply is requested in order that the necessary arrangements for return may be promptly agreed upon with the Soviet naval expert now in Washington.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

SOVIET NOTE OF MARCH 21

WASHINGTON, *March 21, 1951*

SIR: In connection with your note delivered to me on February 7, 1951 by Mr. Wiley during the negotiations on the question of a Lend-Lease settlement, I have the honor to state the following:

As you know, by agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. negotiations were renewed in Washington on January 15 this year between representatives of both Governments for settling all Lend-Lease accounts. Prior to that time agreement had already been reached between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on several specific questions of the Lend-Lease settlement, and several other specific questions remained to be agreed upon in order to complete the negotiations and to conclude an agreement for a final and total settlement. In particular, an agreement was reached concerning

the sale to the Soviet Union of all the merchant ships and part of the naval ships received under Lend-Lease. With regard to merchant ships, an agreement was also reached about sale prices and that the value of all merchant ships of pre-war construction would be paid for in cash. It is important to note that the agreement concerning the sale of merchant ships to the Soviet Union was reached long before the expiration of the Act of 1946 concerning the sale of merchant ships. As concerns the naval vessels, it is well known that the Government of the U.S.S.R., in view of the agreement which had been reached earlier, sent a naval expert to Washington at the suggestion of the Government of the U.S.A., proceeding on the basis that the American and Soviet experts would discuss the conditions of the sale of naval vessels to the Soviet Union.

The proposal for the immediate return of all merchant and naval vessels, made by the Government of the U.S.A. in your note of February 7 of this year, violates the agreement already reached between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. during the negotiations on Lend-Lease.

The United States Government attempts to justify its violation of the agreement concerning the sale to the Soviet Union of all merchant vessels and part of the naval vessels by referring to Article 5 of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, which stipulates the possibility of the return of Lend-Lease residue at the determination of the President of the United States. However, in this case the question concerns solely the fulfillment by the Government of the U.S.A. of an agreement which had been reached after the conclusion of the Agreement of June 11, 1942 and which fully corresponds to the principles and tasks of this agreement, which provides for the necessity of guaranteeing the interests of both sides in the final Lend-Lease settlement.

It is necessary to note that the Government of the U.S.A. motivates its proposal, concerning the return of the merchant and naval vessels received by the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, by the fact that the United States has need of these vessels at the present time. This motivation cannot but cause surprise.

The United States demands the return by the Soviet Union of an insignificant number of merchant vessels while according to the report of the Senate Commission of August 30, 1950, No. 2494, three-fifths of all tonnage or more than 15 million gross tons of the United States merchant fleet are not being used and are moored inactive at piers.

The United States also demands the return by the Soviet Union of an insignificant number of small naval vessels badly worn out and for the most part unfit for navigation in the open sea. Meanwhile it is well known that the United States has sold and transferred several naval vessels to other countries. Thus, according to data of the U.S.

Department of Defense published in a press release of January 9, 1951, two light cruisers were sold to Brazil and Chile; according to reports in the American press, destroyer escorts, submarines and other naval vessels were sold to Turkey, Greece, France and other countries. Altogether according to data published in the United States twenty-six large naval vessels were sold to other countries in 1950 and 1951, not to mention a considerable number of small naval vessels. With regard to the sale of merchant vessels, as can be seen from data published on January 18 of this year in the American press the United States has sold 1,113 American vessels of war-time construction to foreign purchasers.

It is also known that during the Lend-Lease settlement with Great Britain, the Government of the U.S.A. sold vessels, along with other Lend-Lease residual items, to the Government of Great Britain, as is witnessed by the report of the Senate Commission of March 22, 1946, No. 110, section V.

Thus the reference in your note to the fact that the United States needs merchant and naval vessels appears to have an artificial character and therefore cannot serve as a basis for presenting the Soviet Union with a demand to return all Lend-Lease vessels. Such a demand does not conform to the principles of the Lend-Lease Agreement, which provides, as is well known, an obligation to consider the interests of both sides and not to act unilaterally and to the harm of these interests.

The Soviet Government also considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the U.S.A. to the fact that the number of Lend-Lease naval vessels indicated in the supplement to your note of February 7 does not correspond to the actual number of such vessels in the possession of the Soviet Union. The total number of available Lend-Lease naval vessels in the U.S.S.R. is 498, not counting two icebreakers. The remaining 56 vessels were lost during military operations and for other reasons. On June 25, 1948 the Soviet Government, as is known, reported the existence in the U.S.S.R. of 518 naval vessels, consisting mainly of cutters, minesweepers and other small vessels, without mentioning the remaining vessels which were lost during the war.

In its note of reply of September 3, 1948, the Government of the U.S.A. correctly listed 36 vessels as lost or destroyed. As concerns 20 vessels, I reported their loss to Mr. Wiley during the negotiations on January 27 of this year. During the negotiations on February 7, additional information concerning Lend-Lease naval vessels now in the U.S.S.R. was given to Mr. Wiley.

The Soviet Government expresses confidence that the Government of the U.S.A. will adhere to the agreement previously reached concerning merchant and naval vessels, which is an important condition in reaching a Lend-Lease settlement.

Accept [etc.]

A. PANYUSHKIN

Analysis of Official Personnel Stationed in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

*Text of Letter from Assistant Secretary McFall
to Representative Thomas J. Lane*

March 20, 1951

MY DEAR MR. LANE: Reference is made to your letter of March 1, 1951, acknowledged by telephone on March 9, 1951, forwarding for the Department's comment a copy of the remarks which you made in the House of Representatives on March 1. In these remarks you recommend that the official personnel which the Soviet Government sends to the United States and the travel of this personnel in the United States be placed on a reciprocal basis with regard to the number of official personnel of the United States in the Soviet Union and the travel privileges of American official personnel in that country.

Your remarks refer to two important questions concerning United States-Soviet relations which are under continual consideration in the Department. The comments of the Department with regard to these matters are presented in the following paragraphs.

The exchange of official representatives between two governments is rarely susceptible to treatment on a numerical parity basis. In almost every instance one country or the other will require a larger official establishment. Actually the variety of functions which the American Foreign Service is expected to perform, including complex visa and passport services and a wide range of reporting on political and economic subjects, is so great that the diplomatic and consular offices of the United States in any foreign country tend to be larger than that country's official representation in the United States.

An analysis of the number of Soviet officials in the United States reported to the Department of State by the Soviet Embassy up to March 5, 1951, and comparable American personnel in the Soviet Union as of the same date indicates that Soviet and United States official representation is practically on a parity basis. This analysis includes Embassy officials, correspondents, and commercial representatives of the two countries. It excludes Soviet representation to international organizations in the United States which have no counterpart in the Soviet Union.

There are enclosed two sheets which present United States official personnel in the Soviet Union and Soviet personnel in the United States as of March 5, 1951. You will note that the Soviet list carries a comparative list of Soviet personnel in the United States as of July 1, 1950. While on the face of these lists there appears to be a numerical disparity in representation in favor of the Soviet Union, an analysis of the figures gives a different picture. On March 5 the United States Government had official personnel numbering 101 with 16 dependents assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow. The Soviet counterpart of this figure is official Soviet personnel numbering 88, with 125 dependents (70 wives and 55 children) assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Thus, the United States has 13 more official employees in the American Embassy in Moscow than the Soviet Government has in the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Since no international organization of which the United States is a member has its headquarters in the Soviet Union, there can be no United States personnel in the Soviet Union comparable to the Soviet personnel assigned to the United Nations; namely, 121 (52 official employees, 38 wives, 31 children). If from the 381 total Soviet official personnel in the United States, there is subtracted 121, which is the Soviet representation, including dependents, to the United Nations, and 153 which represents Soviet dependents in the United States other than dependents of Soviet United Nations employees, the total Soviet official employees in the United States would amount to 107, 6 more than the 101 United States official employees in the Soviet Union, minus dependents.

With regard to Soviet restrictions on the travel of foreigners, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is divided into "free" and prohibited areas for diplomatic and consular personnel of foreign nations in the Soviet Union. Foreign officials on duty in Moscow may not travel more than 50 kilometers from the city limits with the exception of three points of historic interest to which foreigners may travel after appropriate notification to the foreign office. In general, all border areas and all of the central Asian republics, the Caucasus with the exception of Tbilisi, the Baltic States, and the western areas of the Ukraine and

Belorussia including the capital cities of Kiev and Minsk are within the zones prohibited to foreign officials. Although most of the Siberian areas is technically "free," in practice it is greatly restricted owing to the fact that the important cities are forbidden areas. In order to travel to "free" areas foreign missions must notify the foreign office in advance of the name and the itinerary of the traveler. Under this procedure, members of the Embassy's staff in Moscow have been able to make frequent trips to "free" areas during the past 2 years.

The question of applying travel control measures to Soviet official personnel in the United States is under constant review by the United States Government agencies concerned. Restrictions upon the travel of Soviet officials will be imposed whenever it is evident that such action is in the over-all interest of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. McFALL,
Assistant Secretary.

Enclosures: (1) Total United States official personnel in the Soviet Union as of March 5, 1951; (2) total Soviet officials in the United States as of March 5, 1951.

Total United States Official Personnel in the Soviet Union, March 5, 1951

Embassy:

State Department.....	64
Navy attaché staff.....	13
Army attaché staff.....	18
Air Force attaché staff.....	6
Dependents.....	16
Total.....	117

UNITED STATES NONOFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN THE SOVIET UNION

Clergymen.....	1
Newspaper correspondents.....	6
Businessmen (composed at present of fur buyers— an approximation).....	2
Total.....	9
Grand total.....	126

Breakdown of figures used in the compilation "Total United States official personnel in the Soviet Union March 5, 1951," attached hereto:

State Department:

Male employees including Ambassador:	
Foreign Service officer.....	15
Foreign Service Reserve officer.....	1
Foreign service staff personnel.....	25
Female employees, unmarried (Foreign Service staff).....	8
Working wives (Foreign Service staff).....	15
Total working personnel.....	64
Dependents (nonworking—includes 2 wives and 9 children).....	11
Total State Department.....	75

Navy Department:	
Naval officers.....	5
Enlisted men.....	8
Total.....	13
Dependents (2 wives included in "working wives" above and 1 daughter included in "female em- ployees, unmarried" above—1 dependent child).....	4
Total Navy Department.....	14
Department of the Army:	
Officers.....	5
Warrant officers.....	1
Enlisted men.....	12
Total.....	18
Dependents (2 wives included in "working wives" above; 2 dependent wives).....	4
Total Army.....	20
Air Force:	
Officers.....	3
Enlisted men.....	3
Total.....	6
Dependents (1 wife included in "working wives" above; 1 wife and 1 dependent child).....	3
Total for Air Force.....	8
Grand total.....	117

Soviet Officials in United States¹

	Comparative figures	
	Mar. 5, 1951 ¹	July 1, 1950
SUMMARY		
Embassy personnel	88	² 86
International organizations	52	59
Purchasing Commission	2	2
Tass	7	7
Pravda correspondents	2	2
Amtorg.	7	17
Correspondents of All-Union Radio Committee of U.S.S.R.	1	1
Wives	124	132
Children	98	103
Dependent relative	0	1
Grand total³	381	410
BREAKDOWN		
Embassy of the U.S.S.R.:		
Accredited officers of Embassy.	40	39
Employees of Embassy	48	47
Subtotal	88	86
Wives of Embassy officers	32	31
Wives of Embassy employees	38	38
Subtotal	70	69

	Comparative figures	
	Mar. 5, 1951 ¹	July 1, 1950
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.—Con.		
Children of Embassy officers . . .	23	24
Children of Embassy employees . . .	32	28
Subtotal	55	52
Dependent relative of Embassy personnel	0	1
Total Embassy	213	208
United Nations:		
U.S.S.R. representation to U.N. . .	49	55
Wives of U.S.S.R. representa- tives	35	39
Children	30	37
Subtotal	114	131
U.S.S.R. members Military Staff Committee	3	4
Wives of members of Military Staff Committee	3	4
Children	1	2
Subtotal	7	10
Total United Nations.	121	141
Government organizations:		
Purchasing Commission	2	2
Wives of members	2	2
Children	2	2
Subtotal	6	6
Tass employees	7	7
Wives	6	6
Children	5	3
Subtotal	18	16
Pravda correspondents	2	2
Wives	2	1
Children	1	0
Subtotal	5	3
All-Union Radio Committee Cor- respondents	1	1
Wives	1	1
Children	2	1
Subtotal	4	3
Amtorg employees	7	17
Wives	5	10
Children	2	6
Subtotal	14	33
Total governmental organiza- tions	47	61
Grand total	³ 381	410

¹ Figures based on note 8 of Jan. 27, 1951, from Soviet Embassy reporting Soviet citizens, employees of Soviet State institutions, Soviet missions, and other organizations to be found in the United States as of Jan. 1, 1951, and note 7 of Jan. 24, 1951, and note 11 of Feb. 7, 1951, which showed further personnel changes.

² Soviet officials in United States as of July 1, 1950. Figures based on note 113 of July 13, 1950. Soviet Embassy reporting Soviet citizens, employees, and other organizations in the United States as of July 1, 1950.

³ In addition to this total, there are 12 Soviet citizens employed by the Secretariat of the United Nations who are accompanied by 12 wives and 6 children (total 30).

Deadline for Filing War Claims With Italy

[Released to the press April 12]

The importance of completing the consideration and adjudication of claims on behalf of American nationals under provisions of the peace treaty with Italy with the least possible delay makes it imperative that a time limit be fixed for the filing of such claims.

Considering that a period of more than 3 years has already elapsed within which such claims could be filed, it has been determined that the date of September 15, 1951, be fixed as the final date for the filing of claims either directly with the American Embassy at Rome or with the Department of State, Legal Adviser's Office, Washington, D.C., for presentation to the Government of the Republic of Italy.

The claims involved are those based upon loss or damage, as a result of the war, to property in Italy which was owned by American nationals.

Since no assurance can be given that it will be possible for claims not filed on or before September 15, 1951, to receive proper consideration, claimants desiring to file claims of the character referred to, but who have not yet done so, are urged to present them as far in advance of the above-mentioned date as possible.

Effect of Revised German Monetary Reform Law on U.N. Nationals

[Released to the press April 12]

The Department of State wishes to direct the attention of United States citizens to an amendment of the monetary reform legislation enacted in Western Germany in June 1948. This amendment is Allied High Commission Law No. 46 and enables United Nations nationals to accept, at the rate of 1 deutschemark for every 10 reichsmarks previously due, payments in deutschemarks of reichsmarks debts owed them by German nationals without waiving their rights to secure whatever future payments there may be to United Nations nationals in the final settlement of such debts. Under the provisions of this law, a United Nations creditor, if he has objected against conversion at the rate stipulated in the currency reform law or has refused a previous tender of deutschemarks, must notify his debtor on or before December 31, 1951, that his refusal of payment is withdrawn.

Under the terms of the 1948 monetary reform legislation in Germany, in general all debts and claims expressed in former reichsmarks were converted into new deutschemark obligations at the rate of 1 deutschemark for every 10 reichsmarks

previously due. Article XV of United States-United Kingdom Military Government Laws Nos. 63 and section XV of French Military Government Ordinance No. 160 provided, however, that United Nations nationals owing claims for the payment of a sum of money arising out of debts expressed in reichsmarks, other than credit balances in financial institutions, could make to their debtors before October 20, 1948, a declaration against conversion of the debt into deutschemarks at the above-mentioned rate of exchange.

Apart from this option of making immediate declaration to their debtors, article XV and section XV also permitted United Nations nationals to refuse a tender of deutschemarks at any time prior to a peace treaty or other agreed settlement of this problem. If a United Nations creditor either objected to the conversion by notification to his debtor or refused to accept a payment when tendered, his rights remain unaffected by the laws and ordinance.

As stated above, the revision of article XV and section XV now permits a United Nations creditor to accept payment of the debt in deutschemarks at the 10 to 1 rate without waiving his right to secure whatever future payments there may be to United Nations nationals under a final settlement of the problem. Such revision further provides that a United Nations creditor, who has objected against conversion at the stipulated rate by a declaration to his debtor or refused a tender of deutschemarks, must notify his debtor on or before December 31, 1951, that his refusal of payment is withdrawn.

Panel of U.S. Women Visit Germany

On April 10, the Department of State and the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany announced that a panel of 11 women delegates from national nongovernmental organizations will leave the United States for Germany on April 19 for 6 weeks' work and consultation with German women's organizations. Their travel to and from Germany is being financed by their respective organizations, representing approximately 15,000,000 American women. The Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor has acted as liaison between the Department of State and the various national organizations in planning this joint panel, the first of its kind to represent the United States in Germany. The names of the organizations and their representatives follow:

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Name</i>
League of Women Voters	Mrs. H. E. Dyke
Congress of Industrial Organizations	Mrs. Marie Meugers
Associated Country Women of the World	Mrs. Philip Jones
Young Women's Christian Association	Mrs. Arthur Anderson

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Name</i>
United Council of Church Women	Miss Luella Reckmeyer
National Council of Negro Women	Dr. Dorothy Ferebee
American Federation of Labor and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.	Mrs. Edna Rose
American Association of University Women	Dr. Minnie Maffett
National Council of Jewish Women	Mrs. Frederick Gilstrap
National Council of Catholic Women	Mrs. Joseph Willen
	Mrs. Anthony J. Scholter

The delegates will spend from 5 to 7 days respectively in the vicinity of Frankfort, Stuttgart, Munich, Berlin, Hamburg, Bonn, and in rural areas of the Federal Republic. At each stopover, the panel will meet with German women's groups and then divide to pursue special interests, such as labor affairs, religious activities, and civic affairs, by working individually with women's organizations and leaders in smaller towns.

The American and German women will exchange ideas concerning mutual problems, the participation of women in civic affairs, and the objectives and functions of national and international women's organizations. The American women will be especially concerned with investigating methods of aiding German-affiliated organizations and other women's groups. They will also visit many of the educational, welfare, and civic projects sponsored by German women's organizations.

The 6-week program is being arranged jointly by the Women's Affairs representatives of the Allied High Commissioners and a committee of representatives of major German women's organizations.

U.S.-Germany Discuss Agreement for VOA German Language Programs

[Released to the press April 12]

The Department of State in a statement released simultaneously today in Washington and Frankfort announced the opening of negotiations in Germany between the general managers of four German radio stations and the Voice of America for an agreement on the relay of Voice of America German-language programs.

The negotiations are the culmination of requests made several months ago by the German broadcasters for discussions with representatives of the Voice of America on the present Voice German-language programs relayed by the stations in the American zone of Germany. These programs have been rebroadcast as an occupation requirement by the stations Radio Bremen in Bremen, Hessian radios in Frankfort, South German Radio in Stuttgart, and the Bavarian Radio in Munich.

The Department of State has received, and is considering, proposals made by Eberhard Beckmann, general manager of the Hessian Radio; Fritz Eberhardt, general manager of the South German Radio; Rudolph von Scholz, general manager of the Bavarian Radio; and Walter Geerdes, general manager of Radio Bremen.

*Statement by Howland H. Sargeant
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*

The negotiations now going on between the German stations and the Voice of America are an eloquent example of free people cooperating wholeheartedly in the international struggle for truthful information. We are happy that through the cooperation of the German broadcasters continued relays of the Voice of America will be possible in a mutually acceptable and beneficial manner. We are particularly happy that through the medium of the Voice of America the German people will continue to receive a complete picture of American thought, action, and culture. The amazing and rapid development of German radio during the occupation into a vital instrument of free expression and thought for all the people of Germany has indeed been gratifying. This latest step in cooperation marks an important milestone in the wholesome relationships between the German and American people. It is a high sign of good will and mutual cooperation in these difficult times. We welcome it as the expression of a free people banded together with us in the Campaign of Truth so necessary in the world today.

VOA To Broadcast in Hebrew

[Released to the press April 10]

The Voice of America will begin a daily 30-minute broadcast in Hebrew on Sunday, April 15, the Department of State announced today.

The initial program will include messages from President Truman; George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Senator Herbert Lehman; and Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the United States. Subsequent broadcasts will contain news, analysis, features, and music. The features will consist of interviews with Israelis in America, Americana, talks by well-known Israelis and economic, agricultural, labor, scientific, cultural, and dramatic programs.

The new Voice of America program will be broadcast short wave from the United States on four frequencies from 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. e.s.t. (8:00-8:30 p.m. in Israel) and will be relayed by the Voice of America relay base at Tangier.

Sidney Glazer, who has been with the Near East section of the Voice of America and was formerly with the Library of Congress, has been designated chief of the Hebrew unit.

The addition of Hebrew will increase to 30 the number of languages and dialects utilized by the Voice of America in its world-wide broadcasting service.

Also, on April 15, the Voice of America will increase its transmissions in Persian, Spanish to Spain, German to Germany and Portuguese to Brazil, which will increase the total Voice of America service to more than 42 program hours daily.

Point 4 Agreement Signed With Iraq

[Released to the press April 10]

The United States and Iraq today signed a Point 4 general agreement in Baghdad. Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tewfiq Suweidi, signed for Iraq and American Ambassador Edward S. Crocker, for the United States. With the addition of Iraq today, there are now 22 countries which have signed technical cooperation agreements with the United States under the Act for International Development, which authorized President Truman's Point 4 Program.

A request has been approved for the services of an American engineer on the Iraq Development Board, which will study the country's most immediate economic problems and make recommendations for a development program. Requests also have been received for technical assistance in the fields of agricultural education, vocational education, and home economics.

The legendary site of the Garden of Eden, Iraq, is taking action to control the flood waters of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers to bring the country back to its historic productivity. Irrigation and proper control of these two great rivers can double the area of about 12,500 square miles now under cultivation and make the land now in use more productive.

A 12.8 million dollar loan was negotiated in June 1950 by Iraq from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a flood control project on the Tigris River, and bids have been asked for the work. A project already is under way in the valley of the Euphrates. It is called the Habbaniyah water storage scheme. Each of these projects, when completed, should provide water to irrigate up to a million acres.

About 80 percent of Iraq's 4,800,000 people are farmers. Two crops, barley and dates, contribute 78.4 percent of Iraq's exports, exclusive of oil, and other agricultural products contribute another 16 percent. The principal food imports are tea, coffee, and sugar, none of which can be grown locally in quantity. Aside from these and other minor items, Iraq's people can produce enough to feed themselves. Industrial and agricultural machinery are important items of importation.

Secretary-General Lie Advised of Change in U. N. Command

Letter From Ambassador Austin to Secretary-General Lie

U.N. doc. S/2082
Dated Apr. 11, 1951

11 April 1951

EXCELLENCY: Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform the Security Council that the President of the United States has today relieved General Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General of the military forces which the members of the United Nations have made available to the Unified Command under the United States, pursuant to the Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, and has designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Request is made that this report be provided to the Security Council.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

WARREN R. AUSTIN

Ambassador Dulles Returns to Japan for Peace Treaty Consultation

Statement by the Ambassador

[Released to the press April 13]

I am flying to Japan to discuss with General Ridgway and Japanese leaders the present state of the Japanese peace treaty. Since our mission left Japan on February 11, good progress has been made, and the President has made abundantly clear his determination that this work shall move forward steadily. That makes it important at this juncture to acquaint General Ridgway with all phases of the matter so that, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, he can assist in completing the peace which was contemplated by the surrender terms and which is now due. It will also be useful, at this juncture, to advise the Japanese leaders as to the pending state of the negotiations with other Allied Powers. There will be some differences to be ironed out, but nothing that has transpired leads us to doubt the practicability of an early agreement by most of the Allied Powers upon a peace treaty which will, in general, follow the lines indicated in my Los Angeles address of March 31.

Whatever may be the differences of opinion here at home as to other matters, I have found agreement by the leaders of both our political parties that we must proceed without regard to partisan-

ship to strengthen peace and the defense of freedom in the Pacific. That is a result which the American people are unitedly determined to achieve, and I shall contribute to it to the best of my ability.

I am glad to be accompanied by the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Earl D. Johnson and Col. C. Stanton Babcock and Robert A. Fearey, who were part of the earlier mission to Japan. My deputy, John M. Allison, is remaining in Washington to carry on the current discussions with representatives of Allied Powers.

We expect to return from our present mission to Tokyo in about 10 days.

Statement by Under Secretary Webb

[Released to the press April 13]

The President has asked me to wish Mr. Dulles a safe and successful trip and to reaffirm the determination of the United States to work earnestly for a prompt conclusion of a Japanese peace settlement. This policy is strongly supported on a bipartisan basis—a fact which Mr. Dulles is eminently qualified to take to the Japanese people.

Purpose of the Ambassador's Trip

[Released to the press by the White House April 11]

In view of the importance of concluding a Japanese peace settlement, as recognized by the leaders of both political parties, at the request of the President, John Foster Dulles, who is acting as the special representative of the President in this matter, will return to Tokyo over the coming week end for the dual purpose of consulting with General Ridgway and Japanese leaders.

The President has made clear that it is the firm policy of the United States Government to press forward to conclude a peace settlement with Japan as soon as possible. The principles underlying the treaty were set out by Mr. Dulles in his Los Angeles address of March 31, 1951.¹ They have been developed with the closest consultation with leaders of both parties in both houses of Congress and with General MacArthur and have the full approval of the President.

Ambassador Dulles' Departure

Ambassador John Foster Dulles, special representative of the President, left at 4:00 p.m. April 13 by special plane for Tokyo. As announced by the White House on April 11, the purpose of Mr. Dulles' trip is to confer with General Ridgway and Japanese leaders regarding matters connected with bringing about the early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan.

Mrs. Dulles will also accompany him as will Mrs. Burnita O'Day, his private secretary.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 9, 1951, p. 576.

The Choices Confronting Us in Korea

Remarks by Dean Rusk

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

Today I should like to talk for a few minutes about where we come out in Korea. How does the fighting end?

Let's look first at the choices which are easy to think about. We could turn the fighting into a much bigger war by attacking those who are directly involved in the aggression in Korea. The action of Red China and the Soviet Union in Korea has been criminal and unconscionable. But we would not solve the Korean problem that way. We might be able to forget it, but only because we would have far more serious things to worry about. Our purpose must be to defend our security and liberties without a world war if we can; but defend them we must.

Perhaps you are one of those who say, "We don't want a general war; we only want to bomb Manchuria and attack China." But there are others in this struggle, who have great power available to them not yet committed to the aggression in Korea. They, too, can make decisions. It may be that your guess is that the Communists won't wage a general war at this time. Your guess might be right. But it might be wrong. Those who make the decision to extend hostilities beyond Korea would be completely irresponsible if they did not take into full account the element of general war, with all the destruction and loss of life which would be involved.

A second easy thing to think about is an immediate withdrawal from Korea. That, too, would lead to disaster. Korea is not the only object of the appetites and ambitions of Communist conspiracy. We could not solve anything by abandoning Korea. Who would be the next victim? And the next? And the next? Have we so soon forgotten Adolph Hitler? Each bite was to be the last. Do you remember the trail which led from Manchuria and Ethiopia to Pearl Harbor? To

abandon Korea would be to abandon the United States.

Some are now saying, "Either extend the war or get out of Korea." They are asking us to choose which of two roads to disaster we should take. Our choice must be to take neither, if we can avoid it. At this point, the job gets tough and complicated.

What we are trying to do is to maintain peace and security without a general war. We are saying to the aggressors, "You will not be allowed to get away with your crime; you must stop it." At the same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagration which would consume the very things we are now trying to defend.

Let's admit that this effort is extremely difficult. There is no more complicated problem than to bring an end to fighting which involves the world's great powers without unconditional surrender of one side or the other—an unconditional surrender which will not come except in general war. It is hard to understand and hard to explain. It means a condition of half-war, half-peace.

Peace will come in Korea when the aggressors decide to give up their purpose. There is no present sign that they intend to do so. But if we count their casualties and the forces they now have in Korea, the aggressors have committed at least 1,250,000 troops to their criminal effort and are right where they were when the first attack was launched. In Red China itself, people are increasingly worried about sending waves of Chinese manpower into the fiery furnace of modern fire power in a foreign land, in a war hatched up by someone else.

The President reminded us last Wednesday evening that Communist aggression was repelled in Greece and in Berlin without a general war. This came about because situations were created by vigorous action on the part of the free world which made it necessary for the aggressors, for

¹ Made over NBC television on Apr. 15 and released to the press on the same date.

reasons fully known only to them, to change their course of action. Both in Greece and in Berlin, the result fully protected the essential interests of the free world and the failure of purpose and loss of prestige went to those who had flagrantly challenged the peace of the world.

Apart from Korea itself, the free peoples of the world are increasing their strength rapidly; their armed forces and their industrial production are being readied to defend themselves against the threat which has been raised against them. This very fact produces peril. For a course of events has been set in motion by the free world which will shortly place us in position to be secure and to get on with the great peaceful purposes which are our true aims. This prospect may be intolerable to the Kremlin—hence, the danger. But, we must pass through this valley of danger if we are to maintain our liberties.

No one can surely promise that we can avoid general war, because conspirators elsewhere can produce one. But, if one should come, it is important that we be in the strongest possible position to meet it. At the moment of greatest danger, strength will come from clear conscience—from the knowledge that we have done everything humanly possible to prevent it. Strength will

come from the solid alliance of all free men; welded together by their common understanding of the stakes and of the nature of the attack. Strength will come from our industrial strength as it is geared to support our armed power. Strength will come from within the iron curtain itself as men revolt against the tyranny and the aggression. All these we must not confuse by ill-considered action on our own part now.

In closing, I should like to add a word about the quality of our world leadership in the period ahead. We Americans know that our politics get boisterous at times. It is normal to our traditions and our history. But, we have vital responsibilities of world leadership; we live in a great goldfish bowl where all the world may see us. What we do here at home has endless effects abroad. It may well be that the most important single fact of the twentieth century is that the energy, wealth, power, and imagination of the American people are devoted to the peace, liberty, and economic well-being of ourselves and others. We do not serve our cause if, in this great democracy, we destroy our unity and undermine our strength, or if we lack the patience and the maturity we shall need, as we move to meet the tests ahead.

Casualties of U.N. Forces in Korea

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information March 31]

The following are the most recent figures showing casualties suffered by the forces operating under the United Nations Command in Korea. These figures are based on an informal survey conducted by the United Nations Secretariat among delegations to the United Nations repre-

senting Governments which have contributed forces to support the United Nations action in Korea.

Except where otherwise indicated the figures given below are as of March 9.

Country	Killed in Action	Wounded in Action	Missing in Action	Total
Republic of Korea.....	16, 182	88, 511	63, 959	168, 652
United States as of 23 March.....	8, 511	37, 918	10, 691	57, 120
Turkey as of 1 March.....	298	672	199	1, 169
United Kingdom as of 21 February.....	145	442	1 305	892
France.....	84	309	3	396
Australia.....	62	196	7	265
Philippines as of 2 March.....	6	49	None	55
Netherlands.....	28	82	2	112
Greece as of 15 March.....	28	60	1	89
Canada as of 12 March.....	17	51	None	68
New Zealand.....	4	2 5	None	9
South Africa.....	0	0	3 6	6
Belgium and Luxembourg.....	(These troops were not in action before 9 March)			
Thailand as of 7 February.....	9	2 99	None	108
Total.....	25, 374	128, 394	75, 173	228, 941

¹ Including 61 prisoners.

² Including sick and injured.

³ Presumed dead.

Assisting Iran To Unite With the Free World¹

*Remarks by George C. McGhee
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern,
South Asian and African Affairs*

MR. MCGHEE: Mr. Cronkite, I am not going to try to minimize the dangers inherent in such a strategically located and oil-rich country as Iran. Martial law, which at first was enforced only in Tehran, is now in effect in the oil fields in the southwestern part of the country. The Iranian legislature has voted for nationalization of the country's great oil industry. About 12,000 workers in the oil fields are on strike. The local Communist Party is fanning the flames of dissension.

Yet, if we take a balanced, long-range look at the situation, there is no reason to be pessimistic. To date, there is no indication that the Kremlin engineered the present crisis in Iran, much as they are delighted with it. The Shah and Prime Minister Hussein Ala, both of whom I saw during my recent visit in Iran, have shown cool judgment in meeting emergency situations. The Iranian army is behind them. This army is capable of maintaining order. There has been almost no violence in the area of the strike.

I had the opportunity for a long discussion with the Shah in Tehran on the day of the second tragic assassination, that of the Minister of Education. I was tremendously impressed with his coolness and courage, his determination to take whatever steps are required to maintain Iran's integrity. He has a keen interest in the welfare of his people and his deep desire to continue the distribution of his land and to get on with the 7-year development program in which he has played such an important role. I conveyed to him the confidence which our Government has in him, and the fact that we are fully behind Iran and want to do what we can to assist Iran.

The point I want to make is that you do not succeed in any endeavor by exaggerating the difficulties that lie ahead. You capitalize on what you have and drive ahead with a will to win. If we had concentrated on dangers of past crises instead of exploiting the strong points, Greece might have fallen to the Communists. There would have

been no Berlin airlift, no intervention by the United Nations in Korea, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and General Eisenhower would never have undertaken his difficult assignment in Europe.

COMMENTATOR: Well, Mr. McGhee, just what is our goal in Iran? What is it that we're trying to do in that country, some 7,000 miles from our firesides here in the United States?

MCGHEE: What we are trying to do, Mr. Cronkite, as a friend of Iran and without in any way interfering in Iranian internal affairs, is to help Iran solve its problems and strengthen its economy and its military forces. The first Point 4 Program in the world was established in Iran. We hope this program can be continued next year and increased. In 1948, we extended a 26 million dollar loan to Iran to buy military equipment. Substantial quantities of military supplies are now being shipped to Iran on a grant basis under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Next year, we expect this assistance to be increased. Iran has been offered a 25 million dollar Export-Import Bank Loan which will take effect as soon as the Iranian Government concludes the agreement. We are prepared to consider other needs as they arise.

COMMENTATOR: Have we done enough, Mr. McGhee?

MCGHEE: We are doing what we can. In the present world crisis with such great demands being made on us all over the world, we must distribute our aid as the needs arise and on the basis of the urgency of each situation involved. We must seek to provide what the Secretary recently called the "missing component" where other components already exist. Some people have asked why has the United States given Iran no more dollar assistance. The answer is that, until recently, Iran's problem did not appear to be a deficiency of dollars.

COMMENTATOR: I can see that we have to ration our help, Mr. McGhee. But when an economic situation does develop which justifies our help, can we move fast enough to meet it effectively?

MCGHEE: We certainly can. We did this in Greece. We did it in Turkey. We are very hopeful that Congress will give us the support to meet the famine situation in India. Here is an example

¹ A CBS television program broadcast on Apr. 8 and released to the press on the same date.

of how we can help the Iranians with our technical assistance if we move quickly. Almost the entire area of Iran, south of the 30th parallel, is in danger of being ravaged by one of the great plagues of locusts which have periodically infested these ancient lands since Biblical times. According to the latest reports, the egg fields of these locusts already cover an area of 2,000 square miles. Unless the locusts are killed off now, they will destroy the crops in southern Iran. Even more serious, the locusts will sweep northward over the entire country, eventually ravaging the northern provinces, which are the real breadbaskets of Iran. The Premier of Iran has appealed to the United States, Great Britain, and the United Nations for help. To be effective, spraying of the infested area must begin in the next 3 weeks. Within a matter of days, we have formulated an effective program for American assistance in the problem, and, by the end of this week, technicians, material, and equipment will be flown to Iran and put in operation.

COMMENTATOR: What do you think the future holds for Iran?

MCGHEE: I am optimistic for the reasons that I have mentioned, and, especially, because of the Iranian people themselves. Iran, as you know, is the modern name for Persia. The Persians built up one of the greatest empires the world has ever known centuries before the new world was discovered. Only about three million of the 16½ million people of Iran live in cities. The rest are hardy farmers or migratory tribesmen of great physical strength and intelligence. They have been fighting the Russians off and on for several hundred years. They have been conquered, but they have never been subjugated. They understand the Russians better than we do. United under their Shah, they are determined to preserve their independence. I feel confident that they will do so.

Remarks by Elbert G. Mathews

COMMENTATOR: Thank you, Mr. McGhee. And now to tell us about some of the political facts we face in the area south of the Communist empire, here is Bert Mathews, Director of the State Department's Office of South Asian Affairs.

MATHEWS: Let's amend that "some" to "a very few" of the political facts we face in the vast area from Greece to India. The countries of this area are separated by important differences of language, religion, culture, and living standards. Most of them do, however, have two things in common. First, having achieved independence after many years as colonies under one foreign empire or another, they are determined to preserve their new sovereignty and freedom at all costs. Second, they are determined to speed the development of their natural resources and the improvement of the living standards of their people.

Both of these characteristics are present in a

very high degree in India, the largest and most heavily populated country in this area. They underlie India's political outlook, which has puzzled many Americans in recent months. Yet Americans, more than any other people, should be able to understand the problems and hopes of new countries.

We should, for example, understand that India will seize every opportunity to demonstrate and defend its newly won independence of judgment and action. The Indian people will be quick to resent any evidence of an attitude of superiority or casualness on the part of other nations.

When George Washington was President, he expressed the sentiments of the new United States in advising against becoming embroiled in the world's troubles outside our own borders. Today, Prime Minister Nehru voices the hopes of his people when he says that India does not wish to become involved in the strains and tensions of the present world. The difference between India's position today and ours at the end of the eighteenth century is that the airplane, fast ships, and quick communications have left the globe much smaller, and no nation, however much it may wish to do so, can now divorce itself from the world's troubles.

We were fortunate when we proclaimed our independence in that we inherited a land rich in untapped natural resources. But the Indians are crowded into an old country which is striving to produce enough food for more than 350,000,000 people. Last year, natural disasters—droughts, floods, earthquakes, and plagues of locust—fell on the people and the land with unusual severity. Famine is imminent in the provinces of Madras, Bihar, and Assam. To avert starvation, India must import 6 million tons of grain. India is paying for 4 million tons. It is asking the United States to assist by providing the remaining 2 million tons. India could pay for this 2 million tons only by harmfully delaying the economic development programs which are essential for the country's security. If we do not give the grain, or if we send it with strings attached, we will strike a serious blow at a new growth of democracy which is taking root in Asia.

COMMENTATOR: Thank you, Mr. Mathews. It seems to me that the American people would be more willing to send grain to India if India, in return, would support our stand in the United Nations against Communist aggression in Korea. Would you care to comment on this?

MATHEWS: Yes, Mr. Cronkite. I have lived closely with this problem. It is part of my job to try to understand why India takes a different position on the Far Eastern problem than we do.

The basic reason is our different estimates of the two strong forces in Asia today. Prime forces are nationalism and communism. Prime Minister Nehru of India and his Government believe that nationalism—the drive of the Asian people for

complete independence—is so strong that it can and will defeat communism. We agree that nationalism is a tremendous force. We doubt that nationalism can withstand aggressive international communism, aided and directed by power grasping regimes in Moscow and Peiping, unless all free nations, including the newly independent nations of Asia, stand together against the threat.

Let me make one last thing clear. The Indian Government has taken severe and effective measures against Communists within its borders. And India will fight if invaded. You can be sure of that.

Remarks by John Loftus

COMMENTATOR: Of all the economic problems of the Middle East and South Asian area, none is more important than oil. To answer our questions about the vital oil fields of the Middle East, here is John Loftus, economic adviser to Mr. McGhee.

Mr. Loftus, most Americans think we have all the oil we need. Is this true?

LOFTUS: In normal times we can almost make out with what we have. But, the last war was a drain on our oil resources. We have changed from a large exporter of oil to an even larger importer of oil. Western Europe, for all practical purposes, has no oil supply of its own. Before the war, Europe imported oil, mostly from the United States and Venezuela. Now, Western Europe depends on the oil fields of the Middle East for three-fourths of its needs.

Production-wise, Middle East oil did not count for much until after the last war. In 1939, the oil fields of the Middle East were producing only one-tenth of the volume which was then being produced in the United States. However, in about 10 years, production in the Middle East has risen from about 300,000 to nearly 2,000,000 barrels per day. Nearly 80 percent of the oil needed to turn the wheels of Europe's industries come from the Middle East.

The most important oil fields are in Saudi Arabia, Southern Iran, the Sheikdom of Kuwait, Bahrein Island, and the Kirkuk area in Iraq. None of the oil goes to Russia. Russia and her satellites produce only about one-half as much oil as is produced in the Middle East. All of the concessions in these Middle Eastern fields are controlled by the free nations of the world.

COMMENTATOR: I think this problem of concessions confuses some of us, Mr. Loftus. We read about the activities of American oil companies in Saudi Arabia, and British oil companies in Iran, and French oil companies in Iraq. Why can't these countries develop their own oil fields?

LOFTUS: Well, it's like this. On the one hand, a large part of the oil resources of the world is located in areas where there has not been much economic and technical progress. On the other

hand, finding, producing, transporting, and refining oil is a very complicated technical business. It requires a great deal of know-how and capital. Generally speaking, the Middle Eastern countries do not have that know-how and capital. So, in effect, they sign contracts with outside companies to do the job for them. The Government of the country which has the oil and the oil company which has the know-how and equipment to develop it sign a concession contract. The company agrees to pay the Government so much royalty on every barrel of oil produced. The Government agrees that the company shall have the right to sell the oil in world markets. The Government, in return, receives a large annual payment as its share of the proceeds. Of course, the contracts cover many other points in great detail, such as taxes, dead rents, and so on.

COMMENTATOR: But, if all details are covered in the concession contracts, why does so much tension develop between the Governments and the oil companies?

LOFTUS: Tension does not always develop, Mr. Cronkite. For example, relations between the Arabian American Oil Company and the Government of Arabia have been quite satisfactory. In Iran, obviously, the tension is very great right now.

There are many reasons for the tensions which do develop. First, the concession contracts are drawn up at a time when no one knows for sure that there is oil in the country. Almost any contract looks good to the Government at the start. But, if the fields turn out to be productive, the picture changes. The company begins to produce and sell great quantities of oil and apparently is making a lot of money. On the other hand, the oil company assumed heavy risks and invested a great deal of money. But the Governments start asking themselves why they shouldn't get a larger share of the benefits.

Second, the Government may feel that the company is not producing as much oil as it could produce. And each country would like to have its own refinery, like the one in Abadan, in Iran, largest in the world.

And so oil, which is initially an economic problem, becomes involved in the great surge of nationalism which is sweeping through the Middle East. There is no easy solution to this problem. We need the oil. These countries need the revenues from oil to finance their economic development programs and they need the companies if they are to realize these revenues. To achieve an equitable solution, Governments and oil companies alike must display statesmanship of the highest order.

Remarks by Norman Burns

COMMENTATOR: Thank you, Mr. Loftus. Oil lies under only a small fraction of the great area of the Middle East and South Asia. And now to tell

us something more about the land of this vast area, here is Norman Burns, agricultural and economic specialist on Mr. McGhee's staff.

BURNS: As Mr. Loftus pointed out, many of the world's richest oil fields have been found in the so-called underdeveloped areas where, today, there is great poverty and privation. These areas were not always underdeveloped. Several months ago, I visited the cradle of our Western civilization—the ancient valley of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in Iraq, formerly Mesopotamia. Today, much of this valley is a desert—flat, sandy, parched by relentless sun. Yet, in the days of Nebuchadnezzar almost 3 thousand years ago, this same area, known as the Garden of Eden, supported millions of people.

With patience, hard work, and modern scientific methods, this land can again support a prosperous and progressive civilization.

Under the present system in the Middle East, most of the land is owned by a small minority and the mass of people are tenant serfs. They have no interest in improving land which is not their own. In Lebanon, two-tenths of 1 percent of the land-owners own half of the cultivable land. In Egypt, 3 million of the 4 million families living on the land own less than 1 acre, or else do not own any land at all.

Recently, the Shah of Iran made the farsighted decision to divide part of his immense land holdings among his people.

And now, let's see what the Government of Iraq did with 163,000 acres of state-owned land which the Iraq Government irrigated with a 30-mile canal between the Tigris and Euphrates. It divided the land, known as the Dujaila project, into tracts of 62½ acres each. It chose 1200 peasant families from the estates of neighboring sheikhs and leased a tract to each family. The head of the family signed a contract with the Government (putting his fingerprint on the paper, since he could neither read nor write). The tenant agreed to cultivate the land for 10 years. He agreed to build a home, a stable for his animals, and storage bins for his crops. Schools, clinics, agricultural machine shops, experimental gardens, and a nursery are within walking distance of his home. After 10 years, if he has tilled the land successfully, the tenant is given title to his tract. His future is then in his own hands. Communism holds little or no appeal for him.

Revitalizing these lands of the Middle East and South Asia is a challenge to fire the imagination of American scientists and the people of the countries themselves. On a recent trip to the Near East, I saw efforts being made to graft an olive tree to an ash tree, so that it could grow in marshy lands. In Lebanon, I saw fields of elephant grass imported from Brazil to provide cheap forage for

cattle. I saw a new variety of grass, known as kudzu, which stores nitrogen in the soil. In Syria, I saw evergreen trees being tested for reforestation. I saw irrigation projects, macadamized roads, experimental farms, a new port at Latakia. In Transjordan, I saw sheep drinking from an ancient Roman cistern which engineers plan to clean out and rebuild as part of a modern water supply.

Americans are eager to offer their technical assistance for these development projects. However, the initiative and the elbow grease to get these projects started must come from the people who will use and benefit from them. The initiative is there. But, in many countries, it is held back by suspicions of our motives, by local red tape and by inertia. The lowest classes of people live in such poverty that, for them, almost any change would be an improvement of their present situation.

Above all, there is the element of time. We must speed up the process of helping these people to improve their lot. If we fail in this effort, many of them will turn in despair to communism.

Summary by Assistant Secretary McGhee

COMMENTATOR: Thank you, Mr. Burns. And now to summarize the facts we face in this vital area south of the Communist empire, here, again, is Assistant Secretary of State McGhee.

MC GHEE: There is not the least doubt in my mind that the strategists in the Kremlin are seeking to gain control of this area as quickly as they can. In their hands, these lands would provide them with great manpower resources, with the oil, manganese, and the many other strategic materials which they need to fight a global war.

In my judgment, they cannot succeed for the following reasons. Without exception, the vast majority of the people in the Near East and South Asia abhor the Communist doctrine. They are religious, they are individualistic, they have old and honored cultures which they are determined to preserve. Most of them are new nations. They have won their independence after centuries of struggle under colonial yoke.

They will not surrender it easily now. They are suspicious of influences from the West, but they are more suspicious of the new Communist imperialism. They are determined to succeed in the hard task of raising their standards of living so that they may share the advantages of free government.

Many of these nations have shown their determination to resist Communist aggression by their stand in the United Nations with respect to Korea. Some have sent troops to fight for the cause of the United Nations in Korea. We, in turn, must continue to take all practical steps to help them realize their aspirations so that they can unite with the rest of the free world for mutual security.

U.S. Aid to Iran in Fight Against Locust Plague

[Released to the press April 10]

Two DC-4 Skymaster planes, carrying six disassembled single-engine planes and over six tons of insecticide to fight the locust plague in Iran, are scheduled to leave Idlewild International Airport, New York, within the next 24 hours. A third plane, carrying two more small planes and additional supplies, is scheduled to take off for Tehran, April 13.

This emergency action, taken at the request of the Iranian Government, is being carried out as part of the Point 4 Program of technical cooperation, administered by the Department of State. A Point 4 project is already in operation in Iran for the purpose of increasing food production and improving living conditions in rural areas.

The flights and spraying operations are being carried out under contract by the United States Overseas Airlines, a private charter service. The Iranian Government will provide fuel for the spraying planes and will house and feed the pilots and mechanics who are making the trip. About 20 of the group will remain in Iran to spray the fields.

A Department of Agriculture entomologist, William R. Mabey, will fly to Iran to direct the technical phases of the project and will remain in Iran as one of the group of American technicians engaged in the long-range technical cooperation project. Mr. Mabey has been stationed at Elko, Nevada, as a supervisor of grasshopper control in the Western States. He is one of the pioneers in the use of airplanes for applying insecticides to field crops to control insects. Another Department of Agriculture entomologist, Edson J. Hambleton, also will make the trip to Iran, but he will stay there only a short time.

Reports from Iran indicate that over 130,000 square miles of cultivated land are threatened by the plague of locusts. At present, the egg fields of the insects actually cover about 2,000 square miles in southern Iran below the 30th parallel, an area where wheat, barley, pistachio nuts, almonds, and other foods are grown. However, Iranian authorities advise that unless the insects are killed off within the next 3 weeks, the locusts will swarm northward, eventually reaching the northern provinces of Iran which are the real breadbaskets of the country.

After the transport planes arrive in Iran, only 6 hours will be needed to assemble the spraying planes. They will carry a new insecticide—aldrin, 2 ounces of which, mixed in solvent, are enough to kill locusts covering an acre of ground. The material to be used in Iran was flown from Denver to Idlewild yesterday.

Preparations for the emergency action have been completed in record time by State Department and

aviation officials. Passports, visas, and inoculations for personnel making the trip have been obtained on 24-hour notice.

The small planes will be ready to begin spraying operations within 10 days after the Iranian officials made their appeal to the United States Government.

Joint Communiqué on U.S.-U.K. Iranian Talks

[Released to the press April 9]

The opening exchange of views between the British Ambassador and the State Department has taken place in a cordial atmosphere. These talks were informal and exploratory and dealt in a positive and constructive way with matters of mutual interest between the British and United States Governments relating to Iran.

The British and United States Governments have many times demonstrated their concern with the stability of Iran and the well-being of the Iranian people. Both Governments, for instance, in May 1950, declared their interest in the continued political independence and territorial integrity of Iran, and they have both given proof of their willingness to provide Iran with technical and material assistance. It is the earnest hope of the British and United States Governments that this mutual cooperation will be maintained and developed with advantage to the peoples of all three countries.

Iranian oil has played a vital part in world trade and in meeting the requirements of many countries of the free world. Its importance to Iran, to the United Kingdom, and to the economy of the free world generally is, of course, great. Hence, the two Governments, while recognizing that questions relating to Iranian oil must be settled elsewhere, have deemed it advisable to exchange views informally.

Further exchanges of views will take place.

Admiral Robert B. Carney To Visit Jordan

[Released to the press April 10]

On the invitation of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, is scheduled to arrive today at Amman, the capital of Jordan. Admiral Carney's visit is in connection with the celebration on April 11 of Arab Legion Day.

Trade Agreement With Costa Rica Terminated

[Released to the press April 4]

Representatives of the Government of the United States and the Government of Costa Rica exchanged notes on April 3 providing for termination of the trade agreement between the two Governments signed November 28, 1936. The trade agreement will cease to be in force on and after June 1, 1951.

In the trade agreement, Costa Rica in 1937 granted reductions and bindings on a wide range of agricultural and industrial products. The Costa Rican customs duties, which will be applied to these items after termination of the trade agreement, have not been announced. The United States bound or reduced its duties on four tropical fruit products (dried bananas, pineapples, preserved guavas, mango and guava pastes) and bound on the free list bananas and plantains, coffee, cocoa beans, deer and reptile skins, turtles, balsa, and cabinet woods. The United States tariff status of these items will be unchanged since the dutiable items are included at the same or lower levels in other trade agreements, and the free list articles are also bound free in other agreements.

In 1948, the Costa Rican Government, impelled by a large imbalance in its trade with the United States and in order to increase its revenues, took steps to restrict imports of nonessential goods and applied exchange surcharges to certain categories of imports, including some items covered by the trade agreement. New legislation in Costa Rica, effective April 1, 1950, provided for increased exchange surcharges. In order to permit Costa Rica to seek a solution of its emergency financial difficulties which would not be in conflict with the trade agreement, the United States agreed to a waiver of article I of the agreement for a year ending March 31, 1951.¹

In the meantime, during the course of conversations between representatives of the two Governments, it became evident that because of special conditions Costa Rica would be unable to apply the terms of the trade agreement in the foreseeable future. After a full exploration of various alternatives, the two Governments therefore agreed to joint termination of the trade agreement effective June 1, 1951. The waiver of article I of the agreement has been extended to that termination date.

¹ BULLETIN of May 1, 1950, p. 694.

TEXT OF COSTA RICAN NOTE

April 3, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note dated April 3, 1951, relating to the termination by mutual consent of the trade agreement signed November 28, 1936, and relating to the extension of the agreement effected by exchange of notes on April 4, 1950.

I have the honor to confirm the agreement arrived at in the course of conversations between representatives of our two Governments, which agreement is set forth in your note of April 3, 1951, above mentioned.

As proposed in that note, it is agreed that your note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force today.

Accept [etc.]

J. RAFAEL OREAMUNO

TEXT OF UNITED STATES NOTE

April 3, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to conversations between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica regarding the termination by mutual consent of the trade agreement signed November 28, 1936. I also have the honor to refer to the agreement effected by an exchange of notes on April 4, 1950 whereby the Government of the United States, at the request of the Government of Costa Rica, agreed to waive, for a period of one year, beginning April 1, 1950, the provisions of Article I of the above-mentioned trade agreement to permit the application of multiple exchange surcharges to imports from the United States of America of articles listed in Schedule I of the trade agreement.

The Government of Costa Rica has made it clear that special conditions exist, and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future, which will make it impossible for Costa Rica to apply the terms of the trade agreement. In view of these conditions, and in accordance with the conversations to which I have referred, I have the honor to confirm the agreement reached today in a friendly and understanding spirit that the Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica, signed at San José on November 28, 1936, shall cease to be in force on and after June 1, 1951.

Pursuant to the request of the Government of Costa Rica during the course of the above-mentioned conversations and recognizing the problems confronting the Government of Costa Rica, I further confirm that the Government of the United States of America agrees to extend from April 1, 1951 through May 31, 1951 the waiver of Article I of the trade agreement as granted

in the agreement effected by the exchange of notes dated April 4, 1950.

If the Government of Costa Rica concurs in the foregoing, this note and Your Excellency's reply thereto will constitute an agreement between our two Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's note.

It is understood that the Government of Costa Rica is desirous of exploring the possibility of negotiating a comprehensive treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between our two countries. My Government is equally desirous of undertaking discussions concerning such a treaty and is prepared to begin them at an early date.

Accept [etc.].

For the Secretary of State:
THOMAS C. MANN



Death of Ernest Bevin, Former British Foreign Minister

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 14]

Ernest Bevin's death brings to me deep sorrow from the loss of a friend and trusted colleague. We have worked together for two and one half years in a critical and troubled time, sharing common problems and determined in the interests of our countries to find solutions in common. To work with him inevitably evoked deep affection, respect, and trust. It could not be otherwise, because his indomitable courage, his simplicity and directness, his love of his country and his understanding of the grandeur of its contribution to the cause of human liberty, his humanity and knowledge of the struggles and aspirations of his fellowmen, his own warm affectionate good humor made him both loved and trusted.

We have sat together in many international conferences and personal meetings. We have exchanged innumerable messages on the problems confronting us. He fought hard for views which were always founded on a remarkable knowledge of history, an apprehension—deeper than knowledge—that he was acting in the moving stream of history, and an understanding of present facts. But his mind was not closed. It was tough, and often stubborn, but always open to arguments strongly and honestly pushed.

Not only his own countrymen but all of us to whom freedom and liberty are the foundation of our lives will stand in spirit beside his grave in sorrow and gratitude and joy that in these times such a man has lived.

Ernest Bevin was a gallant gentleman, a great Englishman, a fighter for the freedom of all men.



Legislation—Continued from page 645

- Clarifying the Immigration Status of Certain Aliens. S. Rept. 111, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 728] 4 pp.
- Authorizing Vessels of Canadian Registry To Transport Iron Ore Between United States Ports on the Great Lakes During 1951. S. Rept. 119, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 683] 4 pp.
- Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services on S. Res. 99 and S. Con. Res. 18. S. Rept. 175, 82d Cong. 1st sess. iii, Map, 23 pp.
- Ninth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 6, 82d Cong. 1st sess. vii, 158 pp.
- Basic Data Relating to Energy Resources. Study Made by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, pursuant to S. Res. 239 (81st Cong.) to investigate available fuel reserves and formulate a national fuel policy of the United States. S. Doc. 8, 82d Cong. 1st sess. xxi, 226 pp.
- Investigation of the Preparedness Program. Fifth Report of the preparedness subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, under the authority of S. Res. 18 (82d Cong.). Interim Report on Lackland Air Force Base. S. Doc. 9, 82d Cong. 1st sess. v, 22 pp. Also, Sixth Report . . . Tin, 1951. S. Doc. 13, 82d Cong. 1st sess. vii, 56 pp.
- North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement and Final Protocol Thereto. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement and the final protocol thereto, which were signed in the English, Spanish, and French languages at Washington on November 15, 1950, by the respective plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the territories in the North American Region (Bahamas and Jamaica), Canada, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Senate Ex. A, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 100 pp.
- 1951 Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on H. R. 1612, a bill to extend the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and for other purposes. January 22, 24, 25, and 26, 1951. [Department of State, pp. 1-104.] vi, 625 pp.
- India Emergency Assistance Act of 1951. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on H. R. 2692, H. R. 2693, H. R. 2694, H. R. 2695, H. R. 2696, H. R. 2698, H. R. 2699, H. R. 2700, H. R. 2702, H. R. 2705, H. R. 2706, and H. R. 3017, bills to furnish emergency food relief Assistance to India. February 20, 21, 22, 23, 1951. [Department of State, pp. 5-38, 45-103, 204-206, 217-225.] iv, 233 pp.
- Imports Controls on Fats, Oils, Rice, and Rice Products. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, first session, on H. R. 5240, a bill to continue for a temporary period certain powers, authority, and discretion for the purpose of exercising, administering, and enforcing import controls with respect to fats and oils, and rice and rice products. June 21, 1949. iii, 5 pp.
- The Effect of Imports on Employment. Hearings before a special subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, second session, pursuant to H. Res. 75, a resolution authorizing the committee on education and labor to conduct studies and investigations relating to matters within its jurisdiction. Hearings held at Washington, D. C., May 2, 6, 15, 16, June 1, 2, 12, 26, and 27, 1950. vii, 430 pp.

Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

ADDITIONS UP THROUGH MARCH 31, 1951

Notes by Denys P. Myers

Compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is a continuation of the compulsory jurisdiction established by article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, therefore, provides for declarations of states parties to the Statute to be effective either—

(a) under the present Statute in virtue of article 36, paragraph 2; or

(b) under the terms of declarations made with respect to the Permanent Court of International Justice and carried over by application of article 36, paragraph 5, of the present Statute.

Compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice was effected by signing a declaration setting forth the terms and conditions reciprocally accepted by the respective party to the Statute. That Statute was brought into force by ratification of a covering protocol of signature dated December 16, 1920, to which was annexed an optional clause providing a medium by which parties to the Statute accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of article 36 in affixing to it the declaration above-mentioned. Ratification of declarations was not expressly required, but ratification was frequently a condition of a declaration.

Compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is effected by depositing with the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration stating the terms and conditions of acceptance. Since the Statute of the International Court of Justice is an annex and an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations, no special protocol of the type of the former optional

clause was set up. Declarations of acceptance may be made subject to ratification. Declarations made under the Statute of the International Court of Justice are separately registered in accordance with article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and published in the United Nations Treaty Series. They are communicated to the registrar of the International Court of Justice and published in chapter X of the *Yearbook* issued by him for successive years beginning July 15, 1946.

The pertinent provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in force since October 24, 1945, are:

Article 36

1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.

2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

- (a) the interpretation of a treaty;
- (b) any question of international law;
- (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.

4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.

5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which

are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms.

6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

Declarations were first compiled and published in the June 1948 issue of *Documents and State Papers* and reprinted with revisions as Department of State publication 3540, International Organization and Conference Series, III, 31, under the title of *Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Inter-*

Status of Declarations Accepting Compulsory Jurisdiction

(Asterisks (*) indicate declarations made before October 24, 1945, which continue in force.)

State	Date of signature	Currently effective from	Duration	References UN Treaty Series Yearbook	
*Australia	Aug. 21, 1940 .	Sept. 2, 1940 .	5 years, and until notice to terminate.		'46:216
Belgium	June 10, 1948 .	July 13, 1948 .	5 years	16:203; no. 260	'47:130
Bolivia	July 5, 1948 .	July 5, 1948 .	5 years	16:207; no. 261	'47:131
Brazil	Feb. 12, 1948 .	Mar. 12, 1948 .	5 years	15:221; no. 237	'47:130
*Canada	Sept. 20, 1929 .	July 28, 1930 .	10 years, and until notice to terminate.		'46:208
China	Oct. 26, 1946 .	Oct. 26, 1946 .	5 years, then 6 months' notice.	1:35; no. 5 . .	'46:218
*Colombia	Oct. 30, 1937 .	Oct. 30, 1937 .	Indefinite		'46:212
Denmark	Dec. 10, 1946 .	Dec. 11, 1946 .	10 years	1:45; no. 10 . .	'46:219
*Dominican Republic	Sept. 30, 1924 .	Feb. 4, 1933 .	Indefinite		'46:208
*El Salvador	Before Jan. 28, 1921.	Aug. 19, 1930 .	Indefinite		'46:210
France	Feb. 18, 1947 .	Mar. 1, 1949 .	5 years, and until notice to terminate.	26:91; no. 378	'46:220
Guatemala	Jan. 27, 1947 .	Jan. 27, 1947 .	5 years	1:49; no. 12 . .	'46:219
*Haiti	[1921]	Sept. 7, 1921 .	Indefinite		'46:207
Honduras	Feb. 2, 1948 .	Feb. 10, 1948 .	6 years	15:217; no. 236	'47:129
*India	Feb. 28, 1940 .	Mar. 7, 1940 .	5 years, and until notice to terminate.		'46:213
*Iran	Oct. 2, 1930 .	Sept. 19, 1932 .	6 years, and until notice of abrogation.		'46:211
Israel	Sept. 4, 1950 .		5 years, from ratification		'46:215
Liechtenstein	Mar. 10, 1950 .	Mar. 29, 1950 .	Until revocation on 1 year's notice.	no. 759	'49:165
*Luxembourg	Sept. 15, 1930 .	Sept. 15, 1930 .	Renewable for 5-year periods.		'46:210
Mexico	Oct. 23, 1947 .	Mar. 1, 1947 .	5 years, then 6 months' notice.	9:97; no. 127	'47:129
Netherlands	Aug. 5, 1946 .	Aug. 6, 1946 .	10 years, and until notice of abrogation.	1:7; no. 2 . . .	'46:217
*New Zealand	Apr. 1, 1940 .	Apr. 8, 1940 .	5 years, and until notice to terminate.		'46:214
*Nicaragua	Sept. 24, 1929 .	Nov. 29, 1939 .	Indefinite		'46:210
Norway	Nov. 16, 1946 .	Oct. 3, 1946 .	10 years	1:37; no. 6 . . .	'46:219
Pakistan	June 22, 1948 .	July 9, 1948 .	5 years, and until notice to terminate.	16:197; no. 259	'47:131
*Panama	Oct. 25, 1921 .	June 14, 1929 .	Indefinite		'46:207
*Paraguay	May 11, 1933 .	May 11, 1933 .	Indefinite		'46:211
Philippines	July 12, 1947 .	July 4, 1946 .	For 10 years, from July 4, 1946, and until notice of abrogation.	7:229; no. 101	'47:128
Sweden	Apr. 5, 1947 .	Apr. 6, 1947 .	10 years	2:3; no. 16 . . .	'46:220
Switzerland	July 6, 1948 .	July 28, 1948 .	Indefinite	17:115; no. 272	'47:132
*Thailand	Sept. 20, 1929 .	May 7, 1930 .	10-year period		'46:208
	May 3, 1940 .	May 7, 1940 .	10-year period		'46:208
	May 20, 1950 .	May 3, 1950 .	10-year period	no. 844	'46:208
Turkey	May 22, 1947 .	May 6, 1947 .	5 years	4:265; no. 50 . .	'47:127
*Union of South Africa.	Apr. 7, 1940 .	Apr. 20, 1940 .	Indefinite		'46:215
*United Kingdom . .	Feb. 28, 1940 .	Mar. 7, 1940 .	5 years, and until notice to terminate.		'46:212
British Honduras . .	Feb. 13, 1946 .	Feb. 13, 1946 .	5 years	1:3; no. 1	'46:217
	Feb. 12, 1951 .	Feb. 12, 1951 .	5 years	annex no. 1 . . .	'46:217
United States	Aug. 14, 1946 .	Aug. 14, 1946 .	5 years, then 6 months' notice.	1:9; no. 3	'46:217
*Uruguay	Before Jan. 28, 1921.	Sept. 27, 1921 .	Indefinite		'46:207

national Court of Justice. The table here presented shows the status of declarations currently in force or made.

All declarations are by the Statute reciprocal "in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation" and are also made "on condition of reciprocity" with regard to terms expressed in them.

Declarations made or renewed since June 1949, when publication 3540 was issued, follow:

Israel

[Translated from French by the Government of Israel]

On behalf of the Government of Israel, and subject to ratification, I declare that Israel recognizes as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to all other Members of the United Nations and to any non-member State which becomes a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 93, paragraph 2 of the Charter and which accepts the same obligation (that is, subject to reciprocity) the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the said Court in all legal disputes concerning situations or facts which may arise after the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification of this declaration¹ and, in particular, which do not involve a legal title created or conferred by a Government or authority other than the Government of the State of Israel or an authority under the jurisdiction of that Government.

This declaration does not apply:

(a) to any dispute in respect of which the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to another means of peaceful settlement;

(b) to any dispute relating to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State of Israel;²

(c) to any dispute between the State of Israel and another State which refuses to establish or maintain normal relations with it.

The present declaration has been made for five years as from the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification.³

Hakirya, the twenty-second of Elul five thousand seven hundred and ten.

(the fourth of September 1950)³

M. SHARETT
Minister of Foreign Affairs

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
Assistant Secretary-General
Legal Department

Liechtenstein⁴

The Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein, duly authorized by His Serene Highness, the Reigning

¹ Ratification by the Cabinet under Israeli law had not been given by Mar. 31, 1951.

² An official press release of Nov. 29, 1950 pointed out that this condition would apply specifically to all matters arising out of the Mandate for Palestine of July 24, 1922, or which took place during the time the mandate was in force, i.e., until Aug. 1, 1948 (stipulated by the Plan of Partition with Economic Union approved by res. 181 (III) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Nov. 29, 1947).

³ Deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations Oct. 11, 1950.

⁴ Translated from the French; registration no. 759.

Prince Francois Joseph II, in accordance with the Order of the Diet of the Principality of Liechtenstein dated 9 March 1950, which came into force on 10 March 1950,

declares by these presents that the Principality of Liechtenstein recognizes as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes concerning:

(a) the interpretation of a treaty;

(b) any question of international law;

(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

The present Declaration, which is made under Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, shall take effect from the date⁵ on which the Principality becomes a party to the Statute and shall have effect as long as the Declaration has not been revoked subject to one year's notice.

DONE at Vaduz, 10 March 1950

On behalf of the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein

Head of Government

[SEAL]

A. FRICK

Thailand (Siam)⁶

On behalf of the Siamese Government, I recognize, subject to ratification, in relation to any other Member or State which accepts the same obligation, that is to say, on the condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory *ipso facto* and without any special convention, in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court for a period of ten years in all disputes, as to which no other means of pacific settlement is agreed upon between the parties.

GENEVA, September 20, 1929.⁷

VARNVAIDYA

RENEWAL

On behalf of the Thai Government, I hereby renew for a period of 10 years, from May 7th, 1940, the declaration of September 20th, 1929, accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court within the limits of and subject to the conditions and reservations set forth in the said declaration.

BANGKOK, May 3rd, 1940.

PIBULASONGGRAN.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BANGKOK, [May 20, 1950].⁸

RENEWAL

No. 9083/2493

Sir, I have the honour to inform you that by a declaration dated September 20, 1920 [i. e., 1929] His Majesty's

⁵ The declaration in virtue of which Liechtenstein became a party to Statute was deposited with the Secretariat and effective on Mar. 29, 1950; registration no. 758.

⁶ The name of Kingdom of Siam was changed to Thailand on June 24, 1939; back to Siam on Sept. 7, 1945; and to Thailand again on May 11, 1949 (BULLETIN of June 12, 1949, p. 765).

⁷ Ratification deposited with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, May 7, 1930.

⁸ Deposited and registered in the Secretariat, June 13, 1950; registration no. 844.

Government had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute for a period of ten years and on condition of reciprocity. That declaration has been renewed on May 3, 1940 for another period of ten years.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 4 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, I have now the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government hereby renew the declaration above mentioned for a further period of ten years as from May 3, 1950 with the limits and subject to the same conditions and reservations as set forth in the first declaration of September 20, 1920 [i. e., 1929].

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
(signed) Illegible

[WORAKAN BANCHAI]

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand

The Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Lake Success, New York.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

On behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, I now declare that they accept as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the Court, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, for a period of five years from today's date and thereafter until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after February 5th, 1930, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date, other than:

disputes in regard to which the Parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement;

disputes with the government of any other Member of the League which is a Member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the Parties have agreed or shall agree;

disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom; and

disputes arising out of events occurring at a time when His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were involved in hostilities;

and subject to the condition that His Majesty's Government reserve the right to require that proceedings in the Court shall be suspended in respect of any dispute which has been submitted to and is under consideration by the Council of the League of Nations, provided that notice to suspend is given after the dispute has been submitted to the Council and is given within ten days of the notification of the initiation of the proceedings in the Court, and provided also that such suspension shall be limited to a period of twelve months or such longer period as may be agreed by the Parties to the dispute or determined by a decision of all the Members of the Council other than the Parties to the dispute.

LONDON, February 28, 1940.⁹

HALIFAX.

⁹Received in the Secretariat of the League of Nations Mar. 7, 1940. For the circumstances under which this declaration was substituted for the previous declaration of Sept. 19, 1929, in force on Feb. 5, 1930 (as stated in this declaration), see Department of State publication 3540, p. 16.

DECLARATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL LEGAL DISPUTES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION, APPLICATION OR VA- LIDITY OF ANY TREATY RELATING TO THE BOUNDARIES OF BRITISH HONDURAS¹⁰

I, Ernest Bevin, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declare on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that for a period of five years from the date of this declaration they accept as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation, application or validity of any treaty relating to the boundaries of British Honduras, and over any questions arising out of any conclusion which the Court may reach with regard to such treaty.

Given under my hand and seal, at the Foreign Office, London, this Thirteenth day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-six.

ERNEST BEVIN.

DECLARATION¹¹

I, Kenneth Gilmour Younger, Minister of State, on behalf of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declare on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that the Declaration of the 13th February 1946, concerning any treaty relating to the boundaries of British Honduras, is renewed for a further period of five years beginning on the 12th February 1951, the date of the expiry of the Declaration of 1946.

Given under my hand and seal at the Foreign Office, London, this twelfth day of February, One thousand, nine hundred and fifty-one.

K. G. YOUNGER

APPENDIX 1—REVISED GENERAL ACT FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

Adopted by General Assembly of United Nations, Apr. 28, 1949¹²
in force for 5-year periods from Sept. 20, 1950¹³
[Excerpts]

¹⁰1 United Nations Treaty Series, p. 3; registration no. 1.

¹¹Circular note of the Assistant Secretary-General, Legal Department, Mar. 2, 1951.

¹²Res. 268 (III) of the General Assembly, 3d sess., 2d part. The Revised General Act was registered *ex officio* Sept. 20, 1950; registration no. 912.

¹³The instrument entered into force 90 days after deposit of the second accession. Belgium's accession, Dec. 23, 1949, extended to all provisions. Sweden's accession, June 22, 1950, extends to chaps. I (conciliation), II (judicial settlement), and IV (procedure); its accession to the General Act of Sept. 26, 1928, extended to chaps. I and IV.

The revised text of article 43 provides:

"1. The present General Act shall be open to accession by the Members of the United Nations, by the non-member States which shall have become parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice or to which the General Assembly of the United Nations shall have communicated a copy for this purpose."

The General Assembly by resolutions 372 (IV), December 3, 1949, and 480 (V), December 12, 1950, deferred until the sixth session the designation of nonmember states to which certified copies should be communicated for the purpose of accession.

Chapter II: Judicial Settlement

Article 17

All disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be made under Article 39, be submitted for decision to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree, in the manner hereinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral tribunal.

It is understood that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Chapter IV: General Provisions

Article 39

1. In addition to the power given in the preceding article,¹⁴ a Party, in acceding to the present General Act, may make his acceptance conditional upon the reservations exhaustively enumerated in the following paragraph. These reservations must be indicated at the time of accession.

2. These reservations may be such as to exclude from the procedure described in the present Act:

(a) Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession either of the Party making the reservation or of any other Party with whom the said Party may have a dispute;

(b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States;

(c) Disputes concerning particular cases or clearly specified subject-matters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly defined categories.

3. If one of the parties to a dispute has made a reservation, the other parties may enforce the same reservation in regard to that party.

4. In the case of Parties, who have acceded to the provisions of the present General Act relating to judicial settlement or to arbitration, such reservations as they may have made shall, unless otherwise expressly stated, be deemed not to apply to the procedure of conciliation.

NOTE

The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was opened for accession by the Assembly of the League of Nations September 26, 1928¹⁵ and entered into force for successive 5-year periods from August 16, 1929. The Revised General Act adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on April 28, 1949 pro-

¹⁴ Art. 38 permits accession to all or only certain chapters of the General Act, which are: I, (conciliation); II, (judicial settlement); III, (arbitration); IV, (general provisions).

¹⁵ 93 League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 343; registration no. 2123.

vides for the "restoration to the General Act of 26 September 1928 of its original efficacy" by amending the text so that assignments to the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice are replaced by references to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations was a specific application of the principles established by resolution 24 (I) of February 12, 1946 relating to the transfer of functions and powers belonging to the League of Nations under international agreements.

The General Act of September 26, 1928 remains in force, the current 5-year period beginning August 16, 1949. An accession is subject to denunciation for the period beginning August 16, 1954 on 6-months' notice before that date. Accessions in force are as follows:

State	Date
Australia	May 21, 1931
Belgium	May 18, 1929
Canada	July 1, 1931
Denmark*	Apr. 14, 1930
Estonia	Sept. 3, 1931
Ethiopia*	Mar. 15, 1935
Finland*	Sept. 6, 1930
France	May 21, 1931
Greece	Sept. 14, 1931
India	May 21, 1931
Ireland*	Sept. 26, 1931
Italy	Sept. 7, 1931
Latvia*	Sept. 17, 1935
Luxembourg*	Sept. 15, 1930
Netherlands (including Netherlands Indies, Surinam, and Curaçao)	Aug. 8, 1930
New Zealand	May 21, 1931
Norway*	June 11, 1930
Peru	Nov. 21, 1931
Sweden	May 13, 1929
Switzerland*	Dec. 7, 1934
Turkey	June 26, 1934
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	May 21, 1931

*Acceded without reservations. For the text of the reservations made by other states see United Nations, *Signatures, Ratifications, Acceptances, Accessions, etc., concerning the Multilateral Conventions and Agreements in respect of which the Secretary-General acts as Depository*, p. 25-30 (1949, V. 9).

The Netherlands and Sweden acceded only to chaps. I (conciliation), II (judicial settlement), and IV (general provisions).

APPENDIX 2—BELGIUM, FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, UNITED KINGDOM

The treaty of collaboration and collective self-defense signed by plenipotentiaries of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland at Brussels on March 17, 1948, and in force for 50 years from August 25, 1948,¹⁶ contains the following provisions:

Article VIII

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that Party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions of agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

APPENDIX 3—AMERICAN TREATY ON PACIFIC SETTLEMENT: “PACT OF BOGOTÁ”

Signed at Bogotá, April 30, 1948; in force May 6, 1949¹⁷

Chapter IV: Judicial Procedure

Article 31

In conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State,

¹⁶ Registered with the Secretariat Nov. 2, 1948; 19 United Nations Treaty Series, p. 51; registration no. 304.

Art. IX of the treaty provides that the parties “may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed to between them and the state so invited.”

¹⁷ 30 United Nations Treaty Series, p. 55; registration no. 449.

Ratifications have been deposited with the Pan American Union as follows: Costa Rica, May 6, 1949; Dominican Republic, Sept. 12, 1950; El Salvador, Sept. 11, 1950; Haiti, Mar. 28, 1951; Honduras, Feb. 7, 1950; Mexico, Nov. 23, 1948; Nicaragua, July 26, 1950.

the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory *ipso facto*, without the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them concerning:

- a) The interpretation of a treaty;
- b) Any question of international law;
- c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an international obligation;
- d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

Article 32

When the conciliation procedure previously established in the present Treaty or by agreement of the parties does not lead to a solution, and the said parties have not agreed upon an arbitral procedure, either of them shall be entitled to have recourse to the International Court of Justice in the manner prescribed in Article 40 of the Statute thereof. The Court shall have compulsory jurisdiction in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 1, of the said Statute.

Article 34

If the Court, for the reasons set forth in Articles 5, 6 and 7 of this Treaty [domestic jurisdiction, matters settled or governed by instruments in force April 30, 1948, exhaustion of local remedies], declares itself to be without jurisdiction to hear the controversy, such controversy shall be declared ended.

NOTE

This treaty, which comes into force for the parties “in the order in which they deposit their respective ratifications” with the Pan American Union, would make article 31 applicable between Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, which have not separately accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Argentina by an express reservation did not adhere to chapter IV.

The United States at signing made certain reservations. It did not “undertake as the complainant State to submit to the International Court of Justice any controversy which is not considered to be properly within the jurisdiction of the Court.” It noted that its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under the treaty “is limited by any jurisdictional or other limitations contained in any Declaration deposited by the United States under Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute of the Court, and in force at the time of the submission of any case.”

● *This compilation was assembled by Denys P. Myers, specialist in international organization, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.*

U.S. Delegation to International Meetings

Seventh Session Human Rights

On April 5, the Department of State announced that Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States representative on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, will attend the seventh session of the Commission, which is scheduled to convene at Geneva, on April 16, 1951. The other members of the United States delegation to the seventh session of the Commission are as follows:

Advisers

Herbert Beaser, Office of the General Counsel Federal Security Agency
John M. Cates, Jr., Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Frieda S. Miller, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor
Herzel Plaine, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Department of Justice
James Simsarian, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Marjorie Whiteman, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Special Assistant to United States Representative

Malvina Thompson, Assistant to Mrs. Roosevelt

The Commission on Human Rights will give priority at its seventh session to the revision of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights. In resolutions on the subject adopted at its 1950 session, the General Assembly of the United Nations requested, among other things, that: the list of rights in the first 18 articles of the Covenant be reexamined in order to insure the adequacy of that list and to define the rights and limitations with the greatest possible precision; the desirability be studied of including a special article on the application of the Covenant to federal states; provision be made for the inclusion in the Covenant of economic, social, and cultural rights, and an explicit recognition of the equality of men and women; consideration be given to provisions, to be inserted in the Covenant or in separate protocols, for the receipt and examination of petitions from individuals and organizations on alleged Covenant violations; and an article be included in the Covenant to make its terms applicable equally to a signatory metropolitan state and to all territories, be they non-self-governing, trust, or colonial, which are being administered or governed by such a state. The Commission was also asked in a General Assembly resolution to study and prepare recommendations on ways and means of insuring the right of peoples and nations to self-determination.

Other subjects on the provisional agenda of the next session of the Commission include (1) the development of the work of the United Nations for wider observance and respect for human rights

and fundamental freedoms throughout the world, (2) annual reports on human rights, (3) the Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Child, (4) an International Court of Human Rights, (5) the continuing validity of minorities treaties and declarations, and (6) the *Yearbook* on Human Rights.

The Commission on Human Rights, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, advises and assists the Council on all matters relating to the obligation assumed by the members of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Eighteen Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its sixth session was held at Lake Success from March 27-May 19 1950.

Plight of Survivors of Concentration Camps

U.N. doc. E/1974
Adopted Mar. 19, 1951

The Economic and Social Council,

TAKING NOTE of the report received from the Secretary-General in pursuance of Council resolution 305 (XI) adopted on 14 July 1950, on the subject of survivors of concentration camps who, under the Nazi regime, were the victims of so-called scientific experiments,

1. *Appeals* to the competent German authorities to consider making the fullest possible reparation for the injuries suffered, under the Nazi regime, by persons subjected to so-called scientific experiments in concentration camps;

2. *Invites* the International Refugee Organization and any authority which may succeed it in the administration of the Reparations Funds, and voluntary agencies distributing these funds, to alleviate the plight of these victims as far as possible;

3. *Invites* the World Health Organization to assist in the health aspects of the problem;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to study the possibility of securing such voluntary support and contributions as may appear necessary to supplement the reparation measures proposed above, if the latter prove inadequate; and

5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to keep informed of all the measures which may be taken, to seek to ensure that they provide full reparation, and to report to the thirteenth session of the Council on the results of the present resolution.

Forced Labor and Measures for Its Abolition

U.N. doc. E/1960
Adopted Mar. 19, 1951

The Economic and Social Council,

RECALLING its previous resolutions on the subject of forced labour and measures for its abolition,

CONSIDERING the replies furnished by Member States to

the communications addressed to them by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolutions 195 (VIII) and 237 (IX).

TAKING NOTE of the communications from the International Labour Organization setting forth the discussions on the question of forced labour at the 111th and 113th sessions of the Governing Body,

CONSIDERING the rules and principles laid down in International Labour Convention No. 29,

RECALLING the principles of the Charter relating to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

DEEPLY MOVED by the documents and evidence brought to its knowledge and revealing in law and in fact the existence in the world of systems of forced labour under which a large proportion of the populations of certain States are subjected to a penitentiary regime,

1. *Decides* to invite the International Labour Organization to co-operate with the Council in the earliest possible establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on forced labour of not more than five independent members, qualified by their competence and impartiality, to be appointed jointly by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Labour Office with the following terms of reference:

(a) To study the nature and extent of the problem raised by the existence in the world of systems of forced or "corrective" labour, which are employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views, and which are on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a given country, by examining the texts of laws and regulations and their application in the light of the principles referred to above, and, if the Committee thinks fit, by taking additional evidence into consideration;

(b) To report the results of its studies and progress thereon to the Council and to the Governing Body of the International Labour Office; and

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the Director-General to supply the professional and clerical assistance necessary to ensure the earliest initiation and effective discharge of the *ad hoc* committee's work.

Water Control and Utilization for Arid Areas

U.N. doc E/1945
Adopted Mar. 9, 1951

The Economic and Social Council,

CONSIDERING the desirability that measures being taken internationally in the general field of water control and utilization should be co-ordinated, and that such co-ordination should be undertaken within the United Nations system, and

CONSIDERING that the General Assembly, in resolution 402 (V), has recommended that the Secretary-General prepare for the examination of the Council at its fourteenth session a report on the practical measures adopted for the study of the problems of arid zones and on the technical and financial means employed by the specialized agencies for this purpose,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take into consideration, in preparing this report, the entire field of water control and utilization as it is related to the problems of arid zones; and

2. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to submit a report to the Council on the work being done by the specialized agencies and other international organizations, whether governmental, semi-governmental or non-governmental, engaged in the broad field of water control and utilization.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Letter dated 12 March 1951 from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General transmitting a report on the activities of the Special Committee provided for in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. S/2047, March 21, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 12 March 1951 from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General transmitting a report on decisions taken by the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. S/2048, March 21, 1951. 15 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 12 March 1951 from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General transmitting a report on the status of the operations of the Mixed Armistice Commissions. S/2049, March 21, 1951. 13 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

Plight of Survivors of Concentration Camps. Progress Report by the Secretary-General. E/1915, February 6, 1951. 50 pp. mimeo.

Recommendations Regarding the Agenda of the Twelfth Session of the Council. E/1919, February 17, 1951. 9 pp. mimeo.

Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance; Second Report of the Technical Assistance Committee (First Part). E/1920, February 17, 1951. 7 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 27 March 1951 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the Ninth Progress Report of the United Conciliation Commission for Palestine [A1793]. S/2057, March 27, 1951. 1 p. mimeo.

Methods of Social Welfare Administration. E/CN.5/224, October 25, 1950. 299 pp. printed, \$2.50.

Economic and Social Council; Eleventh Session, 3 July to 16 August 1950 (Geneva) and 12 October to 13 December 1950 (Lake Success). Disposition of Agenda Items. E/INF/40, January 2, 1951. 236 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Report [The Ewe Problem] by Mr. Paulin Baptiste, Procurator-General. T/S46, February 26, 1951. 28 pp. mimeo.

Department of Public Information Research Section

United Nations Headquarters. Background Paper No. 63. 44 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

[April 13-19, 1951]

General Assembly

Additional Measures Committee.—At a meeting on April 18, the subcommittee approved forwarding the following report to the Additional Measures Committee (AMC):

The Additional Measures Committee, at its second meeting of March 8, appointed this sub-committee to consider practical measures and to study priorities. The sub-committee has carefully considered these subjects. There have been numerous consultations and exchanges of views on the general approach which the AMC might use in its studies.

The sub-committee unanimously recommends that, when the Additional Measures Committee pursues the examination of additional measures against the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, it should give priority to the study of economic measures.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on Human Rights.—The 18-member Commission began its seventh session at Geneva on April 16, which will last approximately 6 weeks. The countries represented on the Commission are: Australia, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Guatemala, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sweden, Ukrainian, S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

At the first meeting, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States representative, who has been chairman since the inception of the Commission in 1946, announced that she would not seek reelection as she considered it desirable that no one person and no representative of one state—particularly one of the larger states—should continue too long to preside over international work of the type done by the Commission. She stated she would continue her deep interest in the Commission's work and would continue as the United States member of it. Several members praised Mrs. Roosevelt's work and her contribution to the cause of human rights both within the United Nations and in private life.

Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon) was nominated by Mrs. Roosevelt to succeed her as chairman. This motion was seconded and he was unanimously elected. The other officers elected were: Prof. Rene Cassin (France), first vice chairman; Mrs. Hansa Mehta (India) second vice chairman; and H. F. W. Whitlam (Australia) rapporteur.

As early as 1946, the Commission considered as its main task the formulation of an International Bill of Human Rights to be composed of three parts. The first of these is the Universal Declara-

tion of Human Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948. The second part will be a covenant on such specific rights as lend themselves to binding legal obligations. The third, which will set forth measures of implementation, will relate to machinery that might be set up by the United Nations to enforce the provisions of the covenant.

At this session, the Commission will give priority to the completion of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation. In this connection, it will give attention to the resolutions adopted by the fifth session of the General Assembly on December 4, 1950, and, at the twelfth session of the Economic and Social Council on February 23, 1951, which request: (1) that the list of rights in the first 18 articles of the covenant be reexamined to insure the adequacy of that list and to define the rights and limitations; (2) that study be given to the inclusion of a special article to apply the Covenant to federal states; (3) that provision be made to include in the covenant economic, social, and cultural rights and an explicit recognition of the equality of men and women; (4) that separate protocols or covenant provisions be considered for the receipt and study of petitions from individuals and organizations on alleged covenant violations; (5) that an article be included to make the terms of the covenant applicable to all signatory states and their territories, colonies, or dependencies. The Commission was also asked in a General Assembly resolution to study and recommend ways and means of insuring the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination.

Among the other subjects on the agenda are (1) the development of the work of the United Nations for wider observance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world; (2) annual reports on human rights; (3) draft declaration on the rights of the child; (4) old-age rights; (5) an international court of human rights; (6) the continuing validity of minorities treaties and declarations; and (7) the *Yearbook on Human Rights*.

At the end of its session, the Commission will adopt a report on its work to be submitted to the next session of the Economic and Social Council.

Security Council

The Council met on April 17 to consider again the Palestine question since the adoption of the resolution on November 17, 1950, which "expressed the hope that the governments and authorities con-

cerned would at an early date achieve agreement on final settlement of all questions outstanding between them."

In accordance with several communications received by the President of the Security Council from Faris El-Khoury Bey, chairman of the Syrian delegation to the United Nations and Ambassador Abba Eban, permanent delegate of Israel to the United Nations, regarding complaints of violations of the general armistice agreement the following items had been placed on the provisional agenda:

1. Violations of the armistice agreement. (Starting and continuing operations for draining the Huleh swamps within the demilitarized zone against the wishes of Syria, Arab landowners, and United Nations supervisors, thus violating, repeatedly the terms of the armistice agreement and defying the recommendation and advice of the United Nations supervisors.)

2. Military Occupation by Israel of demilitarized zones.

3. Firing on Syrian posts. (Firing of automatic weapons and mortars on Syrian military posts.)

4. Evacuation of Arab inhabitants. (Evacuation of the Arab inhabitants by force within the demilitarized zones.)

5. Bombing and demolishing incidents. (Bombing of Syrian military posts and demolishing of Arab villages on Syrian territory on April 5, 1951.)

6. Complaint of Syrian violation of general armistice agreement between Israel and Syria by persistent firing on civilian workers in the demilitarized zone in Israel territory near Banat Yakub on March 15, 1951, and between March 25 and 28, 1951.

7. Complaints of Syrian violation of general armistice agreement between Israel and Syria by the entry of Syrian armed forces into the demilitarized zone in Israel territory between El Hamma and Khirbeth Tewfig on April 3, 1951.

8. Complaint of Syrian violation of general armistice agreement between Israel and Syria by the action of Syrian armed forces in opening fire on Israel civilian policemen near El Hamma in Israel territory on April 4, 1951, killing seven Israel civilian policemen and wounding three.

Prior to adoption of the agenda, the President stated "there is no *prima facie* value in any item appearing on the provisional agenda. The items are intended only to identify the subject matter." He also called attention to press reports received from the United Nations public information officer with the Palestine Conciliation Commission, Jerusalem, that both Syria and Israel had agreed, April 16 and 12, respectively, on the following four points as a basis for resumption of normal meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission: "(1) All military and para-military forces of both sides to be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone.

(2) No further fighting within the zone or across demarcation lines. (3) United Nations observers to be afforded every facility for carrying out their duties. (4) The responsibility of the Mixed Armistice Commission Chairman to implement Article 5 of the Armistice Agreement, on the resumption of normal life in the zone, to be reaffirmed."

Mr. El-Khoury stated that Israel had ignored Syria's protests and the warnings of the Mixed Armistice Commission and had entered the militarized zone to begin large-scale drainage works. He cited a series of requests from the Mixed Armistice Commission Chairman to the Israelis to suspend the drainage work, pending an inquiry. Such requests were ignored while Israel moved in armed forces and began mass deportations of Arab inhabitants in the demilitarized zone. As for the legal issues, he declared there was no law of expropriation for the demilitarized zone. Furthermore, the mass deportations of the Arab inhabitants was in open contravention of international law and justice.

The zone was not Israeli territory, nor did either party have sovereignty there. The draining of the Huleh swamp, in itself, was a useful project, Mr. El-Khoury admitted, but his Government opposed the drainage for a variety of reasons, as explained. He stated further that Syrian forces had never fired on United Nations observers as Israel alleged, and the observers themselves had never made such a complaint. In conclusion, he said, it was obvious that the Syrian Government could not remain unconcerned regarding the Huleh drainage project. In addition, the bombing of Syria by the Israeli Government had to be considered an international crime condemned by the Charter and international law.

In a brief reply, Mr. Eban stated that the Israeli complaints had been submitted for two reasons: the circumstances showed a clear breach of the peace by Syrian armed violence; also, the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) had been in a state of paralysis and inertia at the time the complaints were filed because of the relationship among its members. He referred to the agreement reached on April 12 between Col. Bennett L. de Ridder, Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and Israel, and stated, now that the MAC had been reconstituted, it was the proper place for discussion. There could be recourse to the Council from the Mixed Armistice Commission, if needed.

Ambassador Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.), the only other member to speak at this meeting, believed the Council should do its best to establish the facts. For that purpose, it would be advisable to hear evidence from Maj. Gen. W. Riley, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

The President agreed with this suggestion and stated he would invite General Riley to attend the next meeting of the Council.

Threat of Famine in India Immediate

Statement by Secretary Acheson¹

I shall not impose on the patience of this Committee by repeating the statement in support of food assistance to India which I made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 20.² I should like, however, to make one or two comments to bring that statement up to date.

I discussed with the House Committee the question of the acquisition by India of food grains which might be available in Pakistan. I was hopeful at the time that India and Pakistan would answer this question themselves. They have done so. On February 25, the two countries signed a trade agreement which provides, among other things, for the delivery to India in 1951 of 300,000 tons of Pakistan rice and 25,000 tons of wheat and flour. This acquisition will be included in India's 1951 purchase program of some 4 million tons of food grains and does not affect the need for the additional 2 million tons specially requested from the United States.

I urged before the Foreign Affairs Committee that the grain specially requested from this country should begin to move no later than April 1. The studies of the executive branch of the Government had led us to believe that the Indian food situation would become dangerously critical by midsummer. Events since January 20 have shown that our estimate was overly optimistic. The Indian Government is already finding it exceedingly difficult to maintain the flow of grain to its ration outlets in such disaster-stricken areas as Bihar. The Indian people are becoming increasingly fearful of the threat of famine. The threat is immediate. The first million tons of grain specially requested from us, if it is to arrive in time, should be loaded on ships for India as soon as is humanly possible, and I strongly urge that the Congress enact the necessary legislation.

As the President said on March 29,

... we should provide the first million tons promptly as a grant. We can then explore in greater detail the situation with respect to the remaining million tons.

I am heartened by the fact that the bill before this Committee, S. 872, is sponsored by a bipartisan group of 30 Senators. I am sure that this Committee and the Senate as a whole are aware of the urgency of the Indian need and will act as quickly as possible.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Apr. 16, and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1951, p. 424.

Reorganization in Bureau of Economic Affairs

[Released to the press April 10]

To meet the new requirements in the field of international economic policy raised by this country's large-scale defense program, the Department of State today announced a reorganization in the Bureau of Economic Affairs.

Effective immediately, the Office of International Trade Policy is abolished.

There is established an Office of International Materials Policy and an Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy.

The Office of International Materials Policy will take over the functions, personnel, and equipment of the Petroleum Policy Staff, the Food and Agriculture Branch, and the Industrial Materials Branch of the Economic Resources and Security Staff.

It will be the purpose of the Office of International Materials Policy, in cooperation with other agencies of the Government; (1) to develop programs and policies which will insure the harmonization of domestic and foreign emergency economic controls designed to stimulate the production of basic materials in short supply; (2) to assure the widest degree of parallel action in the adoption of conservation measures; (3) to provide for the continued export of goods essential to meet the minimum civilian requirements of other parts of the free world; (4) to assure the availability to the United States adequate supplies of basic materials, and (5) to promote the allocation where necessary of materials in short supply.

The Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy will take over the functions, personnel, and equipment of the Commercial Policy Staff, the International Business Practices Policy Staff, and the Economic Security Branch of the Economic Resources and Security Staff.

It will be the purpose of the Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy to promote the strength of the free world through economic ties to prevent inflation and to increase the flow of essential trade. The Office will cooperate with other Government agencies to consolidate and strengthen the framework of international cooperation in the field of trade policy and economic treaty relationships to develop greater political unity and to assure long-run economic stability on which a sustained defense program must rest. The Office also will have authority in the Department's jurisdiction over controls of exports to the Soviet bloc.

Principal Officers

The principal officers in the new units are as follows:

- a. Office of International Materials (OMP)
 - Winthrop G. Brown, acting director
 - John W. Evans, acting deputy director
 - Willis C. Armstrong, acting special assistant
 - Clarence W. Nichols, acting special assistant
 - (1) Petroleum Policy Staff (PED)
 - Edwin G. Moline, acting chief
 - (2) Manufactured Products Staff (MPS)
 - (3) Agricultural Products Staff (APS)
 - Francis A. Linville, acting chief
 - (4) Industrial Raw Materials Staff (IRM)
 - (5) Metals and Minerals Staff (MMS)
 - Harlan P. Bramble, acting chief
- b. Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy (EDT)
 - John M. Leddy, acting director
 - Joseph D. Coppock, acting adviser
 - (1) Economic Defense Staff (EDS)
 - (2) Commercial Policy Staff (CP)
 - Carl D. Corse, acting chief
 - (3) Business Practices and Technology Staff (BPT)
 - Roger C. Dixon, acting chief

Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer Suspended

[Released to the press April 10]

Deputy Under Secretary Carlisle H. Humelsine announced today that he has ordered the suspension of Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer because of information received that the Department of the Navy had suspended her husband, Stephen Brunauer, under Navy Department loyalty and security procedures. Mrs. Brunauer's suspension was taken automatically pending the outcome of the Department of the Navy action concerning Mr. Brunauer. Mrs. Brunauer has been employed by the UNESCO relations staff of the Department of State as a liaison officer.

In announcing this action, Mr. Humelsine made it clear that Mrs. Brunauer's suspension results from action taken by the Navy in regard to her husband and not from any information which has been received concerning her.

Fifth Semiannual Report of Educational Exchange Issue

[Released to the press April 12]

A sharpening of the Department of State's Educational Exchange Program to fulfill the objectives of the Campaign of Truth is reported in the fifth semiannual report of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange.¹

The report, made public today following its submission to Congress, was presented by the Commission Chairman Harvie Branscomb, chancellor of Vanderbilt University. It contains an attach-

¹ H. Doc. 108, 82d Cong. 1st sess.

ment on the cultural penetration of northern Korea by Soviet Russia as an example of the need for shifting the emphasis in the operation of the exchange program in many parts of the world.

The report comments,

This provides a vivid illustration of a Soviet program to misguide and seduce a whole population for violent ends.

The Commission recommends increased activities in the international exchange of labor leaders—more scholarships at workers' education centers, more study tours of trade unionists, and special summer classes to study social problems in various countries.

The report further comments,

Communist propaganda is aimed at workers who constitute a large and important part of the world's population. The United States must combat this influence to win the workers' support.

Our task must be to depict the true status of workers in the U.S.S.R. and in Soviet satellite countries in contrast to the position of labor in the United States where workers have economic security, dignity, self-respect, and recognition without recourse to class warfare and dictatorship which the Communist doctrine holds to be necessary before workers can attain their rights.

The report notes that organized American labor has developed a technical assistance program through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU]. Among the many projects initiated by the ICFTU, the report notes, is the establishment of training schools in Asia to develop leaders for free trade unions.

Reviewing Soviet activities in North Korea, the report detailed widespread cultural penetration during the 5 years preceding the outbreak of hostilities. This included the enrollment of over 1,300,000 North Koreans in Soviet-oriented cultural societies, the translation and publication of over 500 Russian books, the organization of Russian-language courses, and thousands of lectures and concerts. Hundreds of intellectual, industrial, and political leaders were taken to Moscow for indoctrination.

The report said, in commenting on the expansion of the program:

While the Communist educational and cultural program in north Korea was exceptional in its intensity, similar efforts in other countries called for a re-thinking and re-direction of United States educational exchange objectives during the last year.

Major steps considered by the Commission were listed as (1) shaping the program to fit each country, and (2) sharpening the objectives of the program. Under the second point, the Commission cited the following three specific objectives to be carried out in collaboration with the international information program:

a. To keep alive the spirit of cooperation among the free nations of the world for the purpose of self-protection and progress for all.

b. To strengthen resistance to Communism in countries immediately threatened with infiltration or aggression.

c. To weaken the forces of Communism and diminish its power in areas now under the domination of the U.S.S.R.

The Commission noted a growth in the number of exchange grants from 450 in 1948 to an estimated 6,500 for 1951. With 30,000 foreign students now studying at a thousand American campuses, it was pointed out that the Government program is relatively small compared to the exchange activities carried out under private auspices.

In a summary appraisal, the Commission stated:

The expansion of the educational exchange program to many new countries, its rapid increase in volume, and its redirection to meet the challenge of Communist propaganda and subversion have placed heavy burdens upon the administrators of the program throughout this three-year period. The responsibilities have been particularly great this past year when, with the initiation of the President's Campaign of Truth, most of the expansion and change has taken place. It is the opinion of this Commission that, on the whole, the job has been well done.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Edward W. Barrett, has given the program vigorous and forward-looking leadership. Obviously, we cannot pass judgment on the capabilities of all the officers he has selected to carry on the work of the program here and overseas. The progress of the program, however, convinces us that he has brought together an excellent staff and, in our various contacts with the program officers here and overseas, we have noted their devotion and enthusiasm for their jobs.

Noting recent proposals to remove the information and educational exchange program from the Department of State, the majority of the Commission expressed its belief that the educational exchange program should remain in the Department of State.

The membership of the Commission, in addition to Dr. Branscomb, includes:

Vice Chairman—Mark Starr, educational director of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union
Harold Willis Dodds, president, Princeton University
Edwin B. Fred, president, University of Wisconsin
Martin R. P. McGuire, professor, Catholic University

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Passport Visa Fees. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1990. Pub. 3709. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Greece—
Effected by exchange of notes dated at Athens March 4 and July 22, 1949; entered into force July 22, 1949.

Some Facts About the Foreign Service, April 1, 1950. Department and Foreign Service Series, 16. Pub. 3789. 70 pp. 20¢.

A short account of its organization and duties together with pertinent laws and regulations.

Termination of Reciprocal Trade Agreement of May 18, 1936. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2983. Pub. 3916. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Finland—
Signed at Helsinki January 18, 1950; entered into force January 18, 1950.

Vocational Industrial Education. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2115. Pub. 4018. 25 pp. 10¢.

Agreements between the United States and Brazil extending and amending agreement of January 3, 1946—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Rio de Janeiro August 23 and September 29, 1949; entered into force October 4, 1949, operative retroactively from June 30, 1948 and Exchange of notes signed at Rio de Janeiro July 23 and October 21 and 27, 1948; entered into force October 30, 1948, operative retroactively from June 30, 1948.

Economic Cooperation With Burma. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2128. Pub. 4022. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Burma—
Signed at Rangoon September 13, 1950; entered into force October 10, 1950, and Exchange of notes—
Signed at Rangoon September 13, 1950.

Claims. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2129. Pub. 4027. 10 pp. 5¢.

Convention between the United States and Panama—
Signed at Panamá January 26, 1950; entered into force October 11, 1950.

Finance: Expenditures by Forces Under Command of the Commanding General Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2135. Pub. 4038. 12 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Korea superseding agreement of July 6, 1950—Signed at Taegu July 28, 1950; entered into force July 28, 1950 and Exchange of notes—Signed September 3 and 5, 1950.

The "Point Four" Program. Economic Cooperation Series 25. Pub. 4042. 10 pp. Free.

Progress report No. 5. The fifth in a series of progress reports on the Point Four Program designed to provide background information in summary form on developments in the President's program for world economic progress through cooperative technical assistance.

Passport Visas. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2137. Pub. 4043. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—
Effected by exchange of notes signed at Santiago August 29, 1950; entered into force September 1, 1950.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2138. Pub. 4044. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ceylon—
Signed at Colombo November 7, 1950; entered into force November 7, 1950.

Air Transport Services. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2131. Pub. 4047. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain amending agreement of December 2, 1944.

Air Transport Services. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2132. Pub. 4048. 3 pp. 5¢

Agreement between the United States and Spain amending agreement of December 2, 1944 as amended—Effected by exchange of *notes verbales* dated at Madrid February 21, and March 12, 1946; entered into force March 12, 1946.

Passport Visas: United States Citizens Visiting Southern Rhodesia; British Subjects Residents of Southern Rhodesia Visiting the United States. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2141. Pub. 4055. 2 pp. 5¢.

Arrangement between the United States and the United Kingdom—Effected by exchange of notes dated at Washington August 26 and September 13, 1950; entered into force September 13, 1950.

Germany: Retention in Germany or Removal as Reparations of German Industrial Plants. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2142. Pub. 4056. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom and France—Signed at London March 31, 1949; entered into force April 8, 1949.

Aviation: Flights of Military Aircraft. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2143. Pub. 4057. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Ciudad Trujillo August 11, 1950; entered into force August 11, 1950.

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Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Belgrade November 20 and 21, 1950; entered into force November 21, 1950.

Emergency Food Assistance: Publicity for Distribution Program. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2146. Pub. 4060. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Belgrade November 17 and 21, 1950; entered into force November 21, 1950.

Passport Visa Fees. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2144. Pub. 4061. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Greece—Effected by exchange of notes dated at Athens January 7 and 29, 1949; entered into force January 29, 1949.

Foreign Service List, January 1, 1951. Pub. 4069. 200 pp. 40¢ a copy. Subscription price, \$1.50 a year; \$2 foreign.

Includes the posts of assignment, consular districts, tariff of Foreign Service fees, index of persons, and geographic index.

Finance: Repayment of Funds Advanced to the National Defense Forces, Republic of the Philippines, by the United States Philippines-Ryukyus Command. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2151. Pub. 4070. 7 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Signed at Washington November 6, 1950; entered into force November 6, 1950.

Telling America's Story Abroad. International Information and Cultural Series 14. Pub. 4075. 28 pp. 15¢.

The State Department's Information and Educational Exchange Program.

Reorganization on the Department of State Implementing the Recommendations of the Hoover Commission. Department and Foreign Service Series 22. Pub. 4106. 6 pp. Free.

Reprint from BULLETIN of January 1, 1951.

Recent Soviet Pressures on Germany. European and British Commonwealth Series 18. Revised. Pub. 4123. 4 pp. Free.

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Unity of Purpose Urged for Security of North Atlantic Area. General Foreign Policy Series 42. Pub. 4129. 18 pp. Free.

Report of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to Members of Congress, February 1, 1951.

The Road Ahead in Collective Defense of Free Nations. General Foreign Policy Series 44. Pub. 4134. 5 pp. Free.

Excerpts from an address by Ambassador Warren R. Austin before the Association of American Colleges at Atlantic City, N.J., on January 9, 1951. Reprint from BULLETIN of January 29, 1951.

It Has Fallen to Us. General Foreign Policy Series 45. Pub. 4144. 8 pp. Free.

A letter from the Secretary of State on the meaning of Korea.

Laying Foundations for Peace in the Pacific. Far Eastern Series 39. Pub. 4148. 12 pp. Free.

Address by John Foster Dulles over the Columbia Broadcasting System network on March 1, 1951.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Instructions Issued to Foreign Service Posts on the Internal Security Act

[Released to the press April 14]

Following are the operating instructions sent to all American diplomatic and consular officers re the act of October 16, 1918, as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Clarification Act of March 28, 1951, pending the issuance of formal regulations.

1. The President approved on March 28, 1951 an Act of Congress (Public Law 14, 82d Congress) which requires a change in the interpretation of the provisions of the Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950.

2. Section 1 of the Act of March 28, 1951 reads:

That the Attorney General is hereby authorized and directed to provide by regulations that the terms "members of" and "affiliated with" where used in the Act of October 16, 1918, as amended, shall include only membership or affiliation which is or was voluntary, and shall not include membership or affiliation which is or was solely (a) when under sixteen years of age, (b) by operation of law, or (c) for purposes of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of living, and where necessary for such purposes.

3. The committee report in connection with the legislation contains the following statements:

The reason most frequently given for the denial of visas or the denial of admission appears to be the applicants' past membership of, or affiliation with, certain totalitarian youth, national labor, or professional, student, or similar organizations, or the alien's service in the German or Italian Armies, or his involuntary membership in totalitarian parties or their affiliates and auxiliaries, including those cases where it was shown that such membership or affiliation occurred by operation of law or edict, or for purposes of obtaining or preserving employment, food rations, or other essentials of living.

The bill makes clear the intent of Congress that aliens who are, or were, voluntary members of the Nazi, Fascist, or other totalitarian parties or organizations are to be excluded, but aliens who were involuntary members of Nazi, Fascist, or other totalitarian youth, national labor, student, or similar organizations, are not to be considered *ipso facto* as members of, or affiliated with, the Nazi, Fascist, or other totalitarian parties or organizations within the meaning of the act of October 16, 1918, as amended. Furthermore, aliens who served in the German, Italian or other armed forces are not to be considered *ipso facto* as members of, or affiliated with, the Nazi, Fascist, or other totalitarian parties or subsidiary organizations.

4. All cases of visa applicants in which adverse action was taken under the Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950, should be reviewed in the light of the Act of March 28, 1951. Visas may now be issued in such cases if they were previously withheld solely on one or more of the grounds which no longer exist, as provided in the Act of March 28, 1951.

5. Visas may now be granted in all bona fide nonimmigrant cases now pending before the Department, or the Department of Justice, for ninth proviso action which was deemed to be necessary under the Attorney General's construction of the law, but which now clearly do not fall within the intent of Congress as stated in the Act of March 28, 1951, and in all such cases arising henceforth. The Department should be promptly informed of any pending cases which are still considered to require ninth proviso action.

6. Immigration visas may be issued to aliens whose cases had been suspended solely upon the basis of former involuntary membership in the Nazi, Fascist, Falangist or Communist party or an affiliate, subsidiary, section, branch, or subdivision of those parties, and in all such cases arising henceforth.

7. The admission of aliens who are, or were, Nazis or Fascists at heart, or who advocate the Falangist system for the United States, is to be considered prejudicial to the interests of the United States within the meaning of the war-time visa regulations contained in Supplement D to the Foreign Service Regulations (22 CFR 53.1-53.41).

8. Aliens who are, or were, voluntary members of, or voluntarily affiliated with, the parties or organizations proscribed by the Act of October 16, 1918, as amended, are still excludable.

9. The principal parties proscribed by the Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950, are:

(a) Every Communist party in the world, which includes every party that has ever been a part of the world Communist movement directed from the U. S. S. R., regardless of the name by which it may be, or have been, known; the Nazi Party (N. S. D. A. P.) of Germany; the Fascist Party (P. N. F.) of Italy; and the Falange (F. E. T.) of Spain. The proscription of the statute also applies to any other party which is or was a "totalitarian dictatorship" as defined in Section 3 (15) of the Internal Security Act of 1950. No party other than those specifically designated has been so designated up to the present time.

(b) Every section, subsidiary, branch, or sub-division (which are to be regarded as synonymous terms) of such parties is also within the statutory proscription. Every direct predecessor or successor party or organization, having the same general ideological objectives or purposes, of such parties is also within the statutory proscription.

(c) Every "affiliate" (affiliated organization) of such parties is also within the statutory proscription. The term "affiliate" as here used means an organization substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by one of the parties within the statutory proscription, which is or was used or operated by such party primarily to help maintain its totalitarian control over the country, or to help disseminate its totalitarian economic and governmental doctrines or ideology.

(d) Considering the Nazi Party of Germany as an example, the (SS) Schutzstaffeln (Protective Squad—Elite Guard), the (SA) Sturmabteilung (Storm Detachment), the (NSKK) NS Kraftfahrerkorps (Motor Corps), the (NSFK) NS Fliegerkorps (Flying Corps), the (HJ) Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth), and the (BDM) Bund Deutscher (League of German Girls) may be regarded as sections, subsidiaries, branches, or subdivisions of the Party. The (DAF) Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front), the (NSV) NS Volkswohlfahrt (Peoples Welfare Service), and the (RAD) Reichsarbeitsdienst (Compulsory National Labor Service) were "affiliates" of the Party.

(e) Where used in this circular airgram, the term "proscribed party or organization" means all of the aforementioned Communist and other totalitarian parties, their sections, subsidiaries, branches and subdivisions, their direct predecessor and successor parties or organizations, and their "affiliates". Where "affiliates" are separately treated it is intended to cover only affiliated organizations which are or were not sections, subsidiaries, branches, or subdivisions of such proscribed parties.

10. (a) Service, whether voluntary or not, in the armed forces of any country shall not be regarded, of itself, as membership in, or affiliation with, any proscribed party or organization, and shall not, of itself, constitute a ground for exclusion. This, however, in no way affects the prohibition contained in Section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, against the issuance of a visa under that Act to any person who has voluntarily borne arms against the United States on the western front during World War II except that the construction of the word "voluntary" as used in this circular airgram shall be applied to the construction of the word "voluntarily" appearing in Section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, in relation to bearing arms, but only by other than German nationals.

(b) Voluntary service in a political capacity (such as a political commissar) with the armed forces of any country shall constitute affiliation with a proscribed party or organization.

11. Membership or affiliation, whether voluntary or not, which ended before an alien reached his

sixteenth birthday shall not constitute a ground for exclusion. If an alien continues or continued his membership or affiliation beyond his sixteenth birthday, the question whether his membership or affiliation after his sixteenth birthday is or was voluntary shall be determined as in the case of any other alien. In that connection, the facts relating to his activities only after his sixteenth birthday may be considered in determining whether the continuation of his membership or affiliation is or was voluntary.

12. Membership or affiliation solely by operation of law shall not constitute a ground for exclusion. This "operation of law" exception includes any case wherein the alien automatically becomes or became a member or affiliate of a proscribed party or organization by official act, proclamation, order or decree.

13. The term "voluntary" when used in relation to membership in, or affiliation with, a proscribed party or organization shall be construed to mean membership or affiliation which is or was knowingly created by the alien's act of joining or affiliating, upon his own volition, with such proscribed party or organization. It does not include:

(a) Membership or affiliation which is or was solely the result of duress or coercion;

(b) Membership or affiliation which is or was solely, and necessary, for the purpose of obtaining or keeping employment, food rations, housing, or other essentials of living, such as general education;

(c) Membership or affiliation in a non-proscribed party or organization, which membership or affiliation continues or continued after such party or organization becomes or became proscribed, or comes or came under the domination or control of a proscribed party or organization, provided that the alien establishes that he cannot or could not have terminated his membership or affiliation without suffering loss of employment, housing, food rations, or other essentials of living, such as general education. However, a person who terminates or terminated his membership or affiliation in a party or organization prior to the date it becomes or became proscribed, or comes or came under the domination or control of a proscribed party or organization, shall not be considered to be or to have been a member or affiliate of a proscribed party or organization;

(d) Membership in or affiliation with an "affiliate", where the alien establishes that at the time he voluntarily joined the "affiliate", it professed a purpose neither Communist nor totalitarian in character, provided the alien establishes that at the time of joining he did not know, and did not have reasonable means of ascertaining, that the "affiliate" had any purpose Communist or totalitarian in character, and that he continues or continued to have no knowledge of, and no reasonable means of ascertaining, the proscribed purpose of the "affiliate", up until the time his membership or affilia-

tion ceases or ceased, or that after he ascertains or ascertained the proscribed purpose of the "affiliate", he is or was not able to terminate his membership or affiliation without suffering loss of employment, housing, food rations, or other essentials of living, such as general education.

14. In all cases under paragraphs 12 and 13 above, the responsible consular officer must be satisfied that the alien did not, in whole or in part, join or remain a member or affiliate because of ideological conviction or belief in the doctrines of Communism or other form of totalitarianism, and that he has never intentionally been active in the promotion of such doctrines.

15. (a) Membership in, or direct (i. e., not through any intermediary "affiliate") affiliation with, any Communist Party, the Nazi Party, the Fascist Party, the Spanish Falange, or other totalitarian party, or any section, subsidiary, branch, or subdivision thereof, including the youth groups under any Communist Party (where the membership or affiliation is or was after the alien's sixteenth birthday)—as distinguished from an "affiliate" or youth group comprehended within (b), below—shall be considered prima facie to be or to have been voluntary, and the burden shall be on the alien to prove by clear and convincing evidence, which shall be made a matter of record in the case, that such membership or direct affiliation is or was involuntary.

(b) Membership in, or affiliation with, an "affiliate" of any Communist Party, the Nazi Party, the Fascist Party, the Spanish Falange, or other totalitarian party, or membership in, or affiliation with, the youth sections of the Nazi Party, the Fascist Party, the Spanish Falange, or other totalitarian party (where the membership or affiliation is or was after the alien's sixteenth birthday), except youth groups under any Communist party, shall be regarded as raising an inference that such membership or affiliation is or was voluntary, but this inference may be overcome by the alien's sworn statement that his membership or affiliation is or was involuntary, provided that, after appropriate security clearances, there is no evidence or reliable information to the contrary. If any such evidence or information to the contrary is obtained, the burden shall continue to be on such alien to establish by clear and convincing evidence, which shall be made a matter of record in the case, that his membership or affiliation is or was involuntary. Officers of the "affiliates" and youth sections referred to in this subsection shall be considered under (a) above.

16. Doubtful cases of immigrants and nonimmigrants should be submitted to the Department for advisory opinions. All cases of members or former members of the Communist Party or any of its sections, branches, subdivisions or subsidiaries as distinguished from nonofficer members of an affiliate thereof, shall be considered to be doubtful for this purpose.

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The Department of State

bulletin

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The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

MAY 14 1951

Our Far Eastern Policy

DEBATE, DECISION, AND ACTION

Address by Secretary Acheson¹

WE HAVE just emerged from a great debate upon one aspect of our foreign policy. I think it is a safe prediction to say that we are about to start upon another. The one just concluded dealt with the defense of the North Atlantic area, the part that we and our European allies would play in it, the need for mutual help and individual effort, the need for unity of command and for direction of effort. The debate brought out our primary purpose and object of maintaining peace and preventing war. It made plain that if peace were broken by aggression, the North Atlantic nations must be able to meet the attack successfully and without sacrificing the freedom of one of them in the initial shock.

The forthcoming debate will deal with the security of the Far East; with the interest that our country has and the part that it should play in maintaining that security; with the part that others can and should play; with the nature of the dangers to be faced and with the steps which are being taken and which should be taken to achieve the same two purposes—the prevention of war and the successful meeting of war should it be forced upon us.

Now the fact that our Far Eastern policy and our European policy have been separately debated should not lead us to make the fatal error of regarding these policies as being divorced from one another.

We are dealing with a global problem which does not correspond to the artificial divisions which sometimes claim our attention.

The present dramatic realities of the Korean conflict may blind us to the less obvious but no less critical realities of the Near Eastern and the Western portions of our global problems.

But if we do not allow this to happen, and if we discuss the problems of each area in the context of the whole, the debate can clarify issues and can help us get ahead.

It is not my purpose tonight to attempt a discourse on all Far Eastern problems in one speech. But it may be useful to make some observations which will indicate lines along which debate can be constructive and perhaps narrow the issues.

At the outset, we should remind ourselves and we should remind our friends abroad of the invaluable part which public debate of public issues has played in the life of our country since its earliest days. In our debates everyone is entitled to his say, and I may add that almost everyone avails himself of this right. It is good that this is so, because with us these periods of national discussion perform many useful purposes. They provide an opportunity for letting off steam, and the importance of letting off steam was known to the framers of our Constitution. They perform the function of public analysis of issues and arguments and public evaluation of the issues and arguments. They are a national "thinking aloud." They make up the national mind and they focus the national will.

Sometimes our friends abroad look with dismay on the divergence of views which are expressed. They fail to remember that out of this divergence, out of hard-fought discussions there comes a national agreement upon conclusions, conclusions produced by the innate common sense of the American people when they have heard all sides and come to the point of decision.

No one expects in these debates that all the statements made are going to be logical or that they are going to be based on proved facts or that they are going to be good tempered. In the heat of debate many things are said which would have been better left unsaid. But we expect this. We understand this. What is essential, if the debate is going to accomplish its important purpose, is

¹ Made before the Women's National Press Club at Washington on Apr. 18 and released to the press on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4201.

that we all try to make our contributions constructive and to keep them directed toward the issues as we see those issues. The greatest disservice that can be done to this institution of the national debate is consciously to confuse it, to obscure it, to frustrate it.

It is well to remember also that this debate will be conducted in the full hearing of that propaganda organization, the Cominform, which is making a ceaseless effort to confuse, to divide, to weaken people in our own and other countries; to divide us from our allies; and to weaken our collective strength.

Points of View on Foreign Policy

Now in the debate which is about to open, it is safe to say that three fairly distinguishable points of view will emerge. These all came out in the prior debate. Two are extreme points of view which are held by small numbers but are vociferously expressed, and sometimes they affect the thinking of the great majority.

One extreme point of view is held by impatient or discouraged people who believe that war is inevitable, that it is futile to attempt to prevent it, and that all our effort should be directed toward fighting it.

The other extreme view is also held by discouraged people who believe that there is no real strength in the non-Communist world except our own, and that we should limit our main effort to holding a defensive circle, and that the help we give to others should be limited to what will support our thrusts by sea and air against the enemy in the event of war.

Sometimes advocates of these respective points of view join forces, and then they recommend withdrawal from one area and involvement in another. But in the main these views are distinct and recognizable.

But the great body of opinion does not hold either of these views. It believes that war is not inevitable, that the great object of policy should be to prevent war, that to do this it is essential to build, as quickly as possible and as effectively as possible, the collective strength of ourselves and our allies. It believes that aggression is an evil which has to be met; that surrender to the threat of force is appeasement; that negotiation and peaceful settlement is not appeasement. Those who hold this point of view do not expect that difficult questions are susceptible of easy and painless answers. They want to be sure that the course chosen is sensible and is the best course among those open to us.

The real debate will occur within this section of American opinion. It will concern itself with knowing the facts, with appraising results, with evaluating the advantages and the risks of various courses and settling upon those courses which are best calculated to preserve peace, to prevent war,

to limit and to end the conflict in which we are now engaged. Above all, it will concern itself with those courses which will best protect the security of our country.

Now with these preliminary observations, we come to what in my judgment are the main questions on Far Eastern policy which will be affected by the coming debate.

Far Eastern Policy For Peace

Let us start with the great constructive tasks on which we have been engaged, the steps that we have been taking to move out of the period of war and to establish a new basis for a stable and constructive structure of peace in the Pacific.

These steps, essential to our security, are not within what seems to be that area of bitter disagreement which may be expected among us.

We are moving rapidly ahead to make a prompt and enduring peace with the Japanese and to join with them as well as with other nations in the Pacific in creating the essentials of security in that area.

We believe that, on these matters, we shall find a large, if not a complete, range of agreement and a minimum of divergence on basic points of view.

The outlines of a treaty of peace with Japan have already been discussed with their own leaders and with other governments concerned and have been made public. Ambassador John Foster Dulles reviewed these in some detail in his Los Angeles speech of March 31. May I put them as concisely as possible. The Japanese peace settlement which we have in mind has these basic elements:

The peace should be, as Mr. Dulles said, "a peace of reconciliation."

The peace should restore Japan as an equal in the world community.

The peace should afford Japan a chance to earn her own way in the world and to become self-sustaining.

The peace should encourage close cultural relations between Japan and the West.

The peace should enable Japan to obtain a reasonable degree of security.

We want this kind of peace because the great energy and abilities of the Japanese people can make a major contribution to the peace and well-being not only of the Pacific but of the entire world. We know that Japan can make this contribution only as a full and free member of the family of nations. We know that the Japanese themselves are anxious to assume their proper international role; that they are in a mood to reject militarism in all its aspects and to seek fellowship with peace-loving nations through collective security and the cooperative activity of the United Nations.

So far as our own country is concerned, these principles of policy have been worked out under

the direction and with the approval of the President. They have been fully discussed by Mr. Dulles with the Japanese and with other governments who are as ready as we to make an early peace. They reflect the views of General MacArthur and have had his full support. They have had detailed consideration in both Senate and House Committees and with the leadership of both of our political parties. I believe that our citizens at home and our friends abroad are entitled to reassurance from the fact that Mr. Dulles, with the strong support of the leaders of both political parties, left for Japan last week for the purpose of going ahead with our plans for a Japanese treaty as a determined national policy.

This afternoon the President announced another important forward step in the great constructive task of building security in the Pacific. This has to do with security arrangements which we already have or which we expect to have with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and with New Zealand.

The United States has been chiefly responsible for the security of Japan since the autumn of 1945, by reason of our role as the principal occupying power. Neither we nor the Japanese desire that a vacuum of power should suddenly be created by a peace settlement with an exposed and unarmed Japan, which would tempt the appetites and ambitions of any with aggressive designs. So it is anticipated that the United States and Japan will by mutual agreement arrange for the continued security of that country, whose safety is vital to both of us.

As for the Philippines, no one can be under the slightest misapprehension about our concern for the security of that nation. Existing agreements register our partnership and the practical means for giving effect to it. But apart from formal relations and formal agreements, the United States would not tolerate any aggression against the Philippines from any quarter. Our history, our mutual esteem, and our practical interests powerfully reinforce our agreements.

In the case of Australia and New Zealand, we recall with regard and affection our association in World War II. Without formal agreements, it has been clear that our fates have been joined. Discussion of a Japanese peace settlement has raised the desirability of saying more formally what had become an underlying fact. Hence our desire to proceed with more specific plans of this sort mentioned by the President.

These plans constitute a threat to no one. They are an expression of our desire to build another portion of the edifice of peace and will enlist the practical principles of self-help and mutual aid which were set forth in the Vandenberg Resolution. They will operate fully within the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

I call your attention to the President's use of the words "initial steps" in describing these plans. They are not a final answer to the organization of security in the Pacific. They will not interfere in any way with such broader agreements as the nations in that area may wish to develop—agreements which we have said would receive the sympathetic interest of the United States.

These prospective plans announced by the President today have had the fullest consideration and approval by the military and civilian departments of government and have had full discussion by appropriate committees of the Congress and by responsible leaders of both political parties. The President has announced our determination to push ahead with bringing these agreements, as well as a Japanese peace settlement, into effect as early as possible. And so nothing done or said in the great Far Eastern debate should hinder this effort, because it is central to the security of the Pacific and to the maintenance of peace in that part of the world.

Far Eastern Policy for Relief

There is a second great constructive effort of immense long-range practical importance which we have been making in the Pacific—again directed toward the purposes of security and peace. This is the work which we have been doing jointly with the nations of Asia to strengthen their newly found freedom and to achieve a measure of relief from the poverty and misery which have been their lot.

Here again there may be a little difference of opinion, but we hope not much. Some may wish to do more, some less—some may wish to do it differently. But these are minor questions. The important point is the basic policy—the unmistakable evidence of the friendship of the United States for these people of Asia, its unquestioned determination to help them in achieving their own purposes in their own way.

In some cases, our assistance takes the form of technical help. In others, we have added direct help with consumers' goods and capital plant. In others we have tried to meet a need for military assistance. Today we have Eca missions in the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and Formosa; we have military-assistance programs in the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, and Formosa. At this particular moment we are also much preoccupied with our effort to provide a substantial quantity of wheat for India as soon as possible to help that great nation get over the desperate food situation which now confronts it.

Time does not permit me to go on to discuss these programs which will shortly be laid before the Congress. They are a part of the battle for peace. They are building strength to maintain peace. They are an essential counterpart to our policy of stopping aggression.

Action Against Aggression in Korea

We now come to the third area in this field of debate. This will revolve around the action which we and other members of the United Nations have taken and are now taking to oppose the aggression in Korea and around what should be done in the future.

Now here again, I believe that the divergence of views will not be as great as might appear at first glance.

So far as what has been done is concerned, I believe that the great body of opinion in this country stands solidly behind the prompt and courageous action which was taken last June. I believe that our countrymen recognized then, and have increasingly come to understand, the aggression in Korea for what it truly was—war by satellite—the first step in a larger plan which, if not checked, would have engulfed all of Asia.

I do not think that there is likely to be much disagreement about the great accomplishments which that action has achieved in the months which followed. The aggressors have thrown into the battle a million and a quarter troops and a vast amount of resources. But they are no nearer to achieving their goal than they were when they started. That goal was a quick and easy conquest in their program of aggression.

The plan of aggression has been thrown badly out of gear. The immediate purposes of the aggression have been thwarted. Our country and the nations associated with it, which have the great preponderance of potential power in the world, have been awakened and stimulated to transform that potential power into power in being—and to do this on a scale never before undertaken in peacetime. This in itself will have a profound effect upon redressing the inequality of power which had arisen and which gravely threatened the peace of the world.

Furthermore, what we call collective security, which is the willingness of nations to fight side by side, if necessary, for the safety of any of them because their common safety is involved, has received a new vitality from this action in Korea which reaches far beyond the immediate problems of Korea.

And this isn't all. Not only the physical struggle in Korea, with the obvious evidence of the sources of its support and direction, but the exposures at Lake Success have torn the veil from the shabby pretense of aggression by satellite. If this device has not already run its course and lost its usefulness, it has become a most dangerous method for those who use it.

No, I do not believe that there will be much difference of opinion that what has been done was well and rightly done. The debate is likely to turn upon what is being done and upon what should be done to end the aggression.

Earlier in these remarks I suggested that the debate was likely to bring out three general points

of view. I think it is here that we shall see these emerge. Again it seems likely to me that the two extreme views will be held by small but articulate groups. The main discussion will center in the larger group.

One extreme view will be the impatient one, that the struggle in Korea can be ended only by widening the hostilities, with the attendant risks, and that any willingness to settle the problems of Korea by peaceful means is tantamount to appeasement.

Another extreme view is likely to be that the best thing to do is to pull out of Korea and abandon the effort. These views run counter to two purposes deeply held by the American people—to prevent the outbreak of world war and to prevent aggression which may lead to world war. They are not likely to hold the center of the discussion. That discussion, I believe, will seek what our people seek, and that is, the best course open to us among difficult courses—the best course which will end the aggression, which will prevent its extension into a world war, and which will best protect the security of our country. Every bit of light and help which the discussion can give toward reaching agreement on this course is good and necessary.

Propositions for Consideration

I shan't attempt to anticipate the discussion, but I offer some propositions in an effort to analyze the problem and forward the discussion of it. These propositions, I believe, stand out:

First: Peace can come to Korea if the aggressors cease their aggression. It is they who prolong the fighting. To end the fighting by giving the aggressor what he seeks would be appeasement in the true sense of that word.

Second: All the nations who are supporting the United Nations military action in Korea are and always have been desirous of solving the problems of Korea by peaceful means. They are not and never have been attempting to solve political problems by force. Their military object is to end the aggression and restore peace. Force was resorted to by the Communist aggressors.

Third: The aggressors continue to suffer heavy losses in the field. The Chinese people are being made to pay an additional price in hardships at home. Those responsible are their own rulers. This cannot be concealed, especially in China.

Fourth: The effective fight in Korea and the growing strength of the countries who are opposed to aggression are upsetting the calculations upon which the attack against Korea was based and upon which, no doubt, other reckless adventures had been planned.

Fifth: Under present circumstances, an extension of hostilities would not aid the United Nations troops in their mission. It would gravely imperil world peace. General Bradley discussed

the military aspects of this fight in his speech yesterday. His conclusion was, and I quote his words: "If at all possible, Korea should be settled on the present battleground."

Sixth: The responsibility for action which would result in extending hostilities and imperiling world peace rests squarely on the aggressors.

Seventh: The aggression in Korea can end by the aggressors' determining from bitter experience in the field and by the growing strength of the nations opposing them that the attempt has failed and is too dangerous to continue; or those responsible for it can deliberately choose to widen hostilities and risk a world war.

It will be clear to the world that if there is an extension of the conflict in Korea, or if a world conflict should result from it, the responsibility will rest squarely on the Kremlin and its agents in Peiping.

The American people will never choose this course. They will not fall into the trap of seeming to choose it.

It is plain that our common safety and our common hopes for the future depend on steadiness and cool heads and unflinching determination to hold a steadfast course in Korea.

Aggression cannot be allowed to succeed; it cannot be appeased, rewarded, or ignored. To meet it squarely is the price of peace.

Now, earlier I suggested that it is well for us to remember that our debates are not conducted in private but are followed in the greatest detail by people all over the world. In one way, this is a good thing. The fact that the process by which our foreign policy is made is open to observation for all the world should make it evident that we conceal no secret purposes and that our real intentions are better known and understood.

But it is well for us all to bear in mind that the vast Soviet propaganda machine is also listening in, ready to make use of what we say here to advance its own purposes.

It is useful, I think, to remind ourselves that the major purpose of Soviet strategy in regard to the United States appears to be to isolate us, to weaken the moral strength of our position, to break apart our ties with our allies, and to prevent us from moving together to build the strength upon which our safety depends.

A fundamental part of the Cominform strategy is to contrive, through political maneuver, to isolate the opponent and make it appear that *he* is the one who is committing the aggression.

Now this involves the use of a lot of upside-down language: they wage war, for instance, in the name of peace, and they acquire an empire in the name of anti-imperialism.

They hide their intentions in deceptive talk and when the nations ask, like Little Red Riding Hood, "What big armies you have!", they reply: "All the better to protect you with, from those aggressive capitalists."

Now, as preposterous as these deceptions appear to us, we cannot let ourselves lose sight of this constant effort on the part of the whole Soviet apparatus to tear down our moral position in the world, to create misunderstandings as to our motives and to magnify differences between ourselves and our allies, and to put us in the position of seeming to be against peace.

To frustrate this strategy is not only a matter for our Government, but is a matter for all of us. Our Government seeks to make our position clear before the world and to maintain with our allies the closest association which grows out of our common interests in peace and progress. But it is also the obligation of all of us who participate in these public discussions to speak responsibly and soberly in order that we may not unwittingly further the Soviet purpose of isolating us.

And there is another point which we need to take into account in thinking about the Soviet rulers.

We usually talk about the rulers of the Soviet Union as though they were always well informed, always cool-headed, always calculating.

But this may not always be the case. Soviet agents may report back what they think their superiors would like to hear. Soviet leaders may deceive not only their people but themselves by the very intensity of their propaganda. They may be blinded to actual conditions in the outside world by the rigidity of their theory.

And, what is even more dangerous, as men who are playing a desperate game of power and of fear, they are subject to being rattled.

This injects an element which we must also have in mind. It requires us to make our meaning and our peaceful purposes plain and to talk, to act seriously and deliberately.

I firmly believe that the program of action in the Far East which I have discussed with you tonight, together with the tremendous effort which is being made to build up strength in Europe and in other parts of the world, will overcome the obstacles created by Soviet policy and will carry us forward toward the kind of world in which we can live in peace.

But to steer a course through these tense and dangerous times requires, more than any other kind of strength, the strength of character of the American people.

New and heavy responsibilities have fallen to our nation in this century. We are a young country, but the responsibilities that go with tremendous power now rest in our hands. The people of the world look to us for cooperative leadership.

The act of leadership is shared by every citizen of this nation. To perform it in a way which will lift from our shoulders the threat of war and establish the conditions of peace will require the support of a steadfast, of a mature, and of a responsible public opinion.

This is the task before us in the days ahead.

Taking Stock of Inter-American Relations

*by Ambassador John C. Dreier
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There is a distinct value to the custom of designating a special day and week of the year for the holding of Pan American celebrations. I do not have in mind merely the opportunity which this occasion affords to engage in a little well-intentioned propaganda to increase the interest in and knowledge of inter-American affairs. This is indeed of real importance. However, I have in mind also the value on the occasion, which is afforded, to pause and take stock of inter-American relations at least once each year.

Like many other things that are an essential part of our life but that do not happen to occupy the center of the stage during this particular scene in the drama of history, it is easy to take inter-American relations for granted. This annual holding of Pan American celebrations gives us an opportunity to take stock of the facts of the case.

Due in large measure to the fact that inter-American relations are established on a pretty sound basis as the result of decades of experience, they do not basically change from year to year. Startling innovations or world-shaking crises, to which our jaded appetites have become accustomed in the world-wide scene, are not apt to originate in Latin America. Inter-American relations are, however, vitally affected by the constantly changing context of world affairs. Although Latin America is geographically somewhat remote from the main theaters of activity in world events today, it would be a mistake to assume that that area is effectively isolated. Regional isolation is no more possible for Latin America than it is for the United States. Inter-Americanism must, therefore, at any given time, be understood in the light of the world situation of which it is a part.

Conditions in other areas of the world have a powerful effect upon Latin America. Trade between Latin America and other areas, particu-

larly Europe, is of vital importance to both parties. Ideas, too, overcome the barriers of geography with sometimes alarming effectiveness. Latin America, therefore, can never be considered as effectively isolated against the spread of either good or bad ideas.

World Events and U.S.-Latin American Relations

However, the world situation also exerts a strong impact on Latin America through the influence which it has upon the policy of the United States. A brief look at history will indicate, for example, the powerful influence of world events on United States relations with Latin America.

When, in the early days of the nineteenth century, the young Republic of the United States of America felt itself vulnerable to aggressive European designs, we paid especial attention to the possibility of encouraging partners in independence among the Latin American colonies. When those colonies threw off the bonds of Spanish imperialism, the United States was quick to recognize their independence. Support of the political independence of the new world states found its culmination in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This doctrine—in the formulation of which a great New Englander, John Quincy Adams, played so important a role—constitutes a foundation stone upon which much of our foreign policy has been developed.

Again, in the 1930's, when the independence of the new world was threatened by the expansion of Nazi imperialism, a new era in inter-American relations developed. The good-neighbor policy, which was adopted by all the American Republics, reaped its harvest in the cooperation of these countries in World War II. One outstanding result of this cooperation was the development of two great inter-American treaties which now form the cornerstone of our Organization of American States. I refer to the Inter-American Treaty of

¹ An address made before the Pan American Society of Mass. and N. New England at Boston, Mass., on Apr. 18.

Reciprocal Assistance, which was signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948.

Because the intensity of interest on the part of the United States in Latin America has varied in the light of the world situation and its demands upon us, Latin Americans have sometimes criticized the United States. It has been said that we forget our friends when we no longer need them. I would say, however, that by and large the reports of this dearth of affection have been greatly exaggerated. If we take an historical perspective, it will be clear, I believe, that the net gain in the positive interest of the Government of the United States in Latin America has been great, particularly over the past two decades.

The change in the nature of United States interest in Latin America, moreover, has been unquestionably for the better. This, in turn, has been in some measure due to the changing role of the United States in the world at large.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States emerged from the Spanish-American War as a world power. There followed an era in which the United States at times assumed the role of a policeman in the Western Hemisphere.

Principles for Uniting Western Hemisphere

Today, as a result of experiences in the Western Hemisphere and during two world wars, our approach to international relations presents a great contrast. The United States now finds itself a leader in a system of collective security in which all states share the responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of law among nations. Committed to a policy of international cooperation under the United Nations, the United States has confirmed, in its world policy, principles which were first developed with the other American Republics for the Western Hemisphere.

It is worthwhile to pause for a moment and review some of these principles. They constitute the very essence of inter-Americanism.

First is the recognition of the sovereign equality of nations regardless of size and strength. All nations in our inter-American system are equal before the law.

Accordingly, we believe in the principle of non-intervention which means that the strong have no right to inflict their will upon the weak. The doctrine of nonintervention can be, and sometimes apparently is, pushed to an unrealistic extreme in inter-American debates. The validity of its fundamental thesis, however, cannot be questioned: the supremacy of law over the unsanctioned use of force.

Nonintervention requires for its effectiveness the establishment of an adequate system of law to which all nations can resort. When the United States felt impelled to appoint itself policeman

of the Caribbean 50 years ago, there appeared to be no effective alternative. Today, there is in the treaty of Rio de Janeiro and in the Charter of the Organization of American States an effective regional alternative whereby the community of American states assumes, within the framework of the United Nations, joint and common responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. A fundamental principle of our inter-American relations today is, therefore, the sharing of responsibility for the enforcement of law in order that peace and justice may be maintained.

Finally, we have in inter-American relations recognized the basic importance of cooperation in the constructive phase of our common interests. Mechanisms for the enforcement of peace and security among the American Republics are important. Also of great significance, however, has been the development of mechanisms of cooperation whereby our American nations can help each other tackle basic problems such as ignorance, disease, and economic backwardness. In this area, too, the sharing of responsibility is essential.

Although these ideas are not new, they are vital and creative ideas. They are deeply imbedded in our inter-American relations. They require continual reapplication in the light of the changing world picture.

Let us stop a moment to take a brief look at the situation in which we and our Latin American neighbors find ourselves today. Certainly, the dominating feature of the position of the United States in the world today is our struggle with Soviet communism. The issue is whether our independence and our way of life can be defended. The Soviet machine has demonstrated its readiness to use force to gain its will whenever that is deemed necessary. So we, in turn, have had to marshal resources of men and of things, both at home and abroad, in a gigantic defense effort.

What is the role and position of Latin America in this situation? On the one hand, does Latin America constitute an increased problem with respect to Soviet imperialism? On the other hand, what does Latin America represent in the way of a source of strength to the rest of the free world in this critical hour?

First, from the military or strategic viewpoint: In World War II, it was feared that an actual invasion of South America by Nazi forces might take place if the German and Italian armies were able to occupy the western coast of Africa. Today the danger of a large-scale military invasion of South America by any potential foe seems relatively small. In this one sense the geographical remoteness of Latin America is a real advantage.

However, our foe in the present world struggle does not rely upon the movement of military forces alone. The ground is first made ready by ideological penetration. To what extent, therefore, does Latin America offer a fertile field for that type of enemy invasion?

It would be impossible to give a categorical answer. It is possible, however, to point out certain factors which weigh on each side of this question.

On the one hand, the large majority of Latin American Governments have taken a firm stand against communism. By and large, the people of Latin America went through much the same process as people elsewhere during the postwar period. Communist movements grew immediately after the war. When, however, it became apparent that Communist Parties were actually serving as the weapons of a foreign power, opposing the national interests of independent countries, popular support of communism declined markedly. All but six countries have outlawed Communist Parties, and those six, like the United States, have chosen other means of combating the danger of subversion. Established institutions in Latin America are as a whole firmly opposed to Communist influence.

On the other hand, one must not overlook the fact that in many countries there are determined groups of Communist followers, some of whom have managed to work their way into positions of influence on public affairs all out of proportion to their numbers. Moreover, there exist in Latin America conditions which require correction in order to prevent the growth of communism. I refer to the poverty among the working people; to the problems of poor housing, ill health, undernourishment, and ignorance with which progressive forces in Latin America are wrestling. Unless democracy as we understand it can demonstrate its capacity to improve the lot of these millions, we cannot rest assured that an alien philosophy, however false may be its promises, will not spread. The translation of democratic principles into better conditions of life in Latin America remains a tremendous task of which those Governments are acutely conscious. We may well bear this fact in mind as we appraise inter-Americanism today.

There is, however, little doubt that Latin America constitutes a great reservoir of support for the rest of Western civilization. As our defense program gets under way, in order to develop both here and in other friendly countries a power capable of resisting further aggression, we become acutely aware of Latin America as an important source of raw materials. Copper, tin, petroleum, wool, hides, foodstuffs, and a host of other products are supplied in important measure by our good neighbors to the south. A few weeks ago, there arrived at Sparrow Point, near Baltimore, Maryland, the first shipment of iron ore from Venezuela, marking the beginning of what promises to be a significant new import trade for American industry.

Latin America therefore again looms as a major source of strategic materials needed in increasing amounts during the present world crisis by the United States and other friendly countries.

Political cooperation among the American Republics is also of great significance at this time. In the United Nations the 20 votes of Latin American countries have frequently exercised an important influence on the decisions of the General Assembly. The interests of these 20 countries in regard to economic and social affairs in the United Nations often differ from those of the United States. However, in the main political and security issues involving resistance to Soviet-inspired aggression, an identity of interest with the United States is apparent.

Thirdly, we come to the question of manpower and possible military assistance from Latin America. The other day, announcement was made of the fact that, for the first time in history, the population of Latin America appears to have exceeded that of the United States. Population experts tell us that this numerical superiority will grow. The manpower in Latin America, therefore, can have an increasingly important bearing on both economic and military affairs.

Although the financial burden of maintaining large armies has been beyond the capacity of most of the Latin American countries, the possibility of working out arrangements whereby the more than 150 million people of Latin America can assume a share of the military burden of defending the free world should be possible. The military responsibilities which Latin America might assume are particularly important with reference to the defense of the continent, its productive enterprises, and transportation routes in case of an attack on America. During World War II, approximately 75,000 United States troops were required for those purposes in the Latin American area.

The job of inter-American relations today is to make effective arrangements whereby the human and economic resources of all 21 Republics can be utilized better for two specific ends: First, to realize the potential strength of the American nations in the common effort to protect their peace and security; and, second, to overcome the weaknesses and deficiencies which the American Republics present today.

Collective Efforts Through the OAS

Fortunately, in the Organization of American States, we have the machinery through which we can formulate common policies and execute those measures which require a collective effort.

The Organization of American States recently took a major step in facing the world situation. At the request of the Government of the United States there was convened at Washington on March 26 a meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 21 American Republics. The statement issued by Secretary Acheson in requesting this meeting indicated its purpose. Secretary Acheson said,

The aggressive policy of international communism, carried out through its satellites, has brought about a situation in which the entire free world is threatened . . . The United States, having embarked on urgent mobilization for the common defense, wishes to consult its fellow members in the inter-American community with respect to the situation which we all face and on the coordination of the common effort required to meet it.

The Government of the United States, in accordance with established procedure, also proposed subjects for discussion at the meeting of consultation. The proposals of the United States were reviewed by the Council of the Organization of American States meeting in Washington, and all of the member governments had an opportunity to make suggestions regarding the agenda. The program which emerged from this procedure covered three main topics: Political and military cooperation; the problem of internal security of the American states against subversive activities; and third, emergency economic cooperation. The results of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, which came to a close on April 7, indicate the answer of inter-Americanism to the present world situation.

The interest in the meeting of Foreign Ministers throughout Latin America was intense. Twenty of the Foreign Ministers, including Secretary Acheson, attended in person, the other being represented by his Ambassador in Washington. Judging from news articles and editorials appearing in newspapers of Latin America, public opinion followed the discussion in Washington with constant interest.

Although differences in some areas of discussions appeared at first to be large, as the meeting got under way, the Foreign Ministers rapidly found a common ground in all subjects. In the final count, the 31 resolutions were approved with no contrary votes, only a few abstentions being recorded on relatively unimportant matters. The meeting ended with a very genuine feeling of satisfaction on all sides that the principles of cooperation and of inter-American solidarity had again demonstrated their ability to cope successfully with differences of national interest.

In the political and military field, the meeting of Foreign Ministers first made clear its general approach to the problems with which it dealt. Resolution No. I, called the Declaration of Washington, declared the firm determination of the American Republics to remain steadfastly united, both spiritually and materially, in the present emergency or in the face of any aggression or threat against any one of them. The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the faith of their countries in the principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States and expressed their conviction of the necessity for strong support of the action of the United Nations as the most effective means of maintaining the peace, security and well-being of the peoples of the world.

The Foreign Ministers gave specific endorsement to the resolution adopted by the General

Assembly of the United Nations last fall called *Uniting for Peace* and recommended that each American Republic should review its resources and give particular attention to the development of necessary armed forces which could promptly be made available for the defense of the hemisphere and for service as United Nations units.

On the question of continental defense with which it was more directly concerned, the meeting built upon the treaty of Rio de Janeiro. The Foreign Ministers recommended that the American Republics orient their military preparation in such a way as to give increased emphasis to the principle of collective defense. They instructed the Inter-American Defense Board to prepare, on this basis, the necessary military defense plans for review by the Governments.

In order to emphasize the peaceful purposes of their cooperation, the Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the obligations of their respective countries to settle disputes by peaceful means. They pointed out that the faithful observance by their countries of these commitments would make it possible for each of them to concentrate its defensive preparations upon tasks required for a collective system of common defense.

The subject of internal security against subversive activities posed a dual problem for the American Foreign Ministers. On the one hand, it was recognized that measures of control must be studied and prepared in order to prevent the abuse of freedom by individuals and groups working on behalf of the Soviet-controlled Communist movement. On the other hand, it must be made clear that democracy could not be made effective by police measures alone but that it required a revitalization of the faith of the American peoples in democracy and an assurance that controls were not directed against any political minorities other than those working in the service of an external power threatening the security of the Americas.

Under this item of the agenda, therefore, the Foreign Ministers adopted resolutions calling for a more effective exercise of representative democracy, social justice, and observance of the rights of men. They called for renewed efforts nationally and internationally not only to realize more effectively the political rights which we hold important but also to improve the social and economic conditions of life throughout the Americas.

In the sphere of controlling subversive activities themselves, the Foreign Ministers gave special attention to the need for each country to review its laws and regulations, with particular reference to the agents of international communism and their travel and communication across national boundaries. They also directed that a careful study be made by technical experts of possible means for more effective prevention of sabotage and other subversive acts. These studies will be made available to the individual Governments for their assistance in developing their respective systems of control.

The largest number of resolutions were submitted under the economic topics on the agenda. It was indicative of the spirit of cooperation and constructive effort displayed by the members of the meeting that the economic group worked until 3 o'clock one morning and until 6 o'clock another morning in order to complete its task by the scheduled date of adjournment.

Many of the issues discussed in the economic field arose from fears on the part of some of the other countries that their requirements and interests would be overlooked in the large-scale defense program which the United States and its other allies were undertaking. Some were concerned lest their efforts at economic development and the improvement of living standards be stranded for lack of materials from our defense economy. They sought some guaranty against unilateral action by the United States in matters which were of vital import to their economic welfare and even to their political stability. United States representatives, of course, urged that top priority be accorded to the requirements of the defense program and that production of strategic materials be expanded. By the constant exercise of good will, fairness, and mutual understanding, these problems were dealt with to the satisfaction of all parties.

The Foreign Ministers recommended that the American Republics should adopt measures for increasing the production and processing of basic and strategic materials required for the defense emergency and for the essential civilian needs and public services. They suggested certain arrangements to be agreed upon as needed by the various Governments to facilitate the achievement of this objective.

The Foreign Ministers resolved that the essential needs for the operation of civilian economic activities should be met and that, when shortages of goods required the adoption of a system of allocation, the principle of relative equality of sacrifice should apply. The imposition of controls should be coupled with an ample opportunity for consultative arrangements among interested Governments concerning the effect of allocations, priorities, and price controls on international trade.

In the area of price controls, the Foreign Ministers emphasized the necessity for controlling inflation and advocated an opportunity for intergovernmental discussion of price-control measures. They urged that price-control systems should apply equally to imports and exports, to the prices of raw materials as well as to those of manufactured products. With respect to policies governing price controls during the emergency period, they agreed that there should be taken into account the desirability of establishing in international commerce an equitable relationship between the price of raw materials and manufactured goods.

Considerable attention was given to the economic development of underdeveloped countries which the Ministers declared to be an essential factor in the total concept of hemisphere defense. They resolved that programs for economic development should be pursued with even greater vigor, giving special priority to projects which would contribute to defense purposes, or satisfy basic civilian requirements.

In summary, I would be inclined to point to the following main factors:

First, the meeting set forth basic policies in all of the most important areas of the problem which the present world situation poses for the inter-American system. These main policies are embodied in the final act containing more than 30 resolutions.¹

Second, the meeting proved the value of the procedure of consultation. So long as people in responsible positions of different Governments can deal only separately and at long distance with each other, they can gain only a limited understanding of the over-all problem in which each one plays but a single part. Questions are bound to be clarified when representatives of all Governments meet together for a frank discussion. The Foreign Ministers of the Americas may now feel that they have had a far greater opportunity to understand the situation facing their countries. This increasing measure of certainty is in itself an advantage.

Third, the meeting of consultation gave renewed faith in the principles of the inter-American system. At various times during the discussions, it was obvious that a force greater than the purely national interest of each country was at work. That force was the tradition of inter-American cooperation which led individual Governments to subordinate their national interests to the achievement of a common goal.

At the same time, it was clearly understood by all those attending the meeting that the adoption of resolutions was, as Secretary Acheson said in his closing remarks, not the end of the task but the beginning. The test of the meeting of Foreign Ministers and the system of inter-American cooperation which it typifies will be in the effectiveness with which the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers are carried out. This will require, of course, an even greater degree of good will, of determination, and of a sense of common purpose.

Much will depend also upon the degree to which, as time goes on, the peoples of the Americas increase their understanding of the world situation with which they are faced. On the part of the people of the United States, there is need for a greater comprehension of the problems and of the aspirations of the Latin American people. Living under a different set of circumstances, far less favored

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 606.

with the material benefits which we enjoy, the people of Latin America naturally view the future in somewhat different terms. They see as an overwhelming need the improvement of living conditions for their people. They aspire to a greater economic independence in the world, and, to this end, they seek greater industrialization.

In the face of their own pressing tasks, problems of Asia and Europe seem remote indeed to many Latin Americans. Yet, in order to fulfill their share in the cooperative enterprise on which they and we have embarked in the Organization of American States and the United Nations, Latin Americans must also gain a greater understanding of the problems which we in the United States face. They must appreciate the significance of American lives being sacrificed in foreign lands to keep the

Americas free. As their minds bridge the geographical distance between their shores and the areas where aggression is taking place against the free world, they will realize more clearly that no part of America—North, Central, or South—can live in cloistered separation from world events.

Progress toward this greater understanding was certainly made on both sides at the meeting of Foreign Ministers. It is now up to those who have the interests of inter-American cooperation at heart to see that this understanding grows among the peoples of all the American Republics. Inter-American cooperation requires at all times a genuine identity of interest among the peoples of our 21 Republics. And for inter-Americanism to live, it must continue to bear a living and conscious relationship to the world to which it is a part.

How Should the American Republics Face the Economic Problems of Today?

*Statement by Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

We are faced with a clear and present danger, and we have no choice except to build our defenses. This means simply that we must devote whatever energy and resources are required to the task of rearmament. Unhappily, once again we in the free world must look to our military strength to insure the preservation of our fundamental institutions.

But, building military strength is not our only goal. Even more basic is the objective that the civilization which we seek to preserve should become more and more responsive to the needs and aspirations of mankind. We must make ever more worthy that which we undertake to defend.

These are great and difficult tasks. No one of our countries alone can protect itself nor can it build its future by itself. We must put our energies, our abilities, and our economic resources into the common effort in order that each of us may continue to develop and grow in ways of life conforming to our ideals. The strength of the whole is much greater than the strength of its parts. We can meet the challenge if we meet it together.

In no area does the emergency raise as many difficult questions as in the economic field. The vast new military production effort necessitates many readjustments, and perhaps the most diffi-

cult part of our task lies in the working out of appropriate economic arrangements and policies both within and among our countries, and also with other countries of the free world.

The Questions Before Us

The specific questions we are called upon to deal with in this Committee can, I think, be summed up about as follows: What common steps are required for us to build up most rapidly and effectively our defensive military strength? How, while doing so, can we best meet the requirements of our civilian populations for goods and services? How can we maintain our economies on an even keel? How can we reconcile the requirements of the defense program with the aspirations of all our countries for improved standards of living and for further economic development?

These are the questions to which we must find the answers. They are more than questions. They are challenges. By accepting them as such, we will go a long way toward meeting them.

In thinking about these problems, I am sure that many of us are tempted to recall the experiences we all went through during World War II and to seek solutions from the history of the war years. The lessons of wartime can certainly be of use to us, but I am sure that we will be making a serious mistake if we try to apply them too closely to our present situation. For there is an important difference between the objectives we

¹ Made on Mar. 27 in Committee III of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States. The U.S. draft resolutions were printed in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 614; however, space did not permit including Mr. Thorp's statement in that issue.

now seek and the objectives we sought then, and there are marked changes between the world economic situation as it was then and the economic conditions which exist today.

I should like to discuss these points a bit further.

Our Objective

First, it is clearly not the objective of the free world to enter upon that full-scale economic mobilization which is necessary for the actual carrying on of war. It is true that this may be forced upon us if the Kremlin persists in a course of aggression. But our purpose now is to discourage the aggressor. Our purpose is to prevent war. We in the free world hope to do this by building around ourselves a military shield of sufficient toughness to deter aggression and to create behind that shield an expanding and dynamic economy which can serve both the purposes of peace and the purposes of war if war should be forced upon us.

This is a goal that is both easier and more difficult than we faced before. It is easier because it will not require that we devote as much of our total energies to military production as we did in wartime. It is more difficult because it depends upon maintaining in peacetime a resolute and unwavering determination that the defensive shield be forged quickly and that, once it is forged, it be kept strong over as many years as may be necessary, perhaps for an indefinite period.

Our Capacity

If the task be less today because it is not the task of full war mobilization, it is also easier because of our present economic potential. We in the free world have much greater economic capacity today than we had before the last war.

In the United States, the total output of the economy—that is, the gross national product—for the last quarter of 1950 ran at the rate of 300 billion dollars per year. We are achieving this output on the basis of an average work week of less than 42 hours. If we adjust this figure for changes in the price level, such an annual rate of the gross national product of the United States is about 60 percent greater than in 1940. The index of our industrial production is more than 70 percent above the 1940 average. Our civilian labor force has grown by more than 7,000,000 workers in the last 10 years, from 55,600,000 in 1940 to 63,000,000 in 1950. We are today producing, without substantial strain, somewhat more than we were producing, under the greatest strain, during the wartime years of peak production.

In the other American Republics, we also see great economic advances. In the last 10 years, it is estimated that the national income in various Latin American countries has increased by percentages ranging from 20 percent to more than

60 percent. Industrial output for the region as a whole has doubled in this period.

In Canada, our neighbor to the north, output has grown by almost one-third during the last decade, from 13.6 billion to 17.7 billion dollars, Canadian dollars, in current prices.

In Western Europe, economic recovery from the devastation of war is all but complete. Real output, even on a per capita basis, is substantially higher than it was at the beginning of World War II. By the end of 1950, the countries of Western Europe had increased the physical volume of their industrial production by 42 percent above the level achieved in 1938.

So that today, we in the free world can begin the hard and disagreeable, but necessary, task of rebuilding our military defenses with the knowledge that we start from a stronger economic base, with greater productive capacity, greater manpower, and enhanced skills to carry us forward.

In part, because we have a greater capacity to produce, we will need to devote less of it to build our defensive military shield than we spent for military purposes during World War II. Again turning to statistics for the United States, during the wartime years of peak production, 45 percent of our gross national product went for military purposes, whereas by the end of 1951 we expect that about 18 percent of our gross national product will go for the purpose of security. Assuming that we are successful in our objective of preventing war and barring a further serious deterioration in the international situation, the percentage of output going into military production is not likely to become greatly higher than this figure. In spite of the burden of armament production, the production for civilian consumption at home and abroad should, therefore, be at a substantially higher level than that of the wartime years. It must be recognized, however, that unless and until new capacity becomes available, certain segments of industry, where the impact of military production is felt most directly, will of necessity have to curtail their output for civilian consumption.

There are other differences between today's economic situation and that prevailing during the war period, which will necessarily affect our international economic relationships.

During the war, the countries of Latin America were almost wholly cut off from sources of supply in Western Europe. The continent of Europe after 1940 was in enemy hands. The export trade of the United Kingdom was drastically curtailed. The United States, which had supplied about one-third of Latin America's imports before the war, and Canada, became virtually the sole suppliers of the goods required to maintain the economies of the other American Republics.

Today, Western Europe has again become an important source for the industrial and other commodities making up the import trade of the

Latin American countries. In 1947, the export trade of the countries participating in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, excluding intra-European trade, amounted to only 75 percent of their exports during the prewar year 1938. During 1948, the prewar level was reached and, in 1949, was slightly exceeded. By the end of 1950, Western European exports had increased to 60 percent above the 1938 level.

Again, there is more shipping available today to carry the commerce of the free world and the trade routes are free of the submarine menace. During World War II, shipping space was the scarcest commodity on the market and, even when goods were available, they could not always be moved.

All of these are comforting comparisons to make. They are mainly useful because they help us to set our sights and steer our course with confidence.

The Task Ahead

The facts about our increased capacity do not mean that we can preserve our liberties without economic sacrifice. Our levels of consumption have greatly increased since the end of the war. Our civilian populations cannot continue to consume all they produce and still build tanks, planes, and guns. There is no way in which we in the free world can build our military defenses without economic pain. We must bear the costs as taxpayers and as consumers. All of us will have to do with less than we would like. But, if we are successful in deterring aggression and avoiding war, we will be substantially better off, even with these cuts, than we were during World War II. Many of our luxuries and some of our comforts and conveniences may have to go, but we should have more of the essentials which we need than we had before.

This, then, is not the mobilization for war of 1943-44. But neither is it "business as usual." It is a time for soberness and sacrifice, as well as a time for keeping our progressive goals steadily before us and alive in our minds. It is a time for sharpening our swords to defend our homes as we go about the task of making those homes better places to live in.

We can view the period ahead of us with confidence, if we also approach it with determination. We have the productive powers, the skills, and the economic resources. We must develop the economic programs and policies which are necessary to deploy our total resources so as to build our military defenses, sustain our essential civilian economic activities, and move forward as circumstances permit toward further economic growth and social progress. These policies and programs should be designed to encourage a greater output of basic materials and foods; provide for the effective and equitable international distribution of scarce goods in support of the defense effort and

of civilian economies; hold in check the inflationary pressures which threaten our economic stability; and press forward with programs of technical cooperation and economic development within the limitations imposed by the emergency.

Again, these are common tasks, to which all of us must make our full contribution, each according to his abilities and circumstances. A major purpose of this meeting of our Foreign Ministers must be to forge our wills to these ends and make known to the world our joint purpose and determination.

I should like to turn now to a number of specific economic problems which we face. These are all problems which have been in the minds of many of us for a long time. They have been discussed in international meetings and in single speeches. They have been discussed in aide-mémoires and in the communications of diplomats. Many of the things which I shall say have been said before by many of you or by your representatives. I have tried to approach these problems not from the point of view of a single country but as a consensus of the thinking, so far as I know it, of all the countries here represented.

Requirements and Supplies

First, I must speak about the problem of physical commodities—copper and cotton, coffee and automobiles, manganese and machine tools—the raw materials and the manufactured goods which are the lifeblood of any economy.

One of the most serious limiting factors affecting the ability of the free world to build its defenses and supply its civilian populations is the shortage of basic materials. The availability of materials, more than any other single thing, will determine how quickly we can strengthen our military defense and how well we can supply the manufactured goods, both durable and nondurable, upon which our civilian populations depend. All of us, I am sure, are aware of the recent spectacular increases in the prices of many of these materials which are so vitally important to the economies of all of us. No one is to blame for these price increases. They are simply the result which one gets when demand outruns supply. They are a measure of the fact of shortage. We, the Governments of the American Republics, and the Governments of other free world countries, will be at fault if we do not cooperate to bring this situation under control.

It is essential that we do our utmost to increase production. The American Republics are among the world's most important producers of the basic materials which supply the factories of the free world. It is appropriate, therefore, that they should take the lead in this effort. We are aware that the stimulation of production of basic materials for emergency purposes may encounter difficulties unless the producers of these materials can look forward to adequate and fair compensa-

tion for their efforts and can be assured of a market for their increased output over a reasonable period in the future. One approach which the Government of the United States is prepared to follow is to cooperate with the other American Republics in providing financial assistance, on reasonable terms, where such assistance is necessary to increase output needed in the common defense. It is also prepared, where necessary, to cooperate in the conclusion of medium or long-term undertakings for the purchase of basic materials at reasonable prices.

Unfortunately, it is clear that, despite efforts to increase production, there will still be shortages. At the manufacturing level, the immediate requirements of military production will necessitate the curtailment of civilian production. The curtailment may be severe in some particular items. None of us, during this period of building up our common defenses, will be able to have everything we want to satisfy the needs and desires of our civilian populations. It will often be necessary for our Governments to place limits on various forms of civilian production and consumption and, to a substantial degree, to direct and channel the flow of goods in international trade.

How, then, shall we go about determining the best way in which to share the limited supply of goods that is available?

Two points, I think, are clear. First, we must give highest priority to the requirements for military production in our common defense. Second, we must stand ready to meet the minimum requirements for the maintenance of essential civilian supply in our respective countries and in the free world. Military strength can be effective only if it is firmly and squarely based on strong and healthy economies.

Military production and essential civilian needs—these are the twin urgencies which must have a prior claim on our economic resources. With respect to less essential civilian requirements, each country should make its full contribution in reducing consumption, and the principle of relative equality of sacrifice among countries should prevail.

We must also take steps to see that we do not strengthen the hand of aggressors or potential aggressors by making available to them goods of strategic significance or by depriving the countries of the free world of the goods which they need.

Many of these matters, which I have been discussing, will appear in the form of individual actions by one country or another. But that is not enough. In the case of key commodities, we have already begun the development of international machinery through the establishment in Washington of the International Materials Conference. The International Materials Conference, consisting of a series of International Materials Committees and a Central Group, is designed to provide an organization through which all of the coun-

tries of the free world having an interest in certain commodities, whether as producer or consumer, can cooperate in bringing about a sensible distribution of materials in short supply, in stimulating their production, and in agreeing to reduce their consumption for nonessential or less essential purposes. The Organization of American States is a member of the permanent Central Group and, as such, plays an important role in its deliberations. The Governments of Brazil and of the United States are also members of the Central Group. Other Governments of the American Republics are represented on the several committees relating to specific commodities. Countries which are not members of particular committees will be afforded a full opportunity to present their views to the committees and will be kept informed as to the work of the committees as it proceeds.

The commodity problems of which I have been speaking are interrelated. Obviously, there will be situations in which some one country will be tempted to seek its own advantage at the expense of the common effort. However, cooperation cannot be turned on and off in accordance with short-run gain or loss. Our cooperation should be built solidly upon a continuing spirit of common purpose, common need, and common sacrifice. Our aim should be to conserve and develop the economic strength of all of us.

Control of Inflation

One of the greatest economic dangers we face is the threat of inflation. If we place unlimited and uncontrolled demands upon our economic resources, we shall multiply manifold the costs of our defense program and undermine our basic economic stability.

Here again cooperation and concerted action among the American Republics is called for. Each of us must be willing to adopt and enforce, both within our own countries and internationally, the stern measures which may be necessary if runaway inflationary tendencies are to be kept under control. For all of our countries, this will mean appropriate internal fiscal, credit and tax policies to reduce excessive requirements for goods of which there is no longer an abundance. For others of us, it will also mean some form of direct control over the prices of goods.

As you know, the United States has already adopted controls over prices, both for goods entering into international trade and for goods consumed domestically. Our price controls have been introduced at a time which, when compared with past periods, is highly favorable to countries which trade with the United States. In other words, the base period selected for the price control is one in which the prices of goods which the United States imports are high in relation to the prices of goods which the United States sells abroad. The index of unit values in the foreign trade of the United States (1936-38 equals 100) shows that, during

December 1950, the unit value of our imports stood at 276, whereas the unit value of our exports was 195. This is certainly a wide price differential.

The price controls which now exist over exports from the United States can be of substantial benefit to the other American Republics in the fight against inflation. But this benefit can easily be wasted and dissipated if parallel measures are not taken in the importing countries to prevent speculative price rises for these same commodities after they have left our shores. We see in this one illustration, therefore, an important opportunity for the American Republics to concert their efforts against inflation, so that the actions of each of them will supplement and reenforce the actions of the others.

Price controls necessarily have an impact on international trade flows, on income from goods produced and sold, and on competitive relationships. Certain basic principles seem to be the subject of general agreement. It should be the aim to manage such price controls as are adopted so as to achieve their central purpose of stabilization while stimulating the production and flow of goods into desirable channels. Price control systems should apply equally to raw materials and manufactured goods. If imposed on imports, they should also be extended to exports. They should not be designed to favor domestic producers or to discriminate against producers in other countries. These are principles by which we can be sure that price controls will be just and equitable in our international dealings with each other.

International Consultation

The emergency economic controls which we must adopt in defense of our liberties will, of course, give rise to many knotty problems and difficulties among our countries on which there will frequently be differences of view. The only true solvent for these problems is full and frank consultation among us. I am sure that the Government of the United States is no different from the other countries represented here when I say that we are prepared at all times to consult fully with each and all of the other American Republics in seeking the right answers to these problems in the light of our common purposes and our historical relationship of mutual friendship. The urgencies of the defense program and the large number of countries involved will not always permit international consultation to go forward before it becomes necessary for a particular government to impose emergency controls. Even in such cases, however, consultation can often lead to appropriate adjustments so that hardships can be lightened and inequities removed.

Economic Development and Technical Cooperation

These, then, are the emergency problems we face—how to increase the production of basic

materials and use them best in the common defense; how to go about the allocation of goods in short supply; how to avoid giving strength to aggressors and potential aggressors; how to keep down inflation and maintain our economic stability; and how to resolve the differences which may arise among us.

But what about the role of economic development during this emergency period? Do the urgencies of defense mean that we must forego all progress toward a better life—that we must shelve for the time being all our plans for improving our health, our education, our industrial and agricultural organizations, our working conditions, our standards of living?

The answer, I think, is clearly, "No." Economic development of the underdeveloped regions of the free world is not a luxury. It cannot be made a casualty of the defense program. Like our other free institutions, it is part and parcel of the way of life in the free world which we are determined to defend.

But neither can we, in this critical time, have all of the economic development that we would wish to have. Like the other aspects of our economic life, it too must be made subject to necessary limitations and priorities.

Let us, then, press forward with our programs of economic development and technical cooperation, advancing them as best we can, subject only to the higher priorities which we must give to the needs of military production and the essential requirements of our civilian economies. In this effort, we should give emphasis to those programs which will stimulate the production of food and of basic materials, raise nutritional standards, reduce the incidence of disease, and improve labor standards and working conditions.

There is, I think, one thing that all of us can do immediately which would stand both as a symbol and as a concrete demonstration of our intention to move forward in the field of economic development. I refer to the need for supporting the Technical Cooperation Program for 1951, which has already been approved by the Council of the Organization of American States. This program, even though of moderate proportions, is being held up for lack of national contributions from the various American Republics. I hope that all our Governments will find it possible to contribute their funds promptly so that this worthwhile program will not be delayed.

Draft Resolutions

In my remarks today, I have, I believe, touched on each of the main economic problems with which we have been called upon to deal. The United States delegation has prepared and distributed to the Conference a series of draft resolutions on these various points. These resolutions are the product of many consultations between my Government and other Governments here represented.

They also reflect much of the work and discussion which have gone into the excellent technical report prepared for us by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. In drawing up these resolutions, the United States delegation has sought to put forward a set of principles and policies which would reflect our common aspirations and meet our common problems. It is our hope, therefore, that they will facilitate the work of the Conference in expressing the agreement of all of us as to the economic policies which should guide us in the difficult, yet hopeful, years ahead.

Regulations Relating to the Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront Facilities in the Canal Zone¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Public Law 679, 81st Congress, 2d Session, approved August 9, 1950, which amended section 1, Title 11 of the act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 220 (50 U.S.C. 191), and as President of the United States, I hereby find that the security of the United States is endangered by reason of subversive activity, and I hereby prescribe the following regulations relating to the safeguarding against destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of similar nature, of vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities in the Canal Zone, and all territory and water in the Canal Zone, and the said regulations shall constitute Part 19, Title 35 of the Code of Federal Regulations; and all agencies and authorities of the Government of the United States shall, and all persons are urged to, support, conform to, and assist in the enforcement of these regulations and all supplemental regulations issued pursuant thereto:

DEFINITIONS

§ 19.1 *Governor.* "Governor" as used in this part, means the Governor of The Panama Canal.

§ 19.2 *Waterfront facility.* "Waterfront facility" as used in this part, means all piers, wharves, docks, Canal locks, and similar structures to which vessels may be secured, buildings on such structures or contiguous to them, and equipment and materials on such structures or in such buildings.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 19.5 *Enforcement.* The rules and regulations in this part shall be enforced by the Governor through such officers, employees, or agencies as he may designate.

§ 19.10 *Preventing access of persons, articles or things to vessels or waterfront facilities.* The Governor may prevent any person, article or thing from boarding or being taken on board any vessel or entering or being taken into any waterfront facility when he deems that the presence of such person, article or thing would be inimical to the purposes set forth in § 19.13.

§ 19.12 *Visitation and search.* The Governor may cause to be inspected and searched at any time any vessel or waterfront facility or any person, article or thing thereon, within the Canal Zone, may place guards upon any such vessel and waterfront facility and may remove therefrom any or all persons, articles or things

not specifically authorized by him to go or to remain thereon.

§ 19.13 *Possession and control of vessels.* The Governor may supervise and control the movement of any vessel and shall take full or partial possession or control of any vessel or any part thereof, within the Canal Zone whenever it appears to him that such action is necessary in order to secure such vessel from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility or waters of the Canal Zone, or to secure the observance of rights and obligations of the United States.

§ 19.16 *Assistance of other agencies.* The Governor may enlist the aid and cooperation of Federal and private agencies to assist in the enforcement of regulations issued pursuant to this part.

IDENTIFICATION AND EXCLUSION OF PERSONS FROM VESSELS AND WATERFRONT FACILITIES

§ 19.20 *Access to vessels and waterfront facilities.* Any person on board any vessel or any person seeking access to any vessel or any waterfront facility within the Canal Zone may be required to carry identification credentials issued by or otherwise satisfactory to the Governor. The Governor may define and designate those categories of vessels and areas of the waterfront wherein such credentials are required.

§ 19.22 *Identification credentials.* The identification credential to be used by the Governor shall be known as the Canal Zone Port Security Card, and the form of such credential, and the conditions and the manner of its issuance shall be as prescribed by the Governor. The Governor shall not issue a Canal Zone Port Security Card if he is satisfied that the character and habits of life of the applicant therefor are such as to authorize the belief that the presence of such individual on board a vessel or within a waterfront facility would be inimical to the security of the United States. The Governor shall revoke and require the surrender of a Canal Zone Port Security Card when he is no longer satisfied that the holder is entitled thereto. The Governor may recognize for the same purpose such other credentials as he may designate in lieu of the Canal Zone Port Security Card.

§ 19.24 *Appeals.* Persons who are refused employment or who are refused the issuance of documents or who are required to surrender such documents, under this part, shall have the right of appeal, and the Governor shall appoint a Board for acting on such appeals. Such Board shall, so far as practicable, include one member drawn from management, and one member drawn from labor. The Board shall consider each appeal brought before it and, in recommending final action to the Governor, shall insure the appellant all fairness consistent with the safeguarding of the national security.

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF EXPLOSIVES OR OTHER DANGEROUS CARGO

§ 19.26 *General supervision and control.* The Governor may supervise and control the transportation, handling, loading, discharging, stowage, or storage of explosives, inflammable or combustible liquids in bulk, or other dangerous articles or cargo covered by the regulations entitled "Regulations for the Transportation of Hazardous Cargoes in Canal Zone Waters" (35 CFR sections 4.106-4.127).

§ 19.28 *Approval of facility for dangerous cargo.* The Governor may designate waterfront facilities for the handling and storage of, and for vessel loading and discharging, explosives, inflammable or combustible liquids in bulk, or other dangerous articles or cargo covered by the regulations referred to in § 19.26, and may require the owners, operators, masters, and others concerned to secure permits for handling, storage, loading, and unloading from the Governor, conditioned upon the fulfillment of such requirements for the safeguarding of such waterfront facilities and vessels as the Governor may prescribe.

¹ Ex. Or. 10226, *Fed. Reg.* 2683.

§ 19.32 *Reporting of sabotage and subversive activity.* Evidence of sabotage or subversive activity involving or endangering any vessel, harbor, port, or waterfront facility shall be reported immediately to the Governor or his representatives.


§ 19.34 *Precautions against sabotage.* The master, owner, agent, or operator of a vessel or waterfront facility shall take all necessary precautions to protect the vessel, waterfront facility, and cargo from sabotage.

PENALTIES

§ 19.36 *Violations.* Section 2, Title II of the act of June 15, 1917, as amended, 50 U. S. C. 192, provides as follows:

If any owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge, or any member of the crew of any such vessel falls to comply with any regulation or rule issued or order given under the provisions of this title, or obstructs or interferes with the exercise of any power conferred by this title, the vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United States in the same manner as merchandise is forfeited for violation of the customs revenue laws; and the person guilty of such failure, obstruction, or interference shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may, in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than \$10,000.

(a) If any other person knowingly falls to comply with any regulation or rule issued or order given under the provisions of this title, or knowingly obstructs or interferes with the exercise of any power conferred by this title, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may, at the discretion of the court, be fined not more than \$10,000.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 23, 1951.

Strengthening Position of Free World in Pacific Ocean Area

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 18]

The United States is moving steadily forward in concert with other countries of the Pacific in its determination to make ever stronger the position of the free world in the Pacific Ocean area.

In connection with the reestablishment of peace with Japan, we are discussing with the Japanese Government the implementation of its expressed desire for a posttreaty security arrangement pursuant to which United States Armed Forces might on a provisional basis remain in and about Japan.

The United States maintains and expects to continue to maintain its Armed Forces in the Ryukyus, particularly at Okinawa.

In the Philippines, the United States is accorded certain military operating rights and facilities pursuant to an agreement with the Government

of the Philippines, and the whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.

The Governments of Australia and New Zealand, in connection with the reestablishment of peace with Japan, have suggested an arrangement between them and the United States, pursuant to articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter which would make clear that in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes; and which would establish consultation to strengthen security on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.

The possibilities of such an arrangement were fully explored by Mr. Dulles at Canberra, Australia, and Wellington, New Zealand, and have since been informally discussed with the appropriate subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

I have now asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Dulles, as my special representative in relation to the Japanese peace settlement and related matters, to pursue this matter further concurrently with the prosecution of the other negotiations necessary to bring the Japanese peace settlement to an early and satisfactory conclusion.

The series of arrangements and dispositions outlined above will strengthen the fabric of peace in the whole Pacific Ocean area, where security is strongly influenced by sea and air power. They constitute natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace in that area and also will contribute to the building of universal peace as sought by the United Nations and under which great goal the efforts of our nation are now being largely dedicated.

Progress on the Point 4 Program

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 18]

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Administrator of the Point 4 Program, has given me an informal report on the progress of the program to date. I am pleased with what he has told me.

The Point 4 Program is more necessary today than ever. The threat of Communist aggression compels the free world to build strong military defenses. But communism cannot be stopped by arms alone. One of its most dangerous weapons is its false appeal to people who are burdened with hunger, disease, poverty, and ignorance.

The Point 4 Program is part of the defense of the free world. It is the best answer to the false promises of communism. It offers the plain people of the world a way to do what they want most to do—improve their conditions of life by their own efforts.

The Point 4 Program is being welcomed in that spirit by the free countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Point 4 general agreements have been signed with 22 Governments. About 360 American technicians are at work on Point 4 projects in 28 countries. More than 240 technicians from 34 countries are being trained in the United States.

But this is only the beginning. Dr. Bennett tells me that, with relatively small appropriations, Point 4 can help some 50 countries with a population of almost a billion people double their food production in 5 to 10 years. Comparable advances can be made by these countries in public health and education, as well as in other aspects of economic development.

Mass Transmission of Drama “Darkness at Noon” Over VOA

[Released to the press April 17]

The Voice of America cleared its broadcast decks on April 14 for a mass transmission of an original 1-hour radio version of the prize-winning Broadway play, *Darkness at Noon*, the Department of State announced today.

The program was beamed to Europe and the Near East from 2 to 3 p.m., e. s. t., on 14 frequencies from the United States and relayed on five short-wave and one medium-wave frequencies from Munich, six short-wave frequencies from Tangier, five short-wave frequencies from England and one medium-wave frequency from Greece. Broadcasts ordinarily scheduled during that period in Serbo-Croat, Hungarian, Arabic, Bulgarian and Rumanian were canceled in order to utilize all available transmitting facilities for the antitotalitarian play.

The program was beamed to Latin America from 8 to 9 p.m., e.s.t., on 16 frequencies and to the Far East from 8 to 9 a.m., e.s.t., Sunday on six frequencies with relays on two frequencies from Honolulu and three short-wave and one medium-wave frequency from Manila. The program was also repeated twice Sunday from relay bases at Tangier, Munich, and Salonika.

The English radio version was adapted from the Sidney Kingsley play which recently won the New York Drama Critics Award. Claude Rains, star of the Broadway cast and other members of the cast, played their original roles in the Voice of America production.

The play was based on Arthur Koestler's novel on the 1937 Moscow purge trials and the radio condensation of the play was written by Gladys Conry of the Voice of America staff. Frank Papp directed the radio version and Vladimir Selinsky composed the original musical score.

Later the Voice of America plans to broadcast a score of foreign-language transmissions of *Darkness at Noon*, either in 1-hour or in a series of shorter versions.

U.S. and U.K. Discuss Mutual Interests in Iran

[Released to the press April 19]

The series of talks between the British Ambassador and the Department of State on mutual interests in Iran in the light of recent developments have been concluded, and the British officials who came to assist the Ambassador have returned to London.

The conversations were satisfactory to both Governments and comprised an informal exchange of views on matters pertaining to their broad policies in the area whose general objectives are similar. Among other matters, the Iranian oil question was discussed in general terms only since it was fully recognized that the problem must be worked out elsewhere by the parties directly concerned.

American National Ballet Theatre To Tour South America

The Department of State received word on April 20 that contracts have been signed at Paris for a 3-month tour of South America by the American National Ballet Theatre. Lucia Chase, founder and director of the Ballet Theatre, and Blevins Davis, president of the Ballet Theatre Foundation, have announced that negotiations for the tour were completed by Dante Vittani, noted South American impresario, and Anatole Heller, European manager of Ballet Theatre.

The company of 60 or more dancers and technicians will begin their tour on May 21 at Rio de Janeiro, officially opening the season at the Teatro Municipal Opera. After playing at Rio for 3 weeks, the Ballet Theatre will appear at São Paulo for another week. The option also calls for a 4-week stay at Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The Department of State is cooperating with Ballet Theatre in arrangements for its tour as a means of demonstrating American cultural achievements to other countries.

Conclusion of Torquay Tariff Conference

STATEMENT ISSUED BY PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS

[Released to the press April 21]

The signing of the final act at Torquay on April 21, 1951, marks the conclusion of the tariff negotiations which began on September 28, 1950.

The purpose of this release is to provide general guidance on the concluding stages of the Conference and the arrangements for giving effect to its results.

General Review of the Conference

The Torquay Conference has been the third of a series of international tariff conferences which have been held since the end of the Second World War. The first was held in Geneva in 1947, when 23 countries entered into tariff negotiations among themselves and drew up the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to put into effect the results of these negotiations and provide rules governing other aspects of their trade relations. The General Agreement—a multilateral trade agreement which comprises the schedules of tariff concessions and, *inter alia*, various provisions designed to protect the concessions against nullification or impairment—became operative in 1948. It was always intended that further countries which were prepared to enter into negotiations should be enabled to join the Agreement and so enjoy its benefits and should have the opportunity of acceding to it through negotiating concessions in their own tariffs. Thus, a second tariff conference on a smaller scale was held at Annecy, France, in 1949, which resulted in the accession of a further group of countries to the Agreement. The proposal to hold a third tariff conference was made in the summer of 1949; invitations to attend were extended in November 1949, and the offer by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Torquay as the site was accepted in March 1950. The Torquay negotiations followed the same pattern as these held at Geneva and Annecy,

except that, in addition to negotiations between contracting parties and the acceding Governments; there were also further negotiations between contracting parties themselves for additional concessions.

The technique of multilateral tariff bargaining through the holding of simultaneous bilateral negotiations between pairs of countries followed by the generalization of the resulting concessions which was put into practice at Geneva and Annecy was continued at Torquay. It has again been demonstrated that despite some growing difficulties, which are referred to below, this technique offers marked advantages over older methods of negotiating tariff reductions. A large number of negotiations has been completed, and a substantial list of concessions has been achieved which will be applied over a very extensive area of world trade before the end of 1951.

The scope and complexity of the Torquay Conference were enhanced by the fact that the negotiations were also related to the renewal of the firm validity of the concessions exchanged at Geneva and Annecy. The reductions and bindings in the rates of tariff duties which were negotiated in 1947 and 1949 had an assured life only to January 1, 1951. Thereafter, it was open to any contracting party to give notice, under article XXVIII of the General Agreement, of its intention to withdraw or modify any of the concessions which it had made in its tariff. If the Geneva and Annecy concessions had remained liable to widespread modification or withdrawal, the stability of world tariff levels—one of the main benefits afforded by the Agreement—would have been imperiled. To avoid this danger, it was decided that any renegotiation of the 1947 and 1949 concessions which countries felt obliged to undertake should be carried out at Torquay and that the assured life of the resulting schedules should be

extended for another 3 years. The life of the Geneva and Annecy concessions will be prolonged by an amendment included in the Torquay protocol and by the declaration on the continued application of the present schedules, which is described later in this release. This rebinding of the Geneva and Annecy concessions, added to the new concessions negotiated at Torquay, will give stability to tariff rates covering a very large part of world trade, until 1954. This element of stability insures a set of tariff schedules for some 38 countries all of which will be bound against increase for 3 years and is in effect a new factor in the picture of world commerce which has been introduced through the operation of the GATT.

The Torquay Conference has also provided for the accession of new Governments to the General Agreement. Through the signing of appropriate legal instruments—the decisions on the accession of the acceding Governments are described later in this release—a further group of countries will be enabled to adhere to the Agreement. Each of these countries will have agreed to reduce its tariffs through negotiations with the contracting parties and with each other, when a basis for such negotiations existed. To a large extent, their tariffs will be stabilized. When they have acceded, the countries adhering to the General Agreement will comprise a group whose trade accounts for over 80 percent of world imports and over 85 percent of world exports.

Against the background of achievement—the significant reductions and bindings of tariff duties resulting from the Torquay negotiations, the prolonging of the assured life of the whole body of tariff concessions for a further 3 years, and the expected accession of a group of important countries—some reference to the difficulties which have been encountered may be permitted. In the first place, many of the countries had to a large extent used up their bargaining power in 1947 and 1949 and were not in a position at Torquay to reduce their tariffs much further.

In the second place, with the steady increase in the volume of trade which has been liberalized from quotas during 1950—particularly in Europe—tariffs are reverting to their traditional role as instruments for protection for domestic industries and agriculture. Generally speaking, the significance of tariffs as instruments of national economic policy is increasing, and the difficulties encountered in lowering rates of duty are probably greater today than at any time since the end of the war.

Organization of the Negotiations

A Tariff Negotiations Committee (Chairman, L. D. Wilgress, Canada), representing all the participating Governments, was appointed as the managing body of the Conference. Day-to-day administrative coordination was undertaken by a smaller group, the Tariff Negotiations Working

Party (Chairman, H. van Blankenstein, Netherlands).

Governments Participating in Tariff Negotiations

The countries and territories which took part in the Torquay Tariff Conference as contracting parties¹ to the General Agreement were:

Australia	Haiti
Benelux Union	India
Brazil	Indonesia
Canada	Italy
Ceylon	New Zealand
Chile	Norway
Cuba	Pakistan
Czechoslovakia	South Africa
Denmark	Southern Rhodesia
Dominican Republic	Sweden
Finland*	United Kingdom
France	United States
Greece	

The countries which negotiated at Torquay with a view to acceding² to the Agreement were:

Austria	Peru
Federal Republic of Germany	Republic of the Philippines
many	Turkey
Korea	Uruguay

At the opening of the tariff negotiations, the delegation of Czechoslovakia stated that the participation of Western Germany was not in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Agreement under which Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit. They also denied that Western Germany had any legal capacity to become a contracting party.

The delegation of Czechoslovakia also stated that they did not recognize the Government of South Korea.

Legal Instruments Open for Signature

Today, the closing date of the Conference, four legal instruments were opened for signature at Torquay:

1. The final act, which authenticates the texts of the instruments described below.
2. Decisions on the accession of the acceding Governments.

There is a separate decision for each of the six acceding Governments. Under the terms of the GATT, a majority of two-thirds of the contracting parties is needed to take a decision to admit each acceding country. The six decisions will be opened for signature at Torquay and will later be deposited at the headquarters of the United Na-

¹ Four contracting parties did not undertake tariff negotiations at Torquay: Burma, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Syria. The Nationalist Government of the Republic of China notified its withdrawal from the General Agreement with effect from May 5, 1950; the Central Peoples Government of China has not yet defined its position in regard to the General Agreement.

² Uruguay also took part in the Annecy Conference but did not subsequently become a contracting party.

tions and will be open there for further signatures. (The seventh of the acceding Governments, namely Uruguay, negotiated initially at Annecy in 1949 and is expected to accede under the terms of the Annecy protocol.) The last day for signature of the decisions will be June 20, 1951.

3. The Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodies the results of the tariff negotiations undertaken at Torquay and the terms on which the new Governments will be able to accede. This will be open for signature by the participating Governments and will later be deposited at the headquarters of the United Nations and will be open there for further signatures. The results of the negotiations may be brought into force by the contracting parties and the acceding Governments (as and when they become contracting parties) at various dates between May and November 1951, depending on the dates of their signatures or notifications regarding article XXVIII negotiations. October 20 will be the last day for signature of the Torquay protocol.

4. The declaration on the continued application of the present schedules, taken in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Torquay protocol, is the instrument through which the contracting parties will prolong the assured life of the Geneva and Annecy schedules, as modified in accordance with such renegotiations as were undertaken at Torquay, until January 1, 1954.

It is expected that, at Torquay, all delegations will sign the final act and most will also sign the declaration.

Announcement of Results; Publication of the Schedules

On May 9, 1951, the Governments which took part in the Torquay negotiations will be at liberty to announce the results of their negotiations.³

On May 12, the schedules of tariff concessions as a whole and the text of the Torquay protocol will be published by the Secretariat at Geneva and will be placed on sale through United Nations sales agents.

Negotiations Completed

A. Countries participating in the negotiations and the number of bilateral negotiations completed by each:

Australia	6
Austria	23
Benelux Union	9
(Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg)	
Brazil	2
Canada	16
Ceylon	2

³An analysis, in detail, of the results of the negotiations on the part of the United States will be made public by the Department of State on May 9, 1951.

Chile	4
Czechoslovakia	7
Denmark	18
Dominican Republic	3
Finland	5
France	17
Germany	23
Greece	4
Haiti	2
India	8
Indonesia	8
Italy	16
Korea	5
New Zealand	3
Norway	16
Pakistan	5
Peru	15
Philippines	16
Southern Rhodesia	4
Sweden	16
Turkey	20
Union of South Africa	10
United Kingdom	9
United States	17
Uruguay	4

B. Bilateral negotiations which each participating contracting party completed with other contracting parties:

Australia	Denmark, Sweden
Benelux Union	Denmark, Italy, South Africa, United States
Brazil	United States
Canada	Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Norway, Sweden, United States
Ceylon	South Africa
Czechoslovakia	Denmark, France, Indonesia
Denmark	Australia, Benelux Union, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Greece, India, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom, United States
Dominican Republic	Canada, France, United States
Finland	France, Norway, South Africa
France	Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Finland, Indonesia, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States
Greece	Denmark
Haiti	Canada, Norway
India	Canada, Denmark, Indonesia
Indonesia	Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Sweden, United States
Italy	Benelux Union, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, United States, Uruguay
Norway	Canada, Denmark, Finland, Haiti, Italy, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States
Pakistan	France, Italy
South Africa	Benelux Union, Ceylon, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden
Southern Rhodesia	France, Italy, Norway, Sweden
Sweden	Australia, Canada, France, Indonesia, Italy, Norway, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States
United Kingdom	Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden
United States	Benelux Union, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Indonesia, Italy, Norway, Sweden

C. Bilateral negotiations which contracting parties completed with acceding Governments:

Australia	Austria, Germany, Philippines, Turkey
Benelux Union	Austria, Germany, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
Brazil	Austria
Canada	Austria, Germany, Korea, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
Ceylon	Germany
Chile	Austria, Germany, Peru, Philippines
Czechoslovakia	Austria, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
Denmark	Austria, Germany, Korea, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
Finland	Austria, Germany
France	Austria, Germany, Korea, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
Greece	Austria, Germany, Turkey
India	Austria, Germany, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
Indonesia	Austria, Germany
Italy	Austria, Germany, Peru, Philippines, Turkey

New Zealand	Germany, Philippines, Turkey
Norway	Austria, Germany, Korea, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
Pakistan	Austria, Germany, Turkey
South Africa	Austria, Turkey
Sweden	Austria, Germany, Korea, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
United Kingdom	Austria, Germany, Peru, Philippines, Turkey
United States	Austria, Germany, Korea, Peru, Turkey

D. Bilateral negotiations completed among the acceding Governments:

Austria	Germany, Turkey
Germany	Austria, Philippines
Philippines	Germany
Turkey	Austria

NOTE: Bilateral negotiations completed by Uruguay with certain contracting parties and acceding Governments:

Uruguay	Italy, Germany, Peru, Turkey
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International Materials Conference

PROGRESS REPORT

[Released to the press by IMC April 8]

Supplemental to the announcements previously made by the International Materials Conference concerning the preliminary, organizational work done by its commodity committees, is the following report on the progress of the committees.

Questionnaires to be filled out by member and nonmember interested countries have been prepared and issued. Some of the committees have examined the available statistics in order to obtain a first estimate of the size of the anticipated deficit, and, at least for certain materials, preliminary discussions have been initiated on measures to be taken to meet the present situation.

Copper, Zinc and Lead Committee

The Copper, Zinc and Lead Committee has agreed upon the questionnaire to be used to secure requirements and production estimates for 1951 and 1952. Copies have been furnished to all members of the Committee for transmittal to their Governments, and letters to all nonmember Governments which have a significant interest either as producers or consumers were dispatched on March 28, requesting that they supply the data covered by the questionnaire. The questionnaire asks for import and export figures, as well as statements of restrictive controls in effect or contemplated and statements of the possibilities and

requirements for increasing production. Replies to the questionnaire are being requested by not later than April 23. The Committee hopes to have them assembled, tabulated and reviewed by early May.

The Committee met April 16 to complete a preliminary review of the 1951 estimate of requirements based upon information furnished by its members during the week of April 2. Such a preliminary review will indicate the probable size and nature of the anticipated deficit in supplies. However, no formal recommendation will be developed by the Committee until it has examined the replies to the questionnaire. The Committee is limiting its current analysis to primary metals but has agreed to examine requirements for semifabricated products later. It recognizes the importance of this aspect of the problem to the countries that import such products and the need to develop such methods for insuring equitable treatment to consuming countries as well as producing countries in the event of a deficit in supplies.

Sulphur Committee

The Sulphur Committee has discussed statements submitted by representatives regarding requirements and the steps taken or contemplated to expand production, conserve sulphur, and substitute other materials. A subcommittee is now in the process of preparing a first report to accompany preliminary tables of statistics. This

report will cover methods of expanding production of sulphur and sulphur-bearing materials, conservation of sulphur and substitution of sulphur, and controls regarding the utilization of sulphur. Also, the Committee is studying drafts of letters and questionnaires prepared by the subcommittee on statistics which call for statistical data and information relating to sulphur and sulphur-bearing materials from member and non-member countries.

Cotton and Cotton Linters Committee

This Committee recessed on March 15, pending the preparation of certain statistical tables required to assess the world situation and to permit the formulation of recommendations. Drafting of a cotton questionnaire designed to develop the information requested by the Committee was completed during the week of March 18. In the past week, forms have been processed for distribution to Governments. Preparation of forms for a linters questionnaire will follow promptly. The Committee has tentatively set June 11 as the date for reconvening.

Tungsten and Molybdenum Committee

The Tungsten and Molybdenum Committee has been occupied with the gathering of statistics of production and consumption. Questionnaires have been issued to member governments and certain nonmember governments, requesting them to furnish particulars both on production and consumption in past years and on the estimates for 1951 and 1952. When the full committee again meets, it will give consideration to information assembled by its subcommittee on statistics. It will consider the problem as a whole with special reference to the supply position of 1951.

Manganese, Nickel and Cobalt Committee

Subcommittees on statistics have compiled available data on production, movements, and consumption of manganese, nickel, and cobalt in the calendar years 1948, 1949, and 1950, also in 1938 for the first material, and 1943 for the latter ones. The subcommittees have drafted a letter to be sent to Governments indicating what additional information is desired from them concerning estimates for 1951 and 1952, and the measures taken or contemplated to increase production, restrict consumption and economize in the use of the materials. The full Committee met last Friday to adopt its permanent rules of procedure and examine the reports of the statistical subcommittees.

Wool Committee

The Wool Committee convened for the first time on April 2. The heads of the delegation have

met several times since to set up their order of business. A subcommittee on statistics is also meeting. This Committee has developed its work rapidly, largely due to the work which has already been done by other international conferences covering this field.

Pulp and Paper Committee

All replies to invitations sent out have not yet been received. Announcement as to the composition and date of initial meeting of this Committee will be announced in the very near future.

COMPOSITION OF MANGANESE, NICKEL AND COBALT COMMITTEE

BELGIUM (Representing **BENELUX**: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg)

Representative: Pierre Jaspas, Economic Counselor, Belgium Embassy

Alternates: Henri Wenmaekers, Attaché, Belgium Embassy

M. H. Moerel, Adviser, Netherlands Embassy

BRAZIL

Representative: João Baptista Pinheiro, Second Secretary, Brazilian Embassy

Alternate: Armino Branco Mendes Cadaxa, Second Secretary, Brazilian Embassy

CANADA

Representative: S. V. Allen, Special Assistant to Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa

Alternate: M. P. Carson, Assistant Commercial Secretary, Canadian Embassy

CUBA

Representative: Enrique Perez-Cisneros

Alternate: Ramón G. Osuna, Attaché, Cuban Embassy

FRANCE

Representative: René Samuel Lajeunesse, Mining Engineer, Paris

Alternates: Pierre Braye, Importation and Allocation Group for Tungsten, Molybdenum and Chrome, Corporation of Minerals and Metals, Paris

Jean-Yves Gautier, Electro-Chemical and Electro-Metallurgical Engineer, Paris

GERMANY

Representative: Rudolf Afflerbach, Representative, Ministry of Economics, Bonn

Alternate: Clemens Schueller, Representative, Ministry of Economics, Bonn

INDIA

Representative: H. A. Sujon, Director, Indian Supply Mission, Washington, D. C.

Alternate: M. B. Shankar, Deputy Director, Indian Supply Mission, Washington, D. C.

NORWAY

Representative: Thoralf Svendsen, Commercial Counselor, Norwegian Embassy

Alternate: Gunnar Kjolstad, Economic Counselor, Norwegian Embassy

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Representative: W. A. Horrocks, Commercial Secretary, South African Embassy

Alternate: J. H. Schutte, Assistant Commercial Secretary, South African Embassy

UNITED KINGDOM

Representative: V. P. Harries, Under Secretary, Ministry of Supply, London

Alternate: Dr. W. E. Berry, Principal, Ministry of Supply, London

UNITED STATES

Representative: John W. Evans, Chief, Economic and Resources Staff, Department of State

Alternate: Edwin J. Lintner, Chief, Additive-Alloys Branch, Munitions Board

COMPOSITION OF TUNGSTEN AND MOLYBDENUM COMMITTEE

AUSTRALIA

Representative: F. A. Meere, First Assistant Comptroller General, Department of Trade and Customs, Canberra

Alternate: Dr. H. G. Raggatt, Director, Bureau of Mineral Resources, Ministry of National Development, Melbourne

BOLIVIA

Representative: Juan Poñaranda

Alternate: Germán Rovira, Commercial Counselor, Bolivian Embassy

BRAZIL

Representative: Col. José Filho Kahl, Chief of Brazilian Aeronautical Commission, Washington, D. C.

Alternate: Lt. Col. Paulo E. da Camara Ortegá, Assistant Air Attaché, Brazilian Embassy

CHILE

Representative: Roberto Vergara, General Manager, Pacific Steel Company, Santiago

Alternate: Not yet designated.

FRANCE

Representative: René Samuel Lajeunesse, Mining Engineer, Paris

Alternates: Pierre Graye, Director, Importation and Allocation Group for Tungsten, Molybdenum and Chrome, Corporation of Minerals and Metals, Paris

Jean-Yves Gautier, Electro-Chemical and Electro-Metallurgical Engineer, Paris

GERMANY

Representative: Dr. Arno Ristow, Chief, Department for Ferro-Alloys, Ministry of Economics,

Alternate: Joachim Hoppe, Official, Ministry of Economics, Bonn

PORTUGAL

Representative: Antonio de Lucena, Second Secretary, Portuguese Embassy

Alternate: João Guimaraes dos Santos, Mining Engineer, Government of Portugal,

SPAIN

Representative: Juan Lizaur, Mining Engineer, Government of Spain, Madrid

Alternate: José Aragonés, Commercial Attaché, Government of Spain, Madrid

SWEDEN

Representative: Olaf Drakenberg, Managing Director, Swedish Ferro-Alloys, Inc., Stockholm

Alternates: Hubert de Besche, Economic Counselor, Swedish Embassy
Torsten Hylander
Stig Nyblad
C. H. von Platen

UNITED KINGDOM

Representative: V. P. Harries, Under Secretary, Ministry of Supply, London

Alternates: Dr. W. E. Berry, Principal, Ministry of Supply, London
H. O. Hooper
G. E. M. McDougall, Counselor, British Embassy

UNITED STATES

Representative: J. H. Critchett, Chief, Ferro-Alloys and Metals Section, Iron and Steel Division, Department of Commerce

Alternate: Robert Bridgman

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Population Commission (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on April 20 that Philip M. Hauser, United States representative on the Population Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) will attend the sixth session of the Commission, which will convene at Lake Success on April 23, 1951. Dr. Hauser is professor of sociology at the University of Chicago and was formerly deputy director and acting director of the Bureau of the Census. He will be assisted by the following advisers:

Dudley Kirk, Division of International and Functional Intelligence, Department of State
Conrad Taeuber, consultant, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce

Established in 1946, the Population Commission, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, advises the Council on all demographic matters falling within the purview of the United Nations. Twelve Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of this Commission. The last session of the Population Commission was held at Lake Success from May 22 to June 2, 1950.

Among the agenda items to be considered by the sixth session are studies of interrelationships of demographic, economic, and social factors in particular areas, demographic aspects of migration, and mortality and mortality rates; a revision of "Findings of studies on the interrelationships between population trends and economic and social factors"; problems related to the 1950 and 1951 censuses of population; demographic aspects of the problem of retired persons and the aged; regional seminars on population problems; analysis of vital, demographic, and migration statistics; and future work and priorities of the Commission.

South Pacific Commission, Seventh Session

On April 16, the Department of State announced that the seventh session of the South Pacific Commission will convene at Nouméa, New Caledonia, on April 28, 1951. The United States Government will be represented at the session by the following delegation:

Senior United States Commissioner

Dr. Felix M. Keesing, professor of anthropology, Stanford University, Calif.

United States Commissioner

Milton Shalleck, attorney, New York

Advisers

Robert R. Robbins, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State.

Claude G. Ross, American Consul, Nouméa

The major items on the provisional agenda for this session include implementation of the recommendations of the first South Pacific Conference held at Suva, Fiji Islands, from April 25 to May 5, 1950; review of projects undertaken in the 1949-1950 work program; appointments of secretary general and deputy secretary of the Commission and deputy chairman of the research council; information program and publications; and various other administrative and financial matters.

The South Pacific Commission is a consultative and advisory body to the member governments (Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) in matters affecting the economic and social development of the 15 non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific under the scope of the Commission. American Samoa is the one United States Pacific territory within the purview of the Commission. The biannual meetings of the Commission are provided for in the agreement establishing the Commission. The last session of the South Pacific Commission was held at Nouméa, New Caledonia, in October 1950.

The UNESCO Conference on the Improvement of Bibliographic Services

by Jesse H. Shera, U.S. Delegate

The UNESCO Conference on the Improvement of Bibliographic Services, held at Paris from November 7-10, 1950, represents the culmination of efforts begun as early as 1946 to develop coordination of international interest in the improvement of national and international bibliographical services. The problems of bibliographic organization have loomed importantly in UNESCO's program from its inception, and, even before the establishment of UNESCO, the views of those who were consulted regarding its activities insisted upon its responsibilities in this field. Beginning with the second session, in 1947, and annually since that time, the General Conference of UNESCO has instructed the Director General to conduct the necessary surveys and make other preliminary preparations for a conference such as this.

In fulfillment of these instructions, UNESCO entered into a 2-year contract with the Library of Congress for the preparation of a report on the present state of bibliographic services and the possibilities for their improvement. The results of

this study appeared in published form as the now well-known UNESCO and Library of Congress Bibliographical Survey, of which the first part, the general report, was prepared by Verner W. Clapp, Chief Assistant Librarian of Congress, and the second part, an historical appendix, was the work of Mrs. Katherine O. Murra, General Reference and Bibliography, Library of Congress.

This survey, which was designed to be the basis of the work of the present Conference, became available early in 1950 and was given careful study by working groups in some 40 countries. National reports, stimulated by the general survey, were prepared by these working groups and were submitted to UNESCO by the summer of 1950. Most of these reports were abstracted by the Secretariat and are now available as volume II of the UNESCO and Library of Congress Bibliographical Survey under the title *National Development and International Planning of Bibliographical Services*. In general, each of the national reports divides into three major sections: a more or less detailed

survey of existing bibliographic services; recommendations for the improvement of bibliographic services within the country for which the report is submitted; and proposals for the improvement of international bibliographic coordination.

The national report for the United States was prepared for the Committee on Bibliography of the American Library Association by Miss Margaret E. Egan, assistant professor of the graduate library school of the University of Chicago and the author. The report could not be prepared in time for inclusion in the second volume of the Bibliographical Survey but was presented to the Conference, and its full text will appear in the pages of *American Documentation*.

Thus, the Conference had, as a basis for its discussions, three important documents: (1) the basic survey prepared by Mr. Clapp and Mrs. Murra, (2) the series of national reports, and (3) a synthesis of the reports prepared as a working paper for the Conference by Mme. Denise Ravage of the staff of the UNESCO Secretariat. With this documentation before it, the Conference convened on November 7. Here were assembled 81 persons representing 31 countries, 16 international organizations concerned with bibliography, and 4 who were invited by UNESCO as independent experts. As chairman of the Committee on Bibliography of the American Library Association and as joint author of the *United States National Report*, the author was chosen as the United States delegate to this Conference. Mr. Clapp was also present as one of the four experts invited by the UNESCO Secretariat.

The proceedings began with an opening address by Jaime Torres Bodet, the Director General of UNESCO, who displayed a remarkable grasp of the relation of bibliographic organization to international intellectual cooperation and of the problems implicit in any effective program of action. Dr. L. Brummel, Director of the Royal Library at The Hague, was unanimously elected President of the Conference, and the group consumed the remainder of the first day in considering certain necessary problems of organization and other essential preliminary matters, including a working definition of bibliography (a term which, incidentally, it ultimately refused to define).

On the second and third days, the Conference divided into two more or less equal working groups, or committees: the one, under the chairmanship of Lionel McColvin, Librarian of the Westminster Public Library, to consider bibliographic organization at the national level, and the other, under Emile Vauthier of the Royal Library of Bruxelles, to deal with problems of international bibliographic organization. From the first group came recommendations for the creation of permanent national bodies designed to represent the several bibliographic interests of their respective countries charged with the task of promoting and coordinating a rational pattern of national bibliographic services and empowered to

deal with such international bibliographic bodies as might be created. Other recommendations had to do with encouraging the preparation and publication of national bibliographies, the establishment of national bibliographic information centers, and bureaus of specialized information. Other recommendations had to do with encouraging the publication of:

- a. A general national bibliography of all books published and on sale within the country
- b. A similar bibliography of all books and pamphlets published but not on sale
- c. An index to periodical literature
- d. A bibliography of maps and atlases
- e. A bibliography of musical works
- f. A bibliography of unpublished theses and other academic publications
- g. A bibliography of local government publications
- h. A directory of periodicals and newspapers currently published
- i. A directory of publishers and booksellers
- j. An indexed directory of learned societies, institutes, libraries, and other related organizations.

Mr. Vauthier's committee concerned itself with the general problem of international coordination of bibliographic activity, particularly as related to the objectives of UNESCO, and the role that UNESCO might play in the promotion of such coordination. The program recommended by this group was divided into three parts: (1) a list of long-range tasks which eventually must be undertaken to coordinate bibliographic activity at the international level; (2) specific recommendations to the Director General of UNESCO for the establishment of a permanent Advisory Committee on Bibliography to assist in the formulation and execution of UNESCO's bibliographic program, especially with reference to certain immediate operations such as a pilot bibliographic center, the preparation of a series of handbooks or manuals on the creation and operation of national bibliographic services, and the publication of other bibliographic information of international importance; and (3) recommendations to the constituent countries concerning the improvement of bibliographic services at the national level.

On the fourth and final day, the Conference again convened in plenary session and with relatively little debate, disagreement, or alteration of the text approved the work of the committees, and the whole was authorized as approved to appear as the final act of the Conference. This final act contains a preamble, 14 resolutions, one annex of long-term tasks in international bibliographic coordination (prepared by Mr. Clapp), and four supplementary resolutions. In general, the major provisions and recommendations of the final act coincide in principle, and even to a large extent in detail, with those contained in the *United States National Report*.

The real success of the Conference can be judged only in terms of the future achievement of the machinery which has been set in motion. At the national level, there is already ample evidence that the special committees, created in response to the initiative of UNESCO, are beginning to assume permanent status and to exercise important leadership in the development of bibliographic services within their own jurisdictions. In Canada, for example, work on the initiation of a much-needed national bibliography, both current and retrospective, is going forward in a manner that follows closely the plans proposed in the Canadian national report. Other countries are displaying an equally intensive interest.

In the United States, the preliminary work of UNESCO has been brought to a focus by the Paris Conference. Librarians and others concerned with the development and coordination of our bibliographic resources have been made increasingly aware of the need for a central bibliographic agency that will serve as a planning group, a clearinghouse of information, and eventually, a production center for bibliographic services. The initial enthusiasm with which the *United States National Report* was received encourages one to believe that the creation of such an agency is a very real and immediate possibility. The most pressing demand is for the establishment of such an agency, either through the reconstitution of an existing organization, such as the American Documentation Institute, or by the creation of a new corporate body designed especially to meet these needs. It is not within the province of the present report to set forth the merits and defects of the alternatives, but it can be reported that preliminary discussions of this problem are already well under way among interested groups.

On the plane of international activity, the results of the Paris Conference are already becoming immediately apparent. Shortly after the Conference adjourned, the Secretariat of UNESCO announced the intention to proceed with the creation of the Permanent Advisory Committee on International Bibliographic Organization as recommended by the assembled Paris delegates. To this end, the UNESCO Secretariat is calling a meeting in London on April 24-27, 1951, of a Committee of Experts to decide how the Permanent Committee can best be provided with a constitution, a program of work, and personnel consonant with the responsibilities of such an important body. One may, therefore, view with considerable optimism the prospects for future success in this important field.

The accomplishments of the Conference may be:

1. A foundation has been laid for international understanding and cooperation in promoting bibliographic organization among some 40 countries of the world.
2. The administrative framework for an agency

to continue such intellectual cooperation in the future has been designed.

3. An opportunity has been given for the free exchange of ideas, opinions, and problems of bibliographic organization on the part of representative national leaders in bibliography.

4. The cooperation and assistance of certain international organizations dependent upon or concerned in bibliography has been solicited and achieved.

5. Policies and procedures have been established for the much-needed improvement of bibliographic services within the jurisdiction of the participating countries.

6. Within the United States, great impetus has been given to a coordinated and systematic approach to the problems of effective bibliographic coverage at the national level.

The significance of these achievements is not to be minimized. The writer is convinced that, in bringing together a group of international specialists who are deeply concerned about the present state of bibliography and the improvement of bibliographical organization, UNESCO has taken an important forward step toward the solution of the many complex problems by which librarians and documentalists are confronted. In these 4 days, a real international understanding of the objectives of bibliographic organization was attained, and a practical groundwork was laid for effective and permanent action. Throughout the meetings, it was constantly evident that the other countries expected the United States to exert a certain amount of leadership, or at least to carry its full share of the responsibility for implementing the program. This responsibility the United States must prepare itself to meet.

Ethiopia Sends Troops to Korea

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information April 12]

The Secretary-General has been advised by the unified command that an Ethiopian expeditionary force will leave Djibouti for Korea on April 15.

In November 1950, the Ethiopian Government, in response to the appeal for offers of assistance which the Secretary-General sent to all member states supporting the Security Council decisions on Korea, replied that—

... The Imperial Ethiopian Government are prepared specifically to offer a contingent of 1,069 officers and men. ...

Countries which already have combat forces serving in Korea under the United Nations Command are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.

Seventeenth Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 1-15, 1951¹

I herewith submit report number 17 of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 1-15 March inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 809-823 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Progress of the campaign continues to be satisfactory, with all three Services—Army, Navy and Air—performing well their completely coordinated tactical missions. Designed to meet abnormal military inhibitions, our strategic plan, involving constant movement to keep the enemy off balance with a corresponding limitation upon his initiative, remains unaltered. Our selection of the battle area furthermore has forced him into the military disadvantage of fighting far from his base and permitted greater employment of our air and sea arms against which he has little defense. There has been a resultant continuing and exhausting attrition upon both his manpower and supplies. There should be no illusions in this matter, however. In such a campaign of maneuver, as our battle lines shift north the supply position of the enemy will progressively improve, just as inversely the effectiveness of our air potential will progressively diminish, thus in turn causing his numerical ground superiority to become of increasing battle field significance. Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and material to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing limitation upon our freedom of counter offensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength,

the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves. The exact place of stabilization is of necessity a fluctuating variable dependent upon the shifting relative strengths of the forces committed and will constantly move up or down. Even now there are indications that the enemy is attempting to build up from China a new and massive offensive for the spring. These are the salient factors which must continue to delimit strategic thinking and planning as the campaign proceeds.

Suffering heavy casualties the enemy conducted vigorous delaying actions as steady United Nations pressure forced him northward six to eight miles on the central front extending about seventy miles from the Pukhan River area east of Seoul to Hajinbu, near the East Coast. Concomitantly United Nations have observed extensive troop and vehicular movement to the hostile rear, disclosing the enemy's efforts to augment and redeploy his reserve forces in the vicinity of the Hongchon River, and in the areas north of Hongchon and Seoul. Additional Chinese Communist and north Korean units are steadily displacing southward, principally along the eastern axis into the Kumhwa-Hwachon-Chunchon-Chorwon area, and depleted front-line units are receiving large numbers of badly needed replacements. Enemy reserve forces available for immediate employment on the front include at least four Chinese Communist Armies and at least one north Korean Corps.

Enemy forces offered strong resistance through 10 March. Fighting was particularly heavy on both sides of the Pukhan River, near its confluence with the Han. After three days of heavy fighting, hostile elements west of the Pukhan retired in disorder on 9 March, abandoning much of their equipment. Heavy fighting also raged in the vicinity of Yongdu, Hoengsong, Sanrgo [Samgo-ri] and Changdong, but by 12 March resistance had diminished and became generally light over the entire front.

Vigorous United Nations operations have substantially reduced the strength of organized Com-

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on April 19. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN, of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; and the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625.

Communist guerrilla elements operating in United Nations rear areas in the past four weeks. In particular, the large guerrilla force built around the 10th north Korean Division suffered severe losses between 4 and 7 March, in the area fifteen miles west of Ulchin, near the East Coast. Remnants of this force have moved northward toward Samchok, their offensive capacity, for the present, drastically reduced. Guerrilla forces elsewhere have been relatively inactive and are believed to be breaking up into smaller bands in order to elude United Nations forces. However, in the event of a renewed enemy offensive, guerrilla forces will undoubtedly regroup and renew their attacks on United Nations rear-area installations.

Front lines at the close of the period ran along the Han River from the West Coast to point twelve miles east of Seoul, thence generally eastward to Yangdogwon, east-southeast to Maam-Ni, east-northeast to Hajinbu, and thence northeast to Chumunjin.

United Nations Naval Forces continued to deny to the enemy the use of Korean coastal waters while assuring the unrestricted movement of United Nations shipping to and from Korea. As part of coordinated interdiction operations directed against enemy lines of communication in northeastern Korea, United Nations carrier-based aircraft, in daylight and night attacks, destroyed scores of bridges, attacked tunnels and constantly harassed moving transport. At the same time, United Nations surface units conducted around-the-clock Naval gunfire operations against key highway and railroad junction points, confining their efforts mainly to the Wonsan, Songjin and Chongjin areas. Similar coordinated operations were conducted in the Chinnampo-Chungsan Got area on the West Coast.

Check-minesweeping operations were continued along the Korean East Coast, particularly in those areas used by United Nations gunfire-support ships. Substantial numbers of drifting mines continue to menace shipping in Korean waters.

The hospital ship *Jutlandia*, contributed by Denmark, reported for operations during the period of this report and constitutes a most valuable and welcome addition to the United Nations Naval forces combatting aggression in Korea.

Enemy jet fighters in flights of 15 to 25 ineffectively challenged United Nations air supremacy several times over north Korea during this period. United Nations medium bombers sustained slight damage but the bombers and fighters maintained the score of downed and damaged aircraft well in the favor of United Nations forces. The enemy jets restrict their operations to the northern part of Korea within easy access to the Manchurian border and to their Antung base visible to United Nations aircraft flying interdiction and counterair operations south of the Yalu River.

Indicative of the relentless pressure being applied by the air echelon is the new high total of

about 1,250 sorties flown on one day of this period. The B-29's have again joined the fighters and light bombers in attacks immediately in rear of the Communist lines. The close integration of the air and ground efforts is most commendable.

Night operations supplementing the daylight attacks continue the destruction and harassment of enemy resupply activities. Considerable increased motor traffic has been subjected to twenty-four hour attack complementing the repeated attacks on supply dumps, bridges and tunnels in the interdiction program.

Transport aircraft repeated their major contribution to the United Nations effort, their efforts being marked by the lift of nearly 5,000 passengers on one day and the airdrop of 1,000 five-gallon drums of motor gas to front line units on another.

There has been no significant change in civil assistance activities during the period. Displaced persons, particularly farmers, are being encouraged to return to their homes and farms in non-combat zones and resume as far as possible their contributions to the normal economy of Korea.

Miniature weekly newspapers in Chinese and Korean are now being disseminated regularly to Communist soldiers in the front lines in Korea. These newspapers are part of a steadily expanding program to provide enemy troops with accurate information concerning the Korean conflict and their position in it, and to expose the false indoctrination of their Communist political officers. This program is being prosecuted vigorously both by United Nations Command Headquarters and by the Eighth Army. More than 280 million copies of some 154 different leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea. These are complemented by front line broadcasts from ground and airborne loudspeakers. Special radio broadcasts on 1 March commemorated the 32nd anniversary of the Korean Declaration of Independence, and regular daily United Nations broadcasts continue to provide reliable news reports to Korean civilians.

The void of reliable information concerning United Nations soldiers who have fallen into the hands of the enemy is another manifestation of the contempt in which the Communists apparently hold the international laws of war. In spite of their statements to the United Nations, we have no information indicating any compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention which require that a civilized nation render certain minimum reports on prisoners of war. The enemy have consistently pursued a viciously misleading program wherein highly colored propaganda has been substituted for the official, confirmed data required by the Geneva Convention. The International Red Cross has not yet been permitted to establish liaison with United Nations prisoners held by the Communists nor to carry out other services usually provided by the Red Cross organization.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of United Nations Command, has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2039, March 14; S/2040, March 15; S/2042, March 16; S/2043, March 16; S/2045, March 20; S/2046, March 20; S/2051, March 21; S/2052, March 23; S/2054, March 26; S/2055, March 27; S/2066, April 3; S/2068, April 4; S/2073, April 6; S/2080, April 11; S/2081, April 11; S/2083, April 11; S/2086, April 16.

ECOSOC Resolution on World Economic Situation

U.N. doc. E/1977
Adopted Mar. 20, 1951

The Economic and Social Council,
NOTING with interest the *World Economic Report, 1949-1950*, prepared by the Secretariat,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT General Assembly resolution 406 (V) and

A

CONSIDERING THAT:

(a) The maintenance of international peace and security, the creation of conditions of economic stability, and the improvement of the standards of living of the world's population are permanent objectives of international economic and social co-operation among the United Nations;

(b) Continued progress in creating conditions of economic stability and in improving standards of living requires increases in the production of food, raw materials and manufactured goods;

(c) In the under-developed countries, progress toward the objectives enumerated in paragraph (b) is limited by the characteristics of their present economic structures, which are reflected in the nature of their foreign trade, in the vulnerability of their terms of foreign trade, in their dependence on foreign countries for capital goods, in low levels of investment and in other factors both external and internal which contribute to their low living standards;

(d) Some of the adverse factors enumerated in paragraph (c) are being aggravated by new inflationary pressures, shortages of goods, regulation of prices at different relative levels for different products, and re-allocation of productive factors, which are likely to affect unfavourably the rate or pattern of economic development of some countries;

(e) In the industrialized countries, particularly those which are faced with the task of reconstruction and re-equipment as the result of war damage, the additional tasks assumed as a result of the international situation are likely to cause inflationary pressures;

(f) Instability of prices in international markets also affects industrialized countries and, in many of them, aggravates internal disequilibrium and makes more difficult the necessary increase of their production;

(g) If appropriate measures are not taken, difficulties may arise in trade between the industrialized countries

and the under-developed countries when present inflationary pressures subside and when reconversion of defence industries occurs; and some of these difficulties would tend to increase the difference between the levels of their respective productive capacities and also to increase the vulnerability of their economies to a decline in the demand for their products and to a fall in the prices of these products in world markets, with consequent unfavourable economic and social effects;

1. *Recommends* that all Members of the United Nations, during the period of general shortage of goods, take special measures to bring about adequate production and equitable international distribution of capital goods, essential consumers' goods and raw materials especially needed for the maintenance of the international peace and security, the preservation of standards of living and the furthering of economic development;

2. *Recommends* that all Members of the United Nations, during the period of general inflationary pressure, take measures, direct or indirect, to regulate at equitable levels and relationships, the prices of essential goods moving in international trade, including capital goods, essential consumers' goods and raw materials;

3. *Recommends* that the equitable regulation of distribution and prices referred to in recommendations 1 and 2 above be maintained as long as strong inflationary pressures persist, in order to minimize changes in the purchasing power, in terms of imports, of current earnings from exports as well as of monetary assets;

4. *Recommends* further that all Members of the United Nations take all steps in their power to prevent the development of inflationary pressures, thereby preventing speculative profits and maintaining the purchasing power of the poorer sections of the population;

5. *Amends* paragraph 19 of resolution 290 (XI) to request that the group of experts to be appointed under that paragraph include in its report recommendations concerning the appropriate national and international measures required to mitigate the vulnerability of the economies of under-developed countries to fluctuations in international markets, including measures to adjust, establish and maintain appropriate relations between prices of raw materials, on the one hand, and essential manufactured goods on the other, and thus to insure greater economic stability; and

6. *Requests* all Members of the United Nations to report to the thirteenth session of the Council on such action as they have taken under the present resolution; and

B

HAVING REGARD to the fact that various Governments have not had sufficient time to study the *World Economic Report, 1949-1950*, particularly the sections on the economic conditions in the Middle East and in Africa;

HAVING REGARD FURTHER to the radically changed economic conditions in the world since the period covered by the Report, and bearing in mind that Members of the United Nations have not had sufficient time to respond to the invitation contained in General Assembly resolution 406 (V) to submit their views concerning the way in which the world situation has affected their economic progress and the prospects of continuing world economic expansion,

HAVING REGARD FINALLY to the request contained in the above resolution of the General Assembly that the Council recommend to governments and to the General Assembly measures designed to make possible the uninterrupted progress of programmes of economic stability and development,

Decides to consider further at its thirteenth session, the world economic situation in 1949-1950, and particularly the sections of the report relating to the economic conditions in the Middle East and Africa, and the views submitted by Members of the United Nations in response to General Assembly resolution 406 (V), with a view to making appropriate recommendations.

U.S. Answers U.N. Questionnaire on Slavery and Servitude

U.N. doc. E/AC.33/Add.55
Transmitted Mar. 13, 1951

8 U.S.C. 56, abolishing and prohibiting the holding of any person to service of labor under the system known as peonage;

18 U.S.C. 1581, providing criminal penalties for holding or returning any person to a condition of peonage or arresting him with the intent of placing him in peonage; and

18 U.S.C. 1582-1588, inclusive, prescribing criminal punishments for providing vessels for slave trade, kidnaping or enticing anyone into slavery or involuntary servitude, holding another in or selling him into involuntary servitude, engaging in the transportation or sale of slaves, serving on board a vessel engaged in the slave trade, keeping slaves on board ship for the purpose of sale, or transporting anyone from any place in the United States to any other place to be held or sold as a slave.

There are also related statutes which may have a bearing on enforcing the general prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude, such as 18 U.S.C. 241 punishing conspiracy to injure any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States;

18 U.S.C. 242, providing punishment of anyone who under color of law wilfully subjects any inhabitant of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States;

Answer of United States to United Nations Questionnaire on Slavery and Servitude

Question 1. Does slavery as defined in Article 1 of the International Slavery Convention of 1926 exist in any territory subject to the control of your Government?

Answer. No. The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, adopted in 1865, abolished slavery and involuntary servitude. The first section of that amendment provides:

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Under the second section of the amendment, which confers upon the Congress of the United States power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation, the Congress has enacted statutes, such as

8 U.S.C. 56, abolishing and prohibiting the holding of any person to service of labor under the system known as peonage;

18 U.S.C. 1581, providing criminal penalties for holding or returning any person to a condition of peonage or arresting him with the intent of placing him in peonage; and

18 U.S.C. 1582-1588, inclusive, prescribing criminal punishments for providing vessels for slave trade, kidnaping or enticing anyone into slavery or involuntary servitude, holding another in or selling him into involuntary servitude, engaging in the transportation or sale of slaves, serving on board a vessel engaged in the slave trade, keeping slaves on board ship for the purpose of sale, or transporting anyone from any place in the United States to any other place to be held or sold as a slave.

There are also related statutes which may have a bearing on enforcing the general prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude, such as 18 U.S.C. 241 punishing conspiracy to injure any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States;

18 U.S.C. 242, providing punishment of anyone who under color of law wilfully subjects any inhabitant of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States;

8 U.S.C. 43 and 47, providing civil remedies for persons injured by violations more or less co-extensive with the violations of 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242;

18 U.S.C. 1201, providing punishment for transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of kidnaped persons; and

18 U.S.C. 2421-2424, dealing with white-slave traffic, and making punishable the transportation, coercion or enticement of any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of prostitution.

Question 2. Does the slave trade, as defined in Article I of the International Slavery Convention of 1926, exist in any of the territories subject to the control of your Government?

Answer. No. The slave trade has been particularly singled out for prohibition and punishment in the sections of law, 18 U.S.C. 1582-1588, summarized in the answer to Question 1 above.

Question 3. Do any practices exist in any territory subject to the control of your Government which are restrictive of the liberty of the person and which tend to subject that person to a state of servitude, as for instance:

(a) Serfdom (compulsory and hereditary attachment to land accompanied by obligations to render service to the landlord);

(b) Traditional forms of involuntary unpaid service exacted by land owners and other employers of labour [Such as *concertaje*, *servicio personal*, *pongaje* or *pongucajo*, *yanaconazgo*, and others];

(c) Debt bondage [Such as *siringales* or *cauchales*];

(d) Pledging and pawning of third persons as security for debt [Such as *iwofa*];

(e) Exploitation of children under the form of adoption;

(f) Purchase of wives and inheritance of widows by the heir of the deceased husband involving involuntary subjection of a woman to a man not of her choice;

(g) Forms of prostitution of women and children involving exercise of ownership over them?

Please describe in detail such institutions or practices which may exist.

Answer. No. However, while slavery has disappeared in the United States, federal authorities do receive complaints concerning possible violations by individuals of the laws forbidding involuntary servitude. Upon investigation, some of the complaints have resulted in the bringing of indictments, and in convictions, e.g., *United States v. Burnette* (U.S.D.C., S.D. Miss., 1945), plea of guilty on a charge of holding a Negro woman and her son in involuntary servitude; *Pierce v. United States*, 146 F. (2d) 84 (C.C.A. 5, 1944), affirming a peonage conviction based upon forced prostitution; *United States v. Ingalls*, 73 F. Supp. 76 (U.S.D.C., S.D. Cal., 1947), conviction for inducing a personal servant to be held as a slave.

Question 4. What legislation has been passed, and what administrative methods have been applied, since 1926, to check slavery, the slave trade, or any practices which are restrictive of the liberty of the person and which tend to subject that person to a state of servitude?

Answer. All of the significant legislation, cited in the answer to Question 1 above was enacted prior to 1926 with the following two exceptions. The revision of Title 18, U.S.C., effective September 1, 1948, made clear by a technical alteration effected in 18 U.S.C. 1584 that the holding to or selling into any kind of involuntary servitude was a punishable offense. The kidnaping statute, 18 U.S.C. 1201, which is sometimes referred to as the Lindbergh kidnaping law, became law on June 22, 1932.

Regarding administrative methods to check practices which tend to subject any person to a

state of servitude, the investigations and prosecutions upon individual complaints have been referred to in the answer to Question 3 above. In this connection, in 1939, there was established in the federal Department of Justice a Civil Rights Section to give special attention to the enforcement of federal civil rights statutes. Moreover, the executive branch of the Government has requested from the legislative branch a general overhauling of the federal civil rights statutes in order to improve the means of investigating and prosecuting alleged offenses.

Question 5. What have been the results of the application of these measures and activities?

Answer. Slavery, the slave trade and practices which are restrictions of liberty of person and which tend to subject a person to a state of servitude have disappeared. However, as pointed out in answer to Question 3 above, complaints are received from time to time concerning possible violations by individuals of laws forbidding involuntary servitude, and upon investigation some of these complaints have resulted in the bringing of indictments and in convictions.

THE DEPARTMENT

Religious Advisory Panel Named

[Released to the press April 21]

Representatives of the Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant faiths have been invited to become the members of a religious advisory panel to meet regularly with Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs to consider the present religious content of Voice of America programs and other output of the United States International Information and Educational Exchange Program.

The panel, which held its first meeting with Mr. Barrett at the Department of State today, consists of Monsig. Thomas J. McCarthy of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Isaac Franck, of the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, and Rev. Edward Hughes Pruden, President of the American Baptist Convention, all residing in Washington.

"We are convinced that our Campaign of Truth can be made tremendously more effective through increasing the proportion of religious materials in the radio programs, pamphlets, and motion pictures that we are sending to people of all religious faiths the world over," Mr. Barrett said. "We will of course continue to adhere strictly to the principle of absolute impartiality in dealing with the various religious sects."

Personnel Improvement Plans Announced

The Secretary of State made public on April 16 a report prepared by a special Advisory Committee on Personnel outlining an improved personnel system for the conduct of foreign affairs. At the same time, the Secretary disclosed that a number of the Advisory Committee's recommendations have been included in a State Department directive to improve the personnel program of the Department and the unified Foreign Service.

Purpose of Advisory Committee

Members of the Advisory Committee included James H. Rowe, Jr., attorney engaged in private practice in Washington; Robert Ramspeck, former Congressman and more recently Executive Vice President of the Air Transport Association of America prior to his appointment as Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission; and William E. DeCourey, Foreign Service officer and Ambassador to Haiti.

The Rowe-Ramspeck-DeCourey Committee had been set up to advise the Secretary whether any fundamental changes were required in the personnel systems and relationships of the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States, including steps that would bring about a closer integration of the two services. At present, personnel of the Department of State proper are administered under the general Civil Service personnel system, whereas employees of the Foreign Service are administered under a separate statute not under the Civil Service. Proposals have been made, from time to time, to place these two groups of employees under a single personnel system. This course of action was recommended by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (The Hoover Commission).

Recommendations

Basically, the Rowe-Ramspeck-DeCourey Committee, after careful study and inquiry including an intensive appraisal of employee attitudes, made the following recommendations:

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SERVICE

1. The personnel of the Department and of the Foreign Service should be placed in one service under a single, but flexible, personnel system.
2. This system should be established initially outside the Civil Service.
3. It should adequately meet the needs of other agencies of Government concerned with foreign affairs.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPROVED PERSONNEL SYSTEM

1. The framework of the new service should provide for a single Foreign Affairs Officer cate-

gory to include general and specialized officers concerned with the substantive aspects of foreign affairs.

2. The personnel system for the new service should be based on maintaining the career principle with entry governed by a strict qualifying process; advancement on the basis of merit; carefully controlled use of lateral appointments at higher grades; and separation of those whose performance unduly inhibits the advancement of more able employees.

3. At the same time, the personnel system should be sufficiently flexible to permit rapid expansion and contraction; to assure a proper blending of generalists, specialists, and career executives; to enable those with specialized training and interests to enter the service and advance in their respective fields; to make lateral appointments from the outside whenever the service cannot itself supply enough qualified staff; and to enable outstanding officers to receive adequate recognition in promotion.

4. The personnel system should eliminate certain inequities which now exist with respect to pay, retirement, and leave benefits.

5. Personnel should be administered under a common set of policies which adequately recognize the conditions of overseas service, and they should serve at home or abroad as the needs of the service might require.

C. TRANSITION TO NEW SERVICE

1. Studies should be started without delay to prepare the statutory basis for the integrated personnel system.

2. Pending the enactment of legislation, all possible steps should be taken administratively to work toward an integrated service.

Objectives

The principal objectives as outlined in the directive issued by Mr. Humelsine are as follows:

1. To obtain, develop, and maintain an experienced and versatile career service capable of meeting present and future needs of the Department and Foreign Service in the conduct of foreign affairs and to provide means for quickly supplementing this staff whenever conditions require temporary or permanent expansion of personnel.

2. To make maximum use of skills and abilities of Departmental and Foreign Service personnel and broaden the range of their usefulness through training and other developmental programs.

3. To eliminate inequities in the treatment of certain categories of Foreign Service personnel.

4. To increase through voluntary means the flexible use of Departmental and Foreign Service personnel interchangeably between overseas and domestic assignments.

These objectives, the Secretary stated, are in line with the Committee's recommendations and

will lay the groundwork for undertaking possible further integration of the two services at some time in the future.

Text of Secretary Acheson's Letter to Members of the Advisory Committee.

I wish to express my appreciation for your excellent report on "An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs." I have read it with interest and you may be sure that the Department will put as many of your recommendations into effect as practicable under present day conditions.

In essence you have recommended that the personnel of the Department and of the Foreign Service be placed under a single personnel system initially outside the Civil Service. You have proposed that this system be based on the career principle and made sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the Government for the conduct of foreign affairs.

I have accepted your basic recommendations regarding the characteristics of an improved personnel system and program. The Department will therefore endeavor to adjust the present Foreign Service personnel system through administrative and legislative means to closely parallel in character the system which you have recommended. Concurrently, we will make corollary administrative improvements within the framework of the Departmental Civil Service system.

However, I believe the emphasis on integration of the two Services should be placed on the Foreign Service and those positions in the Department for which continuing overseas experience is essential or desirable. Common conditions of employment can reasonably be applied to the personnel used to staff these positions, whereas this is not practicable for a large segment of the Departmental Service.

Secondly, I feel it is essential that Departmental employees not be penalized for failure to accept the conditions of employment implicit in an integrated Service. Rather, their availability for continuing service at home and abroad should be accomplished on a voluntary basis. Accordingly, the Department favors and will promote the entrance into an improved Foreign Service personnel system of Departmental employees who are qualified and willing to accept dual service at home and abroad. Above and beyond this, the Department will endeavor to increase substantially the number of Departmental employees possessing overseas experience but who are unable to assume the obligation of dual service for a protracted period.

This approach is consistent with the ultimate objective of a fully integrated Service. Once we have attained the more immediate goal of an improved personnel system coupled with partial steps toward integration, the Department will have a more informed basis for deciding whether to undertake additional steps toward further integration.

Mr. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, has been directed and authorized to carry out this program without delay. I have asked him to bear constantly in mind your wise caution, concerning a gradual and considered application of basic changes in the present personnel systems of the Department and the Foreign Service.

I inclose a copy of the Directive which Mr. Humelsine has been authorized to issue. You will note that it embodies a considerable number of your basic recommendations. The Board of Foreign Service, which includes advisers from other Federal agencies with an interest in foreign affairs, has concurred in this Directive. In this connection we propose to extend the scope of the home assignment program considerably to permit Foreign Service personnel to be assigned to other Federal agencies in the United States on a reimbursable exchange basis.

Mr. Humelsine is also planning to circulate your report within the Department of State and the Foreign Service, as well as making it available to the press and to interested outside groups. We want everyone concerned to have an opportunity to read your recommendations directly at the same time that we announce the Department's proposed course of action.

Mr. Humelsine and I will be glad to meet with you and with the Committee's Staff Director, Mr. William Howell, to elaborate on the Department's intended course of action. I am inclosing a copy of a letter to Mr. Howell.

Ben Hibbs Confirmed as Member of Information Advisory Commission

On April 18, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Ben Hibbs as a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, term expiring January 27, 1954.

FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

On April 17, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Philip B. Fleming as American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Costa Rica.

On April 18, the Senate confirmed the following nominations:

George R. Merrell as American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Afghanistan;

Paul C. Daniels as American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ecuador;

J. Rives Childs as American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ethiopia.

Proposals Set Forth for Emergency Assistance to Yugoslavia

TEXT OF U. S. NOTE TO YUGOSLAVIA

[Released to the press April 18]

The State Department today made public the text of a note to the Yugoslav Government dated April 17, 1951, in connection with the President's announcement of April 16 that Military Defense Assistance funds not to exceed 29 million dollars will be made available to Yugoslavia. The note, signed by United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia George V. Allen, is as follows.

I have the honor to refer to the request submitted to the Secretary of State of the United States of America, by the Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for further assistance to meet the emergency in Yugoslavia resulting from the recent drought.

Particular reference is made to that part of your country's shortage of raw materials and other supplies which affects the continued ability of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to support the matériel requirements of its military forces. It is understood that the shortage of such raw materials and supplies results from the recent drought that depleted Yugoslavia of those agricultural commodities by export of which Yugoslavia normally acquires these raw materials and supplies, and that such shortage is now, in consequence, so drastic as seriously to impair the ability of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to defend itself against aggression.

Our two Governments are both desirous of fostering international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of these purposes and principles.

Accordingly, I am pleased to inform you that the Government of the United States of America is prepared, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 329, 81st Congress, as amended, to extend immediate assistance in the form of raw materials and other supplies in amounts and kinds equivalent to certain consumption needs for supporting the armed forces of the Federal People's Republic

of Yugoslavia on the following mutually agreed basis:

1. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will use the assistance exclusively for the purpose for which it is furnished, namely in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and to strengthen the defense of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia against aggression;

2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia agrees not to transfer to any other Nation the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement without the prior consent of the Government of the United States of America;

3. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will provide the United States of America with reciprocal assistance by continuing to facilitate the production and transfer to the United States of America in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, of raw and semiprocessed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Yugoslavia. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to requirements of Yugoslavia for domestic use and commercial export;

4. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will permit and facilitate in every way the freedom of the Representatives of the Government of the United States of America, duly designated for this purpose by the United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, without restriction, to observe, supervise and report on the receipt and distribution in Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available pursuant to this agreement, and to cooperate fully with them by permitting them to have full access to communication and information facilities. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will afford to such representatives of the Government of the United States of America opportunity to make their observations known to, and to discuss the necessary supply and transportation arrangements with, the appropriate officials of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is prepared to provide periodical

reports concerning the use made of this assistance;

5. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia recognize that it is in their mutual interest that consistent with the requirements of security, full publicity be given to the objectives and progress of the assistance being rendered pursuant to this agreement and that all pertinent information be made available to the people of Yugoslavia;

6. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will take appropriate measures to enable it to become independent of extraordinary outside assistance;

7. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will establish a special account in the Central Bank of Yugoslavia in the name of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter called the Special Account) and will make deposits in dinars to this account in amounts commensurate with the indicated dollar cost to the Government of the United States of America of commodities and services (including any cost of processing, storing, transporting, repairing, or other services incident thereto) made available to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia pursuant to this agreement. The Government of the United States shall from time to time notify the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia of the indicated dollar cost of any such commodities and services, and the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will thereupon deposit in the Special Account a commensurate amount of dinars computed at a rate of exchange which shall be the par value agreed at such time with the International Monetary Fund. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia may at any time make advance deposits in the Special Account which shall be credited against subsequent notifications pursuant to this paragraph;

b. The Government of the United States will from time to time notify the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia of its requirements for administrative and operating expenditures in dinars within Yugoslavia incident to the assistance herein, and the Government of the Federal People's Republic will thereupon make such sums available out of any balances in the Special Account in the manner requested by the Government of the United States in the notification;

c. Five per cent of each deposit made pursuant to this paragraph in respect of the assistance herein shall be allocated to the use of the Government of the United States for its expenditures in Yugoslavia and sums made available pursuant to part b. of this paragraph shall first be charged to the amounts allocated under this 5 per cent;

d. The Government of the Federal People's

Republic may draw upon any remaining balance in the Special Account for such purposes as may be agreed from time to time with the Government of the United States of America consistent with the objectives of this agreement;

8. The Government of the United States of America reserves the right at any time to terminate its assistance to Yugoslavia made available pursuant to this agreement, including termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled but not yet delivered.

Your Excellency will note that with the exception of paragraph 7 above the foregoing constitutes a reiteration, appropriate changes having been made, of the assurances contained in the exchanges of notes on November 17, 20 and 21, 1950, regarding supplies furnished to Yugoslavia under the MDAA and of the agreement signed on January 6, 1951, regarding the provision of foodstuffs by the United States Government in accordance with the provisions of the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950.

If the Yugoslav Government after considering the foregoing proposals is in accord with them, I have the honor to propose that this note, together with the reply of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia so indicating, constitute an agreement, effective on the date of your reply.¹

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES

[Released to the press by the White House April 16]

The President today sent the following identical letters to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know, the United States has provided emergency food assistance to Yugoslavia during the past months to meet the threat to the security of that country caused by the recent drought: initially, under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the Economic Cooperation Act, and through loans made by the Export-Import Bank; and then under the provisions of the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act. The drought which gave rise to the need for assistance, however, not only caused a shortage in the availability of food for consumption in Yugoslavia, but also has made it impossible for Yugoslavia to export the agricultural products with which Yugoslavia normally obtains the resources to pay for imports of critically needed raw materials. The consequent shortage of raw materials, which includes those basic to the needs

¹The Yugoslav note, signed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Yugoslav Government, states that the Yugoslav Government is in accord with the U.S. note.

of the Yugoslav armed forces, is so acute as to jeopardize the combat effectiveness of the Yugoslav armed forces and to weaken the ability of Yugoslavia to defend itself against aggression. This development seriously affects the security of the North Atlantic area.

As I explained to you in my letter of November 24, 1950, and for the reasons stated therein, I have found that Yugoslavia is a nation whose strategic location makes it of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area, and that an immediate increase in its ability to defend itself over that which exists if no assistance is supplied will contribute to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area.

I have determined, therefore, after consultation

with the Governments of the other nations which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, that in order effectively to carry out the purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, it is essential as an immediate measure to use not to exceed \$29 million of the funds appropriated for the purposes of Title I of that Act to provide raw materials and similar supplies for Yugoslavia in amounts and kinds equivalent to certain consumption needs for supporting its armed forces. I am, under the authority of that Act, approving the procurement and shipment of such materials and supplies.

This letter constitutes the notification required by Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended.

Legislation

Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. Hearings before the preparedness subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on S. 1, a bill to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military service and training, and for other purposes. January 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, and February 2, 1951. [Contents lists statements, dates, and charts.] xix, 1243 pp.

Emergency Powers of the President. Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, second session, on S. 4264, to amend and extend certain provisions of the First War Powers Act, 1941, S. 4266, to amend and extend title II of the First War Powers Act, 1941, December 20, 1950, and S. 101 (82d Cong., 1st sess.) to amend the Reorganization Act of 1949, January 23, 1951. iii, 79 pp.

Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on S. Con. Res. 8, a concurrent resolution relative to the assignment of ground forces of the United States to duty in the European area. February 1, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, and 28, 1951. iv, 819 pp. [Department of State, pp. 77-125.] iv, 819 pp.

Investigation of Shipments to Communist China. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, . . . October 17, 19, 30, November 21 and 22, 1950. [Department of State, pp. 88-96.] iii, 199 pp.

Development of a Twenty-Year Programme for Achieving Peace Through the United Nations. E/1900, February 12, 1951. 18 pp. mimeo.

World Economic Report 1949-50, Preliminary edition. E/1910, January 29, 1951. 392 pp. mimeo.

Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea. E/1913, February 12, 1951. 35 pp. mimeo.

Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 181, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 62] 2 pp.

Alien Property Claims. S. Rept. 59, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 28] 6 pp.

India Emergency Assistance Act of 1951. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 3017, a bill to furnish emergency food relief assistance to India. H. Rept. 185, 82d Cong. 1st sess. iii, 37 pp.

Extending the Time for the Filing of Certain Claims Under the War Claims Act of 1948. H. Rept. 217, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. J. Res. 40] 4 pp.

Study of the Health of World War II Prisoners of War. H. Rept. 228, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 304] 8 pp.

Ninth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration. Supplement. Economic Cooperation Agreements and Other Documents, July 1, 1950-December 31, 1950. H. Doc. 713, Part 2, 81st Cong. 2d sess. v, 100 pp.

Reports To Be Made To Congress. Letter From the Clerk of the House of Representatives transmitting a list of reports which it is the duty of any officer of department to make to Congress. H. Doc. 27, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 39 pp.

Tenth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration. For the Quarter Ended September 30, 1950. H. Doc. 52, 82d Cong. 1st sess. xi, 147 pp.

Assistance to the Republic of India. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a recommendation . . . H. Doc. 56, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 4 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriations, Involving an Increase, for Various Agencies in the Executive Branch. Communication from the President of the United States . . . an increase of \$36,694,250 . . . H. Doc. 66, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 10 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriations Together with Proposed Provisions and Increases in Limitations Pertaining to Existing Appropriations. Communication from the President of the United States . . . in the amount of \$242,165,024 . . . H. Doc. 67, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 18 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for the Department of State. Communication from the President of the United States . . . in the amount of \$97,500,00. . . H. Doc. 74, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 2 pp.

Amending the Reorganization Act of 1949. S. Rept. 45, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 101] 12 pp.

Certain Cases in Which the Attorney General Had Suspended Deportation. S. Rept. 69, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 9] 2 pp. Also, S. Rept. 70, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 10] 2 pp. Also, S. Rept. 137, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 15] 2 pp.

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Release of Robert A. Vogeler by the Hungarian Government

ASSURANCES GIVEN HUNGARY BY U.S.

[Released to the press April 28]

Robert A. Vogeler, an American citizen who has been held in Hungary for over 17 months, was today released by the Hungarian authorities and has arrived at the American Legation in Vienna. Mr. Vogeler was delivered by Hungarian officials into the custody of a representative of the American Legation in Vienna at Nickelsdorf on the Austrian frontier at 11 a.m. today (5 a.m. e.s.t.) and was escorted directly to Vienna.

The Department is gratified that this American citizen has regained the freedom of which he was unjustly deprived and that he is now safely reunited with his family. The release of Mr. Vogeler follows upon continuous efforts by the United States Government in his behalf since the beginning of his detention and brings to a successful close negotiations which the American Minister in Budapest, Nathaniel P. Davis, has carried on personally with the Hungarian Government over a long period of time, with skill and determination, under most trying conditions.

In connection with the understanding reached with the Hungarian Government for freeing Mr. Vogeler, assurances on the following points have been communicated by Mr. Davis to the Hungarian Government, and, in consequence of the latter's action in releasing Mr. Vogeler and of his safe arrival at the American Legation in Vienna, these assurances now enter into effect:

(1) The United States Government will approve the reopening of Hungarian consular establishments in New York City and Cleveland, Ohio.

(2) It will also, through its appropriate agencies, again validate the passports of private American citizens who may wish to travel to Hungary.

(3) Finally, the United States Government will facilitate the delivery of all Hungarian goods in the United States zone of Germany which, in the light of the provisions of article 30 of the treaty of peace with Hungary, have been found available for restitution, including Hungarian cultural property, and will permit two Hungarian representatives to enter the United States zone of Germany for the purpose of receiving such property and arranging for its transportation. United States civil and military officials in Ger-

many will facilitate the entry of the Hungarian representatives for the purpose stated, render them all proper assistance as regards the collection and shipment of the property in question, and regard them as official representatives of the Hungarian Government.

With regard to the matters dealt with under points (1) and (2) above, it is, of course, the expectation of this Government that the Hungarian Government's observance of consular rights and the rights of American citizens will be in accord with international law and practice and with the provisions of existing treaties between the United States and Hungary. Moreover, private American citizens who may wish to travel to Hungary will undoubtedly wish to inform themselves through the Department or American missions abroad concerning conditions in that country.

BACKGROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN VOGELER CASE

[Released to the press April 28]

Mr. Vogeler was arrested on November 18, 1949, by the Hungarian security police and was not permitted to communicate with his family or to have access to American consular officials at any time or in any manner. As may be recalled from documents released by the Department at the time, the conduct of the Hungarian Government was such that the United States Government was impelled to close the Hungarian consulates in New York City and in Cleveland, Ohio, and to prohibit further travel by private American citizens to Hungary. Mr. Vogeler was brought to trial before the Criminal Court in Budapest on February 17, 1950, on an indictment charging espionage and sabotage, and was sentenced by that Court on February 21, to 15 years in prison. The decision of the Hungarian Supreme Court upholding this sentence was announced in the Hungarian press on May 11.

The United States Government, deeply concerned at the arbitrary arrest of Mr. Vogeler, his prolonged detention without access at any time to American consular representatives, and the *ex*

parte nature of the entire trial proceedings, made repeated protests and representations through its diplomatic representative, Mr. Davis, against the conduct of the Hungarian Government, which was in flagrant violation of elemental human rights and all accepted standards of justice.¹ It also affirmed in the clearest terms that it regarded the allegations made by the Hungarian authorities against Mr. Vogeler as palpably false and politically motivated. This conclusion has been confirmed in every detail by the Department's study of the Hungarian Government's published account of the proceedings against Mr. Vogeler.

On March 25, 1950, Mr. Davis called in person on Deputy Prime Minister Matyas Rakosi in order to press representations in behalf of Mr. Vogeler before the highest Hungarian authority. On this occasion, for the first time, it was indicated that the Hungarian Government might be disposed to give serious consideration to the request of this Government that Mr. Vogeler be released and permitted to depart from Hungary. The essential position of the United States Government on which Mr. Davis was instructed to base his approach was then, as throughout subsequent negotiations, that this Government stood ready, upon the release of Mr. Vogeler by the Hungarian Government, to rescind those measures which it had put into effect because of the Hungarian Government's unwarranted proceedings against Mr. Vogeler. Mr. Davis was also authorized to inform the Hungarian Government that a satisfactory solution of the Vogeler case would make it possible for the United States Government, pursuant to the provisions of article 30 of the treaty of peace with Hungary, to facilitate the delivery of Hungarian goods in the United States zone of Germany which had been found available for restitution to Hungary. The delivery of such goods to Hungary had been suspended since 1948 because of various differences between the United States and Hungarian Governments.

The conversations thus begun were patiently pursued by Mr. Davis with the Hungarian Foreign Office and were brought to an apparently satisfactory conclusion on June 16, 1950, when the Hungarian authorities agreed to proceed promptly with arrangements for Mr. Vogeler's deportation. According to this understanding, it was agreed that this Government, upon the release of Mr. Vogeler and his safe arrival at the American Legation in Vienna, would (1) permit the reopening of Hungarian consular establishments in New York City and in Cleveland, Ohio, (2) again validate the passports of private United States citizens who might wish to travel to Hungary, and (3) facilitate the delivery of all Hungarian goods in the United States zone of Germany which had

been found available for restitution to that country. The Minister was informed by the Hungarian Foreign Office that he would be notified on June 19 of the exact time and arrangements for Mr. Vogeler's release. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Hungarian Government in this matter underwent a sudden and complete change between June 16 and June 20, and, by the latter date, the Hungarian authorities were no longer prepared to carry out the "full agreement" of June 16 for Mr. Vogeler's release.

On June 17 and 18, the terms agreed upon for Mr. Vogeler's release received premature publicity, and this occasioned wide speculation in the press. Subsequently, moreover, in the latter part of June, a rumor of unknown origin was given wide circulation by the press to the effect that the principal condition for Mr. Vogeler's release was the return of the historic Crown of St. Stephen of Hungary. This report was entirely untrue, as the subject of the Crown up to that time had never arisen in connection with the Vogeler negotiations. Mr. Davis and the Department, being concerned to forestall a complete breakdown of diplomatic negotiations which it was imperative to carry out on a confidential basis and being desirous of preserving the framework of agreement laboriously established after many months, concluded in this situation that the interests of Mr. Vogeler would be seriously prejudiced by any public discussion or comment on their part regarding the details of the case. They, therefore, remained largely silent, although the Department felt it necessary to affirm in response to public inquiries that this Government was continuing its efforts to effect Mr. Vogeler's release and to caution that the speculative reports then current with regard to the subject should be treated with the greatest reserve.

When Mr. Davis called at the Hungarian Foreign Office on June 20, 1950, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Andor Berei, made it clear that the Hungarian authorities regarded the premature publicity on the terms of the agreement as particularly aggravating. Dr. Berei then insisted that the question of interference with the broadcasts of Radio Petofi in Budapest, allegedly resulting from Voice of America Hungarian-language broadcasts transmitted from Munich, had not been properly clarified by previous discussion and that, accordingly, a solution of this problem was an essential condition for Mr. Vogeler's release. This was an entirely new condition for, although the matter had previously been discussed by Mr. Davis with the Hungarian Foreign Office in connection with the Vogeler negotiations, it had originally been treated as a technical matter requiring clarification rather than as a condition which the United States Government would be required to meet before Mr. Vogeler's release. Mr. Davis had presented and the Hungarian Foreign Office had accepted such a clarification,

¹ For materials previously released, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1950, p. 21; Jan. 16, 1950, p. 95; Feb. 27, 1950, p. 323; Mar. 6, 1950, pp. 377 and 378; Mar. 13, 1950, pp. 398 and 399.

wherein it was pointed out that the alleged interference could be eliminated or alleviated if the Hungarian radio held exactly to its prescribed wave length and avoided spreading its signal.

Despite the Hungarian refusal on June 20 to implement the agreement reached on June 16, Mr. Davis remained in touch with the Hungarian Foreign Office in the hope of resolving the new differences which had arisen. However, the situation did not improve, for on September 11, 1950, Minister Davis was informed by the Hungarian Foreign Office that it would require as a further condition for Mr. Vogeler's release the return to Hungary of St. Stephen's Crown. Thus, this matter, which had become the subject of unfounded reports and speculation after mid-June, now entered into and complicated the subsequent negotiations for Mr. Vogeler's release.

The Hungarian demands with respect to St. Stephen's Crown and the elimination of radio interference proved to be serious obstacles to the early conclusion of a new agreement for Mr. Vogeler's release and, as new factors, necessitated a review of the entire situation.

Mr. Davis, with the approval of the Department, continued his conversations with the Hungarian Foreign Office with a view to exploring all possibilities for bringing about Mr. Vogeler's release. In addition to his constant efforts looking toward the accomplishment of this fundamental objective, the Minister also approached the Foreign Office on December 12, 1950, in a renewed attempt to secure permission on humanitarian as well as legal grounds for an American consular representative to visit and talk with Mr. Vogeler at regular intervals at his place of detention or elsewhere for the purpose of ascertaining his welfare, needs, and treatment. However, this request was rejected by the Hungarian Foreign Office on December 16, 1950, on the grounds that it lacked all legal foundation and that "under present circumstances the Hungarian authorities are unable to meet such requests."

Meanwhile, it had become increasingly evident that because of the proximity of the frequency used by Radio Petofi in Budapest and the failure of that station to stabilize its transmitter precisely on that frequency, the VOA Hungarian-language broadcasts transmitted from Munich were frequently rendered unintelligible to listeners in Hungary, particularly in the Budapest area. When further investigation confirmed this fact, the Department concluded that it would be in the interest of effective VOA broadcasting to utilize another frequency which would assure a clear channel. Accordingly, this Government on its own initiative decided to terminate the relay of the VOA Hungarian program through Munich and to utilize another channel which would enable clear broadcasting. This change was announced by the VOA to Hungarian listeners on April 1 and was effected on April 7.

On April 9, 1951, following his return to Budapest from Washington on consultation, Mr. Davis called at the Hungarian Foreign Office to renew official discussions with Dr. Berei and to present the position of the United States Government once more in concrete terms. The Minister referred to the action which the United States Government, being concerned no less than the Hungarian Government with the problem of radio interference, had already taken on its own initiative and in its own interest to terminate the relay of the VOA Hungarian-language program through Munich and to transmit through another channel clear of such interference. The Minister added that he assumed this action effectively disposed of the question of radio interference raised by the Hungarian Government. With regard to the question of St. Stephen's Crown, Mr. Davis informed Dr. Berei as follows:

The Government of the United States is not prepared to discuss the return of St. Stephen's Crown as a condition to the release of Mr. Robert A. Vogeler. This property was not removed by force from Hungary but was surrendered to United States authorities for safe-keeping and is being held in trust by them. It is therefore outside the scope of restitution and continues to be treated as property of a special status. The Government of the United States does not regard the present juncture as opportune or otherwise appropriate for taking any action regarding its disposition.

In conclusion, Mr. Davis stated to Dr. Berei, with reference to the part of the agreement of June 16, 1950, dealing with restitution, that the United States Government would perforce have to proceed with the liquidation by public sale of Hungarian property in the United States zone of Germany found available for restitution, other than Hungarian cultural property, if full agreement were not reached by April 30 for Mr. Vogeler's release and the way thus cleared for the return of such property to Hungary.

Dr. Berei received the Minister's presentation of the United States position on these matters without substantive comment and stated that he would report to his Government at once and communicate its reply to the Minister as soon as possible. On April 20, Dr. Berei made known to Mr. Davis, orally and in writing, that the Hungarian Government did not accept the United States viewpoint concerning the status of St. Stephen's Crown. He added, however, that independently of this question his Government perceived no obstacle to the release of Mr. Vogeler at an early date, in view of the disposal of the question of radio interference, provided that the points of the agreement of June 16, 1950, regarding the Hungarian consulates, travel of United States citizens to Hungary, and restitution were confirmed by the Minister in writing. A press release issued by the Hungarian Foreign Office on April 21 officially confirmed that the negotiations for Mr. Vogeler's release had been concluded successfully.

Peace Without Fear

*by Ambassador John Foster Dulles
Consultant to the Secretary¹*

The United States, in association with its allies and in consultation with Japan, is seeking a prompt peace, a just peace, a peace insured by collective power.

These three principles have solid bipartisan support in the United States. If that were not so, our mission would not be here today. The change in the Supreme Command has left United States policies untouched insofar as relates to Japan. That is good news, for policies which depend upon the vicissitudes of individual fortunes are always fragile. Policies which surmount personalities are the policies which are dependable. All the world can now know that our Japanese policies have that quality of dependability and of survival.

Prompt Peace

The fact that the United States is seeking a prompt peace is shown by the energy with which our Government has been moving forward. Our mission was established by the President on January 10, 1951. We left for Japan on January 22, 1951. After nearly 2 weeks of intensive activity here, we went on to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. We laid the foundation for an Australian-New Zealand-United States security arrangement related to the Japanese peace. My deputy, Mr. Allison, went to England. We completed the task of drafting, as a working paper, the complete text of a suggested Japanese peace treaty. We circulated that text to the 15 other Governments principally concerned, and we have given personal explanations to 14 of them.

In all of these matters, we have maintained close working relations with our Congress.

We availed of the presence in Washington of the Foreign Ministers of the 20 other American

states, all belligerents, to explain to them the principles of the Japanese peace we sought.

Within a few hours following the retirement of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander and after confirming that there was continuing bipartisan support of established policies, we returned to Japan so that the new Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, might be fully informed. He has been informed, and, already his great ability, tested not only in war but also in the counsels of the United Nations, is being dedicated to the attainment of peace.

We have taken advantage of our presence here to inform your Prime Minister and other Japanese political leaders of the progress made, of the obstacles surmounted, and the problems that remain.

The records of the past 3 months admit of no doubt as to our intention to seek an early peace. It is not necessary, in this respect, to rely upon what we say. You can see what we do.

Just Peace

The peace we seek is a just peace which will promote reconciliation between those who have been enemies. When I spoke in Tokyo last February, we talked of a peace of trust and of opportunity.² The treaty terms, which we have now tentatively formulated, were described in an address made in Los Angeles on March 31.³ I shall not describe them here again because they are familiar to you. I am confident you have found that our detailed proposals fully conform to what we forecast here. The peace treaty we envisage would, in fact, restore Japan as a free and equal member of the society of nations.

There is always the temptation to take advantage of a defeated nation's helplessness to impose restrictions of a kind which are not applicable to

¹ Address made before a meeting of the United Nations Association of Japan, at the Industrial Club, Tokyo, on Apr. 23 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1951, p. 252.

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 9, 1951, p. 576.

other sovereign nations. The United States is opposed to that. We are convinced that the welfare of all concerned, the victors as well as the vanquished, will best be served by a peace which will erase the wounds of war, not keep them festering.

General MacArthur, who largely inspired our concept of peace, said that it "brings a new spiritual idea to mankind and evokes a new standard of morality in international relations." That is worth doing. Though the value of that is intangible, it is not, on that account, less real.

Secure Peace

We seek a peace that will be insured by the deterrent of collective power. When I last spoke there on February 2, I referred to the United Nations concept that there should be "effective collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace." Veto power in the Security Council has prevented the United Nations itself from setting up an effective security force. But the United Nations principle is, nevertheless, being applied through regional collective security arrangements, which are contemplated by the Charter. In that way, there is being built up collective power to deter aggression.

Today, the material might to deter aggression resides largely in the United States. But, as we said here before, the United States is prepared to combine its power with that of others in mutual commitments so that the deterrent power that protects us will also protect others. Japan can, if it wishes, share in that protection.

The Obstacle of Fear

Since we have been here, many have asked us about the obstacles that lie in the way of the prompt, just, and secure peace we seek. Of course, there are obstacles. That is a normal incident of every great achievement. There are, however, no obstacles that seem to be insurmountable except perhaps the obstacle of fear. Fear is a paralyzing, a corroding emotion. It destroys men's capacity to think clearly, and it makes them irresolute in action. Fear is a negative rather than a positive force. The most important task, to clear the way for the peace we seek, is to dispel the fears that harass us.

United States Stands Firm in the Pacific

Some seem to fear that the offer of the United States to establish collective security for Japan and for other Pacific areas means little because, they suggest, the power we possess will only be used to protect the members of the North Atlantic pact, leaving Asia in a position of neglect. That suggestion is wholly without foundation. I do not ask you to believe that merely because I say it. I

ask you to consider such indisputable facts as the following:

1. Of the Armed Forces of the United States which are outside of our homeland, a large part are in Asia.

2. The Far Eastern Air Force has been expanded in numbers and facilities, a fresh United States Army division has, in the last few days, arrived in Japan to strengthen the position here, while still another is en route.

3. The United States stands ready, by bilateral arrangement with Japan, to continue after the peace a screen of protection which could not be breached without placing upon the United States grave responsibilities, which we publicly accept.

4. The United States has, and expects to maintain, armed force at Okinawa, and new construction there is steadily going forward.

5. The United States has in the Philippines military-operating rights and facilities pursuant to agreement with that Government, and President Truman, only last week, has affirmed that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.

6. The United States, as the President further announced last week, is prepared, in connection with reestablishment of peace with Japan, to make an arrangement with Australia and New Zealand providing for common action to meet the common danger inherent in an armed attack upon any of them in the Pacific.

7. The bulk of United States power, and notably its strategic air power, remains, of course, within the United States itself. But, there, it also serves others. An armed attack upon any of the areas, East or West, where there are such prearrangements as I have described, could bring into play this immense retaliatory striking power. That is known, and that knowledge exerts a powerful influence for peace. The Japanese nation can share the security which the United States itself and others derive from the fact that potential aggressors know that they cannot attack without subjecting themselves to the risk of great disaster.

8. Secretary Acheson, speaking in Washington on April 18, in discussing the contemplated arrangements between the United States and Japan for the continued security of Japan said that Japan's safety is of vital concern to us both.⁴

In the light of all these facts, it is ridiculous to pretend that the collective security which is offered to Japan is illusory.

Fear of Indirect Aggression

Let us turn now to a second cause of fear, the fear that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Com-

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 683.

munist Party (Bolshevik) may not leave Japan alone.

As I pointed out in speaking here last February, international danger has two aspects. There is the danger of direct aggression and also of indirect aggression.

I cannot in honesty say to you that the menace of indirect aggression is illusory. That is a danger that is ever present and all pervading. In every free country of the world, there exists, partly in the open but also invariably underground, a Bolshevik organization working to gain political control so as to add that country to the list of those which are subject to the will of international communism. Their avowed goal is to achieve a universal state under the domination of the Soviet Communist Party as the leader of the world proletariat. In their efforts, they accept the direction of the Moscow Politburo as being what they call the General Staff of the world proletariat. This is a danger which, as I say, exists everywhere. It is, however, a danger which, when it is recognized, can be met. That has been proved time after time.

Communism wins its internal victories by using fraud and terrorism to win converts and by then using these converts first to break down orderly government and then to seize power through revolutionary effort. Those methods fail utterly when falsehood is met with truth; when secrecy is confronted with exposure; and, above all, when the society is so sound and healthy that there are not mass discontents which furnish communism with recruits. Confronted by these conditions, the tactics of Bolshevik communism cannot prevail.

The consequences of Communist conquest are now so demonstrably evil that to abet the conquest is a supreme crime. We see these consequences in China and North Korea. There the Communist rulers, like all true Communists of the Bolshevik school, proclaim and protest loyalty to the Politburo at Moscow, and now the destitute and war-weary peoples of North Korea and China are being fed into the fiery furnace of a war of aggression to gain control of all Korea, an area which has been a strategic objective of Russia since the days of the czars. The total casualties of North Korean and Communist Chinese forces in Korea between June 25, 1950 and April 17, 1951, are officially estimated by the United Nations Command as being 827,186. This awful sacrifice is so sickening that all peoples in their senses will take the necessary measures so that they will not, in turn, become victims of Communist despotism and be made to pour out the lives of their youth to promote the fanatical Bolshevik dream of world domination.

The danger is real. It is a danger that confronts every nation in the world, but it is a danger that can be dealt with and which will be dealt with by all who see the danger, for the consequences of neglect are disastrous.

The Danger of Direct Aggression

There is, of course, some risk of general war, but I personally doubt that the rulers of Russia now want it. I may be wrong. No one can be certain of what goes on within the dark recesses of the Kremlin. But experience to date indicates that the rulers of Soviet Russia spread fear of general war primarily because that helps the Communist Parties in non-Communist countries to strengthen their position so that they can take over from within.

I recall that in 1948, the Prime Minister of France told me that the Communist Party within France had been greatly strengthened numerically by rumors that France would be invaded by the Red armies of Russia. The Communists deliberately spread those rumors and sought to capitalize on the resultant fear by urging membership in the Party as a means of getting safety as against liquidation when the Red armies moved in.

That is standard technique, and I should be surprised if it is not practiced in all other countries within reach of the military power of Russia.

Also, I recall the furor that Soviet Russia raised when the North Atlantic security pact was made 2 years ago. The Russian leaders cried to high heaven that this security arrangement constituted in fact an offensive threat and that it involved the United Kingdom and France in violation of their treaties of alliance with Russia. Communists indicated that this might be a cause for war.

Some timid souls were paralyzed with fright and saw, in nightmares, the Red army marching into Western Europe. Those who were calmer and more experienced saw that the Red armies would not march on the basis of some legalistic pretext. They saw that it was better to gain strength than to succumb to blackmail which would mean permanent weakness and the living in perpetual fear. So the Atlantic countries went ahead. They made their security pact, they began to implement it, and the Red armies did not march.

There is always danger of war when there are ambitious despots who control a great military establishment. That has been so since the beginning of time. However, the evidence to date suggests that the present program for world conquest is primarily the program of the Communist Party, that it is being pursued primarily by methods of indirect aggression, and that the fear of direct aggression and armed attack is being spread to frighten the free peoples into a condition which will make them vulnerable to conquest from within.

Over-All Peace

Those who seek alternatives to collective security are the victims of a great illusion.

Some seek safety in what they call an over-all peace. That means, I take it, that they do not

want peace before it is offered jointly by the free nations and also by Soviet Russia.

It is, of course, highly desirable that the Soviet Union should become a party to the kind of peace we seek for Japan. The United States has sought earnestly to bring that about, and we shall continue to do so. We have been scrupulous to seek to keep in touch with the representatives of the Soviet Union precisely as with the other Allies principally concerned.

For some months, the Soviet Government, through Jacob Malik, carried on discussions with us. Before coming to Japan last January, I explained to Mr. Malik the exploratory nature of our mission; that no final decisions would be taken and that we would discuss the situation with him when we returned. In accordance with that promise, immediately upon our return, we sought to see him to report the good prospects ahead, and to exchange views about future procedure. Thereupon, Mr. Malik, presumably under instructions, announced to the press that he would not "resume negotiation on a Japanese peace treaty."

We were not willing to reply on a press announcement on so important a matter. Therefore, we personally approached Mr. Malik to find out whether the press statement must be accepted at its face value. He confirmed that his Government was unwilling to resume our Japanese peace treaty discussions.

Even so, however, we do not accept the rebuff as final. We have submitted our suggested text of treaty to the Soviet Embassy in Washington and, in this way, informed the Soviet Government that the United States would appreciate its consideration of the draft and an early expression of its views. We have further informed the Soviet Government that thereafter the Government of the United States would expect again to get in touch with the Soviet Government with a view to concerting future procedures.

Our approach has so far elicited no response, and it may be that the Soviet Union intends to disassociate itself from the Japanese peace. If so, the reasons will not be hard to find. The Soviet Government talks much of peace but in fact, when peace comes near, they avoid it like the plague. They do so because they desire to deny the reassurance which peace would bring and to keep alive the fear upon which the Bolshevik Communist Party capitalizes in its efforts at indirect aggression.

If that attitude persists, then those who advocate a so-called over-all peace are, in effect, advocating no peace at all.

Neutrality and Friendship

There are some who feel that neutrality is safer than collective security. Neutrality would, of course, be normal if we were living in a world where aggression was permanently banished. But in a world where there are still aggressors, neutrality

is no protection, rather it encourages aggression.

No one has spoken more clearly or eloquently on this point than Stalin himself. Speaking on March 10, 1939, Stalin bitterly reproached what he called "the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France, and the United States" because, he said they—

... have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention, a position of "neutrality." That policy might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can" ... but, actually speaking the policy of nonintervention means conniving at aggression.

We should all be advised to remember these words. History is full of examples of how illusory it is to seek security through neutrality and pacts of nonaggression and of friendship.

Let us recall the experience of the National Government of China.

As part of the Yalta arrangement of February, 1945, Stalin agreed to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance. Six months later, the Soviet Union did in fact make such a pact. The National Government of China, in accordance with the Yalta proposal, agreed to surrender to Russia effective control of Manchurian railroads, Port Arthur, and Dairen. But in return, as was stipulated by the Yalta proposal, the Soviet Union made with the National Government of China a treaty of friendship and alliance and solemnly promised that, for 20 years, it would—

... render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China.

A few days later, the Japanese surrender having been concluded, the Russians moved into Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, North Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kuril and Habomai Islands, thus cashing in on a formal belligerency that had lasted 6 days. In Manchuria, they acquired not only Japanese industrial investments but also vast amounts of Japanese armament and ammunition dumps. These latter they turned over to the Chinese Red armies, despite the explicit agreement they had just made, to give military supplies only to the National Government.

In October 1949, in another direct violation of its 20-year treaty of 1945, the Soviet Government withdrew its recognition of the National Government and recognized the Red regime of Mao Tse-tung as the government of all China.

The lessons are clear. As Stalin said, the only reliable security policy is the policy of collective resistance to aggressors and a policy of neutrality means in fact "conniving at aggression."

The Road to Peace

I have spoken of fears in the hope of allaying fear. Fear itself is usually far more dangerous

than what is feared, for it destroys the capacity to surmount danger.

As we have seen, the actual danger that confronts us, the danger of indirect aggression, can be dealt with. The danger of direct aggression is a kind of danger that has been constant in the world as it has existed for thousands of years. There is today much more chance to overcome that type of danger than ever before in the history of mankind. Now, for the first time, there is a possibility of collective measures adequate to assure that victims will not be plucked one by one. Therefore, we can face the future with courage and confidence and act to seek the kind of peace that the nations envisaged when they met at San Francisco and drafted the United Nations Charter which should always be our guide.

Collective Security

That Charter, you will recall, rejects the thesis of pacifism that there should be no armament and no resistance to aggression. On the contrary, the Charter imposes upon every member the obligation to stand ready to provide armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter recognizes that there is a right of individual and collective self-defense and that this is what it calls an inherent right. It recognizes the need for "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." It contemplates regional arrangements as an agency for peace.

It is in pursuance of those principles that the President of the United States last week outlined his plans for strengthening the fabric of peace in the Pacific Ocean area by a series of steps which initially would include (a) a posttreaty security arrangement between the United States and Japan; (b) the maintenance of armed forces at Okinawa; (c) recognition that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety; and (d) the conclusion with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand of an arrangement whereby, in the event of an armed attack upon any of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger. These measures, he pointed out, were "initial steps," and, as Secretary Acheson pointed out the following day, they will not interfere in any way with such broader arrangements as nations in the Pacific area may wish to develop—arrangements which he said would receive the sympathetic interest of the United States.

The series of measures thus outlined, taken in the aggregate, represent major steps in the exercise of regional and collective security rights which are authorized by the United Nations Charter, and which all of the members of the United Nations have by the Charter recognized to be in the interest of peace, security, and justice. Let us

also recall that the United Nations Charter, while it recognizes the necessity of there being armed force to resist armed attack, lays down another principle; namely, the principle that "force shall not be used, save in the common interest." This great principle, if given practical expression in arrangements for collective security, automatically gives hope that armed force created for security will not serve to create insecurity. Since this principle is embodied in practice, it will mean that individual nations will be less inclined and less able to use national force to promote purely national ambitions. It is a principle which operates against the militarism which neither Japan nor its neighbors want.

Economic Well-Being

Let us also recall article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes that stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations and which calls upon the nations to promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.

The leaders and people of Japan are, I know, concerned with their economic problems, and that is a natural concern. It is because of the difficulty of the Japanese economic position that the United States stands against imposing such economic burdens and disabilities as would make it improbable that Japan would realize the conditions which the Charter of the United Nations recognizes to be necessary for lasting peace.

If the Japanese conform in public and private trade and commerce to internationally accepted fair practices and if the industry, the aptitude, and the ingenuity of the Japanese people are devoted to developing mutually desirable trade and commerce with the rest of the world, that should assure the possibility of a rising economic standard.

In this connection, it is useful to recall that trade and commerce are apt to flourish where they have the protection of a common security system. If there is concluded between Japan and the United States such a post-treaty security arrangement as the President of the United States has suggested, that in itself will promote the confidence which will encourage business and finance within our two nations to work together in cooperation for mutual advantage.

Human Rights

Let us also recall that the United Nations Charter calls for universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for cultural and educational cooperation.

In Japan, human freedom and opportunity have already been vastly enlarged during the occupation through such measures as women's suffrage,

land reform, the organization of labor, the liquidation of militarism and police terrorism, freedom of the press, and, broadly, the giving of sovereignty to the people through a truly representative government. Japan is today one of the nations which are in the forefront of those seeking to conform their conduct to the high ideals enunciated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

You are eager for cultural and educational cooperation and, in this respect, you have much to give, for your people have demonstrated over the centuries the capacity to appreciate and create beauty and culture.

The free world, in turn, welcomes cooperation

with Japan in the field of education and culture, and our mission is perhaps unique in the history of peace missions in that one of its members was specifically charged with finding ways to promote cultural and educational cooperation.

Conclusion

We stand at a threshold beyond which lies a vista of opportunities that are immense and glorious. The door is not yet open, but we hold in our hands the key. Let not our hand be paralyzed by fears and doubts. Let us dare to use that key to open that door and go forward on the road to peace.

The Phony "Peace" Offensive

by John D. Hickerson

*Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs*¹

How well do we in the United States understand Soviet techniques designed to undermine the free world?

In the great debates taking place in this country about how we can best defend ourselves from the threat of Soviet imperialism, we should not lose sight of the aims and methods utilized by those who would destroy us.

Some Soviet techniques we now understand fairly well—such as subversion through coups, espionage, overt aggression through satellites, and the constant repetition of blatantly false propaganda. But are we sufficiently alert to some of the more subtle maneuverings of the Kremlin which are designed to advance Soviet imperialism by exploiting the free world's sincere desire for peace? I doubt it.

I would like, therefore, to talk to you today about one of the most insidious weapons of the Cominform—the phony "peace" offensive.

We are in a period of history which is unique in many ways. Man's aspiration to live in harmony with his fellow man has existed since the beginning of time. But, there has probably never been a time when more people, from all walks of life, in all parts of the world, were so anxious for peace. The last two world wars reached into the homes of millions of people, took away dear ones and wrecked the products of their life's work. At no time have the ravages of war been felt by so many. A new war would affect more rather

than fewer men, and its potential havoc is terrifying to contemplate. Paradoxically, however, there have been few times in history when a just peace has been so hard to attain.

The universal desire for peace is not lost on the men in the Kremlin. Although they alone are sabotaging peace, they see in this universal desire for peace an opportunity to exploit for their own ends.

Exploiting the Desire for Peace

Why has the Kremlin found it desirable to exploit this yearning for peace?

The Soviet's ability to extend their power through the medium of communism, as an economic and political belief, has been steadily losing ground in most parts of the world. The Cominform brand of "domestic" communism has become known for what it is—an arm of Soviet expansionism, entirely subservient to the aims of the Kremlin.

Communism thrives on empty stomachs, on chaos, and on fear. As the free nations of the world increase their security, the appeal of communism declines.

The democratic nations of the world have made tremendous strides in the reconstruction of their countries and in their ability to defend themselves. The material betterment we have achieved far outstrips the progress made by the Soviets and their satellites. The free countries are proving that they can give to the world an ever-expanding economic and social program.

¹Address made before the 2d Annual Institute on U.S. Foreign Policy at Milwaukee, Wis. on Apr. 27 and released to the press on the same date.

The Marshall Plan, Point 4, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Rio Pact have given evidence of the ability of the democracies to provide bread and security.

The Communists must realize that no informed person believes them when they claim to be the champions of social justice. Thus, the area, in which the Soviet Union can persuade people without the use of force, has been steadily decreasing. Theirs is a bankrupt philosophy, and, more and more, people have come to realize this. As political dogma, it is as dated as the slang of another decade.

The decline in the Soviet Union's ability to sell its wares and the increasing strength of the democratic nations are matters of grave concern to Soviet leaders. To rally support, they have, therefore, seized on one central theme with which no one can quarrel. That theme is peace. Of course, we all want peace. As long as the Communists don't define it—for a Communist definition is invariably a contradiction of the term itself—the people of the world will naturally tend to support a campaign for peace.

Let us see, now, how the Kremlin has tried to exploit the peace theme. In Paris, back in 1949, the Communists set up the partisans-of-peace organization. Together with the word "peace" they utilized the word "partisan," which had strong associations among democratic peoples with the united effort during World War II to overthrow the tyranny of totalitarianism. They sought to gather strength for their campaign of deceit through use of these universally appealing words. These so-called partisans of peace later met at Stockholm where they initiated the notorious Stockholm Appeal. Later, they met in Warsaw where they established an executive body known as the World Peace Council. The first meeting of this World Peace Council was in East Berlin last February.

What is this World Peace Council?

The Council asserts grandiloquently that it has 262 members from 60 countries and represents 500 million people. It claims to be a more representative international organization than the United Nations itself. Let's investigate it more carefully. The total population of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China exceeds 500 million, and no one can tell how many of these are included among the 500 million people supposedly represented by the World Peace Council. Representatives are selected to the World Peace Council by the usual Communist methods of "self-election" or appointment.

We can well imagine how the U.S.S.R., Chinese Communists, and satellite ones are chosen. Who are some of these representatives who purport to represent other countries? Joliet-Curie, who is the chairman, is an avowed Communist who was removed last year from his position as High Commissioner of the French Atomic Energy Board,

because of doubt about his primary loyalty to France. Does he purport to speak for France? Paul Robeson is a member of the Executive Council. Does he purport to speak for 153 million Americans?

These are two representative examples of who it is that speaks for countries in this World Peace Council. The others are largely persons notorious in their own country; thoroughly discredited in the eyes of their own countrymen; and hand-picked for their naivete or primary loyalty to the Soviet Union. The net result is that at least 85 percent of the members of the World Peace Council are Communists or fellow travelers. To make insurance doubly sure, control of the Council is in the hands of its executive bureau. All but two of the 27 members of this bureau are either Communists or fellow travelers. The very structure of this organization is indicative of its origin. This is typical Communist-front organizational procedure.

In the United States, the mission of the World Peace Council is carried on by something that calls itself the American Peace Crusade. This group was publicly exposed by Secretary Acheson last February as merely a continuation of the spurious partisans-of-peace movement. The entire program of this shadowy group coincides with the foreign policy objectives of the U.S.S.R.

How does this World Peace Council operate?

The object of this organization is to obtain widespread support from groups which would not ordinarily respond to Communist doctrines. It is its aim, through playing the role of champion of "peace," to win these people away from the support of democratic ideas and policies to a concept of false neutrality. They will play upon the universal desire for peace; upon abhorrence of warfare; upon the purposes of the United Nations. They try to garner support under these general rubrics.

Let us look at the fine print, however. You will note how this support for peace is cleverly coupled with support of specific Communist objectives, and how it is hypocritically designed to exploit inconsistent local prejudices.

Here is how this specious device works. A world-wide drive for peace is started. Peace has a universal appeal. The man in the factory in Detroit wants peace; the farmer in Brittany wants peace; the man in the rice paddy of South Asia wants peace. When beamed at South Asia, the propaganda organ of the partisans is for peace and against colonialism. In exploiting Asian nationalism, they fail to say that they want to impose a totalitarian government subservient to Soviet imperialism. They want to create a power vacuum into which they can inject their fifth column and secure control over these peoples in a way which makes old time colonial rule look enlightened. No colonial domination of the old order was ever felt so heavily by the people as is the tyranny of Soviet imperialism.

When talking to the Frenchman, they are for peace and against German rearmament. By exploiting the historic fear of a militant Germany, they seek to bring about a weak Europe—a Europe they can dominate with fear and overrun when it suits their purposes. When talking to Germany, they are for peace and a strong, unified Germany. When talking to certain parts of the Far East, they want peace and are against Japanese rearmament. Playing on the fears of a resurgent Japan, they seek again a power vacuum in which the Japanese people will not be able to defend themselves. In this way, the organization couples a universal idea with a local issue with which to serve their own interests.

Soviet Agitation by "Peace" Meetings

In addition to a skillful, constant use of mass media for such purposes, they have scheduled—to use the parlance of bureaucracy—regional and functional meetings. There is, for example, a meeting sponsored by the World Peace Council in the American hemisphere scheduled for this summer. The issue of peace will doubtless be coupled with local prejudice in such a way as to be useful to the local Communist parties. Perhaps it will be peace and Yankee imperialism. Perhaps, it will be peace and the alleged exploitation of Latin America in some other form by the United States. At all these meetings, the unwary will soon find that peace means Soviet peace; that the meeting is being run by experienced Soviet-trained agitators and Communist organizers.

I mentioned earlier that the World Peace Council claims to have the support of millions for peace. But the organization will also claim that these millions support its specific policies. This is but one of the insidious methods by which they are attempting to obtain wide support for their own ends from innocent, well-meaning peoples. A well-meaning person may sign a petition saying simply: "I am for a peace pact." Whether he knows it or not, his name is misused as a supporter of Soviet imperialism. Like the not yet forgotten American practice of offering free lunch with a nickle glass of beer, the World Peace Council is trying to sell its product—Soviet imperialism—by promising world peace.

The obvious attempt is to create a propaganda basis which could be used to divide the free world. Their aim is to drive a wedge between the people and their governments, and between free governments themselves. To this end, they utilize innocent non-Communist persons who are sincerely interested in peace.

Now let us look more closely at some of the policies advocated in this phony Communist peace offensive. What are the planks in the platform?

First, the subject of atomic weapons is a popular one. At their Stockholm meeting, the partisans of peace appealed for a banning of atomic

weapons. This has been a standard theme since then. Well, who is really against banning atomic weapons? Just examine the history of efforts in the United Nations to assure the control of atomic energy and make possible a real abolition of atomic weapons. The statement of the participating powers on their attempts at negotiation with the Soviet Union on atomic energy control is eloquent on this subject.

It states:

It is apparent that there is a fundamental difference not only on methods but also on aims. All of the Sponsoring Powers, other than the U.S.S.R., put world security first and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and economic organization where these are necessary for security. The Government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty. If this fundamental difference could be overcome, other differences which have hitherto appeared unsurmountable could be seen in true perspective, and reasonable ground might be found for their adjustment.

Yet the partisans of peace sought to delude the peoples of the world into thinking that a Communist paper pledge would insure against atomic attack. What is needed, of course, is not a declaration against the use of the atom bomb but an effective system of control and inspection. Yet all efforts in the United Nations to secure agreement on such a system have been frustrated by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union alone.

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission drafted a plan for the control of atomic energy which was approved in 1948 by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly. Since then, it has twice been reaffirmed by even larger majorities.

If these partisans of peace were actually concerned about the use of atomic weapons, why did they not address themselves to this plan? Is it because the Soviet Union is not really interested in effective control? Is it because, while calling for the outlawing of the bomb, they have maintained a standing army far outnumbering that of any of the world powers today? One could speculate that they exploited the universal abhorrence of the atomic bomb to try to weaken us in the one field—technical proficiency—that could be matched against their larger land armies.

Second, the World Peace Council, now brazenly says it is against aggression. The earlier version of the Stockholm Appeal failed to condemn aggression. Now, they say they are against aggression, but they condemn the United Nations for having declared the Chinese Communists to be aggressors in Korea. The Cominform asks for "peace" at meetings of the partisans of peace in Stockholm, Paris, Warsaw, or in Berlin. At the same time, they attempt to intimidate Yugoslavia and they actually succeed in instigating armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.

It is revealing to note that just before the North Koreans launched their unprovoked attack against

the Republic of Korea, more than half the population of North Korea was reported to have signed the Stockholm petition. This illustrates the basic hypocrisy of the Communist "peace appeal." The Soviet concept of world peace means the absence of any opposition to the ever-expanding Soviet drive for power.

Third, the organization is now campaigning for a five-power peace pact, a favorite Soviet proposition. The Five Powers would be the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and Red China. They state that failure to meet for the purpose of signing a peace pact between the Big Five would be evidence of aggressive intentions. A campaign is under way to secure signatures which will, in their own words, "create" a movement of public opinion powerful enough to force discussion and final conclusion of a "peace pact."

These techniques are so important to Moscow that the Cominform journal, the organ of international communism, stated that the collection of these signatures is "the main paramount task" of international communism. It is interesting to note that a campaign to collect these signatures in North Korea was announced just a few days before the latest Communist offensive against United Nations forces in Korea.

It is nonsensical to say that complex problems can be worked out if only Five Powers would sit down at a conference table and talk them out. Ever since the end of World War II, we have been and are still attempting to do this. We have held six meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in an attempt to settle our differences. But Soviet intransigence was just as marked at the last as it was at the first.

In Paris, the Deputy Foreign Ministers are meeting in an attempt to secure agreement on an objective agenda on limited issues. After 8 weeks—8 weeks—the Soviet representatives have not yet agreed to a simple agenda which would serve as a basis of discussion between the Big Four.

We sit at the council tables at Lake Success, day in and day out, in an effort to collaborate on the peaceful settlement of disputes. There is something more fundamental involved than simply trying to talk things out. We have witnessed Soviet tactics of subversion and obstruction, in and out of the United Nations. If the Soviet Union will not carry out its existing obligations, what reason is there to assume that they would honor a new peace pact. The Charter itself is the most solemn peace pact in history. Why do we need a new one?

Fourth, they ask that the United Nations return "to the role assigned it by the Charter," namely, that it serve as an area of agreement between governments. They assert that it now acts as an instrument of a "dominant group."

The Soviet Union's activities in the United Nations have been 100 percent negative in the political field, in the economic and social fields, in the

fields of disarmament and atomic energy. Not only have they offered no constructive program in the United Nations; they have consistently attempted to subvert the organization to their own propaganda purposes. When they talk about the United Nations, check what they say against the telltale record of their performance. There is no doubt about who is out of step.

Nevertheless, in spite of Soviet obstruction, the United Nations has important achievements to its credit. Among these are the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iranian territory in 1946; the successful conclusion of the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute, resulting in the establishment of an independent Indonesia; the cease-fires in Palestine and in Kashmir, the contribution through its close surveillance and active concern to the independence of Greece; and, more dramatically, the defense of the Republic of Korea.

Fourteen members of the United Nations now have fighting forces in Korea alongside the gallant Koreans. Reinforcements from these and other countries are on the way or will soon be on the way. Three other countries have medical units in Korea. Forty-one countries have furnished or pledged nonmilitary assistance to the Koreans. As a result of this collective effort, the Communist aggressors have twice been rolled back to behind the point where the original aggression started. I am confident that we will give a good account of ourselves in the current fighting.

No, the United Nations has not, as Marshal Stalin said he feared, gone the inglorious way of the League of Nations and failed to meet aggression. But the aggression, which it met and is in the process of repelling, is a Communist aggression. Is this, perhaps, why the Soviets have stepped up the tempo of their campaign against the United Nations, particularly, after the United Nations branded the Chinese Communist aggressors in February?

Answering Soviet Charges Against U.N.

The Soviet charge that the United Nations has disappointed the peoples of the world comes from the nation which has caused such disappointment as exists by its threats and use of force; its subversive and conspiratorial methods; its refusal to cooperate; its propaganda of hatred; and its misuse of a great idea for its own purposes.

The Soviets charge that the United Nations has failed because it has turned into a docile instrument of United States policy. This is nothing but an absurd way of saying that the majority of free nations of the world have been alert to Soviet subversion. The voting record in the United Nations reflects the unity of the democracies against the vociferous minority of the Soviets and their satellites.

The United States cannot honestly be blamed because other nations find their interests at odds

with those of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are themselves responsible. Their unreasonable and uncompromising positions have engendered a real fear among the majority of the members of the United Nations. An eloquent statement of this was made by Paul Henri Spaak, former Belgian Foreign Minister, when, in reply to Mr. Vyshinsky, he said:

I must answer you. I think I am the one to do it, because no one could consider that Belgium is trying to be provocative against the Soviet Union. We are afraid because by your conduct you have rendered this organization (the United Nations) ineffective. We are afraid because the problems before this Assembly have remained unsolved; because, even when a solution is proposed by a majority of the United Nations, you have refused to adhere to this solution. We are afraid because we have placed all our hopes and confidence in the defensive organization of the United Nations; and through the policy you have pursued, you are forbidding us to seek our security and our salvation within the framework of this organization, but making us seek it within the framework of a regional arrangement. We are afraid of you because, in every country represented here, you are maintaining a fifth column, beside which the Hitlerite fifth column is nothing but a boy scout organization, if I might say so. There is not a single spot in the world whether in Asia, whether in Europe, or whether in Africa, where a government represented here fails to find difficulties, and these difficulties are being made still further aggravated by you . . .

Fundamental political and security decisions of the United Nations have been supported by the vast majority of members including countries with such diverse interests as the American Republics, the Asian states, and the Arab states. Their decisions are arrived at through democratic means in the give and take of free discussion. Differences of opinion, in degree, do, of course, exist. I believe that this is proof, however, of the democratic nature of the organization.

In organizing its phoney "peace" campaign, what has the Kremlin in mind concerning the future of the United Nations? That is anybody's guess on this side of the iron curtain. This "peace" campaign professes a wish to bring the United Nations back to its original purposes. In this manner the World Peace Council seeks to discredit the United Nations and thus lessen the stigma of the United Nations' denunciation of the North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression.

By building up their World Peace Council, the Soviets seek to exert propaganda pressure against the United Nations—a sort of blackmail. It is perhaps significant that the last North Korean message to the United Nations, contained in a lengthy document in the Russian language, carefully followed the line being voiced by the World Peace Council.

However, in spite of the Soviet record, we are not willing to give up hope for peace. We are willing to continue to try to settle differences with them by negotiation. We believe this should be done largely through the United Nations. We are not, however, blind to Soviet aims and tactics, and we must not allow them to subvert the United Na-

tions to their ends. We have fought their attempts to do this since 1945 and will continue our efforts to strengthen the United Nations as an effective organization on world peace.

We of the free world have worked consistently to further man's desire for peace, freedom, economic betterment, and security. We will not be deceived by broad statements of the Soviet-dominated Peace Council.

Let's be sure they are made to explain what they mean by peace. Let's be sure it isn't acquiescence in Soviet imperialism. Let's be sure we are not lulled into a false sense of security by a declaration outlawing the atomic bomb without an effective system of inspection and control. Let's be sure they do not succeed in sowing dissatisfaction within the United Nations.

If they insist on slandering the United Nations, we must lay the blame for the inadequacies of that organization squarely where it belongs—on the Soviet Union and its policies of obstruction and subversion. We must block the Kremlin's efforts to deceive and divide.

What do the Soviets mean by peace? Look at the record of the past 6 years. The kind of peace the Soviets have in mind is clear. Soviet peace means the fall of democratic Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, aggression by satellites, the extinction of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all areas which they control, and brazen defiance of the United Nations Charter.

Let no one be deceived by the World Peace Council. It is an organ of Soviet foreign policy. It is a tool of the phony "peace" offensive.

The real peace offensive is being waged by those who honestly support the United Nations. This was well put by the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, in the course of replying to Joliet-Curie:

The United Nations is working for collective security against armed aggression. The United Nations is working for the peaceful settlement of international differences by negotiation, mediation, and conciliation. The United Nations is working for the control and reduction of armaments and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction under an international control system that will protect all nations against violations and evasions. The United Nations is working to give freedom, bread, security, and opportunity for improvement of their lot to all the hungry, the poor, the oppressed, and the frightened people of the world. Finally, the United Nations stands for the principle of universality and seeks to apply the doctrine of the peaceful coexistence of all kinds of systems and cultures which is talked about so much and—outside the United Nations—practiced so little in the world today.

It is the first duty, therefore, of every peace-loving man and woman in the world to give their support to the United Nations, to seek to persuade all governments to give respect and compliance to all its decisions and recommendations, and to use every opportunity to spread and to strengthen its influence for peace. Conversely, those whose actions tend to weaken the United Nations, to undermine its authority, to sharpen the discords that are inevitably present in a world organization—they are no true friends of peace no matter what they profess to be.

. . . Support the United Nations with understanding and loyalty, and you shall have peace.

Outlook and Tasks Ahead for Germany

OUTLINE OF UNITED STATES POLICIES

by John J. McCloy

United States High Commissioner for Germany¹

Six years ago, the obstacles of the rebuilding of Germany seemed to be staggering. The tasks of restoring order from chaos, of preventing the starvation and death of millions of people, of cleaning up the physical and moral debris of war looked almost hopeless.

Progress Since 1945

Look at your country today. It is easy to criticize, but you must see the situation in perspective. The progress since 1945 is astounding. More people are now gainfully employed than ever before in Western Germany. Hundreds of thousands of new dwellings are going up everywhere in the Federal Republic. Restrictions on almost all kinds of production, including shipbuilding, have fallen. Much, to be sure, remains to be done to reduce unemployment, to reach a better equilibrium in the price-wage scale, to provide more housing. But the simple fact is that your economy provides you with unrationed food, clothing, and other consumer goods on a scale at least equal to that of other Western European countries and far greater than that achieved anywhere behind the iron curtain. Politically, you have created a free democratic community in the Federal Republic. The individual is safe from the arbitrary will of one man or of one party. Men and women are free to speak and to take active part in the affairs of their country.

The Bundes Republic is gaining increasing respect abroad. Your position as a full member of the European Council now seems assured. Two weeks ago, your Chancellor was received in Paris as an honored guest to negotiate on a basis of equality with the ministers of five other European countries. The rebirth of Germany in the past

6 years has been a great constructive accomplishment. It has been the result of hard work by the German people and their representatives, aided by the great economic and moral contribution from the free world. It has been achieved without slave labor, without fear of a secret police, without false promises of 5-year plans. If there were a way to do so, a vast majority of the millions of Germans in the East zone would try to share in the economic and political progress made by the Bundes Republic.

The outside world has noted these achievements of postwar Germany. The German people should take pride in them. The fact that Germany is obliged to pay a portion of the costs involved in the occupation or that a peace treaty is not in the immediate offing does not lessen these gains. The threat posed by the Communists by their control of the East zone makes the situation here much more complicated, for example, take the case of Japan.

The Task Ahead for Germany and U.S. Policies

In the next period, the task of Germany will be twofold; first, to maintain and extend at home the gains already achieved, especially in strengthening and modernizing economic and political institutions. The second main task is to forge strong and enduring links with the free world. In this connection, I want to outline to you briefly how the policies of the United States in Germany are designed to help carry out these tasks:

INTEGRATION WITH FREE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

1. It is the policy of the United States to support the integration of Germany with the other free countries of Europe. The European countries themselves must join together to solve their joint problems. Here, the Schuman Plan rep-

¹Address made over the Bavarian Radio on Apr. 25 and released to the press on the same date.

resents a striking example of the possibilities of such cooperation. In American eyes, the Schuman Plan is a test of the sincerity and ability of European countries to act as one community.

In a basic sector of the European economy, the Schuman Plan will consolidate the economic strength of Western Europe, free markets, and develop new economic opportunities. It will create employment, not unemployment. It is fantastic to assert, as some have, that the United States, which has poured billions into Germany to help revive production, would favor a plan to put people out of work or hamper German industrial development. Politically, it marks Germany's emergence as an equal partner in a great European project. If this bold, imaginative concept were rejected, it would be a serious and perhaps fatal blow to the hopes built up slowly during the past few years. It would create the danger of a disunited, weak Europe and an isolated Germany.

Farsighted leadership on both sides of the Rhine has carried the Schuman Plan concept thus far. It is now a matter for debate by the various parliaments. I hope that, through this process, all of you will become fully aware of the character of the plan and its high objectives.

RESISTANCE OF ARMED ATTACK

2. It is the policy of the United States to assure men peace and to deter aggression by supporting and participating in the effort to create a strong Western European security system. It is our policy to resist any armed attack on West Germany or West Berlin.

The necessity for defense preparations is an unpleasant fact we must all face. Korea has shown—and the new Communist offensive shown again—that aggression in any part of the world affects European and German security.

The NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces are being built up in Europe to deter aggression not to institute it. The power of the Western World will come into action only in the event of aggression against any member. But, if attacked, the power of each country will become the strength of all.

PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE SYSTEM

3. The United States recognized the right of Germany to participate in her own and in the common defense within an integrated European defense system under conditions of equality.

We are firmly opposed to any revival of German militarism or of any German Army which would be independent of an international security system and we, together with the German people, will guard carefully against any such development.

We believe that German participation in an integrated European force is a decision which

the German Government and people must make for themselves. We are not attempting to buy or force and do not intend to buy or force such participation.

We believe it must be obvious to the German people that the nature and the efficacy and extent to which Germany can be protected depends in a large measure on German participation in its own defense. Neutrality has never been an effective bar to aggression against an unprotected country.

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS

4. It is the policy of the United States to support the development of a democratic Germany and to aid all democratic elements in Germany to safeguard against the revival of nazism or the imposition of communism. The German people have shown their rejection of communism in every free election which has taken place in Germany. Once identified, the Communist approach is always repudiated. This is now so clear that the Communists have resorted to their familiar tactic of using false fronts, such as neutrality, pacifism, and peace plebiscites to cover up their own imperialistic designs. These attempts are cynical frauds, just as the Communist cry for German unity is a fraud when, at the same time, free elections are outlawed.

Equally sinister is the threat from other totalitarian groups composed in large part of former Nazi activists. In certain areas of Germany, small groups are again trying to spread the evil doctrines, the old slogans and tactics, which brought Germany to ruin and will do so again if they should ever prevail. The German people, through their democratic governments, must be aware of these developments and be prepared to deal effectively with them. The German people cannot ever again permit such forces to gain control in their country, nor will the democratic world permit it.

ASSISTANCE TO GERMAN YOUTH

5. It is the policy of the United States to help German youth to recognize that its future opportunities can be found only in a democratic Germany within a great European community in a united, free world.

We recognize that a majority of German youth is eager to attach its loyalties to affirmative objectives; that it will not be deceived again by glittering promises that only a decade ago caused the destruction of its hopes and ideals. For that reason, the United States has made large contributions, including financial support, to German organizations which assist youth. We do not seek to control, to propagandize, or to regiment youth. We seek only to give German youth a chance for a better life.

For their part, the German people and their governments—city, kreis, land, and bund—should,

in my judgment, take greater interest in the problems of youth, spend more money on projects to help youth, and give youth greater opportunity for self-development. Young men and women should not be barred by their elders from office simply because of their youth, restricted in their participation in public affairs, or have their freedom to engage in a trade or profession arbitrarily circumscribed.

AID AND STRENGTH FOR CITY OF BERLIN

6. It is the policy of the United States to help the city of Berlin. The free world has been profoundly impressed by the fortitude of the people of Berlin and in their determination to stand up

for and defend their freedom. I hope and I am confident that the Bundes Republic will do everything possible to aid the city and strengthen ties with it.

These aims of the United States are not complex, and in no one of them is there the slightest suggestion of aggrandizement or extension of American power.

The condition of our aid, the condition of the maintenance of our policy is likewise simple. It demands only that the German people and their Government put their great energies and capacities into the making of a liberal, tolerant community, in which all men can walk with dignity and freedom.

German Federal Republic's Monthly Economic Review ¹

In February, a substantial decline in unemployment and an increase in the daily rate of coal production indicated that the economy of Western Germany was beginning to revive from its mid-winter slump. Economic policy also reached a turning point with the Federal Government's decision to suspend trade liberalization in order to curb the mounting deficit with the European Payments Union. The issuance of licenses for quota imports was also suspended and the Bank Deutscher Laender initiated a stringent program for the reduction of (short-term) debt.

Industrial production in January registered another decline (2.4 percent), largely as a result of seasonal factors, coal and power shortages, and the beginning of certain raw material shortages. Employment during February rose mainly because of revived building activity. Labor continued to push its claims for wage increases comparable to the rise in the cost of living, and to press for co-determination, extending its demand to the chemical industry and railways, as well as iron, steel and coal.

Foreign Trade

West German exports and imports decreased in January. Exports of \$217,500,000 represented a decline of \$23,700,000 from December to reach the lowest level since last October. The export decline carried added significance as the first monthly decline since April 1950. Imports of \$295,400,000

in January were \$19,400,000 less than in December. The most important developments by area were:

USA.—Exports of \$14,400,000 and imports of \$39,200,000 were both slightly below December figures.

Other Western Hemisphere.—Trade was maintained at a high level as exports (\$23,200,000) were only \$500,000 less, while imports (\$25,500,000) were \$500,000 higher than in the previous month.

Marshall Plan Countries.—Most of the decline in both exports and imports in January was in trade with the Marshall Plan countries. Although January exports to sterling participants (\$15,900,000) were greater than in December, those to non-sterling participants declined to \$126,100,000, the lowest amount since September 1950. Imports from both sterling (\$31,700,000) and non-sterling (\$142,600,000) participants declined, and the total for imports from Marshall Plan countries (\$174,300,000) was also the lowest since September.

Sterling Countries outside Marshall Plan.—Exports (\$10,900,000) declined \$2,400,000, but imports (mostly raw materials) continued to rise, reaching \$23,800,000 in January.

Eastern Europe.—Exports (\$7,600,000) to and imports (\$10,300,000) from the Soviet Bloc countries fell off, while exports to Yugoslavia (\$7,800,000) were almost triple the figure for December.

Commoditywise, food and agriculture exports (\$14,300,000) were almost double the December total, but the finished goods component, the key item in West German exports, declined by \$24,300,000 to \$145,800,000. On the import side, all

¹ Reprinted from the April Issue of the *Information Bulletin*; prepared by the Analytical Reports Branch of the Program Review Division of the Office of Economic Affairs, Hicoa.

major commodity groups shared equally in the decline.

Reasons for the adverse foreign trade developments in January were seasonal—there were less working days, for workers took long vacations at New Year; there were the normal post-Christmas slump, and the usual cold weather impediments to trade. Although the January decline in exports followed the December drop in German production, it is too early to assess the degree to which raw material shortages, international and domestic, were responsible for this development.

Dollar export figures to the United States and Canada in December disclose that of the total of \$15,700,000 exported to the United States, five commodity groups (pig iron, \$1,600,000; steel pipes and tubes, \$1,500,000; sheet iron, \$1,000,000; ferrous scrap, \$1,000,000 and fine mechanics and optical goods, \$800,000) accounted for \$5,900,000 or almost 40 percent of the total.

Of the December exports to Canada, three commodity groups (ironware, \$323,000; fine mechanics and optical goods, \$103,000; and cutlery and hardware, \$50,000) made up \$476,000 or one-half of the \$872,000 total.

Comparison with a year ago reveals that, for the major items, as the level of West German production and trade has risen, emphasis in exports to the United States has shifted away from scarce non-ferrous metals and semi-manufactured goods toward iron and steel mill products. Exceptions to this development are ferrous scrap, the export of which is a postwar phenomenon and of which about 30 percent of the total export to all countries went to the United States in December, and fine mechanics and optical goods, a traditional German export to the United States and Canada.

WEST GERMAN FOREIGN COMMODITY TRADE

January 1951
(Thousand Dollars)

CATEGORIES	Imports	Exports
Food and Agriculture	112,363	14,203
Industry	183,048	203,275
Raw Materials	104,437	22,965
Semifinished Goods	41,110	34,494
Finished Goods	37,501	145,816
Total	295,411	217,538
AREA		
Total Non-Participating Countries	121,146	75,150
USA	39,189	14,378
Canada	1,197	1,010
Latin America	24,309	22,204
Non-participating Sterling Countries	23,830	10,910
Soviet Bloc (incl. China)	10,340	7,619
Yugoslavia and Finland	4,203	9,417
Other Countries	18,078	9,612
Participating Countries	174,264	141,941
Non-Sterling	142,590	126,059
Sterling	31,674	15,882
Unspecified	1	447
Total	295,411	217,538

IMPORT SURPLUS: January \$77,873,000.

Foreign Payments Position

On Feb. 22, the German government announced temporary suspension of trade liberalization in an attempt to stem the mounting deficit

with the European Payments Union (EPU). During the month the deficit swelled by approximately \$58,000,000 as against \$42,000,000 in January. This peak deficit occurred in a month when it was expected that Western Germany's payments would begin to break even. The total cumulative deficit has now reached \$457,000,000. The rate of licensing for liberalized imports continued at the high level reached during the second half of January and the value of tenders issued in February by the German Import Advisory Committee for non-liberalized imports were almost double the January figure. Although the rate of licensing increased with the dropping of the deposit requirement from 50 percent to 25 percent, the main impetus was the continuation of excessive demand for imported goods, due to the lack of stringent credit restrictions and a virtual discontinuance of savings. As a result of these developments, the German government decided on Feb. 22 to suspend temporarily issuance of liberalized licenses. At a special meeting on Feb. 23, the EPU Managing Board accepted Germany's suspension of liberalization and requested the Federal Government to submit its program of measures to counteract the developments which led to the suspension. On Feb. 27, the suspension of licensing was extended to the quota items imported from EPU countries, and the issuance of foreign exchange allocation certificates was suspended.

Industrial Production

In January, industrial activity slackened further, still beset by persisting coal and power shortages and seasonal factors. Shortage of raw materials, an additional handicap, is beginning to make itself felt. Bottlenecks in the supply of power and raw materials are not only restricting output, but also preventing expansion of employment in many manufacturing establishments. On the other hand, however, orders received remained well above the value of current sales, although a three percent drop was recorded for December.

The federal index of industrial production (excluding building, stimulants and food processing) declined three points (2.4 percent) from the December figure to 126 of the 1936 level. The decreasing trend in production during the last two months has followed generally that of a year ago when industrial activity fell abruptly in December, slightly less in January and began increasing in February. This year, however, the rate of change is sharper. The usual holiday and seasonal factors affecting this decline were augmented during 1950 by coal, power and raw material shortages, the last of which is now beginning to restrict output by industrial users of non-ferrous metals, rubber, rayon, wool and sulphate.

As the winter passes, indications are that the trend of production should level off in February and improve in the coming months. Of the 30 industry groups for which data are available, 21

showed decreases in production during January, while nine showed increases.

INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

1936=100

	1950	1951
	Nov.	Dec. Jan.
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES	135	r129 126
(incl. electricity and gas 1/)	132	125 122
(excl. electricity and gas 1/)	136	r129 123
Investment goods (total)	106	r 94 91
Raw materials	155	r150 143
Finished products		
General production goods		
(incl. electricity and gas)	142	r140 139
(excl. electricity and gas)	131	127 126
Consumer goods	125	r117 116

1/ = Excluding food processing, stimulants and building.
r = Revised.

PRODUCTION OF MAJOR COMMODITIES

COMMODITY	Unit of Measure 1/	1950	1951
		Nov. r/	Dec. r/ Jan. p/
Hard coal (gross mined)	thous. t	10,022	9,585 10,138
Crude petroleum	t	97,793	103,050 102,176
Cement	thous. t	1,010	735 599
Bricks (total)	1,000	411,691	319,109 247,790
Pig iron	t	864,296	766,149 801,003
Steel ingots	t	1,080,868	929,952 1,011,968
Rolled steel finished products	t	792,755	675,795 745,097
Farm tractors (total 2/)	pieces	5,221	5,197 5,670
Office machines	t	622	552 613
Passenger cars (incl. chassis)	pieces	22,916	20,613 23,028
Cameras (total)	pieces	202,838	139,948 178,055
Sulphuric acid (incl. oleum)	t-SO ₃	108,313	114,078 110,779
Calcium carbide	t	40,024	44,724 37,737
Soap (total)	t	8,618	6,784 11,779
Newsprint	t	14,564	13,173 13,641
Auto and truck tires	pieces	331,743	289,033 283,591
Shoes (total)	1,000 pairs	9,409	7,431 7,209

1/ = All tons are metric tons.

2/ = Excluding accessories, parts and spare parts.

r = Revised.

p = Preliminary.

Coal

The fuel shortage is still a serious handicap to the expansion of output and has been reported as cause for cutting production and employment in some industries. (See Industrial Production above.) During February, however, a favorable upward trend began in hard coal output. With 24 working days in February, daily average production reached a record level of 384,164 tons. This brought production for the month to 9,445,803 tons, with only 258,632 tons reported as extra shift production. Factors believed contributing to the increase in the rate of production are: approximately 1,000 additional miners, a decrease in the number of shifts lost and a decline in the absenteeism rate.

Germany's coal export quota for the second quarter of 1951 was fixed at 6,200,000 tons by the Council of the International Authority for the Ruhr at its Feb. 16 meeting. Two assumptions underlying this quota were that 900,000 tons would be exported to the Saar in exchange for equivalent imports from that area, and that 200,000 tons of coal would be imported from the United States during the quarter.

Despite the short month, aluminum production in February remained at 3,500 tons, and was expected to reach 4,000 tons in March. With sufficient water supply, aluminum smelters increased production. The zinc, lead and copper smelters,

with sufficient supplies of raw materials and coal, have been able to maintain production. A serious contraction was expected in April, however, when present difficulties in obtaining raw materials and shipping space were expected to come to a climax.

The Federal Republic law for the control of raw materials is not yet in force, and until a tighter control on the end-use of scarce materials is introduced, increasing difficulties in obtaining United States export licenses must be expected.

Production in the chemical industry continues to drop, restricted by the shortage of coal and raw materials. Manufacturers' stocks of coal are down by one to four days' supply, with some firms operating intermittently, depending upon coal deliveries. Some coal has been purchased from the United States with free dollars, urea traded for French coal, and soda traded for Belgian coal. The production index for the chemical industry has been dropping steadily from the high of 138 in November to an expected 110 or lower in February. As a result, the chemical industry is cutting employment and producing less for export.

Other than coal, the main shortages are sulphur and chlorine. The allocation of only 36.8 percent of the German requirements of United States sulphur will seriously affect the production of carbondisulphide for textiles and sulphur available as insecticide for the vineyards. An Allied working party is investigating Germany's need for additional chlorine capacity.

Mild weather with heavy rains increased hydroelectric power available during February, so that the shortage of power was not as acute as in January. Coal allocations continued to be insufficient, and coal stocks remained at only 13 days' supply—below a safe point for this season of the year. As a consequence, power restrictions imposed in January were continued through February, but were reduced to a certain extent in some Laender (states) where the supply of hydroelectricity increased. Despite these restrictions, power consumption in February was 19 percent higher than in February of last year. Fifty MW new capacity, financed by ECA counterpart funds, was placed in service during the month.

Cold weather in February reduced crude oil production below the January level. Refinery output also showed a reduction during the month, resulting from fuel shortage and refinery repairs. Stocks of gasoline showed no essential change. February consumption, increasing 10,000 tons over January, was estimated at 105,000 tons, and receipts from domestic and foreign sources were estimated at 174,000 tons. Stocks were expected to increase considerably by March 1. Diesel oil stocks, however, do not indicate this favorable development. By Feb. 1, stocks decreased by 31,000 tons, and decreased further during the month. February consumption, 7,000 tons less than in January, was estimated at 115,000 tons, and receipts were estimated at only 75,000 tons.

Transportation and Communication

Traffic demands on the Bundesbahn remained at a comparatively high level in February, averaging 59,000 cars per workday. At the same time, the number of serviceable cars dropped to 251,000 cars (253,000 in January; 262,300 in December; and November high 264,500). Workshops cannot keep abreast of the increasing number of un-serviceable cars. This development was fully foreseen in the fall of 1950 when the Bundesbahn, to meet heavy harvest traffic demands, deferred all repairs on running equipment. By so doing, it kept more than 260,000 cars in traffic. As a consequence, the Bundesbahn could not meet February demands in full—a fact causing particular concern, since traffic demands for any European railway are usually lighter for February than for any other month of the year.

The Bundesbahn and the Federal Government are aware that both new cars and a stepped-up freight car repair program are requisites. The major difficulty still facing the Bundesbahn is the immediate need for new capital to finance a freight car construction program and the continued rehabilitation of war damages, since such programs cannot be financed out of profits from current Bundesbahn operations.

The month of February saw a combined effort of the three Allied Powers, in conjunction with the Federal Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications, to standardize and make uniform all procedures for the procurement and payment of communications facilities and services rendered the Allied Forces by the Deutsche Post. This involves major changes in the procedures currently being followed by each of the three authorities with relation to the ordering of long distance circuits, local service and equipment, and modification of accounting and billing procedures.

The primary objective of this entire program is to bring current procedures in line with the overall policy surrounding the inauguration of the national budget principle. When completed it will permit each of the three Allied authorities to procure its own services directly from the Deutsche Post, regardless of location and to reimburse the Deutsche Post from its own budget.

During January the Bundespost continued to make progress on its telecommunications plant construction program. Six new manual and two automatic central office exchanges were brought into operation, and work was completed on extensions to five manual and 20 automatic exchanges plus extensions to seven long distance trunk exchanges. These new facilities will relieve, to some extent, the present shortage of telecommunication facilities in the Federal Republic.

Labor

The labor market situation as of mid-February 1951 was exceptionally good. Employment was

higher than ever before at this time of year. This also applied to the building trades, which had slumped badly in December and early January.

Employment statistics reflect fundamentally favorable business conditions. With substantial orders on hand, employers are not discharging workers when temporary shortages of coal and raw materials retard production. Public employment exchange officials believe that if the Federal Government allows the speculative maldistribution of raw materials and half-fabricates to grow more serious, employment will soar to new heights before June.

Registered unemployment declined in February by almost 160,000, thus bringing the total decrease since the turning point in mid-January to approximately 250,000. At the end of February, unemployment stood at 1,663,000, or about 27,000 less than at the close of 1950. Comparisons with the early part of 1950 reveal the recent unemployment development has actually been a very favorable one. At the end of February 1950, unemployment was still hovering around the 2,000,000 mark, and was 425,000 higher than in December 1949. It was not until the end of May 1950 that unemployment was reduced to 1,668,300—the end of February 1951 is already 5,000 below this figure.

Furthermore, the unemployment rate is now significantly lower than in February 1950, when dependent employment was approximately 1,000,000 less than the present level. In February 1951, the rate of unemployment in terms of the wage and salary-earning labor force was 10.5 percent as against 13.1 percent last year.

Seasonal factors, which were primarily responsible for rising unemployment between the end of October 1950 and mid-January 1951, also account largely for the recent reversal in trend. The major part of the decline in unemployment has come in outdoor occupations such as building and construction, including public works projects, and in agriculture.

Significantly, however, there has also been a drop in unemployment in manufacturing, also due mainly to seasonal factors, and in commerce and transportation. Among the manufacturing industries which would probably show higher employment for February are stones and earths, metal working industries, including those related to the building trade, woodworking, clothing, food processing and leather. Employment in other branches of manufacturing is undergoing little change.

With much less fanfare than in the latter half of 1950, a new wage drive of considerable proportions is underway. Pay boosts were obtained in February by approximately 775,000 industrial workers, and negotiations are proceeding for employees in public administration and services. Notification of termination of collective agreements, effective in March or April, has been given in the building, textile and clothing, and the shoe

industries in the federal area. The Woodworking Union is reportedly considering similar action.

The unions present the rise in consumer prices during recent months as their reason for demanding wage increases. The official consumer price index rose by 2.6 percent between October and January, and consumer prices continued to increase in February.

Commodity Price Indexes

In January, the three major price indexes all rose sharply. The basic materials price index showed the sharpest rise since September—an increase of 11 points (4.8 percent) to a new high of 240 percent of the 1938 level. The industrial component of the basic materials price index (up 14 points—5.3 percent—to 279) is now 30 percent above the level of a year ago, with practically all of that rise occurring since the beginning of the Korean War. The agricultural component (up only six points—5.4 percent—to 182) is eight percent above the index of a year ago, with the entire rise occurring in the last seven months.

The index of industrial producers prices (up 11 points—5.6 percent—to 206 in January) has risen by 13 percent during the past year; the largest gains noted were in textiles and clothing (up 30 percent), and iron, steel and non-ferrous metals (up 27 percent).

The index of consumer prices for January 1951 (up three points to 154 percent of 1938) stands at almost the same level as a year ago, having declined almost continuously during the first nine months of the year before beginning a steady rise in September 1950.

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (BIZONAL AREA^{1/})

1938=100

(Wage/salary earner's family of four, with one child under 14)

	1950		1951
	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.
TOTAL	151	154	156
Food	155	157	159
Stimulants	275	275	275
Clothing	192	197	203
Rent	103	103	103
Heat and light	119	121	122
Cleaning and hygiene	149	151	154
Education and entertainment	142	143	145
Household goods	165	171	177
Travelling	133	148	151

^{1/}=The Consumer Price Index is not yet available on a Trizonal basis.

INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS PRICES

Bizonal Area

1938=100

	1950		1951
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.
TOTAL	189	195	206

BASIC MATERIALS PRICE INDEX

1938=100

	1950		1951
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan. p/
Food	177	176	182
Industry	256	265	279
TOTAL	224	229	240

p/=Preliminary.

Finance

The DM 186,000,000 increase in short term bank credit outstanding in January, was considerably less than the prior month's expansion of DM 250,000,000. Direct Central Bank credits outstanding totaled DM 1,311,000,000 in January, a significant drop below the December total of DM 1,580,000,000.

The following restrictive measures were introduced by the Bank Deutscher Laender on Jan. 31, 1951, in an attempt to improve the foreign payments situation and to redress the position of certain banks which had over-extended their credit operations. The immediate aim of these measures is to curtail the volume of bank credit outstanding:

(1) Short term business credits not to exceed capital and reserves more than 30 times;

(2) Current account and acceptance credits not to exceed 70 percent of deposits, capital and reserves;

(3) Acceptance credits not to exceed capital and reserves by more than seven times (in certain instances, three times); and

(4) Liquid assets (cash on hand and on deposit with the Central Bank and Post, checks, bills of exchange and treasury bills) not to fall below 20 percent of deposits and acceptances.

It is too early to ascertain how these restrictions will affect the development of commercial bank credit and the money supply.

A decrease in January of DM 410,000,000 (estimated) in the volume of money was noted over December's revised totals. This compares with a DM 68,000,000 revised monthly increase in November and a DM 524,000,000 revised monthly increase in December. The January level of excess reserves expressed as a percentage of legal reserves amounts to three percent as compared with December's revised level of 4.8 percent.

Food and Agriculture

A greater than usual amount of snowfall and rain during the winter months has resulted in an increasing amount of soil moisture, which insures the starting of early spring crops. Precipitation and temperatures during February were about normal. No particular damage to fall-sown crops, or to root crops remaining in storage, was reported.

Indications at present point toward a satisfactory crop year in 1951. Some field work was underway during February and full spring operations were expected to start early in March.

During February, the number of cases of foot and mouth disease increased. The disease has not reached critical proportions, however, and vaccine supplies are sufficient to keep it under control.

All shipments from the Federal Republic, under the United States program for expedited aid to Yugoslavia by shipping German-milled flour and

replacing this with equivalent quantities of wheat, were completed early in February.

The two principal items of federal legislation concerned seeds and butter. The Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forestry issued an ordinance prohibiting the sale, in commercial quantities, of other than certified agricultural and vegetable seeds. The certifying agencies are the state authorities; basic conditions for certification are fixed by the federal minister. Under an ordinance of the minister of economics, maximum butter prices per 100 kg for the different grades, in lots of 25 kg or over, are fixed as follows: if delivered by dairies and wholesalers, DM 498-550; if delivered by retailers, DM 512-564. Allied High Commission decision on both ordinances is pending.

Berlin

Seasonal declines in industry normally recurring in January remained very mild this year and in the latter half of the month were more than compensated by impressive upward trends in iron, steel and malleable castings, in the output of non-ferrous metal foundries, as well as in clothing. Employment, following a decline of more than 8,300 in the first half of January, increased by 3,300 in the second half of the month, and by almost 1,900 in the first half of February. This favorable reversal of the usual seasonal employment trend occurred one month earlier this year than in 1950.

Reports of the Berlin Central Bank indicate that the city's balance of payments position continued to weaken in February. In the past, counterpart funds releases and Federal Republic assistance were usually sufficient to cover this deficit. From time to time, however, small deficits in the city's balance of payments exceeded the external aid to Berlin and were financed by borrowings of the Berlin Central Bank from the Bank Deutscher Laender. About eight percent of the 1950 gap in the payments balance was covered by these credits.

In February, however, it became necessary to borrow substantial additional funds from the Bank Deutscher Laender, although actual transfers to Berlin under the various headings of external assistance were somewhat higher during February than in the previous month (DM 65,000,000 against DM 62,000,000 in January). The Berlin Central Bank's indebtedness to the Bank Deutscher Laender on Feb. 28 amounted to DM 126,700,000 and was DM 29,500,000 higher than on the last day of January.

It was found that a number of firms whose business activities were concentrated in Western Germany, obtained an unduly large portion of their credit requirements from Berlin banks through their Berlin branches or head offices. As a conse-

quence, on Feb. 9, 1951, the rediscount rate was raised from four to six percent, thereby adjusting the Berlin rate to the West German level. It is expected that this will be an important factor in improving Berlin's balance of payments situation.

Procedure for Filing Claims] Under Berlin General Claims Law

[Released to the press April 23]

The Department of State wishes to direct the attention of United States residents to the recent promulgation by the Berlin City Assembly of legislation known as the Berlin General Claims Law. The coming into force of this legislation provides a means whereby certain classes of persons, who suffered monetary and other losses in Berlin during the Nazi regime, may receive indemnification for losses falling outside the scope of restitution legislation previously enacted in Berlin. The registry agency is Entschadigungsamt, Fehrbelliner Platz 1, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Germany. Claims based on this legislation must be filed with that registry agency by January 10, 1952.

The Berlin General Claims Law provides that persons who during the period from January 30, 1933, to May 8, 1945, were persecuted because of political conviction or for racial, religious, or ideological grounds and thereby suffered damage to life and limb, health, liberty, possessions, property, or economic advancement shall be entitled to restitution according to the provisions thereof.

For the city of Berlin to be liable as restitutor, claimants must have had their legitimate domicile or usual residence in Berlin on January 1, 1947, or have been assigned to Berlin as a refugee, or, having had such domicile or residence, have died, emigrated, have been deported, or have been expelled prior to that date.

Persons desiring further information concerning the Berlin General Claims Law should address their inquiries, including requests for copies of the law, to the Entschadigungsamt in Berlin.

Raw Cotton for West Germany

Approximately 109,000 bales of raw cotton are going to German mills under a Marshall Plan purchase approved recently. Reporting procurement figures for the final month of 1950, the ECA said the cotton authorization for Germany represented about 23 percent of the December total. The figure for the month was \$190,300,000, including \$44,100,000 for the German cotton purchase. Deliveries were to have been completed last month.

U.S. Proposes To Submit Disagreement Over Soviet Lend-Lease Settlement to Arbitral Panel

[Released to the press April 27]

The United States today proposed to the Soviet Government that the outstanding disagreement over a lend-lease settlement be submitted to an international arbitration board.

The board would be asked to decide the amount and terms of a financial settlement which the two governments, in 4 years of direct negotiations, have been unable to reach.

The decision of the board, the United States said in a note delivered to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, Alexander S. Panyushkin, should be final and binding on both parties.

The lengthy negotiations with the Soviet delegation "have yielded little progress," the American note, signed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, said.

"In order to achieve a solution satisfactory to both sides," the United States proposed that the question of what would be "fair and reasonable terms of financial settlement" be submitted to an arbitral panel of three members. One member of the panel would be appointed by the United States and one member by the U.S.S.R. The third member would be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice.

The United States note said that the question of lend-lease ships, the return of which was again demanded in the United States note of April 6, 1950, is not included in the arbitration proposal.¹

During the war, the United States furnished lend-lease supplies and services to Russia valued at 10.8 billion dollars. The United States has requested payment only for civilian-type articles which remained in Soviet custody at the end of the war. No request for payment was made for civilian-type articles lost, destroyed, or consumed during the war.

Value of the civilian-type articles in Russian hands at the end of the war has been estimated by the United States, after liberal allowances for losses and depreciation, at 2.6 billion dollars. In an effort to speed the settlement, however, the United States offered to settle for 1 billion dollars and later for 800 million dollars. The final amount offered by Russia was 240 million dollars.

Text of U.S. Note of April 27, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the negotiations between our two Governments for a settlement of the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, and specifically to the questions of compensation for lend-lease articles not lost, destroyed or consumed during the war and the terms and conditions under which such articles may be retained by the Soviet Government. The Government of the United States has upon several occasions already demanded the return under Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of all lend-lease ships and watercraft, particularly in its notes of February 7 and April 6, 1951. The question of ships therefore is not considered herein.

The Government of the United States has requested no payment for "military-type" articles (arms, ammunition and implements of war, exclusive of ships) which may have remained in Soviet custody at the war's end. The position of the Government of the United States, however, has been that the terms of any settlement would reserve the right of the Government of the United States, as set forth in Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, to the return to the United States by the Soviet Government of such "military-type" articles and would maintain the obligation of the Soviet Government as stipulated in Article III of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, to obtain the prior consent of the Government of the United States before retransfer of such articles to third parties. The position of the Government of the United States in this matter is in keeping with the settlements already concluded with other Lend-Lease countries having Master Lend-Lease agreements similar to that with the the Soviet Government.

The Government of the United States also has requested no payment for "civilian-type" articles lost, destroyed, or consumed during the war. The Government of the United States has requested payment only for those "civilian-type" articles which remained in Soviet custody at the war's end and has offered to transfer title to such

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951, p. 646.

articles in consideration of payment of a mutually satisfactory sum on terms agreed by our two Governments. These "civilian-type" articles consist of lend-lease supplies having a peacetime value to the Soviet economy and remaining under the control of the Soviet Government on September 2, 1945, or subsequently received by it with the exception of ships, "military-type" articles as stated above, and certain lend-lease articles title to which had been transferred to the Soviet Government under the Agreements of May 30, 1945 and October 15, 1945.

In order to provide a basis for determination of the fair value of "civilian-type" articles remaining in Soviet custody at the war's end, the Government of the United States carefully compiled from its own records a detailed estimated inventory of such articles. In preparing this inventory most liberal allowances were made for wartime losses. The value of this inventory at landed cost less most liberal allowances for depreciation amounted to a total of \$2.6 billion. The Government of the United States, in an effort to arrive at a mutually satisfactory sum representing the fair value of these articles to the Soviet peacetime economy, initially proposed the sum of \$1.3 billion repayable in thirty annual installments beginning five years after July 1, 1946, with interest at 2 percent per annum accruing from July 1, 1946 and payable annually thereafter. Subsequently, in a further effort to speed the negotiations to a mutually satisfactory conclusion, the Government of the United States expressed its willingness to accept still lesser sums, first by proposing the amount of \$1 billion and later the amount of \$800 million. Furthermore, in the interest of a prompt settlement, the Government of the United States has repeatedly indicated its readiness to reduce further this sum provided that the Soviet Government on its part would increase its present offer to a sum more nearly reflecting the value of the articles to the Soviet peacetime economy.

The Soviet Government has taken the position that a lend-lease settlement, in the first place, must take into account the Soviet contribution to the victory against the common enemy, and secondly, must conform with other existing lend-lease settlements. The Soviet Government, however, has cited only the settlement with the British Government.

With regard to the first principle put forward by the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States believes that it has given full recognition to the Soviet contribution to the defeat of the common enemy by writing off completely the entire lend-lease contribution of the United States to the Soviet war effort and asking payment only for those "civilian-type" articles remaining in the Soviet Union at the war's end. It is to be noted that total lend-lease assistance provided by the United States to the Soviet Union

during the war amounted to approximately \$10.8 billion and represented a vast contribution of the skills, labor and resources of the United States to assist the peoples of the Soviet Union in the defeat of the aggressor nations. It is also to be noted that the amount of compensation now proposed by the Government of the United States is \$800 million. From these facts it may be clearly seen that the Government of the United States has asked no payment for war-time lend-lease aid totaling approximately \$10 billion. This represents, on the part of the Government of the United States, great recognition of the community of interest of our two Governments in the achievement of the common victory and takes full cognizance of the part played by the Soviet Government in this effort.

With regard to the Soviet contention that a lend-lease settlement must conform to "precedents", specifically the settlement with the British Government, the Government of the United States has invited the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that the Government of the United States has never agreed to give most-favored-nation treatment in connection with any lend-lease settlement. Nevertheless, the Government of the United States has in fact sought to reach a lend-lease settlement with the Soviet Government on the basis of the same principles which were observed in the settlement with the British Government. In accordance with these principles the British Government was not asked to pay for lend-lease articles lost, destroyed or consumed in the war; nor was payment asked for "military-type" articles remaining in the United Kingdom at the end of the war. Payment was requested only for the fair value of "civilian-type" articles remaining in the United Kingdom at the war's end. The Soviet Government, however, has repeatedly and categorically refused to reach a settlement on the basis of these principles.

It will be recalled in this connection that, unlike the British Government, the Soviet Government while refusing to furnish an inventory of lend-lease articles remaining in existence at the end of the war, has declined also to consider the estimated inventory provided by the Government of the United States as a basis for settlement. The Soviet Government has instead sought to make settlement on the basis of the total lend-lease furnished and has had recourse to extraneous analogies not germane to the British settlement.

The Soviet Government has thus refused to accept the very principles on which it insists and upon which the settlement with the British Government was based. The Government of the United States must, therefore, reject the contention of the Soviet Government that its offer fully conforms to the British settlement.

The Soviet Government, on the basis of its own principles, has offered to pay to the Government of the United States a "global" sum first in the

amount of \$170 million, later increased to \$200 million and more recently has made an offer of \$240 million stated by Soviet representatives to be "final". The Soviet Government proposes that payment of this sum should be made over a period of 50 years with interest at 2 percent per annum, but with payment of interest and principal beginning five years after the conclusion of the agreement. The Government of the United States considers the amount and terms of the offer of the Soviet Government to be inadequate and unreasonable.

In these circumstances the Government of the United States must point out that four years of direct negotiations between our two Governments have yielded little progress toward a settlement of this issue. Therefore, in order to achieve a solution satisfactory to both sides, the Government of the United States proposes that there be submitted to an arbitral panel consisting of three members, one each to be appointed by the Government of the United States and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and a third member to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice, the question of what would be fair and reasonable terms of financial settlement by the Soviet Government for the lend-lease articles having civilian utility, except ships, which were not lost, destroyed or consumed during the war and which are not returned to the United States.

The Government of the United States expresses its hope that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will agree to treat the decision of such an arbitral panel on this question as binding upon both Governments and will accept this proposal as a practical means of reaching final agreement on this issue.

Accept [etc.].

DEAN ACHESON

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Colombia Signed

[Released to the press April 26]

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Colombia was signed today in Washington. The Secretary of State signed for this Government and Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta-Angel, for Colombia.

The treaty establishes a set of advanced principles as a basis for economic and cultural relations between the two countries. It replaces, in the greater part, a 104-year old treaty with New Granada, the name by which Colombia was known until 1861. The conclusion of this treaty marks the increasingly close neighborly relations between Colombia and the United States. Other

recent evidences of close cooperation are the dispatch by Colombia of a war vessel to the Korean war zone and the assignment of a substantial contingent of troops to serve with the United Nations forces there.

The new treaty contains 26 articles and a protocol and deals in considerable detail with a wide range of subject matter. In brief, however, each of the two Governments: (1) agrees to accord within its territories to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to the general run of industrial, commercial, and cultural pursuits (2) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons, their property and interests that reflect the most enlightened legal and constitutional principles (3) recognizes the need for special attention to requirements for stimulating investment for economic development and (4) reasserts its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

From the standpoint of aiding the economic interests of Colombia, the treaty represents an additional step in the development of that country's forward-looking plans for promoting its industrial development and for improving the welfare of its people by various means, including the encouragement of foreign private investment and the utilization of foreign technical assistance. Other related steps in implementing this policy have been the arrangement for an economic survey of the country, carried out in 1949 by a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the subsequent employment of an economic and financial advisory mission; the conclusion on March 9 of a general technical cooperation (Point 4) agreement with the United States preparatory to the negotiation of specific technical aid arrangements; and the recent extensive liberalization of the system of controls over foreign exchange designed to expand the country's trade and national income. In addition, a project for an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation is under consideration by the two Governments.

The United States program for the negotiation of treaties of this type is an integral part of this country's policy for the furtherance of liberal principles of trade and economic relations in general, and particularly for creating throughout the world conditions favorable to economic development. Domestically, these treaties reinforce in terms of international obligation the position of the Federal Government as guardian of the rights of foreigners and foreign enterprises in this country, a policy that has developed in conformity with the Constitution and Federal law. They safeguard aliens, on a basis of reciprocity, against certain statutory disabilities, particularly with respect to engaging in certain types of occupations, inheritance matters, and others.

U.S. To Send Military Supplies to China for Defense of Taiwan

[Released to the press April 25]

Exchange of Notes Between the U.S. and China

AMERICAN EMBASSY, Taipei,
January 30, 1951.

EXCELLENCY: Pursuant to instructions from my Government, I have the honor to deliver the following statement:

"The Government of the United States is prepared to make available to the Republic of China under the terms of P. L. 329, 81st Congress, as amended, certain military material for the defense of Taiwan against possible attack.

"This material, and any other furnished under the authority of the law referred to, is transferred on the understanding that it will be used and disposed of pursuant to the following undertakings and that failure to do so by the Chinese Government will be contrary to the understanding of the United States Government, and may be considered by the United States to be cause for the cessation of further deliveries (it being understood that the undertakings contained in the first three paragraphs below apply as well to the material transferred to the Chinese Government under that law since June 27, 1950);

"1. The Chinese Government will use the material to maintain its internal security or its legitimate self-defense.

"2. The Chinese Government will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the United States Government and the Chinese Government in order to prevent the disclosure and compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished by the United States Government.

"3. The Chinese Government agrees to receive personnel of the United States Government who will discharge in the territory under the control of the Chinese Government the responsibilities of the United States Government under this agreement and who will be accorded adequate facilities to observe the progress of the assistance furnished, to confirm that the material furnished is being used for the purposes for which it is provided, and to carry out such other operations or arrangements as shall be mutually agreed pursuant to this agreement. Such personnel, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Chinese Government, operate as a part of the United States Embassy, under the direction and control of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.

"4. The Chinese Government will not transfer, sell, or otherwise dispose of the material provided pursuant to the above undertakings, or any other

equipment susceptible of military use, without regard to its source, or the time or manner of its acquisition, without first obtaining the assurance of the United States Government that such equipment or material is not required by the United States for its own use or required to support programs of military assistance undertaken by the United States.

"The United States Government would appreciate a written assurance from the Chinese Government of its acceptance of the undertakings in this note."

Accept [etc.]

K. L. RANKIN
[*Charge d'Affaires, a. i.*]

TAIPEI, TAIWAN
February 9, 1951

MONSIEUR LE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note No. 13, dated January 30, 1951, which reads as follows:

[Here follows the text of the United States note, quoted above.]

In reply, I have the honor to signify on behalf of the Chinese Government the acceptance of the undertakings set forth in your note under reference.

Please accept [etc.]

[SEAL]
GEORGE K. C. YEH
[*Minister of Foreign Affairs*]

Treaty Discussed With New Supreme Commander and Japanese Officials

Statement by Ambassador John Foster Dulles¹

[Released to the press April 24]

Our mission returns from a week in Japan.¹

One of our tasks was to inform the new Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, regarding United States policies and program for a Japanese peace settlement. This has been done. General Ridgway is quickly mastering the subject, and there can be complete confidence that he will deal effectively with the Japanese phase of

¹The returning members of the mission in addition to Mr. Dulles are Assistant Secretary of the Army, Earl D. Johnson and Col. C. Stanton Babcock, of the Department of Defense, Robert A. Fearey, of the Department of State, secretary of the Mission, and Burnita L. O'Day, Mr. Dulles' personal secretary.

his new responsibilities. The Japanese themselves are already beginning to appreciate that, and they will soon appreciate it fully.

Another task was to reassure the Japanese nation that the change in Supreme Command did not involve change in the basic policies with which General MacArthur had been particularly identified in Japan. These policies were: an early and just Japanese peace settlement; an unwavering will to resist Communist aggression in the western Pacific, and the implementing of that will by deeds to save Japan from being left defenseless upon consummation of the treaty. We met with many Japanese political and civic leaders, and I made a public address which was widely reported to the Japanese people. In such ways, we were able to provide a large measure of reassurance; and, as our nation continues to translate these basic policies into effective action, we are confident that the Japanese nation for its part will continue to place confidence in the United States and desire close association with us.

A third task was to discuss with the Japanese Government the present status of our negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty. We had full exchanges of views with the Prime Minister and his associates. We reported the substantial progress made, the obstacles encountered, and our program for bringing the peace settlement to an early successful conclusion. In this connection, we also had useful talks with some of the diplomatic representatives in Tokyo of the Allied Powers.

There is unmistakable evidence that the Communist Parties of Russia, China, and Japan are working intensely and with renewed vigor to spread distrust and fear in Japan and to block the peace settlement on which the hopes of the Japanese people center. We return confident that their design can be frustrated if the free world acts promptly, unitedly, and with an enlightened recognition of its community of interest with the peace and freedom-seeking people of Japan.

U.S.-Bolivia Study Strategic Materials and Development Problems

[Released to the press April 23]

Following consultation between the Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, and the Department of State, representatives of the departments and agencies of the United States Government concerned are studying the problems involved in the subscription of long-term and mutually advantageous contracts for the purchase of strategic minerals, especially tin and tungsten,

from Bolivian private producers and the Bolivian Mining Bank. In the meantime, in order that normal shipments of Bolivian tin ores for the RFC smelter at Texas City may not be interrupted, an interim contract, covering deliveries between March 1 and May 31, 1951, has been signed, while negotiations for a long-term contract are continuing with the aim of concluding it before May 31.

At the request of the Bolivian Foreign Minister, a committee of United States officials has been formed to study, with a committee of Bolivian officials, basic Bolivian economic problems which are of mutual interest to the two Governments and which are related to the common defense effort. This committee will study the needs and possibilities of providing additional United States technical and financial assistance, public and private, in order to contribute to an increase in Bolivian production of strategic minerals and to the development of increased agricultural and industrial production.

U.S.-Bolivian Officials Named on Joint Economic Committee

[Released to the press April 27]

On April 23, the Department of State announced the formation of a committee of United States officials to study, with a committee of Bolivian officials, basic Bolivian economic problems which are of mutual interest to the two Governments and which are related to the common defense effort. The United States committee is composed of Fletcher Warren, Director of the Office of South American Affairs of the Department of State, as Chairman; Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Director of the Office of International Materials Policy of the Department of State; Merwin Bohan, who was chief of a United States economic mission which was sent to Bolivia in 1941; and Rollin S. Atwood, Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs.

The Bolivian committee is composed of Ricardo Martínez Vargas, Bolivian Ambassador to the United States, as Chairman; José Romero Loza, formerly Minister of Finance and National Economy in Bolivia; Juan Penaranda Minchin, Minister-Counselor of the Bolivian Embassy in Washington; and Guillermo Mariaca, General Manager of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, the Bolivian Government's petroleum agency.

The work of the two committees was formally initiated in a brief joint meeting at the Department of State on April 26.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During April 1951

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
Third Set of Tariff Negotiations of Contracting Parties	Torquay	Sept. 28-Apr. 21
Special Session of Contracting Parties	Torquay	Mar. 29-Apr. 3
International Exposition of Railroads, Industry and Economy	Santiago	Mar. 1-Apr. 7
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Social Commission	Geneva	Mar. 19-Apr. 14
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Slavery: 2d Session	New York	Apr. 2-17
WMO (World Meteorological Organization): First Congress	Paris	Mar. 19-Apr. 30
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Airworthiness Division: 4th Session	Montreal	Mar. 20-Apr. 21
Operations Division: 4th Session	Montreal	Mar. 27-Apr. 27
Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States.	Washington	Mar. 26-Apr. 7
Lyon International Trade Fair: 33d	Lyon.	Mar. 31-Apr. 9
First Meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.	Washington	Apr. 2-10
South Pacific Quarantine Conference	Suva, Fiji Islands.	Apr. 2-11
Cannes Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 3-20
IRO (International Refugee Organization):		
Executive Committee, 9th Session	Geneva	Apr. 4-19
General Council, 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 9-20
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Rice Breeders' Working Party: 2d Meeting.	Bogor, Indonesia	Apr. 9-13
Working Party on Fertilizers: 1st Meeting.	Bogor, Indonesia	Apr. 14-19
FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Nutrition: 2d Session.	Rome	Apr. 10-17
XXIX International Milan Fair	Milan	Apr. 12-29
*Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute: 55th Meeting.	Southport, England	Apr. 23-27
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 3d Meeting.	London	Apr. 23-26
*Second Inter-American Indigenist Exposition.	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 13-30
Rubber Study Group: 8th Session.	Rome	Apr. 16-20

In Session as of April 30, 1951

United Nations:		
General Assembly: 5th Session	Lake Success	Sept. 19-
Economic and Social Council:		
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 6th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 10-
Human Rights Commission: 7th Session.	Geneva	Apr. 16-
Population Commission: 6th Session.	Lake Success	Apr. 23-
Commission on the Status of Women: 5th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 30-
International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26-
Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord.	Bern	Mar. 5-
Council of Foreign Ministers, Meeting of Deputies	Paris	Mar. 5-Apr. —
Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany (continuation of Fourth Phase).	London	Apr. 3-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

* Tentative.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of April 30, 1951—Continued

Fourth International Poplar Congress	United Kingdom	Apr. 25-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): Administrative Council: 6th Session.	Geneva	Apr. 16-
Pan American Sanitary Organization: 13th Meeting of Executive Committee.	Washington	Apr. 23-
ICAO Air Navigation Commission Communications Division: 4th Session.	Montreal	Apr. 24-
Paris International Trade Fair	Paris	Apr. 28-
South Pacific Commission: 7th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia.	Apr. 28-
International Textile Exposition	Lille, France	Apr. 28-

Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1951

International Exposition of Textile Art and Fashion	Turin, Italy	May 2-
Festival of Britain, 1951.	England	May 3-
Ninth International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial Arts and Modern Architecture.	Milan	May 5-
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Fourth World Health Assembly.	Geneva	May 7-
Executive Board: 8th Session.	Geneva	June 4-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Coal Mines: 4th Session	Geneva	May 7-
Joint Maritime Commission	Geneva	May 21-
Governing Body: 115th Session.	Geneva	May 28-
34th International Labor Conference	Geneva	June 6-
Meeting of Experts on the Status and Conditions of Employment of Domestic Workers.	Geneva	July 2-
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Fiscal Commission: 3d Session	Lake Success	May 7-
Statistical Commission: 6th Session.	Lake Success	May 7-
Economic, Employment and Development Commission	Lake Success	May 14-
Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Conference of Plenipotentiaries.	Geneva.	May 28*-
Economic Commission for Latin America: 4th Session	Mexico City	May 28-
Economic Commission for Europe: 6th Session.	Geneva	May 29-
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 4th Session.	Geneva.	June 18*-
Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	Lake Success	June 19-
Agenda Committee	Geneva.	June 26-
Council, 13th Session	Geneva.	July 3-
International Law Commission: 3d Session.	Geneva.	May 15-
Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 5th Joint Session.	Geneva.	June 5*-
Trusteeship Council: 9th Session	Lake Success	June 11-
Caribbean Commission: 12th Meeting	Barbados, British West Indies	May 7-
First Pan American Congress on Medical Education.	Lima	May 14-
Third Regional Seminar on Social Affairs	Pôrto Alegre, Brazil	May 14-
Inter-American Commission of Women	Santiago	May 14*-
First Pan American Congress on Veterinary Medicine	Lima.	May 20-
Universal Postal Union:		
Executive and Liaison Committee.	St. Gallen, Switzerland	May 21-
Technical Transit Committee.	Pontresina, Switzerland.	June 6-
Canadian International Trade Fair	Toronto	May 28-
ICAO: 5th Assembly	Montreal	June 5-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels.	June 5-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): International Radio Consultative Committee: 6th Plenary Meeting.	Geneva.	June 5-
Fao Council: 12th Session	Rome.	June 11-
19th International Aeronautical Exposition.	Paris	June 15-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
General Conference: 6th Session	Paris	June 18-
Seminar on Teaching of History	Sèvres, France.	July 11-
Seminar on Teaching of Visual Arts in General Education	Bristol	July 7-
International Wheat Council, 5th Session	London.	June 13-
Building Exhibition, "Constructa": the 25th.	Hannover, Germany	July 3-
Conference of British Commonwealth Survey Officers	London	July 9-
14th International Congress on Public Education	Geneva.	July 12-
International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling, 3d Meeting .	Capetown.	July 23-
Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting	London	July

*Tentative

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Fourth Session of Communications Division (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on April 25 that the fourth session of the Communications (Com) Division of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Icao) convened at Montreal, Canada, on April 24, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegate and Chairman

George L. Rand, Chief, Communications Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce.

Alternate Delegate and Vice Chairman

Arthur L. Lebel, Assistant Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

Advisers

John M. Beardslee, Deputy Director, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

John Durkovic, Corporation Secretary, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., Washington, D. C.

Benjamin F. Engel, Commander, United States Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

Thomas A. Kouehnerkavich, Electronics Engineer, International, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Donald Mitchell, Chief, International Affairs Branch, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Gordon C. Pearson, Aeronautical Communications Specialist, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Clinton A. Petry, Director, Frequency Department, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., Washington, D. C.

Edmund V. Shores, Aeronautical Communications Specialist, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Vernon I. Weihe, Radio Engineer, Air Transport Association of America

The Communications Division is one of ten technical Divisions of the Air Navigation Commission, as established by the Icao Council. These Divisions are responsible for formulating for the Commission and for eventual Council action recommendations on standards, procedures, and facilities which appear to be necessary or desirable for the safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation. In practice, the Divisions function as technical or specialized conferences open to delegations from all Icao contracting states. The

third session of the Communications Division was held at Montreal from January 11 to February 26, 1949.

The fourth session will examine problems of air communications relating, in particular, to procedures, codes, and abbreviations; frequency utilization; equipment; and communication systems. In addition, the Com Division will review its existing work program and recommendations thereon.

Fifth Session of Commission on Status of Women (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on April 27 that Olive Remington Goldman, United States representative on the Commission on the Status of Women of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the fifth session of the Commission which will convene at Lake Success on April 30, 1951. She will be assisted by the following advisers:

Sara Buchanan, labor economist, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor

Katherine B. Fite, assistant to the legal adviser, Department of State

James N. Hyde, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

Rachel Nason, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Carolyn A. Reehl, Division of Research for U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Department of State

Among the items on the provisional agenda for this session are political rights of women, the status of women in both public and private law, educational opportunities for women, equal pay for equal work for men and women workers, participation of women in the work of the United Nations, and the report of the Inter-American Commission of Women.

The Commission on the Status of Women, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the Ecosoc, is responsible for the preparation of recommendations and reports to the Council on the promotion of women's rights in political, economic, social, educational, and civil fields. Fifteen Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of this Commission. The last session of the Commission was held at Lake Success, May 8-19, 1950.

Health Congress of Royal Sanitary Institute

The Department of State announced on April 23 that the Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute will convene at Southport, England, on that date. The United States delegation is as follows:

Chairman

Col. Jay F. Gamel, MC, USAF, Headquarters, Third Air Division, Middlesex, England

Delegates

Robert P. Burden, ScD., Paris Office, Rockefeller Foundation, Paris

Lt. Col. Raymond J. Karpen, MC, USA, Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army

Lt. Col. Louis C. Kossuth, MC, USAF, chief, Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Air Surgeon, Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe

Dr. Arthur S. Osborne, senior science attaché, American Embassy, London

Capt. J. P. Wood, MC, USN, Office of Naval Research, Branch Office, London

The Royal Sanitary Institute, which is the leading public health society of Great Britain, was founded in 1876 to promote the application of the English Public Health Act of 1875. The object of the Institute is to further the advancement of sanitary science in all its branches and the diffusion of knowledge relating thereto. It is the belief of the Institute that one of the best means of disseminating such knowledge is through holding annual meetings of representatives from all over the world to discuss subjects of public health and sanitation.

This meeting will afford the delegates an opportunity to exchange scientific information and to discuss, in particular, such matters as preventive medicine, maternal and child health, food and nutrition, tropical hygiene, and hygiene in industry.

The last Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute was held at Eastbourne, England, April 24-28, 1950.

Pan American Sanitary Organization

The Department of State announced on April 23 that the thirteenth meeting of the executive committee of the Pan American Sanitary Organization (PASO) will convene at Washington from April 23 to May 1, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Alternate United States Representative

Dr. Frederick J. Brady, Assistant Chief, International Organization Branch, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency

Advisers

James F. Anderson, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Marcia M. Fleming, Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State

Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional-American Affairs, Department of State

The Executive Committee was set up by a directive of the Twelfth Pan American Sanitary Conference (Caracas, January 1947), which authorized the reorganization of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, a body established in 1902 as the central coordinating agency for public health activities in the American Republics. The Committee, elected by the Directing Council, performs interim executive and advisory functions between meetings of the Council and prepares agenda for Council meetings.

The thirteenth meeting will consider such matters as the program and budget for both the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the regional office of the World Health Organization (WHO).

The last meeting of the Executive Committee was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, October 11-13, 1950.

International Arrangements Reviewed for Equitable Use of Raw Materials

Remarks by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 25]

In response to a question whether, as alleged by Aneurin Bevan, the United States was gobbling up most of the raw materials Britain also needs with resultant jeopardy to Britain's economy, Secretary Acheson today made the following remarks at his press conference, which he authorized for direct quotation.

We all know that rapid implementation of an effective defense program to meet the present situation will necessitate very real sacrifices on the part of the peoples of all 12 nations participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; sacrifices in which the United States, as a member, expects to share; and of which all 12 participants are aware.

In the International Materials Conference, and in many other ways, the United States is continuing to press for increased production of essential raw materials and for international arrangements to insure an equitable and efficient utilization of existing stocks. Some of these essential materials we produce in the United States. For others, we are dependent upon foreign sources. Consumption for less essential purposes has already been restricted in this country.

The export and import policies of the United States are designed to take full account of the essential needs in other friendly countries for materials to supply their basic economy and defense programs.

Obviously, a full scale defense program suddenly imposed on the economy of any nation must have some inflationary effect; a tendency which we in the United States are equally anxious to curb.

The United States in the United Nations

[Apr. 20–May 3, 1951]

Security Council

Kashmir.—The Council met on April 30 to appoint a United Nations representative as mediator for India and Pakistan on Kashmir in accordance with the resolution adopted on March 30. His task is to effect the demilitarization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the two United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, or at least to obtain the parties' agreement to a demilitarization plan.

The President, D. von Balluseck (Netherlands), stated that the delegates of the United Kingdom and the United States had presented for consideration the name of Dr. Frank P. Graham, Defense Manpower Administrator in the Department of Labor, former United States Senator, and former President of the University of North Carolina. After receiving a negative response to his inquiry whether there were any other nominees, the President asked the members to vote on the appointment of Dr. Graham as United Nations representative. The vote of approval was 7–0–4 (India, Netherlands, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia). Dr. Graham is to report back to the Council within 3 months from the date of his arrival at the subcontinent.

Ambassador Warren R. Austin, in presenting the name of Dr. Graham, stated that he was "among the five distinguished United States citizens designated by my Government for inclusion in the United Nations Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation. His fine qualities are well appreciated in the United States where he is known as a distinguished educator, statesman, government official, and negotiator of great ability. I know that he will bring to this new task in full measure the qualities needed for his part to accomplish his mission. . . . It is our earnest hope that both parties will work with Dr. Graham and will implement the details of demilitarization preparatory to the plebiscite, which will permit the people of Kashmir freely to express their will regarding the question of accession."

Palestine.—Two meetings were held, April 25 and May 2, on the Palestine question. On April 25 statements were made by Ambassador Abba S. Eban (Israel) and by Maj. Gen. William E. Riley, USMC, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.

Mr. Eban stated that: (1) The original center of tension in the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel had been the Huleh area, where Syria had "fomented" incidents in February and March

in order to "impede" the drainage of the swamps. (2) During negotiations for an armistice, Dr. Bunche had proposed the creation of a demilitarized zone, including the two areas, Huleh and Ain Gev, and some others. Israel had been assured that only its military forces would be denied access to the zone, that it could continue to pursue all non-military activities. The text of the armistice agreement contained no such restrictions as were now being claimed, and he could state "from intimate personal knowledge" that Israel would never have signed an agreement containing any such restrictions. The view of Israel was that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the Chairman of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission had no capacity to make rulings on sovereignty, on the annulment or extension of concessions, on laws of expropriation, or other legal and political matters. (3) The areas in question had been part of Israel since its establishment. Work on the Huleh concession had extended to the demilitarized zone in January with the full knowledge of the Syrian Government and the representatives of the United Nations—and "without objection." (4) Syria had proclaimed its intention to annex the Huleh and the Ain Gev areas. "We reject Syria's claim and will sign no peace involving cession of these areas." (5) Israel considered that the retaliatory bombing of El Hamma and nearby Syrian positions on April 4 had been taken in self-defense following the Syrian wanton murder of seven Israeli policemen. He admitted that the action "may not be in conformity with the armistice agreement" and wanted to voice Israel's regret. It had been due "only to extreme provocation."

General Riley commenced his discussion of this dispute by expressing regret that the complaints had come before the Council since he believed that they could and should be handled by the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. He set forth Dr. Bunche's interpretation of Syria's and Israel's rights in the demilitarized zone between them. He pointed out that this interpretation had been accepted by both countries and accordingly had governed him, General Riley, in his enforcement of the armistice agreement's provisions relating to the zone. Neither party could validly claim to have a free hand in the demilitarized zone over civilian activity, while military activity was totally excluded. Dr. Bunche had stressed that the armistice agreement did not prejudice the question of territorial sovereignty. General Riley stated that the "troublesome question" of administrative authority in the zone was one which, if

considered and clarified by the Security Council, could be very useful to the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Commission could then take decisions on all the subsidiary questions involved.

In answer to a series of questions put to him at the May 2 meeting by the delegates of Ecuador, Israel, Syria, United Kingdom, and the United States, he replied: (1) The removal of armed forces was basic to the security of the demilitarized zone and entry of forces from either side would be a flagrant violation of the armistice agreement; (2) The Huleh project itself should not be discussed by the Mixed Armistice Commission. However, it could be considered if Syria complained regarding the expropriation of land as this would be a dispute over the interpretation of the agreement. He was not aware that any of the actual drainage work had been undertaken as the result of approval by the Mac Chairman. The Arabs had been dispossessed of 7 acres in the area and thus the project was interfering with the restoration of normal activities; (3) Each village was responsible only to itself for its administration and policing, and, in the event of disputes, the Mac Chairman would work through the heads of the Arab and Israeli villages. (4) The issue was whether Syria could dictate to Israel as to what the latter could do in Israeli-controlled territory, including Huleh. If the Israelis could proceed with the project without violating the armistice or interfering with the restoration of normal life, then Syria could not say that Israel could not carry it out.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on the Status of Women.—The 15-member Commission opened its fifth session at Lake Success on April 30. Mrs. Marie-Helen Lefauchaux (France) was reelected chairman. Mrs. Olive R. Goldman, chief, Public Education Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Illinois State Board of Vocational Education, is the United States delegate.

The Commission's task is to make recommendations and reports to the Economic and Social Council on the promotion of women's rights in the political, civil, economic, social, and educational fields, which would implement the principle of equality of rights for men and women.

The adopted agenda includes: report of the Secretary-General relating to the political rights of women; consideration of a draft convention on the political rights of women; political education for women in countries where women have only recently acquired the right to vote; status of women in public law; report of the Inter-American Commission of Women; equal pay for equal work for men and women; and participation of women in the work of the United Nations.

The Commission decided that it was not competent to consider the U.S.S.R. motion to unseat the representative of the Chinese Nationalist Govern-

ment. It also voted not to include in the agenda a new item sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and Poland in behalf of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) resolution similar to the Communist Stockholm "Partisans of Peace" petition. The chairman stated that the Commission should stay strictly within the terms of its reference, and in this way it could best serve not only the cause of women but also of peace.

Population Commission.—The 12-member Commission began its sixth session at Lake Success on April 23. Alfred Sauvy (France) was reelected chairman, Germano Jardim (Brazil) vice chairman, and Philip M. Hauser (U. S.) rapporteur.

Among the agenda items are: studies of inter-relationships of demographic, economic, and social factors in particular areas; demographic aspects of migration; mortality and mortality rates; a revision of the report on "Findings of studies on the inter-relationships between population trends and economic and social factors"; problems connected with the 1950 and 1951 censuses of population; demographic aspects of the problem of retired persons and the aged; regional seminars on population problems; and convening of a World Population Conference under United Nations auspices.

The U.S.S.R.'s customary proposal, that the representative of the People's Republic of China should be invited to attend in place of the representative of the Chinese Nationalist Government, was ruled out of order by the Chairman. This decision was upheld 7-2 (U.S.S.R., Ukraine)-1 (Yugoslavia). The Commission will submit a report to the Economic and Social Council at the close of the session.

Specialized Agencies

World Meteorological Organization (WMO).—The First Congress of the Wmo concluded a 6-week session in Paris on April 28, after approving an agreement which provides for its affiliation with the United Nations as a specialized agency. The agreement will be submitted to the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) and the General Assembly for final approval.

As of February 15, 1951, 44 states, including the United States, had deposited instruments of ratification or accession to the Convention establishing the Organization.

Dr. F. W. Reichelderfer, Chief of the United States Weather Bureau, was elected President. An Executive Committee was established, which will meet at least once a year, and will guide the activities of Wmo between sessions of the Congress, whose headquarters will be at Geneva.

The basic objective of the Organization is to coordinate, standardize, and improve world meteorological activities, and to encourage an efficient exchange of meteorological information between countries.

Eighteenth Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 16-31, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2107
Dated Apr. 26, 1951

I herewith submit report number 18 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 March, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués number 824-839 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

During this period the enemy has been driven northward about fifteen miles over the entire front, except in the Seoul area, where United Nations forces advanced 25 miles. The heaviest fighting occurred from 23 to 25 March near Uijongbu, Naegang, and Hyon, on the western front, and at Chaun-Ni on the central front. Enemy resistance appeared to be stiffening toward the end of the period, especially along the central front in the Kapyong and Chunchon area. In his withdrawal the enemy has made increasing use of mortars and landmines.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally from Munsan east through Chunchon to the vicinity of Hyon-Ni, and thence northeast to Yangyang, which fell to United Nations forces on 27 March.

During the past two weeks the battered Chinese units on the central front were relieved and replaced by at least three, and probably four, rehabilitated Chinese Communist armies. Concurrently, the enemy has built a powerful reserve force, generally within supporting distance of the front. This force, includes four fresh north

Korean corps, totaling twelve divisions, the equivalent of five fresh Chinese Communist force armies, totaling approximately fifteen divisions, and the four Chinese Communist force armies, totaling twelve divisions, which were recently withdrawn from combat. Enemy forces currently deployed on the front, plus the reserve forces, total about sixty divisions. Southbound transport movements in the enemy rear indicate a strong effort to provide adequate logistical support for future combat operations. Enemy traffic is heaviest on north-south supply routes terminating in Central Korea near the 38th parallel.

Enemy guerrilla forces in United Nations rear areas have been steadily reduced by vigorous United Nations action. Most contacts occurred in the east coastal area, as United Nations forces sought out and attacked scattered guerrilla bands. Guerrilla strength has been somewhat reduced in southwestern Korea by the surrender of numerous guerrillas to civil authorities.

Constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval forces continued to deny movement of enemy shipping in Korean waters. Naval gunfire support continued along the east coast near the 38th parallel. Coordinated interdiction operations by United Nations carrier-based aircraft and surface forces, conducted on a round-the-clock basis, continued to restrict severely the movement of enemy supplies on the northeast Korean lines of communication. One specially planned bombardment operation in the Wonsan area inflicted very severe personnel casualties on a large concentration of enemy troops.

More than the usual numbers of drifting mines were sighted in Korean waters during the period of this report. Check minesweeping operations continued, mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment.

United Nations air power continued the relentless pounding of enemy troops, supplies and transportation facilities. The Far East Air Forces with attached South African, Australian and shore-based United States Marine units consistently averaged more than 1,000 sorties a day. On 23 March the Fifth Air Force mounted its one

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on April 26. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN, of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; and the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710.

hundred thousandth sortie of the air war in Korea.

As battle lines continued to move northward, rail and highway bridges, tunnels, trackage, locomotives and boxcars were destroyed in a massive air effort which has substantially reduced the enemy's ability to furnish the regrouping forces with ammunition and reinforcements. Virtually all enemy supply movement during daylight hours has been brought to a standstill, while improved methods of air operations at night have facilitated the destruction of a large portion of his rail and vehicular traffic attempting to move under cover of darkness.

Several enemy MIG-type planes were destroyed and others damaged; however, most of the flights which have been observed south of the Yalu River have fled to their Manchurian sanctuary when approached by United Nations aircraft.

The second and largest airborne operation of the Korean war was launched on 23 March. After days of careful preparation, thousands of paratroopers were successfully dropped behind enemy lines about fifteen miles northwest of Seoul. In addition to normal unit equipment and supplies, the drop included heavy equipment, jeeps, weapon carriers, howitzers, and many other bulky items. Earlier in the day, all possible enemy troop positions were blasted with napalm, rockets and bombs by fighters and bombers of the Far East Air Forces.

Enemy prisoners report continuing strenuous efforts by Communist officers to isolate their men from the truth and to deceive them with calculated falsifications. These tactics are being combated with increasing effectiveness by United Nations leaflets and loudspeaker and radio broadcasts. Through these media, many Chinese and North Korean soldiers are, even now, learning for the first time that their armies are opposing the United Nations as well as the Republic of Korea. They are also being shown, by actual photographs as well as by descriptions, how the United Nations forces accord to every enemy prisoner the privileges guaranteed him by the Geneva Convention. Prisoners report, almost without exception, that Communist officers have attempted to convince them that they will be executed or tortured if captured. Approximately 300 million United Nations leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea, in conjunction with regular broadcasts from ground and airborne loudspeakers and from fixed radio stations.

Violations of the laws of war by the enemy continue to be reported by United Nations forces in Korea. The following incidents in which the armed forces of North Korea have violated, and are continuing to violate, accepted standards for the humanitarian conduct of war have been reported: On or about 22 September 1950 the 27 Regimental Commander (NKPA) ordered the execution of six United Nations prisoners of war. Their hands were bound, eyes covered and they

were shot to death near Kachon-Myon. One mile southwest of Inchon the bodies of twenty-seven civilians were found who had been bound and shot on or about 15 January 1951. On 8 February 1951, in the village of Pabalmak, the bodies of nine civilians were uncovered. Available information indicated the victims had been bound and shot on or about 5 February 1951. These reports are being collated and investigated to verify the facts and to establish the units and persons responsible.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

- Authorizing Vessels of Canadian Registry To Transport Iron Ore Between United States Ports on the Great Lakes During 1951. H. Rept. 283, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 2338] 4 pp.
- Copper Import-Tax Suspension. H. Rept. 285, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3336] 3 pp.
- Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 303, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 90] 2 pp.
- Amending the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as Amended. H. Rept. 325, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3576] 6 pp.
- Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. H. Rept. 326, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3283] 13 pp.
- Report of Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report . . . H. Doc. 70, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 69 pp.
- Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. S. Rept. 188, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 49] 2 pp.
- Amending Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. S. Rept. 195, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 927] 2 pp.
- Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. S. Rept. 214, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 984] 11 pp.
- Giving the Department of Commerce the Authority To Extend Certain Charters of Vessels to Citizens of the Republic of the Philippines. S. Rept. 218, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. J. Res. 57] 5 pp.
- Joint Economic Report. A Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report on the January 1951 Economic Report of the President. S. Rept. 210, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 121 pp.
- Convention With Canada Relating to Operation of Certain Radio Equipment or Stations. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a Convention . . . signed at Ottawa on February 8, 1951. Senate Ex. C. 82d Cong. 1st sess. 5 pp.
- January 1951 Economic Report of the President. Hearings before the Joint Committee of the United States, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on Sec. 5 (A) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress) January 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, February 2, 1951. 530 pp.
- Proposed Supplemental Appropriation To Pay Claims for Damages, Audited Claims, and Judgments Rendered Against the United States. Communication from the President of the United States . . . in the amount of \$1,999,044.26 . . . H. Doc. 85, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 20 pp.

Summary of Report on Mutual Defense Assistance Program

SEMIANNUAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS

[Released to the press April 26]

President Truman, on April 25, transmitted to the Congress the second semiannual report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), covering the period from April 6 to October 6, 1950.

(This completes the first full year of operation under Public Law 329, 81st Cong., 1st sess., cited as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949," approved October 6, 1949. The act was amended to increase its scope at the 2d sess. [Public Law 621, 81st Cong.] approved July 26, 1950.)

Summary of Report

The report details the joint activities of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Administration in providing military assistance to "certain friendly nations whose security must be maintained in the interests of preserving world peace"—including North Atlantic Treaty nations.

While most of the details of the program—the world's greatest peacetime cooperative defense effort—have already been made public, the report shows them in relation to their bearing on American foreign policy today and makes clear that the program of economic-military aid being followed is aimed at preserving world peace.

As the report states:

Because communism probed for weak links regardless of their character and then skillfully selected and shaped its tactics to exploit them, the task of building strength in the free world was that of building strength in all of its principal elements—economic, political, spiritual, and military. It was futile to revive the economy and spirit of a people in order to provide a shield against internal Communist aggression while leaving them an easy, undefended target for Soviet military or paramilitary forces.

Moreover, the attainment of internal stability depended in part upon the development of a feeling of security from external aggression—a conviction that the fruits of the self-discipline and hard labor required for economic recovery could not be harvested by a conqueror. Conversely, however, no nation could create and maintain an effective military establishment without a healthy economy. Similarly, the cost of such an establishment would be unjustified if it protected a nation which was too weak

internally to survive Communist subversion or was lacking in the will to resist external force in crisis. The development of economic, military, political, and spiritual strength must go hand-in-hand, and for this reason the principal elements of the American program to achieve peace and security were specifically designed to provide these several components of total strength both abroad and at home.

The principal elements of this program were:

(1) The European Recovery Program and other economic programs designed to assist the free nations to repair the ravages of war and to attain a standard of existence that gave them the strength and the desire to resist Communist subversion and propaganda;

(2) the creation and maintenance of an American defensive military establishment capable, alone in the first instance, and later as part of a collective force, of discouraging any immediate challenge of military aggression;

(3) participation in collective security arrangements with other friendly Governments in the Western Hemisphere and North Atlantic area in those cases where, in the light of our available resources, the character of our strategic interests, and the practicability of effective associations, such arrangements were likely to provide increased military strength against aggression; and

(4) the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and several smaller and more specific earlier programs, intended to provide cooperating free nations, to the extent that they could not help themselves, with the physical means of achieving military strength.

Along with strong and continuous support for the United Nations in both word and action, the United States has vigorously and with increasing success pursued these four courses.

Whereas, the first 6 months of operation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program had represented a period of planning and preparation, the second 6 months—to October 6, 1950—was a period of active operations. By the end of the period, approximately 330,000 measurement tons of military matériel and commodities had been shipped, including nearly 500 tanks and combat vehicles.

A sharp upswing in the obligation of MDAP funds also is noted in the report. From March 31, 1950, when total obligations were just under 42 million dollars (less than 3 percent of total funds appropriated for fiscal year 1950), obligations jumped to about 1.9 billion dollars by October first.

The extent to which cooperating nations are making efforts of their own to build their defenses is discussed at length in the report.

In summing up, the conclusion of the report states:

The story of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program which has been recorded in these pages bespeaks its own lessons. The world as we find it is a world in which the ability of free men to preserve their freedom depends upon the ability and will of free men to defend themselves against the sinister, virulent, and powerful forces which seek to enslave them. Everywhere, Soviet communism, evil and strong, is assaulting the ramparts of liberty—probing for weakness and endeavoring by the exploitation of weakness to spread the hopeless darkness which covers its present, already vast empire to the farthest reaches of the earth. The events which have been chronicled in this report have demonstrated the nature and ever-present character of this danger. They have also proved that this danger can only be removed by building comparable strength throughout the free world—spiritual strength, political strength, economic strength, and military strength. Force must be confronted with force—force defensively so great that Soviet communism will never dare to test it. Toward this end the Mutual Defense Assistance Program clearly has an indispensable role. It must therefore be continued in the future for so long and in such size and form as may be required to build the kind of military strength among free nations that will preserve the security of these nations, including the United States, against Soviet aggression.

The task of meeting Soviet communism on its own terms in every sphere is a manageable task, but it requires more than plans, promises, and hopes. It will demand the best and most that every free nation can contribute. The price will be high, but it is a price which the free nations can pay, and it is a price that they must pay if they wish to preserve their freedom.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program and other programs directed toward strengthening the non-Soviet world are a necessary part of that price. There is no other choice, no easy middle road of concession or neutrality, because Soviet communism brooks no compromise except where compromise will serve its own imperialistic ends. So long as this condition persists, free man will either meet the challenge and pay the price or cease to be free. Whether they will have the foresight and wisdom to look beyond the shadows of their own hamlets and perceive and understand this fact, and whether they will have the courage and be prepared to make the heavy sacrifices required to deal therewith, are the great issues of our time. American foreign policy proceeds on the assumption that the quality of free men and nations is such that these issues can and must be resolved on the side of freedom and liberty.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

[Released to the press by the White House April 26]

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 329 (81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. 714), I submit the Second Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, covering the period from April 6, 1950 to October 6, 1950.

In making this submission I can do no better than to reiterate the following words which were contained in my letter submitting the First Semiannual Report on June 1, 1950:

By its enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, and by its earlier provision of aid for Greece and Turkey, the Congress of the United States recognized

that the security of the United States required a strengthening of the will and ability of certain free nations to resist the aggression with which they were threatened. The preservation of world peace in a form which free peoples could accept depended then, as it depends now, upon the physical capacity and moral determination of the free world to stem those forces which seek to cloak the whole earth with the mantle of totalitarianism. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program represents one part of our effort to assist in the development of this essential capacity and determination and, as the attached report clearly demonstrates, is, and must continue to be, an integral part of the total policy of the United States.

Events since that time have proved beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of these principles.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
April 25, 1951.

THE DEPARTMENT

Mrs. Bertha S. Rodrick Retires With Fifty-Year Employment Record

Mrs. Bertha S. Rodrick retired from the Department of State on April 30, 1951 after 50 years of service.¹ She is the first woman employee to achieve this record of service in the history of the Department.

Mrs. Rodrick was first appointed to the Department on March 28, 1900. At this time, she was employed for 1 month to do special work on the Foreign Relations volumes. On May 16, 1901, she was appointed to the Department as a stenographer in the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, and her service has been consecutive since that time.

In 1906, she was transferred to the Passport Division, which at that time consisted of 7 employees. At present, there are over 200 employees in this Division, headed by Ruth B. Shipley, more than the total employment of the Department in 1906. Since that time, the Passport Division has issued 5¼ million passports.

Mrs. Rodrick's knowledge of passport requirements and procedures and long experience with all phases of this critical facet of the Department's responsibilities has made her services effective in dealing with the wide range of requests and inquiries relative to passports and complicated citizenship matters.

Secretary of State Acheson presented a letter of commendation for her noteworthy service to Mrs. Rodrick on April 30, 1951.

¹ For interview with Mrs. Rodrick, *Viewing 48 Years in the Department of State*, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1949, p. 741.

PUBLICATIONS

Pamphlets on Germany and German Youth Released

[Released to the press April 29]

The Department of State released today two pamphlets relating to Germany and German youth. They are *Confuse and Control: Soviet Techniques in Germany*, and *Preparation for Tomorrow: A German Boy's Year in America*.

The pamphlet *Confuse and Control*, describes Soviet efforts to reduce the German people to a helpless confusion of distrust and divided purpose. Through example and detailed analysis, presented against the background of United States policies and programs in Germany, these hundred-odd pages give the story of Soviet subversion tactics, their successes, and their failures in a crucial year of the occupation. The account opens with an estimate of Soviet intentions and of the importance of Germany to the U.S.S.R. and to the free world. It proceeds with a discussion of the two Germanys of today, an estimate of the influence of communism in Western Germany, and an examination of the current Party line, including the Kremlin version of the Korean issue as spread by the Communist "free" press in Eastern Germany. Communist literature, Communist-inspired riots, and the remarkable election of October 1950 are brought into the record.

Also brought into the record are the attempts of the Soviets to entice the young people of Eastern Germany into the Communist Party by the methods Hitler used more than a decade ago to convert the youth of his day to nazism. The pamphlet describes the Communist spring festival in Berlin a year ago when half a million young Germans were brought to the capital for a jam-boree that was to rise to a climax in a riotous march through Western Berlin. Through the good sense and the precautions taken by the citizens and officials of Western Berlin, the Soviet plans for a bloody riot—and the world headlines that would have announced it—were blocked. Instead, some thousands of the young visitors who wandered into Western Berlin were welcomed by the people of that sector who took them into their homes and offset some of their Communist teachings with considerable success.

Confuse and Control pays tribute to the citizens of both Eastern and Western Berlin for the courageous way in which they are resisting Soviet pressures. With a spirit characteristic of most of the peoples who stand closely under the guns of

the Kremlin, Berliners are showing a fortitude and toughness of mind that are defeating the Soviet confusion tactics. As this account indicates, Germans who are not in daily contact with Soviet rule are likely to be more susceptible to these confusion tactics, but the strenuous efforts of the Allied occupation authorities in Western Germany have had a marked success in defeating Soviet plans and in building up the democratic patterns that are establishing confidence and a clear goal for the German people.

Confuse and Control gives a full pictorial coverage of its topics with maps, cartoons, and photographs. Included are reproductions of Communist posters extolling the "joys" of living under communism and deploring, with pointed reference to Germany's problems, the horrors of American "brutality" and "dollar imperialism."

The second pamphlet, *Preparation for Tomorrow*, the Department of State has told the story of a 17-year-old German boy's year in America under the Department's exchange program for German boys and girls of secondary school age. This illustrated pamphlet describes Ernst Taucher's family background, how the opportunity to go to the United States came to him, his journey, his introduction to American life in an Indiana farming community, his experiences as a member of a hospitable midwestern family, as a student in the high school, and as a sharer in the everyday life of a small town. Finally, it describes the conflicting emotions with which Ernst uproots himself from his new life and returns to Germany.

Ernst's experiences, special and extraordinary as they seemed to him, are common to the 576 German youngsters who have had or are now having a chance to learn what democracy is by living with it for a year under American conditions.

The exchange program for Germany's teen-age boys and girls, as conducted by the State Department's Office of Educational Exchange with the cooperation of various religious and civic organizations, is designed to give some of Germany's most promising young people practical training in democratic procedures and living. Ernst speaks of his American experience as "the most wonderful year of my life." The Department and the increasing number of Americans who have come to know the young visitors from Germany take the position that the teen-ager exchange program is a sensible and typically American way of helping Germany to develop sound leadership.

Both of these publications are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. The price of *Confuse and Control: Soviet Techniques in Germany* is 30¢. The pamphlet, *Preparation for Tomorrow: A German Boy's Year in America*, sells for 25¢.

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WHY WE NEED ALLIES

*by President Truman*¹

THIS conference is being held to consider one of the most important tasks facing our country. The lives of many millions of our fellow citizens may depend on the development of a strong civil defense. The threat of atomic warfare is one which we must face, no matter how much we dislike it. We can never afford to forget that the terrible destruction of cities, and of civilization as we know it, is a real possibility.

There are two things our country must do in the face of this awesome and terrible possibility. One of them is to look to our civil defense. So long as there is any chance at all that atomic bombs may fall on our cities, we cannot gamble on being caught unprepared. And let's not fool ourselves—there is such a chance. We must prepare for it.

The other thing we must do is to try to prevent atomic war from coming. That is what I have been working for ever since I became President. That is what our foreign policy is all about. The foreign policy of the United States is based on an effort to attain world peace. Every action we have taken has had this aim.

We are right in the midst of a big debate on foreign policy. A lot of people are looking at this debate as if it were just a political fight. But the stakes are a lot more important than the outcome of an election. The thing that is at stake in this debate may be atomic war. Our foreign policy is not a political issue. It is a matter of life and death. It is a matter of the future of mankind.

These two things—civil defense and foreign policy—are what I will talk about tonight. As you see, they are closely tied together. And they are both concerned with a form of warfare which is more destructive than anything the world has ever known before.

Civil Defense Against Atomic Bombs

Our civil-defense problem starts with a few basic facts. Because there was an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union in 1949, we must act on the assumption that they do have atomic bombs. They have planes that could drop atomic bombs upon

our cities. No matter how good our air defense may be, or how big an air force we build, a determined air attack by the Soviet Union could drop bombs upon this country. Our air force experts say planes would get through, however good our defenses may be.

The purpose of atomic attacks would be to strike a death blow at our cities; to burn out our centers of production; and to create panic among our people. There is no complete protection against an atomic-bomb attack. But there is a lot we can do to reduce the number of deaths and injuries and to check panic.

We must organize ourselves—in every city, factory, office, and home. Civil defense is a responsibility which begins with the individual, and is shared with the city, the State, and the Nation.

We have two immediate jobs. One is to teach all our people how to protect themselves in the event of enemy attack. The other is to organize and train millions of volunteers as active members of the United States Civil Defense Corps.

The question we are putting up to you men and women at this conference is: how can we do these jobs as quickly and as efficiently as possible? We need your help in getting our fellow citizens to realize that this is a very serious business. So long as we face the threat of an atomic attack on the United States, we have got to build a strong civil defense organization. But even with such an organization, our losses in an atomic war, if we should have one, would be terrible. Whole cities would be casualties. Cleveland or Chicago, Seattle or New York, or any of our other great cities might be destroyed. Even with such losses, frightful as they would be, I think this country would survive and would win an atomic war. But even if we win, an atomic war would be a disaster.

Collective Security Through the United Nations

The best defense against atomic bombing is to prevent the outbreak of another world war and achieve a real peace. We must bend all our energy to the job of keeping our free way of life, and to doing it without another war. We can have peace only if we have justice and fair dealing among nations. The United Nations is the best means we have for deciding what is right and what is wrong between nations. It is a great

¹ Made before the Civil Defense Conference at Washington on May 7 and released to the press by the White House on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4218.

attempt to make the moral judgment of mankind effective in international affairs. Nothing is more important if mankind is to overcome the barbarian doctrine that might makes right.

Our best chance of keeping the peace and staying free is for nations that believe in freedom to stick together and to build their strength together. This is what we call collective security. We have been trying since the last war was over and even before to build a system of collective security among all those countries that really believe in the principles of the United Nations. I think we have made a lot of progress. I know that some people have become impatient with our efforts to establish collective security, because we have not yet succeeded in attaining world peace. But we are on the right road.

There are cynics who scorn the United Nations, who are indifferent to the need for cooperation among the free peoples. They do not understand that our best hope for peace is to bind together the nations that are striving for peace and to increase their strength to stop aggression. The United Nations is being severely tested today because of the Korean conflict. The fighting there is requiring great sacrifices. In a time of crisis, there is a tendency to look for some easy way out regardless of the consequences. But we must not be misled. We must not lose sight of the world picture and the critical importance of the United Nations if we are to reach a permanent solution.

Communist Aggression in the Far East

Communist aggression in Korea is part of the world-wide strategy of the Kremlin to destroy freedom. It has shown men all over the world that Communist imperialism may strike anywhere, anytime. The defense of Korea is part of the world-wide effort of all the free nations to maintain freedom. It has shown free men that if they stand together, and pool their strength, Communist aggression cannot succeed. The firm stand of the United Nations in Korea has checked the advance of Communist imperialism throughout Asia. It is using up the military resources of the Chinese Communists to such an extent that they are not able to carry out the designs of Communist imperialism against the independence of other Asian countries. And the people of those countries who have been resisting Communist aggression have now been given new hope and new courage.

The Communist assault in Indochina has been checked by the free people of Indochina with the help of the French. In Malaya, the British are holding firm against Communist guerrilla attacks. In the Philippines, in Burma, and in other places in Asia, Communist-led guerrillas are being blocked.

The fight against aggression in Korea has also dealt a heavy blow to the Kremlin conspiracy outside of Asia. It has brought new hope and cour-

age to free men in Europe, and in the Middle East, who face the Soviet menace across their frontiers. The fight against Communist aggression in the Far East is the fight against Communist aggression in the West as well.

The struggle in Korea is a long and hard one. But it can be won—and our policy is designed to win it.

The Chinese rulers are losing large numbers of their soldiers. As these losses increase it will become clearer and clearer to them that aggression does not pay. They can have peace when they give up their aggression and stop the fighting.

Meanwhile, the strength of all the free nations is growing. The Soviet plan of world conquest is becoming more and more impossible to achieve. If we stick to our guns, and continue to punish the aggressors, we can end the aggression in Korea and restore peace.

Foreign Policy and World Peace

We have been urged to take measures which would spread the fighting in the Far East. We have been told that this would bring the Korean conflict to a speedy conclusion; that it would save the lives of our troops. In my judgment, this is not true. I believe we have a better chance of stopping the aggression in Korea, at a smaller cost in the lives of our troops and those of our allies, by following our present course. Let me tell you that I have studied this question for a long time. It is not a question that can be decided in the light of Korea alone. It does not affect the Far East alone. It is not a local question. It affects Korea and Japan, and the security of our troops in those places. But it also reaches Europe, and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the security of free people there and everywhere else in the world. It is a decision that affects the future of the United Nations and the future of the whole world.

I have refused to extend the area of the conflict in the Far East, under the circumstances which now prevail, and I am going to tell you exactly why. I have refused first on military grounds. The best military advice I have been able to obtain—the best collective military advice in this country—is that this course of action would not lead to a quick and easy solution of the Korean conflict.

On the contrary, it could very well lead to a much bigger and much longer war. Such a war would not reduce our casualties in the Far East. It would increase them enormously. Such a war would expose our troops to devastating air and submarine attacks. It would seriously endanger Japan and the Philippines. It would unite the Chinese people behind their Communist rulers.

Furthermore, a deep involvement on our part in a war in China, whatever the outcome there, would have critical military consequences in Europe. There is nothing that would give the Kremlin greater satisfaction than to see our resources

committed to an all-out struggle in Asia, leaving Europe exposed to the Soviet armies.

These are some of the military dangers.

Moreover, there are other dangers. The Kremlin is trying, and has been trying for a long time, to drive a wedge between us and the other free nations. It wants to see us isolated. It wants to see us distrusted. It wants to see us feared and hated by our allies. Our allies agree with us in the course we are following. They do not believe that we should take the initiative to widen the conflict in the Far East. If the United States were to widen the conflict, we might well have to go it alone.

If we go it alone in Asia, we may destroy the unity of the free nations against aggression. Our European allies are nearer to Russia than we are. They are in far greater danger. If we act without regard to the danger that faces them, they may act without regard to the dangers that we face. Going it alone brought the world to the disaster of World War II. We cannot go it alone in Asia and go it in company in Europe. The whole idea of going it alone is the opposite of everything we have stood for and worked for since World War II. In this way, going it alone in Asia might wreck the United Nations, The North Atlantic Treaty, and the whole system of collective security we are helping to set up.

That would be a tremendous Soviet victory. We do not intend to fall into that trap. I do not propose to strip this country of its allies in the face of the Soviet danger. The path of collective security is our only sure defense against the dangers that threaten us. Moreover, it is the path to peace in Korea, to peace in the world.

We are determined to do our utmost to limit the war in Korea. We will not take any action which might place upon us the responsibility for initiating a general war. But if the aggressor takes further action which threatens the security of the United Nations forces in Korea, we will counter that action.

I repeat: I am convinced that the course we are now following in Korea is achieving the most for peace—and at the least cost in American lives. All of us wish that no Americans had to fight and die. But by fighting on a limited scale now, we may be able to prevent a third world war later on.

Remember this. If we do have another world war, it will be an atomic war. We could expect many atomic bombs to be dropped on American cities. And a single one of them could cause many times more casualties than we have suffered in all the fighting in Korea. I do not want to be responsible for bringing that about.

Tension Behind the Iron Curtain

Some people do not understand how the free world can ever win this long struggle, without fighting a third world war. These people overlook the inner weaknesses of the Soviet dictatorship.

They forget that the free world is stronger—stronger in its determination, stronger in its staying power, stronger in its human resources—than any system of slavery.

The Kremlin's system of terror, which appears to be its main strength, is one of its greatest weaknesses. Dictatorships are based on fear. They cannot give their people happiness and peace. They have nothing to offer except aggression and slavery.

As the aggressive tactics of the Kremlin are checked by the collective defenses of the free world, the futility of the whole Communist program is becoming more and more apparent to the people under Soviet control. We can already see this process at work. In China, the failure of the Korean adventure is weakening the hold of the Communist government. Wholesale arrests and executions are taking place. In the same way, the pressure of the police state is increasing in the other satellite countries. Yugoslavia has thrown off the Kremlin yoke. Every day refugees flee across the border from the Iron Curtain countries into the free countries of Europe.

There are growing signs of internal tension and unrest behind the Iron Curtain.

Our Goal of Peace

We must remember that the peoples under the Soviet rule of terror are not only our friends, but our silent allies. They are the victims of a terrible tyranny. We do not hate them. We have had friendly relations with them in the past; we can have such friendship again.

As the free nations build their strength and unity, this fact will compel a change in the Soviet drive for power and conquest. The Soviet rulers are faced with the growing strength of the free world, the increasing cost of aggression, and the increasing difficulty of driving their people to greater and greater hardships. They will be forced by these pressures from within and without to give up aggression. It will then be possible to make progress with a program for international control and reduction of armaments and for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Our programs of economic aid and technical assistance, and our campaign of truth, not only strengthen the free peoples; they weaken the dictatorships. They remind the victims of tyranny that a better world lies outside their prison. They build up the hope of freedom everywhere.

Everything we do to strengthen the free world; every dollar we spend for assistance to other free nations; every effort we make to resist aggression in Korea, and around the world, brings closer the day of genuine peace.

We are not engaged in a struggle without end. We are engaged in a struggle which has the definite goal of peace. Peace under law is the victory we seek. To achieve this goal we must

(Continued on page 779)

Defending the Peace From Soviet Thrusts

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

The common interest around which your organization is built is one which goes right to the heart of what we are trying to achieve in the world through our foreign policy.

Your organization is one of the major expressions of America's great productive power, and, though there may be differences of opinion about many things, I think all of us will agree that this great productive power of ours is one of the key factors, and perhaps the most important single factor, on which the peace of the world today depends.

Although we are blessed with the greatest productive capacity in all the world, we dare not forget that there are other important concentrations of industrial production in the world. Fortunately, most of the other important concentrations are in the hands of those who share our basic purposes. This means that a preponderance of industrial power is in the hands of nations who are trying to build, rather than destroy, international relationships based on the principles of the United Nations.

Now, your Government is asking you to devote a substantial share, and an increasing share, of this great productive capacity to turning out items that contribute to the defensive strength of this and other free nations.

All of us wish that it were not necessary to do this. We would all much rather be turning out things that are creative and constructive, things that make life better for people, rather than weapons of war.

And, we all wish that we could devote a larger portion of our energies to our great constructive programs to assist other free peoples to move toward better standards of living. This is the kind of thing we Americans traditionally prefer to do.

But instead, we are called upon to devote some

15 to 20 percent of our national output to the urgent necessities of military defense.

What I would like to discuss with you today is why this has become necessary and what it is this nation is seeking to do with this strength you are helping to build.

Menace of Soviet Thrusts

In the 5½ years that have passed since the end of the war, the men who control the destinies of the Soviet Union have continued to press forward not only with the traditional territorial aspirations of Old Russia but also with the revolutionary aims for world rule of the Bolshevik conspiracy.

This is the threat which requires the rest of the world to build defensive strength.

By a combination of a ruthless control system over their own people and false promises to the discontented in many other lands, the men who run this vast conspiracy have been reaching out for more power. And, what is most important for us to understand is that they are reaching out for those critical centers of power which will give them leverage over all the rest.

The object of the Soviet reach for power in this period is to bring within the Soviet sphere of control two critical areas. One of these contains the great industrial capacity of Europe. The other is Asia with its resources, including the present and, more important, the potential industrial capacity of Japan.

With these areas under their control, the Soviet rulers believe that they could dominate the world. They would not only be in a strong position in the event of war but what also is just as important, they would be in a strong position to impose their will on the other parts of the world without having to fire a shot.

It is immediately clear that this would be a very dangerous condition for us and for all free people.

Now, even if we were to leave aside all the con-

¹Made before U. S. Chamber of Commerce at Washington on Apr. 30 and released to the press on the same date.

siderations of our friendship and concern for the people who would be enslaved in this expansion of Soviet power and were to take the narrowest view of our own national security, we would still be faced with that fact that these two thrusts by the Soviet power system would not be compatible with our national security. It is, therefore, the essential task of our defense program in the present period to prevent the Soviet system from adding the resources and the productive concentrations in Western Europe and in Asia to its own war-making machine. This is not all that our defense program has to do, but it is, in broad strategic terms, the major task now required of it.

Let us now take a closer look at what we are doing, with the strength which you are helping to build, to meet these two major Soviet thrusts in Europe and in Asia.

Meeting the Thrust in Europe

One arm of our security effort is seeking to meet the Soviet thrust against Europe.

I am not going to review with you here all the details of the progress we are making under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the setting up of General Eisenhower's headquarters and staff, and the operation of our military and economic aid program, and the steps which show the growing cohesion and strength of the European nations. I know that these are familiar to you and that your organization has been following these programs closely.

What I do want to do is to step back and look at these efforts in the large, to see this European effort in great block poster colors, so that we can come away with a feeling for the whole pattern of what it is we are trying to do there.

In the large, the people of Europe, with our help, are trying to harness their growing economic strength to the urgent need for an effective defense system, so that they and their resources and their skills and their industrial plants will not, either through attack or through subversion, fall into the hands of the Soviet rulers.

Germany, as I indicated a moment ago, occupies a place of particular significance in this effort, because Soviet control over the Ruhr would put the Soviet rulers in a strong position to reach out for the rest of Europe.

The Soviet rulers have long understood this simple strategic fact.

The whole point of the Soviet tactics in the talks among the deputy Foreign Ministers at Paris has been to retard, and if possible to prevent, the strengthening of the Western European defense system. To do this, they have been trying to drive a wedge between the Allies by portraying themselves as the put-upon lovers of peace and by characterizing our defense measures as aggressive. In particular, they have been seeking to prevent the participation of Western Germany in the Western European defense system.

The increased shrillness of the Soviet representative in the Paris talks, Mr. Gromyko, is in a sense the measure of the progress of our defensive effort.

If we weren't getting anywhere with the European defense program, the Soviet representatives wouldn't be making a great noise about it. But as we make progress, as we eliminate the possibilities for easy conquest, we must be prepared for these propaganda blasts, for a war of nerves, for fake peace offensives.

It is one of the inescapable features of this situation that, as we eliminate the weaknesses which invite aggression, the tensions and the dangers of the immediate period may increase.

Since the only alternative to this course would be to remain at a disadvantage and ultimately lose all, we have no choice but to plug ahead, building our combined strength as steadily and as rapidly as we can. That is the only way to work our way through this period of danger.

We have repeatedly said—and our record in these Paris discussions and on many previous occasions makes it clear that we mean what we say—that we are ready to negotiate in good faith now or at any time. But until we are met with equal good faith, and so long as this threat hangs over us, we cannot relax our efforts to build our common strength.

One advantage that the people of Europe start with in building this defensive strength is the remarkable rate of economic recovery they have achieved from the destruction of the war. Great credit is due the people of Europe for this achievement. It does not in any way diminish from the luster of their accomplishment for us to acknowledge the part our aid program has played in that recovery.

Our economic aid program, which was carried forward, appropriately under the name of the Marshall Plan, has been a tremendous success. Make no mistake about that. The evidence of Europe's mounting productive output is not only a testimony to our enlightened and unprecedented effort to assist the people of Europe in rebuilding their war-shattered economy but it is also, even from a narrow interpretation of our own self-interest, a good return on our investment in bolstering our national security.

The urgent problem that remains is to translate an adequate part of this economic potential into the tanks and the planes and the guns needed for defense.

A good start has been made in this direction. But the Soviet military preparations have been going on steadily since the war, and Soviet satellite forces are being built up rapidly, to add to the Soviet capability for intimidation and attack.

The best military minds of this country and of our European allies have been working to devise defense plans and create a defense program which will be adequate to the threat.

It is our goal to build a defense system which will inspire confidence among the people of Europe that they can prevent their homelands from being overrun. It is also our goal to attain a level of defense which will, together with our power, be sufficient to discourage the appetite for aggression altogether.

It will take time and great effort on the part of all of us to bring this European defense system to a level which approaches these necessary goals.

I would like to say a word here on the cost of our assistance to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in answer to suggestions I have heard that this aid is an extravagance which should be discontinued.

Purely in terms of the hard-headed question: How much security will a dollar buy? It is evident that the aid we are furnishing our allies so multiplies our common security that it is in fact an economical use of resources.

Our aid is not only an addition to the billions of dollars now in the military budgets of the European countries—but it is often a multiplying factor. To take one example, 55 thousand dollars worth of copper and zinc supplied by us made possible the manufacture of 3.6 million dollars worth of antitank mines in Britain.

Or, in another case, 300 thousand dollars worth of machine tools made it possible for France to produce almost 14 million dollars worth of air frames.

Reduced to its simplest terms, our aid to Western Europe produces more security per dollar, faster, than we could possibly achieve ourselves. And, it is security which is vital both to us and to our European allies.

We are well aware that the rapid fulfillment of our common defense program is certain to affect the civilian life, not only of our own people but of all the people with whom we are allied.

Wherever careful planning and cooperation can moderate or equalize these burdens, we are endeavoring to bring this about.

This is all part of the complex but essential process by which the combined defense system is now taking shape.

Our progress up to this point has been sufficient, I believe, to justify our confidence that, with time and with effort, we can build the strength of this European defense system sufficiently to prevent the Soviet thrust in this direction from achieving its aim. To do so is necessary to peace and to our security.

The Pattern in Asia

Now, let us look at the other major Soviet thrust and at what we are doing about it.

The purpose of this thrust is to put the Soviet empire in a position to dominate all Asia, including control over Japan, with its already large production and its larger potentialities, with its skilled population and its strategic position. By

linking the production of Japan to the manpower of China and the resources of Asia, the Soviet rulers would be in a strong position to redouble their pressure on the rest of the world.

To understand this purpose helps to make clear the meaning of the attack on Korea.

This attack, carried forward by satellite troops, was designed in the first instance to extend Communist control over the entire Korean peninsula.

To achieve this, they were willing to flout the authority of the United Nations, and they sought, in so doing, to weaken the political and moral position of the United Nations and of all the nations that are standing in the way of the Soviet ambitions.

Another purpose of this attack, which has made itself apparent, is to divert our attention from Europe by occupying us as fully as possible in Asia before our strength-in-being has been further built up.

How are we dealing with this Soviet strategy for Asia? Again here, as in our discussion of the thrust against Europe, I will not go into great detail about the steps we are taking. These details are familiar to you, and what I want to try to bring out is the pattern of our efforts.

The objective of these efforts is to thwart the Soviet attempt to dominate Asia. It is our purpose to help the people of Asia protect their freedom and independence.

One of the major lines of effort in this program is the writing of a peace treaty for Japan. The careful and able work of Ambassador John Foster Dulles has laid the basis for a Japanese peace treaty which will enable Japan to become an equal, peaceful, and self-sustaining member of the world community. It will also put the people of Japan in the best position to contribute to the independence of their country, which, as we have seen, is important to our security as well as to theirs.

The people of Japan have earned our confidence by their steady and responsible course during these difficult months since the attack was launched against Korea, and we look forward to the establishment of permanent bonds of friendship between Japan and all other free nations.

In order that a power vacuum will not be created by a peace settlement with Japan, we are making cooperative arrangements, on the basis of mutual agreement, to insure the independence and the continued security of Japan.

This agreement is to be one of a series recently announced by the President,² which are intended as initial steps toward building the basis for security in the Pacific.

Conditions in the Pacific area are substantially different from those which prevail in Europe, and the establishment of security arrangements similar to those in the North Atlantic area are not now feasible. We wish to help the peoples of the Pacific area in their efforts in any way we can,

² BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 699.

and the present and proposed security arrangements between ourselves and Japan and with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, to which the President referred, will, we hope, further strengthen the structure of peace in the Pacific.

Our economic and military aid programs are another essential part of this total effort to maintain peace in the Far East.

By demonstrating our friendship for the peoples of Asia and by helping them to achieve and protect their freedom and to make progress against the poverty and misery which oppresses them, we are, at the same time, helping to throw up a bulwark against the Soviet imperialist design, and we thereby strengthen our own security.

Our friendship for the people of China, who are now suffering the tragedy of life behind the iron curtain, has not diminished. The structure of peace which we and our allies are building will never be complete until all the peoples who are now under the domination of the Kremlin are able to participate freely and independently.

The Soviets are constantly probing for points throughout Asia at which penetration may be possible. Efforts to penetrate by economic and political means of subversion have now been supplemented by the use of armed invasion and war.

Our military and economic aid programs have been adapted to meet the further threat posed by this Communist use of force.

Supplementing the important aid programs which we had been developing in the Far East, additional military aid has been directed to those areas especially threatened by this military development.

This includes additional aid to Formosa, the Philippines, and Indochina. As the President declared following the Communist attack on Korea, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces in these circumstances would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces in that area. The Seventh Fleet was ordered then to prevent any attack on Formosa. To supplement the defense of Formosa and insure that Formosa will not fall into hostile hands, we are providing increased military aid.³

The aid programs in the Far East meet not only such immediate security requirements as these but also give powerful support to our national security interest by helping the people of Asia lay the basis for stable and developing societies. It is important for us to appreciate that our humanitarian instincts and our own national security interests are both served by these programs.

The Test of Strength in Korea

Now, we come to the most direct military aspect of our efforts to deal with the Soviet thrust in Asia. This relates to what we and the other members of the United Nations are doing to stop the aggression in Korea.

³ BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 747.

What I have already said should make it clear why it is important to our security that this attack in Korea be stopped in its tracks. We have seen that this attack is part of a design to gain control over all Asia. This attack is also intended to weaken the position of the United Nations, the United States, and others who stand in the way of Soviet ambitions.

There are several other points which have emerged from our survey, and which bear on this conflict in Korea. One is that this is not the only Soviet thrust we must bear in mind. The Soviets are using satellite troops for this aggression, keeping their own forces in reserve. It would further their strategy if we were to expend our major strength against the forces and the territory of their satellites or if we were to neglect other vital interests in meeting this thrust.

We have also seen that we need time to push ahead with our program of building strength, and we need to build that strength together with our allies.

These are factors which cannot be ignored in thinking about what it is we are doing in Korea.

Our objectives in Korea are very clear, and there should be no misunderstanding about them.

In the simplest terms, we are trying to accomplish three things in Korea:

1. We are trying to stop this act of aggression.
2. We are trying to keep this conflict from spreading, to the extent that it is in our power to do so.
3. We are trying to restore peace and security to the area.

These have been our purposes from the beginning, and these have been the agreed purposes of the United Nations. The United Nations has never contemplated the use of force to accomplish its political objective in Korea, which is the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic country.

A great deal has already been accomplished by the steadiness with which we have held to these purposes, and above all by the heroic devotion of our men in Korea and their fellow soldiers from other countries. We should not, in the course of the present debate, lose sight of these accomplishments:

First, this act of aggression has not succeeded according to the Soviet plan, and whatever other actions were planned have been interfered with;

Second, the defense against this aggression has served to arouse free men all over the world and has stimulated them to speed up their efforts to build a strong defense system;

Third, new vitality has pulsed through the whole idea of collective security against aggression;

And fourth, this device of satellite aggression has been thoroughly exposed, and its usefulness in other situations has been reduced.

We knew last June, and we know today, that it

was right and necessary to stand firm against this attack. If we had not, the whole spirit of resistance against the Soviet grab for power would have been weakened, perhaps fatally.

Now, people are saying: this may be true, but how can the conflict in Korea be brought to an end?

There are two ways in which this situation in Korea may develop.

One is that the fighting may spread despite our efforts to limit it. Further acts of the aggressors could touch off world war. If this happens, the responsibility for it will rest squarely on the Kremlin and its agents in Peiping.

The other is that the fighting may be brought to an end in Korea. The best way to do this is for us to continue firm in our determination to meet and repel the enemy until it becomes clear to him that his aggression cannot pay. There must be an end to the fighting, there must be concrete measures against the renewal of the attack, and there must be an abandonment by the enemy of his attempt to conquer the Republic of Korea.

If we remain firm and steady on the course we are following in Korea, if we don't flinch or get rattled, we shall have the best chance of bringing this action to a successful conclusion.

The other day at Paris, Mr. Gromyko was playing back to us some of the arguments he has been overhearing from this side of the Atlantic about Korea. He raised the question whether or not we are going to hold to our course in Korea with firm determination.

Well, we are. But his intervention serves to remind us that, in thinking about this action in Korea, we have to keep always in mind the total world picture, and the whole threat we face.

The ingredients of peace in the world must include: the resoluteness with which we hold to our course in Korea; the speed with which we build up our strength elsewhere in the world; the closeness of our common defense arrangements with our allies.

As I said at the outset, the strength and the power you are helping to build are essential to our security and to world peace. But equally important is the strength of character and the steadiness of the American people.

To win through to a period of peace in the world will require wisdom and courage and common sense from all of us.

Removing Prohibition Against Travel in Hungary

[Released to the press on May 1]

The Department of State has instructed all American diplomatic and consular officers abroad and the passport agents in the United States that

passports may now be issued, renewed, extended, and amended without invalidation for travel to Hungary. The American diplomatic and consular officers and the passport agents are also being instructed that passports which come into their hands for any purpose and which bear the restriction against travel in Hungary should be amended by deleting the restriction. This new procedure does away with the instructions of December 20, 1949, of the Department of State, under which all passports other than those issued on official business or to bona fide American correspondents were required to bear an endorsement invalidating them against use in Hungary.

Passports will be issued, renewed, extended, and amended for travel to Hungary, but the Passport Division, when granting such services, will furnish the applicants with a statement that, private American citizens desiring to travel in Hungary will, no doubt, desire to inform themselves concerning conditions in that country by consulting the Department of State or American missions abroad.

Robert Vogeler Expresses Gratitude to the President and the Secretary

[Released to the press May 1]

Message to President Truman

I was not aware until reaching Vienna of the great crisis which was forced upon the United States and which occurred during my imprisonment. It is amazing to me that with all your difficulties and troubles time was found to complete so successfully negotiations for my liberation. This is an example of the great solicitude our country has for every one of its humblest citizens. Pending my return to the United States, I should appreciate your thanking the American people in my name for their confidence and continuing interest in my welfare.

Message to Secretary Acheson

I have just learned of the personal interest you took in my release and the wonderful consideration you have shown to my wife and champion, and I thank you for all the happiness you have brought to me and my family in making this reunion possible. From all of the information I have received since my liberation, I cannot but admire the constant intense effort made by the State Department throughout this long period of my imprisonment. Please convey this expression of my gratitude to all of the personnel concerned for their untiring interest.

CAN THE U.N. BECOME A COLLECTIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION?

by *Harding F. Bancroft*

*Deputy U. S. Representative on Collective Measures Committee*¹

The adoption by the General Assembly last fall of the resolution, *Uniting for Peace*, represents a further effort by the world community to organize itself for collective action to deter or suppress aggression.² This paper will analyze how the process of the United Nations under the uniting-for-peace resolution carries out the purposes of the Charter and will consider the political and legal implications of that program.

The pragmatic adaption of the Charter in the security field was started sooner than could be anticipated because of the aggression in Korea on June 25, 1950. The action of the Security Council in this first instance of United Nations collective measures and its first use of military force to meet an act of aggression was done by recommendation rather than by order. To this extent, the United Nations action in Korea broke the ground for an alternate route around the impasse which had been created by the failure to reach agreement on the forces to be available to the United Nations under article 43. In Korea, therefore, improvising was necessary. No forward planning—no methods, no procedures, no apparatus—had been established for the creation of a United Nations command and for the integration of forces and other contributions from member states into that command.

The method used in the Korean action is, nevertheless, clearly directed toward the same destination as the exact scheme of the Charter—namely, a United Nations organized and equipped to deter

or to repel the attack of an aggressor state. In Korea, there is now in being a United Nations force acting in common cause in furtherance of paragraph 1, article 1 of chapter I of the Charter and actually taking “effective collective measures . . . for the suppression of acts of aggression”.

The problem, therefore, that stood out in the summer of 1950 was how to ready the United Nations for similar action in the future, within the framework of the Charter and within the limitations of political realities. The uniting-for-peace resolution, that the Assembly adopted by 52 affirmative votes, sought to pave the way for the answer to that problem.

The principal features of the uniting-for-peace resolution are:

1. The provision that the General Assembly can meet on 24 hours' notice if the Security Council is prevented by the veto from exercising its primary responsibility for international peace and security.

2. The provision that in such case the General Assembly may make recommendations to member states for collective measures including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force.

3. The provision recommending that each member state maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as United Nations units on the recommendation of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

4. The establishment of the Peace Observation Commission to observe and report in any area where international tension exists.

¹ Based on a paper read before the American Society of International Law on Apr. 27, at Washington.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

5. The creations of the Collective Measures Committee to study and report on methods to strengthen peace and security in accordance with the Charter.

In these provisions are the essential elements of a collective security system:—the means of determining aggression, an organism to put collective measures into operations, military force in readiness to carry out those measures, and some apparatus to perfect the methods for coordinating collective action.

Indeed, these elements are the same as those in the Charter. Only in terms of process is there a permissive rerouting of its precise scheme in respect to the forum available for initiating the action, the differing procedures if the alternative forum is used, and the nature of the commitment undertaken by member states.

The pattern of the uniting-for-peace resolution is not a deviation from the intent of the Charter. The Security Council can and normally would be used to initiate enforcement or preventive action. Furthermore, contributions from member states to the collective effort, whether of armed force or otherwise, would presumably be the same whether called into service by the Security Council or by the General Assembly.

Nothing in the uniting-for-peace program, therefore, distorts the original concepts or purposes of the Charter, but, on the contrary, the design is to carry forward those concepts and purposes. That, after all, is the best test of constitutionality. Any progress that the Collective Measures Committee may make, any procedures that it formulates, any machinery that it creates, or the planning that it does is in furtherance of the Charter's design and can, at a moment's

notice, be utilized under the exact scheme of the Charter with the role of the Security Council maintained.

Politically, it cannot be validly argued that the establishment of a system of collective security in furtherance of the uniting-for-peace resolution is an anti-U.S.S.R. alliance. It is an attempt to make the United Nations work in the collective security field. If the U.S.S.R. wishes to "rejoin" the United Nations and to cooperate in these efforts, then, the reason or occasion for using the General Assembly for collective action vanishes.

Use of the General Assembly

The first constitutional question that is raised in analyzing the uniting-for-peace resolution is the use of the General Assembly in place of the Security Council.

This question has been frequently debated in detail. Under article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council was given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But it was not given complete and exclusive responsibility.

The General Assembly's authority to recommend collective measures has its source in article 10 of the Charter which authorizes the Assembly to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter and to make recommendations to member states. The legislative history of this provision makes it unquestionably clear that this language meant exactly what is said. The big powers who held the veto made this concession to the other 45 nations at San Francisco who insisted that the Assembly have this latent power. The only limitation lies in article 12, namely, that the General Assembly may not make recommendations in respect to a dispute or situation when the Security Council is dealing with that dispute or situation.

The argument has been advanced, however, that paragraph 2 of article 11 of the Charter deprives the General Assembly of the authority to make recommendations for collective measures. That paragraph provides that any question on which the Assembly may wish to make recommendations on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. Although the meaning of the word "action" may be subject to some doubt, it would appear from the context that it refers to orders or binding enforcement decisions of the Security Council under chapter VII

In the Charter of the United Nations, we have one of the greatest peace pacts in history. All of the large powers including the Soviet Union have subscribed to that pact. It applies in its peace-protecting clauses to all nations whether they are members or not. If the people of the world are sufficiently informed and clear about the essentials of the Charter, no nation can escape its responsibilities or slip out from under its obligations even by withdrawing from the organization. Not even a veto in the Security Council excuses any member from joining in carrying out collective measures. It all depends upon the will of the peoples and governments to support a real system of collective security, as 53 of them did on June 25, 1950.

—Ambassador Warren R. Austin
April 1, 1951

of the Charter rather than to recommendations. Whatever its meaning, under the uniting-for-peace resolution, the Assembly would not be encroaching upon the authority of the Security Council, only filling a vacuum left by the Council's nonaction. Since the only reason for the Assembly to act would be in cases where the Security Council had had the opportunity to take action and had failed to do so. In these circumstances, therefore, to construe article 11, paragraph 2, in such a way as to restrict the General Assembly's right to act would be to come out with a completely circular and nonsensical result.

Voting

If the forum of the General Assembly, rather than the Security Council, is used to put in train collective measures to maintain the peace, the process of decision is naturally different. In the Security Council, there is the veto. In the Assembly, there is none. All that is required in the General Assembly in order to make a recommendation to member states, with the moral force and authority of the United Nations behind it, is a two-thirds Assembly vote. The right of veto was more than a protection to the permanent members of the Security Council. It was also regarded as a safe-

In emphasizing the idea of collective measures, I do not want to neglect what I have always regarded as the most important function of the United Nations—namely, the peaceful settlement of disputes. We are going to continue to have disputes long after the last imperialist power gives up ambition to rule the world by force. We have dealt with quite a few disputes between nations since 1945 and have a good record of preventing or stopping armed clashes. In each case our success was based upon the willingness of the parties to bring their dispute to the United Nations.

The provisions for peaceful settlement to be found in Chapter VI of the Charter will be used with greater certainty if aggression is made hopeless by a collective security system. As in the case of individuals, the police tend to drive the disputants to the court to settle their differences rather than to a dueling field.

We have learned a great deal in Korea about what we require to make a really broad United Nations defense possible. In the Collective Measures Committee, established by the last General Assembly, the plans are being drawn up to produce peace forces of many parts which can form a united front. This concerns problems such as advance training, equipping of special units, overcoming language barriers, providing in advance for transport, arranging for professional military direction, and others.

—Ambassador Warren R. Austin
April 1, 1951

guard by the smaller states who knew that, because the veto existed, they would never have to comply with Security Council decisions unless all five permanent members agreed to the course of action.

It may be asked whether the use of the vetoless General Assembly in this field is of real significance in terms of political and practical realities?

If the veto was in the nature of an escape hatch to the majority of the United Nations members in the event of a falling-out between the great powers, as no doubt many members thought of it, the hatch has not been battened down by the use of the General Assembly. In the first place, an Assembly resolution is not a binding decision but merely a recommendation to be complied with or not in accordance with each members' honest judgment of his obligations as a signatory of the Charter. Moreover, because a two-thirds vote would be necessary in the General Assembly to institute collective measures, they could be blocked by one-third plus one of the total membership. Both these factors constitute practical and realistic protection to a member state from becoming involved itself in United Nations action which it believes to be undesirable, ineffective, or unwise. They afford no protection, however, to an aggressor who cannot stop the collective action of an angry and determined two-thirds majority.

Nor is the distinction between the decisions of the Security Council and the recommendations of the General Assembly a fundamental one in practical application. Even Security Council decisions have no process for judicial execution which in the present state of organized international society can compel compliance. The commitment under the Charter to carry out decisions of the Security Council is not the source of collective strength. Rather, it lies in the individual and collective determination to maintain freedom and to preserve a way of life—a willingness to act together in a common cause.

Undertakings To Provide Armed Forces

Under article 43 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations undertook to make available to the Security Council on its call the armed forces necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Special agreements governing the number and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, as well as other types of assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, were to be negotiated

and concluded between the Security Council and individual members. Plans for the application of armed force were to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

What are the basic differences between the uniting-for-peace proposals and the unfulfilled Charter provisions for the use of armed force?

In the first place, the uniting-for-peace resolution makes no provision for special agreements but places reliance on a recommendation that the members maintain elements within their national forces available for prompt United Nations service. Both under article 43 and the uniting-for-peace resolution, members' contingents are to be drawn from the national armed forces of member states.

The basic difference, therefore, lies in the fact that the article 43 forces were to be deposited, as it were, in a bank to be drawn out by appropriate decisions from the Security Council. But, again, it must be questioned exactly how negotiable such a Security Council decision would be if a member state for reasons of its own did not wish to employ its own force. A General Assembly recommendation has no mandatory effect on a member state reluctant to use its forces. It must be remembered, however, that a General Assembly recommendation has behind it two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations, and we may assume some relation exists between the voting position of a member state and its action position when collective measures are called for.

The third basic distinction lies in the United Nations' capabilities for planning under the two schemes. If, under the scheme of the Charter, all the special agreements were to be negotiated, concluded, and ratified, the United Nations would know with certainty the total over-all strength of the forces, assistance, and facilities that could be called into use from every member state.

Under the uniting-for-peace resolution, it will not be possible to know with similar exactitude the total available strength. The resolution attempts to make some headway in this direction by requesting member states to inform the Collective Measures Committee promptly of the steps taken in complying with the recommendation that elements within its armed forces for United Nations use be maintained. Thus, the Collective Measures Committee can, by collating the responses of member states, make rough estimates of the force at hand. The possibility of real prog-

In the United Nations, we are laying the foundations for a security system, which will put an end to the war method in international relations. Those who may be called upon to make sacrifices of life and limb in support of this system are not fighting for the victory of a side in a conflict but for the victory of mankind in its struggle against war itself.

The principles of the collective security system are easy to state and to comprehend. But the task of constructing it through voluntary cooperation of independent countries takes infinite patience and goodwill. Many complex problems are involved.

A collective security system is a shield of peace, for it confronts an aggressor with the combined forces and resources of the entire world. Accordingly, the victim of an aggressor is not just a particular nation over whose borders troops may march. It is all the independent nations prepared in advance to defend themselves by defending the immediate victim. Mutual aid and self-help goes into action regardless who the initiator of the assault may be or what his politics or mission. By the principles of collective security, we must be prepared to put down the act of aggression. This act shall not prevail. The peace-loving majority have it within their spiritual strength and their economic and military power to enforce that doctrine.

—Ambassador Warren R. Austin
April 1, 1951

ress, however, lies not in computations of prospective contributions but in the ability to devise methods and procedures and techniques of coordination, so that the national action taken by the member states in response to an Assembly recommendation will have maximum operative effectiveness.

The process of girding the loins of the United Nations is not a short or easy one. It is, however, susceptible of progressive development. The United Nations may never be perfected to meet an idealist's goal, but, if sufficient progress is made, it may determine whether a potential aggressor will be willing to face the consequences of his act.

From the point of view of our own American policy, in the most selfish sense, the creation and development of a universal security system in the United Nations is to be our best interests. It is not merely an idealistic concept conceived and promoted by those who maintain no relations with reality. On the contrary, recognition is given to the fact that, in collective action, we multiply our defensive capability.

In short, the building up of our own strength and the building up of the strength of the United Nations is one and the same thing pointing in the same direction: to prevent a war, or, if it cannot be prevented, to win it.

U.N. Action on Collective Security: What It Means to Americans

by John D. Hickerson

*Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs*¹

Amidst the debate and tumult these days, as this great country works out in its own way the guidelines which will mark its path of leadership in the civilized world, one fact remains crystal clear. Our leadership, in strengthening the free world, will not falter. We are committed to the job, and it is going on every minute and every day.

The debates may go on since people here are free to voice their differences and to bring their ideas to the market place of a democratic society. But, the debates are over the how and when and where of our defenses. We may now debate ways and means, but we are united as a people in the conviction that what we have is worth preserving. We know that we are menaced by enemies of the Republic from without, that we must assume a posture of defensive strength, and that, with the collaboration of other free peoples, we must take the lead in working for peace through strength. This is America's foreign policy. And one of the foundation stones of the edifice is the United Nations.

Through the United Nations, we are working for peace. To the United Nations, we are giving strength, to reinforce this international instrument of community law, morality, and action. And, from the United Nations, we are gaining strength—the strength of collective action—and the best hope for the future peace of the world.

U.N. Actions on Collective Security

It is this facet of our policy which I shall speak on: strengthening the free world through the United Nations.

Despite many handicaps, the United Nations is doing a good job in the world today on many fronts. But the one which is of most immediate importance is the front of collective security. This means the effective action of the world commu-

nity to preserve peace and, indeed, community existence against the outlaw.

The problem is as old as society itself. Countless ages ago, man first learned that, alone, he was the prey of marauders, thieves, and bandits. During the intervening ages, he learned that survival lay in joining with his fellow creatures for mutual protection. Our advanced community life, in towns and cities and within nations, pays tribute to the lesson learned over the centuries.

Somehow, this lesson never was well learned when it came to nations. The law of the jungle, long since outlawed through collective action wherever men had become civilized, still ruled men's affairs in the international setting.

The slow tortuous process of learning how to live together, how to pool individual strength for mutual protection, and how to live peaceably but equipped to deal with the lawless—this process has finally brought us to a point, where, for the first time in history, free men, organized as nations, are rallying under a common banner to protect their national freeholds by enforcing the judgment of the community against the lawbreaker the first time he tries to jump on an individual member.

This, then, is the backdrop for collective security. Korea is the setting. The free men of the world, led by this nation, are the protagonists in the fateful drama. With the history of man's slow progress in learning his lessons of international life, it becomes clear that this is a beginning, not an end. It becomes clear that the United Nations action in Korea is the action of all peaceful men, whether in the fight or not. The United Nations moves as we, the member nations, will it to move. As we are resolute and courageous, it acts with those qualities. If we are divided and indecisive, it seems to be weak and without strength. And, above all, its effectiveness as a center for genuine collective action to preserve the peace is only as great as the will and strength of this nation and of other free nations to make it

¹Address made before the Virginia Federation of Women's Clubs at Washington on Apr. 25 and released to the press on the same date.

so. Only after the efforts are made and the process becomes habitual and accepted is there a chance for the sum to become greater than the parts.

Today, with collective international action in its first stages, we cannot, of course, rely on the United Nations as our only means of protection against aggression. It is one of the means. The United Nations is buttressed by our own increasing strength, combined with that of the other free nations; this strength is now the principal deterrent to the would-be conqueror.

But I am firmly convinced that the United Nations can steadily be developed into a strong collective security system if we keep in mind what it is, what it can do, and what we can do to support it most effectively.

Analyzing the Charter

It would be well to correct a common misunderstanding. It is often said that the United Nations system was founded on the assumption that the Big Five would cooperate for world peace. This is looking at the picture through the wrong end of the lens. We did not just "assume" that the Big Five would cooperate—the Big Five, in signing the Charter, specifically pledged that they would cooperate for world peace. The Charter is one of the most solemn international obligations in history. No one was compelled to sign it. But those who did sign it solemnly undertook to carry out in good faith its provisions.

This difference is important in understanding the facts. If the United Nations Charter is viewed solely in terms of an assumption that the Big Five would cooperate—which, of course, the Soviet Union has not done—you may feel that the United Nations cannot achieve its original purposes. But, if you look at the Charter as we do—as a solemn commitment to abide by its contents—then, when one of the important parties violates its commitments, it is a challenge to the ingenuity and strength of those members of the United Nations who take the Charter seriously. The job becomes one of devising other ways within the framework of the Charter to accomplish its purposes and principles. That is what we are doing in the United Nations.

The basic element of an ideal collective security system would be an armed force which could be called promptly into action and which would be stronger than the armed forces committing aggression. The founders of the United Nations planned for military forces to be at the call of the Security Council. Two things have prevented this. First, the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with the Military Staff Committee which was supposed to work out the plan for these forces. Secondly, the Soviet representatives constantly abused the veto. In an age when the aggressors are the Soviet imperialists or their satellites, this made it clear that, even if such forces were at the disposal of the Security Council, the Soviet veto

would obviously frustrate any effort to use them against an aggressor. It is fair to assume that the Soviets thought they had effectively sabotaged the efforts of the United Nations to develop a collective security system.

Frustrating A Well-Planned Aggression

That was the situation on June 25, 1950—when the Soviets gave the signal to their North Korean puppets to invade the Republic of Korea. In fact, the Soviets were apparently so convinced that they could write off any effective collective counteraction by free nations that they did not even think it necessary to be present at the meetings of the Security Council in June and July to cast their vetoes.

But they seriously underestimated the free world.

The Soviet puppets did not get away with their aggression. They ran smack into the firm determination of the vast majority of the United Nations members to repel the aggression—to repel it even though there was no United Nations army ready to be rushed to the scene. We know now what we guessed then—that the Soviets expected the North Koreans to overrun all of Korea within a few days if no outside assistance was given and within a few weeks if the United States tried to assist the Republic of Korea. Our answer to their confidence is that we are still in Korea with the other fighting forces of the United Nations. We have not been driven out of Korea—not by the North Koreans and not by the Chinese Communists. The United Nations is ready, as it has always been, to arrange for the phased withdrawal of United Nations troops after a satisfactory agreement to stop the fighting and end the aggression.

But we do not intend to be driven out.

And we will not slink out behind a smokescreen of appeasement.

How did it come about that the United Nations was able to frustrate this well-planned aggression?

It came about because the free world, at last, had learned the bitter lesson of history that aggression must be met by firm collective action. The Security Council could not call upon its own forces because the Soviet Union had prevented their organization. But it could, and did, urge the member nations to come to the rescue of the Republic of Korea. Free men everywhere took heart at this decision. Fifty-three of the 59 members of the United Nations endorsed the action taken by the Security Council. The will to repel the aggression was unmistakable. But the means had to be improvised. For some time, we were practically the only ones fighting alongside the gallant forces of the Republic of Korea. We are still bearing the major burden along with the Republic of Korea forces, but the situation is different now. Thirteen other United Nations members actually have fighting forces in Korea, and

they are all—I repeat, all—actually fighting and giving a splendid account of themselves. I am sure you have heard of the gallantry of our brothers-in-arms from the British Commonwealth: United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa; the magnificent fighting qualities of the Turks; the stirring performance of the French; and the battlefront exploits of forces from Belgium, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Greece, and Luxembourg.

Counteraction by Member Countries

Their contributions are not numerically large but, considering the problems each country is facing against the threat of Soviet attack or subversion, I do not call them small.

I am glad to be able to report that some of these countries have already sent or are planning to send reinforcements. A number of countries which do not yet have troops in Korea are now preparing to send forces; for example, Colombia will soon have an infantry battalion en route to Korea.

How shall we measure our own contribution? We have paid a very heavy price in American dead, wounded, and missing; in disrupted homes; and in our national treasury. But we know that those who have made these sacrifices have done so for the security of our own country and for free men everywhere. They have done it for a principle which all of us know is right. And what has been the result?

The United Nations forces have twice rolled the aggressors back in Korea—back to behind the point where the original aggression started. Now, the aggressors have launched a new offensive. I am confident we will give a good account of ourselves in the current fighting. We have seriously set back the Communist timetable for expansion and aggression. We have limited the war to Korea and have avoided precipitating a world conflict. We have gained precious time for the free world to develop its own strength. We have learned the imperative necessity of doing this as rapidly as possible. Perhaps we couldn't have learned any other way. Perhaps it required the shock of Korea to make us and our friends in the free world understand the dangers confronting us. And the measure of the effectiveness of our efforts there will be in how resolutely we build on the lessons this experience has taught us.

Building on Lessons Learned in Korea

How is the free world building on the lessons we have learned in Korea? First, we are increasing our own strength, and we are helping our friends in the free world increase their strength at a rate unprecedented in peacetime. Secondly, and this I would like to discuss in some detail, I believe that the greatest single step forward to-

ward the goal of collective security was the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly last fall of the uniting-for-peace resolution proposed by Secretary Acheson.

This was a carefully thought-out plan to strengthen the United Nations. Let me review some of the important features of this plan and tell you of some of the progress that is being made under it.

First, the uniting-for-peace plan went a long way toward stripping the veto of its significance as far as collective security is concerned. You will recall that the Soviets had been boycotting the United Nations during the months of June and July when the Security Council took such important action on Korea. Malik's return to the Security Council on August 1 is proof that this was a miscalculation on their part which they sought to rectify. Well aware of this, the free nations in the United Nations were determined not to be frustrated in the future in their desire for peace by Soviet abuse of the veto. So, the uniting-for-peace resolution provided that the veto-free General Assembly could be called into emergency session on 24 hours notice—previously 2 weeks were needed—if the Security Council proved itself unable to handle a threat to the peace or breach of the peace. In effect, the General Assembly was saying simply this to the Security Council: If there is a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace, you do your best to restore peace. But if you can't, or if you don't, we are prepared to consider the situation and take action if it is wise to do so.

The next important thing the uniting-for-peace resolution did was to establish a 14-member Peace Observation Commission. The purpose of this is clear. It was fortunate that, when the Communist aggression occurred in Korea, there was on hand a United Nations body which had previously been sent there by the General Assembly. This body, known as the United Nations Commission on Korea, consisted of representatives of seven United Nations members whose objectivity cannot seriously be questioned. The Commission reported promptly to the Security Council that the Republic of Korea had been the victim of an unprovoked attack by the North Korean Communists. Without this impartial report, some members of the United Nations might have been reluctant to act so promptly and firmly. Largely on the basis of this experience, the General Assembly set up the 14-member Peace Observation Commission. It will be the duty of the Commission to send observers to troubled areas when requested to do so and with the consent of the country involved. We feel that the presence of such a group might in itself act as a deterrent to aggression. If it does not, at least the United Nations will get a quick and impartial report on which to base further action.

The uniting-for-peace resolution also took into

account that armed forces to be placed at the call of the Security Council have not been developed and probably will not be in the foreseeable future. But, from Korea, we learn that the free nations are willing to respond to a recommendation that they come to the rescue of the victim of aggression. We learned too—and it was a hard lesson to learn—that most of the members who were willing to do this were not militarily prepared to do so. We learned also that many countries would go to unusual lengths to prepare armed forces for use against aggression but that they were handicapped in doing so by uncertainties of the Korean situation—how long the fighting would last, what types of troops were needed, what kind of equipment, and who would pay for it.

The international Communist movement has recently launched a World Peace Council with delegates from 80 countries deluded by the Stockholm Peace Appeal to assist in the campaign of divide and conquer. This Council seeks to attract support from many peace-minded people who would be horrified by the thought that they were helping to extend the reach and control of the Soviet dictatorship. Whether this new Council succeeds in catching many people on their blind side in terms of their desire for peace depends very much on how clear citizens of the free world are about this matter of collective security.

The best defense of peace is the strength of independent nations and their determination unitedly to resist aggression. The great deterrent to regimes out to increase their territory is strength, unity, and cooperation of the free. That perhaps explains why so much pressure is directed against the stubborn unity we maintain.

Among the "peace proposals" of the Communist-sponsored World Peace Council you find such items as: withdrawing United Nations forces from Korea. Another is a pact for peace among the five powers—that is, between the Soviet Union and the four other large powers, including the United States. The Council declares that any country which is not willing to join such a pact is to be regarded as an aggressor. There are, of course, other demands on such subjects as atomic energy and the peace settlements.

They all add up to a weakening of the efforts to build a system of collective security. That is the target. The bleating for peace in Korea, essentially on the terms advocated by the Soviets from the beginning, attempts to turn the first successful collective action against aggression into a failure. This would result in new aggressions rather than peace. Surrender would lead to surrender. Rewarding aggression in Korea would invite aggression in Hong Kong, Formosa, Malaya, Indo-China, Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Western Europe. More than anything else, it would deliver an almost fatal blow to the bright prospects for building up the system of collective security. After renegeing on the Charter in that manner, what members of the United Nations could be expected to take, in the future, effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace.

—Ambassador Warren R. Austin
April 1, 1951

Ethiopian Contribution

Let me give just one specific example—one among many. Not long after the fighting broke out in Korea, we were advised that Ethiopia wanted to contribute an expeditionary force. This was a significant development, coming as it did from a country which had itself been a victim of aggression in 1935 and which had felt let down by the international community in the League of Nations days in resisting that aggression. But it was impractical to take immediate advantage of this offer because of the lack of organized military training, the inadequacies of equipment, and other logistical difficulties. But Ethiopia went ahead. She organized and trained an expeditionary force of over 1,000 men. Last week, that force sailed for Korea. Their morale was high. It was entirely a voluntary force, and, for every man in the force, 10 other volunteers had been rejected. The embarkation took place with remarkable efficiency, with just one amusing and rather significant exception: Just before the expeditionary force sailed from Djibouti, the Commander noticed an Ethiopian First Lieutenant who had not been assigned to the unit. When asked to explain his presence, the Lieutenant admitted that he had stowed himself away on one of the troop trains which had brought the force 486 miles from Addis Ababa to Djibouti. He said that, above all, he wanted to join the force bound for Korea. The Commander was regretfully obliged to put this man ashore.

I have no doubt that this Ethiopian contingent will perform in the field as heroically as the fighting forces from other countries. I have no doubt, too, that other contingents will be trained from Ethiopia—and from many other free countries. Whether all these forces can arrive in time to take part in the fighting in Korea cannot be predicted at this time. But, under the uniting-for-peace plan, the momentum generated by the Korean situation will be continued. All the members of the United Nations are asked to maintain within their armed forces contingents which could be made available to the United Nations for the purpose of repelling aggression. We believe that every free nation must share proportionately in the effort. This is not something that can be achieved overnight. It is a slow and difficult process. But I am glad to say that it is proceeding. We hope, for example, that it will thus be possible for the United Nations to use the services of that stowaway Ethiopian Lieutenant and of the thousands of other volunteers who did not sail for Korea in the first contingent.

Another important feature of the uniting-for-peace plan is the establishment of a 14-member Collective Measures Committee. The purpose of this Committee is to devise ways and means of strengthening the United Nations' ability to suppress aggression. The scope of this Committee's

study is limitless—it can examine and report to the General Assembly on all phases of military, political, economic, social, and psychological measures available to the United Nations. It is not in itself empowered to take any action. But what it is doing is to try to develop a blueprint for using the available resources of those members of the United Nations who are sincerely desirous of preserving the peace. . . .

The blunt question may be asked: "Will the uniting-for-peace plan alone guarantee the peace?" The answer is, "No." We regard this whole plan as but a step in the right direction. In the interests of the United Nations, the United States must remain strong until the dangers now confronting the world have passed. But a peaceful, orderly world society can, we think, only be developed by such steps as this plan. The world has within its grasp today the makings of a real system of collective security if it wants it and if the free world is willing to pay the price for it. We have made a start but, I repeat, only a start in the right direction. I am convinced that the people of this world who still have any freedom of choice want such a system of collective security and are willing to pay the price for it. I profoundly believe that it can be made to work. . . .

I have tried to sketch out some of the things which the United Nations means to us as Americans in terms of collective security. The problems are big problems. But can we not detect, in the great events which are unfolding, the forward steps of free men determined to keep the peace they have fought for three times in our own life span? Peace is a fragile organism. We have finally learned that it needs strength to live—that indifference, pious hopes, and noble words alone will not suffice. But I think the more realistic we are, and the more practical, the greater chance we have to achieve our ideals.

I would like to close with the words of one who understands man's quest for collective security perhaps better than most other men alive today. He saw it fail once, and he saw his country overrun by an aggressor. On April 12 of this year, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, spoke these moving words to his men about to sail for distant Korea to join the battle of free men for their security and their way of life:

It is in a large sense, soldier, that you are today leaving the homeland to fight on distant shores. You are fighting not only for freedom as we know it in Ethiopia and the right of each people to its freedom, you are also representing and defending in far corners of the earth the most sacred principles of modern international policy—that principles of collective security with which the name of Ethiopia is imperishably associated.

Thus it is that you are now departing to take your honored place beside the valiant soldiers of other united nations, those of the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Turkey and others.

Remember that you are about to pay a debt of honor for your homeland which was liberated thanks not only to the blood of her patriots, but also to that of faithful

allies, likewise members of the United Nations. Remember also that in paying this debt you are laying the basis for a universal system of collective security in behalf of your own homeland as well as of all nations of the world, be they great or small, powerful or weak.

May God protect you, give you courage to acquit yourselves as heroes and bring you back safely to your beloved homeland.

Progress on Japanese Peace Settlement Reported to President

[Released to the press by the White House May 3]

John Foster Dulles reported to the President on the second trip which he had made to Japan as the President's representative in relation to a Japanese peace settlement, and from which Mr. Dulles had returned last week. Mr. Dulles told the President that in his opinion the Japanese Government and people were now aware that the change in the Supreme Commander involved no change in basic United States policies toward Japan and communism in Asia and that the United States would continue vigorously to work for an early and just Japanese peace settlement. Mr. Dulles also told the President of the satisfactory talks he had had with General Ridgway, the new Supreme Commander, and of the General's prompt grasp of the situation in Japan.

The President, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Dulles considered the program for concluding, in connection with the reestablishment of peace with Japan, a security arrangement between the United States and Australia and New Zealand, in accordance with the President's statement of April 18, which also outlined the contemplated security arrangements between the United States and the Philippines and between the United States and Japan.

Mr. Dulles reported that the President's statement of April 18 had a very salutary influence in the Western Pacific and was accepted as clear evidence of the determination of the United States to stand firm in this area.¹

Why We Need Allies—Continued from page 765

work together, steadfastly and patiently. We must not be led astray. The real issue is whether we stand alone, or whether we stand and work with the other free peoples of the world.

I am confident that the American people will not yield either to impatience or defeatism. I am sure that our courage and wisdom are equal to the great test we are now undergoing. And I believe that with all of our resources, our human energies, and our common sense, we shall be successful in the great objective of defending freedom and bringing peace to the world.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 699.

Effectiveness of the Voice of America

by *Foy D. Kohler*

Chief, International Broadcasting Division¹

It is a little hard to reduce to a short talk the topic of my assignment, mainly because of the scale and scope of the Voice of America operation. We are presently broadcasting over a world-wide network of transmitter bases in 33 languages. We operate around the clock, sending out in these languages more than 80 separate programs a day, each tailored specifically for the time of day and the attitudes of the target audiences. We process over two million words daily and put more than 350,000 out over the air waves. We are expanding even from these staggering figures. Within a few months, we expect to be using 50 languages and broadcasting over a hundred programs daily, about 60 hours of "live" programs, containing over a half a million words. The United States taxpayer has an investment in facilities already operating or under construction of about 125 million dollars. If Congress approves, this will be increased by an additional 100 million within the next couple of years. The cost of programing and operating is presently running at the rate of approximately 25 million dollars per annum and, if the new facilities are granted, will gradually work up to a high level of about 45 million dollars per year.

Is the taxpayer getting his money's worth?

Is the Voice of America effective?

I think the Voice of America radio operation is certainly one of the best investments ever made with the taxpayer's money. I think it is effective, and I shall try to suggest to you why I am convinced there is ample support for my conclusion.

Answers to Questions of Effectiveness

The question of effectiveness of the Voice of America, as I see it, involves really three questions.

1. Are we delivering a clear, strong signal?

2. Are we getting an audience? Indeed, do the possibilities of getting an audience exist?

¹ Remarks made before the Institute for Education over radio-television at Columbus, Ohio, on May 4 and released to the press on the same date.

3. Are we affecting the minds and influencing the actions of our audience in a sense favorable to the interests and aspirations of the American Government and the American people?

I can deal with the first two questions only in passing.

With respect to the first: Are we delivering a clear, strong signal?

The United States is severely handicapped in international broadcasting by its geographic location. Short-wave radio is, in any event, a medium with severe limitations both in terms of the quality of the signal and of access to the signal by prospective listeners. To overcome these handicaps, we have started to ring the world with relay bases which boost the signal to the listeners via both short and medium wave. We are developing overseas program operations. We are doing our best to obtain local relays wherever there is such a possibility. We are pioneering in advanced techniques and superpower with the collaboration of the best electronic engineering groups in the country. If Congress gives us the necessary financial support, we can deliver an effective radio signal, even through the Soviet jamming.

With respect to the second element: Are we getting an audience?

We are extremely fortunate in that radio, even in relatively backward areas of the world, is an established and fairly highly developed medium of communication. We have available either firm figures or solid estimates on the number of radio receivers which we can reach throughout the world. We know there are about 80 million receiving sets outside of North America, giving international broadcasters a direct potential audience of over 300 million people, not to mention secondary distribution. And we are able, at comparatively low cost, to promote ever-wider distribution of receivers. Within the free world, we can apply with some adaption the techniques of quantitative audience surveys so highly developed

in the United States. Through these, we are able to get an accurate measure of the size, composition, and other characteristics of our audience and of changes in these elements. To do this, we use mainly private contractors, notably such organizations as the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Polls) and its overseas affiliates; and the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University (Kingsley Davis-Paul Lazarsfeld).

I can give you only a few examples of our findings.

We thus know that in France, where our program is rebroadcast over the French domestic network, our audience has increased constantly and greatly in size during the past few years. We know that over 24 percent of the adult population of France of 7 million people are at least occasional listeners to the Voice programs, that on any given weekday we can count on an audience of at least a million people, and that we have nearly 3 million on Sundays. We know that over half the adult population of that country has heard the Voice of America at some time and that our problem is to get more and more of them tuning in regularly. We know that this audience includes the better educated and urban residents in greater proportion than their ratio to the total population.

In Germany, we know that we have likewise been able to bring more and more Germans to their receivers when we are on the air; that we now have a regular audience numbering over 6 million in the United States zone alone. Here, the audience is characterized by its proportionate accent on youth—a very good thing, I would say.

In Sweden, surveys indicate an occasional audience for our English-language broadcast of 15 percent of the total Swedish population, or over 700 thousand people, and a regular audience of nearly 100 thousand, heavily weighted on the side of so-called opinion leaders and of youth. The same studies, based on direct sampling and on analysis of BBC's Swedish audience, made it clear that we could multiply our audience manifold and get their more consistent attention to our story if we broadcast in the Swedish language. We are, accordingly, preparing to do so during the coming fiscal year.

You will recognize that I have been talking about relatively advanced and accessible areas. Unfortunately, the job is a lot harder outside Western Europe. In the free areas of Asia and Latin America, we find that our contractors are engaged in an unprecedented pioneering effort. But, I am glad to say that they are getting a good reception and cooperation from local authorities and local educational institutions. Consequently, we are gradually acquiring a first collection of firm information about the holdings and distribution of radio receivers and the attitudes, listening habits, and characteristics of the audiences in these parts of the world.

Behind the curtain, in the satellite states of

Eastern Europe we have, of course, been unable to make direct surveys. However, we are not without our resources here either. We have firm figures from preslavery days on the distribution of radio sets and sufficient current intelligence to keep these up to date. Research agencies, letters from displaced persons, interrogation of defectors, United States missions—all these sources are surprisingly unanimous in agreeing that we reach about 80 percent of the radio owners every day and that the Voice of America, with the assistance of the well-developed grapevine, can deliver an important message to practically the entire population of the satellite states within a matter of hours. Similar sources indicate that there has been a comparably sharpened interest in China since the Communists took over. The frantic efforts of local stooge governments to combat our efforts confirm these estimates.

In the Soviet Union, in the early days of our Russian language program, which was inaugurated in February 1947, all the evidence we could amass at the Embassy in Moscow indicated that the Voice of America must have a regular listening audience of at least 10 million people. What the figure is since the Kremlin indicated its disapproval of listening, by undertaking a colossal jamming campaign in April 1949, nobody really could know. However, our monitoring indicates that we have greatly improved the delivery of our signal since that date; that the Voice can be heard 25 percent of the time even in Moscow, where the jamming is concentrated, and 60 to 80 percent of the time outside the capitol. Moreover, defectors continue to give us a pattern of widespread listening, and the Soviet press and radio contribute additional evidence. Last year, an important Soviet journal started its review of the current Soviet stage success by saying:

The Voice of America: To millions of Soviet people these words have become synonymous with lying and provocative fictions.

So much for audience measurement.

Impact on Audiences

Now, what is the Voice's impact on the audiences we reach?

This question involves even more intangibles in the international field than in the field of domestic radio—and, as all of you know, there are plenty of intangibles even here at home. It involves questions of the analysis of the content of our programs and their measurement against our communications intentions. It involves ascertaining sample audiences' reaction to specific programs through the panel technique and the use of such devices as the Stanton-Lazarsfeld reaction analyzer. It involves the testing of the level and quality of the language we use in our 30-odd language programs and audience reaction to specific announcers voices and method of delivery. For all these purposes, we can also use established

American methods and techniques and the services of objective and experienced American research agencies like International Public Opinion Research, Inc. (Elmo Wilson, Elmo Roper, Joshua Powers), McCann Erickson, The Committee on Communications of the University of Chicago, and the Research Study for Human Relations of New York University. Within the free world, tests can be made on the spot in the target countries. For testing programs delivered behind the iron curtain, panels of recent defectors are assembled both along the immediate periphery of the Soviet orbit and here in the United States.

I want to say at this point that, in a democracy—and in the long run in any regime anywhere—the word and the deed must go together. Pure propaganda at variance with acts may serve to confuse for a while or even to attain immediate tactical objectives. But, in the long run, false pretensions will out. In fact, it is one of our constant purposes to expose the false pretensions of our opponents. By the same token, it is our basic rule to maintain credibility and confidence in the Voice of America, even at the expense of occasional tactical reverses.

In a general way, then, I think it is clear that the Voice of America can take a considerable share of the credit for fostering the growing strength and determination of the free world; for the succession of 50-odd to 5 votes in the United Nations condemning Communist aggression in Korea; for the declining strength of communism throughout the free world, and, particularly, in such vital countries as France and Italy.

This is attested by the constantly increasing size and interest of our free world audience, of which I have spoken. It is reflected in ever growing demands for our program-schedule booklet. This schedule is sent to listeners on written request only, and circulation figures have mounted in the past year from 500,000 to nearly 900,000 copies an issue. General effectiveness is also shown by the steady upward trend of our audience mail. In 1949, we received 126,000 letters from our listeners; in 1950, 230,000. In March of this year, we reached an all-time high of nearly 40,000 letters for 1 month alone.

Now, I realize that these booklets and letters are not scientifically established methods of measurement comparable to our surveys and panel tests, but they are very heart-warming and encouraging. And they do give us valid and sometimes striking examples of audience attitudes and changes therein. I should like to read you a few very random excerpts:

From France.—I was climbing the steps to my sixth floor apartment (slowly as I am 74 years old and suffer from a heart condition); I could hear the Voice of America from every door, even at the sixth floor. I was both proud and happy.

From Indonesia.—The more I know about your country and people, the more I get to appreciate America. I am very glad knowing that the Voice of America is able to

gratify the desire of all democratic nations, namely, the disclosure of the Soviets behind the Iron Curtain. I exult that you have done many things in order to make clear the meaning of democracy.

From Germany.—At the beginning of your broadcasts, I used to be rather skeptical and must took them for a mere propaganda trick. . . . I have changed my mind fundamentally about everything concerning your operation.

From Turkey.—Since our brigade went to Korea the interest in and love for the Voice of America have greatly increased. You made us very proud. . . .

From Austria.—I followed your deliberation in radio with increasing interest until I finally discovered that formerly I was politically on the wrong road. By means of your broadcast, I came to despise the (Communist) path which I had unwittingly begun to travel.

Programs Endeavor To Boost Morale

In our programs to the peoples of the captive states, our job is a little different. Here, the stooge regimes are our enemies and have a tendency to be "more royal than the king." But the people are our long-established friends. We try to give them the assurance that we have not forgotten and will not forget. We try to sustain their hope for eventual freedom and encourage their continued hostility toward and their resistance to their oppressors. At the same time, we must avoid arousing their hopes unduly and, thus, disillusion them. We must also avoid inviting them to commit suicide by premature rebellion. It is a fine line to draw. We are constantly attacked by extremist emigré groups for being either too soft or too hard. Maybe this in itself is a good indication that we are continuing to maintain the right line, but a lot of other more valid evidence indicates this too. Of course, our own people still in those countries are able to give us good advice. Moderate emigré groups abroad do likewise. Mail from and interviews with the defectors constantly streaming out into Germany and Austria on the Continent and into Korea and Hong Kong in the Far East also support our conclusion that we are hitting the target with satisfactory accuracy. Here, too, I can perhaps best illustrate my point by quoting a couple of samples of the obviously deeply felt words of these interviewees and letter writers.

A Woman in Czechoslovakia.—In this atmosphere of oppression, the only moment of hope occurs when we hear the Voice of America. Your voice comes to this fiery hell like greetings from a civilized world. . . . We can live our terrible life behind the Iron Curtain and keep on living only if you, on the other side of the ocean, continue to feed us with the strength of everlasting hope.

In Liberated Scout, after months of Communist occupation, a Korean Listener.—During those weary and distressing days of my dug-out life, the only hope and comfort have been my listening to your broadcast over the Voice of America. . . . I knew then we would win. Please keep on sending us your messages of hope, strength, encouragement, and inspiration. We need them. . . .

In our programs to the Soviet Union, we draw

a clear distinction and do our best to drive a wedge between the despotic regime and its enslaved subjects. We appeal to their memories of better days and remind them of their own suppressed historic traditions and political and literary classics. We stimulate their skepticism about the story being told them by their own rulers, by telling them the other half. We try to clarify the curiosity we know they have about the outer world, and correct the warped and distorted image of that world given them by their Kremlin masters. I think there is strong, perhaps almost conclusive, evidence that we are succeeding. Defectors do continue to come out, despite the great dangers they run. We have questioned scores of them, and practically all refer to the influence of the Voice's programs on their decisions. Occasionally, we have striking demonstrations of our direct influence, such as that of the two Soviet aviators who flew their plane straight out of the Soviet Union a couple of years ago. The unabated efforts of the Kremlin to keep our message out of the Soviet Union by the use of their colossal jamming network is another measure of the Kremlin's own estimate of our effectiveness with the Soviet citizenry. Even better is the constant stream of attacks made on us over the Soviet radio and in the Soviet press. These have gone from a quarterly level of 30-odd full-dress attacks in 1949 to over 100 during the last quarter of 1950. They are so voluminous and so revealing that we have them under constant analysis by the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. Not only do they give us a concept of the extent and composition of our audience, as I have already suggested, but they indicate the themes to which the Kremlin is particularly sensitive and with which it feels compelled to try to rebut to its own people. I might mention that they have reacted with special violence to our comparisons of living standards in the Soviet orbit and the outside world; to our campaigns on the question of slave labor; to our demonstration that even minor improvement in living conditions in the Soviet Union proper is matched by a worsening of conditions in the satellites, and to our exposure of the frauds and fallacies of the Stalinist concept of Marxism.

A Russian Defector recently wrote us after his arrival in Germany.—Your Russian broadcasts undermine the Soviet regime and completely nullify the Communist propaganda behind the Iron Curtain. Your broadcasts are a weapon more powerful than the atom bomb.

Now our friend's language is perhaps a bit exaggerated—this would be understandable in the circumstances. But its obvious conviction and essential message seem to me to confirm Arthur Schlesinger's recent statement that:

... only the potential disaffection of the Russian people prevents the Kremlin from throwing the world into another global conflict.

We propose to keep that potential of disaffection alive and growing.

VOA Honors 160th Anniversary of Polish Constitution

Statement by the President

[Released to the press May 4]

I take pleasure in honoring the one hundred and sixtieth anniversary of Poland's Constitution of May 3, 1791. For more than a century and a half, in bondage and in freedom, Poles have commemorated May 3 as the symbol of their unflagging devotion to human rights and of their indomitable resistance to foreign oppression. The Constitution of May 3 has an additional meaning for Americans because it was brilliantly defended against the foreign invader by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a hero of our own war for independence. I think it is appropriate on this traditional Polish holiday to recall the opening words of the Polish national anthem:

Poland is not yet lost while we are living.

A spirit like that can never die.

Relay of VOA Programs Over German Stations Negotiated

[Released to the press May 2]

On April 12, 1951, the Department announced the inauguration of negotiations in Germany between the general managers of four German radio stations and the Voice of America for an agreement on the relay of Voice of America German-language programs.

These negotiations grew out of requests by the German broadcasters for discussions with representatives of the Voice of America on the present Voice German-language programs relayed by the stations in the American zone of Germany. These programs have been rebroadcast as an occupation requirement by the stations Radio Bremen, Hessian Radio in Frankfurt, South German Radio at Stuttgart, and the Bavarian Radio at Munich.

The negotiations were designed to place the relays on a voluntary basis and to integrate them with the general schedule of the stations. The preliminary agreement reached provides for a 15-minute relay at 6:45 p. m., German time, consisting of political commentary, news analysis, and press roundups. Feature type broadcasts will be relayed at other times convenient to the stations.

German station managers have emphasized the value of the political broadcasts, originating with the Voice of America, and have asked that they be continued. American and German surveys have shown that the programs enjoy constantly increasing popularity.

Statement by Secretary Acheson on Wedemeyer's Korean Report

[Released to the press on May 2]

The record of our action in Korea is plain. Certainly, our course in Korea has paralleled the recommendations of General Wedemeyer.

The United States endeavored, between 1945 and 1947, to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. concerning the broad problem of Korean freedom and independence, including the question of the withdrawal of American and Soviet occupation forces from Korea. When this proved fruitless, the United States went to the United Nations and in October 1947, introduced a resolution calling for elections under United Nations supervision and the establishment of a free and independent nation. On November 14, 1947, the United Nations passed such a resolution, and a United Nations Commission was sent to Korea to supervise the elections and formation of a government.

The Soviets refused to recognize the United Nations action and never permitted the free elections in North Korea. Free elections were held in South Korea, and the Republic of Korea was established on August 15, 1948.

American occupation forces were not withdrawn from Korea until June 29, 1949, 6 months after the announced withdrawal of Soviet forces. An American military advisory group of some 500 officers and men was established in Korea, upon the withdrawal of the occupation forces, to continue the training of the Republic's army, coast guard, and police. This mission was still there when the Communist sneak attack was launched. It has played a very important part in advising and assisting the Korean army throughout the fighting.

At the time of the withdrawal of our occupation troops, the Republic of Korea had security forces totaling about 114,000. The army of 65,000 was fully equipped with United States infantry-type matériel. About one-half of the police and coast guard had United States side arms and carbines and the remainder had Japanese equipment of similar type. By the time of the attack, these security forces had been increased to 150,000 with our assistance.

Prior to the North Korean attack, the United States had delivered to Korea military equipment with an original value of over 57 million dollars. That equipment, at the time of its delivery, would have cost almost 110 million dollars to replace. Included in the equipment were over 105,000 rifles and carbines; over 2,000 machine guns and sub-machine guns; over 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition for these guns; also mortars, howitzers, bazookas, and other artillery with necessary ammunition; 5,000 trucks; 50,000 mines and demo-

lition blocks; 79 vessels, many of them armed for coast guard use; and 20 liaison aircraft.

Further military assistance was provided for in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.

Advice and training of technical specialists and tactical units had been and was being provided by the military advisory mission.

In addition, the United States gave Korea substantial economic assistance to correct the dislocations in Korea's economy which had resulted from the war and the division of Korea at the 38th parallel. During the occupation, 1945-48, a total of 356 million dollars was provided for Government and relief. With the establishment of the Republic, ECA launched a large-scale program of economic assistance designed to fill the economic vacuum which had been created and to promote economic stability which would contribute to the maintenance of the political stability of the new Republic as a basis for eventual unification of the entire country. ECA plans called for a 3-year program totaling 285 million dollars.

The only recommendation not carried out in actual fact was that calling for the creation of an American-officered Korean scout force. Instead, we provided a military mission to advise and train a Korean-officered army. In actual operations, our officers have served with the Korean forces in the field.

Norway Contributes Mobile Surgical Hospital Unit for Korea

On April 30, the United Nations Department of Public Information announced that the following information had been received from the United Nations Information Center at Copenhagen.

The last preparations are now in hand for Norway's humanitarian contribution to Korea. Early in June, a Norwegian mobile surgical hospital is expected to be in full operation in Korea.

The hospital, toward which the Norwegian Government has contributed an initial 5 million kroner (\$750,000), will be organized by the Norwegian Red Cross. It will have a total personnel of approximately 80 people: 12 doctors, 20 nurses, porters, drivers, etc., and will be divided into three main sections, each devoted to special branches of surgery. The equipment, including the large army tents in which the hospital will be installed, will be purchased in Tokyo. It is scheduled to hold 60 beds, and it is expected that about 100 beds will be added gradually.

Two planes have been chartered for the transport of the doctors and staff direct from Oslo to Tokyo. The planes are expected to leave Oslo on May 16 and 23. After arrival in Tokyo, the staff will undergo training for about a fortnight and will then be flown to the base selected by Unified Command.

U.S., France, and U.K. Submit Claims Regarding German-Looted Gold to Arbitrator

[Released to the press May 2]

Representatives of the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States met in Washington in March to seek a solution of the problem with regard to the distribution of certain looted gold, claim to which has been made by both Albania and Italy. The Gold Commission, established by the tripartite Governments to distribute from the pool recovered gold previously looted by Germany, had been unable to reach a conclusion in this particular complicated case.

At the Washington discussions, the three Governments signed the attached agreement which is thought to set forth a just and appropriate procedure for the solution of the case. The attached statement explains the circumstances surrounding the two competitive claims and also a connected British claim to the same gold. The latter claim goes back to the Corfu Channel incident.

The State Department is requesting the President of the International Court at The Hague to designate an arbitrator as provided by the agreement.

STATEMENT CONCERNING AGREEMENT

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who have under part III of the final act of the Paris conference on reparation the duty of distributing monetary gold from the pool formed by the gold found in Germany by the allied forces and recovered from third countries, have found themselves unable at the present time to reach a conclusion with regard to a certain quantity of gold to which claims have been made, both by Albania and by Italy, under paragraph C of part III of the Paris act. The three Governments have, therefore, decided to submit this question to an arbitrator to be selected by the President of the International Court of Justice and to obtain from the arbitrator an opinion whether Albania or Italy, or neither of them, has established a claim to this amount of gold under part III of this act. The three Governments have signed an agreement, providing for this reference to an arbitrator, the agreement providing that the arbitrator, before he considers his opinion, shall afford a full opportunity to Albania, to Italy, and to each of the three Governments to submit to him such evidence and legal arguments as they may desire to do. The three Governments will accept the opinion of the

arbitrator as decisive on the question of the claims made under part III of the Paris act.

If the opinion of the arbitrator should state that Albania has established a claim under part III of the act, the Three Powers are confronted by another question because both the United Kingdom on the one hand and Italy on the other hand maintain for different reasons that the gold which on this hypothesis falls to Albania under part III of the Paris act should be delivered to them.

The United Kingdom maintains that the gold should be delivered to it because it has obtained in the International Court of Justice a judgment against Albania for £843,947 in respect of the deaths of and injuries to members of the British Navy and the loss of and damage to British warships in the Corfu Channel, as a result of an undisclosed mine field, for which the Court held that Albania had a responsibility. This judgment has remained completely unsatisfied, and although discussions have taken place between the British and Albanian agents in the case, Albania has not offered anything more than a token sum in satisfaction of this judgment, and accordingly the discussions between the two agents have been broken off. The United Kingdom contends that in the circumstances, if Albania establishes a claim to the gold under part III of the Paris act, it should be delivered to the United Kingdom in partial satisfaction of the judgment of the International Court of Justice against Albania.

Italy also has asserted a claim to the gold involved here, which arises from a matter not covered by part III, namely, the Albanian Law of January 13, 1945, whereby Albania confiscated without any compensation the assets of the National Bank of Albania, the shares in which were for the most part held by the Italian Government. The gold in question constituted an important asset of the said Bank outside of Albania, and Italy contends that under international law no extra-territorial effect should be given the Albanian Government's confiscation and the gold should be delivered to Italy. In addition Italy asserts a claim to this specific gold based on the provisions

of the Italian peace treaty. Finally, the effect of the Italian peace treaty as regards the respective rights of the interested parties would have to be considered.

The three Governments have agreed that, if the opinion of the arbitrator is that Albania has established a claim under part III of the Paris act to 2338.7565 kilograms of monetary gold looted by Germany, they will deliver the gold to the United Kingdom in partial satisfaction of the judgment in the Corfu Channel case unless within 90 days from the date of the communication of the arbitrator's opinion to Italy and Albania either (a) Albania makes an application to the International Court of Justice for the determination of the question whether it is proper that the gold, to which Albania has established a claim under part III, should be delivered to the United Kingdom in partial satisfaction of the Corfu Channel judgment; or (b) Italy makes an application to the International Court of Justice for the determination of the question, whether by reason of any right which she claims to possess as a result of the Albanian Law of January 13, 1945, or under the provisions of the Italian peace treaty, the gold should be delivered to Italy rather than to Albania and agrees to accept the jurisdiction of the Court to determine the question whether the claim of the United Kingdom or of Italy to receive the gold should have priority, if this issue should arise.

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States declare that they will accept as defendants the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of the determination of such applications by Italy or by Albania or by both.

The three Governments agree to conform in the matter of the delivery of gold with any decisions of the International Court of Justice given as the result of such applications by Italy or by Albania.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the three Governments),

Whereas Part III of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation provides:

A. All the monetary gold found in Germany by the Allied Forces and that referred to in paragraph G below (including gold coins, except those of numismatic or historical value, which shall be restored directly if identifiable) shall be pooled for distribution as restitution among the countries participating in the pool in proportion to their respective losses of gold through looting or by wrongful removal to Germany.

B. Without prejudice to claims by way of reparation for unrestored gold, the portion of monetary gold thus accruing to each country participating in the pool shall be accepted by that country in full satisfaction of all claims against Germany for restitution of monetary gold.

C. A proportional share of the gold shall be allocated to

each country concerned which adheres to this arrangement for the restitution of monetary gold and which can establish that a definite amount of monetary gold belonging to it was looted by Germany or, at any time after March 12th, 1938, was wrongfully removed into German territory.

D. The question of the eventual participation of countries not represented at the Conference (other than Germany but including Austria and Italy) in the above-mentioned distribution shall be reserved, and the equivalent of the total shares which these countries would receive, if they were eventually admitted to participate, shall be set aside to be disposed of at a later date in such manner as may be decided by the Allied Governments concerned.

E. The various countries participating in the pool shall supply to the Governments of the United States of America, France, and the United Kingdom, as the occupying Powers concerned, detailed and verifiable data regarding the gold losses suffered through looting by, or removal to, Germany.

F. The Governments of the United States of America, France, and the United Kingdom shall take appropriate steps within the Zones of Germany occupied by them respectively to implement distribution in accordance with the foregoing provisions.

G. Any monetary gold which may be recovered from a third country to which it was transferred from Germany shall be distributed in accordance with this arrangement for the restitution of monetary gold.

Whereas, for the purpose of fulfilling their duties under the aforesaid Part III, the three Governments established a Commission designated as the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold and invited all Governments which desired to make claims under Part III of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation for a proportionate share of the gold pool to submit their claims to the said Commission;

Whereas, in 1943 Germany looted, or wrongfully removed from Rome to German territory, 2338.7565 kilograms of gold;

Whereas, Albania claims that the said amount of gold was monetary gold belonging to Albania within the meaning of the aforementioned paragraph C and that in consequence, under the aforesaid paragraph A, Albania should receive a proportionate part of the gold pool referred to in that paragraph;

Whereas, Italy claims that the aforesaid amount of gold was monetary gold belonging to Italy within the meaning of the aforesaid paragraph C and that in consequence, under paragraph A, Italy should receive a proportionate amount of the gold pool referred to in that paragraph;

Whereas, the Governments of Italy and Albania submitted claims to the Commission as above recited;

Whereas, the said Commission considered that the competitive claims of Albania and of Italy involved disputed questions which the Commission felt itself incompetent to determine and accordingly revoked its previous provisional decision on the matter (which previous decision shall now be regarded as a nullity) and referred the said claims to the three Governments for decision; and

Whereas, the three Governments consider that the aforesaid claims of Albania and Italy involve disputed questions of law and fact and, in order

that they may, in the exercise of their duty under Part III of the Paris Act, carry out the distribution provided for in that Part correctly, they should be assisted by the opinion of an impartial and highly qualified jurist;

Have agreed as follows:

(1) The three Governments request the President of the International Court of Justice to designate as an arbitrator an eminent and impartial jurist, to advise them as to the decision which they should adopt with regard to the aforementioned claims of Albania and of Italy. The emoluments and expenses of the arbitrator shall be defrayed by the Tripartite Gold Commission as a proper charge against the gold pool.

(2) The arbitrator, after taking into account all the facts and all the legal considerations which it is proper for the three Governments to take into account under Part III and bearing in mind that his advice should be consistent with decisions already made in other cases by the Tripartite Gold Commission, is requested to advise the three Governments whether:

(i) Albania has established that 2338.7565 kilograms of monetary gold, which were looted by Germany from Rome in 1943, belonged to Albania, or

(ii) Italy has established that 2338.7565 kilograms of monetary gold, which were looted by Germany from Rome in 1943, belonged to Italy, or

(iii) neither Albania nor Italy has established that 2338.7565 kilograms of monetary gold, which were looted by Germany from Rome in 1943, belonged to either of them.

The arbitrator is requested to furnish his advice in the form of a fully reasoned opinion.

(3) Before submitting his opinion, the arbitrator shall afford to the Governments of Albania, and of Italy, and to each of the three Governments an opportunity of submitting to him any material, evidence and arguments relating to the questions submitted to the arbitrator which they may respectively desire to submit.

(4) Save as provided in the two preceding Articles, the arbitrator shall determine all questions of procedure, including the manner and the time limits within which evidence and observations may be submitted to him by any Government entitled to do so. Before determining any questions of procedure, he shall convoke a meeting at Brussels of the Agents of all the Governments entitled to submit evidence and arguments to him, and shall hear their views with regard to all questions of procedure. If any Government entitled to do so does not, within thirty days of being invited to do so by the arbitrator, inform the arbitrator of its intention to appoint an Agent and to submit evidence or observations, that Government shall be deemed to have renounced its right to do so.

(5) The three Governments, in exercising their duty under Part III of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation, will accept the advice

given by the arbitrator on the question whether Albania, or Italy, or neither has established a claim to the aforesaid amount of gold.

In witness whereof, the undersigned representatives of the three Governments, being duly authorized thereto, have signed the present Agreement.

Done this 25th day of April 1951, at Washington in English and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy, which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, of which certified copies shall be transmitted by the Government of the United States to the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, Albania, and Italy.

For the Government of the French Republic:

HENRI BONNET

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

OLIVER S. FRANKS

For the Government of the United States of America:

DEAN ACHESON

Killing of American Soldier at Vienna Being Investigated

The Department of State was informed on May 4 by its Legation at Vienna of the killing of an American soldier by Soviet soldiers in that city's international sector.

The United States element is responsible for the preservation of law and order in the international sector of Vienna during the month of May, in accordance with quadripartite agreement which assigns this responsibility in rotation to the four occupying powers.

According to the dispatch, the soldier, experienced in the Vienna international patrol, was accompanied by another American soldier. The soldiers were on foot patrol at approximately 12:30 a. m., Vienna time, when two armed Soviet soldiers who were asked to halt for the usual identification, without warning fired two bursts of a "tommygun" at less than 10 yards range. The American soldier fell immediately and died en route to the hospital. His companion returned the fire, and it is believed that one of the Soviet soldiers, who fled into the Soviet sector, was wounded.

Troops of all occupying powers are authorized by protocol to carry weapons in the international sector.

A thorough investigation is under way. The United States High Commissioner is making the strongest official protests to the Soviet authorities. The Department will issue a further statement as soon as detailed information is available.

Educational Exchange Among Free Nations

FIFTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS JULY TO DECEMBER, 1950¹

I. APPRAISAL OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM

This appraisal of the development of the educational exchange program is submitted by the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange in fulfillment of its statutory reporting responsibilities under Public Law 402, Eightieth Congress.

The educational exchange program of Public Law 402 was formally authorized on a world-wide scale in 1948, at which time this Commission was appointed. The program has faced not only the initial problems encountered in any new undertaking, but also special ones due to the worsening of world conditions from 1948 to the present time.

At its outset the program was the heir of ideas which had been developed during the Second World War as well as more specific Government programs which had been carried out in the Latin-American countries in order to cement hemispheric friendship and cooperation. Its basic concept was to interpret the United States to other countries. It was to make known the strength of the United States, the character and purpose of our people, and our national policies and objectives. At first restricted in the main to the Latin-American countries as a continuation of what remained of the wartime program,² the educational exchange service was expanded in 1950 to Europe and other areas of the Eastern Hemisphere.

The program was established with certain major instruments, including the exchange of persons, both at the student and mature leadership level, the maintenance of overseas libraries and cultural centers, the translation of representative American books and documents into foreign lan-

guages, assistance to American-sponsored schools in the other American Republics, the support of various official projects in connection with universities, industrial exhibits, and fairs, and certain cooperative technological services in the Latin-American area.

The concept of interpreting the United States appealed strongly to the American people, and the program has received wide public support and steadily increasing appropriations from the Congress. In 1948, a total of around \$20,000,000 was appropriated to the United States information and educational exchange programs, including the program of scientific and technical cooperation with the other American Republics. Of this total of \$20,000,000, approximately \$3,000,000 was available for educational exchange activities.

In succeeding years the appropriations were made steadily larger. Funds available for 1951 exceed \$111,000,000³ for the information and educational exchange programs of Public Law 402. Of this total around \$10,000,000 has been allocated to educational exchange. In addition, for fiscal year 1951, approximately \$20,000,000 in dollars and the dollar equivalent in foreign currencies is available for special educational exchange programs under other authorities, such as the Fulbright educational program and other special programs in Finland and Germany, and the China area aid program.

Thus, two developments have been under way during this brief period: the expansion of the program to new countries and an increase in its volume. Simultaneously has come the necessity for another development. As world conditions worsened, it became evident that although the objectives as originally conceived were still valid, they were inadequate and needed supplementation and sharpening. The Communist attack on the

¹Transmitted by the chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, Harvie Branscomb, on Apr. 6, 1951. Printed from H. doc. 108, 82d Cong., 1st sess.; for material on the fourth report see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1950, p. 417.

²The overseas library program has been world-wide ever since its beginning in World War II and it was a part of OWI as well as the Latin-American program.

³The contrast between this figure and the \$20,000,000 for 1948 is even greater when certain facts are pointed out. The 1951 amount of over \$111,000,000 does not include funds for the scientific and technical projects of Point 4, for which around \$35,000,000 was appropriated. The 1948 amount did include funds for this purpose.

United States was not new, but the program as it was first conceived did not take into consideration intensive campaigns for the conversion of whole peoples to the Communist point of view. The events in North Korea before the Communist military invasion of South Korea illustrate this challenge.

The facts in this instance are so significant that they should be cited specifically. In 1945 some 3,700 North Koreans were enrolled in one or another of the Soviet-oriented cultural societies in that area. By 1949 this number had been increased to over 1,300,000. During the 3-year period prior to 1948, some 770,000 copies of 72 Russian books were published in North Korea. In 1949 some 500 books were translated and large numbers of copies distributed. For example, of 2 books alone 537,000 copies were distributed. Numerous classes in the Russian language were organized. Almost 70,000 lectures and concerts were given in North Korea by Soviet artists, writers, and other cultural representatives in 1948, and an even greater number were given in 1949. In the course of the 5-year period preceding hostilities, hundreds of intellectual, industrial, and political leaders from North Korea were taken to Moscow for indoctrination. This provides a vivid illustration of Soviet program to misguide and seduce a whole population for violent ends. (Details of the Soviet cultural penetration of North Korea are given in the attachment on p. 795.)

While the Communist educational and cultural program in North Korea was exceptional in its intensity, similar efforts in other countries called for a rethinking and redirection of United States educational exchange objectives during the last year.

The Commission on Educational Exchange has discussed with departmental officers the formulation of basic principles and policies underlying the new approach. Certain major steps in this reshaping of the program may be cited as follows:

1. Shaping the program to fit each country

National attitudes and conditions in each country and area of the world have been analyzed from the standpoint of the objectives of the program to be conducted in each. This has directed attention to special needs in various areas and ended the concept of a single program directed from Washington. For example, 31 countries are now considered by the Department of State to be areas of critical concern. They are the countries under Communist domination, those in danger of being so dominated, or those whose loss to the Communist forces would constitute a serious blow to us. The purpose of the analysis is to tailor the educational exchange program to fit the local situation.

2. Sharpening the objectives of the program

The aims of the educational exchange program have been examined and restated. Three specific

objectives have been set up, the relative emphasis upon each being determined by conditions in the respective countries. In collaboration with the information program, the educational exchange service is now striving—

(a) To keep alive the spirit of cooperation among the free nations of the world for the purpose of self-protection and progress for all.

(b) To strengthen resistance to communism in countries immediately threatened with infiltration or aggression.

(c) To weaken the forces of communism and diminish its power in areas now under the domination of the U.S.S.R.

These aims obviously are not in contradiction to the earlier, general aim of interpreting the United States to other countries. They do represent, however, a great gain in flexibility and in definiteness.

3. Review and redirection of specific program activities

In order to achieve the goals set forth above, the program operations have been reviewed and redirected. A number of specific projects or activities have been revised.

United States information centers.—An excellent illustration of this is the broadening of function as well as the increase in the number of overseas libraries, now called United States information centers. In 1948 there were 67 overseas libraries and 22 reading rooms. By contrast, it is expected that the information centers will number 170 by June 30, 1951. Their change of name from libraries to information centers corresponds to the more positive role which has recently been assigned to them. In addition to providing books and other reference and extension services, they now arrange for lectures, discussion groups, and “workshops” for specialized groups such as teachers; show documentary films; and hold exhibits, as local conditions make these activities practicable and desirable. These information centers actively assist local institutions and groups along many lines, including the lending of materials to national libraries and educational institutions and providing English teaching materials and textbooks to local schools and groups.

Exchange of persons.—The greatly expanded exchange-of-persons program is also being adapted to serve immediate needs more effectively. Grants formerly were limited chiefly to the academic and scientific fields. Exchange activities now include individuals in other representative categories: Government officials, labor groups, youth leaders, and professional leaders in all fields. There is an increased emphasis on bringing mature leaders and specialists to the United States on short-term visits. Even in student exchanges, one of the main criteria in the selection of grantees is an individual's prospect of a position of influence in the near future.

A few statistics illustrate these new trends in the exchange of persons program, and also its expansion. In 1948 around 450 grants were awarded to students and adult professional leaders. In 1951, the plans provide for 1,555 grants from Smith-Mundt funds. With the addition of special educational exchange activities under the German program, the Fulbright Act, the Finnish program, and some others the total figure for 1951 is expected to exceed 6,500 grants. Roughly half of the 6,500 grants will be made to mature leaders selected from a number of representative fields for the purpose of lecturing, inspecting new techniques, pursuing research projects, teaching, and other activities.

The Department of State's program, however, is only a small part of the total United States exchange-of-persons activities, the great bulk of which are carried out under private auspices in the United States and other countries. Over 30,000 foreign students are now studying in over a thousand American campuses. Not more than 9 or 10 percent⁴ of these foreign students are supported by Government grants. The great importance of this student migration and the teaching contribution of American educational institutions to an intellectually unified and cooperating world is impossible to calculate.

In some instances, the sharpening of the program to meet Communist attacks has been accomplished indirectly. For example, a number of appointments to qualified Negroes for study or other work abroad has done more to offset the charges of racial conflict in the United States than many articles on the subject could have done.

Other activities.—In a number of countries progress has been made to secure local support for the program. For example, binational American centers are being opened during the current fiscal year in Turkey, Iran, and Burma. These centers offer regular English classes, provide intensive English training for special groups such as educators, and offer courses and seminars on American civilization and other services.

Difference of language is always a barrier. The previously mentioned Russian program in North Korea placed emphasis on overcoming this problem. The Department of State is carrying out activities designed to increase the number of English-speaking peoples in various countries, as well as to reach other nationals through their own language by translating representative American publications.

English-teaching materials are being distributed to foreign schools and individuals engaged in the teaching of English. In addition, special English-teaching materials are being developed. These include textbooks and recordings in Korean, Viet-Nameese, Indonesian, Burmese, Turkish, and Persian. Experimentation is now under way to

make effective use of motion pictures and radio as media for English teaching. Activities in the field of translation include financial and other assistance to foreign publishers for the translation and publication of American books, and Government-financed translations of certain United States Government publications for distribution abroad. By the close of fiscal year 1951, nearly 2,000,000 copies of translated American publications will have been distributed in 23 different languages.

Summary Appraisal

The expansion of the educational exchange program to many new countries, its rapid increase in volume, and its redirection to meet the challenge of Communist propaganda and subversion, have placed heavy burdens upon the administrators of the program throughout this 3-year period. The responsibilities have been particularly great this past year when, with the initiation of the President's Campaign of Truth, most of the expansion and change has taken place. It is the opinion of this Commission that on the whole the job has been well done.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs has given the program vigorous and forward-looking leadership. Obviously we cannot pass judgment on the capabilities of all the officers he has selected to carry on the work of the program here and overseas. The progress of the program, however, convinces us that he has brought together an excellent staff and in our various contacts with the program officers here and overseas we have noted their devotion and enthusiasm for their jobs.

We feel that special comment is called for in connection with the administration of this program since we understand that this topic has been under consideration in congressional circles. This Commission is a policy and program appraising body and does not deal with administrative or operating problems. However, a number of administrative studies, surveys, and changes designed to improve the program as it expands have been brought to our attention and should be cited.

About a year ago the Department of State was reorganized along lines recommended by the Hoover Commission. This reorganization laid the groundwork for administering the information and educational exchange programs along more effective, better coordinated lines. Soon after this reorganization, the Department employed a private firm of well-known management engineers to make a survey of the operations and the administrative aspects of the total educational exchange program. Many of the recommendations which came out of this survey have already been put into effect and others are in process. This firm reports to us that in general the operations of the educational exchange program compare favorably with those of any private firm or institution doing similar or related work.

⁴Exclusive of Chinese students assisted under the special China area aid program.

In order to obtain objective counsel on the professional aspects of the publishing program, the Department has employed three private experts as consultants for the program of the Division of Libraries and Institutes. Two of these consultants are in the publishing field and were selected after obtaining the advice of the American Book Publishers Council. These individuals have spent on an average of 2 days a week for a period of 2 months reviewing the program in detail. They are now surveying operations at 17 overseas missions in Europe and the Near East. The appointment of consultants on other phases of the educational exchange program is in process.

The Commission wishes to make it clear that we do not believe the program has attained its maturity either in scope or definition. The process of adjusting it to the tasks imposed by the Communist challenge will be a continuous one. To illustrate, we feel that the reexamination of the content of the presentation made to other peoples, as contrasted with the objectives sought, has only just begun. Part of the approach used at one time—the emphasis upon the strength and industrial wealth of the United States for example—ran grave risks of creating envy and resentment, rather than attitudes of cooperation and friendship. We believe that more attention should be given to the development of basic themes for program guidance. Yet it would be very unrealistic to insist that everything must be accomplished at once, and we are unanimous in reporting to the Congress that steady progress has been made over this 3-year period in this indispensable but relatively new undertaking. We urge for it increased attention and constructive criticism by the Congress and the public, and further financial support.

The preceding statement is not intended as a full and detailed report on the Department of State's educational exchange program. It is not the duty of this Commission to provide such information. Rather, it is a statement of the situation as the members of the Commission see it—a résumé of considerations which have led us to believe that the educational exchange program is sound in character and is making an indispensable contribution to United States foreign policy.

The Commission has also studied certain specific problems during the period covered by this report. These problems and the Commission's recommendations are set forth in the following section.

II. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE

(July 1–December 31, 1950)

A. Department of State Versus Independent Agency Control

During the period covered by this report, there have been various proposals to remove the informa-

tion and educational exchange program from the Department of State. This Commission's review of the proposals has been made solely from the standpoint of whether or not such action would make for more effective operation of the educational exchange program.

This Commission believes, one member dissenting, that the educational exchange program should remain in the Department of State and we are so advising the Secretary of State.

Our position is based on three major considerations:

First, we believe that if the program is to be responsive to the needs of United States foreign policy, it must be closely integrated with the Department of State offices which formulate such policy.

In the second place, the Department of State's over-all educational exchange program is a composite of many programs whose procedures and policies have been closely integrated so as to give the total effort common objectives. The Smith-Mundt educational exchange program under Public Law 402 is but one part of this over-all educational exchange program. Others are—

The Fulbright exchange program (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.).

The program for educational exchanges with Finland (Public Law 265, 81st Cong.).

China area aid (Public Laws 327 and 535, 81st Cong.).
Iranian-American trust fund (Public Law 861, 81st Cong.).

The German educational exchange program (Public Law 535, 81st Cong.).

Thirdly, we feel that independent status for the program would make it more difficult for the program to operate effectively at the overseas missions. Under the present set-up, the Foreign Service officers assigned to this program are a part of the regular Foreign Service establishments. Their work is integrated with the official diplomatic work. It is our opinion that if our educational exchange officers operated in establishments separate from the embassies, their work could not be as closely and effectively tied in with other embassy activities.

We feel, however, that some improvements can be made in the organization of the program by making adjustments within the framework of the Department of State itself. By the close of 1951 the two programs of Public Law 402 will account for around one-half of the employees and half of the total of the appropriations of the Department of State. Also, the operations of the information and educational exchange programs differ from other activities of the Department of State which historically have given primary emphasis to the diplomatic and political side of international relations. It is logical and desirable for special provisions to be made for the two programs so as to insure increased flexibility and increased speed of operations. With these considerations in mind we feel that the over-all status of the program in the Department should be studied. We have been

informed that the Department is doing this and we look forward to reviewing the results of any surveys conducted.

(This recommendation is being submitted to the Department of State simultaneously with this report to the Congress. Therefore, no departmental reply can be reported at this time.)

B. Relationship of Information and Educational Exchange Programs and Commissions

This Commission discussed with the Commission on Information the question as to whether the information and educational exchange programs, and the two Advisory Commissions, could more profitably be combined into a single undertaking. Both Commissions agreed that the direction of both by one assistant secretary and a single general manager, as well as the direction of both in the field by a single public affairs officer, provided adequate coordination.

(No departmental action required.)

C. Coordination With Advisory Board on International Development

The Commission on Educational Exchange and the Advisory Board on International Development have taken steps to insure the coordination of their respective activities. This has been considered necessary because of the interrelation of the programs upon which both bodies advise.

A member of each body has been appointed to specialize on the policies and operations of the other board. If either specialist finds that problems of mutual interest are developing, either body may request the advice and assistance of the other through joint meetings of the two Boards or conferences of individual members. Members appointed to carry out these responsibilities are as follows:

Advisory Board on International Development; President John A. Hannah, University of Michigan, member of the Board

Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange: Chancellor Harvie Branscomb, Vanderbilt University, Chairman of the Commission on Educational Exchange

(No departmental action necessary.)

D. Evaluation of International Exchange of Persons Activities

The Commission on Educational Exchange has taken steps to develop specifications and secure private sponsorship for an evaluation project dealing with exchange of persons in order to ascertain what elements have contributed to the success or failure of programs of international exchange. The Commission hopes to interest one of the larger foundations in financing the project and arranging for its conduct, without any participation by

the Department of State or the Commission on Educational Exchange.

(No departmental action necessary.)

E. The Department of State's Conduct of the Finnish Program

The legislative history of Public Law 265, Eighty-first Congress, clearly indicates that the Congress intended for the Commission on Educational Exchange to assume advisory responsibilities for the program of educational exchange with Finland conducted under that law. Accordingly, the Commission has reviewed the progress made by the Department of State in the administration of the program during fiscal year 1950, the first year of the program's operation. For this period, \$264,422 was available for the Finnish program, with two-thirds allotted to exchange of persons activities.

Funds for exchange of persons activities (\$176,281) provided for 50 grants to Finnish nationals—10 grants to specialists and 40 to graduate students. Fields covered included agriculture, education, engineering, industrial relations, journalism, medicine, meteorology, natural sciences, woodworking, and the humanities. These funds also provided for one lecturer in American history to go to Finland.

The selection procedures appear entirely satisfactory. For specialist grants, the candidates were nominated initially by the American Legation in Helsinki upon the recommendation of Finnish professional organizations in their respective fields, and final selections were made by the Department of State. In connection with student candidates, preliminary selections were made in Finland by the Committee on Study and Training in the United States and reviewed by the Legation, as well as the various professional committees of the Institute of International Education in New York. Final selection was made by the Department of State.

Over \$88,000 was available under this program for the purchase of special educational equipment for use by institutions in Finland. This equipment included scientific and technical books, journals, and periodicals as well as specialized laboratory and visual aids equipment.

Since funds available for the Finnish program under Public Law 265 may not be used for administrative purposes, the Department of State has administered and serviced the program without hiring additional personnel for this purpose. Despite this, the Department has, in the opinion of the Commission, established the program on a sound footing and administered it well.

(No departmental action necessary as a result of this statement.)

F. Labor in International Exchange

Communist propaganda is aimed at workers who constitute a large and important part of the

world's population. The United States must combat this influence to win the workers' support. Our task must be to depict the true status of workers in the U.S.S.R. and in Soviet satellite countries in contrast to the position of labor in the United States where workers have economic security, dignity, self-respect, and recognition without recourse to class warfare and dictatorship which the Communist doctrine holds to be necessary before workers can attain their rights.

Both Government and labor have recognized the importance of labor in international relations. The Department of State has labor advisers and consultants, and, at overseas posts, labor attachés and labor reporting officers form a part of the United States diplomatic missions. Under the ECA program and the Department of State's exchange-of-persons program numerous labor representatives have visited the United States. Organized American labor has developed its own technical assistance program which was organized in December 1949 under the sponsorship of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), in protest against the Soviet domination of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The ICFTU's program is similar in concept to point 4 activities. Among the many projects initiated by the ICFTU is that of establishing training schools in Asia to prepare promising leaders from countries in the region to function more effectively in the development of free trade unions.

The Commission on Educational Exchange endorses heartily the emphasis being placed on labor by the Department of State. However, we feel that certain additional steps would increase the effectiveness of the Department's activities. Among these are the following which the Commission recommends for consideration by the Department of State:

(a) More scholarships at workers' education centers and labor colleges.

(b) More planned short-term study tours of trade-unionists on a functional basis.

(c) Special summer schools and institutes for labor activists to study social problems and solutions proposed in various countries.

(This recommendation was submitted to the Department of State simultaneously with its submission to the Congress. Therefore no reply can now be recorded.)

G. Orientation of Chinese Students

The Commission on Educational Exchange has recommended that the Department of State take the following steps in connection with the orientation of Chinese grantees in order to carry out the terms of the legislation authorizing the China area aid program (Public Law 535, 81st Cong.):

(1) Urge foreign student advisers throughout the United States to see that the Chinese student

grantees participate in American campus and community life. This would include insuring that the Chinese share appropriate housing facilities with American students and other steps which would be conducive to closer associations between American and Chinese students, thereby avoiding the formation of national cliques which tend to isolate the Chinese from the American democratic influences.

(2) Recommend that college or university representatives, professors, advisers, and deans be encouraged, whenever possible without imposing requirements concerning specific courses, to advise and counsel Chinese students to take courses which in the judgment of the advisers would enable them to interpret American democracy more effectively to their countrymen upon their return to China.

(3) Take such steps as are possible to insure the widest practicable distribution throughout American colleges and universities of Chinese students who are entering the United States under this program.

(4) Proceed with the plans to hold a conference with representatives of colleges, educational institutions, and universities with a sizable Chinese enrollment in order that the Department and the advisers may exchange experiences and develop plans for the program which will carry out further the objectives of its authorizing legislation.

The Department of State has informed the Commission that it will take action concerning the above recommendations in accordance with the following (excerpts from the Department's official reply):

The Commission set forth for the Department's consideration one formal recommendation concerning the China area aid program which is administered by the Department under the authority of Public Law 535, Eighty-first Congress. Your recommendation consisted of four major proposals, each designed to insure more effective orientation of Chinese grantees in the American way of life. Although each of these proposals bears on problems which have been under consideration by the Department we have benefited from the fresh approach of the Commission.

Before commenting on the specific points recommended by the Commission, I should like to mention the points raised by the Department's Advisory Committee on Emergency Aid to Chinese Students and Scholars, which devoted a major portion of its last meeting, in December 1950, to a discussion of the problems. The committee agreed (1) that the orientation of Chinese students is part of the larger question of foreign students generally; (2) that in dealing with this problem the most effective work is done at the local level, and should not be under direction from Washington; (3) that the Department can properly inquire of local institutions as to programs which have been developed and their success to date and that future progress in this direction should be reported to the Department; (4) that over-all coordination can well be achieved by regional or national conferences in which experiences in this activity might be shared.

The Commission's first proposal was that the Department of State urge foreign student advisers throughout the United States to see that the Chinese student grantees participate in American campus and community life. Efforts have been made in this direction. Members of

the Department's staff have made extensive field trips to discuss with university authorities and foreign student advisers ways and means of stimulating participation of Chinese students in extracurricular affairs. Since the Department considers that significant progress is dependent primarily upon efforts of the American community, special attempts are constantly being made to enlist the services of private agencies and local groups to do their utmost to relate the community experiences of the student to their educational goals. The work of the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers has been particularly fruitful in coordinating individual efforts and in furthering participation by American groups in this important phase of educational exchange. In line with the Commission's proposal, the Department has taken additional steps. Arrangements have been made with the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers to have a full discussion of the problem at its conference to be held in Denver next April. At this meeting the Department will present the Commission's views on the subject.

The Commission's second proposal was that university representatives and faculty advisers be encouraged to counsel Chinese students to take courses which would enable them to interpret American democracy more effectively upon their return to China. The Department feels that implementation of this proposal might affect the successful operation of the program in the individual colleges and universities since the Federal Government has no jurisdiction over the selection of courses in this or any other program of educational exchange. We should like to point out, however, that we have been informed of action taken locally in line with the Commission's recommendation.

The Commission's next proposal was that the Department insure the widest practical distribution of Chinese students throughout American colleges. Full execution of this proposal is limited due to the fact that the program is based on the principle of providing assistance to Chinese students already enrolled in accredited colleges and universities in the United States. However, there are now some 530 institutions which have been approved for participation in this program. The Department has indirectly taken steps to prevent high concentrations of Chinese nationals in a few schools by following, since the inception of the program, a policy of discouraging the transfer of Chinese students from one university to another.

In connection with the Commission's fourth point endorsing the Department's plan for meeting with representatives of colleges and universities who are responsible for various aspects of the Chinese aid program, I should like to point out that the Department now considers it preferable to approach the problem in a somewhat modified manner. For example, the Department has been holding a series of small meetings on many campuses, at which representatives of the Department discuss with university officials problems related to the Chinese program. The Advisory Committee on Emergency Aid to Chinese Students and Scholars has been another effective medium for exchanging views, and, in general, coordinating the operations of this program. Also, at various meetings of private groups, such as the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers, and various educational associations, there have been frequent and detailed discussions of this program, in which representatives of the Department have participated. From time to time the Department has considered the possibility of convening a national conference of representatives of educational institutions to discuss problems arising from the Chinese student program, but the Department believes it is preferable to approach the problem through the devices previously mentioned, rather than through such a national conference.

The Department will continue to develop other means, consistent with the substance of the Commission's recommendations, whereby participants in this program may obtain a better understanding of democratic principles and processes as exemplified on the American scene.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1950, FOR WHICH DEPARTMENTAL ACTION HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO CONGRESS

Destitute Chinese Students

Recommendation

The Commission considers that its general proposals for United States financial aid to destitute foreign students remain sound but that subsequent changes in the Far East necessitate a revision of its recommendations with respect to destitute Chinese students. (The text of these proposals may be found on pp. 9-11, H. Doc. No. 431, 81st Cong., Dec. 29, 1949.) The following statement is a revision of these recommendations:

The Commission approves efforts of the United States Government to strengthen democratic elements in China by providing educational opportunities in this country for future Chinese leaders. Further, insofar as the Commission's previous recommendations are concerned, we wish to leave to the discretion of the Department of State the question of requiring the return to China of Chinese students in the United States. However, even though this question must be decided in the light of changing conditions in China and the availability of funds, the program should be based on the general guiding principle that foreign students should return to their own countries upon completion of their educational program and make their training and experience available to their people.

Action (departmental reply)

The Department is in agreement with the Commission's recommendations on aid to destitute Chinese students. Regulations governing the administration of the \$6,000,000 now available for such aid are being drafted by the Department. Provision for payment of return travel of needy Chinese will continue to be made. This, in itself, indicates the Department's intent that recipients of such aid shall, like all other United States Government grantees, be expected to return to their own countries to make their training and experience available to their own people as soon as practicable. The matter of requiring the return to China of Chinese students in the United States is, however, within the province of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice.

Report From United States Grantees

Recommendation

The Commission on Educational Exchange recommends that the Department of State, in order to insure the proper supervision, control, and evaluation of the exchange-of-persons programs, require all persons receiving United States Government grants to submit adequate reports covering their activities during the period of the grant.

Action (departmental reply)

The Department agrees with the Commission's recommendation regarding reports from persons receiving United States Government grants. Reports are required from all United States Government grantees. At present there is great variation in the form of these reports. An effort is being made, however, to utilize these reports more fully. The Department will develop, with the assistance of its missions abroad and the cooperating agencies in the United States, a common format and content pattern for these reports which will produce the information necessary to insure that proper supervision, control, and evaluation of the exchange of persons program is maintained.

Two projects now in progress will contribute to our study of this problem. Results of the management survey of the Office of Educational Exchange will include suggestions for improvement of the reporting functions in terms of more efficient organization of personnel assigned to analyze and exploit this material. The results of this survey will be available November 1, 1950. Likewise, one of the objectives of the current planning study for the application of evaluation techniques to the educational exchange program is to review and make a qualitative assessment of existing government reporting and analysis procedures, and recommend practical revisions which will increase their value.

Stabilization of Latin-American Program

Recommendation

The Commission on Educational Exchange makes the recommendation to the Department of State that it investigate the possibility of utilizing foreign currency credits resulting from the sale of United States surplus property to stabilize the educational exchange program in the other American Republics.

Action (departmental reply)

With regard to the Commission's recommendation for stabilization of the Latin-American program, the Department desires to inform the Commission that it has been investigating the possibility of utilizing foreign currency credits resulting from the sale of United States surplus property for exchange-of-persons programs with the other American Republics. A recent reexamination of the situation, however, reveals that under the surplus-property agreements negotiated with the other American Republics there are no foreign currencies available for educational exchange purposes. While some foreign currencies have been made available to the United States Government as a result of lend-lease settlements, these moneys may not be used for educational exchanges under the Fulbright Act, which is limited to the use of credits resulting from surplus-property agreements.

However, the Department will continue to take every opportunity to seek foreign currency credits in this area which may be used for educational exchange purposes. The Department is also exploring new ways of stimulating greater use of funds from private organizations and private enterprise.

ATTACHMENT

Soviet Cultural Influence in North Korea

The predominant role of the Soviet Union in North Korea is reflected in North Korean education and culture. During the period of Japanese rule, mass education of the Koreans was neglected, artistic creativity was repressed, and literature, drama, and art were limited to a select few, mainly Koreans educated in Japan. The educational and cultural void enabled first the Soviet occupation forces and then the North Korean regime to foster Soviet culture among the mass Korean people through the educational system and through the encouragement of mass appreciation of Soviet literature, drama, and art. Until the past year, however, lack of facilities limited the scope of the educational and cultural program. Since then, there has been increased activity in both programs.

Most aspects of Soviet cultural imperialism are carried out through official channels. The programs are facilitated by the Economic and Cultural Agreement of March 17, 1949, which states:

The contracting parties shall in every way develop and consolidate the relations which have been established between them in the spheres of culture, science, and art.

The objectives of the Soviet educational and cultural programs are publicly supported by the North Korean Government leaders, who have avowed the superiority of Soviet culture and have encouraged the spread of training in the Russian language, the influx of Soviet educators into the schools, the translation, publication, and reading of Soviet literature and the cultivation of Soviet artistic works.⁵

⁵Typical statements propounding Soviet cultural superiority are:

"In order to develop the important educational culture, it is the most pressing popular aspiration to study and absorb broadly the advanced Soviet educational science, and to consolidate more than ever the everlasting imperishable good will between Korea and the Soviet Union. . . . Soviet educational science occupies the highest place in the world as the means to develop culture and the weapon for the realization of a Communist society." (Pyongyang radio broadcast on October 26, 1949, of a speech by Paik Nam Un, Minister of Education.)

"Only by absorbing the advanced Soviet culture will we be able to develop our national culture further. Therefore we must intensify our efforts to absorb more vigorously the advanced Soviet culture so that we may develop our national culture to a higher level and make ours a rich, powerful country." (Pyongyang radio broadcast on October 19, 1949, of a speech by Paek Chong Son, Vice Minister of Culture and Propaganda, on the necessity for the absorption of Soviet culture.)

The educational and cultural programs projected to encourage assimilation of Soviet culture are implemented mainly by the Ministries of Education and Propaganda. In addition, there are special organizations charged with the responsibility for the propagation of Soviet culture. The Korean-Soviet Culture Society is the indigenous agency primarily responsible for the Soviet cultural program. In the fall of 1945 the society had a membership of about 3,700, with only 20 branches. By May 1949, the membership of the society was over 1,300,000, with 105 branches and 20,000 units. Among the activities of the society are the translation and publication of books, the publication of a newspaper and a magazine, and the making of arrangements for lecture tours, concerts, theatrical performances, etc.

There are, moreover, certain Soviet organizations that direct the flow of materials and Soviet representatives to the Korean-Soviet Culture Society and to other indigenous organizations. Among these are the Soviet culture houses and several propaganda outlets under the Soviet Embassy; the Soviet Information Bureau and Soviet libraries; the Soviet Motion Picture Export and Import Society (a branch of the Soviet Ministry of Cinema Industry); and the Tass News Agency.

SOVIET INFLUENCE ON THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

A primary objective of Soviet educational policy is the teaching of Russian as the second language in North Korean schools. The Ministry of Education has reportedly decreed that Russian will be the only required foreign language in Korean schools. In order to train middle school teachers and Government employees, 109 special Russian-language schools have been established. There are reported to be 1,580 graduates of these special schools already. A Russian Language College has been established in Pyongyang. Reliable reports indicate that the Russian language has been added to the curriculum of other colleges and universities. In addition to Russian training, courses on Marxism, Soviet history, literature, art, and other aspects of the Soviet civilization are offered in North Korean schools.

Soviet influence over the educational system is further manifested through the assignment of Soviet scholars and professors to teach in North Korean colleges and universities, short visits of other Soviet academic personnel, and the provision of Soviet textbooks, teaching and training manuals, experimental apparatus, and literary works on both an advanced and an elementary level. It is reported that 13 of the original members of the teaching staff of Kim II Sung Univer-

sity were Russians. Since July 1948, more than 30 well-known Soviet scholars have visited the various Korean institutions of higher learning to assist in their educational programs. Soviet engineers also visited Korea to provide similar assistance in industrial and agricultural fields.

The Soviet Union has also brought Korean students to the U.S.S.R. for educational training in the natural sciences, humanities, public administration, and engineering and other technical fields. More than 600 such students, both men and women, are currently in the Soviet Union, and recent reports indicate that many more students are expected to go to the U.S.S.R. These students, upon their return, are expected to assume positions of responsibility in the Government and political organizations and to form a nucleus for the Communist intelligentsia in North Korea.

CULTURAL ASSIMILATION

Assimilation of Soviet culture is sought not only through Soviet influence over the educational system but also through dissemination to the general public of a wide variety of translated Soviet publications; the performance of Soviet motion pictures, plays, music, ballet, and the like; the exhibition of Soviet creative works; and the visits and lectures of Soviet writers, artists, and other cultural representatives. In the field of publications, from the time of the Soviet "liberation" up to 1948, 72 books (with a total of 770,000 copies) were published in North Korea, most of them translations of Soviet literature and technical books. In 1949, some 500 books were translated; copies of the History of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the U.S.S.R. and Stalin's Collected Works alone totaled 537,000. In addition, two daily newspapers are devoted primarily to Soviet writings; one published by the Korean-Soviet Culture Society and the other by the Soviet Foreign Culture Association. Finally, there is also a weekly publication of the Soviet Foreign Culture Association and a magazine published by the Korean-Soviet Culture Society.

In the nonpublication fields, there are numerous examples of Soviet cultural penetration. During 1949 more than 209 Soviet films were imported into North Korea and shown in both urban and rural areas. The State Theater at Pyongyang, established on January 9, 1947, is reserved for the performance of Soviet plays and for concerts by Soviet musicians and dancers. Its limited facilities, however, permitted the production of only eight plays in 1950. Finally, almost 70,000 lectures and concerts were given by Soviet artists, writers, and other cultural representatives in 1948, and an even greater number were given in 1949.

The United States in the United Nations

[May 4-10, 1951]

Security Council

As a result of the increased tempo of the fighting, which broke out the latter part of last week in and around the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria, the Council met on May 8 to consider the immediate issuance of a cease-fire order.

United States Ambassador Warren R. Austin introduced the following draft resolution (S/2130), cosponsored by France, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States:

The Security Council

1. RECALLING its resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 17 November 1950,

2. NOTING with concern that fighting has broken out in and around the demilitarized zone established by the Syrian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949 and that fighting is continuing despite the cease-fire order of the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization issued on 4 May 1951,

3. *Calls upon* the parties or persons in the areas concerned to cease fighting and brings to the attention of the parties their obligations under article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Security-Council's resolution of 15 July 1948 and their commitments under the General Armistice Agreement and accordingly calls upon them to comply with these obligations and commitments.

Mr. Austin stated that it was important that the fighting stop; otherwise the peace of the entire area would be jeopardized. The action of the Security Council would be directed to the parties and persons in the area without prejudice to further deliberation by the Council. Later, in assessing responsibility for the outbreak, the Council might want to take into account the readiness of the parties to comply with the Council directives. Neither Israel nor Syria should lay down any conditions for carrying out the cease-fire order. Adoption of the resolution, he added, would in no way mean that the Council was dropping discussion of the Palestine question. This was merely an emergency step, required by the circumstances, and debate on the main question should continue afterward.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) stated that his Government had been gravely disturbed by the recent deterioration of relations between Israel and Syria and by the outbreak of fighting in the demili-

tarized zone. It was his Government's view that redress for the fighting should be sought through the machinery provided in the general armistice agreement and not through resort to armed force. There could be no justification on the part of either party not to attend the Mixed Armistice Commission's (Mac) meetings, nor generally to cooperate in its work.

The French representative, Francis Lacoste, expressed the deep concern of his Government over the dispute and stated that the need for a return to a *de facto* peace was very urgent.

Ambassador Selim Sarper (Turkey), in explaining his Government's cosponsorship of the resolution, pointed out there was nothing in its terms which would prejudice the claims of either party.

Ambassador Abba S. Eban (Israel) said the Syrian aggression had increased in scope and momentum and had now led to Israel's formal protest and complaint. The Syrian army had established itself at the southern triangle of the demilitarized zone. In addition, it had canceled and violated a cease-fire arrangement, had inflicted and suffered considerable casualties, and had left behind unmistakable evidences of Syrian military occupation. His Government could not give the slightest credence to suggestions that the forces attacking the Israeli territory were "civilians." Furthermore, Israel held the Syrian Government wholly responsible for the activities of these attacking forces. The intensive Syrian aggression had been accompanied with a virtual breakdown of United Nations machinery in the area. He criticized the reports sent to the Security Council as disjointed recitals which consisted mainly of reports submitted by both parties. The Israeli complaints had not been accurately or fully transmitted, and the main military engagements had been entirely ignored. In referring to the resolution, he stated he was in full accord with its central theme. At the same time, he noted the armistice agreement provided for the absence of military and paramilitary units from the demilitarized zone. Therefore, he suggested an amendment to the resolution which would require withdrawal of all military and paramilitary units that

had penetrated the zone. He concluded by reserving the right to seek condemnation of Syrian aggression.

Faris El-Khoury Bey, chairman of the Syrian delegation to the United Nations, stressed that the several reports from the Truce Supervision Organization substantiated his denial that Syrian units had been guilty of aggression. In particular, he referred to a cable of May 4 which discounted an Israeli claim regarding an alleged attack on Tel El Mutilla by Syrian forces. While denying that Syria was attempting to occupy the zone, Mr. El-Khoury stated that Syria considered all claims to the zone were in abeyance during the armistice. He charged that Israel had planned and perpetrated iniquitous methods of ridding the Huleh drainage area of Arab landowners. The Council should provide for the immediate suspension of the Huleh project, pending further discussions in the Mac and pending the acquisition of needed land by the free consent of the owners. Also, there should be the immediate return of all inhabitants of the zone. Further, there should be payment by Israel to the Arabs for destroyed property. All military and paramilitary forces should be withdrawn from the zone, including police units not locally recruited. The Council and the two parties should confirm the powers of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and the Mixed Armistice Commission. He read a declaration from his Government which stated that the United Nations observers were no longer able to perform their duties because of flagrant disregard of their authority. The statement also said Israel was trying to utilize the delay in the Council on the dispute in an effort to present a *fait accompli*. He also offered an amendment to the resolution, which would provide for the withdrawal of military and paramilitary units, as well as the safe return of all civilian inhabitants to the demilitarized zone. He stated that Syria agreed to the cease-fire.

The Council decided not to consider the amendments offered and adopted the four-state resolution by a vote of 10-0-1 (U.S.S.R.).

Under questioning, Maj. Gen. William E. Riley, USMC, who planned to return to the Middle East on May 13, gave data to the Council concerning the predominance of Arab population in the de-

militarized zone, together with the information that two Arab villages in the zone had been destroyed. He also stated that at the present time there were 30 United Nations observers, and that five additional observers had been requested. However, if the Mixed Armistice Commission were used, he thought he could get along with the present number.

Specialized Agencies

World Health Organization (WHO).—The Fourth World Health Assembly, legislative body of WHO, opened May 7 at Geneva. The membership comprises 76 nations; three other countries—Japan, Spain, and the German Federal Republic—have sent representatives and have requested full membership in the Organization.

Dr. Leonard A. Scheele, Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, was designated by President Truman to head the 19-member United States delegation to the Assembly. Dr. Scheele was elected president, and Dr. D. A. Dowling (Australia), Dr. A. H. Taba (Iran), and Dr. K. Evang (Norway) were elected vice presidents.

One of the important events that will take place at this conference is the adoption of a single code of International Sanitary Regulations to replace the many existing sanitary conventions.

Other agenda items include: (1) Completion of work on a 4-year plan for world health designed to strengthen national public health services and develop WHO's permanent world-wide technical services; (2) Plans to expand WHO services through funds provided by the United Nations program of technical assistance for economic development; (3) The Director-General's annual report for 1950; and (4) Various financial matters, including fixing a scale of assessment for 1952.

Dr. Scheele, in accepting the presidency, said:

The United States firmly desires to continue its support to the World Health Organization to the end that the world may be a better and more healthful place for all. . . . We believe that health improvement in all parts of the world is one of the main roads to peace. The world cannot remain half healthy and half sick and still maintain economic, moral, and spiritual equilibrium.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Career Foreign Service Officer Category Expanded

[Released to the press May 2]

On April 16, the Department of State announced a program designed to improve the personnel program of the Department and the unified Foreign Service of the United States.¹ In the furtherance of that program, the Department announced today a program for substantial expansion of the career Foreign Service officer category to meet the increased needs for such officers in the conduct of foreign affairs.

To achieve this objective, lateral entry to the intermediate and upper grades of the career service will be thrown open for a period of 3 years to qualified noncareer officers of the Department of State, the Foreign Service Staff Corps, and the Foreign Service Reserve without restriction as to number. (The term "lateral entry" is applied to the entry into the career Foreign Service of noncareer officers of the Department, the Foreign Service Staff Corps, and the Foreign Service Reserve at approximately the same salary or grade level as that currently held by such noncareer personnel.) All qualified officers in the noncareer service are being urged to make application for entry into the career service under this program.

At the same time, a systematic and intensive campaign is being inaugurated in colleges and universities throughout the country to increase the number and quality of young men and women seeking appointment at the entrance level as Foreign Service officer, Class 6. This drive is being inaugurated in order that the base of the service may be expanded to keep pace with increases in the middle and upper grades.

Selection, in all cases, will be on the basis of examinations conducted by the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service.

Those eligible for consideration for the career Foreign Service officer category under the expansion program are:

1. All personnel of the Department of State, the Staff Corps, and the Foreign Service Reserve, including personnel of the Economic Cooperation Administration appointed under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.

2. Applicants must be American citizens of at least 10 years.

3. Married applicants must be married to American citizens.

4. Applicants must have rendered at least 3 years of continuous service in positions of responsibility in the Department of State or Foreign Service or have been employed by the Economic Cooperation Administration following appointment under the provisions of the Economic

Cooperation Act of 1948 and have achieved an efficiency rating of Very Good or Excellent (or their equivalent) for each of those years.

5. Applicants under the age of 31 must have rendered 4 years continuous service and have achieved Very Good or Excellent efficiency ratings for those years.

6. All applicants must be under age 52 as of July 1, 1951.

Any employee of the Department, the Staff or the Reserve who does not meet these qualifications on July 1, 1951, but who expects to meet them on or before January 1, 1954, will be permitted to submit an application for designation for examination. A deadline of November 1, 1951, has been established for the receipt of applications. Applicants wishing to be examined during the present calendar year, however, must submit applications no later than June 29, 1951.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Overseas Information Programs of the United States Government. Bibliography No. 58. February 28, 1951. Division of Library and Reference Services. 34 pp. 25¢.

A selection of writings appearing in books, periodicals, documentary materials and official publications on the organization and administration of the overseas information programs and in particular those concerned with the various media used in the dissemination of information abroad. References to the activities of nongovernmental and international agencies have also been included.

Massachusetts and Foreign Trade. 23 pp. Free. Limited distribution.

One of the reports prepared by the Department of State in response to a large number of requests from individuals and organized groups. Statistical data were prepared by the International Economic Analysis Division, Department of Commerce.

Education: Cooperative Program in Panama. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2148. Pub. 4065. 22 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Panama Extending Program provided by agreement of November 13 and 14, 1944—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Panamá September 23 and 24, 1948; entered into force September 24, 1948; operative retroactively from June 30, 1948.

Confuse and Control: Soviet Techniques in Germany. European and British Commonwealth Series 17. Pub. 4107. 108 pp. 30¢.

Description of Soviet efforts to reduce the German people to a helpless confusion of distrust and divided purpose. Full pictorial coverage of topics with maps, cartoons, and photographs; reproductions of Communist posters.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 715.

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May 21, 1951

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U.S., U.K., and French Deputies Present Alternative Proposals for Meeting of Foreign Ministers

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JESSUP¹

In presenting the three alternatives in behalf of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, Ambassador Philip C. Jessup of the United States made the following explanation.

Our discussions here have reached an impasse. For 8 weeks the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have continued to explore every avenue which might lead to agreement on an agenda for a meeting of the four Ministers.

I believe it is unnecessary to review the arguments or to restate the present situation. I only wish to point out again that while the three delegations submitted new proposals for a complete agenda on April 2, 17, and 27, the Soviet delegate has submitted no new proposal for a complete agenda since March 5.

Since it is the desire of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France that the Foreign Ministers should meet, we have explored every possible way to end the impasse. In a further effort to reach agreement on an agenda which will permit the Foreign Ministers to meet, the three delegations now make three alternative proposals. The four Foreign Ministers could meet on the basis of any one of these proposals.

Alternative A

Since I shall confine my statement to an explanation of the three alternative proposals they will be distributed now. The first alternative proposal, which is marked "Alternative A," represents a maximum effort by the three delegations to secure agreement upon an agenda along the lines of the discussion in the last 8 weeks. Three changes have been made in the text of the draft which was proposed by the three delegations on April 27.

In the first place, the text of the new proposal changes the order of the point on the demilitarization of Germany so as to place it first among the

Alternative A

[Released to the press at Paris May 2 and at Washington May 9]

I. Examination of the causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe and of the means to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and France, including the following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany; the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the U.S.S.R., United States, United Kingdom and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces; fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.

II. Completion of the treaty for the reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

III. Problems relating to the reestablishment of German unity and the preparation of a treaty of peace.

IV. Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary: agreements of the Four Powers concerning Germany and Austria.

V. Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.

several points included by way of example in item I.

We still see no logic in the Soviet arguments in favor of having the Ministers discuss the question of German demilitarization before they discuss the general problem of armaments. However, contrary to Mr. Gromyko's statement on Monday, the three delegations have had no ulterior purpose in trying to persuade the Soviet representative of the soundness of their point of view on this question of order.

We have been guided wholly by considerations of logic and common sense and by a desire to facilitate the work of the Ministers by listing items in an orderly way. The several points listed in item I are all parts of a single item.

This item calls for an "examination of the causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe and a means to secure a real and lasting

¹ Made on May 2 at Paris and released to the press in Washington on May 9.

improvement in the relations" between the Four Powers. The proposed agenda specifies certain questions which are to be included in that examination. We think that the Soviet argument that any one of these points would be "buried" if it were listed second or even third is silly. It obviously has no relation to the realities of a discussion by the four Ministers under a single heading.

However, since the change of the order of this point in item I involves no commitment of fundamental principles, the three delegations propose to meet the Soviet view in this respect in "Alternative A."

This proposal by the three delegations may well be regarded as a test of the general Soviet position and of its delegations' willingness to cooperate with the other three delegations in arranging for a meeting of the four Ministers. The proposal on this point is advanced for the purpose of reaching full agreement and for no other reason.

No change has been made in the wording of the point dealing with armaments because the Soviet proposal prejudices the issues which the four Ministers are to consider. The effect of the Soviet proposal, as explained by Mr. Gromyko, would be to commit the four Governments in advance to take as their aim the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the Four Powers without regard to the armaments and armed forces of other countries and without sufficient regard to the necessary examination of the existing level of armaments and armed forces and of the establishment of international controls.

It is unnecessary to restate at length the reasons why the three Governments reject the Soviet wording on this matter of armaments. I merely state the fact again that the Soviet proposal is not acceptable.

The new proposal marked "Alternative A" contains a change in items IV and V. This change is the insertion of the word "fulfillment" in both items. The Soviet representative has insisted on the exact wording of the item on Trieste which the Soviet delegation proposed. The other three representatives have pointed out to Mr. Gromyko the possibility of misunderstanding if the word "fulfillment" was used in this item.

In response to the arguments of the three representatives, Mr. Gromyko has insisted that the Soviet Government has no intention of overlooking the role of the Security Council of the United Nations under the Italian peace treaty in the part concerning Trieste.

The three delegations have taken this into account. They recall also that one of the agreed points under item I reads "fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements." The three Governments, of course, have no objection to the Ministers examining the question of the fulfillment of any outstanding treaty or agreement.

Clearly, if it is appropriate that the word "fulfillment" should be included in the item on Trieste,

it should also be included in item IV which refers to "treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary: agreements of the Four Powers concerning Germany and Austria." This word accordingly has been inserted in both these paragraphs.

The Soviet proposal of an item on the North Atlantic Treaty and bases has not been included because it is completely unacceptable to the three Governments for reasons with which Mr. Gromyko is entirely familiar.

The three delegations would be entitled to expect the Soviet delegation's acceptance of this new proposal listed as "Alternative A" if it were convinced that the Soviet delegation shares in equal measure the desire of the three delegations to reach agreement upon the full text of an agenda. The three delegations hope that this will prove to be the fact and that the work of these meetings can now be concluded by Soviet agreement to the proposal contained in "Alternative A."

The various detailed proposals contained in this complete draft agenda are interdependent and readvanced in the hope of securing full agreement. If that agreement is forthcoming, we can proceed at once to consider any incidental matters and to set a date for the meeting of the four Ministers.

Alternative B

In case, however, the Soviet delegation is unwilling to accept the wording of the draft agenda proposed as "Alternative A" the three delegations propose as a second alternative the revised draft agenda marked "Alternative B."

The essential nature of this proposal is an offer of the three Governments to proceed with a meeting of the four Ministers, even though agreement is not reached on all points of the agenda. Except for the listing of two texts on the question of armaments the wording of all of the items in "Alternative B" is identical with the wording of the items in "Alternative A." However, in "Alternative B" the order of the point on German demilitarization would remain reserved for the decision of the Ministers along with the two texts dealing with the question of armaments.

For the reasons already stated, the three delegations are willing under "Alternative A" to accept the Soviet view in regard to the order of listing the point of German demilitarization.

This proposal, however, is contingent upon reaching full agreement on the agenda. If that agreement cannot be reached, this question must be reserved for decision by the Ministers. They themselves will be able to determine whether it is more advantageous to discuss German demilitarization before or after the question of armaments.

In regard to the question of armaments, there is no disagreement that this topic should be dis-

Alternative B

[Released to the press at Paris May 2 and at Washington May 9]

Examination of the causes and effects of the present international tensions in Europe and of the means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, including the following questions relating to:

U.S., U.K., and France

The existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K., and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces; the demilitarization of Germany; fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.

U.S.S.R.

The demilitarization of Germany; measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the U.K., the U.S. and France, the existing level of armaments and armed forces and the establishment of an appropriate international control. Fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.

Completion of the treaty for the reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

Problems relating to the reestablishment of German unity and the preparation of a treaty of peace.

Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary; agreements of the Four Powers concerning Germany and Austria.

Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.

ussed by the Ministers. The disagreement relates to the way in which this topic is to be described on the agenda. If no agreement is reached on "Alternative A," the two texts can be referred to the Ministers.

In regard to the other items included in "Alternative B," the three delegations have assumed that no difficulty will arise since the word "fulfillment" is included in the item on Trieste in accordance with the desire of the Soviet delegation. If the Soviet delegation agrees to the proposal in "Alternative B," the Ministers can meet on that basis and we can proceed at once to dispose of any incidental matters, including the date of the meeting.

Alternative C

To the three delegations it seems clear that only an unwillingness to have the four Ministers meet could prevent agreement here on either "Alternative A" or "Alternative B." Nevertheless, since the three delegations wish to explore every possible basis for a meeting they propose also the draft agenda marked "Alternative C."

This draft embodies a simplified, strictly factual listing of the topics which the Ministers would discuss.

For 8 weeks the three delegations have pointed out to the Soviet delegation that they were quite willing to agree upon such a simple listing of topics. Moreover, such a simple listing would be entirely in conformity with the agenda of previous meetings of the four Ministers. The 8 weeks of discussion which have taken place here have served to bring out in great detail the views of the four Governments on all of these topics.

The four Ministers, when they meet, would be fully familiar with the views which have been expressed here. They would, accordingly, be aware of the various detailed aspects of these topics which one or another Minister will desire to raise. It is perfectly clear that if the Ministers meet on the basis of such a simplified agenda, as is proposed, "Alternative C," they will be able to give full consideration to all of the matters which have been discussed here during the last 8 weeks. Certainly, there is nothing contained in "Alternative A" or for that matter in any of the proposals of the Soviet delegation which could not be considered by the Ministers under "Alternative C." Accordingly, the three delegations propose this third alternative which would have the advantage of eliminating disagreements over the formulation of particular points.

These then are the three alternative proposals which are presented by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I repeat that their three Governments wish to have a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers and are prepared to have such a meeting on the basis of any one of these three alternative proposals.

I hope that the significance and importance of these three alternative proposals will be fully understood by the Soviet delegation. We recognize that they will require thorough study. I have tried to make my explanation of the three alternative proposals as brief as possible, but we will, of course, be glad to answer any questions which Mr. Gromyko may desire to ask for the purpose of further clarification.

Alternative C

[Released to the press at Paris May 2 and at Washington May 9]

I. Examination of measures for the elimination of the present international tensions in Europe, of the threat of war, and of the fear of aggression.

II. Questions concerning armaments and armed forces.

III. Questions concerning Austria.

IV. Questions concerning Germany.

V. Fulfillment of treaties and agreements.

The Great Alliance of Free Men

by *W. Averell Harriman*

*Special Assistant to the President*¹

During the past months, our country has been engaged in a series of debates. All kinds of things have been said on all sides of every question. Some would even have us believe that we are all in a state of confusion. Some contend that we have no policies, that we are drifting aimlessly. Some are attempting to distort the true purpose of our policies. Much of what is said is irrelevant; much is even irresponsible.

Of course, in our democratic way we should debate all issues, but, at a time when our country is in grave danger, we should conduct these debates for the sole purpose of gaining a clearer understanding of the issues.

Tonight, I want to try to cut through the fog of unreality. I want to talk about the things we face, and how we are dealing with them.

Policies of Foresight

I spent a good deal of time in Russia during the war, and I had an unusual chance to learn something about the Russian people and their rulers in the Kremlin.

When I came home 5 years ago, I was gravely concerned over the dangers that were developing from the Kremlin, and I was afraid that we would not face up to them before it was too late.

Well, we have faced up to them. I think the American people have been magnificent during the past 5 years. They have supported unprecedented measures. Never in the history of our country, or in the history of any country, has a nation in peacetime taken such wise and effective steps in dealing with so many varied and complex problems.

In 1945 I had come back for a brief visit just after the death of President Roosevelt, and I vividly remember the first encouragement I got. It came from President Truman. It was the first

time I had met him. I found that he was already alive to the indication of the trouble ahead with the Soviet Union. He had carefully studied the records of President Roosevelt and his last messages to Stalin. He was already much concerned by the duplicity of the Kremlin and was determined to stand firm against the Kremlin schemes. As a result, he has been prepared to take prompt and vigorous steps in dealing with the Kremlin threat. No president has in peacetime initiated so many unprecedented and far-sighted measures and actions for our national security as has President Truman.

Wartime Relations With U.S.S.R.

In our wartime relations with the Soviet Union, we had two fundamental objectives. Of first importance was to keep Russia as an effective fighting ally. We also wanted to use this new relationship to find a way of working together for peace on a live-and-let-live basis. People in this country, and all over the world, had hopes that this could be accomplished. The British and American Governments were well aware of the difficulties in attaining this objective.

During the war, Roosevelt and Churchill made every effort to talk things out with Stalin in order to arrive at some workable understanding on the basis of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

When I was in Moscow, there were indications that the Kremlin had two approaches to their postwar policies. In the many talks that I had with Stalin, I felt that he himself was of two minds; one emphasized internal reconstruction and the other external expansion.

On the one hand, they were discussing possible understandings with us which might result in increased trade with and loans from the West for the reconstruction of the terrible devastation left in the wake of the war. This would mean soft-pedaling, for a time at least, the Communist designs for world domination—much along the lines

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations, Inc., at Los Angeles on Apr. 30 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

of the policies they had pursued between the two world wars.

On the other hand, they were treating us in many ways as potential enemies. There were indications that they would take advantage of the Red army occupation of neighboring countries to maintain control, and they were supporting Communist parties in other countries to be in a position to seize control in the postwar turmoil.

The Kremlin Choice—Aggressive Imperialism

The men of the Kremlin chose the second course.

In October of 1945, I went to see Stalin at his country place in Sochi in the Caucasus. After two long nights of arguments over the disagreements we were then having, he as much as told me in a moment of anger that he had decided to go his own way. As time went on, the imperialist plans of the men of the Kremlin became increasingly aggressive.

They broke the agreements they had entered into. If they had carried out these agreements, the world would be a different place today. They used the occupation of the Red army to set up puppet governments. They established a network of subversion all over the world, inciting disorders and insurrections and exploiting weakness wherever it exists.

The one great thing, however, accomplished by our constant efforts during and since the war to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union was that they establish our moral position before the people of the world. Had these efforts not been made, many people would still be wondering whether we and not the Kremlin were to blame for the tensions that have developed.

Alliance for Meeting Aggression

The United Nations has provided the forum through which the designs and the duplicity of the Kremlin have been made crystal clear. The United Nations has been the medium through which the free nations have been drawn together. It is the medium through which the United States has been able to give leadership. And when it came to shameless aggression against the Republic of Korea, it was the medium through which we rallied 53 nations, all of the free nations, to face together this attempt to use force for conquest. We had built better than we knew. Never before in history has there been such unanimity of world understanding and world opinion.

This was no accident. Step by step our policies had built strength and confidence among the free nations. As the Kremlin plan of action unfolded, we had helped other countries to resist and turn back aggression. We helped Greece put down Kremlin-inspired civil war. We have helped Western Europe to rebuild its economic life and suppress Communist subversion.

We took leadership in the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty. In a manner unprecedented, we have gone out to deal with the threat to our security at its source; we have not waited until it came to us. And let no man think that it would not have come to us. Western Europe would not have survived Kremlin domination if it had not been for our prompt and imaginative action. With control of Europe, the industrial capacity available to the Kremlin would have practically equaled ours. We might have faced an unmanageable situation. Instead today we are combining the potential of the North Atlantic community in the development of collective defense forces under our great General Dwight Eisenhower.

In Korea we have faced force with force. We have learned from the bitter experience of the events which led to World War II that aggression must be dealt with at the very beginning, or it will encourage further aggression. We are showing the Kremlin that the free world will not tolerate the use of force for conquest, that free men have the will and ability to resist. Our action in Korea is giving confidence to other peoples who are under pressure that they can maintain their independence. We are destroying the myth that the Chinese Red armies are invincible. We are upsetting their timetable of attack in other areas of Asia.

But it is not our aim to bring on another world war. Our aim is to limit the conflict if we possibly can and deal with it successfully within Korea. In the meantime, we are converting our tremendous economic resources into military strength and are helping our friends and allies do the same. Before long, the free world will have the military strength to meet any threat with confidence. When we are strong enough, the Kremlin will not dare undertake further aggression.

As I say, we are using every means at our command to prevent another world war. No man with any understanding of history can say that there can be victory in a general war. There can be nothing but chaos and disaster. But there can be victory—and glorious victory—in preventing another world conflict. And that is the clear aim of American policy. Every step we have taken has this objective. Let no man take us off this course.

Korea—A Case Study

I want to discuss some of the alternatives that are being put forward with respect to Korea.

Some would have us abandon Korea. This would be an invitation to further aggression, and we would soon find ourselves fighting elsewhere. Or, any idea that we can obtain a solution by buying off the Chinese Communists through appeasement and giving any reward whatsoever for aggression is unthinkable. In view of the misrepresentations and false statements that are being made about the policies of our Government, I want to

state in the most emphatic terms that President Truman will not engage in appeasement or reward aggression. He rejects any such idea and so do all his advisers. This has been said time and time again. Thirdly, there are those who would involve us in a wider war in order to end the present conflict in Korea. Yet they have not explained how, when, and at what cost this wider conflict could be brought to a successful conclusion. They are ready to have us lose our allies with all of the world-wide consequences that would result. And they are ready to risk a total war. They say this is the necessary way to solve the Korean situation.

GREECE

You remember the talk during the Greek civil war. People said that we were bogged down in Greece—there could be nothing but a stalemate. "How could the fighting be brought to a successful conclusion within Greece?" "We should either abandon Greece or carry the fight across the borders and attack the Communist bases in Yugoslavia." And yet the struggle was won on Greek soil. And don't let us overlook the fact that now Yugoslavia is joining the ranks of those who are resisting the Kremlin.

BERLIN

We heard the same sort of thing during the Berlin airlift. There were those who could see no end to it. We were told either to get out or have a showdown. In these cases, we pursued the same kind of determined and yet restrained policies that we are now pursuing. We must always remember that, although the menace of war comes from the Kremlin, hasty and ill-conceived action on our part can lead to grave consequences. I would like to recall to you the words of Winston Churchill from his recent war memoirs:

. . . Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clearcut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is . . . to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint. How many wars have been averted by patience and persisting good will! . . . How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands!²

No one can foresee the future. Our men are joined in desperate battle in Korea. They are inflicting frightful casualties, estimated at the equivalent of the better part of a Chinese division a day. They are fighting to force the Chinese Reds to abandon the aggression. They are fighting to prevent the untold horrors to us and all mankind of another world war. Let all Americans give them their support. Let us pray for their success. It is shocking that some question

the good faith of our allies who are fighting with us.

Let us think back a few years.

UNITY OF PURPOSE

In 1940, the Greeks refused to appease and faced alone invasion against overwhelming odds. The British came to their assistance with the small forces they had available in the Middle East. I was in Cairo in the spring of 1941 when the British troops returned from this honorable but unsuccessful expedition. I know the risks they took and the sacrifice they made to support their ally. Threatened as the Greek people still are, they have sent a token force to Korea. It is a token of their determination to stand with the free nations against aggression. It is a token of honor.

The Turks, under a similar threat of aggression at home, have sent a brigade which has won the respect of all.

The French have been fighting Communist aggression in Indochina for 4 years and have now 150,000 troops engaged in that conflict. Yet they have sent a small force to join us.

The British were quick to send their Pacific Fleet and then troops, although they too are engaged against the Communists in Malaya.

A total of 13 nations have sent forces according to their situation and others are preparing to join. Although the preponderance of the forces is ours, we are not fighting alone in Korea. There have been times when other nations have fought alone. I was in England during the year when the British stood alone against the full force of Nazi power. The men and women of Britain stood firm with courage and determination. They took pride in the feeling that they were fighting not only for themselves but for the freedom of other nations as well. Korea is a vital part, but only a part, of the world-wide struggle in which all free nations are engaged.

The Meaning of Interdependence

Let no man try to tell us that there are any safe or easy shortcuts. The years ahead will be difficult. To achieve our objectives we must do many things that will mean many sacrifices. Military strength alone is not enough. Neither military strength nor political stability can be attained without an expanding economy in the free world. We are all interdependent. The industrial countries need adequate food and increasing quantities of raw materials. The new nations of the East will need the know-how and economic assistance to expand production and to give promise for a decent life for their people. It is only on this basis that there can be political stability.

The resources of the free world are today vastly greater than those of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Atlantic community alone has about three-quarters of the heavy industry of the

² *The Gathering Storm*, Houghton-Mifflin Co., p. 320.

world, and over 400 million of the most inventive, skillful, and productive people. But the life of the free world cannot survive if it is dismembered limb by limb. We Americans understand this. Strong as we are, we can not survive alone. But we must use our strength to cement the unity and strength of the free nations.

We are engaged in a great enterprise—the building of a great alliance of free men for human welfare and mutual security. With the success already achieved, we can have faith that the free nations working together can build the necessary strength and stability to withstand external aggression and internal subversion alike.

Weighing the Issues

Don't let us either underrate or overrate the Soviet capabilities. Don't let us underrate their ruthlessness and determination; their skill in the techniques of subversion and in creating and exploiting weakness; their conviction that they are destined to dominate the world. They believe that free men can not stand together; that free men can not rule themselves; that free nations can not be united, but will fight among themselves.

But we should not overrate the strength of Russia on which their operations are based. They are maintaining vast military forces by imposing a terrific burden on their economy and their people. You really have to go to Russia to understand how backward it is. The people have never known what we would consider a decent life. Men and women have to work hard and long hours for very little. But their equipment and organization are so poor that the productivity of industry and agriculture is far behind that of the West. After 35 years of rule, the Kremlin has not been able to gain the loyalty of the people. Stalin himself once admitted this when he told me during the war that the people were "fighting for their motherland, not for us." By "us" he meant, of course, the Kremlin. Russia is ruled by fear. The Kremlin fears the people, and the people fear the Kremlin. Whenever we hear of purges, it is an indication of internal tension. The unhappy people of the satellites crave only to be freed from the iron hand.

As the free world grows stronger, pressures will increase behind the iron curtain. The deflection of Yugoslavia was primarily caused by the success of the Marshall Plan. Tito saw that there was nothing to hope for but exploitation from the Kremlin in his alliance with Russia. With the improvement of conditions in Western Europe, he wanted economic association with the West. As the free countries become stronger and stronger, their very strength will act as a magnet on the enslaved peo-

ples. There is a brittleness in any dictatorship, but one can never know when it will be strained to the breaking point.

American Faith in the Future

The policies which we must follow have been laid out. We must pursue them unflinchingly.

Our men are fighting in Korea tonight to do their part in preventing another world war and to preserve our freedom. We must face the future, and the long future, with the same courage, determination, and perseverance. I am convinced that we can succeed, and I believe we will succeed.

As I have said, the American people have been magnificent during the past 5 years. It is inconceivable to me that anyone can deflect us from our course. The job ahead is even more difficult. But the success we have already achieved in our endeavors gives promise for the future.

But peace in Korea will not put an end to the global danger of Soviet aggression. We must build up enough military strength—enough military strength actually in existence—to convince the Kremlin that it ought not start a world war.

—President Truman
May 9, 1951

Let us not be confused by men of little faith in America's capabilities who say that we can't afford to do the things we must to safeguard our security. Let us not be confused by those who are impatient and would lead us to take reckless steps. Let us not be confused by those who have no understanding of the strength of the great association of free nations that we are building. Let us closely examine what is being said so that we will not be misled by those who are distorting and falsifying the facts.

The wise statesmen of both our political parties have laid out the road to follow: support the United Nations and its actions in Korea; support the North Atlantic Treaty; vigorous and rapid action to rearm; aid to our friends and allies to equip adequately their military forces; work with other nations for an expanding world economy; help the new nations of the East to attain political and economic stability; and strive with all our strength to prevent another world war.

Of first importance is to attain unity of purpose at home for the world-wide struggle. We can then give effective inspiration and leadership for unity in the free world. In the great alliance of free men we are building, we can have faith that we will rid the world of tyranny, that we can maintain peace, and that freedom will prevail.

North Atlantic Council, Financial and Economic Board Adopt Terms of Reference

Text of Communiqué Issued at London, May 5, 1951

by Charles M. Spofford, Deputy U.S. Representative for NATO

[Released to the press May 8]

I.

The North Atlantic Council Deputies announce today the adoption by their Governments of new terms of reference for the North Atlantic Council, which will hereafter incorporate the Defense Committee and Defense Finance and Economic Committee and thus become sole ministerial body in organization.

The Council Deputies announce at the same time the creation of a Financial and Economic Board [FEB], located in Paris.

The North Atlantic Council, as originally established, was composed of the Foreign Ministers of the nations party to the North Atlantic Treaty. Two other ministerial committees were organized, a Defense Committee composed of Defense Ministers and a Defense Finance and Economic Committee composed of Finance Ministers. The only full-time agencies functioning during the early months of Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) were the standing group (made up of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the permanent working staffs of the Defense Finance and Economic Committee and of the Military Production and Supply Board, a subordinate organization of Defense Committee.

Experience soon demonstrated the need for a central, continuously functioning body to insure coordination between the work of the various treaty agencies and to facilitate the implementation of agreed plans. The Council in May 1950 therefore established the Council Deputies, who first met in July of that year.

II. The Canadian Proposal

Experience also demonstrated the need, particularly as emphasis shifted from planning to

the implementation of plans, for a simpler organization with clear lines of authority, for fewer committees and more full-time operating agencies. In the autumn of 1950 the Canadian Government proposed reorganization of NATO to meet this need, and in December the Council authorized the deputies to study and recommend the necessary changes. The result is the structure announced today.

III. The Reorganized Council

As before, the Council is the principal body in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and is "charged with the responsibility of considering all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the treaty." The reorganized Council, however, incorporates not only the Council envisaged by article 9 of the treaty but also the Defense Committee referred to in the same article and the Defense Finance and Economic Committee. Both latter cease to exist as separate entities. The Council will continue to be composed of persons of ministerial rank, although in exceptional circumstances member governments may be represented by other persons duly designated for the purpose. Heads of Governments may attend meetings of the Council in person. Otherwise, Governments will be represented by their Minister for Foreign Affairs and/or the Minister of Defense, or by other competent ministers, especially by those responsible for financial and economic affairs, according to the nature of the agenda.

As hitherto, the Council will meet annually in ordinary session and such other times as may be deemed desirable by the majority of the parties.

IV. Location of Sessions

Location of each session will be determined by the chairman after consultation with the other parties. For general convenience, the ordinary annual session will normally be held at about the same time and in the same geographic area as the annual session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Other ordinary sessions will normally be held at some convenient location in Europe.

V. Chairmanship

The chairmanship of the Council will continue to rotate in alphabetical order. Paul van Zeeland, Foreign Minister of Belgium, is the present chairman. In order that the Council may effectively carry out its responsibilities and exercise them continuously, each Government is represented by a council deputy. Each deputy represents all ministers concerned with NATO matters in his Government and is responsible to such minister or ministers as his Government may determine. The Council Deputies, located in London, constitute the permanent working organization of the North Atlantic Council.

VI. The Council Deputies

When the Council is not in session, the Deputies carry out its policies, recommend to Governments the measures necessary to this end, formulate issues requiring decisions by the Council or by member governments and otherwise constitute a body which may register the approval of their Governments on matters before them for consideration.

The deputies will also be responsible for coordinating the activities of and giving guidance to all other permanent organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, exchange views on political matters of common interest within the scope of the treaty, promote and coordinate public information activities in furtherance of its objectives.

The chairman of the Council Deputies in addition to presiding at their meetings, is responsible for directing the permanent working staff of the organization.

VII. Military Structure

With the exception of the incorporation of the former defense committee into the Council, the military structure remains unchanged. The Council Deputies will deal directly with the military committee, and, when that body is not in session, with the standing group on political matters having military implications. It will provide those bodies with political guidance upon which strategic decisions should be based. The standing group will maintain close liaison with the Coun-

cil Deputies and provide that body with advice on military matters.

VIII. Defense Production Board

The Defense Production Board, which was established last December and has its headquarters in London, replaced the military Production and Supply Board and the subsidiary agencies of that committee. It has as its general objectives the achievement of the maximum production of military equipment in the most efficient manner, at the least cost, and in the shortest time to meet the military material requirements of NATO. These objectives will be sought by coordinating national production programmes so that they will together fulfill NATO-wide production objectives. The Board is directed to concentrate its activities on those aspects of military production and procurement which involve major problems of international cooperation among the NAT members. A unified international staff has been organized to serve the Board under a coordinator of North Atlantic Defense Production, who is ex officio a member of the DED.

IX. Creation of the FEB

The creation of the Financial and Economic Board (FEB) is another step toward simplifying and making more effective the executive organization of NATO. In this respect it follows the precedent established in the setting up of the Defense Production Board.

According to its terms of reference, the new FEB:

shall be responsible for considering and making recommendation upon financial and economic problems arising in connection with NATO defense programs and upon the best use of financial and economic resources in member countries in support of the common defense effort. It shall advise the other NATO bodies under the Council Deputies on all relevant economic and financial questions arising out of their work.

The FEB will ordinarily address its recommendations to the Council Deputies, but in specified cases these may be sent direct to member governments.

The FEB will succeed to the functions and responsibilities previously belonging to the permanent working staff of the Defense Financial and Economic Committee, the advisory group on raw material problems, and the economic and financial working group, which was set up some months ago in Paris. Among its other tasks, it has been assigned the duty of reporting to the Council Deputies on the financial and economic aspects of progress of defense programs in member countries. It will also:

maintain close contact with the work of other international organizations dealing with financial and economic problems and in particular with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), having in view the need to avoid duplication of effort.

The FEB will be based in Paris so that it will be able to draw on the experience and skills of the OEEC. It is expected that governments will be represented on FEB by senior members of their delegations to OEEC so that close coordination of activities of these two bodies will be assured.

U.S.-Iceland Sign Defense Agreement

[Released to the press May 7]

An agreement concerning the defense of Iceland was made public today. The agreement was signed by Bjarni Benediktsson, Foreign Minister of Iceland, and by Edward B. Lawson, United States Minister to Iceland, on May 5, 1951.

The agreement concerns the use of facilities in Iceland in the collective efforts of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to preserve peace and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area. Iceland agrees to provide such facilities as are mutually found necessary, and the United States will make defense arrangements under conditions set forth.

The United States-Iceland agreement grew out of a request of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that the United States and Iceland make arrangements under which armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty countries may make use of facilities in Iceland in the common defense of the Treaty area, and an agreement has now been concluded in Reykjavik between the two Governments.

At the request of the Icelandic Government and in accordance with agreed defense plans of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a contingent of United States security forces is in Iceland. This contingent is stationed there in accordance with the terms of the agreement. This defense step is being carried out under the direction of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

[Released to the press May 7]

Defense Agreement Pursuant to North Atlantic Treaty Between United States and Republic of Iceland

Preamble

Having regard to the fact that the people of Iceland cannot themselves adequately secure their own defenses and whereas experience has shown that a country's lack of defenses greatly endangers its security and that of its peaceful neighbors, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has requested, because of the unsettled state of world affairs, that the United States and Iceland in view of the collective efforts of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to preserve peace and security in the North

Atlantic Treaty area, make arrangements for the use of facilities in Iceland in defense of Iceland and thus also the North Atlantic Treaty area. In conformity with this proposal the following agreement has been entered into:

Article I

The United States on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in accordance with its responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty will make arrangements regarding the defense of Iceland subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement. For this purpose and in view of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area Iceland will provide such facilities in Iceland as are mutually agreed to be necessary.

Article II

Iceland will make all acquisitions of land and other arrangements required to permit entry upon and use of facilities in accordance with this Agreement, and the United States shall not be obliged to compensate Iceland or any national of Iceland or other person for such entry or use.

Article III

The national composition of forces, and the conditions under which they may enter upon and make use of facilities in Iceland pursuant to this Agreement, shall be determined in agreement with Iceland.

Article IV

The number of personnel to be stationed in Iceland pursuant to this Agreement shall be subject to the approval of the Icelandic Government.

Article V

The United States in carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement shall do so in a manner that contributes to the maximum safety of the Icelandic people, keeping always in mind that Iceland has a sparse population and has been unarmed for centuries. Nothing in this Agreement shall be so construed as to impair the ultimate authority of Iceland with regard to Icelandic affairs.

Article VI

The Agreement of October 7, 1946, between the United States and Iceland for interim use of Keflavik Airport shall terminate upon the coming into force of this Agreement whereupon Iceland will assume direction of and responsibility for civil aviation operations at Keflavik Airport. The United States and Iceland will negotiate appropriate arrangements concerning the organization of the Airport to coordinate the operation thereof with the defense of Iceland.

Article VII

Either Government may at any time, on notification to the other Government, request the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to review the continued necessity for the facilities and their utilization, and to make recommendations to the two Governments concerning the continuation of this Agreement. If no understanding between the two Governments is reached as a result of such request for review within a period of six months from the date of the original request, either Government may at any time thereafter give notice of its intention to terminate the Agreement, and the Agreement shall then cease to be in force twelve months from the date of such notice. Whenever the contingency provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty shall occur, the facilities which will be afforded in accordance with this Agreement shall be available for the same use. While such facilities are not being used for military purposes, necessary maintenance work will be performed by Iceland or Iceland will authorize its performance by the United States.

After signature by the appropriate authorities of the United States and Iceland, this Agreement, of which the English and Icelandic texts are equally authentic, shall come into force on the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a notification from the Government of Iceland of its ratification of the Agreement.

Done at Reykjavik, the 5th day of May 1951

EDWARD B. LAWSON
BJARNI BENEDIKTSSON

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[Released to the press May 7]

The outbreak of war in 1939 made Iceland's geographical position on the North Atlantic sea and air routes between Europe and North America one of prime strategic importance. United States recognition of this importance was manifested by the signing of a defense agreement by Iceland and the United States on July 1, 1941, which provided that American troops would be stationed in and take over the defense of Iceland from the British who had undertaken the protection of the country after the Nazi invasion of Norway.

The period during which American forces were in Iceland—from July 1941 to April 1947—was one marked by most friendly relations between the two countries.¹ The American forces departed from Iceland in accordance with an agreement dated October 7, 1946, which also set forth the conditions under which the United States-built Keflavik Airport, the leading military airfield in Iceland, would be turned over to Iceland. However, the United States received the right to operate the airport for use in connection with the support of its control agencies in Germany. The United States Government designated an American civil aviation company to administer the operations of the airport, and this company, utilizing both American and Icelandic personnel, operated Keflavik as an international civil airport. It had been used extensively by United States and foreign commercial carriers since 1947.

The agreement of 1946 was to remain in effect for the period of United States maintenance of control agencies in Germany subject to review at the request of either Government at any time after 5 years; if no agreement was reached within 6 months after such a review, the Keflavik agreement could be denounced to terminate 1 year later. Under this provision it would have been possible for either party to terminate the agreement by April 1953. The agreement of May 5, 1951, terminates the Keflavik agreement, and places the responsibility for the civil aspects of operations at Keflavik under Iceland.

The agreement of May 5 is an outgrowth of Iceland's becoming a member of the North Atlan-

tic pact, and the agreement falls within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Icelanders, in signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, expressed their confidence that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization offered them the best available assurance of security. Recently, the Icelandic Government decided to request that troops be stationed in their country, which would increase the security of Iceland and the North Atlantic Treaty area. (The Icelanders themselves have no armed forces and never have had since the establishment of their nation over a thousand years ago.) Consequently, the United States and Iceland, acting in accordance with NATO recommendations, concluded the agreement of May 5 in which Iceland makes available certain facilities for the use of United States troops for defense purposes.

U.S.-Canada Agree on U.S. Leased Bases in Newfoundland

[Released to the press on May 1]

It was announced today at Washington and Ottawa that the United States and Canada had reached agreement in principle on certain changes in the agreement of March 1941, regarding the United States leased naval and air bases in Newfoundland. Discussions were carried on in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, and the joint recommendations of the Board have now been approved by the two Governments.

The United States, in the agreement of March 1941, leased from the United Kingdom for 99 years naval and air bases located in Newfoundland and in the Caribbean area. The United States has been operating four bases in Newfoundland: Pepperrell Air Force Base near St. John's, Harmon Air Force Base near Stephenville, McAndrew Air Force Base at Argentia, and the Naval Operating Base at Argentia.

Newfoundland was incorporated into Canada and became its tenth province on April 1, 1949, at which time the Canadian Government became a party to the 1941 agreement. Shortly before this time, the Canadian Government requested the United States to negotiate changes in those parts of the agreement regarding customs and excise taxes, income tax arrangements, military postal facilities, and jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases.

The Prime Minister of Canada announced today that it would be necessary to make certain changes in Canadian domestic legislation to implement the recommendations of the Board. It is anticipated that after Canada has made the necessary legal changes, there will be an exchange of notes be-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1941, p. 15.

tween the two Governments constituting a formal agreement.

The proposed arrangements are satisfactory to both Governments and provide an equitable and practicable solution to the points at issue. The settlement of this problem provides a further indication of the ability of the two countries to arrive at mutually satisfactory arrangements for their common benefit.

It is expected that the text of the recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense will be made public in the Canadian Prime Minister's statement to Parliament.

U.S. and Denmark Sign Agreement for Defense of Greenland

[Released to the press April 27]

An agreement concerning the defense of Greenland was signed today at Copenhagen by the United States and Denmark. The agreement was signed on behalf of the United States by Ambassador Eugenie Anderson. The agreement providing for the use of facilities in Greenland in the common defense comes into force upon notification to the United States that the Danish Parliament has given approval to its terms.

The United States-Danish agreement grew out of a request by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that arrangements be negotiated under which facilities in Greenland might be made use of by the armed forces of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the common defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

It is expected that the full text of the agreement will be made public when presented to the Danish Parliament.

Francis Adams Truslow Appointed to U.S.-Brazil Joint Commission for Economic Development

[Released to the press May 2]

The President announced today the appointment of Francis Adams Truslow to be United States Commissioner on the United States-Brazil Joint Commission for Economic Development with the personal rank of Minister.

The Joint Commission was established by a formal exchange of notes between the Governments of Brazil and the United States and was announced at the same time, December 21, 1950, that the conclusion of a general agreement for technical

cooperation under the Point 4 Program was made public.

Mr. Truslow recently resigned as president of the New York Curb Exchange to accept a position with the Department as consultant on Brazilian Economic Relations to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

The Joint Commission, to be located in Rio de Janeiro, will be directed by two commissioners, one American and the other Brazilian.

The Joint Commission will study the development needs of Brazil and will make recommendations for development and improvement in specific fields. The Commission will recommend what technical assistance is needed on specific projects and will advise on opportunities for utilizing foreign and domestic technical knowledge and skills. It will also seek ways of encouraging private investments in furthering Brazil's economic development.

During World War II, Mr. Truslow, a member of the New York Bar, was president of the Rubber Development Corporation and spent considerable time in Brazil and the Amazon region.

U.S. Delegation to Nicaraguan Inaugural Ceremonies

On April 25, the Department of State announced that the President has approved the following delegation to represent the United States at ceremonies marking the inauguration of Gen. Anastasio Somoza as President of the Republic of Nicaragua on May 1:

Capus M. Waynick, Personal Representative of the President and Special Ambassador, *Head of Delegation*; U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua

Fletcher Warren, Special Ambassador; Director of the Office of South American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Other Members of the Delegation

Carl Hinshaw, U.S. Representative, California
Thurman Chatham, U.S. Representative, North Carolina
Lt. Gen. William H. H. Morris, Jr., USA, Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command

Rev. Joseph Francis Thorning, Washington, D.C., Associate Editor of *World Affairs*

Philip P. Williams, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua

Col. Samuel P. Walker, Jr., Military Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua

Capt. Alvord John Greenacre, Naval Attaché and Naval Attaché for Air, U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua

Lt. Col. Wendell L. Bevan, Jr., Assistant Air Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua

Overton G. Ellis, Jr., Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua

John L. Topping, Second Secretary, U. S. Embassy in Nicaragua

Soviet Obstruction to Western German Government

*Statement by Henry A. Byroadê
Director, Bureau of German Affairs¹*

I want to talk to you about one of the major problems our Government faces today.

After continuous effort over a period of years to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. on Germany, our Government—in conjunction with the French and British—concluded reluctantly in 1949 that progress could no longer be delayed because of Soviet obstruction. We, therefore, gave authority to the Western Germans to establish a democratic form of government in Western Germany.

Attempts at obstruction by the Soviet Union followed, including the blockade on the City of Berlin. You all know the gallant story of the airlift to Berlin. Thwarted in this, the Soviets requested a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in a final effort to block the formation of the West German Government. We met with them in good faith, but Molotov soon made it very clear that there could be no agreement on Germany except one which would place all Germany at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

I give you this history because of its similarity to what is happening today.

The tactics, military preparations, and hostile propaganda of the Soviet Union—resulting in open aggression by forces in their orbit last June—have reluctantly caused free nations to look to their own defense. In the Atlantic area, the 12 nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization made a far-reaching decision to establish a common force and further agreed that Western Germany, should she so elect, would have the right and opportunity to join and so participate in her own defense. This was many, many months after Soviet representatives had established military forces—so-called police forces—in East Germany.

The Soviet Union has attacked this defensive plan, now with veiled threats, now with mocking "peace offensives." They also asked for a Big Four meeting to discuss German demilitarization.

We have no desire to avoid such a meeting, since one must always cling to the hope that a basic agreement can be possible. But this time we wanted the assurance of an agenda, not simply weeks of futile discussions by the Foreign Ministers on procedures and on what to talk about.

For this purpose, the deputies of the Foreign Ministers have now been in session in Paris more than 8 weeks.

I want to cut through confused interplay of agenda wording and tell you why what is going

on at Paris is much more important to us than a play on words.

Gromyko, the Soviet representative, has maintained that the question of Western German participation in her own defense is the principal cause of tension in Europe. This is clearly nonsense since the question of German participation in defense would not arise except for the aggressive Soviet behavior, coupled with their large military forces, in Eastern Germany and the satellites. To accept their contention would lead to the conclusion that the acts and policies of the West were the primary cause of tensions in Europe.

The Western deputies have also indicated that existing level of armaments and armed forces and means for international control of armaments should be a subject for Four Power consideration. When we and our Western Allies disarmed upon the end of the last war, Russia maintained—in some instances even increased—her military strength. It is the threat of these Red armies—partly outside Russian borders and far in excess of the needs of any state for its own self-protection—that is the real cause of tension in Europe today. In the face of this situation, the Soviet representative desires agenda wording which would commit us to a policy of reduction in armed strength of the Four Powers—and this prior to any consideration of the present unbalance and prior to any agreement on a form of international inspection and control. This is an old and familiar Soviet proposition. It, too, forms no basis for honest discussions.

These are some of the differences at Paris. Soviet propaganda, Soviet double talk, Soviet insistence that white is black and black is white, denies what you and I know to be true. It would seem that the original goal of the Soviet representatives—that is to prevent Western Germany from accepting a defense role with the West—has now been broadened into an attack upon the whole defensive effort of the West. It is important that we all understand what is behind their efforts to confuse and control.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents.

Confuse and Control: Soviet Techniques in Germany. European and British Commonwealth Series 17. Pub. 4107. 108 pp. 30¢.

Description of Soviet efforts to reduce the German people to a helpless confusion of distrust and divided purpose. Full pictorial coverage of topics with maps, cartoons, and photographs; reproductions of Communist posters.

Preparation for Tomorrow: A German Boy's Year in America. European and British Commonwealth Series 20. Pub. 4138. 54 pp. 25¢.

The story of a 17-year-old German boy's year in America under the Department's exchange program for German boys and girls of secondary school age. Illustrated.

¹ Made over the NBC television on Apr. 29 and released to the press on the same date.

Results of Torquay Tariff Conference Under GATT

The results of the recent 34-country Tariff Conference at Torquay, England, which ended on April 21 after sessions lasting almost 7 months, constitute a very substantial advance in the field of international trade relations and the relaxation of unnecessary restrictions on world commerce.¹

At Torquay the United States exchanged significant and mutually advantageous tariff concessions with 17 countries, five of which were new countries negotiating for the purpose of becoming contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and 12 of which were already contracting parties. Moreover, the Conference agreed to the extension, until January 1, 1954, of the validity of the concessions which had been exchanged at the two previous conferences at Geneva in 1947, and at Annecy, France, in 1949. This extension gives stability to the pattern of trade-barrier relaxation which is the basis of the General Agreement and which is fundamental to the economic foreign policy of the United States.

In addition to advantages gained through direct negotiation with other countries, the United States will benefit in a great many cases from concessions which other countries negotiated with each other and which will apply, under the provisions of the General Agreement, to the trade of the United States.

Participation of the Federal Republic of Germany was an important aspect of the Conference. A wide range of concessions was negotiated between the United States and the Federal Republic. Substantial concessions were agreed to in the negotiations between the United States and Canada, France, Peru, and other countries, including both contracting parties and countries negotiating for accession.

The United States was not able to find a basis for expanding the existing range of concessions in the General Agreement with regard to Australia, Cuba, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom. This situation does not affect the continued participation of these countries as parties to the General Agreement nor the maintenance of the concessions which they negotiated at Geneva and Annecy. Neither does it preclude further negotiations with them at some future time when conditions are more favorable.

Legal Instruments Make Results Effective

On April 21, all but four of the participating Governments signed, at Torquay, the final act which authenticates the texts of other legal documents embodying the results of the Conference. These documents include:

1. The Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which, with the schedules of concessions annexed to it, sets forth the results of the negotiations and the terms on which new contracting parties may accede to the agreement. The United States signed the Protocol at Torquay on April 21, and the document will be open for signature by other countries until October 20, 1951.

2. A separate Decision with regard to each new country applying for accession to the agreement. Such a Decision is, in effect, a vote in favor of admitting the country concerned. June 20 is the last date for signing the Decisions. The United States signed Decisions with respect to each country negotiating to accede, at Torquay on April 21. Under the provisions of the General Agreement a majority of two-thirds of the present contracting parties is required for admission of a new contracting party.

3. The Declaration which, together with the relevant provisions of the Protocol, provides for extension, until January 1, 1954, of the concessions exchanged at Geneva and Annecy. A provision in the Protocol itself so amends the text of article XXVIII of the General Agreement as to effect the extension of the life of the Geneva and Annecy concessions. The amendment will go into effect when two-thirds of the contracting parties have signed the Protocol.

Concessions negotiated at Torquay will be put into effect by the Governments negotiating them, at various dates in 1951, depending upon the dates on which the participating Governments sign the Torquay Protocol and other necessary legal instruments. The Provisions of the Protocol govern these effective dates. The United States Government signed the Protocol and all other Torquay documents on April 21. The earliest date at which any United States concessions can be put into effect is June 6, 1951. The United States and all other contracting parties are free to withhold concessions initially negotiated at Torquay with a given country, until 30 days after that country has signed the Torquay Protocol.

U.S. Receives Concessions

At Torquay, the United States received new foreign concessions in the form of tariff reductions or the binding of existing customs treatment, on a very wide range of American agricultural and

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 701.

industrial export products. In 1949, the countries which granted concessions to the United States at Torquay, imported from this country more than a billion dollars' worth of the products to which the concessions apply.

U.S. Grants Concessions

In exchange, the United States granted tariff reductions or bindings of existing customs treatment on several hundreds of items imported into this country, principally from the countries participating in the General Agreement. United States imports in 1949 of products on which the United States granted concessions at Torquay were valued at about 500 million dollars.

The apparent wide disparity between the 1949 value of trade on which the United States obtained concessions and the 1949 value of trade on which the United States granted concessions, is due in large part to the highly abnormal pattern of trade in that year. In 1949 United States exports were much greater than could be expected under ordinary conditions, especially exports of such commodities as foodstuffs, materials, and equipment urgently needed by other countries in their postwar efforts toward economic recovery. European countries, moreover, had not, in 1949, reached their present capacity to produce goods for export to the United States. It is not likely that the striking imbalance of trade coverage between concessions obtained and granted will continue to be so large as is indicated by the 1949 figures.

Many Commodities Covered

The list of products on which the United States obtained foreign concessions includes most of the important American products which seek markets abroad. The list includes wheat and wheat flour; corn; cotton; lard and other meat products; dried, canned, and fresh fruit; many chemical and related products; machinery of practically all kinds; textile specialties; all types of electrical equipment and apparatus; agricultural implements; and office machinery and equipment.

Among the products on which the United States granted concessions are lead and zinc, Canadian-type whiskey, cigarette leaf tobacco, aluminum, long-staple cotton, precious and semiprecious stones, certain laces and embroideries, flour bulbs, sugar (except from Cuba and the Philippine Islands), cheese, and bonito and certain other fish, not including frozen fish fillets. In over-all figures, duty reductions made by the United States at Torquay apply to 15.5 percent, by value, of all dutiable imports into this country in 1949; duties were bound on an additional 1 percent of dutiable imports; and duty-free status was bound on about 1 percent of duty-free imports. In all cases, concessions were granted on products which can be imported into this country to the advantage of the national economy.

It is not possible, at this stage, to make an estimate of the amount of United States trade which will benefit, indirectly, from the concessions negotiated by other countries among themselves, which will apply to United States products, but the advantages will undoubtedly be very great.

The list of commodities on which the United States would consider granting concessions in the negotiations, as published before the public hearings preceding the Torquay negotiations, contained approximately 2,800 items. Concessions actually made at Torquay apply to about 1,325 items.

In order to provide for the public the maximum of information with regard to the Torquay Conference, there has been prepared a comprehensive analysis of the results, containing full details of all concessions obtained and granted by the United States. For convenience, a summary of that analysis is attached to this release.² The analysis itself is available by purchase from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at the price of \$1.00.

World Trade Week, 1951³

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS trade among the free nations of the world raises the standards of living of the peoples of such nations and fosters friendly relations among them; and

WHEREAS international trade makes it possible for us and our allies to obtain supplies and materials necessary for the mobilization of a common defense against aggression; and

WHEREAS it is particularly fitting in this time of international tension that the ideals and effectiveness of free enterprise should be reasserted:


NOW, THEREFORE, I Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 20, 1951, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Government and of the several States, Territories, possessions, and municipalities of the United States to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighth day of May in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-fifth.

[SEAL]



By the President:

DEAN ACHESON,

Secretary of State.

² Not here printed. For text of summary, see Department of State press release 365 of May 7, 1951.

³ Proc. 2927, 16 Fed. Reg. 4367.

Problem of Fair Distribution of Commodities

by Willard L. Thorp

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

There are a number of things that have brought about the present situation, and, by the present situation, I am thinking about shortages of raw materials and the tremendous rise in prices of raw materials. The first thing has been just the behavior of the economies themselves, quite apart from any new programs of any kind.

For the last quarter of 1950 in the United States, our industrial production was 22 percent above the level of the previous year, 1949. It had gone up quarter by quarter through 1950, and that is a tremendous increase. The total industrial production of the United States was running at the end of 1950, the last quarter, 22 percent above the level of the year 1949. In Western Europe, it was 23 percent above the level in 1949.

This step-up in industrial production not only has required much more raw materials but there is a thing called the pipeline, a series of various steps from raw material to consumer, and what happens is that you not only have to bring a given increased amount out at the end but there is a tendency for inventories, at each point along the pipeline, to have to be increased so that the total impact is an exaggerated one.

It has always been true, as those who have studied business cycles can tell you, that the swings in an economy are less at the consumer's point and most at the raw materials point, both pricewise and productionwise. This is a normal phenomenon. Swings become exaggerated as you get away from the consumer.

Now, on top of this increased demand was the fact that a good many people began to anticipate that there might be shortages and, of course, there is nothing that creates a shortage as definitely as the expectancy that there will be a shortage. You remember we had a run on sugar,* here in the United States, when there was no shortage, but

only rumors of one. In the department stores a little while ago, there was a period in which in some items the sales were just tremendous, obviously a kind of stockpiling, if you will, on the part of consumers. This is a natural phenomenon, it is not against the law, and everybody proceeds to do it. Individuals, businessmen, and speculators—I mean by that, people who just buy because they think the price is going up—and finally governments, all have moved in in anticipation of shortages, to purchase these raw materials.

I must say that the Government purchases for stockpiling are something on which information is not given out, but I can say that they usually are greatly exaggerated in the various markets as against what actually has happened.

Well, all this together, plus the fact that clearly there will be added demands for particular materials when the production of military items gets rolling, all this means that in some items there are and will be shortages. Iron, steel, copper, and zinc and a whole series of things will be needed in military production. To the extent to which we meet the future as we hope to do by greater total production, both military and civilian, the pressure on raw materials will be that much greater.

Now, a lot of things have been done to ease this situation and mostly done by the United States.

In the first place, in a great many items, we have issued orders which forbid production or the use of materials for certain types of products. We just have wiped them out because they were luxurious uses of particular products.

In the second place, many industries have been told on what reduced basis they can have these raw materials, looking ahead quarter by quarter. The automobile people can only have so much steel, less by a considerable percentage than they had last year. This is typical of a whole series of steps that have been taken, because you have a situation in which the demand seems to outrun the supply. There are only two things you can do. You can either cut back on the demand or

¹ Excerpts from an informal speech made before a National Conference held at the Department of State on May 2 and released to the press on May 3.

you can increase the supply. We have been cutting back on the demand on a selective basis, and will continue to do so as may be necessary, because if we don't, then we will have obviously a wasteful situation in which a precious material is being used in far less important uses.

We have also done a good deal with respect to increasing supply. That, of course, is a matter in which it is easy to act in some cases and difficult to do in others. In the case of rubber, we have taken all the synthetic rubber plants out of mothballs, and they are getting under operation, so that that will greatly ease that particular situation.

This Government is financing the opening of new sulphur deposits in other countries, manganese deposits in other countries, tungsten deposits in other countries, in fact, very actively looking toward the expansion of the supply. But, even after you have done what you can on cutting back the demand and what you can on increasing the supply, there still is a problem of fair distribution among countries, because, after all, the United States can outbid anybody else in most markets. Therefore, we have a basic problem of fair distribution where there are shortages.

In the case of the two commodities, which are particularly important at the present time, in which the United States has very substantial control, sulphur and cotton, we have set up export controls for allocation as among countries so that as far as the American supply going abroad is concerned, it will be fairly distributed and each foreign country will get its share, based upon what it has customarily taken, with consideration of any special circumstances. But even beyond that, starting last fall, we organized, here in Washington, a new organization which has had very little publicity, and doesn't need it particularly, known as the International Materials Conference.

It has a central committee in which there are 8 countries plus the Organization of American States and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 10 members as a central committee which sets up international committees on particular commodities. To do this, it gets out the statistics, and it invites the half dozen countries that are the chief producers and the half dozen countries that are the chief consumers. It calls them together and says, "Now, you are the most important countries producing and consuming this commodity. We would like to put on you as a group the responsibility for considering what can be done to increase production and to make more effective and fairer distribution of this particular commodity."

Those committees are meeting busily here in Washington, and I expect that some of them very shortly will begin to make recommendations to their Governments as to steps that can be taken. So here is an organized international approach to the problem of sharing goods with other countries.

One can argue purely selfishly that we have to get things from other countries like copper and lead and zinc and petroleum, and, to the extent to which we want to get them from other countries, we obviously have to be prepared to export to them. But beyond that, there is the point that these various friendly countries must maintain their civilian economies, and much of that depends upon exports which they get from the United States.

Interestingly enough, I anticipate that our problems in the next year, as far as the State Department and its work in the field of economic relations is concerned, will be more important in terms of whether or not foreign countries get from the United States commodities which they are perfectly prepared to pay for, but which are difficult to get, rather than the problem of the dollar shortages which they may face, although both of them will be problems that will be active and difficult.

U.S.-Chile Discuss Copper Situation

[Released to the press May 7]

The United States and Chilean Governments have concluded a series of talks, held at the request of the President of Chile, on outstanding problems with respect to copper. Agreement was reached which should result in a substantial increase in Chilean copper production, greater supplies of copper from Chile for the United States, denial of Chilean copper to unfriendly countries, and a higher price to Chile for her copper. No purchase commitments are, however, involved.

It was agreed that production of copper in Chile should be expanded. In the case of the American companies, this is to be done without United States financial assistance but with priority assistance for equipment to the fullest extent that the emergency permits. The companies concerned are negotiating with the Chilean Government concerning the actual means of expansion and with respect to a satisfactory proposal for a new tax and exchange law. These meetings between the companies and the Chilean officials are being carried out in a cooperative atmosphere and are calculated to bring out a substantial increase in the production of copper, the bulk of which will be available for United States defense needs. The United States also agreed to consider an aid program for expansion of production at small mines if such expansion proves feasible.

The Chileans agreed to cease abnormal trade in semiprocessed copper and taking cognizance of the need of maximum shipments of copper to the United States agreed that no more than 20 percent of the production of the American companies will be reserved for Chile's own use and for export

to other countries. Chile will take steps to limit such exports to essential requirements of friendly countries and will take the necessary measures to insure that such copper will not be reexported, and she will make no sales to countries of the Soviet bloc.

In recognition of the fact that the price of Chile's copper has not kept pace with the rise in most of the commodities Chile imports, to induce increased production of copper, and in further recognition of Chile's needs for additional dollars in order to maintain its economic stability and support its own effort for participation in hemispheric defense, the United States Government has stated that it considered reasonable an increase of 3¢ per pound in the price of Chilean copper sold in the United States. It is understood that prices to third countries will not be lower than the price to the United States.

Representatives of the Chilean Government included the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador to the United States and the officials of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company and Kennecott Copper Corporation, which control the largest copper mines in Chile, were given an opportunity to present their views. The United States Government was represented by officials of the Department of State, Defense Production Administration, and the Economic Stabilization Agency.

VOA Adds New Programs to World-Wide Broadcasting Service

[Released to the press May 7]

The Voice of America will step up its world-wide broadcasting service next Sunday (May 13) with the inauguration of daily programs in Hindi, Urdu, Thai, and Albanian, and with increases in present Finnish and English transmissions.

The new programs will increase the Voice of America broadcast output to approximately 45 program hours daily in 37 languages and dialects.

The 30-minute Hindi program to India (6:30 p.m., Indian time) and the 30-minute Urdu program to Pakistan (6 p.m., Pakistan time) will be relayed by Tangier and Radio Colombo, in Ceylon. The 30-minute Thai broadcast to Thailand (7 p.m., Thai time) will be relayed by Manila and Honolulu. The 15-minute Albanian program (6:15 p.m., Albanian time) will be relayed by Tangier, Munich, Salonika, and BBC.

The new Finnish program (6:30 p.m., Finnish time) will be relayed by Tangier and BBC and will increase the daily Finnish language output to 30 minutes.

The additions to the Voice of America English service will consist of two 30-minute programs,

one to the Far East (8:30 p.m., China Coast time) with relays by Manila and Honolulu, and the other to South Asia (9 p.m., Indian time) with relays by Tangier and Radio Colombo.

Opportunities for Graduate Study Research and Teaching Abroad

[Released to the press May 5]

Opportunities for more than 1,200 Americans to undertake graduate study, teaching, or research abroad during the 1952-53 academic year under the terms of the Fulbright Act were announced today by the Department of State. A comparable number of opportunities will be available for foreign nationals to come to the United States for similar purposes.

The countries in which these opportunities will be available are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Iran, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

All applications must be submitted by October 15, 1951. Persons wishing to apply should send their inquiries to the following agencies for:

Graduate study

Students now enrolled in American colleges and universities should apply to the Fulbright Program advisers on their campuses.

Others should apply directly to: Institute of International Education, 2 West 45th Street, New York 19, N.Y.

University teaching, or advanced research

Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington 25, D.C.

Teaching in American secondary schools abroad

American Schools Service, American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., Washington 6, D.C.

Teaching in national secondary schools abroad

Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington 25, D.C.

These awards are made under Public Law 584, 79th Congress, the Fulbright Act, which authorizes the Department of State to use certain foreign currencies and credits acquired through the sale of surplus property abroad for programs of educational exchange with other nations.

Grants are normally made for one academic year and are renewable only in exceptional cases. Grants to Americans usually include round-trip transportation, tuition or a stipend, a living allowance and a small amount for necessary books and equipment. Grants to foreign nationals include round-trip transportation only, and their expenses in the United States must be met from other sources.

Polish Charges of Discriminatory Inspections of Her Vessels Entering Port of New York Called Unfounded

[Released to the press May 11]

The American Embassy at Warsaw today delivered the following note to the Polish Foreign Office in reply to the Polish Government's note of April 18, 1951, concerning the withdrawal of the Polish Motor Ship Batory from the New York service.

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Ministry's note of April 18, 1951,¹ concerning discontinuance of service to New York by the Motor Ship *Batory* has the honor, pursuant to instructions of the United States Government, to make the following reply:

The United States Government notes this formal communication of the Polish Government on a maritime problem contains many passages that can only have the purpose of propaganda. The United States Government, therefore, refuses to take seriously, or address itself to, various propaganda assertions and insinuations about the alleged "anti-peace policy of the United States" or its actions "hostile to peaceful international cooperation." The specious character of such charges is generally apparent as is also the implication that Poland belongs to a block of countries which alone are striving for peace.

It is essential, however, to deal with certain statements in the Polish note involving points of international law. In both its notes of March 19 and April 18, 1951,¹ the Polish Government has intermingled and confused measures of the Federal Government of the United States and a local action in which the Federal Government played no part. The Polish Government has taken the position that the decision of the municipality of New York as announced on March 9 by Edward F. Cavanaugh, Jr., Commissioner of Marine and Aviation, denying further use of municipally owned piers to the Motor Ship *Batory* belongs to the same group of measures as inspections of that ship which Immigration, Customs, and Coast Guard officers of the Federal Government have been accustomed to make.

The Polish note further confuses the issue by referring to these measures of inspection conducted by the Federal Government as actions by the Port Authorities in New York. The Embassy's note of April 2, 1951,¹ clearly distinguished between such steps of the Federal Government and the recent decision of the New York municipality concerning leasing its piers and insists that this distinction must be kept in mind as a basis for any factual consideration of the problem.

In the treatment of these two separate matters it is desired to deal first with the charge that the inspections of the Federal Government constitute discrimination against the Polish flag and are in violation of the principles of international law.

These precautionary measures do not violate the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Poland signed at Washington on June 15, 1931, since there are no provisions in the Treaty that prohibit such inspections. In the absence of a governing treaty provision, there is no known principle in international law to prevent a government from taking necessary and reasonable precautions (such as inspections complained about) in its own territory for the protection of its citizens and its security.

This is especially true during times of national emergency. Long-term treaties governing peacetime intercourse between nations have been considered as being implicitly subject to security reservations. More recent treaties, out of an abundance of precaution, do contain security reservations. As an indication of the views of nations concerning precautionary safety measures for the preservation of human life, at the time of the 1948 Conference on the subject of Safety of Life at Sea, it was decided that inspection officers of any Government had the right to verify that the vessel carried a valid certificate and, if necessary, that conditions of the ship's seaworthiness corresponded substantially with detailed provisions of the Convention governing the building and equipment of seagoing vessels and their lifeboats.

Since inspections are not prohibited by treaties

¹ Not printed.

and are not at variance with International law, officers of the Federal Government will inspect any ship, foreign or domestic, when similar circumstances exist to make desirable such inspections. The charge that inspections are discriminatory are, therefore, without foundation and cannot be accepted by the United States Government.

As to the other matter, involving the entry of the *M. S. Batory* into New York harbor after the decision of the New York municipality affecting the use of municipal-owned piers, the U. S. Government wishes to stress again it had no connection with this local action of a local pier owner, or statements made by the pier owner, and, in fact, was not even consulted by the New York municipality. The issue of whether the action of the municipal authorities constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of freedom of navigation and principles of International law must be considered in relation to the actual facts of the situation.

The local municipality does not own or control all berths in the New York Port area. Ships of the Gdynia-American Line, Inc., the operators of the *M. S. Batory*, have not been outlawed or barred from calling at the Port of New York or any other American port open to commerce and the Line has not been excluded from leasing privately owned berthing facilities, the equal in every respect to those being used by certain other well-known steamship companies, including the American Export Lines, the American President Lines and the Holland-America Line, operating luxury passenger liners to and from New York.

If privately owned berthing facilities are available for lease, the statement in the Polish note that "the Steamship Line has no possibility to conclude an agreement for another pier in the Port of New York" is in error. The Polish Government has made no showing that such facilities are not available; in fact the United States Government understands that the Gdynia-America Line, Inc. was, in fact, offered space for docking at Jersey City across the Hudson River within the Port of New York.

In the absence of such a showing the conclusion is inescapable that on this point there has been no violation by the United States Government of the freedom of commerce and navigation provisions as set forth in article VI of the Treaty. The Gdynia-America Line, Inc. has been operating ships to the United States for a long time and although permitted to do so has never shown any interest in acquiring its own pier facilities. Inasmuch as there has been no violation of the freedom of navigation and commerce provisions of the Treaty, there can be no violation of a similar principle in international law even if such a principle could be proven to exist in the absence of appropriate treaty provision.

The United States Government does not dispute the assertion that local or municipal authorities

are bound as much as federal authorities by treaty provisions. The United States Government, however, finds no particular treaty provisions as having been violated either by the local authorities or by the Federal Government, and, indeed, the Polish Government cites no such violation. If all berths available in the Port of New York had been under control of the local authorities, or if Polish vessels had been prevented from calling at the Port of New York, the situation complained about would have been viewed more seriously. But as the Polish Government must realize, the actual circumstances are quite different.

In view of these considerations the only conclusion to be drawn is that the Polish Government did not wish, for other reasons, to continue the services of the *M. S. Batory* to New York. It is thus apparent that the Polish Government was seeking a pretext in the action of the New York municipality for withdrawing the *M. S. Batory* from navigation to New York whereby it could seek to place responsibility for this decision on the United States itself.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Essentials of a Peace With Japan. Far Eastern Series 40. Pub. 4171. 11 pp. Free.

Address by John Foster Dulles delivered at Whittier College, Los Angeles, California, on March 31, 1951.

The Schuman Plan Constituting a European Coal and Steel Community: Draft Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community and Draft Convention Containing the Transitional Provisions. European and British Commonwealth Series 22. Pub. 4173. 126 pp. 55¢.

Proof texts of basic documents initialed at Paris on March 19, 1951, by the representatives of France, Italy, the German Federal Republic, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg).

An Analysis of the Schuman Plan. European and British Commonwealth Series 23. Pub. 4176. 8 pp. Free.

Reprinted from the BULLETIN of April 2, 1951.

The Department of State. Department and Foreign Service Series 23. Pub. 4177. 14 pp. Free.

Description of functions of the Department and listing of heads of principal activities of the Department. Illustrated.

Preventing a New World War. General Foreign Policy Series 48. Pub. 4195. 8 pp. Free.

Address by Harry S. Truman, President of United States, on April 11, 1951.

Point 4 Agreements Signed

POINT 4 AGREEMENT WITH ECUADOR SIGNED

[Released to the press May 4]

The United States and Ecuador signed a Point 4 general agreement at Quito yesterday. Foreign Minister Neftali Ponce signed for Ecuador and Chargé d'Affaires John N. Hamlin signed for the United States. Twenty-three Governments have now signed pacts for technical cooperation with the United States under the Act for International Development which authorized the President's Point 4 Program. With the signing of this agreement, the technical assistance activities of other United States Government agencies in Ecuador will be included under the Point 4 Program.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, who recently visited Ecuador, predicted good results from cooperation between American and Ecuadoran experts:

What I saw convinced me that Ecuador has a future of great promise, if her economic development plans are carried out.

Her citizens have shown remarkable stamina under adversity. When the terrible earthquake of Ambato struck in 1949 the whole country rallied to the task of relief and recovery. The Ecuadoran people have a remarkable spirit and a determination to let nothing stand in the way of reconstruction and progress. They have earned our respect and cooperation.

The Ambato earthquake caused more than 6,000 killed and a property loss estimated at more than 20 million dollars; one of the very first to offer assistance was the United States Health and Sanitation field party of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, a Point 4 agency.

A health and sanitation servicio has been in operation in Ecuador since 1942. The United States field party cooperating with the Ecuadoran Government in the joint servicio is headed by Charles Preston Blanks, Jr., of Meridian, Mississippi. In the combined staff of the servicio, there are at present six American technicians and 495 Ecuadorans. Its activities have included the building, staffing and equipping of 29 hospitals, training professional and technical personnel, and a program of malaria control.

An education servicio was started in 1945 by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in coopera-

tion with the Ecuadoran Government. George Greco, of Nesquehoning, Pennsylvania, is chief of the United States field party. He has five other Americans on his staff.

There has been a United States agricultural mission in Ecuador since 1941. At present, it consists of eight technicians and is headed by Lee Hines of Ripley, Tippah County, Mississippi. He is director of the cooperative experiment station of Ecuador. Its work now includes improvement of cacao through plant selection for yield and resistance to disease. This work is carried out in cooperation with commercial cocoa producers.

Some United States technicians are working on cereals and the improvement of food crops in general. Others devote their attention to fibrous and oil-producing plants and still others to livestock, which includes insect and pest study and control and the improvement of the dairying industry.

A United States civil aviation expert is now in Ecuador studying the country's transportation problems, advising on the construction of airfields, and the setting up of air traffic controls and navigation facilities.

Requests have been approved for technical assistance on census and industrial training. Specialists will be sent out by the Department of Labor under the new Point 4 agreement.

Today, there are 22 Ecuadoran trainees in the United States studying American methods in civil aviation, census, vital statistics, child welfare, public health and sanitation, water resources, aqueducts and sewers, education and labor statistics.

POINT 4 AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT SIGNED

[Released to the press on May 5]

The Governments of the United States and Egypt today concluded a Point 4 general agreement. The signing of the agreement took place in Cairo, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Mohamed Salaheddin Bey representing Egypt and Ambassador Jefferson Caffery representing the United States.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, announced simultaneously that two projects in the fields of agricultural development and rural improvement, which the Egyptian Government had requested, will go into action immediately.

In one of these projects, American technicians will cooperate with the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs on its comprehensive program of social security and rural improvement. They will help to train staffs for the 131 rural training centers already in operation and advise on administration of the social security program.

In the other project, American specialists will work with the Ministry of National Economy on a national agricultural program including problems of the milling and storage of grain, extension services, dry farming, and control of citrus diseases. In all, seven ministries and agencies of the Egyptian Government will participate in the work under the Point 4 Program.

Trainees will be brought to the United States for advanced study in rural and agricultural improvement. When they finish their training and return to Egypt, they will act as instructors in the 131 rural training centers the Government now operates. They will organize cooperatives, develop handicrafts, and establish basic education, agricultural, and health programs.

The Point 4 mission will consist of six technicians under a technical cooperation officer; two of them will work with the Ministry of Social Affairs, and four will cooperate on the agricultural development program with the Ministry of National Economy.

POINT 4 AGREEMENT WITH HAITI SIGNED

[Released to the press May 9]

A Point 4 general agreement has been concluded with Haiti by a formal exchange of notes between the Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy at Port-au-Prince.

Technical Cooperation Administrator, Henry G. Bennett, said that the exchange of notes paves the way for an expanded program of technical cooperation with Haiti under the Point 4 Program.

Dr. Bennett called Haiti's food problem the number one priority, because of her rising population. He pointed out that a scant 35 percent of the country's area can produce food. Much of this land has become unproductive through years of unscientific farming. He said that Haiti, with an area only slightly larger than Vermont, has to support 3,500,000 people compared to Vermont's 374,000 people. Each square mile of Haiti's tillable land must feed 1,050 mouths. This, said Dr. Bennett, is possible only through modern methods and careful planning.

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs has cooperated with the Government of Haiti on a food supply program through a joint servicio, since 1944. The Institute's field party is now under the direction of Vance Rogers, of Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The food supply servicio staff consists of 8 Americans and 239 Haitians. The program has helped farmers to restore lands to food growing which were diverted to production of other crops during the war. It has been concerned also with the construction of grain seed storage facilities. It has operated demonstration farms for food crops and livestock. It has reclaimed small districts in the Artibonite River Valley through drainage, irrigation, and soil leaching. These pilot projects have set a pattern for large-scale rehabilitation of the Valley for which a credit of 14 million dollars was recently approved by the Export-Import Bank.

The United States has been extending technical and financial assistance to Haiti for the past 35 years. This service has been especially important during the past 15 years. Since 1947 the United Nations and its related agencies such as UNESCO, to which the United States contributes, have also been active in Haiti.

Technicians of the United States Government have served as advisers in the fields of agriculture, finance, health and sanitation, education, census statistics, irrigation, and reclamation. At the same time, Haitian students have come to the United States for advanced study along similar lines. During the 1944-49 period, 212 specialists arrived in this country from Haiti for training.

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs has been cooperating with Haiti on a health and sanitation servicio since 1942. It has a staff of 7 Americans and 323 Haitians. Edwin L. Dudley, a sanitary engineer of Biloxi, Mississippi, is chief of the IIAA field party.

The principal work of the health and sanitation servicio has been to control yaws and malaria, to train public health nurses, to improve hospital facilities, and to train Haitians progressively to take over their own health activities.

POINT 4 SIGNED WITH ATHENS COLLEGE

[Released to the press May 10]

The United States Government today signed a grant-in-aid agreement for \$297,525 with the Athens College, Greece, to be administered under the Technical Cooperation Program.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, signed for the United States Government, and President Homer W. Davis signed for the Athens College. The college, a 25-year-old joint Greek-American institution, will expand its departments of chemistry, physics, biology,

manual arts, and commercial training, erect several buildings to permit an increase in enrollment, and provide scholarships for 200 Greek students in the next 2 years.

The grant will enable the college to add 14 professors and assistants, both Greek and American, to its staff and to provide them with necessary laboratory equipment.

Point 4 scholars will be drawn from the rural areas where educational opportunities are scarce. They will be selected on the basis of competitive examinations, and preference will be given to those who are willing to go back to the rural areas as technicians and teachers.

Dr. Bennett said that since the liberation of Greece, more than \$200,000 has been donated to the college by the Greek people for new buildings and scholarships. The fact that this gift represented the sacrifices of hundreds of people who have suffered great hardships speaks well for the reputation of the college.

Greeks and Americans have contributed about equally to the support of Athens College, which is administered by two governing bodies, a Greek Board of Directors in Greece and an American Board of Trustees in the United States. An American president and a Greek co-director share responsibility for the operation of the college.

There are about 900 students enrolled in Athens College studying courses on the Junior College and secondary school level.

Former Prime Minister Themistocles Sophoulis recently said,

Institutions such as Athens College complete and strengthen the work of American aid to the Greek people. The cooperation of Greeks and Americans in defending our country, in rebuilding its ruins would be incomplete without cooperation in the task of creating a new generation capable of shouldering the responsibility for the future of Greece.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT UNDERTAKES POINT 4 PROJECT

[Released to the press April 26]

The American University of Beirut today entered into a Point 4 agreement under which the university will train Near Eastern technicians in agriculture and engineering, preventive medicine, economics and finance, and public administration.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator in the Department of State, and Dr. Stephen B. L. Penrose, President of the University, today signed the agreement, setting forth the terms of cooperation between the university and the Point 4 administration. The agreement provides a unique opportunity in the Near East for nationals of that region to gain technical competence in these four fields considered essential to the economic development of the region.

As a regional training center, the university will prepare selected students for public service in their

own countries. These students, Point-4 fellows, will be nominated by their respective governments, approved jointly by the university and the Point 4 mission at Beirut, and given a year's intensive training.

Each student must agree to spend at least a year in the public service of his country working in his special field after completing his course at the university. The program will graduate 118 of these special students each year.

The four new schools will be jointly staffed by the university and the Technical Cooperation Administration, drawing on other agencies of the Government, such as the United States Public Health Service, and the Department of Agriculture for technical personnel. Equipment which cannot be locally obtained will be financed by Point 4 funds, as well as the tuition of the special students. Their Governments are expected to pay their transportation expenses. An initial sum of \$624,000 has been allocated to the project by the Technical Cooperation Administration on the basis of a 2-year program.

In signing the agreement, Dr. Bennett pointed out that the new project follows a pattern of Point 4 cooperation with private organizations of distinguished reputation and proven experience. This pattern, he noted, was first set by a Point 4 agreement with the Near East Foundation on January 30, and it will be increasingly used and expanded, in line with established Point 4 policy.

The American University of Beirut was chosen as the Point 4 agency for this training project because of the reputation it has earned as an outstanding institution of learning during its 85 years of life. The majority of the physicians practicing today in the Arab states received their medical education at the University, and its fame is so well-founded that the selection of trainees should be a relatively easy task.

The university was started at Beirut in 1866. It began with 16 students. It was known as the Syrian Protestant College until 1920 when its name was changed to the American University. It has a charter from the regents of the University of the State of New York. Its medical school was started in 1867 and today is on the approved list of foreign medical schools of the American Medical Association. Under the agreement just signed with the Technical Cooperation Administration, a school of preventive medicine and public health will be added.

Today, the university has 40 buildings located on a campus of 70 acres. The International College, which has been established at Izmir, became affiliated with the university in 1936 to take over the preparatory schools and the first 2 years of college teaching. The university and the college conduct the following schools; elementary, preparatory, secondary, school for nursing, school of arts and sciences, school of pharmacy, and school of medicine.

UNITARIAN COMMITTEE TO SEND POINT 4 MEDICAL MISSION TO ISRAEL

[Released to the press May 10]

The Department of State and the Unitarian Service Committee today signed a Point 4 agreement, under which the Committee will send a 14-man medical mission to Israel for a 6-week period.

The agreement was signed by Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator and Howard Brooks, Associate Director of the Unitarian Service Committee. The project, which grew out of a request by the Government of Israel, is jointly financed by the World Health Organization and by a Point 4 grant.

The Unitarian Service Committee is organizing a mission consisting of outstanding American and European physicians who will contribute their services in order to share modern medical techniques with the doctors of Israel. The Committee has recently sponsored similar projects in Germany at the request of the United States Government.

The mission will hold seminars and short refresher courses in various branches of the medical sciences. It will give demonstrations and organize informal discussions for the double purpose of sharing recent advances in medicine and stimulating cooperation among specialists in different fields.

Howard Brooks, Associate Director of the Unitarian Service Committee, will go to Israel as administrative officer of the mission. The other members so far appointed are:

- Dr. Edward Grzegorzewski, Director, Division of Education and Training Services, WHO, Geneva, Advisor on Medical Education, who will represent the Director General of WHO on the mission
- Dr. Lucien E. Morris, Assistant Professor of Anesthesiology, University Hospital, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Ia.
- Dr. Erik Warburg, Professor of Medicine, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, specialist in Internal Medicine
- Dr. Samuel Z. Levine, Professor of Pediatrics, Cornell University Medical College, New York
- Dr. Carl Semb, Surgeon-in-Chief, Ulleval Hospital, Oslo, Norway, specialist in General and Thoracic Surgery
- Dr. Leo G. Rigler, Professor of Radiology and Head of Department, University of Minnesota School of Medicine, Minneapolis
- Dr. Hugo Theorell, Professor of Biochemistry, Nobel Institute, Stockholm
- Dr. Paul Klemperer, Clinical Professor of Pathology, Columbia University, College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York
- Dr. Gordon Kenneth Moe, Professor of Physiology, State University of New York, Medical Center, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, specialist in Physiology and Pharmacology
- Dr. John E. Gordon, Professor of Preventive Medicine and Epidemiology, Harvard University School of Public Health, Boston
- Professor Richard Tyler, Professor of Sanitary Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, specialist in environmental sanitation

The problem which the mission will help to solve is not a shortage of doctors, with which Israel is relatively well supplied, but a lack of up-to-date information concerning the latest developments in medicine, public health, and medical education. Many of Israel's doctors have recently come there as members of refugee groups. Their period of medical training coincided, in general, with the years of war and intensive persecution in Europe, during which time they were largely cut off from world-wide progress in medicine.

This is the sixth of a series of cooperative arrangements, under the Point 4 Program, which has been signed with private organizations that have had long experience in technical and educational work abroad. Similar agreements have been concluded with the Near East Foundation for village improvement projects in Iran and Syria, with the Booker Washington Institute in Liberia, and with the American University of Beirut, Lebanon.

POINT 4 AGREEMENT WITH NEAR EAST FOUNDATION SIGNED

[Released to the press May 2]

Two Point 4 agreements were signed today with the Near East Foundation for the expansion of rural improvement programs in Iran and Syria.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, represented the United States Government and Edward C. Miller, Secretary of the Near East Foundation, signed for that organization.

At the signing of the agreements, Dr. Bennett said,

The Near East Foundation has shown that remarkable results can be obtained through the rural approach in countries like Iran and Syria, where most of the people live and work in small villages. The Foundation works directly with the people, showing them better methods of farming, better health practices and basic, practical methods of education, and training them to demonstrate these improvements, in turn, to their own people.

In Syria, the agreement makes possible the employment of 12 additional specialists in the fields of agriculture extension, homemaking, medicine, nurse-midwifery, sanitation, and rural education. In Iran, it will mean increasing the number of village demonstration centers from 35 to 75. It will add 10 American technicians to the staff and a large number of Iranians trained under United States supervision.

The training methods have been found satisfactory. Each American specialist will have from five to ten local trainees assigned to him for a year of training. They will be nominated by the Foundation and approved by their Governments. They will enter public service when their training ends. The doctors will conduct clinics at isolated centers with the help of local trainees. They will train nurse-midwives who, in turn, will teach as well as practice their skills.

The Near East Foundation will work closely with Point 4 missions in Iran and Syria.

In Iran, the Foundation's program will supplement and strengthen the existing Point 4 village improvement project which is under the direction of Dr. Franklin Harris, and which is supervised by an Iranian-United States Joint Commission for Rural Improvement, under an agreement signed in October 1950.

The purpose of the Foundation's work is the same as that of the Point 4 mission: to raise standards of living at the village level by a concerted effort to improve agriculture, health, and education, and to train a body of Iranian experts to carry this work to other parts of the country.

The Near East Foundation was incorporated in New York on February 18, 1930. It succeeded the Near East Relief and selected the Near East as its field of activity because of the needs of the area and the inheritance of knowledge and good will it received from the Near East Relief.

At present, it is working in Syria, Iran, and Greece. In Greece, its program emphasizes livestock improvement, vocational training for the physically unfit, youth welfare, and rural improvement.

The Near East Foundation is supported entirely by voluntary contributions. It represents an organized American effort to assist people through fully recognizing the values in national genius and cultures; understanding changing conditions in social and economic life; undertaking demonstrations only upon local request and where local cooperation is assured; adapting proved American welfare methods to existing needs; selecting technically trained American personnel of proved ability to direct each project; expecting each project to be continued by local agencies and specifically trained local personnel; and maintaining broad international ideals with a staff pledged to respect native customs and work in accord with local religious opinion.

CARIBBEAN AREA GRANTED VOCATIONAL TRAINING UNDER POINT 4

[Released to the press on May 7]

Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett today announced a grant of \$38,250 of Point 4 funds to the Metropolitan Vocational School of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for vocational training of citizens of the British, French, and Dutch territories in the Caribbean area. The project grew out of the interest of the Caribbean Commission in creating a nucleus of trained artisans needed for the development of the Islands.

In a letter to Ward M. Canaday, chairman of the United States sector of the Caribbean Commission announcing the approval of the grant, Dr. Bennett said:

This project has been developed, largely as a result of the interest shown by the Caribbean Commission and its

members. In order to insure that the training is given to those individuals who will be able to make the greatest contribution to the economic development of the Islands, it is our hope that the Commission will sponsor this program and assist in carrying it out.

Specifically, we should like to have the Secretary General of the Commission, working with the school in Puerto Rico, take steps to see that the availability of this training is made known to the officials and peoples of the territories. We should like to have the Secretary General receive the applications, determine which ones should be included within the number authorized in this project and certify them to the school. We should like very much to have reports from the Secretary General from time to time indicating the progress which is made by the students upon the completion of their training.

The fields of training at the Metropolitan Vocational School, in which the students from the Caribbean area may enroll, include cabinet making, electricity, radio, auto mechanics, machine shop, printing, air-conditioning, refrigeration, baking, and drafting. The grant approved today will permit 30 students to take a 1-year training course. The fact that last fall 47 applications had been received by the Secretary General of the Caribbean Commission was cited as evidence of interest among the islanders.

POINT 4 TECHNICIANS TRAIN FOR FIELD ASSIGNMENTS

The Department of State announced on April 25 that 15 Point 4 technicians, preparing to take up field assignments in Latin America and India, were told today that the President's Point 4 Program is "good business" for Americans as well as for the people of less developed regions.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Administrator of the Point 4 Program in the Department of State, told the technicians:

We borrowed from everybody in building up this great nation. Now, in the Point 4 Program, we are just paying back a little—and benefiting ourselves while we help others.

It is technologically possible for every human being to be well-fed, decently clothed, and housed and to have proper medical care. The peoples of other lands have learned of this progress. They want to share in the knowledge that makes it possible to produce and enjoy the good things of life.

If we are to have stable peace in the world, we must attack the sources of war, the Four Horsemen: hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance.

Dr. Bennett spoke at the Foreign Service Institute where the fifteen technicians are completing a 3-weeks orientation course which emphasizes the understanding of foreign peoples, their customs, cultures, and languages. The wives of several of the technicians are also attending the orientation course.

Twelve of the experts will proceed to Latin America to take part in Point 4 projects concerned with food supply, education, public health, and census mapping. One is going to India to cooperate in agricultural development. Two will be roving consultants in the administration of social security programs.

Special Report of U.N. Commanding General ¹

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEAL DETAILS FOR ATTACK ON KOREA

U.N. doc. S/2112
Dated May 2, 1951

I herewith submit a Special Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea consisting of two documents captured from the North Korean forces. The first of these documents is Reconnaissance Order No. 1, General Staff of the North Korean Army, dated June 18, 1950. The second of these documents is Operation Order No. 1, issued by Lee Kwon Mu, Commander, 4th Infantry Division, dated June 22, 1950. The originals of these documents, which are in the Korean language, are in the possession of the United States Government.

These two orders issued to North Korean forces on June 18 and June 22, 1950, provide clear and documented confirmation that the attack against the Republic of Korea, launched on the 25th of June 1950, was carefully prepared and carried out in accordance with a deliberate and preconceived plan for the conquest of the Republic of Korea.

Reconnaissance Order No. 1 of June 18, 1950, instructs the Chief of Staff of the North Korean 4th Division to carry out reconnaissance prior to the attack in order to determine the location of the main body of the forces of the Republic of Korea and to work out an accurate target map of the installations of such forces. The Order further directs the Chief of Staff of the North Korean 4th Division "as the attack begins" to carry out continuous observation of the centers of resistance on the routes of defensive lines approaching Seoul.

Operation Order No. 1, dated June 22, 1950, issued by Lee Kwon Mu, Commander, North Korean 4th Infantry Division, states the objec-

tive of the 4th Division "in the frontal attack" is to advance to the Uijongbu-Seoul area for which preparations are to be completed by June 23, 1950. The first report to the Security Council of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea, dated July 25, 1950, discloses that the attack on the central front was carried out in accordance with the plan set forth in this document.²

The remaining portions of Operation Order No. 1 contain specific and detailed military directives for carrying out the attack against the Republic of Korea.

Full translation of a group of documents representing orders from G-2, General Staff, North Korean Army to the Chiefs of Staff of various military units. Dated 18 June 50.

(TN: indicates exact transliteration from the original Russian.)

To: The Chief of Staff of the 4th Division

Reconnaissance Order No. 1

General Staff of the North Korean Army

18 June 1950

Map 50,000—1949 Issue

1. The enemy, 1st Regiment, 7th Division, with an attached artillery, is defending the sector from IMJINGANG up to hill 538.5 (0634). The frontal edge of the defense of the 38th parallel is along the northern slope of the heights at the parallel. The frontal edge of the enemy main line of resistance is along the northern slopes of the heights 217.0 (0622), SEKKYO-RI* (SOKKYO-RI (0622)) northern slopes of the heights 411.3 (0628) the northwestern and northern slopes of the heights (0630-0632). The defiles along the roads from the parallel to KANSANRI* (9824) and TONGJIN are protected with a well-developed system of defense installations. The positions of the regimental reserves are supposedly in the region of hill 249.7 (0026). To the left, the defenses are held by the 13th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division, to the left is the 9th Regiment of the 7th Division.

2. When the division is set up in an attack position, and prior to the beginning of the attack, through obser-

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on May 2. The official Command reports are published regularly in the BULLETIN.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203.

*Indicates exact transliteration from the original Russian.

vation and reconnaissance the night before the attack, it is necessary to:

Guarantee the final defining of the true frontal edge of the main line of enemy resistance, the presence and arrangement of mine fields, wire entanglements and other barricades, the presence and location of unbarricaded sectors and passes in barricades.

Determine accurately the arrangement of the trenches, connecting trenches, DOT (TN Reinforced concrete pillbox) DZOT (TN Earth-and-Timber pillbox), NP (TN Observation point), the defense firearms supply and the system of firing.

Determine the location of the main body of the enemy personnel and the plan of the day.

Determine accurately the firing positions of the artillery, the number and caliber of the guns on hand. Determine the arrangement of the antitank guns, especially along the approaches to the defile.

Toward the end of the second day, after assuming an attack position, work out a very accurate target map and a map of the engineering installations of the enemy.

As the attack begins:

Carry on a continuous, intensified observation for the appearance of new firing points covering the defile; to uncover, in time, new strong points and centers of resistance of the enemy; watch where the dislodged enemy elements retreat.

When the front units reach the SEKIJO* (TN Presumably CHOKSONG) (0416)-TONGJIN line, organize additional reconnaissance in the directions of SEKIJO*-SINZAI* KANAYRI*; along the railroad to GI-SEIFU*, with the objective of a timely stand along this line of the enemy defense sectors and along the line of the arrival of reinforcements from the rear.

After reaching HIGAIRI* (S614) YOSHU (YANGJU) (S426) line organize the reconnaissance of routes: HIGAIRI*-KAYO (HAYANG), RIOFUKUIN* (7414); KANAI* FUKOKU-RI, KYOKHATSURI* (7416); IOSU, TISEIFU* SODORI (7226) with the objective of determining possible resistance points on these routes of defensive lines approaching SEOUL.

With the advance toward the approaches to SEOUL by all means secure the collection of information about enemy forces concentrated in the city and the steps intended for the city defense.

3. The 24-hour intelligence summaries must be submitted to the Intelligence Section by 1900 hours daily by telegraph, radio and telephone. Written reports, captured documents and interrogation reports must be submitted to the Intelligence Section daily by 0800 hours and 2000 hours.

4. Not more than a third of the personnel of the reconnaissance subdivisions are to be placed along the attack line at observation points, and two-thirds must be readied to accomplish the reconnaissance in the heart of the enemy defenses.

Each regiment must have one group of three to five men who would collect captured documents on the battlefield.

*Chief of Staff
Chief of Army Intelligence Section*

Full translation of a mimeographed copy of Operation Order No. 1, dated 22 June 50, issued by LEE Kwon Mu. Co. 4th Infantry Division, North Korean Army

TOP SECRET

Recd 0512 hours, 24 June.

TN: Inscribed in pencil.

OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

Issued by Operations Section, 4th Inf Div OKKE-Ri, 1400 hours, 22 June, 1950

(Map 1:50,000, issued 1949)

1. The 1st Infantry Regiment of the enemy's 7th Infantry Division is standing on the defensive against our attack.

2. The most important objective of our Division in the frontal attack is to penetrate the enemy's defensive line on the KWAN-Dong (05.18)-AJANG-Dong (03.33) line, and after taking MAJI-Ri (03.16), hill 535.6 (03.33), P'Yongmaul (95.13), and NAEHIOEAM (91.32), advance to UIJONGBU-SEOUL Area. The plan calls for completion of preparations by 23 June 1950.

3. On our right wing the 1st Infantry Division will stand to the attack. The boundary between the right wing and other area is the line along MAKTAEDONG (23.18), NOGONG-Ni (18.18), BANGJUNG-Ni (88.11) and PIBONG (67.18). The 4th Infantry Division is not responsible for any of these positions apart from MAKTAEDONG. On the left wing, the 3rd Infantry Division will attack. The boundary between the left wing and our area is the line along PUHUNG DONG (20.35), hill 533.5 (06.34), hill 535.6 (03.33), hill 519 (93.32) and hill 337.1 (82.29), for all of which the 4th Infantry Division is not responsible.

4. The main attack will be directed toward the wide road on the left flank. Battle (TN Two words illegible.) Will be in two echelons.

5. The 18th Infantry Regiment, together with one battalion of artillery, one 45mm gun company, one self-propelled artillery battalion, one engineer company, one tank company, and two antitank sections will break through the enemy's defensive line on the KWAN-Dong (05.18) and SAHANG-Ni (09.30) line, and as the present objective, take the KUUM-Ni (14.18) and TONGMYONG-CHON (06.27) line, and lastly, the line on MAJI-Ri (03.16) and hill 262 (24.27). Subsequently, an attack will be directed against the enemy in the HYANGDONG (31.24) Area.

The foregoing action will be carried out with the aid of one antitank company from the Antitank Battalion, 13th Artillery Regiment, 13th Infantry Division, one 76mm gun company, one 45mm gun company, one 45mm gun company from the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment, and one 82mm gun company from the same battalion. The left wing boundary of the 16th Infantry Regiment will be the line along UMNAE-Ri (19.30), SAECHIP (12.27), SARANG-Ni (19.30), hill 289 (06.27), TANGNAE (00.27), CHUNGPAE (97.26) and SONGAM-Ni (94.27) all of which, with the exception of UMNAE-Ri, will be included in the 18th Infantry Regiment. The security of the area adjacent to the left wing will be entrusted to the commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment.

6. The 16th Infantry Regiment, the 2d and 3d Battalion, along with one 45mm gun company of the Division Artillery Regiment, two companies from the self-propelled artillery battalion, two sections from the antitank rifle company, 45mm gun battalion, and one company from the engineer battalion, will break through the enemy's defensive line on the SARANG-Ni (09.30)-PAEGI-Ri (10.34) Area, and will take, as the primary objective, YANGWONG-Ni (05.27) and PAEHA-Ri (05.33). As the second objective, they will take the line on hill 362 (04.27) and hill 535.6 (03.33), and subsequently attack the UIJONGBU Area. The regimental action will be carried out with the aid of the 2d Battalion of the Artillery Regiment, 13th Infantry Division, two companies from the antitank artillery battalion, two 76mm gun companies, two 45mm gun companies, and 76mm gun company, 120mm gun company, and two 82mm gun companies from the 5th Regiment.

The left wing boundary line will be the Division boundary line, and responsibility for the adjacent area lies with the Commander of the 16th Regiment.

7. The 5th Regiment (less one battalion), as the Division's second echelon, will follow the rear of the 16th Infantry Regiment and will prepare to penetrate the line on hill 362 (4.27) and hill 535.6 (03.33). The Commander of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment will form an assault group with one antitank gun section, two antitank rifle squads, two heavy machine gun squads, and one engineer platoon, in addition to one infantry platoon. The infantry platoon leader will take command of the assault group.

8. The 2d Infantry Battalion of the 5th Regiment, together with the antitank gun company, will be engaged in attack on the heels of the 18th Infantry Regiment and will prepare for tank attack along the MAJI-Ri (03.16) and TONGP'YONGCH'ON (06.27) line.

9. The corps artillery battalion will be placed under my command. Artillery preparation fire will be laid down for 30 minutes: 15 minutes bombardment and 15 minutes rapid fire.

The general function of artillerymen is:

Firing — minutes

At the time of preparation for charge—

(a) To cripple and destroy the enemy's fighting power on its defense line.

(b) To break down the enemy's artillery positions, engineer fire positions as well as permanent fire positions.

(c) To construct a road through obstacles on the enemy's defense line.

(d) To hold off the enemy from the line on CHOMBANG (06.20), PUJOPTONG (06.25) and CH'OH'ON-Ni (06.30).

(e) To prevent the enemy's observation from posts on the defense line.

When supporting the charge—

(a) The charge by infantry, tanks and self-propelled artillery will be carried as far as MAJI-Pi (03.16), MACH'ABAN (02.20) and hill 535.6 (03.32).

(b) Stamp out the enemy's staying power as well as engineer positions and permanent positions on the right and left sides of the main road leading to SEOUL.

(c) Carry out counterfire upon the enemy's artillery positions.

(d) Prevent the enemy from carrying out a possible counter-charge in the area along the roads leading to KOSAYONG (02.14), HOSA-Ri (?) (97.25) and UIJONGBU.

(e) Prevent the enemy from assembling on the TONGDUCH'ON-Ni and HANSAN-Ni (97.24) Area.

(f) Destroy the enemy's command system.

During the last phase of action—

(a) Cut off the enemy's retreat.

(b) Continue bombardment by artillery.

(c) Cut off the roads and waterways on the enemy's line of retreat and destroy the flank of TONGTUCH'ON.

(d) As soon as the present mission of the Division is carried out, it will keep the enemy from assembling at the road junction (97.20) of TAECH'ON (98.15) YOGONG-Ni (97.20) and HANSAN-Ni (97.25) as well as the KIOHON (97.32) Area.

(e) Prevent the enemy's concentration for counter-attack from the UIJONGBU direction.

The preparation for bombardment calls for completion by 2400 hours 23 June 1950.

10. Duty of the air corps—

(a) Cover our movements and protect our troops from possible enemy charges.

(b) Destroy the enemy's military facilities and railway stations.

(c) Keep the enemy from concentrating and prevent the approach of their reserves.

(d) Destroy the enemy's roads in order to prevent them from concentrating.

11. To meet the enemy's air raids, each regiment will take counter measures separately, using equipment at hand, and in case of enemy air attack, mobilize 30 percent of the arms of the infantry force. The division air observation liaison station is No (TN Blank.), and those of each regiment are as follows:

18th Inf Regt No (TN Blank.)

16th Inf Regt No (TN Blank.)

5th Inf Regt No. (TN Blank.)

The anti-aircraft machine gun company will protect artillery positions as well as the command post area of the Division.

12. The antitank reserve unit, composed of one company from the 45mm artillery battalion and one engineer company, will follow the second echelon, attacking, and at the end of the attack, will prevent the enemy's mechanized unit from penetrating. Each unit will take its own antitank measures by utilizing its own antitank weapons.

13. The division Medical Section and transfer point will be situated, respectively, at 23.30 L on the map, from 20 Jun 50, and 23.31 L, after 21 Jun 50.

14. The Division Command Post (presently at HYOPKOK 13.28) and the Observation Post (presently at 03.31) will be removed to a point along the road leading to UIJONGBU.

15. Reports will be made:

(a) When attack preparations are completed.

(b) When attack is begun.

(c) By messenger, radio, and written report when the present, the next, or a day's duty had been completed.

(d) Once every two hours on matters other than the above.

(e) Written reports will be sent twice a day to be received exactly at 0700 and 1900 hours.

16. Standard signals—

NO.	SIGNAL	FLARE	TELEPHONE	RADIO
1.	Begin attack		Storm . . .	244
2.	Begin charge	Green . . .	Fine . . .	224
3.	Begin bombardment.	Red . . .	Storm . . .	333
4.	Begin supporting charge.	Green . . .	Snowstorm.	111
5.	Cease firing	White . . .	Stop firing .	222
6.	Call for fire power .	Red and Green mixed, fired toward object.	Thunder .	444

17. First deputy: The Chief of Staff.

Second Deputy: The Commander of 16th Infantry Regiment.

LEE KWON MU, *Commander*
4th Infantry Division
Ho BONG HAK
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: 3 copies made

No. 1 copy

Other copies will be sent as

specified in the Secret

Documents recording form.

(TN One word illegible.) HWANG Myon Chong

(TN Illegible.)

22 June 1950

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2090, April 17; S/2091, April 17; S/2093, April 17; S/2095, April 19; S/2097, April 20; S/2098, April 20; S/2100, April 24; S/2106, April 26; S/2108, April 27; S/2109, April 27; S/2110, April 30; S/2115, May 3.

Implementing Details of Demilitarization in State of Jammu and Kashmir

*Statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin
U. S. Representative in Security Council¹*

When my Government undertook to explore the possibility of presenting the name of someone to this Council for the post of United Nations representative for Kashmir, it turned to the Panel for Enquiry and Conciliation operated by General Assembly resolution of April 28, 1949. Dr. [Frank P.] Graham, as you know, is among the five distinguished United States citizens designated by my Government for inclusion in the Panel. His fine qualities are well appreciated in the United States, where he is known as a distinguished educator, statesman, government official, and negotiator of great ability. I know that he will bring to this new task, in full measure, the qualities needed for his part to accomplish his mission.

In expressing the good wishes of the United States for the success of the mission of the new United Nations representative, I should like to add a word or two regarding the character of his mission. This is or may be, as the Council knows, twofold. His first effort will be to effect demilitarization in the state of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the international agreement embodied in the UNCIP [United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan] resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.² While previous efforts to bring about agreement between the parties on the demilitarization provisions of these resolutions by the India-Pakistan Commission, General McNaughton, and Sir Owen Dixon have not been successful, they have undeniably made progress toward the desired end. The area of disagreement has been narrowed and we have, thanks to them, a fairly clear picture of what these disagreements are. I am sure that the debate on the Kashmir case recently concluded in the Council, in which the distinguished representatives of Pakistan and India have presented their Government's views, has been most helpful to the members of this Council. Council members in their interventions exhibited a large measure of agreement in their understanding of the issues and their ideas of what should be done to resolve them.

The disagreements on the demilitarization process still existing are, basically, differences of interpretation of how the framework provided by the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission should be filled in. These resolutions, in

attempting to devise procedures which would furnish adequate security and equitable treatment for all, went as far as was possible at the stage then reached. The procedural details necessarily had to be left to be worked out by the parties. This they have not yet succeeded in fully doing. It is our earnest hope that both parties will work out with Dr. Graham and will implement the details of demilitarization preparatory to the plebiscite which will permit the people of Kashmir freely to express their will regarding the question of accession.

If, however, these efforts should fail of their purpose, the United Nations representative would embark on the second phase of his mission: He would return to the Council and report to it those points of differences between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, which he considers must be resolved to enable demilitarization to be effected. The arbitration clause of the present resolution would then become operative, and the United States most earnestly urges that the parties accept the arbitration procedure as a final step to conclude a peaceful settlement of this problem which holds so much danger for the peace, prosperity, and stability of the great subcontinent. I fully concur with our distinguished President, who said at the 538th meeting of this Council,

In a case like the one with which we are dealing, this would seem to be the logical procedure, since it concerns questions which, as the representative of Brazil has so ably explained, might well be considered as coming within the widely acknowledged justiciable sphere where arbitration would be fully justified.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Second Report of the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee. E/1911, January 24, 1951. 82 pp. mimeo.

Proceedings of the Conference on Building Research. General. E/ECE/122, E/ECE/1M/HOU/BR/2. December 1950. 285 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

¹ Made before the Security Council on Apr. 30 and released to the press by the U. S. Mission to the U. N. on the same date.

² For a review of the Kashmir dispute, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1951, p. 394.

International Materials Conference: Progress Report

[IMC Information Bulletin of May 4]

Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee

This Committee has received replies from a majority of the countries to which it sent questionnaires for production and consumption estimates. The replies were due on April 23. A sufficient number have been received to enable the Committee to revise its previous preliminary estimates of the supply situation. It is currently analyzing the data and considering methods of dealing with the shortages of supplies.

It is expected that the Committee will be able to submit to its members for their consideration later this month reasonably firm estimates of the 1951-52 production and consumption, and recommendations as to methods for distributing available supplies. When the member governments have acted upon the Committee recommendations, provision will be made for further consultation with nonmember governments regarding their special problems as may be necessary.

Sulphur Committee

The Committee has completed its first report and has sent it to member and nonmember governments together with a questionnaire which calls for statistical data and estimates of requirements.

In addition to the statistical data and estimates, the questionnaire requests as much information as possible under the following headings:

1. Explanation of requirements of sulphur for 1951-52.
2. Steps taken and projected to initiate and/or increase production of sulphur and pyrites.
3. Steps taken and projected to initiate and/or increase production of other sulphur-bearing raw materials and to use them in substitution for native sulphur; e.g., anhydrite, gypsum and gases from smelting of zinc, copper, lead, and other ores and concentrates.
4. Steps taken and projected to recover and use sulphur available from industrial processes; e.g., the manufacture of coal gas and coke, oil refining and cracking.
5. Steps taken and projected to conserve sulphur, including: a. substitution, in whole or in

part, of other material for sulphur in agriculture or industry; and b. recovery or recuperation of sulphuric acid in industrial processes.

6. Effect of steps taken in 2, 3, 4, and 5 on future requirements of sulphur.

7. Any factors, such as the need for machinery, equipment and transport facilities, which limit the adoption of the measures referred to above.

At a later date, an opportunity will be provided to nonmember governments for stating their case orally to the Sulphur Committee. Meanwhile, to permit early consideration of requirements of native sulphur, the Committee has requested that replies to the questionnaire be made by May 20, 1951. The question of equitable distribution is being considered.

Cotton-Cotton Linters Committee

This Committee has been in recess since March 15 pending the preparation of certain statistical tables required to assess the world situation and to permit the formulation of recommendations. The Committee has set May 9 for its next meeting.

Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee

For the past 3 weeks the Committee has been engaged with work on the principles of distribution. Hitherto, the Committee has mainly worked on the distribution of molybdenum, but alternative plans in the case of tungsten also have been laid before members of the Committee. The consumption of these two materials in the form of ores and concentrates by nonmember countries is not large and it is believed that the Committee is already in touch, directly or indirectly, with all nonmember consumers.

The consumption of tungsten and molybdenum in the form of primary products is somewhat more general, but the Committee has not yet considered this part of the subject. It is possible that if a satisfactory plan to deal with the urgent problem of distribution of ores and concentrates of these two metals can be agreed upon, it will not be necessary to proceed further and consider primary products. This is a point, however, on which conclusions have not yet been reached.

Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee

This Committee has received a few answers to the questionnaires sent out on April 16, 1951. Members are expected to furnish their replies within a few days and nonmember governments at the latest on May 16, 1951.

In the meantime, the Committee has appointed a special Subcommittee on Distribution to outline various principles and possible methods of international distribution of the materials concerned. Any schemes developed will be made available for discussion by the Committee and eventual implementation in case the supply position of any of the materials appeared to be so critical as to render such action necessary.

Wool Committee

During the past 2 weeks, the Wool Committee has continued its study of the wool situation and has received preliminary reports from its subcommittees. The Subcommittee on Production has submitted a draft of a report suggesting means of increasing production of wool. The proposals are concerned particularly with the years following 1952 since it is recognized that it is not practicable to influence the production for the next clip. The Subcommittee on Conservation is completing a draft of a report which will be considered by the full Committee next week. The Committee is still engaged in the examination of all factors affecting the supply and demand situation.

Pulp-Paper Committee

This Committee held its first meeting on April 30. Twelve nations were represented: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.

Willard L. Thorp, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, welcomed the delegates on behalf of the host government. The United States delegate, G. J. Ticoulat, was elected as chairman pro tempore.

Pending adoption of the rules of procedure, temporary rules concerning representation and voting were adopted. The Committee also considered its future order of business. Four subcommittees were established: Program Subcommittee; Subcommittee on Rules of Procedure; Subcommittee on Statistics and Subcommittee on Emergency Supplies of Newsprint. These subcommittees will report to the full Committee within a few days.

Composition of Pulp-Paper Committee

[Released to the press by IMC April 30]

The Pulp-Paper Committee met today for the first time. Twelve nations were represented. This is the last of the seven commodity committees thus far established by the IMC to meet.

Composition of the Pulp-Paper Committee is as follows:

AUSTRALIA

Representative: F. A. Meere, First Assistant Comptroller General, Department of Trade and Customs, Canberra

Alternate: Not yet designated

BELGIUM

Representative: Pierre E. Jaspar, Economic Counselor, Belgian Embassy, or in his absence: Maurice Heyne, Minister Plenipotentiary, Commercial Counselor, Belgian Embassy

Alternate: A. D. Jaexsens, Chargé, Economic Mission, Belgian Embassy

BRAZIL

Representative: Raul de Vincenzi, Second Secretary, Brazilian Embassy

Alternate: Helio Bittencourt, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro

CANADA

Representative: S. V. Allen, Special Assistant to the Coordinator of Materials, Department of Defense Production, Ottawa

Alternate: M. P. Carson, Assistant Commercial Secretary, Embassy of Canada

FRANCE

Representative: Marc Hyafil, Secretary of State of Economic Affairs, Director of Foreign Economic Relations, Paris

Alternate: Not yet designated

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representative: Max H. Schmid, President, Zellstoff-fabrik Waldhof, Wiesbaden

Alternate: Not yet designated

ITALY

Representative: Dr. Luigi Cibrario

Alternate: Dr. Vincenzo Amici, Director, Technical Service, Italian Institution, Pulp and Paper, Rome

NETHERLANDS

Representative: J. Grooters, Assistant Financial Attaché, Embassy of the Netherlands

Alternate: J. Teppema, Second Commercial Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands

NORWAY

Representative: Thoralf Svendsen, Commercial Counselor, Embassy of Norway

Alternates: Gunder Kvaerne, First Secretary, Embassy of Norway

Egil Nygaard, Counselor of Embassy, Embassy of Norway

SWEDEN

Representative: Hubert de Besehe, Economic Counselor, Embassy of Sweden

Alternate: Baron C. H. von Platen, First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden

UNITED KINGDOM

Representative: A. S. Gilbert, Assistant Secretary, Board of Trade, London

Alternate: E. Atherton, Assistant Economic Attaché, British Embassy

UNITED STATES

Representative: G. J. Ticoulat, Director, Pulp and Paper Division, National Production Authority, Washington, D. C.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Directing Council (American International Institute for Protection of Childhood)

The Department of State announced on May 9 that Elisabeth S. Enochs, Chief, International Technical Missions, Office of the Commissioner for Social Security, Federal Security Agency, has been designated as alternate United States technical delegate to a meeting of the Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood to be held at Montevideo, Uruguay, beginning on May 11. Katherine F. Lenroot, Chief, Children's Bureau, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency, and United States technical delegate to the Directing Council, is unable to attend.

The Directing Council will be concerned at its forthcoming meeting with the making of plans for the Tenth Pan American Child Congress, which is scheduled to be held in Colombia in 1952, and with such business matters as (1) review of the report of the Director General on the activities of the Institute during the past year (2) adoption of regulations to define the functions and responsibilities of delegates to the Directing Council and (3) election of a president, vice president, and secretary for the period 1951-53.

The American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, of which the Directing Council is the governing body, is the center of international activities connected with child life and child welfare in the Americas. The last meeting of the Directing Council was held at Montevideo, October 6, 1950.

Twelfth Meeting of the Caribbean Commission

On May 4, the Department of State announced that the United States Government be represented at the twelfth meeting of the Caribbean Commission, at Barbados, British West Indies, May 7-12, 1951, by the following delegation:

Commissioners

Ward M. Canaday, United States Co-Chairman; Chairman of the Board of Directors, Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., Toledo, Ohio
Jesus T. Piñero, former Governor of Puerto Rico.

Advisers

Sol Luis Descartes, Director, Economic Research of Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration
J. Jefferson Jones, III, Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State
A. B. Nyren, Vice Consul, American Consulate, Barbados, B. W. I.
Frances McReynolds Smith, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

The Caribbean Commission was established in 1948 as an advisory and consultative body on economic and social matters to the Governments of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the 15 territories under their administration in the Caribbean area. Like its predecessor, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, it has made a real contribution to the economic and social well-being of the inhabitants of the Caribbean area.

The 22-item provisional agenda for the twelfth meeting provides, among other things, for action on the recommendations of the West Indian Conference (4th sess.), consideration of technical assistance projects in the area, action on the reports and recommendations of conferences on statistical and technical matters, and action on the lease of a Commission headquarters building at Trinidad.

Fourth Session of the Coal Mines Committee (ILO)

The Department of State announced on May 4 that the fourth session of the Coal Mines Committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO) will convene at Geneva, on May 7, 1951. The United States will be represented by the following tripartite delegation:

GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

Delegates

William R. McComb, *Chairman*, Administrator, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division, Department of Labor
Louis C. McCabe, Chief of the Fuels and Explosives Division, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior

Advisers

Robert M. Barnett, Economic Officer (labor), American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, Resident at Geneva
Witt Bowden, Special Consultant, Department of Labor

EMPLOYERS REPRESENTATIVES

Delegates

H. J. Connolly, President, Pennsylvania Coal Company, Scranton, Pa.
Huston St. Clair, President, Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation, Tazewell, Va.

Alternate Delegate

James W. Haley, Vice President, Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation, Washington, D.C.

WORKERS REPRESENTATIVES

Delegates

Samuel Caddy, President, District No. 30, United Mine Workers of America, Lexington, Ky.
Thomas Kennedy, Vice President, United Mine Workers of America, Washington, D.C.

The agenda for this session includes an examination of a general report, prepared by the International Labor Office, in which particular reference is made to action taken by the various countries to implement conclusions of previous Committee sessions, steps taken by the International Labor Office to follow up the studies and inquiries proposed by the Committee, and recent events and developments in the coal industry.

The Committee will also consider possible methods of dealing with resolutions of the Miners' International Federation requesting that the United Nations and the ILO jointly call a tripartite meeting of all coal-producing countries to regulate the problems of production, trade, prices, and working conditions. In addition, the Committee will review hours of work and productivity in coal mines with a view to submitting recommendations to the ILO for amelioration therein.

The Coal Mines Committee was the first of eight industrial committees established by the ILO to meet the need for dealing with problems peculiar to important industries. The United States is one of the 12 member states of this Committee, which seeks the general improvement of working conditions and safety factors in coal mines. The last session of the Committee was held at Pittsburgh, April 20-30, 1949.

Third Session of Fiscal Commission (ECOSOC)

On May 7, the Department of State announced that Edward F. Bartelt, Fiscal Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, and United States Representative on the Fiscal Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the third session of that Commission, which is to be held at Lake Success, May 7-16, 1951. Mr. Bartelt will be assisted by the following four advisers:

Roy Blough, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President
Nathan N. Gordon, Economist, Tax Advisory Staff Secretary, Department of the Treasury
Eldon P. King, Special Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury
Frederick Livesey, Adviser, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State

The major question at the forthcoming session of the Fiscal Commission will be how it can best use the forces at its disposal to contribute to international economic development and stability. International activities for economic development are handicapped by the fact that (1), at the national level, the establishment of comprehensive fiscal policies is virtually impossible in some countries and (2), at the international level, synchronization of government financial action is extremely difficult. Priority consideration will undoubtedly be given by the Commission to the fiscal aspects of the problems of financing economic development and stability and to the formulation of recommendations on those international aspects of public finance relating specifically to policies which contribute most to economic development and stability.

Specific items on the agenda for the session relate to international tax problems, government financial reporting, public finance information services, government finance and economic development, and profits taxes and devaluation of money. One of the questions which will probably be discussed in connection with the Commission's review of international tax problems is: "What are the proper methods of solving the problem of international multiple taxation, especially from the point of view of the different interests and financial resources of capital exporting and importing countries, and the availability of unilateral legislation and bilateral agreements?"

The Fiscal Commission, which is one of the 9 permanent functional commissions of the Ecosoc, advises the Council on matters in the field of public finance. Fifteen Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its second session was held at Lake Success, January 10-25, 1949.

Fourth World Health Assembly

On May 2, the Department of State announced that Leonard A. Scheele, M.D., Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, has been designated by President Truman to serve as chairman of the United States delegation to the Fourth World Health Assembly, scheduled to convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 7.

Other members of the delegation are, as follows:

Delegates

Roy Cleere, M.D., Executive Director, Colorado State Department of Health, Denver, Colo.
India Edwards (Mrs. Herbert T. Edwards), Executive Director, Women's Division, Democratic National Committee

Alternates

Frederick J. Brady, M.D., Assistant Chief, International Organizations, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency
Howard B. Calderwood, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

H. van Zile Hyde, M.D., United States Representative,
Executive Board, World Health Organization
George Mason Ingram, Chief, Division of International
Administration, Department of State

Congressional Advisers

Herbert H. Lehman, United States Senate
Richard M. Nixon, United States Senate

Advisers

Gaylord Anderson, M.D., Dean, School of Public Health,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
Wesley E. Gilbertson, Sanitary Engineering Director,
Communicable Disease Center, Atlanta, Ga.
Malcolm T. MacEachern, M.D., Director Emeritus, Ameri-
can College of Surgeons, Chicago, Ill.
Richard S. Meiling, M.D., Chairman, Armed Forces Medi-
cal Policy Council, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense
Henry B. Mulholland, M.D., Assistant Dean and Professor
of the Practice of Medicine, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Va.
Anne Steffen, Assistant Dean, School of Nursing, Univer-
sity of Calif.
Knud Stowman, Ph.D., Foreign Affairs Health Adviser,
Division of International Health, Public Health Serv-
ice, Federal Security Agency

Secretary of the Delegation

Millard L. Kenestrick, Conference Attaché, Office of Resi-
dent United States Delegations to International Or-
ganizations, Geneva

Technical Assistant

Jeanne Ende, Office of United Nations Economic and
Social Affairs, Department of State

Documents Officer

Florence S. Thomason, Administrative Assistant to the
United States Representative, Executive Board, World
Health Organization

The Health Assembly is the policy-determining body of the World Health Organization (WHO), which was formally established on April 7, 1948, after the deposit of ratifications of the Organization's Constitution by 26 member states of the United Nations. At the present time, 75 states are members of the WHO.

One of the most important items on the agenda for the Fourth World Health Assembly is consideration of a draft sanitary code, to be known as International Sanitary Regulations or WHO Regulations No. 2. This code is designed to provide a maximum of security against the international transmission of such dangerous epidemic diseases as cholera, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus, and yellow fever.

Since April 9, a special committee on international sanitary regulations, on which the United States Government is represented, has been meeting at Geneva and has been revising and consolidating several existing, yet outmoded, international sanitary conventions in order to prepare for their replacement by a single code of procedure which will be applicable on a world-wide basis to all means of international transport and which will be sufficiently flexible to permit the making of

such periodic, partial revisions as may be necessary to keep pace with the progress of scientific knowledge. The new regulations will come into force 15 months after their acceptance by the Assembly.

A second important topic on the agenda is "the education and training of medical and public health personnel." At past sessions of the Assembly, in particular at the Third World Health Assembly held at Geneva May 8-27, 1950, the need for developing a sound and comprehensive program on professional and technical training was emphasized. Among the factors which made the need strikingly apparent were the problem of geographical distribution of doctors, the need for establishing international standards of medical education, and the lack of facilities in underdeveloped countries for training health personnel.

Consideration of the annual report of the Director-General for 1950, and of the reports of the various WHO expert committees, will provide a basis for considering new program proposals and for adopting the programs and budgets necessary to enable the WHO to achieve its objective of raising the health level of all peoples.

It is expected that the program adopted for 1952, as well as a new longer-term program which is to be adopted in order to give greater continuity to the work of WHO, will deal with a wide variety of activities:

The provision of advisory services to governments in the form of expert consultants and health demonstration teams;

The granting of fellowships for medical and health studies and training purposes;

The exchange of professional personnel between countries;

The promotion of medical research and dissemination of scientific knowledge;

The provision of daily information, for use by national health authorities and seaport and airport officials all over the world, regarding the prevalence of communicable diseases to assist governments in protecting their countries against the introduction of such diseases;

The prohibition of the distribution and use of habit-forming drugs; the safety, purity, potency, and uniformity of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products; and the advertising and labeling of such products moving in international commerce;

The provision of assistance to governments in dealing with epidemics and other emergencies;

The World Health Assembly will also consider and adopt a program to guide the activities of the WHO during 1952 in providing technical assistance for the economic development of underdeveloped countries.

Like past sessions of the Assembly, the Fourth World Health Assembly will also consider numerous administrative, financial, and legal matters. Included on the agenda are items relating

to the internal administration of the Wno; co-ordination with the United Nations and its specialized agencies on administrative and financial questions; applications by Germany, Japan, and Spain for membership in the Wno; the transfer to the Wno of the assets of the International Office of Public Health; the status of contributions; and the scale of assessments for member nations in 1952.

Sixth Session of Statistical Commission (ECOSOC)

On May 4, the Department of State announced that Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director in charge of statistical standards, Bureau of the Budget, and the United States Representative on the Statistical Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the sixth session of that Commission, which is to convene at Lake Success on May 7, 1951. Mr. Rice will be assisted by the following advisers:

Harry Venneman, Bureau of the Budget, *Principal Adviser*
Maxwell R. Conklin, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce
J. Edward Ely, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce
Vladimir Kolesnikoff, Bureau of the Budget

At its forthcoming session, the Statistical Commission will review a report on the standard international trade classification which was developed by the Commission at its third, fourth, and fifth sessions in order to provide a single classification of commodities for use in compiling international trade statistics. The need for such a classification stemmed from the desire of a number of countries to obtain guidance from the United Nations in devising new systems for classifying their own external trade statistics, the need for obtaining trade statistics which would be comparable either for a group of countries regionally or the world as a whole, and the need for reducing the variety of classifications used by international agencies in asking individual countries for statistical trade reports. It is expected that the report will deal, in particular, with the extent to which countries and international agencies have used the classification and the progress of work that has been undertaken to prepare comprehensive manuals or guides to the application of the classification.

The Commission will review and discuss reports on the classification of occupations; the international standard industrial classification of all economic activities; the application of transport definitions; censuses of distribution; the status of technical assistance in statistics; and the international convention relating to economic statistics. Proposals for international standards with respect to vital records and statistics, basic industrial sta-

tistics, price index numbers, and international trade statistics will also be discussed.

The Statistical Commission, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the Ecosoc, was established in 1946 to assist in the development of the statistical services of the United Nations Secretariat and to recommend those improvements of statistics and statistical methods necessary to make the statistics of one state comparable with the statistics of other states. Fifteen Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its fifth session was held at Lake Success, May 8-17, 1950.

THE DEPARTMENT

Noel Hemmendinger Named Economic Affairs Officer for Korea and Japan

The Department of State announced on April 15, 1951, that Noel Hemmendinger was appointed officer in charge of economic affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. In his new post, Mr. Hemmendinger will be responsible for economic policy with respect to Japan and Korea.

Assignments for Japanese Peace Settlement¹

1. The purpose of this announcement is to explain the assignments and responsibilities of the personnel working with Ambassador John Foster Dulles on problems relating to the proposed Japanese peace settlement.

2. In addition to his position as Consultant to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Dulles continues as the President's Special Representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, in conducting on behalf of the United States such further discussions and negotiations as may be necessary to bring a Japanese peace settlement to a successful conclusion.

3. Ambassador Dulles is assisted by the following staff:

a. John M. Allison is serving as Ambassador Dulles' Deputy, with the personal rank of Minister.

b. Robert A. Fearey is serving on detail from the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

c. Col. C. Stanton Babcock of the Office of Occupied Areas in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, acts as General Liaison Officer between Ambassador Dulles' office and the Department of Defense.

4. Ambassador Dulles, in coordination with the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, has action responsibility within the Department of State on all matters directly related to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan and the Japanese security and mutual assistance arrangements among the Pacific island nations connected therewith, within the definition of action responsibility found in Volume II, Organization, Manual of Regulations and Procedures.

¹ Departmental Announcement 103 of May 8, 1951.

The United States in the United Nations

[May 11-18, 1951]

General Assembly

Additional Measures Committee.—At its fifth meeting, May 14, the Committee, established by the General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951, to consider additional measures to be employed to meet aggression in Korea, adopted (11-0-1) an amended United States draft resolution which "*Recommends* that every State apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war."

United States Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, in introducing the resolution, called attention to the fact that it was addressed to all states, and not merely to United Nations members. He explained that the primary purpose was to proclaim as the United Nations policy the economic measures which were already being applied by a large number of countries. This embargo would have a very strong moral value in itself by demonstrating the unity of the United Nations and the intention of persevering in the efforts to repel the Communist aggression in Korea. He emphasized that this was a collective enterprise, just as the United Nations military action had been collective. He also stressed the importance of the references in the resolution to the Good Offices Committee and stated that the United States action in proposing the embargo in no way signaled a failure of the Good Offices Committee to find an avenue to peace in Korea. The resolution reaffirms that the United Nations policy continues to be that of bringing about a cease-fire and achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea and requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its efforts toward this end.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) advised that Great Britain had been applying, almost from the beginning of the Korean conflict, a "selective embargo" against the Chinese Communist regime. The continued unwillingness of Peiping to make any move in the direction of stopping the war had

removed any doubts his Government may have had about imposition of the embargo.

Francis Lacoste (France) said his Government approved the resolution because it had been applying very important restrictive measures to prevent such materials from reaching the People's Republic of China.

The Chairman, Selim Sarper (Turkey) emphasized that the proposed measures were "the least that could be done" and "a modest beginning." The resolution did little more than approve policy already being followed, he thought, and expressed the hope that additional measures would be considered.

Joseph Nisot (Belgium) stated that his country, as well as the Netherlands and Luxembourg, was already applying the embargo measures.

All the other members of the Committee, with the exception of Egypt, which abstained from voting, spoke in favor of the resolution.

Committee I (Political and Security).—The Chairman, Dr. Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez (Colombia), called a meeting of Committee I on May 17 to give immediate attention to the Additional Measures Committee report, which included the embargo resolution it had adopted. This report was to be considered under the agenda item of "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea."

Keith C. O. Shann (Australia), rapporteur of the Additional Measures Committee (AMC), stated that "quite a large number" of the members of that Committee were already carrying out the measures recommended in the draft resolution. It was, however, the opinion of the AMC that the recommendation of these measures to all United Nations members and other nations "may have an appreciable effect on the Chinese by filling loopholes in the present restrictions on the importation of materials useful in the waging of war."

The next delegates to speak, the U.S.S.R. and her satellites, refused to participate in the discussion, and argued that the General Assembly was not authorized to consider such questions as the imposition of an embargo, which was exclusively within the competence of the Security Council. However, as no formal proposal was presented

along these lines, the Chairman stated that the Committee would proceed with the debate.

Ambassador Gross (U.S.), the next speaker, announced that the United States, jointly with Australia, France, United Kingdom, and Venezuela, was offering an amendment to the embargo resolution by adding "transportation materials of strategic value" to the general list of items to be subjected to the embargo. The resolution, he stated, would mean that the United Nations would express "its determination that United Nations soldiers—soldiers on a mission unprecedented in history—must not be opposed by materials of war produced by member nations, or indeed, by any other state." He gave a detailed review of the various provisions of the embargo resolution, stressing those which are designed to prevent any circumvention of the embargo. "No state should go into the market place of the aggressors and enlarge its trade in commodities which other states have embargoed. The forces of aggression are not entitled to buy war materials in a black market."

Mr. Gross stressed also that provision of the resolution which would enable the Additional Measures Committee to recommend that the embargo be lifted if the aggression against the United Nations is ended. It was the opinion of the United States Government, he declared, that the embargo resolution would strengthen the hand of the Good Offices Committee, and that the resolution would be a further step in the United Nations efforts for peace. "The aggressors," he said, "will be brought closer to the realization that in their own self-interest, they must end their aggression. It is only in this way that a peaceful settlement in Korea can be achieved."

Statements in explanation and in support of the resolution were made by the majority of the members who voted for its adoption. They argued, in substance, that the proposed embargo was the logical step in the United Nations efforts to meet the aggression in Korea, and they all maintained that its effect would be to speed up the attainment of peace in Korea.

Also, several of the members that abstained from voting—Syria, Sweden, Egypt, India, Burma—advised as follows: (1) Syria—" . . . is always ready to comply with United Nations resolutions, irrespective of the way we vote"; (2) Sweden—" . . . no export of war material had taken place from Sweden to China and no such export was envisaged under the circumstances"; (3) Egypt—" . . . did not export any of the articles envisaged in this resolution"; (4) India—" . . . would remain unaffected by the resolution since its present trade with China was limited to barter for rice and other food grains and did not involve war materials," and (5) Burma—" . . . its trade with China was not appreciable and none of the materials listed was exported by Burma."

The joint amendment, adding "transportation materials of strategic value" to the categories of items to be embargoed was approved by a vote of 45-0-9. The amended resolution was adopted by a roll call vote of 45-0-9 (Afghanistan, Burma, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, Syria.) Ecuador abstained due to lack of instructions from its Government; Luxembourg was absent; and the Soviet bloc did not participate in the voting.

In a postvote explanation, Ambassador Gross (U.S.) declared that "the Soviet delegation misinterprets the Charter" in its claim that the General Assembly was not competent to deal with this issue. It was true that the Charter gave the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, but it was also true that when the Council was not discharging this responsibility, the General Assembly was empowered to do so. In this very case, the Security Council was prevented, "by Soviet veto," from carrying out its responsibility with regard to the aggression in Korea. Furthermore, he said, the Security Council had removed this question from its agenda.

General Assembly.—The Assembly met in plenary session on May 18, and, after limited general discussion, voted on the above embargo resolution in three parts: (1) the preamble was approved 44-0-10; (2) the operative section was adopted 46-0-8; and (3) the resolution as a whole was approved by a roll call vote of 47-0-8 (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, Syria). The Soviet bloc did not participate in the voting.

Security Council

Palestine.—Ambassador Warren R. Austin (U.S.) presented to the Council, May 16, a French-Turkish-United Kingdom-United States draft resolution designed to put an end to the current Syrian-Israeli dispute.

Ambassador Austin stated that it was the conviction of the United States that "if peace is to come in the Palestine area the major responsibility for such peace rests upon the parties in the area. They have the means for maintaining the Armistice that now exists, if they will use it in good faith. This means full cooperation with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, the rendering of all necessary facilities to the United Nations Observers in the performance of their duties, and a will to abide by decisions reached by the Commission or by its Chairman, whichever has jurisdiction in the case."

Statements in support of the draft resolution were made by representatives of the other sponsoring nations, and by Ecuador, the Netherlands, Brazil, and India.

On May 18 the Council members completed debate on the resolution, and it was adopted, with minor revisions, by a vote of 10-0-1 (U.S.S.R.).

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Sustaining Friendship With China

by Ambassador John Foster Dulles
*Consultant to the Secretary*¹

One of my most prized possessions is a letter I received when 8 years old from Li Hung Chang, then the great Chinese elder statesman. The opening sentence of the letter reads: "To the little grandchild of General Foster, my friend and counsellor in my hours of perplexity and trouble."

That letter is to me symbolic of what has been, and always should be, the relations between our peoples.

It breathes the spirit of fraternal friendship between their old and our young society. It reflects the kindly good humor and respect for home and family ties which make it easy for Americans to understand and to love the Chinese character. It confesses the troubles and perplexities which inevitably confront an ancient civilization when it is pressed upon by the thrusts of a restless new outer world. It testifies to the value to be found in counsel which is understanding and loyal.

That, you may say, is sentiment. So it is. Sentiment, rather than materialism, is, indeed, the essence of the relationship of the American people with the Chinese people. First, as colonists we came to know and admire Chinese art in terms of chinaware, wall paper, silks, and lacquer. Later, our clipper ships began directly to touch at China ports. But trade with China never grew to large proportions nor did Americans ever invest heavily in China. Always the contacts have been primarily cultural and spiritual, notably through missionaries.

Historic Relations With China

The Tientsin treaty of 1858 freely gave Christianity a special invitation. During the nineteenth century, scarcely a community in the United States was without at least a share in a missionary to China. Our church people regularly gathered together to fill missionary boxes for China and to hear read aloud the story of their China mis-

sionary and his Chinese friends and of the growing spiritual kinship between them. Later, Americans founded in China many Christian colleges, medical schools, and hospitals, and many Chinese students came to this country.

Only when the Spanish war made us a western Pacific power did our relations with China become a matter of major governmental concern. We saw that the people of China should be allowed to develop in their own way which, we were confident, would be a peaceful way. We were fearful of the consequences if the Chinese became the tools of alien despots. So, Secretary Hay called for the "open door," Secretary Hughes made the Washington treaty to maintain China's integrity, Secretary Stimson proclaimed "nonrecognition of the fruits of aggression." Finally, we accepted the probability of war with Japan rather than accept Japanese domination of China through the puppet regimes which Japan had set up in Manchukuo and Nanking.

During the long, hard Pacific war, the United States helped China, both morally and materially, and we looked forward to victory as opening a new era of closer friendship between us.

Insidious Influence of Communism

It comes as a brutal shock that today much of China is under the control of a regime which fanatically hates the United States and which has sent Chinese armies to Korea to kill Americans who are there at the behest of the United Nations.

The Chinese Communist attitude is exemplified by a widely publicized pamphlet written last October. The first section is entitled *We Must Hate America, Because She is the Chinese People's Implacable Enemy*. There follows a recital of alleged historic incidents which blames the United States for almost all of China's troubles, beginning with the opium war which was allegedly supported by the American Navy.

The second section is entitled *We Must Despise America, Because it is a Corrupt Imperialistic Nation, the World Center of Reaction and Deca-*

¹ Address made before the China Institute at New York City, N.Y. on May 18 and released to the press on the same date.

dency. There follows a picture of the United States which is indeed startling: 18 million unemployed; 10 million with no housing whatsoever; 40 million who barely exist in slums; 14 thousand agents of the F.B.I. engaged in "the exclusive mission of persecuting the people"; 99 percent of the newspapers and magazines controlled by the National Association of Manufacturers and used for making the younger generation "spiritually decadent and halting their intellectual development, so that they may be driven to serve aggression and war."

The third section is entitled *We Must Look Down Upon America Because She is a Paper Tiger and Entirely Vulnerable to Defeat*. There follows a picture of America without friends or allies, internally divided and confronted by the closely knit 830 million peoples of China, Russia, and the Russian satellite states. Our great industrial capacity is admitted but, it is said, this will be offset when Western Europe is liberated and, further, our concentrated industry is said to be particularly vulnerable to the Soviet Union's atom bombs. It concludes America faces "defeat which will be more disastrous than that which befell Hitler and Japan."

That is the regular Party line. By print, by radio, by drama, by pictures, with all of the skills which communism has developed, "Hate America, Despise America" is the sentiment being pounded into the Chinese people.

How has this come to pass? In part, no doubt, because of some errors on our part. But, in a larger sense, the present situation is the Soviet's reward for 30 years of hard work.

In 1924, Stalin revealed it as basic strategy that "the road to victory over the West" would be sought in Asia, and particularly, China. The 450 million people of China must be made to serve the Soviet Communist program of world conquest. To this end, a Chinese Communist Party was formed under the guiding direction of the Russian, Borodin. That Party, Soviet Russia has nurtured until it has matured into today's regime of Mao Tse-tung which serves as the instrument of Soviet communism.

If any doubt that relationship, I remind them of these facts:

1. The Chinese Communist Party has consistently and publicly proclaimed its disciple-master relationship with Stalin and Soviet Russia. The following oft-repeated statement of Mao Tse-tung, first made in 1939, is typical:

The fact that Stalin has come into the world is indeed fortunate. Today, when we have the Soviet Union, the Communist Party, and Stalin—all's right with the world.

2. The Soviet Government paid a great price to bring the Chinese Communist regime into power and would only have done so to serve itself. Among other things, it openly dishonored its 1945 Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with National China whereby it undertook that for 20 years its

"moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources," would "be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China."

3. Mao Tse-tung, after winning mainland victories with the Soviet help we have referred to, went to Moscow at the end of 1949 where he spent nearly 3 months in consultation with the Soviet leaders. On his return, he broadcast to the peoples of Southeast Asia, calling upon them to seek liberation through "armed struggle" as part of the "forces headed by the Soviet Union." There followed Communist-armed interventions in Korea, Indochina, Tibet, and the Philippines. These interventions conformed exactly with known Soviet wishes and, indeed, were forecast in advance by the Soviet official press.

4. These foreign policies of Mao Tse-tung are utterly irreconcilable with the interests of the Chinese people. After 14 years of exhausting war, they desperately need internal recuperation. No one in his senses could assert that it is in China's interest to shovel its youth and material resources into the fiery furnace of Korean war to gain South Korea, an area which means little to China, but which, since the czars, has been coveted by Russia because of its strategic value as against Japan.

By the test of conception, birth, nurture, and obedience, the Mao Tse-tung regime is a creature of the Moscow Politburo, and it is on behalf of Moscow, not of China, that it is destroying the friendship of the Chinese people toward the United States.

What has happened is precisely what Stalin planned. In his 1924 lectures on Leninism, Stalin discusses what he calls "The National Problem," that is, the problem of how aspirations for national independence can be fitted into the Soviet program of world conquest. Communist leaders in Asia must, he says, recognize that national independence is but a slogan wherewith to ride into power on anticolonial sentiment. But, once in power, the Communist leaders must fight against the tendency of the masses toward "national insularity" and must seek "the amalgamation of these masses into a single state union" which is the goal of "Soviet power."

That is what is going on in China now. Anti-American sentiment is being whipped up to eradicate the influence of the West, ostensibly in the interest of national independence. But this popular hysteria is sought as a front behind which the Chinese people are being deprived of their independence and being betrayed into amalgamation with the mass which serves Moscow.

It is inevitable that many Chinese should be fooled by what is going on. But the American people and their Government should not be fooled. We should treat the Mao Tse-tung regime for what it is—a puppet regime. The relationship to Moscow is camouflaged more craftily than was

the relationship between the Japanese and the Nanking regime of Wang Ching-wei. Recent developments in the technique of propaganda enable it to win greater popular support and to depend less openly upon foreign military power. But the doctrine and the iron discipline of the Communist Party, Bolshevik, bind Mao Tse-tung to the service of Moscow more completely than was Wang Ching-wei ever bound to the service of Japan.

That could change. The Chinese people are today being abused to a degree that is causing many Chinese Communist leaders to feel rebellious against the subservieny to Moscow. But, unless and until actual conduct gives clear proof of change, our national self-interest, our friendship for China, and the historic dedication of our Nation to the cause of human freedom combine to require that no act of ours shall contribute to a Mao Tse-tung success which could fasten the yoke of Moscow on the Chinese people.

My own official concern today is the Japanese peace treaty. I can assure you that, in negotiating that treaty, we shall not consider that the voice of Mao Tse-tung is the voice of China.

While we thus adopt a negative attitude toward Mao Tse-tung and all his ilk, we should adopt a positive attitude toward the many Chinese who remain loyal to the welfare of China and to the friendship between China and the United States which has in the past served China so well. Our own loyalty to those ideals should be demonstrated by deeds, public and private. It will not always be easy to find the way. But whatever the obstacles, however long and troubled be the way, we must be loyal to past and present friendships. We must work to preserve these friendships with persistence and resourcefulness at least equal to that which for 30 years Soviet communism has devoted to undermining Chinese-American friendship.

A great weakness is that we are not enough interested in long-range programs. Because elections come so frequently, there is a tendency on the part of government to seek short cuts which can bear quick political fruit. There is a tendency to evade long, hard tasks.

That gives the Soviet Union a great advantage, for its planning is often in terms of what Stalin has referred to as "an entire historic era."

I am not advocating slow motion in the case of China. On the contrary, it is imperative that we move quickly, while we still have many friends not only on Formosa, but also on the mainland, and possibilities of access to them. But we must not only start fast, we must start with long vision and endurance because we cannot overnight undo what has been accomplished by the best brains and skills of the Soviet Communist Party working with substantial resources over a span of 30 years.

Generally, and particularly in the Orient, great results are not achieved quickly, and those who

would succeed must dedicate themselves to sustained effort.

That is where our people come in. In the past, our churches, colleges, private organizations, and individuals have decisively molded and sustained our China policy. That must continue to be the case. Despite provocation and discouragements in China, the American people must persist in their faith in the Chinese people and the determination to find works which will express that faith. Thus hatred will succumb to friendship, servitude will give way to liberation, and warfare will subside into peace.

We have entered upon a period of long trial. But true friendship has the capacity to survive the strain of misunderstanding, provocation, and disappointment. It "beareth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."

Those who have been friends of China, who inherit and would preserve that great tradition, have often been mocked because their plans have gone awry, and their hopes have seemed vain. All of that is unimportant, so long as faith and determination persist. The friends of China may have been daily wrong—but they have been eternally right.

Italian Senate Approves Funds for Defense Budget

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press May 18]

The Italian Ambassador [Alberto Tarchiani] called upon me to discuss the Italian defense effort and to inform me of the passage by the Italian Senate of the bill appropriating 250 billion lire, the equivalent of 400 million dollars, for rearmament as Italy's immediate additional contribution to the defense of the North Atlantic community.

I welcomed this expression of Italy's cooperation with the other nations of the North Atlantic community in their common program for deterring aggression. I pointed out that free democratic Italy has made a notable recovery since the war and today occupies a place of distinction and full equality among the free nations working to establish an enduring peace. Although denied admission into the United Nations by repeated Soviet vetoes, Italy as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is making a major contribution to the common defense of liberty and the preservation of democratic traditions in a free world.

The bonds of friendship existing between the American and Italian people are being constantly strengthened by daily association and cooperation in the effort to maintain peace and guard against aggression.

Chinese-American Friendship

by Dean Rusk

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I should like, first of all, to congratulate the China Institute on its quarter century of splendid public service and to compliment you who are responsible for this timely chance to recall the warm friendship which has marked the relations between the Chinese and American people throughout the last two centuries.

Something of what we have in mind this evening is contained in a concurrent resolution which passed the Senate on May 4 and which is now before the House of Representatives, which reads in part:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, and declares—

That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood; and

That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war;

Traditional Bonds

Despite the artificial barriers which now separate us from most of the peoples of China, we meet to reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for the people of China.

Most of you here this evening are better qualified than I to explore the origins and elements of Chinese-American friendship. Over the centuries, this friendship has come to be taken for granted; cordial sentiments between a free China and a free America became strong and durable

because they were constantly nourished by common purposes and common practical interests.

We and the Chinese, for example, have had a vital interest in the peace of the Pacific. Each of us wants security on our Pacific flank and wants to be able to look across those vast waters to find strength, independence, and good will in its great neighbor on the other side. It was inevitable that the driving force of Japanese militarism would sooner or later bring China and America together to oppose it, just as we had moved 40 years earlier to support China's independence and integrity against threats from Europe. The same issues are now posed again—and are made more difficult to deal with because foreign encroachment is now being arranged by Chinese who seem to love China less than they do their foreign masters.

We meet here this evening to reaffirm our friendship with the Chinese people—but not merely as a routine and elegant expression of good will. For the friendship we have taken for granted for so long is now being attacked with every available weapon by those who have come to power on the mainland of China. Their sustained and violent effort to erase all evidence of this friendship bears powerful witness to the validity and strength of the bonds between our two peoples. American influence among the Chinese people is intolerable to those in power in Peiping and Moscow because they know, and quite rightly, that the idea of national and individual freedom which is at the heart of American political thought is the greatest threat to their own evil purposes.

Is the message of this meeting this evening to our friends in China prompted solely by narrowly conceived American interests? That important American interests are involved, there can be no doubt. But our historical relations with China have always reflected a high regard on our part for Chinese interests, and it is these we ask our friends in China now to consider.

¹ Address made before the China Institute at New York on May 18 and released to the press on the same date.

Threats to China's Independence

The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Communist world, there is room for only one master—a jealous and implacable master, whose price of friendship is complete submission. How many Chinese, in one community after another, are now being destroyed because they love China more than the Soviet Union? How many Chinese will remember in time the fates of Rajk, Kostov, Petkov, Clementis, and all those in other satellites who discovered that being Communist is not enough for the conspirators of the Kremlin?

The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, mass slaughter, banishment as forced labor to Manchuria, Siberia or Sinkiang, the arbitrary seizure of property, the destruction of loyalties within the family, the suppression of free speech—these are the facts behind the parades and celebrations and the empty promises.

The territorial integrity of China is now an ironic phrase. The movement of Soviet forces into Sinkiang, the realities of “joint exploitation” of that great province by Moscow and Peiping, the separation of Inner Mongolia from the body politic of China, and the continued inroads of Soviet power into Manchuria under the cloak of the Korean aggression mean in fact that China is losing its great northern areas to the European empire which has stretched out its greedy hands for them for at least a century.

Are our Chinese friends reflecting upon the maps of China now being published on the mainland which show Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and areas in the west and southwest as something distinct from China? Are our friends in China impressed by trade union buttons appearing on the streets of Peiping which no longer show Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia on the map of China? Have the authorities in Peiping themselves fully considered what it means for them to have Soviet troops on Chinese soil, in the light of the experience of the miserable satellites of Eastern Europe?

The peace and security of China are being sacrificed to the ambitions of the Communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure of foreign aggression which cuts across the most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people. This action stands condemned by the great world community in which the Chinese people have always aspired to play a worthy role.

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese youths are being sacrificed in a fiery furnace, pitting their waves of human flesh against the fire power of modern weapons and without heavy equipment, adequate supply, or the most elementary medical attention. Apart from Korea, the Chinese are being pressed to aggressive action in other areas—all calculated to divert the attention and energies

of China away from the encroachments of Soviet imperialism upon China itself.

Support From the Free World

I find it hard to believe that the Chinese people will acquiesce in the kind of future which their masters are now preparing for them. I find it impossible to believe that our friends in China have given up their desire to live at peace with their neighbors, to play a major role as a peaceful member of the international community of nations, to trade freely with all the world, to improve their own conditions in accordance with their own needs, aspirations and traditions, to maintain their independence as a nation, to preserve their territorial integrity, and to live out their lives in dignity and with the respect of their fellow men.

Events in China must surely challenge the concern of Chinese everywhere—in Formosa, on the mainland, and in overseas communities. There is a job to be done for China which only the Chinese can do—a job which will require sustained energy, continued sacrifice, and an abundance of the high courage with which so many Chinese have fought for so long during the struggles of the past decades. The rest of us cannot tell them exactly what is to be done or how. We cannot provide a formula to engage the unity of effort among all Chinese who love their country. But one thing we can say—as the Chinese people move to assert their freedom and to work out their destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes—they can count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts of the world.

It is not my purpose, in these few moments this evening, to go into specific elements of our own national policy in the present situation. But we can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. It is entitled only to the fruits of its own conduct—the fruits of aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselessly embarked.

We recognize the National Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That Government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. Under the circumstances, however, such aid in itself cannot be decisive to the future of China. The decision and the effort are for the

Chinese people, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of China.

If the Chinese people decide for freedom, they shall find friends among all the peoples of the earth who have known and love freedom. They shall find added strength from those who refuse to believe that China is fated to become a land of tyranny and aggression and who expect China to fulfill the promise of its great past.

*Statement by Michael J. McDermott
Chief Press Officer²*

Attempts to read into the speech of Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk on Friday night implications which are said to amount to a change in policy are not justified by what was said. The speech was intended to be and was a restatement of the deep and long friendship between the Chinese and American people, the concern of the American people for preserving the independence and integrity of China and our concern that the Chinese people have been sacrificed by Communist leaders in the fighting in Korea. It reaffirms our hope and belief that the Chinese people will not give up their national characteristic of wishing

to live at peace with and engage in peaceful trade with the nations of the world. It states what has often been said before, that the United States will not acquiesce or aid in fastening upon them a regime which subordinates their interests to the interests of a foreign state. It states that this regime is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. There is certainly nothing new here.

It states the fact that we continue to recognize the National Government of the Republic of China and we believe that its demand for independence from foreign control represents an historic Chinese attitude. It states that we are giving aid to the National Government, as we are obviously and publicly doing.

It concludes that if the Chinese people decide for freedom they will find friends among all people who love freedom. Such a decision on the part of the Chinese people obviously would restore close relations between the Chinese and other peoples of the world.

To strive to build these statements into far-reaching conclusions of involvement in the Chinese civil war is absolutely not justified.

Embargo on Shipments to People's Republic of China Urged

*Statements by Ambassador Ernest A. Gross
Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N.³*

The aggression against the United Nations in Korea continues.

Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities, reckless of casualties, press their attack against the Republic of Korea. The aggressors ignore the efforts of the President of the General Assembly and of the Good Offices Committee to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means.

Forces of the United Nations stand shoulder to shoulder with forces of the Republic of Korea in resisting the wanton assaults of the aggressors. We meet today to consider how best to support United Nations forces fighting in the field, how best to help end the aggression, and how best to help bring about that peaceful settlement which it is our declared purpose to achieve.

The draft resolution of the Additional Measures

Committee proposes one immediate and practical step leading toward the attainment of these three great objectives. The members of the Additional Measures Committee have worked long and carefully to make sure that their first recommendation would be responsive to the actual situation in Korea, as well as to the objectives laid down in the General Assembly's resolution of February 1. The Committee has labored constantly to preserve the fundamental unity of the United Nations in its determination to resist aggression.

The Committee's task was to devise measures which would supplement the military action of the United Nations forces in the field. Numerous consultations and exchanges of views among members of the Committee led to agreement that priority should be given to the consideration of economic measures. The result of that agreement is the resolution set forth in the Committee's first report.

The resolution recommends a full strategic embargo against Communist China and the North Koreans. What does that mean? It means that

² Made on May 21.

³ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on May 17 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

the General Assembly will recommend not simply to all members of the United Nations, but to all states everywhere, that they deny these two aggressors strategic materials necessary to maintain the armies they are hurling against United Nations units in Korea. It means that the United Nations is expressing its determination that United Nations soldiers—soldiers on a mission unprecedented in history—must not be opposed by materials of war produced by member nations or indeed by any other state.

My Government already has banned all trade with North Korea and Communist China. We prohibit United States ships and planes from calling at Communist Chinese ports or carrying goods destined for that area. We have frozen Communist Chinese assets within the United States.

Many other members of the United Nations have already prohibited the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China.

The resolution now before us takes account of these facts and recommends a full United Nations strategic embargo—a program which can be immediately and effectively applied on the widest possible scale.

I turn now to a more detailed comment on the draft resolution.

Paragraph B of the preamble records the important fact that a number of states have already embargoed the shipment of strategic items to Communist China. The draft resolution proclaims the policy of the United Nations to make these actions more effective by widening the area of international cooperation.

Paragraph C of the preamble states the two purposes of the proposed embargo. First, these measures would support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea. Second, they would assist in putting an end to the aggression. To restate United Nations objectives in this resolution is a good thing. It is right to say that the United Nations is determined to do what is needful in order to attain those objectives.

In the operative part of the resolution, paragraph A contains a broad formula for deciding what strategic items are recommended for embargo. My delegation has joined with four other delegations in sponsoring an amendment which would help clarify the formula and thereby strengthen the resolution. As revised, paragraph A would recommend that every state:

(A) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war.

Under paragraph B of the operative section each state would have the responsibility of deciding which items are covered by the broad formulation of the embargo, and what specific

Text of Embargo Resolution

U.N. doc. A/1805
Adopted May 18, 1951

The General Assembly.

NOTING the Report of the Additional Measures Committee dated 14 May 1951,

RECALLING its resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951,

NOTING THAT

(a) The Additional Measures Committee established by that resolution has considered additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea,

(b) The Additional Measures Committee has reported that a number of States have already taken measures designed to deny contributions to the military strength of the forces opposing the United Nations in Korea,

(c) The Additional Measures Committee has also reported that certain economic measures designed further to deny such contributions would support and supplement the military action of the United Nations in Korea and would assist in putting an end to the aggression,

1. *Recommends* that every State:

(a) Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war;

(b) Determine which commodities exported from its territory fall within the embargo, and apply controls to give effect to the embargo;

(c) Prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States pursuant to the present resolution;

(d) Co-operate with other States in carrying out the purposes of this embargo;

(e) Report to the Additional Measures Committee, within 30 days and thereafter at the request of the Committee, on the measures taken in accordance with the present resolution;

2. *Requests* the Additional Measures Committee:

(a) To report to the General Assembly, with recommendations as appropriate, on the general effectiveness of the embargo and the desirability of continuing, extending or relaxing it;

(b) To continue its consideration of additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

3. *Reaffirms* that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its good offices.

controls it should apply to prevent their continued export.

Paragraph C recommends that each state support the actions taken by others so that a com-

modity embargoed by one state shall not be transhipped or reexported or in some other way assisted on its way to the aggressors.

Paragraph D asserts the basic nature of this plan by recommending cooperation among states. It is broad; but it is meaningful. No state should go into the market place of the aggressors and enlarge its trade in commodities which other states have embargoed. The forces of aggression are not entitled to buy war materials in a black market.

The draft resolution provides that each state will determine what particular articles fall within the strategic embargo. Hence, the review machinery which this resolution would establish is an essential part of the program. Like all effective United Nations operations, this is a cooperative undertaking for collective security. It tests the determination of members of the United Nations to support by economic measures United Nations forces fighting in Korea to protect the system of collective security upon which the survival of the free world depends.

The resolution further makes two requests of the Additional Measures Committee. First, it is asked to establish a procedure for reviewing reports made by states on the measures they have already taken or will take in accordance with the resolution. This provision will allow the Additional Measures Committee to determine how well the embargo is being applied and whether new measures are needed to apply it more effectively. The Additional Measures Committee will also be in a position to recommend changes in the embargo in the light of changing circumstances. If the aggression continues, the Additional Measures Committee may recommend broader economic measures. The experience gained through the strategic embargo would show how to apply such measures most effectively and thus help solve those complex economic and administrative problems which such broader measures may entail. If the aggression ends, the Committee may recommend that the United Nations end its embargo.

The Additional Measures Committee would also be requested to continue its consideration of other different measures which might usefully be employed to meet the aggression. The decision of the Committee to give priority to economic measures does not, of course, alter the responsibility of the Committee, under its original terms of reference, which this resolution would reaffirm.

The final paragraph of the resolution requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its efforts. My Government attaches great importance to the work of the Good Offices Committee. We believe that the peace-making functions of the United Nations must never be lost sight of, even in the midst of our efforts to strengthen collective action against aggression. In our view, the measures contemplated by the draft resolution will strengthen the hand of the Good Offices Committee, by demon-

strating to the aggressors our unity of purpose and firmness of action against aggression and for peace.

The passage of this resolution will be a further step in the United Nations effort for peace. The aggressors will be brought closer to the realization that in their own self-interest they must end their aggression. It is only in this way that a peaceful settlement in Korea can be achieved.

In my statement earlier today, I set forth the attitude of my Government concerning the resolution just adopted by this Committee and the reasons why we support it. My explanation of vote at this time is designed to deal with the question raised by the Soviet delegate concerning the power of the General Assembly to recommend collective measures against the aggressor.

The Soviet delegate, as I understood his argument, maintains that under the United Nations Charter the Security Council is the only United Nations body authorized to deal with the question of collective measures.

The Soviet delegate misinterprets the Charter. It is true, as he said, that article 24 confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security but it is also true, as he did not say, that the Charter confers upon the General Assembly the authority to discuss and make recommendations on any question or any matter within the scope of the Charter, unless the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the Charter. If the Security Council fails to exercise its functions, or ceases to deal with matters arising under the Charter, the General Assembly has the power to make recommendations appropriate to deal with them.

The General Assembly itself has declared this to be true. In its resolution entitled *Uniting for Peace*, adopted on November 4, 1950, the Assembly formally resolved that "if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

In this very case, Mr. Chairman, the General Assembly dealt squarely with the question which has arisen because in this very case the Security Council has been prevented by Soviet veto from carrying out its responsibility to deal with the aggression in Korea. The very first paragraph of the resolution of February 1, 1951, which sets up the Additional Measures Committee and under

which resolution the Additional Measures Committee has reported to the Assembly, stated:

Noting that the Security Council because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

Then the resolution proceeds to take the action with which we are familiar. In addition, Mr. Chairman, the Security Council itself by formal action on January 31, at its 531st meeting, had taken this question off the agenda of the Security Council.

There can be no question in the view of my delegation, therefore, that the General Assembly is fully authorized by the Charter to recommend the action which this Committee has just approved.

U.S. Position on Iranian Oil Situation

[Released to the press May 18]

The United States is deeply concerned by the dispute between the Iranian and British Governments over Iranian oil. We are firm friends of both Iran and Great Britain and are sincerely interested in the welfare of each country. The United States wants an amicable settlement to this dispute, which is serious not only to the parties directly concerned but also to the whole free world. We have followed the matter closely and have told both countries where we stand. The views which we have expressed have related to the broad aspects of the problem, as it has not been appropriate for us to advise with respect to specific terms of arrangements which might be worked out.

Since the United States attitude has been the subject of some speculation, it is deemed advisable to describe the position which we have taken in our talks with representatives of Iran and Great Britain.

We have stressed to the Governments of both countries the need to solve the dispute in a friendly way through negotiation and have urged them to avoid intimidation and threats of unilateral action.

In our talks with the British Government, we have expressed the opinion that arrangements should be worked out with the Iranians which give recognition to Iran's expressed desire for greater control over and benefits from the development of its petroleum resources. While the United States has not approved or disapproved the terms of any particular British proposal, it is pleased to note a sincere desire on the part of the British to negotiate with the Iranians on all outstanding issues.

We fully recognize the sovereign rights of Iran and sympathize with Iran's desire that increased benefits accrue to that country from the development of its petroleum. In talks with the Iranian Government, we have pointed out the serious effects of any unilateral cancellation of clear contractual relationships which the United States

strongly opposes. We have stressed the importance of the Iranians achieving their legitimate objectives through friendly negotiation with the other party, consistent with their international responsibilities. This would have the advantage of maintaining confidence in future commercial investments in Iran and, indeed, in the validity of contractual arrangements all over the world.

Iran has been urged, before it takes final action, to analyze carefully the practical aspects of this problem. In this connection, we have raised the question of whether or not the elimination of the established British oil company from Iran would in fact secure for Iran the greatest possible benefits. We have pointed out that the efficient production and refining of Iranian oil requires not only technical knowledge and capital but transport and marketing facilities such as those provided by the company. We have also pointed out that any uncertainty as to future availability of Iranian supplies would cause concern on the part of customers which might lead to shifts in their source of supply with a consequent decreased revenue to Iran.

Those United States oil companies which would be best able to conduct operations such as the large-scale and complex industry in Iran have indicated to this Government that they would not in the face of unilateral action by Iran against the British company be willing to undertake operations in that country. Moreover, petroleum technicians of the number and competence required to replace those presently in Iran are not, due to extreme shortages of manpower in this specialized field, available in this country or in other countries.

The United States believes that Iran and Great Britain have such a strong mutuality of interests that they must and will find some way, through friendly negotiation, of reestablishing a relationship which will permit each party to play its full role in the achievement of their common objectives. Through such negotiation it is felt that Iran's basic desires and interests can best be realized, the legitimate British interests preserved, and the essential flow of Iranian oil into the markets of the free world maintained.

The United States has repeatedly expressed its great interest in the continued independence and territorial integrity of Iran and has given and will continue to give concrete evidence of this interest.

Consular Offices

The consular agency at Quepos, Costa Rica, was closed both to the public and officially on April 30, 1951.

The American Legation at Vientiane, Laos, was officially opened on August 22, 1950. The office is a special purpose post administered by a Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the absence of the American Minister who is accredited to the three associated states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The Minister maintains his permanent residence at Saigon, Vietnam, and makes periodic visits to other associated states.

U. S. Analyzes Comments by U. S. S. R. for Effecting Japanese Peace Treaty

U. S. MEMORANDUM TO U. S. S. R.

[Released to the press May 20]

The following United States reply to the remarks of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated May 7, 1951, on the draft Japanese peace treaty was handed to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on May 19, 1951.

The Government of the United States has carefully considered the remarks of the Government of the Soviet Union of May 7, 1951, relative to the draft of a Japanese peace treaty which the Government of the United States submitted on March 29, 1951. These remarks show the persistence of a major difference of opinion as regards procedure. However, as regards substance, the Government of Soviet Union raises objection only to the proposed treatment of (a) Formosa and the Pescadores; (b) the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; (c) Japan's future security; and even here the differences are only partial, not total. The Soviet Government's analysis would seem to constitute a genuine, if unintended, tribute to the regard for balanced justice with which the draft treaty was prepared.

I

The paragraphs of the Soviet Government's Remarks numbered I, deal with procedure.

The Soviet Government asserts that under the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, "the drawing up of a peace treaty with Japan has been laid upon the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain," constituting for this purpose the Council of Foreign Ministers.

This view of the Soviet Government has been put forward on several occasions and has as often been rejected by the Government of the United States.

The Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, contemplates that the Council of Foreign Ministers thereby established would, "as its immediate important task," draw up "treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland" and propose "settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe." It is then provided that the Council "shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany." It is finally provided that "Other matters may from time to time be re-

ferred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments."

Thus, the Potsdam Agreement between the Government of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States did not mention the Japanese Peace Treaty. This was natural, for the war with Japan was then in full vigor and the Soviet Union was then neutral in that war.

The Council of Foreign Ministers can, of course, deal with "other matters" than the European matters specified, but only "by agreement between the Member Governments."

The United States has not agreed and does not agree to the reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the matter of making a Japanese peace treaty. The reason, among others, is that the systematic misuse in the Council of veto power militates against the speedy achievement, through the Council, of an early peace treaty. Furthermore, the procedures of the Council would give a secondary role to Allied Powers which bore a greater burden of the Pacific war than did the Soviet Union.

The Government of the Soviet Union urges that the peace-making procedure should fully take account of the interests of China in a Japanese peace treaty. The procedure being presently followed does that. It is true that the United States does not seek guidance from a convicted aggressor, but the real interests of China are fully reflected in the present draft treaty. For example, by Article 11, "Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China" and Article 19 makes this renunciation automatically effective. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Government, which in Parts II and III of its remarks, deals fully with substantive issues, suggests no modification or addition in favor of China except in relation to Formosa and the Pescadores, as to which it is suggested that Japan should do more than liquidate its own title. This large measure of acceptance by the Government of the Soviet Union of the substantive provisions dealing with China testifies to the scrupulous regard for China's interests with which the draft treaty was prepared.

II

The paragraphs of the Soviet Government's remarks numbered II deal with the substance of the draft treaty.

(a) As to territorial matters, the Government of the Soviet Union suggests that the draft treaty does not faithfully reflect the Surrender Terms because it does not provide that "the Island of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China."

The territorial clause of the Surrender Terms stipulated "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." The draft treaty would, in fact, limit Japanese sovereignty accordingly.

The Cairo Declaration provided that "Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."

The Government of the United States notes that the remarks of the Soviet Government fail to quote accurately the Cairo Declaration. The word "Manchuria" is deleted and "China" is substituted for "the Republic of China."

In view of the known acquisition by the U. S. S. R. of zones of interest in Manchuria, the United States Government is prompted to inquire as to the significance of the present avoidance by the Soviet Government of reference to the restoration of Manchuria.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Government of the Soviet Union has itself pointed out on numerous occasions that the "Republic of China" is not identical with what the Soviet Government now refers to as the "Chinese People's Republic," the Government of the United States inquires of the Government of the Soviet Union whether it in fact now desires that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores should be restored to "the Republic of China."

The draft treaty proceeds on the assumption that Japanese sovereignty "shall be limited" to exclude sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores, according to the Surrender Terms and that if this is done by Japan, Japan will have done all that can be required of her and the Japanese people ought not to be denied a state of peace because of a difference of opinion among the Allied Powers as to the subsequent disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores.

The Government of the Soviet Union criticizes the provision that the Ryukyu, Bonin, and certain other islands may be placed under United Nations trusteeship with the United States as administering authority.

It is true that the Surrender Terms, neither by themselves, nor by the incorporated reference to the Cairo Declaration, mention by name South Sakhalin or the Kurile Islands, now occupied by the Soviet Union, or the Ryukyu, Bonin Islands or other islands mentioned in the Remarks of the Soviet Government. Since, however, the Surrender Terms provided, as indicated, that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the four main islands and such minor islands as may be

determined, it is consonant with the Surrender Terms for the Allied Powers by treaty of peace with Japan to deal with Japanese islands other than the four main islands mentioned.

(b) As to demilitarization, the Soviet Government complains that the present draft does not guarantee against the restoration of Japanese militarism and does not limit the size of armed forces in Japan. It is said that this cannot be reconciled with "known agreements of the powers concerning demilitarization of Japan."

The Soviet Government does not attempt to identify the so-called "known agreements". In fact there are none, outside of understandings dealing with the occupation period.

Of the agreements mentioned by the Soviet Government's remarks, neither Cairo nor Yalta touch on the subject. The Potsdam Surrender Terms provide that "until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied," and that "the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."

The United States Government is satisfied that "Japan's war-making power is destroyed." Apparently the Soviet Government shares that conviction, since it says that the occupation of Japan has "impermissibly dragged on". Furthermore, the United States, so far as it is concerned, has in fact completely disarmed the Japanese military forces under its control and has assured that they now lead peaceful and productive lives. Of the belligerents, only the Soviet Government has failed to comply with this provision and, in violation of the Surrender Terms, withholds from return to their homes and peaceful lives approximately 200 thousand Japanese soldiers. The people of Japan, eagerly await the return to peaceful pursuits of these thousands of Japanese soldiers, as promised by the Surrender Terms.

With respect to the avoidance of any future offensive military threat from Japan, this is a matter of profound concern to the United States, which bore the burden of Japan's war of aggression for nearly 4 years, as against 6 days of Soviet Union belligerency. It is the belief of the United States Government that the most effective means to the desired end is to make the future security of the Japanese area a matter of collective international concern, which would as a practical matter assure that the measures which the Japanese might take for their own security, would develop as a cooperative rather than as a purely national project.

The President of the United States indicated in his statement of April 18, 1951, that the United States Government is prepared now to take what the President referred to as "natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace" in the Pacific Ocean

area and, as one of such steps, to enter into a post-treaty security arrangement with Japan. The United States Government contemplates that this arrangement would accept the principle that Japan should not possess military forces which could become an offensive threat.

The United States Government is not disposed to rely upon the dependability of treaty limitations on armament such as were imposed upon Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by the Treaties of Peace and which limitations already are being grossly exceeded.

(c) As to ending the Occupation, the Soviet Government alleges that the present draft does not establish any period for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Japan. On the contrary, under the draft treaty, the occupation would cease upon the coming into force of the treaty. If, after the treaty comes into force, any allied troops are in Japan they will not be there as occupation troops but pursuant to such collective security arrangement as Japan may make voluntarily. Such arrangement would carry no offensive threat.

The Government of the Soviet Union refers to the fact that the territory of Japan and its natural and human resources are even now being utilized in connection with what is referred to as "armed intervention in Korea" by which is presumably meant the efforts of the United Nations to repel armed aggression in Korea.

The assistance which the Japanese in fact are rendering to the United Nations action in Korea is within the demilitarization limits established by Far Eastern Commission decisions, is nonbelligerent in character, and is in accord with the Charter and recommendation of the United Nations.

According to Article 2, Paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Charter even "states which are not members of the United Nations" are required to "give the United Nations every assistance" so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, and General Assembly Resolution No. A/1771 adopted February 1, 1951, calls upon "all states and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to United Nations action in Korea."

(d) As to Japan's peacetime economy, the Soviet Government alleges that the draft treaty "ignores the necessity of removing limitations with respect to the free development of the peaceful economy of Japan." In reality, the draft treaty, by restoring to Japan complete sovereignty without any limitation upon the development of its peaceful economy and without imposing burdensome current reparation liabilities, would accomplish completely the result which the Government of the Soviet Union professes to desire.

III

The Paragraphs of the Soviet Government's Remarks numbered III contain certain proposals designed, in the words of the Soviet Government, to bring about the "speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan."

(1) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests, as to procedure, the calling of a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in June or July of 1951 to be composed of representatives of the United States, China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to embark upon the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. For the reasons earlier stated, and because all experience shows that this procedure would not in fact achieve a "speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan," the United States Government cannot agree to this procedural proposal.

(2) The Soviet Government proposes that in drawing up a Japanese peace treaty the powers concerned should be governed by certain basic aims. With one qualification, these basic aims are, in fact, reflected in the present draft treaty, namely:

a. Japan should become a peace-loving, democratic, independent state.

Japan already is a peace-loving and democratic state and the Treaty would give it independence.

b. Democratic rights should be guaranteed and organizations to deprive people of their democratic rights . . . should not be allowed.

These matters are taken care of by the Japanese Constitution and by the Declaration, contemplated by the present draft treaty, that Japan will strive to realize the objectives of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to create internally conditions of stability and well-being as envisioned by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by postwar Japanese legislation.

c. As guarantee against a revival of Japanese militarism, limitation should be established in the treaty on the size of Japanese armed forces in order that they may not exceed the requirement of self-defense.

The proposal of the Soviet Government seems to assume that Japan will have to depend, for defense, solely on its own armed forces; and that its requirement, in this respect, can now be measured definitely, for all time. But the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of collective, as well as individual, self-defense. Generalissimo Stalin, in his memorable address of March 10, 1939, pointed out that "adequate defense against aggression requires collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors" and, he says, the policy of "let each country defend itself from aggressors" means "conniving at aggression."

The present suggestions of the Soviet Government that Japan shall have armed forces as required for its self-defense, coupled with the further Soviet proposal (4) that there can be no other troops in Japan, seems a reversion to the principle of "let Japan defend itself" and consequently, as Generalissimo Stalin said, a "conniving at aggression."

Furthermore, to define "the size of Japanese armed forces" needed for "requirements of self-defense" as the Government of the Soviet Union now proposes, would not only be difficult, but might be dangerous. Japanese land, sea, and air forces adequate for self-defense under present troubled circumstances might also, under other circumstances, be adequate for offense.

It is the hope and expectation of the United States Government that application of the policy of collective security envisaged by Article 7 of the draft treaty will provide Japan with effective security with much less Japanese armament than would be required if the Treaty reflected the policy of "let each country defend itself."

d. No limitation in the matter of development of a peaceful economy should be laid on Japan.

The present draft contains no such limitation.

e. All limitations with respect to trade of Japan with other states be removed.

The present draft imposes no limitations on the right of Japan to trade with others.

(3) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests providing in the treaty that "Japan will not enter any coalition directed against any of the states taking part with its armed forces in war against militaristic Japan."

It is the view of the Government of the United States that Japan should not enter into any coalition directed against *any* state, whether or not it was a belligerent in the war against Japan. This is provided for by Article 6 of the draft Treaty whereby Japan would agree, in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

(4) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests that the peace treaty should provide that "all occupation forces will be withdrawn from Japanese territory in the course of not more than 1 year and no foreign state will have troops or military bases in Japan."

It is contemplated by the draft treaty that the occupation will end immediately upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace. It will not be prolonged even for 1 year thereafter.

With respect to the presence in Japan of the troops of any other state the United States Government would not be willing to deny to Japan what the Charter of the United Nations refers to as the "inherent right of . . . collective self-defense."

(5) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests that "the states signing the Peace Treaty with Japan will support the entry of Japan into the United Nations."

The present draft contemplates that Japan will promptly apply for admission to the United Nations and the Government of the United States welcomes the recognition by the Government of the Soviet Union that Japan is qualified for membership.

IV

The Government of the United States earnestly urges that the Government of the Soviet Union should continue to cooperate in the Japanese peace-making already in process and now far advanced. The United States Government does not seek, as is alleged, to make a "separate" peace treaty with Japan. On the contrary, it seeks the participation of all concerned.

The Soviet Government complains because the United States Government has taken the lead in the initial stages of formulating peace treaty terms. That complaint seems not well taken by a state which, in the hour of victory, joined in recognizing the unique position of the United States in relation to Japan and in placing upon the United States the sole responsibility for naming and issuing directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in an occupation which was designed to prepare Japan for a "new order of peace, security and justice." The United States Government accepted that responsibility and has invested in the occupation not only large resources and much effort, but hopes and aspirations for a Japan which would henceforth live with others as a good neighbor. The United States Government would fail utterly in the discharge of the occupation responsibility which the Government of the Soviet Union, among others, placed upon it if it did not take a timely initiative in transforming that occupation into a peace which will be just and durable.

Already the views of the governments principally concerned have been thoroughly canvassed through discussions initiated last September and continuously pursued ever since. The draft submitted on March 29th to the Government of the Soviet Union, as pointed out in the covering memorandum, to a considerable extent reflects views which the Government of the United States had obtained as a result of cooperation manifested by other governments. Among the views taken into account were the views of the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government now states that it "is not true" that there have been "an exchange of opinions between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and representatives of the Government of the Soviet Union."

The undeniable facts are that on October 6, 1950, November 20, 1950, and on January 13, 1951, there were personal discussions of the proposed

Japanese peace treaty between the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. Malik, and John Foster Dulles. Furthermore, on November 20, 1950, Malik submitted to Dulles on behalf of the Soviet Government an aide mémoire dealing with the principles underlying the proposed treaty and on November 26, 1950, Dulles transmitted to Malik a reply memorandum.

The Government of the United States is thus at a loss to understand what the Soviet Government now means when it says that it is "untrue" that there has been "an exchange of opinions" between representatives of the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union.

The present remarks on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union in response to the United States Government's memorandum of March 29, 1951, and in further development of its views heretofore submitted, orally and in writing, shows that the differences which stand between the Government of the Soviet Union and the peace terms embodied in the March draft are not enough to prevent an agreed peace, assuming that there is genuine desire on the part of the Soviet Union promptly to give peace to Japan. Therefore, the Government of the United States trusts that the Government of the Soviet Union will continue to pursue to a favorable conclusion the procedures now under way, rather than to seek now to shift to procedures which, in all candor, it must recognize would not in fact be productive of the "speedy conclusion" which the Soviet Government states that it seeks.

The United States stands ready to resume prompt and intensive diplomatic discussions with the Government of the Soviet Union under circumstances that will be calculated to advance a just treaty to a speedy conclusion.

REMARKS BY THE U.S.S.R.¹

The Government of the U.S.S.R. received on March 29, 1951, from the Government of the United States of America a draft of a peace treaty with Japan. In connection with this, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to make the following remarks.

In spite of the fact that more than 5 years have already passed since the time of the termination of war with Japan, the question of a peaceful settlement for Japan remains unresolved. Such a situation has been created, first of all, as a result of the position taken by the Government of the U.S.A., which under various pretexts has postponed not only the conclusion but the very preparation of a peace treaty. In this connection, the Government of the U.S.A. has repeatedly rejected

the proposals of the Soviet Government for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan jointly with other Governments, as envisaged by the appropriate international agreements. As a result of this, the occupation of Japan by foreign troops has impermissibly dragged on.

1. The remarks of the Soviet Government, concern, first of all, the incorrect preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.

In the memorandum accompanying the American draft of a peace treaty with Japan, the Government of the U.S.A. declares that the draft referred to was drawn up after an exchange of opinions between representatives of the Government of the U.S.A. and representatives of the Governments of several other states, including the Soviet Union. It should be noted that this last is not true, since the Soviet Government as early as the beginning of March of this year published a statement concerning its refusal to carry on separate negotiations with representatives of the U.S.A. with regard to the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. In this connection, the Soviet Government proceeded from the position that the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan cannot be the affair of any one Government or of a query conducted by it of the opinions of other interested Governments, but should be a joint affair of all these Governments, as is provided for by the appropriate international agreements. Nevertheless, the Government of the U.S.A. did not refrain from the separate preparation of a peace treaty with Japan, aiming at arrogating this right exclusively to itself, which is a violation of the obligations undertaken by it concerning the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan jointly with the U.S.S.R., China, and Great Britain, with the participation of other interested states.

In accordance with the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, a Council of Foreign Ministers of the five powers—U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, Great Britain, and France—was established, in which connection it was directly stated in the Potsdam Agreement that the Council of Foreign Ministers was being created, in the first instance, for "preparatory work on peaceful settlement," and that in drawing up the corresponding peace treaties "the Council would consist of members representing those states which have signed the terms of capitulation dictated to that enemy state which the given task concerns." The peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland were prepared and concluded in conformity with this. That the drafting of a peace treaty with Japan has been laid upon the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., China and Great Britain, who, as is known, signed the Japanese surrender document, also flows from the Potsdam Agreement referred to. As early as 1947 the Soviet Government proposed calling a special session of the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of the representatives of China, U.S.A.,

¹ Handed to Ambassador Kirk by Acting Foreign Minister Bogomolov on May 7, 1951.

U.S.S.R. and Great Britain in order to embark upon the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. In this connection, it was envisaged that all states who participated with their armed forces in the war with Japan would be drawn into the preparatory work for drawing up a peace treaty with Japan. But this proposal as well as other repeatedly renewed efforts of the Soviet Government directed toward hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan have furnished no positive results, since the Government of the U.S.A. ignores the necessity of calling a Council of Foreign Ministers for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan as well as calling a peace conference for the consideration of this treaty.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to mention particularly the impermissibility of excluding China from the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. It is known that China was subjected during the course of many years to cruel aggression on the part of militaristic Japan, waged a protracted hard war against Japanese imperialism and bore the greatest sacrifices from the aggression of Japan. It is natural, therefore, that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, being the only legal representative of the Chinese people, has a special interest in the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan and in the establishment of lasting peace in the Far East. It is perfectly obvious that without the participation of the Chinese People's Republic in the work of preparing a peace treaty with Japan a real peaceful settlement in the Far East is not possible.

From this it is seen that the Government of the United States is endeavoring to exclude the U.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Republic and other countries from the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan and to take this matter exclusively into its own hands in order unilaterally to impose upon Japan through the procedure of a dictate conditions of this treaty satisfactory to the Government of the U.S.A., utilizing for this purpose the dependence of the present Government of Japan upon the American occupation authorities.

2. The remarks of the Soviet Government concern, secondly, the fact that the American draft of a peace treaty with Japan contains, from the point of view of the substance of the matter, several incorrect contentions incompatible with existing agreements between the powers.

In such known international documents as the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the Yalta Agreement of 1945 the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, China, and the U.S.S.R. took upon themselves definite obligations with relation to a future peace treaty with Japan.

In these documents the territorial borders of Japan were defined and it was pointed out that there should exist in Japan "a peacefully disposed and responsible government in conformity with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people,"

after which the occupation troops should be withdrawn from Japan.

In these documents, as well as in subsequent agreements between the powers, it is stated that there should in Japan "be eliminated all obstacles to the revival and straightening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" and that broad possibilities for the development of the peaceful economy of the country should be opened up. Along with this it is stated there that it is necessary to finish with the authority and influence of the militarists and to accomplish the demilitarization of Japan.

The American draft of a peace treaty with Japan ignores in one degree or another these obligations of the powers which flow from the documents referred to above.

First of all, this must be said of territorial questions.

For example, in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 it is directly stated that the Island of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China. In this American draft it is stated only that Japan renounces all rights to Taiwan and Pescadores Islands, but nothing is said regarding the transfer of Taiwan and Pescadores Islands to China. From this the conclusion can be drawn that the draft leaves the present situation with Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, which have actually been torn away from China, without change, in violation of the Cairo Agreement concerning the return of these islands to China.

The American draft provides, further, for taking the Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Parece Vela, and Marcus Islands out from under the sovereignty of Japan and transferring them under the administration of the U.S.A. under the pretext of establishing a trusteeship over them, allegedly on the part of the United Nations Organization. Inasmuch, however, as the wresting of the islands named away from Japan is envisaged neither by agreement between the powers nor by decision of United Nations in the person of the Security Council, such wresting away does not have any justification.

Those deviations on military matters from the international agreements mentioned above which are contained in the American draft of a peace treaty with Japan possess even greater significance. It suffices to say that the American draft not only does not contain a guarantee against the restoration of Japanese militarism but in general does not set forth any limitations with relation to the size of the armed forces in Japan.

It is known that in the peace treaty with Italy, which together with Japan was one of the primary aggressors in the Second World War, precise limitations on the proportions of the Italian army, the number of naval fleet personnel and also the size of the air forces are contained. Meanwhile, no limitations on the armed forces of Japan are contained in the American draft. Thus, Japan

is placed in a privileged position in comparison with Italy, although there is no basis for this. From this it is seen that Japan itself will decide the matter of the size of its armed forces for so-called "self-defense." The Soviet Government considers that this is tantamount to allowing Japan to restore militarism. It is quite clear that such a position can in no way be reconciled with certain agreements of the powers concerning demilitarization of Japan.

Likewise the fact cannot be passed over that the American draft does not establish any period for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Japan and is directly designed to leave American occupation troops and military bases in Japan even after the conclusion of a peace treaty. Consequently, even after that "peaceful settlement" which the United States is preparing for Japan, the military occupation of Japan will not be discontinued and the United States of America will remain the real master in Japan.

As is known, in the peace treaty with Italy the withdrawal of occupation troops from Italy within a 3-months period after the conclusion of peace was provided for. Thus, Japan falls into a worse position in comparison with Italy, and the U.S.A. receives unlimited right to continue the occupation of Japan after the signing of peace with Japan for an unlimited period. It is quite clear that all this can in no way be reconciled with the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.

It is necessary to add to this that already at the present time the Government of the U.S.A. is utilizing the occupation of Japan by American troops for other purposes than were agreed among the states signing the Japanese surrender document. American occupation troops located on Japanese territory are utilizing the territory of Japan, its material and human resources for armed intervention in Korea, which is incompatible with international agreements according American troops the right of occupation in Japan only for the purposes of carrying out measures for the demilitarization and democratization of Japan.

Finally, the American draft ignores the necessity of removing limitations with respect to the free development of the peaceful economy of Japan. It is quite clear that without the development of the peaceful economy of the country and without the existence of normal trade with other countries it is not possible to create a reliable basis for the economic upsurge of Japan and growth in the welfare of the Japanese people.

The Soviet Government also has other remarks on the draft of the treaty which it intends to set forth at a meeting of the interested powers.

3. The Soviet Government, constantly insisting on a speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, considers that a peace treaty should be

drawn up on the basis of international agreements which were concluded between the powers during the period of the Second World War, and the preparation of a draft treaty should be carried on jointly by representatives of the U.S.A., the Chinese People's Republic, U.S.S.R. and Great Britain with all the member states of the Far Eastern Commission being drawn into the matter.

In conformity with this, the Soviet Government proposes:

First.—To call in June or July of 1951 a session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs composed of representatives of U.S.A., China, Great Britain and U.S.S.R. in order to embark upon the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan having in view bringing into the preparatory work for drawing up a peace treaty with Japan representatives of all states participating with their armed forces in the war with Japan, in order that a draft of a peace treaty may be submitted for the consideration of a peace conference.

Second.—To conduct the drafting of a peace treaty with Japan on the basis of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Yalta Agreement, governed by the following basic aims:

A. Japan should become a peace-loving, democratic, independent state.

B. Democratic rights should be guaranteed to the population of Japan and the existence of such organizations be they political, military, or of military character whose purpose is to deprive the people of their democratic rights, as was provided in the peace treaty with Italy, should not be allowed.

C. As a guarantee against the revival of Japanese militarism limitations should be established in the treaty on the size of Japanese armed forces in order that they may not exceed the requirements of self-defense, as was established in the peace treaty with Italy.

D. No limitations be put upon Japan in the matter of the development of her peaceful economy.

E. All limitations with respect to the trade of Japan with other states be removed.

Third.—To provide in the treaty that Japan will not enter any coalition directed against any of the states participating with their armed forces in the war against militaristic Japan.

Fourth.—To specify precisely in the treaty that after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan all occupation troops will be withdrawn from Japanese territory in the course of not more than 1 year and no foreign state will have troops or military bases in Japan.

Fifth.—To agree that the states signing the peace treaty with Japan will support the entry of Japan into the United Nations Organization.

Moscow, May 7, 1951.

Actual Participation by Soviet Union in Foreign Ministers Meeting Questioned

Statement by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup¹

Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few comments on the present state of our work and the prospects for it.

The first point I should like to touch on is this. Mr. Gromyko keeps talking about agreement on the agenda as if the agenda were a final binding agreement of governments for the solution of all the major existing international problems.

Now we all know actually that an agenda is not that kind of international agreement, inter-governmental agreement. The agenda actually is preparatory work for a meeting of the Ministers in order to make the task of the Ministers easier when they do meet. Now if we could reach full agreement on the agenda it would be a distinct help to the Ministers. We want such an agreement.

However, in spite of the large amount of evidence that the Soviet Government is unwilling to make a real effort for the strengthening of peace, the three Governments—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are ready to take the step of having the Ministers meet even without a full agreement on the agenda.

We presented on May 2 three alternative proposals for a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers.² Mr. Gromyko told us yesterday that the Soviet delegation could not say that it had agreed to any one of them. We have now spent 2 days in a discussion principally of one of the alternatives which was marked Alternative A. That discussion has served to underline one fact: that fact is that the Soviet delegation insists that we make here an agreement on the substance. Mr. Gromyko demands that we agree here that the best way to secure a reduction of armaments is for the three Governments to bind themselves here and now to accept the Soviet substantive proposal for confining reduction to the Four Powers.

This proposal for confining the reduction of armaments and armed forces to the Four Powers is an illusory and deceitful proposal. We will not be a party to any such deception. No honest look at the realities of the world situation would lead anyone to think that the three Governments could consider reducing their forces while the Soviet Government remained free to maintain and to increase the other armies supporting the Soviet Union in Europe and in Asia.

No honest look at the realities of the world situation would lead anyone to think that the three Governments could make a binding decision here and now on reduction of armaments and armed forces before knowing whether the Soviet Government is prepared to lift the iron curtain and agree to an effective international control.

Everything that Mr. Gromyko says on the Soviet proposal on the reduction of armaments and armed forces supports the conclusion that he is asking for a binding decision here. If this were not true, all of his talk about "burying" and "drowning" (the question of reduction of armaments) would be merely childish nonsense.

All of Mr. Gromyko's talk about the continuance of our defense effort while these meetings are going on supports the conclusion that he is trying to get us to make a binding decision now. It all goes to show that what he is trying to do is to tie the hands of the three Governments through a substantive decision reached here which will prejudice the decisions which ought to be reached by the four Ministers themselves.

Our defense measures will go on just as long as our security is threatened. That security is threatened by the huge armed forces which are maintained by the Soviet Union and by the other armies which are supporting the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia. No agenda by itself can remove that threat to our security. No mere words spoken by Mr. Gromyko here can remove that threat. It can be removed if the Soviet Union

¹ Made at the forty-sixth deputies meeting at Paris on May 8.

² BULLETIN of May 14, 1951, p. 803.

will participate in a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers and join in an honest effort to take real steps which will promote peace.

Under any one of the proposals submitted by the three delegations for the agenda, the Soviet Minister could raise, and the four Ministers can consider, Soviet proposals for the reduction and control of armaments and armed forces. The Ministers will then have before them the details of the Soviet plan, whatever it may be. They will also have before them proposals of the three Ministers, and they can examine at that time the existing level of armaments.

We hope that the attitude of the Soviet Government at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers will then permit agreement on the reduction of armaments and armed forces, but these are considerations to be taken up at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers.

As the Soviet Government said in its note of December 30, 1950, referring to this present meeting:

It goes without saying that in tasks of such a preliminary discussion, consideration of questions which should be considered at the meeting itself of the four Foreign Ministers will not be included.³

We still hope that the Soviet delegation will be able to agree on a complete agenda. But if the Soviet delegation refuses to agree to any complete agenda which fills the normal role of an agenda by indicating the subjects which the Ministers are to discuss instead of binding them in advance to some particular solution of any one of the problems involved, the three Governments are willing to have the four Ministers meet on the basis of the results of our work up to now. This means listing the items and points on which there is no disagreement and also two parallel texts where agreement has not been reached. That is what we, in effect, propose in Alternative B.

The legitimate question which is raised by Mr. Gromyko's brief references to this Alternative B is the following: Does the Soviet Government refuse to participate in a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers? Although we have been making and are making and will make every possible effort to secure an agreed agenda, we are basically interested in the reality of the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers because we hope that such a meeting would be a step toward promoting peace.

In the notes of the three Governments under date of February 19, we expressed to the Soviet Government the hope that this preliminary conference would find a "mutually acceptable basis for a meeting" of the four Foreign Ministers.⁴

Our proposal, Alternative B, is in effect a statement by the three delegations to the Soviet delegation as follows: under the existing circum-

stances the extent of agreement already reached here on the agenda with two parallel texts included on the unagreed points is an "acceptable basis for a meeting." Our Alternative A is an acceptable basis for a meeting. Our Alternative C is an acceptable basis for a meeting.

With particular reference to Alternative Proposal B, I make the statement, Mr. Gromyko, that the three Governments wish to have a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. I, therefore, put the question squarely to Mr. Gromyko. Is the Soviet Government willing to participate in a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers, or is it not?

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Gromyko will answer my questions.

Cordell Hull Foundation Furthers Good Neighbor Policy

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press May 9]

I have just been informed of the announcement to establish the Cordell Hull Foundation for International Education.

The creation of this Foundation is a fitting tribute to one of our great Secretaries of State. It is especially appropriate that a foundation bearing the name of Cordell Hull should be established to promote better relations between the United States and Latin America. This country owes Mr. Hull a special debt of gratitude for his untiring efforts in strengthening the bonds between the northern and southern hemispheres. In establishing such a foundation, this gratitude is translated into action, the effects of which will continue through the years.

Legislation

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting. A Report to the United States Senate by Senators Theodore Francis Green and Homer Ferguson appointed to attend the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting in Canberra, Australia, December 10-13, 1950. S. Doc. 16, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 52 pp.

Universal Military Training. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on H. R. 1752, a bill to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military service and training, and for other purposes. January 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, February 5, 6, 26, 28, March 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1951. 969 pp.

Bills Pending Before the Committee. Preliminary Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, first session. February 6, 7, and 8, 1951. 88 pp.

Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on H. R. 1612. 981 pp. Part 1, February 22, 26, 27, 28, March 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 1951; also Part 11, March 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, April 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1951. 452 pp.

³ BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1951, p. 91.

⁴ BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1951, p. 366.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Status of Offers of Military Assistance to the U. N. for Korea ¹

Country	Offer	Status
1. AUSTRALIA	Naval vessels (S/1524, S/1646)	In action.
	1 RAAF squadron (S/1530)	Do.
	Ground forces (S/1637, S/1664)	Do.
2. BELGIUM	Air Transport (S/1620)	Do.
	Infantry battalion (S/1787)	Do.
3. BOLIVIA	30 officers (S/1618)	Acceptance deferred.
4. CANADA	3 naval vessels (S/1602)	In action.
	1 RCAF Squadron (S/1617)	Do.
	Ground forces (S/1700)	Do.
	Canadian-Pacific Airlines (Commercial Facilities (S/1685))	Do.
	10,000 ton dry-cargo vessels.	Do.
5. CHINA	3 infantry divisions and 20 C-47's (S/1562)	Acceptance deferred.
6. COLOMBIA	1 frigate	En route.
	1,080 ground forces.	Accepted.
7. COSTA RICA	Sea and air bases	Do.
	Volunteers (S/1645)	Acceptance deferred.
8. CUBA	1 infantry company	Accepted.
9. DENMARK	Hospital ship <i>Jullandia</i> (S/1699)	In Korea.
	Motor ship <i>Bella Dan</i>	Withdrawn.
10. EL SALVADOR	Volunteers if U.S. will train and equip (S/1692)	Acceptance deferred.
11. ETHIOPIA	1,069 ground forces.	In Korea.
12. FRANCE	1 patrol gun boat (S/1611)	Withdrawn.
	Infantry battalion (S/1611)	In action.
13. GREECE	7 RHAf Dakota transport aircraft (S/1612)	Do.
	Ground forces (S/1755)	Do.
14. INDIA	Field ambulance unit (S/1647)	Do.
15. LUXEMBOURG	Infantry company (44 men)	Do.
16. NETHERLANDS	1 Destroyer (S/1670)	Do.
	1 Infantry battalion (S/1775)	Do.
17. NEW ZEALAND	2 frigates (S/1563)	Do.
	Combat unit (S/1636)	Do.
18. NORWAY	Merchant ship tonnage (S/1576)	Do.
19. PANAMA	Contingent volunteers; bases for training	Acceptance deferred.
	Use of merchant marine	Accepted.
	Free use of highways (S/1673)	Do.
	Farm hands to supply troops	Pending.
20. PHILIPPINES	17 Sherman tanks	In Korea.
	1 tank destroyer (S/1561)	Do.
	Regimental combat team (S/1681)	In action.
21. SWEDEN	Field hospital unit (S/1615)	Do.
22. THAILAND	1 infantry combat team (S/1622)	Do.
	2 corvettes and navy transport	In action (1 corvette destroyed after grounding.)
23. TURKEY	1 infantry combat force (S/1630)	In action.
24. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA	1 fighter squadron (S/1669)	Do.
25. UNITED KINGDOM	Naval forces (S/1515)	Do.
	Ground forces (S/1638, S/1702)	Do.
	Air unit.	Do.

¹ As of Apr. 23, 1951. Prepared by the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

Canadian Infantry Troops Arrive in Korea

On May 5, the United Nations Department of Public Information announced that the following information has been received from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea at Tokyo.

Soldiers of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade streamed off a United States navy transport at a South Korean port on Friday to join the United Nations Forces in action in Korea.

Welcomed on the docks by bands and Korean flower girls, the troops immediately moved to a camp from which they hope shortly to go into the line alongside the Canadian 2d Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry which has been in Korea since December.

The new troops of Princess Pat's are part of a Canadian Army Special Force recruited for service anywhere in the world under the United Nations flag.

Brig. John M. Rockingham, Commanding Officer, said,

The 25th Brigade will be part of the newly formed First Commonwealth Division.

The Brigade is in very good shape, and we have some wonderful troops. In all my experience I have never seen troops as willing to work as these.

Belgium Sends More Forces to Korea

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information May 4]

Secretary-General Trygve Lie has received the following letter dated May 3 from Ambassador Fernand van Langenhove, permanent representative of Belgium to the United Nations.

With reference to the resolutions of the Security Council of 25 and 27 June 1950, I have the honor to inform you that the Belgian Government has decided to increase the effective strength of the Belgian expeditionary corps at present in action in Korea and to insure the maintenance of these forces through the creation of a reserve. To this effect a first contingent of reinforcements consisting of about 225 volunteers will embark for the Far East early in May. The departure of the next contingent will take place during the month of June.

U.S. Delegation to Sixth Session of Employment and Development Commission (ECOSOC)

On May 14, the Department of State announced that Leroy D. Stinebower, Office of Financial and Development Policy and United States repre-

sentative on the Economic, Employment and Development Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the sixth session of that Commission, which will be held at Lake Success May 14-June 1, 1951. Mr. Stinebower will be assisted by the following advisers:

George A. Eddy, Chief of Stabilization Fund, Gold and Silver Division, Office of International Finance
William J. Stibravy, Office of Financial and Development Policy

The Economic, Employment and Development Commission will, as requested in a resolution adopted at the twelfth session of the Ecosoc (Santiago, Chile, February 20-March 21, 1951), give priority consideration at its sixth session to the problem of financing the economic development of underdeveloped countries.

The Economic, Employment and Development Commission, one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the Ecosoc, advises the Council on economic matters in general and those economic questions in particular which must be solved to promote higher standards of living in all parts of the world. Eighteen Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. The fifth session was held at Lake Success, January 18-30, 1950.

Concessions Under Torquay Protocol Effective June 6, 1951

[Released to the press May 16]

United States tariff concessions initially negotiated at Torquay, England, with the Benelux Customs Union (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic will, under the provisions of the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, be put into effect on June 6, 1951. All these countries except Canada joined the United States in signing the protocol on April 21, the opening date for signature of the document. Canada signed at New York on May 7.

Concessions granted by the United States to the 11 other countries with which we negotiated at Torquay will, in practically all cases, be withheld until the thirtieth day after each of these countries signs the protocol. A few United States concessions negotiated initially with those 11 countries will, however, be put into effect on June 6, for technical and other reasons.

As soon as possible, and before the effective date, the President is expected to issue a proclamation for the purpose of making effective the new United States tariff rates which will go into effect on June 6.

On June 6, also, the countries other than the United States which have already signed the Torquay Protocol will be required by that document to put into effect any concessions they made to the United States, as well as those which they made to each other. They may also put into effect concessions which they had granted to other countries.

The countries with which the United States initially negotiated concessions at Torquay are indicated in the *Analysis of Torquay Protocol Schedules, and Related Documents* (Department of State pub. 4209), in the sixth column of the tabulation beginning on page 361 of that document. The concessions shown there as having been granted to Benelux, Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic are those which the protocol provides will be put into effect on June 6, as stated above.

Copies of the *Analysis* may be inspected at the field offices of the United States Department of Commerce and at the offices of the United States Tariff Commission in New York. They are available by purchase from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at the price of \$1.00.

Information regarding specific concessions may be obtained from the United States Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

Brief Report on U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund Activities

Based on U.N. doc. E/ICEF/174

Dated Apr. 19, 1951

Between 1948 and the end of 1950 approximately 4 million dollars has been delivered by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund [UNICEF] in medical supplies assistance to operating projects developed by European governments. During 1950 additional projects to the extent of 1.5 million dollars were developed and are now in operation, for which the major portions of supplies have been shipped in 1951.

UNICEF assistance to medical projects began only after the emergency feeding operations were well established. Plans of operation in the medical field were not developed with Governments before early in 1949. Under the impact of war and immediate postwar conditions, Governments had felt it essential to use all available resources to feed their children and, therefore, postponed their requests for assistance in the medical field. During 1948 and 1949 the Governments began to give emphasis to large-scale attacks upon tuberculosis, malaria, and venereal disease. Since that time there has been a gradual development of long-term projects for child health, and greater emphasis shifted to projects in the field of maternal and child health approved by the joint UNICEF/WHO Committee on Health Policy and assistance in this field alone has reached approximately 1.25 million dollars.

Working in close cooperation with WHO's special office for Europe, which maintains a liaison medical officer with UNICEF, UNICEF supply assistance has been given to those projects which would, with minimum allocations of funds, give greatest impetus to government initiative. Programs have not been considered unless they could be fitted into the social, economic, and administrative organizations of the countries requesting aid, and only where it would be possible to continue such projects under governmental

resources after the termination of UNICEF aid. Great care was given to the development of projects by existing national health organizations, in order to take advantage of the existence of organized technical personnel, established governmental budgets for implementing such projects, and the possibility of project continuation under the government's own resources. Each project was considered also with the aim of reaching the largest possible section of the child population. While there is a varied availability in European countries of technical medical personnel, such personnel does exist to a much greater extent than in other UNICEF assisted areas. Thus, over 95 percent of all UNICEF country allocations has gone into the direct provision of medical supplies.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Education: Cooperative Program in Panama. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2149. Pub. 4066. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Panama extending program provided for by agreement of November 13 and 14, 1944, as extended by agreement of September 23 and 24, 1948—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Panamá July 23 and September 2, 1949; entered into force September 2, 1949.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2168. Pub. 4090. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Nicaragua—Signed at Managua December 23, 1950; entered into force December 23, 1950.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2167. Pub. 4091. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Panama—Signed at Panamá December 30, 1950; entered into force December 30, 1950.

Education: Cooperative Program in Bolivia. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2182. Pub. 4116. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia modifying and extending agreement of September 7, 1944, as modified and extended—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at La Paz July 6 and August 9, 1948; entered into force September 8, 1948.

The Fallacy of a "Preventive" War. General Foreign Policy Series 43. Pub. 4130. 6 pp. Free.

Address by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup delivered at Union College, Schenectady, N. Y., February 23, 1951.

Our Far Eastern Policy: Debate, Decision, and Action. Far Eastern Series 41. Pub. 4201. 11 pp. Free.

Address by Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered before the Women's National Press Club, Washington, D.C., April 18, 1951.

The United States in the United Nations

[May 19-24, 1951]

General Assembly

The International Law Commission.—The Commission opened its third session at Geneva on May 16 and elected James L. Brierly (U.K.), chairman. Manley O. Hudson is the United States representative. Among the items the Commission will consider are (1) review of its statute with the object of recommending revisions thereof to the Sixth General Assembly; (2) reservations to multilateral conventions, with specific reference to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; (3) General Assembly resolution (Nov. 17, 1950), "Duties of States in the Event of Outbreak of Hostilities," and in connection therewith the issue raised by the U.S.S.R. on a definition of aggression; and (4) preparation of a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind.

Economic and Social Council

International Children's Emergency Fund.—The Executive Board of UNICEF convened its second session, May 22, at United Nations headquarters. The chairman, Mrs. Adelaide Sinclair (Canada), was elected for the current year at the February session.

In answer to the usual Soviet proposal concerning Chinese representation, Katherine F. Lenroot, United States representative, moved for adjournment of debate on this question for the present session stating that the Board was not the appropriate place to make this decision and expressing the United States view that representatives of the People's Republic of China should not be seated in the United Nations or specialized agencies while that regime was engaged in hostilities in Korea against the United Nations. This motion was carried by a vote of 16-5-4.

Among the items on the agenda are (1) general progress report of the Executive Director; (2) approved plans of operations in Latin America as of April 1, 1951; (3) approved plans of operations in Asia as of April 1, 1951; (4) plans and progress of operations in UNICEF-Assisted Child-Feeding Programmes in Europe; (5) report of the Executive Director on estimated requirements July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952; and (6) apportionments, allocations, and other questions.

Economic, Employment and Development Com-

mission.—The sixth session of the 18-member Commission convened May 14 at United Nations Headquarters and will extend over a 3-week period. José Nunez Guimaraes (Brazil) was elected chairman. Leroy D. Stinebower, Officer of Financial and Development Policy, is the United States representative.

At the first meeting, the chairman ruled out of order (12-5 (Soviet bloc, India, Yugoslavia)-0) the U.S.S.R. motion to unseat the representative of the Chinese Nationalist Government and invite a representative from the People's Republic of China to attend.

The Commission has before it the following three agenda items (1) financing economic development of underdeveloped countries; (2) report of the group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General upon recommendation of the Council on measures to reduce unemployment and underemployment in underdeveloped countries in light of the current world economic situation and of the requirements of economic development; (3) replies of Governments to the full employment questionnaire covering the period 1950-51, which was circulated by the Secretary-General on instructions from the Council.

The Commission will submit a report to the Council at the close of the session.

Commission on Human Rights.—The 18-member Commission, which ended its seventh session on May 19, completed the draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation. By a vote of 15-0-2 (U.S.S.R., Ukraine), the Commission decided to forward the draft covenant immediately to United Nations members and specialized agencies to obtain their observations prior to the next session of Ecosoc beginning July 30, 1951.

The draft covenant includes provisions for economic, social, and cultural rights, and following is the adopted (10 (U.S.)-8-0) text of the general clause concerning these rights:

The States parties to the present Covenant,

1. BEARING IN MIND the link between the rights and liberties recognized and defined above, and the economic social and cultural rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

2. RESOLVED to combat the scourges, such as famine, disease, poverty, the feeling of insecurity and ignorance, which take toll or degrade men and prevent the free development of their personality;

3. RESOLVED to strive to ensure that every human being shall obtain the food, clothing, and shelter essential for

his livelihood and well-being and shall achieve an adequate standard of living and a continuous improvement of his material and spiritual living conditions;

4. *Undertakes* to take steps, individually and through international cooperation, to the maximum of their available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in this part of the Covenant.

The Commission rejected (7-10 (U.S.)-1) the proposal to include provisions in the Covenant authorizing receipt and examination of petitions from individuals and nongovernmental organizations on alleged covenant violations.

The report to the Council was adopted by vote of 15 (U. S.)-0-3 (U.S.S.R., Ukraine, India).

Commission on Narcotic Drugs.—The 15-member Commission completed its sixth session on May 24, and adopted 10-2 (U.S.S.R., Poland)-0 its report to ECOSOC, which includes the following:

1. Resolution adopted 8 (U.S.)-2 (Poland, U.S.S.R.)-2 (China, U.K.), covering a draft protocol of principles, based on a French proposal, designed to limit the production of opium to medical and scientific needs.

2. Resolution, cosponsored by Canada, United States, and Yugoslavia, which (1) recommends adoption by the Council of the principles of the opium protocol, and (2) requests the Council (a) to instruct the Secretary-General to submit these principles to the members of the United Nations and to nonmember states parties to the international treaties on narcotics for their observations and (b), in the light of these observations, to study the possibility of convening an international conference for the purpose of preparing and adopting a protocol relating to the limitation of the production of opium. The Commission adopted this resolution by a vote of 8 (U.S.)-2 (Poland, U.S.S.R.)-2 (China, Iran).

3. With regard to the adoption of a single convention for the control of narcotics, it was decided to defer consideration of this until the seventh session of the Commission. In the meantime, the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body, established by the 1931 convention, have been requested to submit their comments and views on the single convention by September 1, 1951. In addition, all Governments will be requested to submit, if they have not already done so, their observations on the single convention by December 1, 1951. The Secretariat will then prepare an annotated, consolidated draft of the convention for further consideration by the Commission at its next session and by the Economic and Social Council during its fifteenth session in July 1952. It is expected that the Council will decide whether to call an international conference to complete the convention.

4. The Commission, under authority granted to it under article 2 of the Synthetic Drugs Protocol of 1948, decided to place two new synthetic drugs, known as NU-1932 and NU-2206, under the 1931 convention pending action by the World Health Organization.

Ad Hoc Committee on the Organization and Operation of ECOSOC and its Commissions.—The Committee, May 22, adopted (7-1 (U. S. S.-R.)) its first report to the Council, and included therein are, briefly, the following recommendations:

1. *ECOSOC.*—(1) The Council should hold three regular sessions each year: the first should be devoted to social and human rights matters; the second to economic issues; and the pre-Assembly session to problems of coordination, priorities, reports of specialized agencies and subordinate organs of the Council, and the report of the Council to the General Assembly; (2) the Council should prepare an annual basic agenda and so arrange its work that subjects are dealt with in related groups; (3) the Council should, as far as practicable, discuss matters in plenary session.

2. *Functional Commissions and subcommissions.*—(1) All the subcommissions, Statistical Sampling, Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and Freedom of Information and of the Press, should be abolished. However, the Freedom of Information Subcommittee should be continued for one more session. The work of the subcommissions should be taken over by the United Nations Secretariat, *ad hoc* groups, as appropriate, and the Commissions. (2) the Economic, Employment and Development Commission, and the Transport and Communications Commission should be discontinued. The work should be taken over by the Council itself, the regional economic commissions or *ad hoc* bodies as appropriate. (3) the Fiscal, Statistical, Population, and Social Commissions and the Commission on the Status of Women should be continued until December 31, 1953. (4) the Commission on Human Rights should be continued until it has completed its work on the Covenant. Thereafter, the Council should review the question of its continuation. (5) the Commission on Narcotic Drugs should also be continued until it has completed its work on the single convention on narcotic drugs.

Specialized Agencies

Universal Postal Union.—The 19-member UPU Executive and Liaison committee opened its annual meeting, May 21, at St. Gallen, Switzerland. Representatives of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Air Transport Association are also attending the meeting. Joseph Lemouel, Director-General of the French Postal Services, is chairman. The United States delegation is headed by A. C. Hahn, Executive Director, Bureau of Transportation, United States Post Office Department.

On the matter of Chinese representation, the Committee decided (10-6-3) that the Chinese Nationalist delegate should be seated.

Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims¹

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO SENATE

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 26, 1951.

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of each of the following conventions:

(1) Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in Armed Forces in the field;

(2) Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at sea;

(3) Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

(4) Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war;

which were open for signature from August 12, 1949, until February 12, 1950, and during that period were signed on behalf of the United States of America and a number of other States.

I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report made to me by the Secretary of State with respect to this matter.

In the event that the Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, it is requested that the Senate do so subject to the reservation made by the plenipotentiary of the United States in signing the convention, namely:

The United States reserves the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2, without regard to whether the offences referred to therein are punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State, with accompanying commentaries; (2) certified copies of Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of war victims.²)

¹ S. Ex. D, E, F, and G, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

² Not here printed.

REPORT OF SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 25, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to submit to the President, with a view to their transmission to the Senate to receive the advice and consent of that body to ratification, if his judgment approve thereof, a certified copy of each of the following conventions:

(1) Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded and sick in Armed Forces in the field;

(2) Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at sea;

(3) Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

(4) Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war:

which were open for signature from August 12, 1949, until February 12, 1950, and during that period were signed on behalf of the United States of America and a number of other States.

At the time of signature, a reservation with respect to the convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war was made on behalf of the United States reading:

The United States reserves the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2, without regard to whether the offences referred to therein are punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins.

The same reservation was also made by Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The conventions were signed subject to other reservations by certain of the signatory states, the texts of which reservations are set forth in a separate section immediately following the texts of the conventions annexed to this report.

The conventions were formulated and adopted at the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, held in Geneva, Switzerland, from April 21 to August 12, 1949. Fifty-

nine governments, including the Big Four (France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States), sent delegations to Geneva to participate. Five other countries had observers present, as did 23 international organizations. Also, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies participated as technical experts and played an active and prominent part in the meetings of the conference.

Specifically, the task of the Conference was to revise existing treaties relating to the protection of war victims, namely, the Geneva convention of July 27, 1929, for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick of armies in the field (47 Stat. 2074); the Geneva convention of July 27, 1929, relating to the treatment of prisoners of war (47 Stat. 2021); and the Hague convention of October 18, 1907, for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva convention of July 6, 1906 (36 Stat. 2371), and to write a new convention applicable to civilians in wartime.

In the light of experiences of World War II, there was recognized by all governments the urgent necessity for rather extensive revisions of the above-mentioned earlier conventions for the purpose of bringing them up to date, making them easier to apply uniformly and less susceptible to different interpretations, and providing more effective protection of the categories of persons covered. It was considered equally important to secure by treaty international legal protection for civilians in belligerent and occupied territories. The generally unsatisfactory stop-gap measure of attempting to apply the prisoners-of-war convention to certain categories of civilians during World War II had pointed up the need for a separate treaty establishing humane standards of treatment for civilians in time of war.

The United States had from the beginning actively supported the initiative taken in the fall of 1945 by the International Committee of the Red Cross to revise the existing conventions and to formulate a new civilian convention before the experiences of World War II had been forgotten. This Government participated in preliminary informal discussions of the subject at a meeting of government experts convened at Geneva under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, April 14-26, 1947. At that meeting 14 Allied Governments were represented, and considerable progress was made in the formulation of revised and new draft conventions. The Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference, which took place at Stockholm August 20-30, 1948, and in which 49 governments, including the United States, and 51 national Red Cross societies participated, offered an opportunity for a continuance of these discussions on a broader scale. These preparatory meetings resulted in the formulation of drafts for each of the four conventions which

served as the working documents for the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva in 1949.

The preparation of the United States position on these new conventions began early in 1946 with the establishment, on invitation of the Secretary of State, of an Interdepartmental Prisoners of War Committee. Interested agencies which have participated in and contributed to the formulation of the United States position include the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, Justice, Treasury (including Coast Guard), Post Office, and Labor, the Federal Security Agency, and the American Red Cross. The United States was represented at the Geneva Conference by a delegation which was composed of representatives of the Department of State, the three military services, the Department of Justice, and the American Red Cross.

Substantial portions of the United States position on all four of the conventions were accepted by the Conference as presented. Foremost among the revisions supported by the United States which were concurred in were the following: (1) A complete rewording of the article concerning food which, in essence, provides that the food ration of prisoners of war shall be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety to keep prisoners in good health, and prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies; (2) a new and simplified formula regarding the employment of prisoners of war which among other things prohibits their use for mine clearance and disposal work; (3) prompt repatriation of prisoners of war after the cessation of hostilities; (4) a provision permitting transfers of prisoners of war among belligerents provided the receiving government is a party to the convention, and placing on both governments involved in the transfer equal responsibility in seeing that the treatment received by prisoners of war following their transfer is in accordance with the terms of the convention; (5) the extension of the application of the prisoners of war and civilian conventions to civil wars provided the dissident party agrees for its part reciprocally to apply the terms of those conventions; (6) definition of the conditions which must be met by partisan forces if they are to be accorded treatment as prisoners of war and entitled to protection of that convention; and (7) improved identification markings for hospital ships.

There are transmitted herewith commentaries, dealing with each of the conventions, which do not purport to discuss and analyze the texts in detail, but in which an attempt is made with respect to the wounded and sick, maritime, and prisoners of war conventions to indicate and identify the significant revisions introduced in relation to the earlier conventions and, in the case of the civilian convention, to present a summary of the subjects dealt with therein.

It is provided in each convention that it will come into force 6 months after not less than two

instruments of ratification have been deposited. Thereafter, it shall come into force for each state 6 months after the deposit of its instrument of ratification. Since the closing date for signature of the conventions, Chile, Czechoslovakia, the Holy See, India, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia have deposited their respective instruments of ratification of all four conventions.

The four conventions represent the culmination of nearly 4 years of preparatory work. It is believed the three revised conventions are a considerable improvement over those which they are intended to replace, and that the new civilian convention marks a step forward in the effort to mitigate, through international agreement, the suffering occasioned by war. They are based on realistic considerations and reflect the experiences of those who were charged with the administrative responsibility of the earlier conventions during the last war. Since the United States played an active and prominent role in furthering the efforts to revise and extend these humanitarian conventions, it is hoped they will be given early and favorable consideration by the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

DEAN ACHESON.

(Enclosures: (1) Commentaries; (2) certified copies of Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of war victims.)

COMMENTARIES

I. PROVISIONS COMMON TO THE FOUR CONVENTIONS FORMULATED AT GENEVA AUGUST 12, 1949

GENERAL PROVISIONS

There have been assembled at the head of each of the four conventions formulated at Geneva the provisions of a general nature dealing with the application of the convention, and the procedure and organizations by which its enforcement is to be facilitated. Most of these provisions are new, and certain of them, namely those embodied in Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the wounded and sick, the maritime, and the prisoners of war conventions and in Articles 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the civilian convention, are common to each of the conventions and, with slight adaptation for the particular convention concerned, have been expressed in identical wording.

Article 2 is concerned with the application of the convention and is entirely new with the exception of the provision stating that although one of the powers in conflict may not be a party to the convention the powers which are parties shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. This article provides that, in addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the contracting parties, even

if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. Also, the convention is to apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a contracting party, even if that occupation meets with no armed resistance. Further, it is provided that in case of conflict in which one of the powers is not a party to the convention, the provisions nevertheless shall prevail if the nonparty accepts and applies its provisions.

The application of the convention to armed conflicts not of an international character is provided for in Article 3 wherein there are established minimum humanitarian principles which each party to the conflict is bound to apply. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities are to be treated humanely without any adverse distinction based on race, color, religion or faith, sex or birth, or wealth. Acts of violence to life and person, the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment of a regularly constituted court are prohibited.

Article 6 provides that contracting parties may, in addition to the agreements expressly provided for in various articles of the convention, conclude other special agreements for all matters concerning which the parties may deem it suitable to make special provision. These agreements, however, are not to affect adversely the situation of the persons protected by the convention or to restrict the rights which the convention confers upon them.

In Article 7 there is stated that very important principle that persons protected by the convention may under no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured them by the convention or by the special agreements referred to above.

It is set forth in Article 8 that the convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the parties to the conflict. Delegates apart from the diplomatic or consular staff may be appointed by the Protecting Powers to help carry out these duties. Representatives of the Protecting Powers are not to exceed their mission under the convention and, in particular, are to take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State in which they are carrying out their duties.

Article 9 states that the provisions of the convention shall constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may undertake to help the persons protected by the convention.

Substitutes for Protecting Powers are provided for in Article 10. Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties inembent on the Protecting Power. When the protected persons cease to benefit by the activities of a Protecting Power or of such organization, the Detaining Power is required to request a neutral state or such an organi-

zation to undertake the functions performed by a Protecting Power. If such protection cannot be arranged, the Detaining Power shall request or accept the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the convention.

In the event of a disagreement between Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the provisions of the convention, it is provided in Article 11 that the Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the disagreement. For this purpose the Protecting Powers may arrange for a meeting of the representatives of the two parties and may, if necessary, propose for approval by the parties to the conflict a person belonging to a neutral power or delegated by the International Committee of the Red Cross who shall be invited to take part in such a meeting.

EXECUTION OF CONVENTION AND REPRESSION OF ABUSES AND INFRACTIONS

In addition to the general provisions outlined above, each of the four conventions has sections containing provisions relating to the execution of the convention and the repression of abuses and infractions. In accordance with these provisions, the contracting parties undertake in time of peace as in time of war to disseminate the text of the convention as widely as possible and to include the study thereof in their programs of military and, if possible, civil instruction. The contracting parties also undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the convention such as wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, or wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. Each contracting party is under an obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches and to bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts, or, if it prefers, hand such persons over to another Contracting Party for trial.

II. GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD OF AUGUST 12, 1949 WOUNDED AND SICK (CHAPTER II)

This is the most important chapter in the convention and the foundation on which the whole convention rests.

Article 12 corresponds to Article 1 of the 1929 convention. It has been expanded considerably, however, and an attempt has been made to define in its provisions more accurately the manner in which the wounded and sick are to be treated and cared for by the parties to the conflict in order to avoid some of the unfortunate experiences of

the last war. The article explicitly prohibits any differential treatment on the basis of sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria. Only urgent medical reasons authorizes priority in the order of treatment to be administered. It is intended thereby to insure that all wounded and sick, whether friend or foe, shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality as regards the protection, respect, and care to which they are entitled. The new provisions also enumerate and expressly prohibit some of the most serious offenses which a belligerent might be guilty of toward the wounded and sick in its power. Prohibited acts include attempts upon their lives or violence to their persons, murder or extermination, subjection to torture or to biological experiments deliberate abandonment without medical care, or exposure to risk of contagion or infection created for that purpose.

Article 13 is new. It defines the different categories of persons who, if sick or wounded, shall be entitled to the benefit of the convention. The 1929 convention applied only to members of the Armed Forces and to other persons officially attached to them. The new convention extends the field of application to other categories of persons. Members of militias and corps of volunteers, including those of organized resistance movements not forming part of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are one of the new groups protected, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. It is defined that these corps and militias may legally operate in or outside their own territory even if it is occupied. This is an important innovation which has become necessary as a result of the experience of World War II.

Other categories covered and not before included in conventional international law are (1) members of regular forces who profess allegiance to a government not recognized by the Detaining Powers, and (2) members of crews of merchant marine and civil aircraft who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

In Article 15 the scope of Article 3 of the 1929 convention has been extended. The 1929 convention made it possible for local military commanders to conclude an armistice or arrange for a temporary cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting and removing the wounded from the battlefield. This provision has been broadened so as to include the exchange of wounded from besieged or encircled areas, and to permit the passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their way to such an area.

The provisions relative to the identification of wounded, sick, and dead have been made clearer and more specific in Article 16 of the new convention than in Article 4 of the 1929 convention. In order to insure more effective coordination, it has been provided that the information the belligerents are required to furnish each other shall be forwarded through the official National Bureau of

each of the parties, and thence through the channel of the Protecting Powers and the Central Prisoners of War Agency established in a neutral country.

In connection with the handling of the dead, new provisions have been included in Article 17. Burial or cremation shall, as far as is possible, be carried out individually and not collectively. Bodies shall not be cremated, except for imperative reasons of hygiene or for motives based on the religion of the deceased.

There is retained in Article 18 the provision of Article 5 of the 1929 convention stating that the military authorities could appeal to the charitable aid of the inhabitants in collecting and caring for wounded persons under the supervision of such authorities, and that, in such cases, the inhabitants in question would be entitled to assistance and protection. Added to this provision are new provisions which formally authorize the inhabitants spontaneously to collect and care for wounded of all nationalities and expressly stipulate that the mere fact of having rendered aid to wounded or sick persons shall never constitute a ground for prosecution or punishment. These are provisions of exceptional importance since they are intended particularly to apply to wounded parachutists or resisters. Assisting or caring for such persons in the last war was frequently prohibited, subject to extremely severe penalties.

MEDICAL UNITS AND ESTABLISHMENTS (CHAPTER III)

Apart from Article 20 providing that hospital ships shall not be attacked from the land, the new provision in Article 22 authorizing protected establishments to care for civilian wounded or sick, and Article 23 relating to the establishment of hospital zones, the provisions of this Chapter are substantially the same as the provisions included in Chapter II of the 1929 convention. The provisions of Article 23 with regard to hospital zones are considered important, for it is the first time that the concept of hospital zones and localities has been provided for in a convention. In accordance with these provisions, any country may set up hospital zones or localities reserved for the wounded and sick and the personnel necessary to give them medical attention. Upon the outbreak and during the course of hostilities, the parties concerned may conclude agreements on mutual recognition of the hospital zones and localities they have created. A model draft agreement which the parties may implement for this purpose and revise if desired is annexed to the convention.

Regular personnel of the medical and chaplain services, and members of the armed forces who are not actually or exclusively members of the medical services but who have received special training to enable them to carry out medical duties, continue to enjoy in Articles 24 and 25 of the new convention the same protection provided for them hitherto in Article 9 of the 1929 convention. Like-

wise, in Article 26 of the new convention, personnel of national red cross and voluntary aid societies of belligerents are again placed on an equal footing with medical personnel as they were in Article 10 of the 1929 convention.

The status of regular medical and chaplain personnel and of personnel of voluntary aid societies after capture by the enemy has, however, been changed in the new convention. The convention of 1929 explicitly prohibited the detention of such personnel, although it did provide in Article 12 that an agreement could be concluded by the belligerents for retaining such personnel temporarily. But this procedure was regarded as being exceptional. Under Article 28 of the new convention, such personnel may be automatically retained without the previous agreement provided for by the 1929 convention in so far as the medical and spiritual needs of the prisoners of war themselves require. Personnel thus retained are not to be deemed prisoners of war, but they are to be accorded the benefits of all the provisions of the prisoners of war convention and in addition special facilities in regard to correspondence and travel essential for the proper performance of their duties.

The status after capture of the members of the armed forces who are only temporarily attached to the medical service has also been changed in the new convention. Whereas the convention of 1929 provided for their return on the same conditions as those applicable to permanent personnel, Article 29 of the 1949 convention provides that they should be treated as prisoners of war, but shall be employed in caring for the wounded and sick.

BUILDINGS AND MATERIAL (CHAPTER V)

The provisions of Article 33 relating to the material of mobile medical units have been radically altered. According to the 1929 convention, if such a unit fell into the hands of the enemy its material would be returned as far as possible at the same time as the medical personnel were returned. The new provisions, on the contrary, stipulate that this material is to remain in the hands of the capturing party but is to be reserved for the care of the wounded and sick. No changes have been made with respect to the disposal of fixed medical establishments which remain subject to the laws of war. It is provided that the material and stores of both mobile units and of fixed establishments shall not be intentionally destroyed.

MEDICAL TRANSPORTS (CHAPTER VI)

As in the case of the material of mobile medical units, the transports of wounded and sick or of medical equipment which fall into the hands of the adverse party are not restored as hitherto provided for in the 1929 convention. Instead, such transports or vehicles are, in accordance with the provisions of Article 35, subject to the laws of war

on condition that the party to the conflict who captures them shall in all cases insure the care of the wounded and sick they contain.

An attempt has been made in Article 36 to take care of the inadequacy of distinctive markings for the protection of medical aircraft under the present conditions of aerial warfare by requiring that such planes fly at heights, times, and on routes specifically agreed upon between the belligerents concerned. Another new provision included in this article stipulates that in the event the aircraft is required by the enemy to land, the medical aircraft with its occupants shall be allowed to resume its flight after inspection.

The 1929 convention did not cover the case of medical aircraft flying over a neutral country. Under Article 37 of the present convention, flying over neutral countries is permitted, subject, however, to previous agreement between the belligerents and neutral country concerned.

THE DISTINCTIVE EMBLEM (CHAPTER VII)

This Chapter corresponds to Chapter VI of the 1929 convention and the changes and innovations of substance are few. The provisions relating to the identification of medical and religious personnel have been clarified in Article 40. In addition to the armlet bearing a red cross, provision has been made for a special pocket-size, water-resistant identity card for all personnel exclusively engaged in protected activities. The identity card is to state in what capacity the bearer is entitled to protection under the convention and is to be uniform throughout the same armed forces. As far as possible, it is to be of a similar type in the armed forces of all the contracting parties, and a model card is annexed to the convention to serve as a guide.

Article 41 dealing with the identification of temporary medical personnel is new. In order to provide some permanent sign to make it possible to recognize and protect them, such personnel are to wear a white armlet with a red cross emblem which is smaller in size than the emblem on armlets worn by permanent personnel. As personnel of this kind will be treated as prisoners of war if they fall into the hands of the enemy, a special identity card is not provided for them. However, their military identification documents are to specify what special medical training they have received, the temporary character of their duties, and their authority to wear an armlet.

In Article 44 there are set forth the conditions under which the red cross emblem may be used. While the essential provisions of Article 24 of the 1929 convention have been incorporated, an attempt has been made to establish a clearer distinction between the use of the distinctive emblem which has a protective value during military operations and the popular emblem used by national red cross societies for purposes of identification. In order that the protective emblem shall retain its full value, it is provided that it can only be used

in time of peace by national red cross societies for their other activities which are in conformity with the principles laid down by the International Red Cross Conferences. When those activities are carried out in time of war, the conditions for the use of the emblem shall be such that it cannot be considered as conferring the protection of the convention, and the emblem must be small in size and may not be placed on armlets or on the roofs of buildings.

In view of the fact that international red cross organizations are required to perform their duties everywhere and in all circumstances, a new provision has been inserted in the present convention permitting such organizations to make use of the red cross emblem at all times.

III. GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK, AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA OF AUGUST 12, 1949

In view of the subject matter with which this convention is concerned, many of its provisions are identical or almost identical to corresponding provisions embodied in the 1949 Geneva convention relative to the wounded and sick. This is particularly true in respect of the articles relating to the treatment of the wounded and sick, the categories of persons entitled to protection under the convention, identification of the wounded and dead and the handling of the dead, the status of medical and religious personnel, the medical transports, and the use of the distinctive emblem. As a consequence of that similarity, discussion in this commentary is restricted to those provisions which are peculiar to the convention relative to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of armed forces at sea.

WOUNDED, SICK, AND SHIPWRECKED (CHAPTER II)

In Article 12 there is included a definition of the term "shipwreck" which is new. As defined, it means shipwrecked from any cause and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft.

A new provision has been inserted in Article 18 which imposes on belligerents not only the former obligation embodied in Article 16 of the 1907 Hague convention to search after each engagement for the shipwrecked, wounded, and sick, but also includes the duty of collecting and taking them on board and providing them with all necessary care. Another new provision also included in this article stipulates that whenever circumstances permit, parties to the conflict shall conclude local arrangements for the removal of the wounded and sick by sea from a besieged or encircled area and for the passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their way to that area.

HOSPITAL SHIPS (CHAPTER III)

In order to be eligible for protection, certain conditions which were not present in the corre-

sponding article (Article 1) of the 1907 convention have been added in Article 22 in connection with the notification of hospital ships to the belligerents concerned. The notification has to be made ten days before a hospital ship is employed and must have in addition to the ship's name the characteristics of the ship, including registered gross tonnage, the length from stem to stern and the number of masts and funnels.

Article 23 provides that establishments ashore entitled to the protection of the 1949 Geneva convention for the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field shall be protected from bombardment or attack from the sea. This is a new provision which has never appeared before in any international convention.

While a minimum tonnage for hospital ships is not specified, a new provision in Article 26 stipulates that belligerents shall, in order to insure maximum comfort and security, endeavor to utilize for the transport of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked over long distances and on the high seas only hospital ships of over 2,000 tons gross.

Under Article 27, which is also new, small craft employed by the state or by the officially recognized lifeboat institutions for coastal rescue operations are to receive the same protection as hospital ships so far as operational requirements permit. Fixed coastal installations exclusively used by these craft are also to receive as far as possible similar protection.

Since hospital ships cannot be captured, another new article (Article 29) provides that if such a ship is in a port which has fallen into the hands of the enemy it shall be authorized to leave that port.

Article 31 sets forth certain rights which parties to the conflict may exercise with respect to the control of hospital ships. In addition to the measures set forth in Article 4 of the 1907 Hague convention, it is further provided in this article that a belligerent may control the use of the wireless installations on such vessels as well as other means of communication. It is also stipulated that neutral observers may be put on board whose duty it would be to verify the strict observance of the present convention.

Article 33 provides that a merchant vessel once transformed into a hospital ship cannot be put to any other use for the duration of hostilities. The intention of this new provision is to prevent a government from refitting a large merchant vessel as a hospital ship, sending it overseas through the danger zones, and then reconverting it into a merchant vessel.

Article 34 provides that the protection to which hospital ships and sick-bays are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. In particular, hospital ships may not possess or use a secret code for their wireless or other means of communication. Protection may, however, not

cease until after due warning has been given and such warning has remained unheeded.

Article 35 lists the conditions which shall not be considered as depriving hospital ships or sick-bays of vessels of the protection due them. The article is similar to Article 22 of the wounded and sick convention. One additional provision stipulates that protection may not be withdrawn because of the presence on board of medical personnel or equipment over and above the normal requirements for the operation of the ship.

PERSONNEL (CHAPTER IV)

Article 36 which deals with the protection to be given to personnel of hospital ships is entirely new. The religious, medical, and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews may not be captured during the time they are in the service of the hospital ship, whether or not there are wounded and sick on board. Members of the crew have been included, for without them a hospital ship would be useless and the entire protection granted to its medical personnel would become inoperative if the crew could be captured. Further, since the present convention stipulates that a hospital ship may not be captured under any circumstances, it is obvious that such a provision would be void if the adverse belligerent were allowed to take the crew prisoner.

Article 37 relates to personnel of vessels other than hospital ships and while it includes the essential provisions of Article 10 of the 1907 convention new provisions have been added permitting the retention for a time of medical and religious personnel to care for the wounded and sick. Moreover, it differs from the 1907 convention in another important respect. The Hague convention referred to religious and medical personnel of any captured vessel, thus putting on the same footing warships, merchant ships, and other vessels. The present article restricts protection exclusively to personnel engaged in the medical or spiritual care of persons protected by the convention under Articles 12 and 13. Members of the crew of these vessels are not protected since the grounds for such protection no longer exist. Religious, medical, and hospital personnel are entitled to the same protection as that of hospital ships, but, contrary to the provisions for personnel of hospital ships, some may be retained if necessary for the care of the wounded and sick who are taken prisoners of war. This retained personnel must be put ashore as soon as possible by the belligerent which captures them and once landed are subject to the provisions of the 1949 Geneva convention concerning the wounded and sick of armed forces in the field.

MEDICAL TRANSPORTS (CHAPTER V)

Article 38 introduces a new provision permitting ships chartered for that purpose to transport equipment exclusively intended for the treatment of wounded and sick members of armed forces or

for the prevention of disease, provided that the particulars regarding their voyage have been notified to the adverse party and approved by the latter. The carrier ships may be boarded by the adverse power, but may not be captured or have their equipment seized.

THE DISTINCTIVE EMBLEM (CHAPTER VI)

The marking of hospital ships and other craft covered by the same system of protection was very inadequately defined by Article 5 of the 1907 Hague convention. The experience of the last war showed that most of the attacks on hospital ships were attributable to insufficient marking. Therefore, in order to try to make possible identification of hospital ships at long range, far-reaching changes have been made in Article 43 of the new convention.

White has been retained as the color for all exterior surfaces, but the horizontal band of green or red has been abandoned. One or more red crosses, according to the tonnage of the ship, are to be painted and displayed on both sides of the hull and on the horizontal surfaces. The color of the crosses is to be dark red which will provide the most striking contrast to the white of the ship. A white flag with the red cross is to be hoisted as high as possible on the mainmast which is the first part of a ship to appear on the horizon and will therefore help make identification possible from that moment. At night and at times of reduced visibility, hospital craft must, subject to the assent of the power to the conflict under whose control they are, take the necessary measures to render their painting and distinctive emblems sufficiently apparent. Lifeboats and small craft employed by the medical service are to be painted white with dark red crosses and shall bear, as far as possible, the same marks of identification as the hospital ships.

IV. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949

GENERAL PROVISIONS (PART I)

There are enumerated in Article 4 the categories of persons who would qualify to receive the protection of the convention. These categories include the same ones as set forth in Article 12 of the Geneva convention of 1949 for the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field. In addition, Article 4 stipulates that persons who are arrested by the Occupying Power because of their membership in the armed forces of the occupied country are to receive the protection of the convention. Article 4 also gives military personnel interned in neutral countries the protection of the convention and sets forth the points on which the treatment of such persons may not be similar to that of prisoners of war.

Article 5 in its first paragraph states the very important principle that the application of the

convention to the persons covered in the preceding article shall continue from the moment they have fallen into enemy hands until their liberation. The second paragraph provides that in the future no person whose right to be treated as belonging to one of the categories of Article 4 is in doubt shall be deprived of the protection of the convention until his status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

GENERAL PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR (PART II)

Part II corresponds to Title I of the 1929 convention, all of whose provisions it restates with the exception of Article 1.

The last two paragraphs of Article 12 are completely new and regulate responsibility in the case of transfer of prisoners from one power to another; transfer to a power which is not a party to the convention is ruled out completely. It is also provided that the transferring power shall bear a contingent responsibility.

Article 13 is a more complete version of Article 3 of the 1929 convention. It states that prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated and provides in particular that no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments not justified by the medical treatment of the prisoners concerned.

CAPTIVITY (PART III)

Beginning of Captivity (Section I)

Section I incorporates the essential provisions of Title II and Section I of Title III of the 1929 convention.

Article 17 contains a new provision which obliges each party to the conflict to issue an identity card to every person under its jurisdiction who may become a prisoner of war. Moreover, under the 1929 convention, a prisoner of war may confine himself to giving, if questioned, only his regimental or personal number. The new convention obliges him to give his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal, or serial number.

Internment of Prisoners of War (Section II)

Chapters I and II of Section II correspond roughly to Chapters 1 and 2 of Section II, Title III of the 1929 convention.

The second and third paragraphs of Article 21 are new and relate to the release on parole of prisoners of war.

In the third paragraph of Article 22, relating to places and methods of internment, there has been inserted a provision stating that the Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality, language, and customs, provided that such persons shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture except with their consent.

Guarantees for the safety of prisoners have been given considerably greater force in Article 23, particularly in regard to the shelters which must be supplied for them, notification of the location of the camps, and their marking.

Article 24 was introduced in order that prisoners of war in permanent transit camps might not be deprived of the guarantees accorded by the conventions to prisoners in other camps.

Article 26 of the new convention abandons the standards of the 1929 convention wherein food rations were put on the same basis as for troops of the Detaining Power's own forces. The new provision is that the basic daily food ration shall be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account must also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.

The provisions of Articles 29, 30, and 31 of Chapter III of Section II dealing with hygiene and medical care and inspections are similar to the Articles in Chapter 3 of Section II, Title II of the 1929 convention; they merely amplify and clarify the provisions of the earlier convention. Article 32, however, is new. It provides that prisoners of war who, though not members of the military medical services of their own forces, are doctors, dentists, nurses, or hospital orderlies may be required to carry out medical duties and shall in that case receive the same treatment as corresponding members of retained medical personnel.

Chapter IV is also new. It defines the position of medical personnel and chaplains who have fallen into the hands of the enemy and are retained with a view to assisting prisoners of war. Each person in this category shall enjoy all the necessary facilities for the carrying out of his duties and have at the same time the protection of the convention without being considered a prisoner of war.

Chapter VI concerning discipline and Chapter VII relating to the rank of prisoners of war incorporate the essential provisions of Chapters 5 and 6 of Section II, Title III of the 1929 convention. Chapter 7 of the 1929 convention, however, has been deleted and its provisions are now contained in the section relating to financial resources of prisoners of war. Accordingly, Chapter VIII in the new convention dealing with the transfer of prisoners of war after their arrival in camp corresponds roughly to Chapter 8, Section II, Title III of the 1929 convention.

In Article 43 a new principle has been introduced, namely, the recognition of promotions in rank accorded to prisoners of war. Article 44 differs from Article 22 of the 1929 convention in that it abandons the rule according to which officer prisoners of war had to provide their food and clothing from what was paid to them by the Detaining Power. They are now put on the same basis in this respect as other prisoners of war.

The conditions of, and procedure for, transfer (Articles 46, 47, and 48) have been provided for in more detail in view of the experiences in World War II. Particular emphasis has been placed on the additional precautions which should be taken in the case of transport by sea or by air. Moreover, prisoners are to be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and the correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited if the conditions of transfer so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry, but in no case to more than twenty-five kilograms per head.

Labor of Prisoners of War (Section III)

This section governing the labor of prisoners of war corresponds with Section III, Title III of the 1929 convention.

The general provisions of Article 49 add to the rules set forth in the 1929 convention by requiring also that account shall be taken of the age and sex of prisoners of war, and that they should be maintained in a good state of physical and mental health.

The 1929 convention stipulated that the work of prisoners of war should have no direct relation to operations of war. In Article 50 of the new convention this principle has been maintained and is clarified by a limitative enumeration of the categories of work which prisoners may be required to do.

Article 52 confirms the principle already laid down in the 1929 convention whereby prisoners of war may not be detailed for unhealthy or dangerous labor. A new provision has been included, however, stating that the removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labor.

Articles 53, 54, 55, 56, and 57 which deal with duration of labor, working pay and working accidents, medical supervision, labor detachments, and prisoners of war detailed to private employers, reproduce in greater detail the 1929 stipulations with the exception of the article dealing with the compensation of prisoners who are victims of working accidents. In the new convention, the Detaining Power must provide these prisoners with all necessary care, but, as opposed to the 1929 provision, the power on which the prisoner depends is now solely responsible for paying such compensation. It is worthy of note also that the Detaining Power is obliged to give a daily rest of one hour in the middle of the day, and, as far as the weekly rest of prisoners is concerned, to take into account the day of rest observed in the prisoner's home country.

Financial Resources of Prisoners of War (Section IV)

This section is completely new. The articles dealing with financial questions have been grouped together, whereas, in the 1929 conven-

tion they are scattered. It is also new in the sense that it profoundly changes the 1929 rules which were based for the most part on the liberal monetary system which operated before World War I. It has been necessary to take into account the more rigid financial and monetary controls without, however, excluding the possibility of applying the liberal concept when this could be to the advantage of the prisoner.

The basic principle of the system of financial resources is set forth in Article 58 which provides that the Detaining Power may, especially with a view to preventing escapes, fix a limit pending an arrangement with the Protecting Power to the sums which a prisoner may have in his possession. Any sum in excess of the limit is placed to the prisoner's account.

Articles 60, 61, 62, and 63 are concerned with the various sources from which prisoners may acquire funds. Under the 1929 convention pay was given only to officers; it has now been extended to all prisoners in order to cover those who, not being able to work, do not earn anything. The amount of pay has been fixed for the various ranks which have for this purpose been divided into five categories. The pay has been called an "advance of pay" to show that the amount is a part only of the amount paid to them in their army. In order to decide in advance the pay due to prisoners of different categories, the complicated system provided for in the 1929 convention has been supplanted by a fixed basis, the gold Swiss Franc.

There have also been departures from the 1929 convention as regards ordinary pay. Since it is not a question of wage or a salary on which a prisoner has to live, the term "working pay" has been introduced. The rather impractical standards in the old convention for fixing pay have been dropped; the Detaining Power itself shall fix the amounts of working pay, but may not go below a minimum which has been likewise fixed in terms of the gold Swiss Franc. Finally, no matter whether prisoners work for private or public employers, the Detaining Power is itself responsible for paying them, and, contrary to the rule adopted in 1929, is responsible also for the working pay of prisoners assigned permanently in the capacity of artisans or clerks to the administration or management of camps.

In Articles 64 and 65 there has been established a system of close control over prisoners' accounts which gives both prisoners and the Protecting Power the possibility of checking the accounts regularly. The winding up of accounts in every case where captivity comes to an end has been carefully provided for in Article 66. The 1929 rule which obliged the Detaining Power to pay the prisoners the credit balance of their account in cash has been dropped. In the new convention, it is provided that a certificate showing the amount of a prisoner's credit balance shall be given to him and a duplicate sent to the power

of origin which shall be responsible for payment to the repatriated prisoners of the credit balance shown on the certificate.

Relations of Prisoners of War with the Exterior (Section V)

In addition to the provision of the 1929 convention which stipulated that the prisoner of war should be enabled to send to his next-of-kin, at the latest one week after his arrival in camp, a post card informing them of his capture, Article 69 provides for a second message on a second card called "capture card" addressed directly to the Central Prisoners of War Agency. This "capture card" is intended to enable the Central Prisoners of War Agency to establish its card index even before having received from the Detaining Power the official lists of the prisoners of war which they have captured.

Article 71 deals with correspondence and attempts to remedy the difficulties experienced in World War II in connection with the slowness in forwarding prisoners of war correspondence due to the congestion of the censorship service. Limitations may be imposed on the number of letters and cards which prisoners may write each month, but cannot normally be restricted to less than two letters and four cards. In order to expedite censorship, correspondence which is addressed to prisoners may also under certain conditions be limited. Further, a new provision extends the number of cases in which prisoners of war may send telegrams.

In view of the importance of collective relief shipments, a new article (Article 73) has been included which makes the practical details of receiving and allocating relief shipments the subject of special agreements between the parties to the conflict. If there is no agreement between the parties concerned, the model agreement annexed to the convention then applies.

Article 74 contains a new provision which has no counterpart in the 1929 convention, namely, that relief shipments for prisoners of war shall enjoy free transport in all territory under the control of the Detaining Power, and in the territory of every other power which is a party to the convention.

Article 75 is entirely new and is concerned with special transport. The object of the article is to enable either the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization acceptable to the parties to the conflict, whenever military operations make it impossible for the latter to fulfil the obligation of providing transport for relief supplies, to undertake on its own initiative to make arrangements in whatever way may prove necessary to insure such transport.

Relations between Prisoners of War and the Authorities (Section VI)

Article 78 restates in greater detail the provisions of Article 42 of the 1929 convention relating

to complaints and requests of prisoners of war. It provides in particular an innovation in that prisoners are given the right of unlimited recourse to the representatives of the Protecting Power in order to make known their grievances.

Article 80 contains an important new provision with respect to prisoners' representatives by stipulating that they shall not be held responsible simply by reason of their functions for any offenses committed by prisoners of war.

With respect to penal and disciplinary sanctions, several new principles have been introduced. In Article 83 an appeal is made to the indulgence of the authorities of the Detaining Power when deciding the question of whether an offense should be the subject of judicial or disciplinary action. In the 1929 text this principle referred only to offenses connected with escape. Article 84 provides that in general prisoners should be judged by military courts and in all cases by courts offering essential guarantees of independence and impartiality. In Article 85 it is provided that prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the convention. Article 87 provides that the courts and authorities of the Detaining Power shall take into consideration when fixing the penalty the fact that the accused prisoner is not a national of the Detaining Power and is not bound to it by any tie of allegiance, and permits the courts or authorities to lighten the sentence of the accused prisoner.

In Article 89 there has been introduced a limitative enumeration of the various forms of disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners. In this connection, there has been omitted the 1929 provision for punishment by disciplinary measures affecting rations. A basic safeguard has been included to the effect that the punishments shall never be inhuman, brutal, or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.

Article 91 is new; it defines the conditions to be fulfilled in order that escapees may be regarded as successful.

In Article 96 it should be noted that camp commandants are now prohibited from delegating their disciplinary powers to prisoners of war and are also required to keep a register of any disciplinary punishment inflicted, which register shall be accessible to representatives of the Protecting Power. The importance of these provisions has been demonstrated by experience.

With respect to the articles relative to judicial proceedings, there has been introduced in Article 99 the principle that no prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law in force at the time the said act was committed. It has also been set forth that no prisoner of war may be tried without having the assistance of qualified counsel. Article 102 guar-

antees to prisoners of war the same trial procedure as provided for members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. The provisions of the convention relating to such matters must also be observed. Article 105 provides that the Detaining Power shall find the accused a lawyer if he or the Protecting Power have not selected one and that the counsel shall be given the facilities necessary to prepare the defense. Also, it is provided that the particulars of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned and other court documents involved shall be communicated to the accused.

The system of notification of judgments to the Protecting Power has been improved. In the future, in accordance with Article 107, the detailed notification which in the 1929 convention was required for the death penalty only is now to be made for all sentences.

Article 108 is new and defines the minimum conditions for the treatment of prisoners after sentence has been passed, particularly with regard to hygiene, correspondence, medical or spiritual aid, the application of penalties, and the provision of separate accommodations for women.

TERMINATION OF CAPTIVITY (PART III)

With respect to direct repatriation and accommodation in a neutral country, Article 109 amplifies the provisions of Articles 68 and 72 of the 1929 convention. This article includes a new provision stipulating that no wounded or sick prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation may be repatriated against his will during hostilities. Article 110 enumerates the categories of persons to be repatriated direct or who may be accommodated in a neutral country. Article 112 covers Mixed Medical Commissions, and prescribes that their appointment, duties, and functioning shall be in accordance with the regulations set forth in Annex II of the convention. Annex II is completely new and the necessity for it was demonstrated by experiences in World War II.

With respect to the release and repatriation of prisoners of war at the close of hostilities, Article 118 sets forth the principle that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay at the end of active hostilities. There is also outlined in Article 118 certain principles dealing with the apportionment of costs of repatriation. Article 119 includes new provisions concerning the conditions governing the repatriation of prisoners. It contains in particular provisions for the restitution and transport of prisoners' property.

In connection with the death of prisoners of war, Article 121 has been inserted because of incidents which took place during World War II. It is clearly stated therein that whenever there is doubt about the cause of death or serious injury there shall be an inquiry, and, if necessary, punishment by the Detaining Power of any persons found guilty.

V. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949

GENERAL PROVISIONS (PART I)

The provisions in this part which are not common to the other conventions formulated at Geneva are embodied in Articles 4, 5, and 6. Article 4 defines the persons who are entitled to claim protection under the convention. In general, the persons protected are those who, in the case of conflict or of occupation, find themselves in the hands of a power of which they are not nationals. Article 5 deals with restrictions which may be placed on the protection afforded by the convention in connection with persons suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the state or the occupying power. Article 6 establishes the beginning and end of the application of the convention. Application begins at the outset of a conflict or as soon as there is occupation. In the territory of parties to the conflict it shall cease on the general close of military operations. In case of occupied territory, the application shall cease one year after the general close of military operations. Should occupation continue after that time, the occupying power will be bound for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such power exercises the functions of government in that territory, by the provisions of certain enumerated articles. These articles contain provisions which should continue to protect the inhabitants of occupied territory for the duration of the occupation.

GENERAL PROTECTION OF POPULATIONS AGAINST CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES OF WAR (PART II)

The articles in Part II are applicable to the whole of the populations of countries in conflict: they concern not only the relations between a given state and aliens but also the relations between a given state and its own nationals. Article 14 envisages the establishment of hospital and safety zones and localities so organized as to protect from the effects of war the wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven. Article 15 permits the setting up of neutralized zones in regions where fighting is taking place to shelter wounded and sick combatants or noncombatants and civilian persons who take no part in hostilities and perform no work of a military character. Articles 16 through 23 deal with the protection and treatment to be afforded the civilian wounded and sick. They relate to the evacuation of besieged or encircled areas, the protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled, the status of the hospital staff, the protection to be accorded the land, sea, and air transport employed for the removal of wounded and sick civilians, and the free passage under certain conditions of consignments of medical supplies, food, and clothing. Articles 24, 25, and 26 are concerned with special measures

relating to child welfare, family news and correspondence, and dispersed families.

STATUS AND TREATMENT OF PROTECTED PERSONS (PART III)

Part III constitutes the main portion of the convention. It deals with two situations presenting fundamental differences, namely, that of aliens in the territory of a belligerent state and that of the population, whether national or alien, resident in a country occupied by the enemy. It is divided into five sections: (I) common provisions governing both of the above situations, (II) provisions relative to aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, (III) provisions concerning occupied territories, (IV) provisions relating to the status of internees, and (V) provisions concerning information bureaus and a central information agency.

Section I (Articles 27-34) provides that protected persons are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons, honor, family rights, religious convictions and practices, and manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated. Women are to be especially protected. The party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may be incurred. Protected persons are to have every facility for making application to Protecting Powers and relief organizations. The use of physical or moral coercion to obtain information is forbidden, and the use of any measure of such a character as to cause physical suffering or extermination is prohibited. Collective penalties, reprisals, and taking of hostages are likewise prohibited.

Section II (Articles 35-46) provides that all protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be entitled to do so unless their departure is contrary to national interests of the state. If a protected person is refused permission to leave he shall be entitled to have such refusal reconsidered by an appropriate court or administrative board designated for that purpose. Persons permitted to leave may provide themselves with the necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reasonable amount of their effects, and departures permitted shall be carried out under satisfactory conditions as regards safety, hygiene, sanitation, and food. Protected persons who are not repatriated are to be treated in principle in the same way as in time of peace. In any case, certain specific rights are to be granted to them. They are to be enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent to them, to receive medical attention and hospital treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the state concerned, to be allowed to practice their religion, and to be authorized to move from an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war to the same extent as the nationals of the state concerned. Protected persons who, as a result of the war, have lost their

gainful employment shall be granted the opportunity to find paid employment and that opportunity shall, subject to security considerations, be equal to that enjoyed by the nationals of the power in whose territory they are. Protected persons may be compelled to work only to the same extent as nationals of the party to the conflict in whose territory they are. The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary, and any persons interned or placed in an assigned residence are entitled to have such action reconsidered by an appropriate court or administrative board of the Detaining Power. Finally, protected persons cannot be transferred to a power which is not a party to the convention. Article 44 establishes the principle that the Detaining Power shall not automatically and in all respects treat as enemy aliens solely on the basis of enemy nationality persons who are bona fide refugees from an enemy state.

Section III (Articles 47-78) sets forth rules which are to govern the Occupying Power in its treatment of protected persons in the territory which is occupied by that Power. Protected persons in occupied territory are not to be deprived of any benefits of the convention by virtue of any change introduced into the institutions or government of the territory or by an annexation of the whole or part of the occupied territory. An appropriate procedure is to be established in order to give persons who are not nationals of the power whose territory is occupied an opportunity to leave the territory. Individual or mass forcible transfers and deportations are prohibited, except that the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. The Occupying Power shall facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children, take steps to facilitate their identification, and make arrangements, if local institutions are inadequate, to maintain and educate orphaned children. Protected persons may not be compelled to serve in the armed forces of the Occupying Power and compulsory work is forbidden except when necessary for needs of the army of occupation, for public utility services, or for the feeding, sheltering, transportation, or health of the population of the occupied country. Destruction of personnel or real property not made absolutely necessary by military operations is prohibited. The Occupying Power has the duty to insure, so far as it is reasonably able to do so, the food and medical supplies of the population and may requisition by payment of fair value such supplies only for the occupation forces and then only if the requirements of the civilian population are taken into account. The Occupying Power is also obligated to maintain, to the extent of its ability reasonably to do so, and in cooperation with the local author-

ities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory. Relief schemes and consignments for the population must be accepted by the Occupying Power and by other parties to the conflict where certain conditions are satisfied. Distribution of relief consignments shall be carried out with the cooperation and under the supervision of the Protecting Power. Relief societies shall be permitted to pursue their humanitarian activities.

With respect to penal legislation, it is provided that penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the convention. Local courts are to continue to function in respect of all offenses covered by these laws. The Occupying Power may enact penal laws which are essential to insure its security, to enable it to fulfill its obligations under the convention, and to maintain orderly government, but these laws cannot come into force until published. In case of offenses against these laws, the Occupying Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, nonpolitical military courts which must sit in the occupied country. The courts shall apply only those laws which were applicable prior to the offense and which are in accordance with general principles of law, in particular the principle that the penalty shall be proportionate to the offense. Persons who commit an offense intended solely to harm the Occupying Power but which does not constitute an attempt on life or limb of members of the occupying forces, a grave collective danger, or seriously damage property of the occupying forces shall be liable only to internment or simple imprisonment. The Occupying Power may impose the death penalty upon protected persons only in cases of espionage, sabotage, or intentional offenses which have caused the death of one or more persons, and then only if such offenses were punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory. Accused persons shall have the right of a regular trial, the right to present evidence necessary to their defense, the right of counsel, and the right of appeal provided for by the laws applied by the court. In no case shall persons condemned to death be deprived of the right of petition for pardon or reprieve, and execution of the death sentence shall not take place before the expiration of at least six months from the date of receipt by the Protecting Power of the notification of the final judgment. Protected persons accused of offenses shall be detained in the occupied country and if convicted shall serve their sentences therein. At the close of occupation, protected persons who have been accused of offenses or convicted by the courts in occupied territory shall be handed over with the relevant records to the authorities of the liberated territory.

Section IV (Articles 79-135) contains the regulations for the treatment of internees. In many

respects these are similar and related to the provisions governing the treatment of prisoners contained in the convention on prisoners of war. The regulations deal with the places of internment; food and clothing; hygiene and medical attention; religious, intellectual, and physical activities; personal property and financial resources; administration and discipline; relations with the exterior; penal and disciplinary sanctions; transfers of internees; deaths; and release, repatriation, and accommodation in neutral countries.

Section V (Articles 136-141) relating to information bureaux and a Central Information Agency contains provisions similar to the provisions on the same subject embodied in the prisoners of war convention.

U.S. Reports Return of World War II Prisoners of War

*Communication From Ambassador Austin
to Secretary-General Lie, dated May 1, 1951*

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to the Secretary-General's note SOA 417/5/02, dated February 23, 1951, regarding the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1950, concerning measures for the peaceful solution of the problem of prisoners of war (Doc. A/1749).¹ The Secretary-General states that he would appreciate receiving any information which this Government might be in a position to furnish with respect to (a) names of World War II prisoners of war still in custody, reasons for which they are still detained and places in which they are detained, and (b) names of prisoners of war who died while in custody, as well as date and cause of death and manner and place of burial in each case.

The Representative of the United States is pleased to inform the Secretary-General that the United States does not have any World War II prisoners of war in its custody. The United States program of repatriation of prisoners of war was completed by June 30, 1947. A list is enclosed giving names and other information regarding the nineteen individual prisoners of war who had been under sentence for post-capture crimes and were repatriated after that date.²

With respect to section (b) relating to deaths of prisoners of war while in United States custody, the Secretary-General is informed that full details concerning serious illnesses, deaths and burials of World War II prisoners of war were promptly furnished the home countries of the prisoners of war at the time through the protecting powers and the International Committee of the Red Cross. However, since receipt of the Secretary-General's

note under reference a list has been compiled, copies of which are enclosed, giving names of and information regarding prisoners of war who died while in custody in the United States.² Owing to the pressure of work on the enemy Prisoner-of-War Information Bureau resulting from United Nations operations in Korea, it has not thus far been possible to compile from the several million individual prisoner-of-war files a similar list of prisoners of war who died in various theaters of operation and were buried overseas. These files will be made available at any time to the United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War.

In connection with both of the above points, it should be noted that the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention of July 27, 1929 were, from the beginning of United States participation in the war, continuously given effect in respect of the United States. Pursuant to this Convention, during the war period and afterward, while the United States had prisoners of war in its custody, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross had access to prisoner-of-war camps and to prisoners of war in United States custody. Representatives of protecting powers chosen by the home countries of prisoners of war also had access to the camps and the prisoners of war. Thus these representatives were enabled to verify the information furnished concerning their identity and the camps in which they were held and to observe the treatment which the prisoners of war received.

All German, Japanese and Italian nationals who were convicted of war crimes by any United States tribunals remained in, or were promptly returned to their home countries for incarceration, where they are allowed communication facilities and may be visited by their families. The names of and other pertinent information concerning these war criminals have been published, and will be made available on request to the United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War.

In the event that the United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War, provided for in the General Assembly Resolution under reference, should wish to obtain information concerning the United States program of repatriation of World War II prisoners of war, or any other information concerning such prisoners of war while they were in United States custody, the United States Government will be happy to make available to it all pertinent records.

The Representative of the United States further assures the Secretary-General that in addition to supplying all necessary information, the Government of the United States will grant to the United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War right of access to the United States and to areas under its jurisdiction and will cooperate fully with the Commission in all aspects of its work in accordance with the resolution under reference.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1951, p. 73.

² Not printed.

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Recommendations for a Mutual Security Program

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

Released to the press by the White House May 24]

Three weeks ago I transmitted to the Congress a request for 60 billion dollars for the United States defense establishment during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.

I am now recommending for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, a Mutual Security Program as follows:

(1) Military assistance to other free nations in the amount of 6.25 billion dollars.

(2) Economic assistance to other free nations in the amount of 2.25 billion dollars, primarily to support expanded defense efforts abroad.

These amounts compare with 5.3 billion dollars appropriated for military assistance, and 3 billion dollars for economic assistance, in the current fiscal year.

Extent and Design of the Program

The program for our own Armed Forces and this Mutual Security Program interlock. The one builds upon the other. The purpose of each is the security of the United States—the security of American lives and homes against attack and the security of our rights and liberties as law-abiding members of the world community.

Our country has greater economic strength and larger potential military power than any other nation on earth. But we do not and we should not stand alone. We cannot maintain our civilization, if the rest of the world is split up, subjugated, and organized against us by the Kremlin.

This is a very real and terrible danger. But it can be overcome. To do so, we must work with the rest of the free world: we must join other free nations in common defense plans; we must concert our economic strength with theirs for the common good; and we must help other free coun-

tries to build the military and economic power needed to make impossible the Communist dreams of world conquest.

This is hard common sense and sound economy. The dollars spent under the Mutual Security Program will build more strength in support of our security than we could build at home with the same expenditure of funds.

This Mutual Security Program brings together our various foreign-aid programs, including the arms aid of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, economic assistance for Europe—now being directed primarily to support of rearmament—and our economic aid to underdeveloped areas under the Point 4 concept. Every one of these programs has proved its worth.

In preparing the present recommendations, each of these separate programs has been revised in the light of the emergency situation that exists in the world and the extraordinary demands that are being placed on our Nation. The amounts, the geographical areas, and the purposes of the aid have all been chosen in order to bring about the greatest possible increase in the security of the United States and the whole free world.

Under this program, the United States will send tanks, guns, and planes to a number of free countries, in Europe and other parts of the world, which are building up armed forces against the threat of Communist attack. We will also send economic help to a number of countries—economic help ranging from machinery and materials with which to make weapons, to seeds, medicine, and technical assistance with which to conquer communism's allies of starvation and sickness.

This program was designed with three major characteristics of the Soviet threat in mind:

First, the Soviet threat is world-wide. In Europe, in Asia, in our own hemisphere, the strategy of the Kremlin concentrates on trying to pick off the free countries one by one, so that their resources and people can be organized against the rest of the

¹ H. doc. 147, 82d Cong., 1st sess. Also printed as Department of State publication 4236.

free world. That is why the Mutual Security Program includes essential help to free countries all around the world which are exposed to the danger of internal or external Communist pressures.

Second, the Soviet threat is total, it affects every form of human endeavor. Communist attack may come in the form of armies marching across frontiers; or it may come in the form of internal subversion. Economic warfare, psychological warfare, political infiltration, sabotage, the marching of armies—these are interchangeable aggressive weapons which the Soviet rulers use singly or together according to shifting calculations of greatest advantage. That is why the free world must concentrate upon building not only military strength, but also economic, political, and moral strength. That is why the Mutual Security Program includes economic as well as military assistance.

Third, the Soviet threat is of indefinite duration. The free world must take into account both the possibility that the Soviet rulers may soon start all-out armed aggression, and the possibility that they may carry on their aggressive tactics for many years by measures short of all-out war.

That is why the task of the free world now is not only to build defenses urgently in the immediate future, but also to prepare for the long pull. We of the free countries must make preparations now so that when our armed forces have been built up we will be able to maintain them for years, if necessary, and at the same time grow in underlying economic strength more soundly and more rapidly than the Soviet dictatorship.

Resources Provided by the Program

The free nations have the resources and the will to overcome all these aspects of the Soviet threat. Together, our potential strength is enormous. The free nations have 75 percent of the world's industrial capacity and most of the world's raw materials.

Most important of all, free men, all around the world, have the determination to stop Communist aggression and to achieve peace. The Communist aggression in Korea dispelled any lingering doubts that the Kremlin is willing to threaten the peace of the world.

The job before the free nations is to organize their potential resources and together to convert them into actual military and economic strength. Our associates in the free world are now making vigorous efforts to this end. The Mutual Security Program will provide them with resources required to supplement and make effective their efforts. It is not a program under which we will carry the rest of the free world on our backs. It could not succeed if that were the case. The program is founded on the principle of mutual effort and the knowledge that we can help effectively only those who help themselves.

The proposed aid is related to the resources available to each recipient country, its economic stability, and the burdens it has assumed. Our aid will be provided only for essential needs that the country cannot meet by its own efforts. The need for aid will be continuously reviewed in the light of each country's performance and of economic and political changes.

The bulk of the assistance under the Mutual Security Program will be military equipment. Most of this will go to our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty, but, in addition, substantial quantities will be supplied to nations in Asia and the Middle East. Military equipment to supplement their own will be provided to countries when they have organized forces which require this equipment in order to become effective fighting units. With our assistance, the free world as a whole will be able to strengthen its military defenses rapidly. Without such aid, the necessary build-up would be dangerously delayed if not impossible.

In addition to supplying military equipment this program will provide economic aid for a number of countries. In most countries in Europe and in some countries in other parts of the world this economic aid will enable the recipients to carry on larger defense programs than would otherwise be possible. In a few cases, some further economic help is necessary to continue progress toward recovery. In Asia and other underdeveloped areas, this program will enable the people to make headway against conditions of poverty and stagnation which are principal asset of Soviet infiltration.

The condition of the people in the underdeveloped areas would be a matter of humanitarian concern even if our national security were not involved. Major improvement in these conditions is necessarily a long-term process, in which the countries' own efforts, private investment, and public developmental loans should play the largest part. Carefully selected projects of technical assistance and initial development on a grant basis, however, can speed up this process and provide tangible benefits even in the short run.

The underdeveloped countries in Asia, South America, and Africa produce strategic materials which are essential to the defense and economic health of the free world. Production of these materials must be increased. Loans and developmental help are needed. The development of the resources of those countries helps them by raising their standard of living and increasing their resistance to Communist subversion, and helps the whole free world by increasing the supply of raw materials essential to defense and to an expanding world economy.

To enable the underdeveloped areas to expand their production of strategic materials, they must be assured of being able to obtain the essential supplies and equipment they need from our country. Indeed, our entire security program will be

successful only if the materials available to the free world are distributed in the way that will best contribute to the build-up of total free world strength. The Mutual Security Program, like the program for our own Armed Forces, has been examined from the standpoint of the availability of supplies, materials, and equipment that are required to carry it out. We believe these resources can and must be made available out of the expanding production of the free world.

In each area, the United States aid which I propose will be a small part of the total resources available for military and economic purposes—but that small proportion is crucial. In all these areas of the world, larger amounts of United States assistance could be put to good use and would pay real dividends. But I have limited the assistance I am recommending to what is absolutely necessary, under the emergency conditions we are in today, to help those countries build essential military and economic strength.

Division of Funds

I propose that the total funds required under the Mutual Security Program be divided as follows:

Mutual Security Program, 1952		
[In millions]		
	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Military</i>
EUROPE -----	1,650	5,240
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA----	125	415
ASIA -----	375	555
LATIN AMERICA-----	22	40
Administrative Expenses-----	78	
	2,250	6,250

The military aid for Greece and Turkey is included in the amount for the Middle East. The amount of the economic aid for Europe includes the economic aid for Greece and Turkey. For convenience, the estimated requirement for administrative expenses for the entire program—approximately 78 million dollars is shown as a single figure under economic aid.

The amounts requested for economic aid include 13 million dollars to be furnished the United Nations and the Organization of American States for their technical assistance programs.

The economic, as well as the military aid recommended, is grant assistance to be provided through appropriated funds. Loans by the Export-Import Bank will also continue to play an important role in our efforts to assist the economic progress of friendly countries. In order that full use may be made of the opportunities for loans, especially to develop strategic materials, I recommend that the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank be increased by 1 billion dollars. Not all of the increased lending authority, of course, will be used in the coming year.

With this program of assistance to the total free

world effort, we will move forward rapidly toward a situation giving reasonable assurance against aggression.

Moreover, the Mutual Security Program is designed to taper off as soon as our safety will permit. The creation of effective military forces in being, coupled with increased productivity, will make it possible, within a few years, for most areas of the free world to maintain their defenses and sustain their economies without further grant assistance from this country.

The creation of this strength will provide a defensive shield against aggression for all the free world. Ever since the war, the free nations have been going forward to develop their resources and improve the lot of their people. Ever since the war, the free nations have been working together to create a world community in which each nation, respecting world law, can play its distinctive and honorable role.

The only kind of war we seek is the good old fight against man's ancient enemies—poverty, disease, hunger, and illiteracy. This is an effort which makes use of the great elements of our strength—our economic power, our science, our organizing ability, our political principles, our enthusiasm as free men with faith in the future. This is an effort to build, not to destroy; to grow in freedom and justice and mutual respect; to replace the force of arms with the force of peaceful change.

We have no doubt about the outcome of this free world effort. But we must be strong and we must have strong partners if we are to discourage new acts of violence by the power-hungry, and to win the opportunity to carry on our work of peaceful progress.

For the time being, therefore, the emphasis in our cooperation with the other free nations must be on building our defensive shield against aggression. This shield threatens no one. It will never be used for aggression. But it will be used instantly for defense.

The strengthening of the free world along these lines is the best hope of producing changes in the policies of the Soviet Union without a world war. Military defense forces will put a stop to the Kremlin's hope of easy conquest. Growing prosperity in the free countries will frustrate Soviet political warfare. In these circumstances, the Soviet rulers will face growing internal pressures. The peoples under Soviet control will grow more and more restive under the burden of an aggressive and futile policy of hostility toward the whole world. The rulers of the Soviet Union will be forced by these pressures to abandon their policy of aggression.

It is too early to predict how or when this policy will change. But this program of mutual security will help to bring about such a change. It is certain that the united vigor and cooperative action of the free world can produce such results if we act in time. No system based on slavery and terror

can long withstand the tremendous human energies that are released by the advance of freedom.

Critical Areas To Be Defended

EUROPE

For the security of the United States, for the survival of freedom in the world, free Europe is a critical area that must be defended.

The people of Europe free from Soviet control number 300 million. They operate a great industrial plant, second only to our own. They occupy a uniquely strategic location. They are at once the most tempting prize for Soviet ambitions and our strongest allies in the world struggle for freedom.

The loss of Europe to the Soviet Union would not only be tragic in itself; it would also result in a tremendous shift of world power. It would compel us to convert the United States into an isolated garrison state.

That is why, 3 years ago, when the countries of Europe were trembling on the brink of economic collapse, the United States launched its program of aid for European recovery.

That is why, 2 years ago, the United States and Canada joined 10 Western European countries—Iceland, Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Portugal, and Italy—in the North Atlantic Treaty, declaring that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all.

The North Atlantic Treaty reflects the basic fact of international life that the freedom of Western Europe and the freedom of North America are inseparable.

Under that Treaty, defense plans have been developed by the military leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty countries. Under General Eisenhower's central command, a unified army, navy, and air force is being organized for the defense of Western Europe, composed of national forces assigned by individual nations.

The key element in the defense of free Europe is the ability to hold on the ground. Western Europe lacks the insulation of wide oceans. Major preparations must therefore be made to hold its lands—by well-armed manpower on the ground, by the great striking force of airpower, and by a seapower which commands its surrounding waters and important lines of communication.

The European countries themselves are providing the great majority of the forces needed. The United States also has Army, Navy, and Air Force units in Europe, which add to the power of the combined defense forces, and more units will move there, both from this country and from Canada.

Our European partners in the North Atlantic Treaty now have over 2 million men under arms, plus large numbers of trained reserves. The bulk of Western Europe's armed forces are pledged

to General Eisenhower's command. Moreover, some of these countries—notably France and Britain—have sizable forces fighting in Malaya, Indochina, and Korea, and have other important overseas defense commitments. The combat power of Western European forces is rising steadily as equipment becomes available and periods of military service are lengthened.

Rearmament will cause a severe drain on the Western European countries. Through their own efforts, national and collective, and with the vital assistance of the Marshall Plan, Western Europe has made a remarkable record of economic recovery since 1947. Production and trade have been restored and financial conditions have been greatly improved. In the free countries of Europe, communism has been checked and thrown back. The original goals of the Marshall Plan have been largely achieved.

But the Western European countries are by no means yet free from the after effects of the most destructive war in history.

They are living on a very narrow economic margin. Whereas our standard of living is nearly 50 percent higher than it was before World War II, theirs has only recently reached their prewar levels, which were much lower than ours.

The European countries cannot move rapidly into sufficient large-scale military production to provide all the equipment required for the essential expansion of their forces. Over the next few years, they do expect to increase their production of military equipment. In the coming fiscal year, it will be more than double the pre-Korean rate. But the most they can do will not be enough to equip their armed forces on the time schedule necessary for the common defense.

The United States, with its huge and flexible industrial capacity and greater margin for diverting resources to military production, can and should continue to supply military equipment to our allies in Western Europe. In this way, many divisions, air squadrons, and naval vessels can be brought to active duty in the next year or two which otherwise can not be.

In the immediately coming years, the crucial need is to produce the initial equipment for a very rapid build-up of forces. The expanding European productive capacity will contribute increasingly to this build-up. With this capacity, Europe should be able to meet the smaller continuing maintenance and replacement requirements without substantial outside aid.

The military aid for Europe I am recommending amounts to 5.3 billion dollars. I also recommend economic assistance for this area for the coming year in the amount of 1.65 billion dollars.

Because of the degree of economic recovery which has been attained, the total economic assistance I am requesting for European countries next year—despite the large new burdens of European rearmament—is substantially reduced from

the amount we have provided in the current fiscal year.

However, in the free countries of Europe which are rearming, the proposed increases in military production and the building of armed forces will require large diversions of manpower and other economic resources away from production of goods for consumption, for investment, and for export. To carrying these greatly enlarged military burdens, our partners in Europe will be taking measures to increase taxes and mobilize their resources through economic controls. Despite determined efforts in this direction they will need some continuing economic assistance.

Some aid is also proposed for Western Germany, which by its support of occupation forces is assisting the defense effort and which may later make more direct contributions to the common defense. In Austria and Trieste, which cannot directly contribute to the rearmament effort, but whose economies are handicapped by special difficulties, economic aid must also be continued to maintain political stability. Certain economic assistance for Yugoslavia is proposed to help meet its minimum requirements in maintaining strength against the threat of Soviet imperialism.

This economic aid is critical—that is, it is the essential condition of an increase in European military effort. It should make possible European production many times larger than the amount of the support given.

MIDDLE EAST

The countries of the Middle East are, for the most part, less developed industrially than those of Europe. They are, nevertheless, of great importance to the security of the entire free world. This region is a vital link of land, sea, and air communications between Europe, Asia, and Africa. In the free nations of the Middle East, lie half of the oil reserves of the world.

No part of the world is more directly exposed to Soviet pressure. The Kremlin has lost no opportunity to stir these troubled waters, as the postwar record amply demonstrates. Civil war in Greece; pressure for Turkish concessions on the Dardanelles; sponsorship of the rebellious Tudeh party in Iran; furthering of factional strife in the Arab States and Israel—all reflect a concerted design for the extension of Soviet domination to this vital area.

There is no simple formula for increasing stability and security in the Middle East. With the help of American military and economic assistance, Soviet pressure has already been firmly resisted in Turkey and the Soviet-inspired guerrilla war has been decisively defeated in Greece. But the pressure against the Middle East is unrelenting. It can be overcome only by a continued build-up of armed defenses and the fostering of economic development. Only through such measures can these peoples advance toward stability

and improved living conditions, and be assured that their aims can best be achieved through strengthening their associations in the free world.

To these ends, I am recommending 415 million dollars in military aid, for Greece, Turkey, and Iran; a portion of this aid will be available for other Middle Eastern nations if necessary. I am also recommending 125 million dollars in economic aid for Middle Eastern countries, exclusive of Greece and Turkey for whom economic aid is provided as part of the program for Europe. This amount also includes programs of technical assistance to Libya, Liberia, and Ethiopia, three independent states of Africa whose economic problems are similar to those of the Middle Eastern countries.

Continuing military aid for Greece and Turkey will make possible the further strengthening of these countries' large and well-trained armed forces, which have already displayed their valiant resolution in the fight for freedom in Korea. In Iran, continuing military aid is required to help build internal security and defense, together with economic aid to help sustain the Iranian economy and give impetus to the much needed longer-term process of economic development for the benefit of the Iranian people.

In the Arab States and Israel, the fundamental requirement is a regional approach to the basic problems of economic development. This is urgently needed to reduce existing tensions, especially through the orderly settlement of homeless refugees. The program for the Arab States will expand needed food production through the development of land and water resources. The program for Israel will help that country to maintain her economy during an especially trying period of her national development. At the same time, the program of assistance to the Arab refugees from Palestine, which will necessarily extend beyond the coming fiscal year, has the threefold purpose of assisting the settlement of refugees, of strengthening those states wherein they settle, and assisting both Israel and the Arab States by removing this threat to the peace of the area.

The program I am now proposing is a balanced program for strengthening the security of the Middle East. It will make a solid contribution to our hopes for peace.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

In Asia, in a vast arc stretching from Afghanistan to Korea, free countries are struggling to meet Communist aggression in all its many forms. Some of these countries are battling the Communist armies of Soviet satellites; some are engaged in bitter civil strife against Communist-led guerrillas; all of them face the immediate danger of Communist subversion.

Soviet intentions with regard to these countries are unmistakably clear. Using the weapons of

subversion, false propaganda and civil war, the Kremlin has already reduced China to the status of a satellite. The Soviet rulers have turned their satellite armies loose on the Republic of Korea. Communist rebellion is raging in Indochina. In Burma, the Philippines, and other places, Communist-inspired groups are stirring up internal disorder. In all countries, they are trying to exploit deep-seated economic difficulties—poverty, illiteracy, and disease.

This campaign threatens to absorb the manpower and the vital resources of the East into the Soviet design of world conquest. It threatens to deprive the free nations of some of their most vitally needed raw materials. It threatens to turn more of the peaceful millions of the East into armies to be used as pawns at the disposal of the Kremlin.

Aside from immediate consideration of security, the continued independence of these nations is vital to the future of the free world. Many of these nations are new to self-government. They have dedicated themselves to the ideals of national independence, of human liberty, and social progress. Their hundreds of millions of citizens are eager for justice and liberty and a stake in the future.

These countries demonstrate the power and vitality of the ideals of our own American Revolution; they mark the sweeping advance across the world of the concepts of freedom and brotherhood. To lose these countries to the rulers of the Kremlin would be more than a blow to our military security and our economic life. It would be a terrible defeat for the ideals of freedom—with grave spiritual consequences for men everywhere who share our faith in freedom.

All these considerations make it essential for the United States to help the free countries of Asia in their struggle to make good their independence and bring economic and social progress to their people. Where the Governments of these countries are striving to establish free and stable political institutions, to build up their military defenses, and to raise the standard of living above the level of bare subsistence, we can and should give them assistance. We cannot replace their own strong efforts, but we can supplement them.

This Mutual Security Program is intended to do that. On the military side, it will supply certain of the Asian countries with items of military equipment and the training they need for their defense forces. On the economic side, it will provide a number of the Asian countries with the most urgently needed commodities, machinery, and tools, and with technical advice in such fields as agriculture, industry, health, and governmental administration.

The assistance I am recommending for Asian countries, 555 million dollars in military aid and 375 million dollars in economic aid, is so planned as to meet the most pressing needs in the various

countries, and is intended to provide the crucial margin of resources which will enable them to move forward.

Military assistance under this program will go to the Chinese armies on Formosa, to help keep that island out of the hands of Communist China. It will go to Indochina, where over 100,000 French troops are fighting side-by-side with the forces of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia against Communist-led forces. It will go to the Philippines and to Thailand, to help build forces strong enough to insure internal security and discourage outside attack. Some of these military assistance funds will also be available for allocation to other countries in the area if a critical need arises.

The military aid under this program will supplement other military efforts against communism in Asia. The countries we will be aiding, and a number of others, are supporting military forces with their own funds. France is supplying the largest part of the military supplies needed in Indochina, and Britain is supplying her forces which are fighting guerrillas in the Malay States. The substantial military aid we are giving to the forces of the Republic of Korea is included in the budget for our military services.

The struggle for security and peace in Asia is far more than a military matter. In many of the Asian countries, including all the countries which need military aid, economic assistance is also required.

These countries urgently need help in their efforts to overcome the desperate conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and disease which are the heart of the Asian problem. It is a terrible fact that poverty is increasing rather than diminishing in much of Asia. Millions of people exist at bare subsistence levels.

The Asian countries are doing what they can on their own to meet this problem. An encouraging proposal affecting a number of these countries is the Colombo Plan for technical assistance and economic development worked out under the auspices of the British Commonwealth. In addition, some aid to Asian countries will be furnished through the programs of the United Nations.

These sources of aid alone will not, however, suffice to reverse the downward trend in living standards. Aid from the United States is also necessary.

Sizable programs of technical assistance and capital development are now being carried on by the Economic Cooperation Administration in some of these countries under the Point 4 concept. A portion of the funds I am now recommending will provide for continuing these programs and extending them to other countries. These funds will be used to send out technical experts and equipment needed to improve health, agriculture, transportation, and communications services and assist in the development of natural resources.

In addition, the funds I am now recommending

will provide necessary economic support for defense programs in Indochina, Formosa, and the Philippines.

Finally, the economic aid funds I am requesting for Asia include 112.5 million dollars for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Together with 50 million dollars which are likely to remain unexpended from funds available for Korean aid for the present fiscal year, these funds will be made available to the Agency at such time as conditions in Korea permit the reconstruction program to be undertaken.

In preparing these recommendations for economic aid, projects which should be financed by loans have been excluded. The investment of private capital and public loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank will play an important part in the economic progress of Asia, as in other parts of the world.

In the administration of this program, loans, grants, and technical assistance will be meshed together with the plans and efforts of each of the recipient countries for the development of its own resources. Only in this manner can the various kinds of outside aid available to an Asian country be used most effectively and without duplication or overlapping.

These economic programs will have as their goal the creation of conditions eliminating the need for further grant aid for economic development. Such programs look toward the creation of sound government finances and public services, and toward more stable economic and political foundations for raising living standards and creating broader opportunities. It will take time to reach these goals but they must be steadily pursued. Our aid will provide a dynamic force in that direction and will thus contribute strongly to freedom and peace in Asia.

LATIN AMERICA

The United States and the other American Republics agreed in 1947, in the treaty of Rio de Janeiro, that an armed attack upon one of them is to be regarded as an armed attack on all, and to act together for the common defense.

Our good neighbors to the south are more than willing to share in defending the hemisphere. But there are real limits on their ability to do so without some aid from us. They produce little modern military equipment.

During World War II, defense tasks in Latin America required the use of over 75,000 United States troops as well as considerable United States naval forces. The armed forces of the Latin American states did not at that time have the equipment or training to carry out those defense tasks by themselves.

It makes good sense that, in planning the defense of this hemisphere, the United States should aid the Latin American countries to prepare for and

take over certain hemisphere defense tasks that are of interest to us all; tasks they are willing to do and well able to handle, with a little help in equipping and training their forces. Consequently, I am recommending 40 million dollars in military assistance to these countries.

In addition, I recommend 22 million dollars in economic aid to carry forward the excellent technical assistance work that is now underway in the other American states in developing agriculture, natural resources, and health, education and other types of basic services. This type of assistance has already proved its worth in the Latin American area. It is helping to raise living standards, hasten economic development, and strengthen both peoples and Governments in warding off the danger of Communist subversion.

This grant assistance is helping to lay the foundation for an expanding volume of capital development, through public and private loans and investments, in the other American Republics. The United States is already providing major economic help to Latin American countries through loans by the Export-Import Bank. Fortunately, the relative geographic security and the economic position of the American Republics make possible large amounts of private loans and investments—the normal and desirable means of fostering economic development.

Administration of the Program

The proposed organization for administering the Mutual Security Program is based on the experience we have had so far, under the arrangements established by the Congress in legislation authorizing previous military and economic aid programs.

The administration of military aid will be handled, as at present, by the Department of Defense, which will be able to insure full coordination between United States production of equipment for our own forces and equipment for our allies. The Department of Defense is responsible for evaluating the equipment deficiencies of the forces of our allies, under mutually agreed strategic concepts, and is charged with procurement, inspection and transportation of military equipment provided by this country.

Administration of economic assistance for Western Europe and most of the countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia will be carried on by the Economic Cooperation Administration. This agency has already proved its effectiveness in aiding countries to achieve economic recovery and is now administering economic assistance in support of our mutual defense and security objectives in Europe and Southeast Asia. The economic aid programs for Latin America and certain other countries in which the economic aid is limited almost wholly to technical assistance are now administered by the Technical Coopera-

tion Administration of the State Department. Consideration is now being given to the question of whether or not it would be desirable to transfer the administration of these programs to the Economic Cooperation Administration during the period that that agency is administering other foreign economic aid programs.

These agencies will work very closely with the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in achieving a proper integration between loan and grant programs.

In order to insure coordinated policy guidance in administering military and economic aid programs, a key coordinating committee has been established composed of senior representatives of the executive agencies concerned. This International Security Affairs Committee has developed out of the experience of an executive committee that had previously been coordinating operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The chairman of the new committee, the Director of International Security Affairs, is a senior official of the Department of State confirmed by the Senate, and occupies a position authorized by the Congress under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

Conclusion

I recommend this Mutual Security Program to the Congress as another vital step along the road to real security and lasting peace. Peace through collective strength is a difficult course. It is not without danger. There can be no absolute assurance of success. But there are far greater dangers in any other course.

We cannot win peace through appeasement. We cannot gain security in isolation. We will not surrender.

Let it never be forgotten, however, that we are ready as we have always been, to follow the road of peaceful settlement of disputes, of control and reduction of armaments, of cooperation in applying man's talents to the building of a just and prosperous world society.

If the rulers of the Soviet Union did not drown their words of peace with the drums of war, if their professions of peaceful intent were matched by deeds, the century in which we live could become the brightest man has known upon this earth. For our part, if peace could be made sure, the American people would be glad to invest a part of the resources we must now allocate to defense to a large-scale program of world-wide economic development.

The benefits of such a program would be immense; the cost a small part of what we must now pay to build our defenses at home and abroad. With such a program, we could, in cooperation with other peoples, inaugurate the most hopeful and fruitful period of peaceful development the world has ever seen.

This was our vision 6 years ago, when the war came to a close. Let us never forget it. And let us never give up our hopes and our efforts to make it a reality.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 24, 1951

Settlement of Intercustodial Conflicts Relating to Enemy Property¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 (50 U. S. C. 1 et seq.), as amended, and the act of September 28, 1950 (Public Law 857, 81st Congress), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Secretary of State and the Attorney General are hereby jointly designated as the officers authorized to conclude and give effect to agreements relating to the settlement of intercustodial conflicts involving enemy property made pursuant to the said act of September 28, 1950, and to exercise all powers incident thereto which are conferred by such act, including, without limitation, the powers to receive, transfer, release, or return property, interests therein, or proceeds thereof.

2. It is the policy of this order that the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, shall perform all functions necessary or appropriate to give effect to any agreement made pursuant to the said act of September 28, 1950, with relation to the protection of American interests in property outside the United States and that the Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall perform all functions necessary or appropriate to give effect to any such agreement with relation to property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and that all other functions relating to the effectuation of any such agreement shall be performed as may be agreed by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. However, no action taken hereunder by either the Secretary of State or the Attorney General shall be considered to be invalid on the ground that under the provisions of this order such action was within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State rather than the Attorney General, or vice versa, or that concurrence was not obtained, or that such action was not joint.

3. The Secretary of State and the Attorney General may each delegate to the other or to any other officer, person, or agency within his respective department such of his functions under this order as he may deem necessary.

4. Any money, property, or interest received as reimbursement by the United States by virtue of any agreement made pursuant to the said act of September 28, 1950, shall be administered and disposed of by the Attorney General as vested property pursuant to the said Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended. Any other money, property, or interest received by the Secretary of State or the Attorney General pursuant to any such agreement shall be administered and disposed of pursuant to the provisions of such agreement.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 17, 1951.

¹ Ex. Or. 10244, 16 Fed. Reg. 4639.

U.S. Position on British-Iranian Oil Controversy

REMARKS BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press on May 23]

In response to questions regarding the United States position with respect to the Iranian oil controversy, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the following extemporaneous remarks at his news conference today.

As we pointed out in our statement of May 18, we believe very earnestly that the controversy between the British Government and the Iranian Government is a controversy which can be and should be settled by negotiation between those parties, and we indicated some of the principles which we thought were important in controlling the general conduct of those negotiations. I don't need to go over them again with you.

There has been comment in Iran, protest in Iran that the United States was intervening, or that we were hostile in some way to them. That is a very surprising reaction as far as I am concerned. I thought there was nothing having to do with intervention about it. There was nothing having to do with hostility or opposition to the stated desires of the Iranians in regard to the control of their resources.

We pointed out to them in the statement that we have consistently urged moderation on both the British and the Iranian Governments. We pointed out that we have taken a firm stand against unilateral action of a confiscatory nature. We pointed out the technical obstacles which the Iranian Government would face if it tried to remove the present company.

I hope that the Iranians will realize that the United States is their sincere friend, that it has helped them in the past and will in the future, and that the great and continuing interest of the United States in the independence, the territorial integrity, and the well-being of Iran remains a cardinal principle of American policy.

There is no intention by the United States of challenging Iran's sovereignty. A serious controversy exists, whatever the rights or wrongs of the matter may be. Such controversies cannot be settled unilaterally. The British Government has stated its willingness to negotiate and to make broad concessions to the Iranian point of view. The United States, therefore, publicly recorded its

belief that the two parties to the controversy should sit down at a conference table and work the matter out.¹

As the statement pointed out, the United States is the friend of, and is deeply concerned in the welfare and strength of both parties to the controversy. The solution of the controversy is of great importance, both to the welfare and strength of these parties and of the entire free world, toward which the United States has made such great contribution. The statement voiced our deep and proper interest in such a solution.

Now, that is a reaffirmation of the reason for the statement, the propriety of the statement, and our interest in the peaceful settlement.

TEXT OF AIDE-MÉMOIRE TO IRAN

The following is the text of an aide-mémoire that the American Ambassador at Tehran handed to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs on May 26.

The aide-mémoire of His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, which was handed to the American Ambassador in Tehran on May 21, has been carefully considered by the Government of the United States.

It is unfortunate that the public statement made by this Government on May 18 has been misconstrued by the Iranian Government as intervention in the internal affairs of Iran.¹ The United States wishes to make it clear that it did not then intend, nor does it now intend, to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, not to oppose Iran's sovereign rights or the expressed desires of the Iranian Government in regard to control of Iranian resources.

There is, however, legitimate basis for deep and proper interest on the part of this Government in a solution of the oil problem in Iran. A serious controversy exists between Iran and Great Britain, a controversy which could undermine the unity of the free world and seriously weaken it. The United States is bound to both countries by strong ties of friendship and has attested its sincere concern for the well-being of both. It has, therefore,

¹ BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 851.

in view of the importance of the matter, discussed the issues with both parties and has stated publicly the principles it considers important in reaching a solution of this controversy.

The United States continues in its firm belief that an issue of this kind can be settled satisfactorily only by negotiation by the parties concerned. While the United States has urged upon both parties the need for moderation, it has taken no position on details of any arrangement which might be worked out. It has, however, reaffirmed its stand against unilateral cancellation of contractual relationships and actions of a confiscatory nature. The United States is convinced that

through negotiation a settlement can be found which will satisfy the desires of the Iranian people to control their own resources, which will protect legitimate British interests and which will assure uninterrupted flow of Iranian oil to its world markets. Such a settlement is, in the opinion of this Government, of the utmost importance not only to the welfare of the two powers concerned but to that of the entire free world. The United States wishes to state again its deep interest in the welfare of the Iranian people and in the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran, which is a cardinal principal of United States policy.

Tasks Confronting the Indian Government

by George C. McGhee

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs*¹

India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, have existed as independent nations for less than 4 years. Independence came to India in consequence of a long and determined campaign against foreign domination. Indian leaders, accordingly, are wary of any form of external power—military, economic, political, or cultural—which might in any way threaten their independence. As a corollary, they are wary of too close an association with states which possess such power. The Indian Government adheres to the view that it may be able to steer a middle course and, by avoiding involvement in a global war, gain an opportunity to build up its economy and strengthen its political structure.

There is no question, however, as to what the Indian Government's reaction would be in the event that India were attacked. Indian spokesmen have stated that an invasion of Indian territory would be resisted with all the force at the country's disposal. Moreover, India's vigilance against invasion is not confined to its own borders. The Prime Minister has also made it clear that India will not tolerate an invasion of Nepal which, as you know, lies between India and Tibet. But India has also expressed its clear determination to avoid association with either of the so-called "blocs" in the cold war. The Indian Government favors the pursuit of peace not through alinement with any major power, but through an independent approach to each controversial issue.

Principal Problems

Let us now consider the principal problems which confront the Indian Government. India's leaders are committed to the task of strengthening the Governmental structure and improving the living conditions of its 350 million people. The Indian Government has had very little time to apply to this challenging task. It is disturbed by any development which threatens to interfere with its accomplishment. No threat causes the Indian leaders more concern than the threat of a global war. They are, therefore, doing everything within their power, according to their judgment and patterns of thought, to localize the present conflict and to prevent global war.

As leaders responsible for the destiny of a very young nation, their attitude might be expressed in the words of another prominent statesman, who said—

With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time for our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.

That statement by George Washington is even more cogent when we apply it to the masses of India's population, the great dislocations which India is undergoing as a result of the precipitate withdrawal of British authority and the pressure of the present times. With this background in mind—the strong desire of Indian leaders to let nothing interfere with the strengthening of their country—it is apparent why India is making every

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Council on World Affairs at Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 15 and released to the press on the same date.

effort to stay out of the so-called cold war and to avoid possible involvement in a shooting war should it come.

Greater Voice in World Affairs

Another major motivation of Indian foreign policy lies in its desire for a greater voice for itself and the other Asian nations in world affairs, particularly in regard to those issues which directly relate to developments in Asia. Responsible Indian leaders tell us that their interest in establishing a greater voice in world affairs does not constitute an attempt to establish Indian leadership in Asia. Rather, they say, it represents an effort to impress the rest of the world with the fact that the awakening of Asia is a powerful factor in world affairs, that the decisive forces of history are no longer centered exclusively in the West.

In the words of the Indian Secretary General of External Affairs, India's advocacy of a greater voice for Asians in world affairs is—

A legitimate and timely reminder . . . that if new conflicts are not to arise under the impulse of political and economic discontent in the world's largest continent, the peoples of that continent must not be treated as dormant, dispirited, and helpless.

India's advocacy of greater Asian participation in international affairs is being realized not only at the United Nations but also within the Commonwealth and in India's direct relations with other members of the international community. Along with its South Asian neighbors, Pakistan and Afghanistan, India has played an increasingly important part in the councils of the United Nations. While more often than not India and the United States have voted on the same side in questions before the United Nations, we hold differing views on certain important issues, particularly the questions of Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and the problem of Formosa.

Our differences with India appear, however, to be much more a matter of tactics than of basic goals. In the achievement of these goals, India is relying chiefly on moral suasion, we on collective security. As you are aware, the Indian Government has played a prominent part in efforts to find a basis for a peaceful settlement in Korea. Here, India and the United States have frankly differed on the best methods of achieving this end. We should not forget, however, that the ultimate goals of India and the United States are the same. Both Governments are working to limit hostilities in the Far East. Both are endeavoring to find a basis for lasting peace in the Far East and throughout the world. Our problem is to agree on the best means of attaining these ends.

Further, we are in full agreement with India concerning the desirability of giving the Asian peoples a greater voice in world affairs. We have a strong realization of the great forces at work in Asia today. No intelligent American will ques-

tion the desirability of closer consultation with the free Asian governments and of giving full consideration to their views in reaching our own decisions on important international questions. Support of the right of free Asian nations to participate in world councils is an effective means of achieving this end, and we have given that support, vigorously and without reservation. But we are not going to let any country—Asian or non-Asian—shoot its way into international councils, nor are we willing to extend membership therein as a reward for aggression.

Thus the differences which exist between the United States and the countries of South Asia are, I believe, more superficial than they appear to be. I should like, moreover, to describe some of the means through which we are endeavoring to resolve these differences and to broaden the significant areas of agreement which do in fact exist. In so doing, we must define the rock-bottom objectives on which our global foreign policy is based.

The basic principles of our foreign policy are to restore and maintain peace through collective action; to assist other peoples to establish the basis for stability and self-development, provided they desire our assistance and are themselves prepared to make the primary effort; and to work toward the development of better mutual understanding and cooperative effort between the free nations of the world.

U.S. Objectives in This Area

Now, how are these principles being applied with respect to our relations with the South Asian countries, and with India in particular? As I have said, both the United States and India are dedicated to the objective of limiting aggression. The United States is attempting to do so through support of the United Nations military efforts to put down the aggression which is ravaging another Asian country. We know that we can make no compromise with the aggressive aims of international communism which serve as a cloak for Soviet imperialism.

We are, therefore, making every effort to convince the Indian Government of the rightness and logic of that course not only in the interests of collective defense by the international community but also in India's own self-interest. We are making every effort to demonstrate to the Indian people the relationship between the tactics of domestic Communist elements in India and the aggressive strategy of Soviet imperialism. At the same time, we are endeavoring to make clear to the South Asian people that we desire them to keep the significant gains which they have made in the direction of political independence and economic progress and to further consolidate those gains.

In our efforts to assist these Governments—all of which are non-Communist—to maintain their independence, we are faced with the problem of

letting the people of that area know that, however trying present conditions may be, Communist domination would create far greater misery. We are confronted with the task of demonstrating to the people of South Asia the need for resisting the false promises of the Communists if they would maintain their independence.

While we are, of course, careful to avoid interfering in any way in the internal affairs of these countries, we lose no opportunity to stress the vital importance of working toward the strengthening of their democratic processes and resisting any tendencies toward authoritarian rule. We try to make it abundantly clear to the peoples of South Asia that we respect their national independence and have no desire to engage in any sort of activity—political, military, or economic—which would interfere in their internal affairs.

Everyone recognizes that there are limits to the support we can give to the economies of other countries whose needs are so great. There are, however, steps which we can take to help improve living standards in free Asia which cost relatively little in terms of dollars—amounts which will be a good investment for us if they will help to build the economic, social, and political components of national strength. I have in mind, for example, technical assistance projects in which a single expert can teach thousands of farmers to improve crops and increase yields through simple demonstration of efficient methods of plowing, seed selection, and irrigation—processes which will help South Asians to move in the direction of self-sufficiency in food grains.

We supported India's request for loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, designed, in large part, to assist in the improvement of agricultural development. More recently, we have had an opportunity to demonstrate our interest in the economic development of this area by our participation on the Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, which met in Ceylon in February. And we hope to accelerate and expand our technical assistance programs, to support projects worked out jointly with the Governments concerned. In the meantime, action is expected any day on the request by the President that Congress provide authority for furnishing 2 million tons of grain to India to avert the widespread famine that would result from the shortage of food production due to natural disasters.

As Gordon Gray emphasized, in his report to the President on foreign economic policies,

In a real sense, the newly established non-Communist governments of this region are on trial before their own people, with their status largely dependent upon their success in finding solutions to their economic problems, and in some areas to the agrarian problem in particular.

We are anxious to assist these free Governments in maintaining and improving their status and to demonstrate to their peoples that they are receiving constructive help in resolving their major problems.

Effort To Maintain Friendly Relations

In addition, we wish to make every effort to encourage the development of mutual understanding and to accommodate our thinking to that of our allies and friends, where we can do so without sacrificing our principles. In this task we can all plan an active role, as indeed the existence of your Council demonstrates.

I hardly need tell you that the day-to-day relations between American and South Asian officials are frank and friendly. They constitute a sound basis for continuing efforts to narrow down our differences in approach. Moreover, the increasing interchange of persons between the United States and South Asia—exchanges of students and teachers, of professional and technical people—is steadily demonstrating and consolidating the mutuality of our interests. This is a process which has an important cumulative effect.

But it is also of vital importance that we demonstrate, both as a nation and as private citizens, that we are deeply interested in the welfare of the South Asian people, that we understand their aspirations, and that we are making sacrifices to preserve the independence of the world's free nations, including the independence of South Asia.

In conclusion, we must not forget that all the Governments of South Asia have thus far successfully resisted the efforts of Communist agents and parties to challenge their authority. In the light of reports of neutral attitudes in these countries toward the Far Eastern crisis, we must not forget that they are fiercely proud of their independence, that they are ready to defend it to the very limit of their ability. We must not lose sight of the fact that there is no single government in South Asia which would willingly accept any arrangement or compromise with any foreign power if it were apparent that this would endanger its hard-won independence.

Let us, then, take hope from the all-important fact that South Asia and its half billion people remain an integral part of the free world. We hope, ultimately, to see the voluntary and forthright association of South Asia in collective action for freedom. On this hope, we can build for the future of Asia.

Appointment of Officers

Robert G. Barnes as Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, effective May 21, 1951.

A Global Foreign Policy

by Francis H. Russell
*Director, Office of Public Affairs*¹

It has been natural, in fact inevitable, that the working people of this country should be among the first to discern the real nature of the primary problem of our time, world communism. They were among the very first to be the object of attack in the peculiar ways in which communism tries to achieve its objectives, by propaganda and confusion. The way in which labor in this country has met that attack and then taken the leadership in helping to resist it around the world stands in the forefront of the successes of democracy. Most dramatic are the successes achieved in Korea, in Italy, Greece, Turkey, in Berlin, and on other fronts.

It is of great importance for this country not only to have strong diplomatic and political ties with other countries but also to have increasingly close relationships between our working people and workers in other countries. In today's struggle, there is no substitute for the good that can be done by a close bond between American labor unions and people elsewhere who are attempting to move forward to greater freedoms and higher standards of living.

Debate on our Foreign Policy

Our foreign policies are today the subject of a great national debate.

It is becoming clear that this great debate involves three basic issues. First is an issue of facts. What is the nature of the crisis we face? What kind of an enemy confronts us? What are his methods, his intentions, his potential? What are our sources of strength? How strong and how reliable are our allies?

The second issue is an issue of principles and objectives. What kind of a world do we hope to see established? Is it a world dominated by the

United States? Or is it a world based upon cooperative arrangements among free peoples? Do we want a world of expanding trade with increased opportunity for all people? Or do we want a world with each country for itself, a world that would be without hope for the submerged two-thirds of the world's population?

The third issue is an issue of methods for achieving our objectives. Can we achieve these objectives by pulling back behind a "gibraltar of the Western Hemisphere?" Can we achieve them by "going it alone?" Or should we work through the various instruments of international cooperation? Should we take any chance of bringing on World War III that could possibly be avoided? Or should we direct all our efforts to achieving freedom with peace.

If we can thwart the efforts to confuse us, if we strip off the irrelevant, we will find that these are the problems that we must tackle.

The Issues To Be Considered

Let us consider each of these issues briefly.

First, what is the nature of the enemy we face? We cannot know how to deal with him until we know who and what he is. There are those who insist on waging today's struggle in terms of the wars of the past. But this is not just a power struggle between two nations. If this were merely a conflict between the United States and China, there might be every reason why we should use all of our resources to push forward to a speedy victory over the Peiping regime. But China is not our principal enemy. We could pay the enormous price of victory in a war against China, and find ourselves, weakened and our resources depleted, still faced with the real enemy.

Nor is our enemy just a political or economic system. We believe profoundly in the right of all men to political freedom and economic well-being. We are not engaged in trying either to resist, or to establish over other peoples, a particular political or economic system. On the contrary, we believe

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Convention at San Francisco, Calif., on May 19 and released to the press on the same date.

that every country, every people, has the right to its own political and economic institutions, even though we may not like some of them.

Today's crisis has arisen because a number of long term, world-wide developments, each of which presents problems of vast proportions, have fused at this particular point in history to produce one of the greatest crises in the history of civilization.

What are these developments? Let me mention some of them.

The first is an international conspiracy directed by one imperialist power. Communism as a world movement is almost exactly a century old but only within the last few years as a result of its having been forged into a principal instrument of Soviet Russia has it constituted the threat to the progress of civilization which it is today.

It has been with difficulty that some Americans have come to a realization of the nature and extent of this threat. There has been nothing in our life to prepare most Americans to understand the designs and the amoral workings of the minds of the men in the Kremlin. But we have come to know that basically they take their departure from most of the rest of mankind at the point where they adopt and build upon the concept that the ultimate value, the final objective in life is the exalting of an entity, the "party." The interests of the party, the Communists say, transcend all rights and interests of individual human beings. Human beings are only pawns to be sacrificed to this end.

From this basic philosophy, the Communists are led inexorably to a controlled press and radio, to purges in place of elections, to a police state where every person is required to be a spy on friend and family, to slave camps, police cards which control movement from one place to another, state monopolies controlling all aspects of economic life, dictated employment, and the banning of freedoms of the mind, of speech, and of religion. All of these are the inevitable attributes of a political system that glorifies the state.

Add to this their fanatical belief that all adherents to the movement must do everything possible to impose this pattern of human existence upon the two and a half billion people in the world. In achieving this there are no moral curbs. They play upon the fears and hopes, the resentments and the ambitions of different groups of people. They say one thing to one person, another thing to other people. They strike terror in the hearts of people wherever they can. They attempt to frustrate all kinds of organizations, from labor unions to the United Nations itself. They create planned chaos and exploit want so people will give up in despair and follow anyone who promises them anything at all. They use aggression where they believe that it will accomplish their purpose. The handful of men in the Kremlin are, in simple fact, engaged in a conspiracy, and they operate through a tight party mechanism

that has its representatives in every part of the world.

It is their ambition to eliminate all other kinds of human existence. They are not interested in compromise. They are not interested in negotiation except as it may give them some kind of tactical or propaganda advantage. That has been demonstrated time and time again. There is only one thing that will give them any halt, even for a moment, and that is the prospect that they may wind up worse off, possibly even with a complete loss of power. That they are not prepared to risk.

That is the nature of the men we face.

Reasons for the Korean Attack

Now, there are a number of conclusions that follow from such an understanding of our enemy. First, it makes clear what the situation is that confronts us in Korea.

The Soviet Union is continuously and relentlessly engaged in searching out weak spots everywhere in the world and then bringing its resources to bear to exploit them to their own ends. Last June, there were numerous buttons that the Kremlin could have pushed. They could have pushed a button that would have started trouble in Germany, or another against Yugoslavia, or in Iran, or they could have stepped up the pressure against Indochina.

The place they chose for their greatest effort was Korea. They chose Korea for several reasons. Intrinsically, from the point of view of raw materials and industrial output, Korea was perhaps the least important. Perhaps the Kremlin felt that the free world might be less inclined to rally to its support. Korea was divided and this gave the Kremlin a chance to claim that it was merely a civil war. But if the aggression succeeded, the Kremlin would be in a position to threaten Japan, one of its major objectives in the Far East.

The obstructions which have been put in the way of a Japanese peace treaty by the Soviet Union are significant. Moreover, the Republic of Korea constitutes a special commitment of the United Nations and the wiping out of the Republic of Korea would have been a serious blow, perhaps a mortal blow, to the prestige and integrity of the United Nations.

But the important thing about Korea is that it was only one of many points at which the aggressor could have directed his blow. It was a test that was being watched by all of the other countries on the perimeter of the Soviet orbit. If Korea were allowed to fall, other friends of freedom would have felt their case was hopeless. We would have faced the possibility of free governments starting to fall like dominoes. All of these things are at stake today in Korea.

It also follows from this analysis of the nature of communism that we shall get nowhere with

proposals for buying off the Kremlin. They will be unimpressed by suggestions that this country, for example, devote to world-wide constructive purposes 10, 20 or 50 billion dollars during the next 5 years provided the Kremlin calls off its aggressive designs. They will be unmoved by proposals for world government as a means for dealing with present tensions and conflicts. The world, to be sure, must strengthen its institutions for security and well-being. But the men in the Kremlin have no interest in promoting that. They have their own very precise pattern of world government and are impressed not by argument, but by power.

An understanding of the basic nature of Soviet communism also makes it possible for us to deal with their efforts to confuse and divide by all-out propaganda. Last year, the Cominform set out to get 400 million signatures to its Stockholm appeal. It was apparent that this was merely an attempt by the Kremlin to exploit the universal desire for peace and to place the onus for the international tensions, which the Kremlin itself has created on the free world.

The "Peace Crusade" Objective

This year, the Cominform is engaged in another effort to confuse and divide the people of the non-Communist world, through a "peace crusade." The objectives of this "crusade" turn out to be the political and military objectives of the Kremlin, namely: (1) to get the United Nations out of Korea so that the Communists can succeed in their aggression there, (2) to bring about the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime under conditions that would solidify the dominance of the Kremlin over China, (3) to bring about a cessation or weakening of the effort to build the defenses of Western Europe under General Eisenhower, (4) to prevent the creation of a free and independent Western Germany, so that this greatest concentration of industrial power outside the United States can be taken over by the Soviet Union, and (5) once more to attempt to sidetrack efforts at genuine disarmament in all types of weapons and to marshal public opinion for a scheme which would deny defensive strength to the free world while leaving untouched the massive military machine of the Soviets.

Purpose of Soviet Propaganda

Now, all of these are points on which intelligent, sincere, and patriotic people of the free world hold different views. A few months ago, according to Mr. Gallup, considerably more than half of the American people felt that we should pull our boys out of Korea. That did not mean that half of the American people were Communists. (Today, the great majority of Americans are in favor of seeing it through in Korea.)

Many of our strongest allies hold views that differ from ours with respect to the way of dealing with Communist China. That does not mean that they are Communists. A number of prominent Americans are opposed to American participation in the defense of Western Europe. They are not Communists.

But the purpose of Soviet propaganda is to accentuate these differences of opinion, to use them to create doubt, confusion, and suspicion, to drive a wedge between free peoples, to prevent the solidarity upon which the strength of the free nations must be built. And so it is that when we go beyond honest discussion and debate and wander in what may, at times, appear to be the attractive fields of narrow partisanship, character assassination, and public confusion we are opening up the only way by which the Communists can hope to make any real headway against us. The leaders in the Kremlin are bending every effort to make the free world as disunited as possible. Their spirits rise according to the intensity with which we feud among ourselves and attack our own. When we do that we are doing their work for them.

So the first factor in the present world crisis is the threat of Soviet Communist imperialism. The second is the revolutionary mood and ferment, entirely unrelated to the Soviet will to world domination, that characterizes the minds of two-thirds of the world's people, the people whose annual income averages around a hundred dollars a year, whose average life span is 30 years, less than one half that of our own, for example. They are the billion and a half people who, only within recent years, have learned through moving pictures, radio, newspapers, and personal contact with the peoples of the economically more fortunate countries that the application of modern science and technology to the resources of their areas of the world can produce a vastly increased standard of living for them and their families. They feel they have hold of the short end of the stick, and they are determined by one means or another to redress that situation. It is this widespread discontent that has been exploited by the Chinese Communists.

China, a Lesson to the Free World

A revolution has been going on in Asia over a long time. It is an economic revolution and a political and ideological revolution, revulsion against misery and poverty and revulsion against foreign domination. It is an insistent drive to individual betterment and national independence. We must base our policies upon a recognition of the power of those dynamic forces.

China is a lesson, a most bitter lesson, to the depressed peoples of the world of what happens when the Communist sword conquers a country and the bright promises all turn out to be false. The families of China are suffering today in

frightful numbers the losses that come when Communist leaders take over and use the subjected peoples as pawns in their further quest for power. The people of China and other satellites are in the process of absorbing this lesson.

But the free world, too, must learn the lesson of our time. We must understand the mood of change and revolution among the hundreds of millions of the world's depressed peoples. We must meet the Communist challenge not only when it takes the form of overt aggression but in the struggle for the minds of men. We must do this through the Campaign of Truth with the instruments at our disposal such as the Voice of America, libraries, exchange of persons programs, and the other ways that are available to us. We must do it also by demonstrating in fact that we can deal with such problems as land reform, racial differences, conditions of labor, standards of living, more effectively under free institutions than can ever be accomplished under totalitarian regimes.

Answers to Communist Aggression

Your Union can be proud of the role taken by the president of your organization in the founding conference of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Free national trade unions such as yours, as well as the ICFTU and other international groups, like the International Transport Workers' Federation, are among the most effective answers to Communist attempts to confuse and control the minds of men.

In another area, take the question of land, or agrarian reform, as it is sometimes called. Despite loose assertions to the contrary, no responsible American official has asserted that the Chinese Communists were "mere agrarian reformers." It has been clear from the beginning that they were Stalinist Communists in thought and in fact. But we shall seriously miscalculate, as others have miscalculated in the past, if we fail to understand the importance of the Chinese Communist propaganda promising agrarian reform to the peasants of China. The average Asian farmer, like the average American farmer, looks forward to land of his own.

One of the most important measures that has been carried out in Japan since the occupation is that of land reform. Today, in Japan, only 10 percent of the farmers are tenants. Before the war, half of them were. By contrast in North Korea, there is a virtually universal resentment against the trickery that has taken place in the guise of "land reform" under the Communists.

In contrast to the fate of the North Korean and the Chinese people, many of the submerged peoples of the world have recently achieved the freedom and national independence for which they have striven for generations. As recently as within the last 5 or 10 years India, Pakistan,

Ceylon, Burma, the associated states of Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea have emerged as full-fledged members of the community of nations. It would be a supreme irony, a frightful tragedy if, as a result of a time lag in thinking, a carry-over of old resentments, those hundreds of millions of people were to throw themselves into a slavery that would be infinitely harsher than they have known in the past, that is, into the slavery of the Kremlin.

We must make sure that we do not put ourselves in a position of successfully keeping communism from entering the front door through resisting its aggression, while it comes through the back door—in the minds of hundreds of millions of the world's people who are trying to improve their lot. Fortunately, there is no country in the world that can help these people achieve what they are striving for as we can, and have, through the Marshall Plan, Export-Import Bank loans, and Point 4. We must continue to use our great economic strength to build more strength in the free world.

Closely akin to this revolutionary ferment is the third major element, the accumulation of years of racial bitternesses and hatreds. The representative of the Chinese Communists, in his 2-hour outburst before the Security Council of the United Nations last January, gave evidence of the volcanic fury that is smoldering among many of the colored races of the world. The demands of "Asia for the Asiatics," the morbid preoccupation of the press of India with racial problems here in the United States, the relations between the races in various parts of Africa, are all instances of the intensity of this problem.

Anyone who asserts that he has the answers to this problem is only displaying the extent of his own ignorance. It is infinitely difficult and infinitely complex. But anyone who, because of its complexity, turns his back on the problem is taking the path to disaster. It will remain with us long after the Communist threat has disappeared.

As a fourth major element in our current world crisis, I would mention the moral and material disintegration that is still our heritage from World War II. Many, but by no means all, of the homes and factories that were bombed in the last war have been rebuilt, but the people of Europe are still suffering from the effects of the war, of occupation, of malnutrition, and want. The fears, the apprehensions, the absence of willingness to face facts are just as real, and frequently more difficult to deal with than was the concrete devastation of the war. We cannot deal with them by mere gestures of impatience.

Finally, in spite of the progress that we have made in building the fabric of international cooperation through the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council, the Organization of American States, and other international instruments, we

still have national fears, national prides, national ambitions, national hatreds, that make it difficult to construct a firm and lasting peace, as we have found in our efforts to further the integration of Western Europe.

These are the main elements of the present crisis of freedom and democracy.

Now, if this is the real nature of our problem, it follows that there has been, there is, and there will be no magic wand that someone could wave, no magic phrase that someone could utter to make the problem disappear. The ingredients of our crisis go far back into the past. They will extend into the future for years to come. And it will require the utmost in human understanding, patience, determination, and sacrifice if we are to overcome them.

These are the facts of world life, and unless we always bear them in mind, we shall risk the danger of making false moves and dissipating our resources.

Our Long-Range Objective

Now, faced with this kind of situation, what should be the objectives to guide us in our day-to-day operations?

Our major, overriding objective is to make it possible for the world to move forward, gradually if necessary but steadily, with the task of creating greater freedoms, better living conditions, a progressively happier existence for the people of the world. This is our long-range objective, because only in such a world can the people of the United States hope to maintain their way of life.

We know that this country cannot "go it alone" because, if we go it alone and all other countries go it alone, we shall be turning the world over to aggressors, and the rest of the world will be very quickly arrayed against us.

We want a world in which neither the Soviet Union nor we nor any other power is going to dictate how things shall be.

We want a world at peace.

How do we hope to accomplish these broad objectives?

First, we must deal with the outright aggression that has been launched in Korea against the free world, the first aggression by mass armies across a national line since the United Nations was set up.

We are fighting in Korea to demonstrate the integrity and efficacy of the United Nations in resisting aggression so that it will not follow the dismal path that was taken by the countries of the world under the League of Nations.

We are fighting to give courage and confidence to other nations that are on the periphery of the Soviet orbit, to show them they are not standing alone and that they may safely take measures to resist Soviet threats.

We are fighting to give time for the free world to build up its vast potential strength.

It has been said that the object of war is victory—no more and no less—and in the present world context that means victory over China. But we must keep our eyes on the main objective, and real victory may require much less than complete subjugation of another country.

At least three times in our history, we have fought major wars in which we achieved our objectives without conquering the nations with which we fought.

In 1798, we fought a naval war with France to protect our commerce and shipping. We won that struggle but we did not carry the war to France. Secretary of State Timothy Pickens, who had insisted on an all-out war against France, was dismissed by President Adams.

In the War of 1812, a satisfactory settlement was achieved with the British by negotiation.

In the Spanish-American War, our purpose was limited. We did not carry the war against Spain itself but we did achieve our limited political objective, to free the Cuban people from the oppression of Spanish rule.

In each case, we achieved a limited objective without extending the warfare.

Always, in times of national crisis, the American people have had to contend with defeatists, with those who said that victory was impossible. Washington had them on his hands at Valley Forge. Lincoln had to contend with them all during the Civil War right up to the moment of victory. More recently, there were those who said that the airlift to Berlin could not win out, and others who contended that aid to Greece and Turkey was fruitless and without hope of any successful end.

The Danger of Defeatism

Today, the greatest danger that we face is the danger of defeatism. Defeatism may show itself in two ways. There is the defeatism of despair and the defeatism of desperation.

We must guard against those who say that our situation is hopeless and that there is no good in making the effort.

We must guard equally against those who say that, because we are faced with difficulties, we should resort to desperate measures.

There is no cause for either despair or desperation. We have every reason for confidence.

We are in the process of building military power capable of meeting with overpowering strength any further Communist aggression. We have the ingredients of this power.

Today, the Soviet rulers and their puppets dominate the destiny of 800 million people. This is their greatest potential strength. But two-thirds of the world's population live in countries still masters of their own destiny and not subject to domination from the Kremlin.

Moreover, the 150 million of the United States and the 275 million of free Europe are the highest skilled, the most productive in the world. The trained minds and trained hands of free men working through free institutions give the free world a productive capacity that far overtops anything the police state and slave labor can produce both in peace and in war.

Steel production is on the side of the free world. Last year, American labor and business management produced 96 million short tons of crude steel. Free Europe produced 55 million tons, Russia and its European satellites produced only 34 million tons.

In 1950, the United States and free Europe produced over a billion tons of coal. Russia and its satellites produced 290 million.

The United States and Western Europe produced 625 billion kilowatt hours of electric energy. Russia and its satellites only 125 billion.

Over the last 10 years, the average standard of living in this country has increased by 30 percent. This increase is equal to the total national production of the Soviet Union—just our advance during the past 10 years.

During the last war, we reached the point where 45 percent of all of our production went into war materials. It is estimated that the percentage of our production during the next 2 years may reach as high as 20 percent. Some of that, of course, will come out of continued increases in production; some of it will have to come out of our standard of living, but probably not by more than 5 percent.

In the last quarter of 1950 in the United States, our industrial production was 22 percent above the level of the previous year. In Western Europe, the industrial production was 23 percent above the level in 1949. This step-up in industrial production, of course, requires many more raw materials and that is what has given rise to some of the shortages that we face, some of the sacrifices that consumers are called upon to make.

In other less developed parts of the free world, there is tremendous additional economic strength, much of it still only a potential. Yet last year, it contributed a large part of the 9 million barrels of crude oil produced daily by the free world. The Soviet Union and its satellites produced less than 1 million.

The free world and largely the underdeveloped nations produced 90 percent of the world's total output of natural rubber, two-thirds of its tin and by far its greatest quantities of uranium, copper, and other essential raw materials.

To mobilize fully the vast actual and potential productive capacity of the free world, the President in his budget message revealed that the

United States proposes to spend over the next year more than 9 billion dollars. We are proposing to use that money to provide arms and other military equipment to areas in the free world where it is most needed. We are proposing to spend part of it in helping other industrial countries in getting their own military production rolling full blast. We propose to spend part of it in supplying essential goods of a nonmilitary kind to countries whose economies are likely to fall without our help. And we propose to spend part of it in technical cooperation programs with other nations to help them help themselves.

The sum total of this program is the building of mutual strength to the point where the Kremlin either will not dare to attack or will be defeated decisively if it does.

Now, no one can give any guarantee that we can avoid a general war because the leaders of the Communist conspiracy can launch a war if they decide to. But, if one should come, we must be in the strongest possible position to meet it, both in our military strength and in our moral position throughout the world.

Summarizing Our Foreign Policy

What, then, is our foreign policy?

It is to advance the welfare and preserve the safety of the United States by putting the weight of the United States behind the steady advance of mankind toward freedom and a better life.

It is to resist the greatest threat to this advance, the aggression of Soviet communism and to cooperate with other free peoples in meeting this threat.

It is to demonstrate in Korea, where Communist aggression has shown itself in its barest and most threatening form, that aggression will not and cannot succeed and that free people everywhere will be supported in their efforts to resist it.

It is to build up the strength of the free world as rapidly as possible to a point where it cannot be challenged and to do it in such a way as to avoid the frightfulness of world war.

It is to demonstrate that the real revolution is the revolution of freedom; that the ultimate value is not a party or a regime, but human life, human beings; that society must be concerned with providing the environment of freedom in which the individual's "happiness," as we put it in our Declaration of Independence, can best take place; freedom to believe, to worship, to speak, to read, to move from one community to another, to create, to freely choose political and economic institutions.

These are the things that mark the real world revolution.

This is the cause we serve, with the steady confidence of people who serve the right.

Communiqué on Settlement of German External Debts

[Released to the press May 24]

The following announcement was made today:

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have been considering the problem of bringing about a settlement of German debts as envisaged by the agreement of 6th March with the German Federal Government. They have now transmitted to the Government of the German Federal Republic and to the Governments of a number of interested countries a communication which describes a proposed procedure for arriving at a settlement of Germany's prewar debts and which outlines their present views on the points of principle relating to it. A copy of this communication, together with its several enclosures, is being released simultaneously, and is attached herewith.

It is proposed that a meeting of interested parties, both governmental and private, should be held in London in the autumn of this year. To prepare for this meeting and to represent their interests in the discussions of the German debt problem, the three Governments have established a Tripartite Commission on German Debts. The Commission will also represent their interests in regard to the question of Germany's debts arising from the postwar economic assistance which the three Governments have extended to Germany.

The Tripartite Commission on German Debts will carry on the work on German debts hitherto performed by the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany, which has now completed the various other tasks assigned to it by the three Governments.

Attachments are as follows:

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN EXTERNAL DEBTS

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have reached the conclusion in agreement with the German Federal Government that the settlement of German external debts is in the interests of the restoration of normal economic and financial relations between

Germany and other countries. They have also agreed with the German Federal Government that interested Governments, including the Federal Republic, creditors and debtors, shall participate in working out a subsequent plan in accordance with certain principles.

2. The exchange of letters which placed this agreement on record, and the letter from the Allied High Commission to the German Federal Chancellor which preceded it and which set out the views of the three Governments in regard to the settlement of claims against Germany, were published on 6th March. Copies of these letters are attached as Enclosure 1.

3. As recorded in this exchange of letters of 6th March, the three Governments have been engaged in preparing proposals for the working out of arrangements for an orderly overall settlement which would be fair and equitable to all the interests affected. They have now completed a tentative procedure for arriving at acceptable settlement arrangements, a statement outlining their present views on points of principle relating to the settlement, and a list of certain technical questions requiring consideration. The relevant documents, of which copies are attached as Enclosures 2, 3, and 4, are intended to serve as a preliminary basis for consultations later in the year. In order to prepare for these consultations the three Governments intend to hold informal preliminary meetings in order to obtain views of some of the interested parties. Thereafter further communications will be sent on the subjects of the enclosures listed above and arrangements made for the participation in these consultations of representatives of creditors and debtors, of the German Federal Government and of the Governments of countries having a significant creditor interest.

4. The three Governments, in order to make an overall settlement of German debts possible, are prepared to modify the priority of their claims in respect of the postwar economic assistance which they furnished to Germany, on condition that the settlement plan is acceptable to them.

5. The arrangements contemplated relate to

Germany's prewar public and private indebtedness and to the German debt arising out of postwar economic assistance; they do not relate to claims arising out of the war which can only be dealt with in connection with a peace treaty.

6. The three Governments have set up a Tripartite Commission on German Debts to act on their behalf in the necessary consultations and negotiations. A copy of its terms of reference is attached as Enclosure 5.

Enclosure 1

A. LETTER TO FEDERAL CHANCELLOR OF OCTOBER 23, 1950

TO: His Excellency, The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

MR. CHANCELLOR, I have the honour to refer to the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers in New York in which they indicated that the Federal Government would be expected to undertake certain commitments consonant with the new responsibilities which the Governments of the three Occupying Powers contemplated would be conferred upon the Federal Republic. The three Governments hold that, at the moment when the Federal Government assumes responsibility for the conduct of its foreign relations, the status of the obligations resting upon it in its relations with foreign countries should be clarified. The three Governments regard the Federal Government as the only German Government which can speak for Germany and represent the German people in international affairs pending the reunification of Germany. They consider, therefore, that pending a final peace settlement, and without prejudice to its terms, the Federal Government is the only Government entitled to assume the rights and fulfil the obligations of the former German Reich.

The High Commission has communicated to the Federal Government separately the decisions which have been taken by the Foreign Ministers concerning the clarification of the status of treaties to which the German Reich was a party. The question of the obligations of the Reich also involves the external debt of the Reich. The three Governments consider that the Federal Government should in consonance with what has been said above, assume responsibility for the prewar external debt of the Reich. They recognize that, in the determination of the manner in which and the extent to which the Federal Government is to fulfil the obligations arising from this assumption, account must be taken of the general situation of the Federal Republic, including, in particular, the effect of the limitations on its territorial jurisdiction.

The determination of the financial responsibilities of the Federal Government necessarily also involves the obligations resulting from the economic assistance which has been furnished by the occupying powers to Germany. As the Federal Government is aware, the occupying powers have, at considerable cost to the peoples of their own countries, extended substantial economic assistance to Germany since the termination of hostilities, with a view to ensuring the well-being of the German people and assisting them in the rehabilitation of their economic life. In due course the occupying powers will call for a settlement of the obligations arising from this assistance. They will consider in the settlement of these obligations the ability of the Federal Government to pay and other relevant factors. Meanwhile, they consider that the Federal Government should acknowledge its debt in respect of the expenditures which they have incurred and that it should recognize the prior status of these obligations over other claims.

It is the intention of the three Governments to proceed as promptly as possible with the development of a settlement plan which will assure fair and equitable treatment

John W. Gunter Named to Tripartite Commission on German Debts

The Department of State today announced on May 25 the appointment of John W. Gunter as the United States alternate representative on the Tripartite Commission on German Debts.

Mr. Gunter, who has been the United States member of the Greek Currency Committee in Athens since 1949, will have the personal rank of Minister. He already has arrived in London to assume his new duties on the debt-commission.

of the interests affected and remove as far as practicable obstacles to normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries. These arrangements would necessarily be provisional and subject to revision when Germany is reunited and a final peace settlement becomes possible. The three Governments are agreed that the plan should provide for the orderly settlement of the claims against Germany, the total effect of which should not dislocate the German economy through undesirable effects on the internal financial situation, nor unduly drain existing or potential German foreign exchange resources. It should also avoid adding appreciably to the financial burden of any Occupying Power.

The three Governments have instructed the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany in London to prepare a plan for handling claims in accordance with the above principles and to recommend arrangements for the appropriate participation of other interested Governments and the debtors and creditors, including the Federal Government. The Federal Government will in due course be informed of the results of these studies.

Although there are numerous problems to which it has not yet been possible to give consideration, the three Governments are in agreement that the settlement plan should include, in particular, those categories of claims whose settlement would best achieve the objective of normalising the economic and financial relations of the Federal Republic with other countries. In their view the plan must therefore necessarily deal with the prewar external debt as well as with the claims in respect of postwar economic assistance which enjoy a priority status over all other claims. The plan should also provide for the settlement of certain claims in connection with social insurance operations and with the conversion into deutschemark of reichsmark brought back from Germany by repatriated prisoners of war and deportees, if these claims have not been disposed of before the establishment of the plan.

In addition to the foregoing matters, other questions may arise in the detailed working out of the settlement arrangements. For example, it may be necessary to give consideration to certain prewar debts owed to the residents of foreign countries which may not be strictly classifiable as external in character.

The three Governments recognize that a settlement plan of the scope envisaged can be put into effect only through some modification of the priority of their claims in respect of postwar economic assistance. Accordingly, the three Governments have agreed that, provided a settlement plan is worked out in accordance with the principles outlined in the preceding paragraphs and provided further that agreed procedures and controls are established that will govern this settlement plan and all payments made under it, they will modify the priority of their claims in respect of postwar economic assistance to the extent necessary to permit the fulfillment of such an agreed plan. This qualified modification of the priority of claims in respect of postwar economic assistance will not preclude the continued fulfillment of the obligations which the Federal Government has already incurred under existing agreements concerning such claims.

The three Governments feel certain that the Federal Government shares their views as to the desirability of

restoring Germany's credit and of providing for an orderly settlement of German debts which will ensure fair treatment to all concerned, taking full account of Germany's economic problems. They feel equally certain that the Federal Government will share their belief that such a settlement will contribute to the restoration of normal relations between Germany and other countries.

The three Governments would appreciate receiving a formal assurance from the Federal Government that it regards itself as responsible for the prewar external debt of the German Reich and that it recognizes its debt with respect to the expenditures incurred by the occupying powers for economic assistance to the Federal Republic and affirms the priority of the claims arising from such assistance over other claims against Germany. They would also appreciate receiving assurances of the cooperation of the Federal Government in working out and implementing a settlement plan.

In order to give formal effect to these undertakings and assurances and to the undertakings and assurances offered by the Governments of the three occupying powers, I have to propose that an agreement should be concluded by an exchange of notes between the Allied High Commission and the Federal Government. It is the intention of the High Commission to proceed with the modification of the controls in the Occupation Statute on the lines agreed by the three Foreign Ministers as soon as this exchange of notes is completed and the assurance in respect of cooperation in an equitable apportionment of materials and products in short supply required for common defense, on which a separate letter is today being sent to you, has been received. However, it is the understanding of the three Governments that the exchange of notes on debt obligations will be submitted to the Federal legislature for approval and I have to request you to confirm that this will be done at the appropriate time.

I beg your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high esteem.

IVONE KIRKPATRICK
Chairman

October 23, 1950

**B. LETTER OF FEDERAL CHANCELLOR
OF MARCH 6, 1951**

to: His Excellency, The Chairman of the Allied High Commission

In reply to your letter of 23 October 1950, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

1. The Federal Republic hereby confirms that it is liable for the prewar external debt of the German Reich, including those debts of other corporate bodies subsequently to be declared liabilities of the Reich, as well as for interest and other charges on securities of the Government of Austria, to the extent that such interest and charges become due after 12 March 1938 and before 8 May 1945.

The Federal Government understands that in the determination of the manner in which and the extent to which the Federal Republic will fulfill this liability, account will be taken of the general situation of the Federal Republic including, in particular, the effects of the limitations on its territorial jurisdiction and its capacity to pay.

II. The Federal Government acknowledges hereby in principle the debt arising from the economic assistance furnished to Germany since 8 May 1945, to the extent to which liability for such debt has not previously been acknowledged in the agreement of economic cooperation concluded on 15 December 1949 between the Federal Republic and the United States of America, or for which the Federal Republic has not already taken over responsibility under article 133 of the basic law. The Federal Government is ready to accord the obligations arising from the economic assistance priority over all other foreign claims against Germany or German nationals.

The Federal Government regards it as appropriate to regulate any questions connected with the recognition and settlement of these debts by bilateral agreements with

the Governments of the countries which have rendered economic assistance, patterned on the agreement concluded with the United States of America on 15 December 1949. The Federal Government takes for granted that these agreements will contain an arbitration clause for cases of dispute. The Federal Government is prepared at once to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of such agreements with the Governments concerned.

The Federal Government hereby expresses its desire to resume payments on the German external debt. It understands that there is agreement between it and the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the United States of America on the following:

It is in the interest of the re-establishment of normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries to work out as soon as possible a settlement plan which will govern the settlement of public and private claims against Germany and German nationals.

Interested Governments including the Federal Republic, creditors and debtors shall participate in working out this plan.

The settlement plan shall in particular deal with those claims, the settlement of which would achieve the objective of normalizing the economic and financial relations of the Federal Republic with other countries. It will take into account the general economic position of the Federal Republic, notably the increase of its burdens and the reduction in its economic wealth. The general effect of this plan shall neither dislocate the German economy through undesirable effects on the internal financial situation nor unduly drain existing or potential German foreign-exchange resources. It shall also not add appreciably to the financial burden of any occupation power.

The Governments concerned may obtain expert opinions on all questions (arising out of the negotiations of the settlement plan and on the capacity to pay).

The result of the negotiations shall be set forth in agreements. It is agreed that the plan will be provisional in nature and subject to revision as soon as Germany is reunited and a final peace settlement becomes possible.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high esteem.

ADENAUER

**C. LETTER TO FEDERAL CHANCELLOR
OF MARCH 6, 1951**

to: His Excellency, The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

In reply to your letter of 6 March 1951, on the subject of German indebtedness we have the honor, on behalf of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, to acknowledge the undertakings of the Federal Government in regard to the responsibility of the Federal Republic for the prewar external debts of the German Reich and for the debt arising out of the economic assistance furnished to Germany by the three Governments since 8 May 1945.

With regard to the priority accorded to the obligations arising from the postwar economic assistance we are authorized to state that the three Governments would not propose to exercise this priority in such a way as to restrict settlement of foreign held claims arising out of trade subsequent to 8 May 1945, essential to the economic recovery of the Federal Republic.

With regard to the question of an arbitration clause in agreements covering the debts for postwar economic assistance, the three Governments will be prepared, when negotiating such agreements, to consider whether it would be useful to include an arbitration clause to deal with any matters which might be appropriately settled by such a procedure.

We further have the honor on behalf of the three Governments to confirm the understandings of the Federal Government as set forth in the second paragraph of

article 1 and in article 3 of Your Excellency's letter. They are now engaged in preparing proposals for the working out of settlement arrangements; these will provide for the participation of foreign creditors, German debtors, and interested governments including the Federal Government.

The proposals will be designed to arrive at an orderly overall settlement of prewar claims against Germany and German debtors and of the debt arising out of the postwar economic assistance, which would be fair and equitable to all the interests affected, including those of the Federal Government. It is the intention that the resulting settlement should be embodied in a multilateral agreement; any bilateral agreements that may be considered to be necessary would be concluded within the framework of the settlement plan. As soon as their proposals are ready the three Governments will communicate them to the Federal Government and to other interested Governments and will discuss with them these proposals and the procedure to be adopted for dealing with the subject.

We have the honor to state that our three Governments regard Your Excellency's letter under reference and this letter as placing on record an agreement between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, on the one hand and the Government of the Federal Republic on the other, concerning the questions of German indebtedness covered in these letters. These letters are prepared in English, French and German, each text being equally authentic.

*The Chairman
Allied High Commission
(ANDRE FRANÇOIS-PONCET)*

Enclosure 2

PROPOSED PROCEDURE

1. In order to arrive at a settlement of German prewar and postwar external debts in cooperation with the interested parties, the three Governments have worked out a tentative procedure for organising consultations and negotiations, in which interested Governments, including the German Federal Government, and with representatives of debtors and creditors, would take part. In the meetings envisaged in this procedure the three Governments would be represented through the Tripartite Commission on German Debts.

2. The procedure is designed to lead to the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement which would establish the general conditions under which outstanding debts would be settled between individual debtors and creditors.

3. In the view of the three Governments the agreement should be arrived at in such a way that its terms would be acceptable both to the Governments and to the various interests affected. This means that representatives not only of Governments but also of private creditor and debtor interests should have the opportunity to participate fully in working out the general settlement arrangements which would form the basis of the agreement. Their participation is in fact an essential step towards and constitutes in itself an element in the normalisation of Germany's international relations. On the other hand in view of their interest in the subject, the three Governments intend to participate fully in each stage of the procedure.

4. The following procedure is proposed:

(a) Consultations between the three Governments and the German Federal Government, the Governments of other countries with a significant creditor interest, and representative of creditors and debtors, on the implications of the statement on points of principle in Enclosure 3, on certain technical issues listed in Enclosure 4, and on the procedure itself. The purpose of the consultations is to explain these matters to the participants and to obtain their views on them and upon the practical methods of implementation. As a result of these consul-

tations, the three Governments would revise and elaborate the documents as necessary.

(b) Preparation of proposed settlement arrangements by the interested parties. The detailed organisation of meetings for this purpose and the procedure to be followed will be discussed in the consultations referred to above. It is however agreed that the procedure should allow for direct negotiations between representatives of debtors and creditors and for full participation by the Tripartite Commission acting on behalf of the three Governments.

(c) Conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement which would enter into force when signed and approved by the three Governments and the Government of the Federal Republic and to which other Governments would be able to accede.

5. The three Governments have considered the best way of organising the consultations referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and believe that it is desirable that a meeting should be held at which the interested parties, both governmental and private, should have an opportunity of expressing their views. It is proposed that such a meeting should be called in London in the autumn of this year.

6. In order to ensure that this meeting is productive and leads without undue delay to the negotiations envisaged in paragraph 4 (b), adequate preparation must be made. The three Governments intend that this preparation should include informal meetings with German representatives and with representatives of the principal creditor groups in the three countries, to which the Governments of four other countries which have a major creditor interest, namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland are being invited to appoint observers. Such meetings will be purely preliminary and designed to explore the issue and prepare the ground for the autumn meeting. Governments of creditor countries not represented will receive further documents drawn up after these informal meetings. It is hoped that through the circulation of the present and later documents all interested Governments will be able to consult the private creditor interests in their own countries and make adequate preparation for their participation at the autumn meeting.

7. Following a short visit to Bonn early in June to explain the procedure to the German Federal Government, the Tripartite Commission will hold the preliminary informal meetings referred to in paragraph 6 in London at the end of June. Thereafter it will complete its own preparatory work, and during August invitations will be issued to the full consultations which it is hoped will be held at the end of September. The negotiation of the general settlement arrangements and the preparation of the intergovernmental agreement would follow as soon as possible.

Enclosure 3

POINTS OF PRINCIPLE

I

1. The three Governments acting in conformity with their responsibilities and by reason of their position as the principal and priority creditors of Germany, have agreed with the Federal Government, in an exchange of letters of 6th March, 1951, between the Federal Chancellor and the Allied High Commission that a debt settlement plan should be worked out in the interest of the reestablishment of normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries. The general purpose of this plan would be to provide for the settlement of the prewar external debts of Germany and of German debtors and of the debts for economic assistance extended to Germany since 8th May, 1945, by the three occupying powers.

2. It is the view of the three Governments that, in order to further the reestablishment of normal economic relations between the Federal Republic and other countries, the settlement should:—

(a) eliminate the state of default of Germany to the utmost extent possible by suitable treatment of matured and maturing debts and of arrears of interest;

(b) lead to a situation which would permit a return to normal debtor-creditor relationships by providing methods for settling these debts by agreement between the parties;

(c) be of such a character as to contribute to the recovery of Germany's international credit by the restoration of confidence in her financial standing and reliability as a borrower, while giving a reasonable assurance that Germany will not again default on her undertakings;

(d) be compatible with and as far as possible facilitate Germany's eventual compliance with obligations which members of the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation have assumed with regard to the transfer of payments on current account, including interest and earnings on investments.

II

3. The three Governments, which are also occupying powers, have a special and continuing interest both in the attainment of the above mentioned objectives and in the settlement arrangements adopted to promote them. They have indicated to the Federal Government in their letter of 23rd October, 1950, which continued to represent their views, that provided a settlement plan is worked out which is acceptable to them, they will modify the priority of their claims in respect to postwar economic assistance to the extent necessary to permit the fulfilment of such an agreed plan. To be acceptable the plan must conform to the following principles:

(a) It should take into account the general economic position of the Federal Republic; it should not dislocate the German economy through undesirable effects on the internal financial situation, nor unduly drain existing or potential German foreign exchange resources, and it should not add appreciably to the financial burden of any Occupying Power.

(b) It should provide for an orderly overall settlement of the debts to be included in the plan and assure fair and equitable treatment of all the interests affected, including those of the Federal Government.

(c) It should be subject to revision as soon as Germany is reunited and a final peace settlement becomes possible, and should be capable of adjustment in the light of changed circumstances.

In the view of the three Governments agreed procedures and controls must also be established to govern this settlement and all payments made under it.

4. The settlement of debts can only be put into effect by agreements between particular German debtors and their foreign creditors, but the three Governments have agreed that such individual settlements should conform to general settlement arrangements which would reflect the foregoing principles. These arrangements would be arrived at in negotiations between representatives of creditors and debtors, the Federal Government, the three Governments, and other interested Governments, and would be incorporated in an intergovernmental agreement. This agreement would provide patterns for the later agreements between the individual debtors and creditors. If a creditor does not wish to accept settlement in accordance with one or other of these patterns, then under the intergovernmental agreement there would be no present possibility of the debt being discharged.

5. It is clear that a settlement plan of the nature outlined above requires that all parties be prepared to make sacrifices in the interest of common agreement. It cannot be expected that creditors will make sacrifices unless the Germans make real efforts to meet their obligations and unless the German Federal Government on their side pursues such foreign exchange and internal fiscal policies as will enable German obligations to be met under the settlement agreement. The Germans must also bear in mind the heavy burden borne by many other countries.

On the other hand, other creditors, like the three Governments, will have to give due regard to Germany's present and future economic position, the other economic burdens which she has to bear, and the fact that she is still receiving governmental economic assistance from abroad.

6. The three Governments will give due consideration to the internal financial position of Germany and the budgetary position of the Federal Government, both of which will be affected by certain problems such as the impact of Western defence requirements.

III

7. The settlement plan should provide that as a rule holders of existing debts denominated in foreign currencies should continue to hold obligations so denominated which would be serviced in foreign exchange. It is, therefore, the amount which Germany can afford to pay in foreign exchange that is likely to be the most important factor. At present Germany has small foreign exchange reserves and is continuing to receive foreign aid or credit. Although it is desirable that service on the debts should be resumed at an early date, it is evident that in the short run, while Germany continues to receive foreign aid, debt service on more than a limited scale would add appreciably to the financial burden of the three Governments. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that in the long run Germany's external payments can be balanced without the need for exceptional assistance. It is necessary, therefore, to make a distinction between what Germany can pay in the immediate future and what she can be expected to pay in the long run.

8. It seems clear the Germany will have sufficient resources to resume service payments on her external debts under a reasonable settlement arrangement provided that she is determined to do so and to accept the sacrifices which may be necessary for the sake of removing a serious obstacle to good relationships with others, improving her credit standing and opening the way to normal sources of credit. On the other hand, the volume of German prewar and postwar foreign indebtedness will be disproportionately large in relation to Germany's prospective ability to make payments thereon. Moreover, a large part of the prewar debts has matured and considerable amounts of interest are in arrears. In view of these factors a realistic approach by the creditors to the problem will be necessary, and this will probably involve adjustments of the terms of the debts. The methods and extent of such adjustments are matters which must be determined in the negotiation of the settlement plan.

IV

9. Other questions for consideration arise from the prospect that some creditors will seek settlement of their debts in deutschemark (DM). Consideration must be given to what extent and under what conditions it would be possible to permit settlement in DM of foreign currency debts. It will be necessary to assure that the plan provides equitable treatment between creditors who receive payment in foreign currency and those who desire to receive payment in DM, and among creditors holding different categories of German debts. To the extent that any DM settlements may be permitted, it is considered that the use of the DM received will have to be controlled in order to reduce the potential loss of foreign exchange to the German economy and in order to channel these DM into long-term investment in Germany.

V

10. The most practicable method of arriving at an equitable treatment of the various creditor groups would seem to be a process of negotiation among them with a view to reaching agreement respecting the treatment to be provided for the various types of claims in the settlement plan. Whatever method is adopted, however, the three Governments will wish to ensure that the settlement arrangements do not lead to inequity or preferential treatment as between some groups of creditors and others.

It will be the aim of the three Governments to see that all groups are properly represented, have a full opportunity to participate in working out the arrangements, and agree to the treatment of each type of claim in the settlement arrangements as a whole. They are agreed that the terms of the debt settlement should not vary according to the currencies in which obligations are denominated.

VI

11. Although the settlement arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to permit of revision when Germany is reunited and to allow the creditors to receive higher annual payments as Germany's ability to make payments improves, they should, nevertheless, provide a stable basis for future financial relations by giving both creditor and debtor a clear picture of their expectations in the future. This aim would not be achieved if there had to be frequent renegotiation of the terms of the settlement. Therefore, the settlement plan should go as far as possible in including provisions designed to obviate the need of any early renegotiation. For this purpose it will be necessary to provide in the plan for adjustment in the light of changes in the German economic situation and the manner in which this can be achieved is a subject which will require careful consideration during the course of the negotiations. The plan must in any case clearly contemplate the possibility of renegotiation at such time as Germany becomes reunited.

Enclosure 4

TECHNICAL QUESTIONS

In connection with the establishment of a plan for the settlement of German external debts a number of questions are expected to arise for consideration.

Among these are:

- (1) Whether German debts owed to foreign creditors which may not be strictly classifiable as external in character should be included in the plan;
- (2) questions connected with the operations of the Konversionskasse and Verrechnungskasse;
- (3) what debts of corporate bodies which functioned as Reich agencies constitute liabilities of the Reich;
- (4) the extent of the liability of the Federal Republic with regard to interest and other charges which became due after 12th March, 1938, and before 8th May, 1945, on securities of the Government of Austria;
- (5) specific problems relating to the debts of Prussia;
- (6) effect of the gold clause provisions in specific German obligations.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TRIPARTITE COMMISSION ON GERMAN DEBTS

[Enclosure 5]

The Governments of France, United Kingdom and United States have decided to establish a commission to be known as the Tripartite Commission on German Debts for the purpose of carrying forward the work of the three Governments in preparing for the orderly overall settlement of German prewar debts and of the German debt arising out of postwar economic assistance, as envisaged in the agreement of 6th March, 1951, between the three Governments and the German Federal Government.

1. The Commission will have its headquarters in London.

2. The functions of the Commission will be:

(a) To serve as a means of coordinating the policies of the three Governments regarding foreign-held German debts.

(b) To take the necessary steps so that a plan for general settlement arrangements for these debts is worked out in consultation with the German Federal Government and other interested Governments and with representatives of creditors and debtors and so that the settlement arrangements are embodied in an intergovernmental agreement.

(c) To represent the three Governments:

(i) in the negotiations relative to these settlement arrangements and the intergovernmental agreement; and

(ii) in dealing with problems in connection with the settlement of postwar debts for economic assistance.

(d) To deal with such other matters relative to German debts as are referred to it by the three Governments.

3. In carrying out these functions the Commission will be guided by the agreed policies of the three Governments including the principles relating to German debts which were communicated to the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic in the letter of 23rd October, 1950, from the Allied High Commission and by the agreement of 6th March, 1951, between the three Governments and the German Federal Government.

Ban on Critical Materials Exports to East-West Trade Violators Urged

[Released to the press at Frankfurt, Bonn, and Washington May 22]

United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy today announced that he is recommending that the United States Government prohibit the shipment of critical export goods from the United States to any companies or persons in West Germany engaging in illegal trade with the Soviet orbit. This recommendation, the result of a long-term study, has been the subject of discussions between several United States departments at Washington and Hicog.

Hicog economics officials stressed the significance of this step in view of the large volume of much needed exports from the United States to West Germany.

The recommended ban on shipments will not affect United States food shipments to Germany but could affect many other kinds of United States exports to Germany.

This action follows the recent announcement of the Federal Chancellor that effective steps would be taken to combat illegal trade and deny scarce

raw materials to violators. It was pointed out that the ECA mission has repeatedly warned that East-West trade violators will get no ECA aid and that there is a constant check on end-use of ECA-financed goods to insure against misuse of these goods. One of the first conditions of the investment of ECA counterpart funds is that the firm concerned is not an East-West trade violator.

In the following letter to Chancellor Adenauer, Mr. McCloy informed the Federal Chancellor of his latest recommendation to Washington:

I was gratified to learn of your statement, dated April 28, 1951, in which you referred to the objectionable situation prevailing within the Federal Republic in the matter of illegal exports of strategic commodities to the East. I noted particularly, the expression of your firm intent to take effective steps in combating such illegal trade and denying scarce raw materials to violators, as one of the steps to be employed.

As you know the Government of the United States is profoundly concerned with this problem and is endeavoring to find an adequate solution to it in Germany, as well as in other parts of the Western world. Mr. Cattier, Chief of the ECA special mission to Western Germany, has informed your Government that no ECA counterpart funds will be approved for investment in any company which engages in illegal trade with the East. Recently, General Handy and I agreed to extend operations of the United States customs unit to the interzonal border of the United States zone, as well as the international border, where it had previously been stationed. Further, as you know, members of my staff in recent weeks have had numerous discussions with representatives of your Government, in reference to various aspects of illegal East-West trade. Information received by my staff confirms the serious state of affairs in this field.

In order to supplement measures which have recently been taken or announced, I would now like to ask you to institute all measures necessary to prevent any allocation of ECA dollars, or commodity imports for ECA dollars, to any person or company which engages in illegal trade with the Soviet orbit.

I would further like to advise you that I am recommending to my Government to prohibit certain exports from the United States to any companies or persons in Western Germany who, according to information coming to our attention, may be engaged in transactions of this nature.

Your offer of cooperation in this matter reflects your appreciation of the scope and significance of this problem and a determination to find an appropriate solution to it. This attitude is indeed gratifying, and I would like to ask you to instruct competent members of your government to meet with appropriate members of my staff, in order to arrive at mutually satisfactory arrangements on procedures and administration in this field in accordance with the objectives outlined in the foregoing paragraphs.

Stay of Executions of German War Criminals Lifted

[Released to the press May 21]

The Department of State announced today that it has lifted the stay of executions of five German war criminals and has notified John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner for Germany,

of its action. Final disposition of the cases is now in the hands of Mr. McCloy. Any additional information will be issued by the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

The sentences were stayed when counsel for the condemned men began appeal proceedings in the United States courts on February 14, 1951. Following the refusal of the United States Supreme Court to consider the cases, the United States Court of Appeals issued its mandate to the District Court, affirming the action of that Court. Today the District Court terminated the court proceedings by entering a final order affirming its dismissal of the petitions.

The five criminals involved are: Paul Blobel, Werner Braune, Erich Naumann, Otto Ohlendorf, and Oswald Pohl.

Two other death sentences of German war criminals are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

[Released to the press May 24]

The Department has been informed by the United States District Court that the Court has issued an order restraining the execution of the seven Landsberg war criminals until 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 29. The Department immediately notified United States High Commissioner McCloy of the stay of execution.

The Court has set 10:00 a.m., Monday for full argument.

Income-Tax Convention With Switzerland Signed

[Released to the press May 24]

On May 24, 1951, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Charles Bruggmann, Swiss Minister in Washington, signed a convention between the United States and Switzerland for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.

The provisions of the convention are similar in general to those contained in income-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The convention will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The convention provides that instruments of ratification shall be exchanged and that the convention shall become effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1 of the year in which the exchange takes place, except that, if the exchange takes place on or after October 1, certain provisions shall have effect only for taxable years beginning on or after January 1 of the year next following the year in which the exchange takes place.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings ¹

Adjourned During May 1951

International Industries Fair	Bombay	Apr. 1-May 15
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Human Rights Commission: 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 16-May 19
Population Commission: 6th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 23-May 4
Commission on Status of Women: 5th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 30-May 14
Fiscal Commission: 3d Session	Lake Success	May 7-16
Statistical Commission: 6th Session	Lake Success	May 7-18
Technical Assistance Board	Paris	May 8-15
Economic Commission for Europe: Coal Committee	Geneva	May 22*-25*
Who (World Health Organization):		
Special Committee on International Sanitary Regulations	Geneva	Apr. 9-May 5
Fourth Assembly	Geneva	May 7-26
Pan American Sanitary Organization: 13th Meeting of Executive Committee.	Washington	Apr. 23-May 1
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:		
Middle East Conference To Explain U. N. to Teachers	Beirut	Apr. 24-May 6
Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
International Poplar Commission: 5th Session	United Kingdom	Apr. 25-May 2
Paris International Trade Fair	Paris	Apr. 28-May 14
International Textile Exposition	Lille	Apr. 28-May 20
Wmo (World Meteorological Organization): Executive Committee	Paris	Apr. 30-May 1
Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly	Strasbourg	May 6-19
Caribbean Commission: 12th Meeting	Barbados	May 7-12
Ilo (International Labor Organization): 4th Session	Geneva	May 7-19
Joint Maritime Commission	Geneva	May 21-26
South Pacific Commission: 7th Session	Nouméa	Apr. 28-May 7
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, Annual Meeting of the Directing Council.	Montevideo	May 11-12

In Session as of May 31, 1951

United Nations:		
General Assembly, 5th Regular Session	Lake Success	Sept. 19-
Economic and Social Council:		
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 6th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 10-
Economic, Employment and Development Commission	Lake Success	May 14-
Economic Commission for Latin America: 4th Session	Mexico City	May 28-
International Law Commission: 3d Session	Geneva	May 15-
Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany	London	Jan. 30-
International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26-
Council of Foreign Ministers, Meeting of Deputies	Paris	Mar. 5-
Four Power Conference on Swiss Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5-
International Exhibition of Textile Arts and Fashion; Art Exhibit.	Turin	Apr. 1-
Iru (International Telecommunication Union):		
Sixth Session of the Administrative Council	Geneva	Apr. 16-
Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Working Group on Draft International Convention Regarding Status of Nato Representatives and International Staff.	London	Apr. 16-
Icao (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Communications Division: 4th Session	Montreal	Apr. 24-
Festival of Britain	England	May 3-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

*Tentative

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of May 31, 1951—Continued

9th International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial Arts and Modern Architecture.	Milan.	May 5—
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Executive and Liaison Commission: 14th Session	St. Gallen	May 21—
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Nutrition: 2d Session.	Rome	May 22—
Fourth Canadian International Trade Fair.	Toronto	May 28—
FAO Working Party on Long-Term Program	Rome	May 28—
WHO Consultative Committee for Europe: 1st Session.	Geneva	May 28—
WHO-UNICEF Joint Committee on Health Policy	Geneva	May 31—
ILO Governing Body: 115th Session.	Geneva	May 28—
Inter-American Commission of Women	Santiago	May 30—

Scheduled June 1–August 31, 1951

Statistical Institute, Inter-American: 1st Session of the Committee for the Improvement of National Statistics.	Washington	June 2—
WHO Executive Board: 8th Session	Geneva	June 4—
ICAO 5th Assembly	Montreal	June 5—
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels	June 5—
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
International Radio Consultative Committee: 6th Plenary Meeting.	Geneva	June 5—
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference	Geneva	August 16—
United Nations:		
Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 5th Joint Session.	Geneva	June 5—
Trusteeship Council: 9th Session	Lake Success	June 11—
Economic and Social Council:		
Regional Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on U. N. Information.	Managua	June 9—
Economic Commission for Europe: Timber Committee	Geneva	June 11—
Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	Lake Success	June 11—
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons.	Geneva	July 2—
Regional Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on United Nations Information.	Indonesia	July 10—
Economic and Social Council—Economic Committee	Geneva	July 23—
Economic and Social Council—Agenda Committee	Geneva	July 23—
Economic and Social Council: 13th Session	Geneva	July 30—
Intergovernmental Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction.	Geneva	Aug. 1—
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
34th International Labor Conference	Geneva	June 6—
116th Session of Governing Body	Geneva	July 2—
Meeting of Experts on the Status and Conditions of Employment of Domestic Workers.	Geneva	July 2—
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Technical Transit Committee: 2d Meeting	Pontresina	June 6—
13th International Congress of Actuaries.	The Hague	June 7—
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Council: 12th Session	Rome	June 11—
Meeting of Mechanical Wood Technology	Strobl, Austria.	Aug. 12*
Statistical Institute, Inter-American, 4th Session of Committee on the 1950 Census of the Americas.	Washington	June 11
International Aeronautical Exposition, Nineteenth.	Paris	June 15—
13th International Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy	Paris	June 17—
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:		
General Conference: 6th Session	Paris	June 18—
Seminar on Teaching of Visual Arts in General Education	Bristol	July 7—
Seminar on Teaching of History	Sevres	July 11—
Executive Board: 26th Session	Paris	July 11—
International Sugar Council	London	June 25—
Fifth Session of the International Wheat Council	London	June 13—
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission	Bern	July 2—
Building Exhibition, Constructa: 25th	Hannover	July 3—
Conference of British Commonwealth Survey Officers	London	July 9—
Public Education, 14th International Congress	Geneva	July 12—
International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling: 3d Meeting	Capetown	July 23—
Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting	London	July
International Congress of Entomology, 9th	Amsterdam	Aug. 17—
International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art, 12th	Venice	Aug. 8—
Izmir International Trade Fair	Izmir	Aug. 20—
Geodesy and Geophysics, International Union of: 9th General Assembly.	Brussels	Aug. 21—
NATO: 7th Session	Europe*	August*

*Tentative

Nineteenth Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1-15, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2156
Dated May 18, 1951

I herewith submit report number 19 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 April, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Enemy forces offered only sporadic resistance until 8 April when all regular Chinese Communist and north Korean forces to the east of the Imjin River had been driven out of the Republic of Korea. Thereafter, enemy forces on their main line of resistance bitterly contested United Nations advances. The most intense fighting of the period took place on the central front along the Hantanchon River east of its confluence with the Imjin, along the southern approaches to the Hwachon reservoir and dam, and along the Soyang River a few miles to the east. Fighting was also intense in the Changam area. In his defensive efforts, the enemy has demonstrated increased strength in artillery and mortars. During the period, United Nations forces advanced eight to fifteen miles over the front west of Chongong.

Although the enemy has remained on the defensive since mid February, only partially exploiting his enormous potential of more than sixty divisions, he retains the capability of assuming the offensive at any time. Marked increase in ac-

tivity in the hostile rear has been accompanied by a continued deployment of combat forces into forward areas. Daily vehicle sightings in late March and early April repeatedly pass the 2,000 mark, and the traffic pattern indicates that the enemy has expanded his central front buildup westward into the Kumchon area, opposite the west flank of the United Nations Eighth Army. Three or more Chinese Communist Forces Armies have recently displaced into this area.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally northeast along the Imjin River to Chongong, east to Hwachon and Inje, and thence to Hupehiri on the east coast.

Guerrilla activity in United Nations rear areas has declined to the lowest point since the outbreak of the Korean conflict, as the dissident bands seek to avoid contact with United Nations forces. United Nations security forces have continued to ferret out and destroy guerrilla units at every opportunity, and have greatly reduced their effective strength in the past three months. As the main enemy forces resume the offensive, the guerrillas may be expected to again become aggressive, but their potential threat to United Nations logistical facilities is much less than before.

United Nations naval forces continued effective denial to the enemy of the use of Korean coastal waters while assuring the unrestricted movement of United Nations shipping to and from Korea. Gunfire support of ground forces was limited to occasional missions on the east coast of Korea. Surface units continued the unremitting program of interdiction by naval gunfire of enemy lines of communications in the Wonsar, Songjin and Chongjin areas. Naval carrier based aircraft, including the Marine Air Wing ashore, flew missions on a daily basis in close support of United Nations ground forces concentrating on the front lines in the western and central sectors. Successful harassment on enemy transportation routes, on east coastal railways and highways and armed reconnaissance in central area was carried out by these Naval aircraft, as well as methodical checks on enemy airfields, small boat and troop movements. A raiding force of British Royal Marine

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on May 18. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN, of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; and for text of a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, see BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828.

commandos, supported by United Nations surface units and carrier based aircraft, landed in the Songjin area, demolished a section of the coastal railroad and withdrew without suffering losses.

Check minesweeping operations were continued along the Korean east coast for the protection of gunfire support ships. Drifting mines continued to menace shipping in the Sea of Japan.

United Nations dominance of the skies over Korea continued despite repeated challenges by an increasing number of enemy Russian-built MIG jet planes. The air battles have taken place practically every day in the general Sinuiju-Sinaju area to which the enemy has restricted his operations by basing his short-range jets in Manchuria. Despite the advantages of the haven north of the Yalu, the Communists losses have been extremely heavy compared to those of the United Nations forces. The greatest air battle of the war took place on 12 April when about 225 United Nations and hostile planes clashed near Sinuiju.

Medium bombers, while continuing their interdiction efforts over all north Korea, have several times attacked the Korean ends of the bridges over the Yalu River. The enemy's concern about the damage to his attempted build-up is indicated by his continued attempted interceptions despite significant daily losses.

Close support of ground forces and disruption of transportation nearer the battle area were continued by the tactical elements of United Nations air forces. Night operations against the increasing vehicular traffic are being expanded with considerable success.

Enemy efforts to maintain north Korean airfields in operable condition are being countered by attacks utilizing bombs, napalm, rockets and machine guns. His continued efforts in this regard give indication of his intent, or at least desire, to renew his air efforts against United Nations forces in areas other than northwest Korea. Intelligence reports indicate there is much air-training activity in various areas of China and Manchuria.

High praise must be paid to the elements engaged in evacuation by air of wounded personnel and of individuals from behind enemy lines. Countless numbers of wounded who would surely have died and of men who would have become prisoners have been saved by prompt and efficient action of the air rescue and evacuation units. The wounded United Nations soldier in Korea has a better chance of recovery than had the soldier of any previous war, not only by virtue of improved medical treatments available at all echelons, but also in large measure because of his ready accessibility to major medical installations provided by rapid air evacuation.

The enemy continues to violate the laws of war in Korea. Since the last report, three new cases of atrocities have been substantiated. These incidents in which the Armed Forces of north Korea

and Communist China have violated accepted standards for the conduct of war have been reported: On or about 29 January 1951, a patrol from the 5th Marine Regiment was dispatched on a mission north of Yongchon. The patrol, consisting of ten Marines and one south Korean, never returned. On or about 7 March 1951, the bodies of ten Americans, reported by local inhabitants to have been captured on or about 30 January 1951 by guerrillas, were found with fifteen bodies of Republic of Korea personnel in a mass grave at Nakehon-Dong. The victims were found with their hands tied, the condition of the bodies indicating they had been beaten, knifed, mutilated and shot at close range.

A soldier of the 2d Infantry Division was captured by Chinese troops on or about 12 February 1951 near Hoengsong. The Chinese poured gasoline over him and set him afire. The victim was recovered by United Nations troops on or about 21 February 1951 and died on 24 February of second degree burns and emaciation.

On or about 26 September 1950 a captured United States soldier was being held at the Peoples Hospital, Kunsang-Ni, Chinan, Korea. He was marched a short distance from the hospital and executed by two members of the north Korean Security Forces. The body was buried by villagers in a Korean Cemetery.

Unconfirmed atrocities, recently reported, are under active investigation. The reports include a massacre of 228 political prisoners at the Holdong Gold Mine, clubbing to death of twenty civilians at Hongnong Myon and the execution of thirteen political prisoners at Gooncha Myon.

In leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and radio broadcasts to enemy soldiers and to Korean civilians, particular emphasis is being placed on regularly restating the United Nations Korean objectives of peace, unification, and rehabilitation. The desire of the United Nations to prevent expansion of the conflict and to arrange a peaceful settlement is kept constantly before soldier and civilian alike. The importance of wide transmission of this information is manifested by recurring reports that Communist political officers are regularly falsifying the facts to deceive their own forces and compel them to continue to support the cause of aggression. A new series of radio programs entitled "Spirit of Freedom" dramatizes for the Korean people the story of the United Nations Forces fighting in their support. More than 326 million leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea.

On 11 April 1951, eight months and eighteen days after the activation of the United Nations Command for the prosecution of the Korean effort, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur relinquished command to the undersigned.

RIDGWAY

The United States in the United Nations

[May 25-31, 1951]

General Assembly

The Committee of Twelve (AEC-CCA).—At a meeting on May 25, the United States representative, Frank C. Nash, presented the United States proposal for the establishment of a single commission to coordinate the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. This plan proposes that the new commission should be established under and report to the Council, which in turn should submit periodic progress reports to the General Assembly. The functions include:

The primary task of the new commission should be to prepare comprehensive and coordinated plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces, and accordingly, would provide for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces.

The new commission should build upon the work already developed by the AEC and the CCA. The United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for any plan for the control of atomic energy unless and until a better and no less effective system can be devised.

Mr. Nash stated that in the view of the United States, the work of the AEC and the CCA—

... has now reached a point where it is appropriate to consider ways and means of initiating the requisite coordination and expansion in a comprehensive system of control. . . . In proposing the establishment of a new and consolidated commission to take over the work of the two present commissions, the United States delegation has in view the further important objective of possibly relieving the atmosphere of stalemate which has prevailed in the two commissions for some time past. . . . It is our hope that the demonstration by the peace-loving nations of the world of their determination to stand together, strengthened and united in effective opposition against any further aggression, may lead to a change in some of these fundamental disagreements. Then . . . we may have a chance of getting ahead with our work toward disarmament.

Only two other delegates, Dr. H. R. Wei (China), and S. K. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.), commented on the proposal at this meeting. Dr. Wei stated that the plan was a valuable contribution and had the correct approach to the problem. The U.S.S.R. delegate voiced objections to the "so-called new United States proposal," which he stated stipulated that the new commission was to base its work on "the same old, obsolete, and unacceptable" United States plan for atomic energy control. In reply, Mr. Nash (U. S.) commented

that the United States had no intention of offering a "new" proposal, and that the Soviet Union had urged a merger of the two commissions some years back. "I am frankly disappointed," he said, "that this new step now lacks U.S.S.R. support."

The Committee, established under the General Assembly resolution of December 13, 1950, is required to submit a report of its work to the next session of the Assembly.

The Committee adopted a United States formal motion (11-1 (U.S.S.R.)-0) authorizing the Secretariat to prepare a study of the activities of the League of Nations in the disarmament field.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).—The fourth session of ECLA opened at Mexico City on May 28. The Commission is composed of 20 Latin American countries, and France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Ambassador Merwin L. Bohan heads the United States delegation.

The items on the agenda include: (1) Economic survey of Latin America for 1950; (2) foreign-trade problems; (3) joint work program of ECLA and FAO; and (4) coordination between ECLA and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).—The sixth session of the Commission convened at Geneva on May 29. Representatives of 17 European member countries of the United Nations, and the United States, are attending the session. Milton Katz is the United States representative.

The items on the agenda include: (1) Reports of the activities over the past year of the principal ECE Committees; (2) a statement by the Executive secretary, Gunnar Myrdal (Sweden), on the past and future work of the Commission; and (3) Secretariat's annual survey of the European economic situation and problems.

Specialized Agencies

World Health Organization (WHO).—The Fourth World Health Assembly, legislative body of WHO, at its final plenary meeting, May 25, adopted a single code of International Sanitary Regulations to replace all the existing sanitary conventions for health protection in international trade and travel. The new regulations do not require ratification by member states and will automatically come into force on October 1, 1952.

As a result of the Assembly's decisions on pro-

gram questions, it is expected that for the first time, 1952, there will be a world-wide coordinated pattern of international health work financed by Wno, UNICEF, and the United Nations technical assistance program.

The Assembly adopted a 1952 budget for Wno of almost 7.7 million dollars, a 25 percent increase over this year's figure.

Three countries—Japan, Spain, and Germany—were admitted to the Wno.

Security Council

The Council met on May 29. After expressions of sympathy on the death of Dr. José Philadelpho de Barros e Azevedo on May 7, the members unanimously adopted the proposal of President Selim Sarper (Turkey) to hold a separate election to fill the vacancy in the International Court of Justice during the next session of the General Assembly prior to the regular election; during that session, of successors to five other judges whose terms of office expire in February 1952.

The President then took up the matter contained in the following two letters received from the Pakistan Government: (a) Letter to the President of the Council, dated May 4, from Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, calling attention to "a report which has appeared in the press in India and Pakistan that the Yuvaraja of Jammu and Kashmir issued a proclamation on April 30, 1951, for convoking a constituent assembly in the State," (b) letter to the President of the Council, dated May 8, from Ahmed S. Bokhari, Pakistan permanent representative to the United Nations, calling attention to an "extract from Sheikh Abdulla's (Prime Minister of the Indian-occupied Kashmir) speech delivered by him at Srinager on the 4th of May 1951 . . . 'We have decided after long deliberations to convene Constituent Assembly to decide future shape and affiliation of Kashmir and no power can veto its decision.'"

Ahmed S. Bokhari (Pakistan) discussed the two communications received by the Council and reviewed previous statements made by the delegates expressing concern over the Constituent Assembly and its possible implications. He stated that the responsibility for the convoking of the Assembly rested with the Indian Government and held that the question of the constitution should be taken up only after the question of accession had been settled. He felt that the device of the so-called Assembly would be a most unhappy augury for the future.

Rajeshwar Dayal (India) declared that the Indian attitude had already been clearly stated previously by Sir Benegal N. Rau (India), who had pointed out that Kashmir as a unit of the Indian federation had to follow the usual constitutional processes and that the proposed Constituent Assembly was not intended to prejudice the question of accession. Sir Benegal had said, and

this continued to be the position of the Indian Government, that the Assembly could not physically be prevented from expressing its opinion on the question of accession if it so chose, but this opinion would not bind the Indian Government nor prejudice the position of the Security Council.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U. K.) stated that his Government "greatly regrets" that the Security Council had to resume the discussion of this matter so soon and believed that the statement of Sheikh Abdulla, rejecting the Council resolutions, would inevitably create a "painful impression." However, in view of the reassuring remarks of the representatives of India, he proposed that the President of the Council communicate with both parties in order to draw their attention to the apprehensions expressed in the Council and express the hope that the two Governments would do everything possible to prevent the Kashmir authorities from acting in a manner prejudicial to the Security Council.

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U. S.) supported Sir Jebb's remarks and proposal. He cited the provision of the Security Council resolution of March 30 with regard to the Constituent Assembly, and also called attention to paragraph 8 of that resolution. He noted it was true that Sir Benegal N. Rau's (India) assurances stated that no prejudicial action was intended and it was "gratifying" to hear a reaffirmation of these assurances. However, Sheikh Abdulla did not seem to agree with these statements of the Indian representatives. He added that the United Nations representative, Dr. Frank P. Graham, would leave for the subcontinent within the next few weeks and it was not only right but necessary that he should arrive there in an atmosphere clear of the doubts raised at this meeting. The United States hoped that both parties and the Security Council would concentrate on the primary objective of aiding the United Nations representative to accomplish his mission. He reemphasized that the United States favored a settlement acceptable to both parties.

After the other members, with the exception of the U.S.S.R., had commented along the same lines as the United Kingdom and United States, the President read the text of the letter he proposed to send to both Governments. It noted with satisfaction the assurances of the representatives of India that the Assembly was not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council. It pointed out, on the other hand, that the communications from Pakistan on the convening and purpose of the Assembly would, if true, involve procedures in conflict with the commitments of the parties involved. The letter recalled the operative paragraph 8 of the March 30 resolution and said a full record of the May 29 meeting would be forwarded to both parties.

The letter was approved 9-0-2 (U.S.S.R., India).

Negotiating a Peace in Palestine

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR AUSTIN U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN SECURITY COUNCIL¹

Last week, in participating in sponsoring this Council's resolution calling for a cease-fire in the present unfortunate dispute between Israel and Syria, I urged the necessity of prompt consideration of the complaints which we have now had on our agenda for the last few weeks under "The Palestine Question."

Fortunately, with the passage of the intervening days between our last meeting and this one, we have received reassuring indications that the fighting in and around the demilitarized zone has ceased as ordered. Today, therefore, I believe we may consider these complaints more dispassionately and with a clearer understanding of the facts and of the necessity for prompt Council action.

I think that the urgency of Council action can be readily appreciated by all of us, for delay in acting here, delays the realization of peace in Palestine. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Riley, should have had a much longer period of convalescence; he has returned to his post in Palestine, and we should see to it that he and the parties in the dispute have material evidence of our determination that this present dispute shall be resolved promptly and that future disputes shall be prevented.

Strengthening the Negotiating Machinery

As a result of what has been heard here before the Council, the impression may have been created in the minds of some of us that the negotiating machinery provided for in the general armistice agreement is incapable of handling this present dispute. This is clearly not so. I believe we may with confidence note the assurances given us by General Riley at the Council's meeting on April 25, when he stated that he was confident that the armistice agreement could be made to work; that it had worked well for almost 2 years and that

it certainly was in the interest of the parties that they should make it work.

The United States strongly supports General Riley's position, but, in view of the critical nature of the present situation in Palestine, it deems it desirable for the Council to consider with care the complaints before us in order to see what may be done to strengthen the existing negotiating machinery.

Examining the Armistice Agreements

In supporting General Riley's view that the Mixed Armistice Commission can and should handle nearly all of the complaints before us, the United States believes that a number of these complaints should be returned to the Mixed Armistice Commission for prompt decisions and equally prompt implementation of the decisions.

In returning these complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission, the Council would do well, in my Government's view, to avoid passing judgment on such of those complaints as the Commission is capable of handling. Not only would such action by the Council duplicate and possibly prejudice decisions of the Commission but it would also lessen the inclination of the parties to exhaust the remedies to which they have agreed before coming to this Council. A new problem might follow a possible conflict of judgment. It should be obvious, I believe, that lasting peace in Palestine will more readily come from decisive negotiation between the parties—particularly where avenues of negotiation already exists—than from decisions demanded of this Council by parties unwilling to negotiate.

The United States believes the Mixed Armistice Commission should act upon the complaints referred to it. In taking this position, it also believes that the Council can render assistance to the parties and to the negotiating machinery by enunciating general considerations which it believes should guide the settlement of the present difficulties.

The Council should be prepared to pass judgment on those matters which, in its opinion, have implications beyond the Commission's jurisdiction. It would appear essential that the parties

¹ Made in the Security Council on May 16 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

be instructed to settle their dispute through the Commission and that the Council should consider ways and means for facilitating the negotiations.

The Council now has before it a number of complaints from the Governments of Syria and Israel. It is regrettably apparent from the statements of Israel and Syria that there are wide divergencies between the views of the two countries, both in the statements of their representatives before the Council and in the claims and counterclaims of the two Governments reported to this Council by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. At the same time, we have the opinions and views of the Truce Supervision Organization itself, and the statements, and answers to questions, by Maj. Gen. William E. Riley.

In signing the various armistice agreements, Israel, on the one hand, and Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, on the other, agreed that the United Nations would assist the parties in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those agreements. The Truce Supervision Organization has played an important role in connection with carrying out the provisions of the armistice agreements. The United States believes that the Council should give great weight to the account of the recent events given by this United Nations body of impartial observers chosen from the armed forces of Belgium, France, and the United States.

Situation in the Demilitarized Zone

In the view of the United States, the basic cause for the present situation in the demilitarized zone has been the conflict of views over the rights and responsibilities of the United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the demilitarized zone. In examining what these responsibilities are, we must look, therefore, at the record of the negotiations which preceded the armistice as well as at the agreement itself.

On June 25, 1949, Dr. Ralph Bunche, the acting mediator for Palestine, expressed himself in a letter to the Syrian and Israeli Governments on the manner in which the demilitarized zone would operate. Dr. Bunche stated in this letter, in part, as follows:

The provision for the demilitarized zone in the light of all circumstances is the most that can be reasonably expected in an armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt with in the ultimate peace settlement and not in the armistice agreement.

I would point out again that previous arrangements for demilitarized zones involving United Nations responsibility as at El-Auma, Government House, and Mount Scopus have worked satisfactorily and have served to protect fully the interests and claims of rival parties pending final settlement. The proposed demilitarized zone in the agreement now under negotiation will work equally well. The United Nations will insure this since its honor and effectiveness will be involved.

I may also assure both parties that the United Nations, through the Chairman of the proposed Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission will also insure that the demilitarized zone will not be a vacuum or wasteland and that normal civilian life under normal local civilian administration and policing will be operative in the zone.

In this regard I would point out that in view of the relatively small area involved and the limited number of settlements or villages in it the administration and policing problem is not at all a severe or greatly complicated one and can be readily solved. I would also point out that in the projected Mixed Armistice Commission both parties will have an opportunity to discuss and agree upon details affecting this or any other aspect of the armistice agreement, and that the United Nations will find fully satisfactory any subsequent arrangements based on mutual agreement of the two parties. The sole function of the United Nations is to assist the parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement and in giving them such help as they may mutually request in implementing and supervising the terms of the agreement.

Of even greater significance in considering this dispute is the definitive comments which were inserted into the records of the armistice conference between Israel and Syria on July 3, 1949, which both parties agreed constituted an authoritative statement of the armistice agreement. This statement, in our view, sets forth a definitive interpretation of the rights of the chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the demilitarized zone. These comments were quoted by General Riley in his statement before the Council on April 25 and, as I stated above, are included in the four-power draft resolution.

With regard to the actual supervision of the demilitarized zone itself, I should like to refer to article 5 of the Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement which provides for its establishment. This zone may be seen on the map attached to the armistice agreement and is divided in a northern, southern, and a central sector.

Article 5 of paragraph 2 of the armistice agreement states:

In pursuance of the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 the armistice demarcation line and the demilitarized zone have been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner to minimize the possibility of friction and incidence while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life and without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

Paragraph 5c of the same article states:

The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article 7 of this agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for insuring the full implementation of this article.

Paragraph 5e states:

The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in subparagraph d of this article.

Discussion of the Resolution

From the foregoing, it seems clear that the armistice agreement provides for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the zone and that this gradual restoration is without prejudice to the ultimate settlement. The agreement also provides that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, who may be the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization or an officer designated by him, is responsible for insuring the full implementation of article 5 and is also empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police for internal security purposes.

It is my Government's view that article 5 of the armistice agreement formally establishes that the United Nations chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and not Israel or Syria, is the responsible party for general supervision of the administration of the demilitarized zone which will take place on a local basis and that this authority has been acquiesced in by both of the parties. It is believed that this situation obtains until Israel and Syria reach an agreement to the contrary or a modification of the armistice agreement is made. In the individual villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone, it seems clear that the local authority lies with the local officials, either Arab or Israeli, but outside of their immediate jurisdiction it would not appear from the agreement that they could undertake activities in the demilitarized zone contrary to the requests or recommendations of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. In the present instance, we have an example of one of the parties claiming to interpret correctly article 5 of the armistice agreement in deciding what constitutes normal civilian life in the zone. I should like to call attention to the fact that the armistice agreement provides appropriate means whereby an interpretation of article 5 may be made. In this connection, I should like to draw attention to article 7, paragraph 8, which states:

Where interpretation of the meaning of particular provisions of this agreement other than the preamble and articles 1 and 2 is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail.

The Council, now, has before it a resolution which has been introduced by the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the United States. It is the view of my Government that the passage of this resolution by the Council will clarify and strengthen the responsibilities and duties of the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. My Government is glad to note that fighting in the area in question has ceased. It is the hope of my Government that the adoption of the resolution which you now have before you will further contribute to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my Gov-

ernment's conviction that, if peace is to come in the Palestine area, the major responsibility for such peace rests upon the parties in the area. They have the means for maintaining the armistice that now exists, if they will use it in good faith. This means full cooperation with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, the rendering of all necessary facilities to the United Nations observers in the performance of their duties, and a will to abide by decisions reached by the Commission or by its chairman, whichever has jurisdiction in the case. The role of this Council should remain that of strengthening the existing armistice machinery when it is necessary, of considering complaints of the parties only when all their other remedies have been exhausted, and of constantly reminding the parties of their overriding obligations to establish a lasting peace among themselves.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

U. N. doc. S/2152/Rev. 1
Adopted May 18, 1951
Vote: 10-0-1

The Security Council,

RECALLING its past resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 17 November 1950 and 8 May 1951 relating to the armistice agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States and to the provisions contained therein concerning methods for maintaining the armistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed Armistice Commissions participated in by the parties to the Armistice Agreement;

NOTING the complaints of Syria and Israel to the Security Council, statements in the Council of the representatives of Syria and Israel, the reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Chief of Staff and the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, and statements before the Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine;

NOTING that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in a memorandum of 7 March 1951, and the Chairman of the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions have requested the Israel Delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission to insure that the Palestine Land Development Company, Limited, is instructed to cease all operations in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project, and,

NOTING further that Article V of the General Armistice Agreement gives to the Chairman the responsibility for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone,

Endorses the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Government of Israel to comply with them,

Declares that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the Governments of Israel and Syria observe faithfully the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949,

Notes that under Article 7, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agreement, where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of the agreement, other than the preamble and Articles I and II, is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shall prevail,

Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom,

Considers that it is inconsistent with the objectives

and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under Article V and calls upon the parties to be represented at all meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests.

Calls upon the parties to give effect to the following excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization at the 542nd meeting of the Security Council on 25 April 1951, as being from the summary record of the Syria-Israel Armistice Conference of 3 July 1949, which was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative comment on Article V of the Syria-Israel Armistice Agreement:

"The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an Armistice Agreement, in subparagraphs 5(B) and 5(F) of the draft article. Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty.

"Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in an Israeli village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of the village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will be authorized.

"As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

"The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and co-operation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He will not assume responsibility for direct administration of the zone."

Recalls to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations under Article II, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not to resort to military force and finds that: (A) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel on 5 April 1951 and (B) any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or around the demilitarized zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization into the reports and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish, constitute a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter.

Noting the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the demilitarized zone: (A) decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission; and (B) holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

Noting with concern the refusal on a number of occasions to permit observers and officials of the Truce Supervision Organization to enter localities and areas which were subjects of complaints in order to perform their legitimate functions, considers that the parties should permit such entry at all times whenever this is required, to enable the Truce Supervision Organization to fulfil its functions, and should render every facility which may be requested by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for this purpose.

Reminds the parties of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their international

disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security are not endangered and expresses its concern at the failure of the Governments of Israel and Syria to achieve progress pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to permanent peace in Palestine.

Directs the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to take the necessary steps to give effect to this resolution for the purpose of restoring peace in the area and authorizes him to take such measures to restore peace in the area and to make such representations to the Governments of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary.

Calls upon the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to report to the Security Council on compliance given to this resolution.

Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such additional personnel and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization may request in carrying out this resolution and the Council's resolution of 8 May 1951 and 17 November 1950.

North Atlantic Planning Board Establishes Defense Shipping Authority

[Released to the press May 25]

In accordance with its directive from the North Atlantic Council, the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping has agreed on an outline plan for the mobilization of ocean-going shipping in a single pool and its allocation on a worldwide basis in time of war or wartime emergency and for the establishment in such circumstances of any international organization of a civilian character to be named the Defense Shipping Authority.

The objective of the Defense Shipping Authority would be to insure that shipping is so organized as to achieve the greatest possible economy in its employment and to render it effectively and readily available to meet the needs, both military and civil, of the cooperating nations according to approved priorities.

The main principles which would govern the operation of the Defense Shipping Authority are that each participating government should in war or wartime emergency take all the ocean-going merchant ships of its own flag under its own control and place them in a central pool for allocation to employment by the Defense Shipping Authority. Each government would insure that the ships under its control carry out the tasks allotted to them by the Defense Shipping Authority. The arrangements between each government and its shipowners would be the domestic concern of that government but would be of such a nature that individual owners would have no direct interest in the financial results of the employment to which their ships were allocated.

For the purposes of day-to-day operation, two branches would be established, one at Washington and one at London, with all participating governments having the right to be represented in both

branches. While the pool of shipping would be operated as a single unit, the branch at Washington would deal primarily with shipping and the demands for shipping services of the Western Hemisphere, and the London Branch would deal primarily with shipping and the demands for shipping services of the Eastern Hemisphere.

It is intended that, should the Defense Shipping Authority be brought into being, non-NATO countries which participate in the common effort should be invited to place their ocean-going merchant ships in the pool and become members of the Authority.

THE CONGRESS

Effectiveness of Fulbright Exchange of Persons Program

[Released to the press by the White House May 11]

*Letter from President Truman
to Walter Johnson*

DEAR DR. JOHNSON: I have read with interest the resolution adopted by the Board of Foreign Scholarships on April 7, 1951, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the Board for their outstanding public service.

The program on which they have been working (created by Public Law 584, 79th Congress, and commonly known as the Fulbright Act) provides for the international exchange of students, professors, research scholars and teachers.

This program is vitally important in widening the knowledge and technical ability of the peoples of the twelve participating countries. Even more important, it is helping us all to understand each other better than ever before. And it is proving effective in combating Communist lies and distortions about social, economic and political conditions and objectives in our respective countries.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships, as well as the Department of State and the binational educational foundations and commissions overseas, is to be commended for the significant success already achieved and for the considerable prestige which is accruing to this program abroad.

I am pleased to accept the resolution of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, to approve the principles it embodies and to reaffirm my unqualified support for the purpose which this program represents.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Text of Board of Foreign Scholarships' Resolution

WHEREAS: The Board of Foreign Scholarships, authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress (The Fulbright Act), has been appointed by the President of the United States to supervise the educational exchange program authorized by such Act; and

WHEREAS: The Board of Foreign Scholarships has carefully supervised the administration of the Fulbright Act since it went into operation; and

WHEREAS: On the recent visit of the Chairman of the Board to twelve countries in which the Fulbright program is operating, it was clearly evident that the program had achieved high prestige and had won the commendation of leaders in these countries as an effective exchange of persons program; and

WHEREAS: The Fulbright program has demonstrated that persons speaking to persons are an effective means of explaining the ideas and aspirations of America to other nations and of these nations to America; and

WHEREAS: The Board feels that the program is making a decided impact in building understanding toward a better and a more peaceful world; therefore, be it

Resolved: That the Board of Foreign Scholarships express (1) its commendation for the excellent administration of the Fulbright Act by the Department of State, (2) its deep thanks for the thorough and highly valuable staff work performed by the Department for the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and (3) its confidence that in the continued administration of this program by the Department of State the exchange of persons under the Fulbright Act will make a lasting and significant contribution to the aims and objectives of American foreign policy.

Passed by the Board of Foreign Scholarships at its formal meeting on April 7, 1951, at Washington, D.C., and ordered to be transmitted to the President.

WALTER JOHNSON
Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships

Résumé of Program

Since Public Law 584 was enacted on August 1, 1946, the United States Government has signed executive agreements with 20 countries to provide for the international exchange of students, professors, research scholars, and teachers. As a result, 1,907 Americans from the 48 States, the territories, and the District of Columbia have received awards to study, teach, lecture, or conduct research abroad and 1,731 nationals of other countries have received awards for similar projects in the United States. In addition, 646 foreign students have received scholarships for study in American schools

in their home country. It is expected that 3,310 persons will be beneficiaries under this year's program.

The selection of persons and institutions qualified to participate in this program is under the general supervision of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Members of the Board are appointed by the President and serve without compensation. The Board has met regularly since its first meeting in October 1947, and its present membership is as follows: Walter Johnson, Chairman of the Department of History, University of Chicago, *chairman*; Lewis Webster Jones, President, University of Arkansas, *vice chairman*; Col. John N. Andrews, Personal Representative of the Administrator, Veterans Administration; Sarah Gibson Blanding, President, Vassar College; Margaret Clapp, President, Wellesley College; Charles S. Johnson, President, Fisk University; Earl J. McGrath, United States Commissioner of Education; Martin R. P. McGuire, Professor of Greek and Latin, Catholic University of America; and Helen C. White, Professor of English, University of Wisconsin.

Legislation

- Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. H. Rept. 326, Part 2, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3283] 6 pp.
- Giving the Department of Commerce the Authority to Extend Certain Charters of Vessels to Citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. H. Rept. 343, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 223] 4 pp.
- Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 370, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 9] 2 pp. Also, H. Rept. 371, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 10] 2 pp.
- India Emergency Assistance Act of 1951. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 3791, a bill to furnish emergency food relief assistance to India. H. Rept. 373, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 9 pp.
- Report on the Communist "Peace" Offensive. A Campaign to Disarm and Defeat the United States. H. Rept. 378, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 166 pp.
- Permitting Free Entry of Articles Imported from Foreign Countries for the Purpose of Exhibition at the Japanese Trade Fair, Seattle, Wash. H. Rept. 427, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 253] 2 pp.
- Suspending Certain Import Taxes on Copper. Conference Report. H. Rept. 428, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3336] 2 pp.
- Conveying Hospital Equipment and Making Grants-in-Aid to the Republic of Philippines for Philippine Scouts. H. Rept. 456, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1216] 5 pp.
- Opposing the Admission of Communist China to Membership in the United Nations. H. Rept. 463, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Res. 96] 1 p.
- Arms Embargo on Communist China. H. Rept. 464, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 101] 1 p.
- Reaffirming the Friendship of the American People for all the Peoples of the World, Including the Peoples of the Soviet Union. H. Rept. 466, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 57] 8 pp.
- Eleventh Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration. For the Quarter Ended December 31, 1950. H. Doc. 115, 82d Cong. 1st sess.

FOREIGN SERVICE

Foreign Buildings Operations Exhibit

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press May 16]

I should like to call your attention to the Foreign Buildings Operations Exhibit in the lobby. This exhibit illustrates by model or photograph some 48 projects out of a total of more than 500 projects accomplished under the Foreign Service Buildings Program since the end of the war. This program has been geared to meet the greatly increased responsibilities of the United States in foreign affairs in recent years. Primary accent has been placed on the providing of efficient, secure, and representative housing and office space for American personnel abroad.

Of special interest is the method of financing the acquisition or construction and furnishing of these projects. From 1947 through 1950 some 540 projects were completed in 72 countries at a cost of approximately 93 million dollars. Of this total amount, approximately 97 percent was obtained from foreign currency credits arising from the disposal of war surplus, lend-lease settlements, utilization of ECA counterpart funds, and other overseas assets.

The total cost to the taxpayer in new dollar expenditures has been only about 2.3 million dollars, the balance of 90.7 million dollars representing the recovery of foreign-currency credits in the form of these valuable and much needed building assets. In addition, the resulting savings to the taxpayer in annual dollar appropriations, for rental of privately owned quarters, exceeds 5 million dollars annually.

This exhibit is one example of many programs and operations which receives little publicity but which is an integral part of the Department's operations.

Correction On Slavery Questionnaire

In the BULLETIN of April 30, 1951, page 713, left-hand column, the first five paragraphs should not have appeared. The following introductory paragraphs were omitted:

The Acting Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to the Secretary-General's notes SOA 317/10/02(2)/EL, dated April 14, 1950, and SOA 317/10/02(2), dated December 14, 1950, regarding the Questionnaire on Slavery and Servitude.

The Acting Representative of the United States has the honor to transmit herewith one copy of the Answer of the United States to the United Nations Questionnaire on Slavery and Servitude.

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- Tasks Confronting the Indian Government (McGhee before Cincinnati Council on World Affairs) 892

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June 11, 1951

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Peace or War and the Survival of Human Freedom

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN: The real issues in the discussion before us are peace or war, and the survival of human freedom.

It is not just a difference as to method which is now under examination. What is challenged is the bedrock purpose of our foreign policy, and of what we have been trying to do. That is the place I would like to start, in this brief statement.

The foreign policy of the United States has a central and dominant objective—to protect the nation and to safeguard the future of its people. We stand ready to defend our future by force of arms if that necessity is forced upon us. But we seek to deter war if we can.

Another world war would be destructive beyond experience; it would not solve problems, but multiply them. Therefore, it is part of our fundamental purpose to prevent, by all honorable means, the outbreak of another general war.

Even before the last world war was over, while our young men were storming the beaches at Normandy and Saipan and dozens of other places now engraved in our memories, the resolution was forming among our people that future wars must be prevented.

Their conviction grew that the best way to protect the security of our nation and of our people was to prevent war, and that the way to go about it was through an international system of collective security.

The Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations—these were not cynical slogans. They represented the idea which our people felt in their hearts was worth fighting for.

It has been the purpose of our foreign policy to keep faith with that idea.

The attempt to build a collective security system on the basis of the cooperation of all the great powers broke down because of the policies of the

Soviet Union. But Soviet ambitions have not been able to obstruct our determined efforts.

Within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, we have been building a collective security system based on the cooperation of those nations who are dedicated to peace.

The united and determined effort of our people to build effective instruments for keeping the peace is recorded in a series of vigorous and far-sighted actions: the United Nations Charter itself, the Rio Treaty, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

We have been building our strength, together with our allies. We must be strong enough to keep the peace.

Side by side with these programs there is another basic element in our foreign policy: to assist the hundreds of millions of people who were acquiring their independence after the war, so that they might be free to develop in their own way, and to join in an international system for preserving the peace.

Our hopes for peace required us to understand the changes which were in motion among vast populations of the Middle East and Asia, and to help peoples who had just gained their independence from losing it again to the new imperialism of the Soviet Union.

Those are the big, central ideas that express what we have been trying to do in the world.

The Challenge of Korea

The attack on Korea was a blow at the foundation of this whole program. It was a challenge to the whole system of collective security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in the world. It was a threat to all nations newly arrived at independence. This dagger thrust pinned a warning notice to the wall which said: "Give up or be conquered."

This was a test which would decide whether our

¹ Made on June 1 before the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees on the MacArthur Hearings.

collective security system would survive or would crumble. It would determine whether other nations would be intimidated by this show of force.

The decision to meet force with force in Korea was essential. It was the unanimous view of the political and military advisers of the President that this was the right thing to do. This decision had the full support of the American people because it accorded with the principles by which Americans live.

As a people we condemn aggression of any kind. We reject appeasement of any kind. If we stood with our arms folded while Korea was swallowed up, it would have meant abandoning our principles, and it would have meant the defeat of the collective security system on which our own safety ultimately depends.

What I want to stress here is that it was not only a crucial decision whether or not to meet this aggression; it was no less important how this aggression was to be dealt with.

In the first place, the attack on Korea has been met by collective action. The United States brought the aggression in Korea before the United Nations, not only because the Charter requires it, but also because the authority and even the survival of that organization was directly involved.

The response of some members of the United Nations, in terms of their capacities and their other security responsibilities, has been generous and wholehearted.

The total action is admittedly an imperfect one, as might be expected of beginning steps in a collective security system. But the development of this system requires us to take into consideration the dangers and interests of those associated with us, just as we want them to take into consideration our dangers and interests.

In the second place, our response to the aggression against Korea required a careful estimate of the risks involved in the light of the total world situation.

There was the risk that the conflict might spread into a general war in Asia, a risk that the Chinese Communists might intervene, a risk that the Soviet Union might declare itself in.

We take it for granted that risk of some sort is implicit in any positive policy, and that there is also a risk in doing nothing.

The elements of risk and the means of reducing that risk to us and to the rest of the free world quite properly influenced our policy in Korea.

It has been our purpose to turn back this Communist thrust, and to do it in such a way as to prevent a third World War if we can. This is in accord with one of the most fundamental tenets of our policy—to prevent, in so far as we can do so, another world war.

It is against this basic purpose that the operation in Korea, and the plans for carrying it to a conclusion, need to be considered.

What the Defense of Korea Has Accomplished

The operation in Korea has been a success. Both the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists declared it to be their purpose to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea and impose Communist rule throughout the entire peninsula. They have been prevented from accomplishing their objective.

It has been charged that the American and allied forces fighting in Korea are engaged in a pointless and inconclusive struggle.

Nothing could be farther from the fact. They have been magnificent. Their gallant, determined and successful fight has checked the Communist advance and turned it into a retreat. They have administered terrible defeats to the Communist forces. In so doing, they have scored a powerful victory.

Their victory has dealt Communist imperialist aims in Asia a severe setback.

The alluring prospect for the Communist conspiracy in June, 1950—the prospect of a quick and easy success which would not only win Korea for the Kremlin but shake the free nations of Asia and paralyze the defense of Europe—all this has evaporated.

Instead of weakening the rest of the world, they have solidified it. They have given a powerful impetus to the military preparations of this country and its associates in and out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

We have doubled the number of our men under arms, and the production of matériel has been boosted to a point where it can begin to have a profound effect on the maintenance of the peace.

The idea of collective security has been put to the test, and has been sustained. The nations who believe in collective security have shown that they can stick together and fight together.

New urgency has been given to the negotiation of a peace treaty with Japan, and of initial security arrangements to build strength in the Pacific area.

These are some of the results of the attack on Korea, unexpected by—and I am sure most unwelcome to—the Kremlin.

How the Fighting Can Be Brought to an End

The objective of our military operation in Korea is to end the aggression, to safeguard against its renewal, and to restore peace. There is wide agreement on this objective in the domestic discussions of this issue.

Both the Administration and its critics have said that the object of the courses they propose is to end the aggression and restore peace. Both are willing—indeed desire—to end the fighting by an honorable settlement which will end the aggression, provide against its renewal and restore peace.

Neither will purchase a settlement by allowing the aggressors to profit by their wrong. Neither

believes that the destruction or unconditional surrender of the aggressor is necessary to attain the goal.

General Marshall, General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given you, in detail, the reasons why they believe that the Chinese Communists will be defeated in Korea and must abandon their purpose.

They report that our forces are in excellent shape, that their morale is high and that they are in a good supply position.

They report not only that the mass attacks launched by the enemy have failed to break through the firepower of United Nations forces, but that the offensives of the enemy have been broken and thrown back with enormous enemy casualties.

These defeats in Korea, together with other consequences of this campaign, present grave problems for the Communist authorities in China.

While the manpower resources of China are vast, its supply of trained men is limited. They cannot cover up their casualties. They cannot gloss over the draft of more and more men for military service.

The Chinese Red leaders have betrayed their long-standing pledge of demobilization and the military demand for manpower has, instead, been increased.

Peiping has also broken its promises of social and economic improvement. In the great cities, dependent on imported materials, unemployment increases. The régime has not lightened the burdens of the people. It has made them heavier.

All of this is reflected in a sharp increase in repressive measures, and in propaganda to whip up the flagging zeal of their own people.

In the light of all these factors, I believe that the aggression can best be brought to an end with a minimum risk and a minimum loss, by continuing the punishing defeat of the Chinese in Korea. This is being done.

No one can predict when the fighting will stop and when the aggression will end. It is also true that no one could have foretold exactly what would happen when we undertook action to end the Berlin blockade, but we did what we thought was right and the blockade was ended.

No one could have foretold how the aggression in Greece would be terminated, but again we took those measures which our best judgment and sense indicated were the right ones and the aggression ceased.

While the outcome of every course of action in the foreign policy field cannot be predicted with certainty in advance, it is our responsibility in taking action to apply our best judgment on the basis of the best information at hand.

I think it is fair to say that all of the President's advisers believe the course we are now following gives us the best chance of stopping hostilities and ending the aggression in Korea.

The Proposal To Enlarge the War

I should like briefly to address myself to the alternative course which was placed before this Committee. This course would seek to bring the conflict in Korea to an end by enlarging the sphere of hostilities.

I will not try to review the military considerations involved in this proposed course, since these have been thoroughly discussed by the previous witnesses before your Committees.

It is enough to say that it is the judgment of the President's military advisers that the proposed enlargement of our military action would not exercise a prompt and decisive effect in bringing the hostilities to an end. To this judgment there must be added a recognition of the grave risks and other disadvantages of this alternative course.

Against the dubious advantages of spreading the war in an initially limited manner to the mainland of China, there must be measured the risk of a general war with China, the risk of Soviet intervention, and of World War III, as well as the probable effects upon the solidarity of the free world coalition.

The advocates of this program make two assumptions which require careful examination. They assume that the Soviet Union will not necessarily respond to any action on our part. They also assume that in the build-up of strength relative to the Soviet Union and the Communist sphere, time is not necessarily on our side.

As to Soviet reactions, no one can be sure he is forecasting accurately what they would be, but there are certain facts at hand that bear on this question.

We know of Soviet influence in North Korea, of Soviet assistance to the North Koreans and to Communist China, and we know that understandings must have accompanied this assistance. We also know that there is a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

But, even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite. Russian self-interest in the Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore a direct attack upon the Chinese mainland.

I cannot accept the assumption that the Soviet Union will go its way regardless of what we do. I do not think that Russian policy is formed that way any more than our own policy is formed that way. This view is certainly not well enough grounded to justify a gamble with the essential security of our nation.

In response to the proposed course of action, there are a number of courses of counteraction open to the Soviets.

They could turn over to the Chinese large numbers of planes with "volunteer" crews for retaliatory action in Korea and outside. They might

participate with the Soviet air force and the submarine fleet.

The Kremlin could elect to parallel the action taken by Peiping and intervene with a half million or more ground force "volunteers"; or it could go the whole way and launch an all-out war.

Singly, or in combination, these reactions contain explosive possibilities, not only for the Far East, but for the rest of the world as well.

We should also analyze the effect on our allies of our taking steps to initiate the spread of war beyond Korea. It would severely weaken their ties with us and in some instances it might sever them.

They are understandably reluctant to be drawn into a general war in the Far East—one which holds the possibilities of becoming a world war—particularly if it developed out of an American impatience with the progress of the effort to repel aggression, an effort which in their belief offers an honorable and far less catastrophic solution.

If we followed the course proposed, we would be increasing our risks and commitments at the same time that we diminished our strength by reducing the strength and determination of our coalition.

We cannot expect that our collective security system will long survive if we take steps which unnecessarily and dangerously expose the people who are in the system with us. They would understandably hesitate to be tied to a partner who leads them to a highly dangerous short cut across a difficult crevasse.

In relation to the total world threat, our safety requires that we strengthen, not weaken, the bonds of our collective security system.

The power of our coalition to deter an attack depends in part upon the will and the mutual confidence of our partners. If we, by the measures proposed, were to weaken that effect, particularly in the North Atlantic area, we would be jeopardizing the security of an area which is vital to our own national security.

What this adds up to, it seems to me, is that we are being asked to undertake a large risk of general war with China, risk of war with the Soviet Union, and a demonstrable weakening of our collective security system—all this in return for what?

In return for measures whose effectiveness in bringing the conflict to an early conclusion are judged doubtful by our responsible military authorities.

Before concluding, I should like to deal briefly with the related proposition that we may need to take extreme risks now because time may not be on our side. I believe this is wrong.

The basic premise of our foreign policy is that time is on our side if we make good use of it. This does not necessarily mean that time must bring us to a point where we can match the Soviet Union man-for-man and tank-for-tank.

What it does mean is that we need to use the time we have to build an effective deterrent force. This requires us to create sufficient force-in-being, both in the United States and among our allies, to shield our great potential against the possibility of a quick and easy onslaught, and to ensure that our allies will not suffer occupation and destruction. And back of this shield we need to have the potential that would enable us to win a war.

This is the measure of the force we need; as we approach it, we approach our objective of preventing war.

Can we do this? I believe we can. We and our allies have the capacity to out-produce the Soviet bloc by a staggering margin. There is no doubt about that. Our capacity to produce has been set in motion and is rapidly getting to the point where its output will be vast and its effect significant.

There is also the critical factor of our will. The future belongs to freedom if free men have the will to make time work on their side. I believe the American people and their allies do have the will, the will to work together when their freedom is threatened.

This is the ultimate source of our faith and our confidence. A free society can call upon profound resources among its people in behalf of a righteous cause.

Legislation

- Extending and Strengthening the Defense Production Act of 1950. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a recommendation. . . . H. Doc. 118, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 11 pp.
- Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. S. Rept. 214, Part 2, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 984] 14 pp.
- Providing for Continuation of Authority for Regulation of Exports. S. Rept. 253, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. J. Res. 50] 4 pp.
- Emergency Food Aid to India. S. Rept. 297, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 872] 14 pp.
- Reaffirming the Friendship of the American People for all the Peoples of the World, Including the Peoples of the Soviet Union. S. Rept. 298, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 11] 5 pp.
- Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. S. Rept. 299, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1612] 8 pp.
- Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1951. S. Rept. 302, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3587] [Department of State, pp. 6, 17] 23 pp.
- Fixing the Personnel Strength of the United States Marine Corps, and Establishing the Relationship of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. S. Rept. 308, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 677] 6 pp.
- Address of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at a Joint Meeting of the Two Houses in the Hall of the House of Representatives, April 19, 1951. S. Doc. 36, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 6 pp.
- Convention (No. 88) Concerning the Organization of the Employment Service, Adopted at the Thirty First Session of the International Labor Conference. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a recommendation. . . . Senate Ex. B. 82d Cong. 1st sess. 21 pp.

The United States and Canada: A Partnership for Peace

by James E. Webb
*Under Secretary of State*¹

It has been a long time since we met here together 8 years ago, and I appreciate more than I can say, your invitation to come back again. Eight years is a long time, and none of us, when we met here in 1943, could look ahead to the events which have piled one on top of another as we came out of one war and moved on in so short a time to face the possibility of another.

Eight years ago I said to you that you citizens of Canada had never wavered in your opposition to tyranny and that you had seen that your own destiny and that of all freedom-loving peoples lay in turning back the swarming hordes of Nazis. I said then that "The heroic deeds of Canada's sons on every fighting front will never die." And today I know I speak the sentiment of millions of your neighboring Americans when I say that, in the following years of war, 1944 and 1945, we were proud to fight by your side. And I can say also that following the war there has hardly been an important endeavor to strengthen peace, to build international cooperation, or to resist aggression, on which we have not stood together.

Identity of Interests

Now, of course, it would be entirely wrong to say that any two great nations living in close proximity, under conditions of modern civilization, with many frictional areas arising out of even the normal activities of trade and commerce, would always take the same view on every subject. Diversity of thought and approach is the very germ of democracy, and I know we both cherish it. But the important thing, the thing that stands out in both the years of war and the years since the war, is that on the matters that really count we have both seen an identity of interests. We have found a commonly acceptable course of action.

¹ Excerpt of an address made before the Kiwanis Club at Montreal, Canada, on May 31 and released to the press on the same date.

What are the things that really count in these times?

I suggest that for Canada and the United States, one of them is that we live close together as neighbors on a continent where geography links us in a common destiny. We trade together, and we both profit by that trade. In fact, the volume of trade between the people of Canada and the people of the United States last year amounted to more than 4 billion dollars, which is the largest volume of commercial interchange that has ever occurred at any time in the past between two nations. Through the years, the long boundary between Canada and the United States has provided many opportunities for working together in the development of common resources, and the results have been good for both of us. In times of international crisis, we have learned to rely heavily on each other and to depend on each other's aid. We, in the United States, have watched with admiration Canada's tremendous increase in wealth and industrial strength and the large stature which Canada has gained and merited in the United Nations, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, in fact, in every international forum. We look to Canada not only as a powerful friend and ally but we recognize her also as a force to be respected, a nation of independent ideas and international interests which are constantly expanding. We see that your external relations have assumed such great importance that you have increased your foreign posts since the war until you now have almost half a hundred in 37 different countries.

For both of our countries, with our common destiny, one of the most important questions—the question which perhaps counts most—is how we shall fare as free nations in a world in which all freedom is under a serious threat. The hard facts of international life which we both must face together are that within this century, within the lifetime of most of you here, two great and destructive world wars have unleashed vast forces of violence. Two revolutions—the Russian and

the Chinese—have run a course of extreme scope and intensity. Five empires—the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, the German, the Italian, and the Japanese—have collapsed. Two major imperial systems—the British and French—have had to readjust to meet the new conditions. Many new independent nations have come into being and are finding their way with great difficulty in the hazardous thoroughfare of international intercourse.

When we look out to the far international horizon, we face a world situation characterized by two clashing concepts of political and social organization. One is based on freedom; the other on totalitarianism. We face the inescapable conclusion that the fanatic doctrine of Soviet Communist imperialism is relentlessly driving to impose its absolute authority over all the peoples of the world. The history of the past 6 years has demonstrated this intention on the part of the Soviet rulers.

We must remember that, when the war ended in Europe, 6 years ago, the Soviet forces already occupied a whole series of European countries. Also, in those countries which had not been overrun by the Red Army circumstances were highly favorable to the Communist purpose of seizing power. In most of them, the German occupation had disrupted the prewar pattern of political life and had damaged the confidence which people had in their former political institutions. Experience taught that there would normally be a wave of bitterness and restlessness in the immediate post-war period. Suspicion and hostility toward the exile governments had been assiduously sown and cultivated by Communist agitators. Their purpose was to make conditions as chaotic as possible. By penetrating into the underground resistance movements, the Communists had placed themselves in an excellent position to act with telling effect. The large popular followings, which they had amassed, enabled them to participate in parliamentary governments when established. They could make favorable deals with non-Communist parties, use these connections to damage their non-Communist associates, invoke the influence of government, and distort its purposes to their own ends.

In these circumstances, it is a remarkable tribute to the brave people of these nations and their staunch leaders that Western Europe is today a citadel of freedom.

Concept of Collective Security

For a period after the war, it seemed that none could withstand the ruthless Soviet pressure—certainly none who were close enough to feel the weight of its military power. Then came the turning point. First Iran, then Turkey, then Greece, felt the pressure and decided to resist. You Canadians and we Americans were able to help, and in the process, we took the measure of the Soviet

purpose and method. Others did likewise. To both of us and to other peoples desperately seeking to establish a firm and lasting peace, Soviet actions were a rude shock, but one that cleared the air. The Marshall Plan has been a successful joint effort. The Western Union Treaty, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty, the European Payments Union, the Schuman Plan, all these are important organized cooperative efforts. All of them have contributed to the laying of a foundation for the most important single concept affecting international life. That concept is the concept of collective security.

I should like to consider with you the implications of this concept as I see them, but first, I think it is important to ask the question: "Why at the end of the war, in its weakened condition did Europe resist and why did we help?" Following 1945 as the pattern of Soviet intentions and actions took shape, it became clearer that in the Soviet system every satellite is subservient to Moscow and becomes an inferior state; that every individual is a pawn of the all-powerful Communist Party masters. It also became clear that among these masters there was no respect for human dignity, no milk of human kindness, no restraint of law. Wherever this system spread its power, people who were not completely subservient were coerced, enslaved, imprisoned, or murdered. It was clear to the peoples of Europe and to us that aggressive imperialism had captured communism and had embarked on a campaign to impose on free peoples, wherever it could, the deadly apparatus of the police state.

Restrictions in Soviet Living

What is that police state? In the U.S.S.R., every worker is required to have an internal passport, a labor book, and a pay book. The Government exercises absolute control over his job and movements. He cannot change his job without permission. If he quits his job or is absent from work, he pays a stiff fine or serves months in a labor camp. Even to change his residence, a Soviet worker must get permission from the police and must register with the police within 24 hours after the move. The same iron rule applies when he wishes to visit another city—he checks in and out with the police at both points. He has practically no choice of where or at what he will work and almost no freedom of movement.

The Soviet worker is rigidly controlled by a government in whose actions and decisions he has no voice at all. He is told what to think in a continuous stream of skillfully planned propaganda. He reads only censored official papers, listens to a censored radio, and casts a meaningless vote. Candidates for office are designated by the Party and are unopposed. Except for Canadian broadcasts, the Voice of America, and other transmissions from the free nations, he lives in a darkness of ignorance about the outside world.

These are the facts of life in the Soviet "worker's paradise." These are the conditions of servitude imposed on a vast population to build up the Soviet armed forces and the international Communist apparatus.

Does anyone here believe that this Communist apparatus was not at the center of the conspiracy to launch aggression against the Republic of Korea last June? Does anyone here believe that this same international Communist apparatus will shrink from any action which will add to its power except as it counts the risk too great?

Has anyone found a practical, hard-headed way to meet this threat of aggression except through the development of the institutions of collective security?

Cooperative Institutions To Meet Aggression

Among the things that really count in these times is, I think, that we in the United States and, I believe, you in Canada are committed to co-operative institutions for collective security because we know of no better way to meet the threat of aggression and to win the peace. We believe that, if the free nations of the world work together, we can face the future with confidence. In the United States, we believe we and you and our friends and allies have the capacity to erect a military shield which can protect us from the aggressive power of the Communist nations, and we are certain that when we have overcome this threat of armed aggression the strength of our religious, political, economic, and social institutions can make secure "the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." We believe that the first job is to rebuild our military power. Through the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio pact, and perhaps at some time a Pacific pact, we believe we can attain a collective security that will adequately serve our common defense.

When the ruthless drive of Communist power and conspiracy became more threatening in 1948, you in Canada and we in the United States recognized the danger and began to build with our friends and allies in Western Europe the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We both intended this to be a major instrument for collective security. We both hoped, I am sure, that if each nation signing the treaty carried out its solemn obligations and built up its own individual military forces even on a limited scale and drew the necessary plans for using these forces in partnership, Communist aggression would heed this warning of our determination. We thought our partnership in the North Atlantic Treaty would make it clear that we were not an easy prey to be picked off one by one.

But Communist aggression ignored the warning. It struck in Korea and was met there by your own heroic sons, and those we and other nations have sent. The first aggressive step that otherwise might have started the fires of a major

war has been stopped in its tracks. It has been stopped, not by one nation, but by The United Nations. It has been stopped by collective action for collective security.

Now, we have both had our losses in Korea, we have mourned our dead, and we have felt the bitterness engendered by a cruel enemy. But, we have also stopped the first step designed to disintegrate our emerging system of collective security, and we in the United States feel that we may have gained the time and wisdom to avoid the catastrophe and the infinitely more terrible losses that would come from another world conflagration.

How shall we utilize our time, how shall we use our wisdom? The stopping of aggression in Korea, important as it is, is only part of the burden we must carry in these times. We, and you, and other freedom-loving nations must bind ourselves together in a system of collective security that will be our strength and our common defense. The most important single fact about the way you and we and other United Nations fight in Korea is that we fight in partnership. This is the real heart of the matter. To take steps to build that partnership stronger and on a broader basis is the challenge to our wisdom and to our ability to best use the time we have so dearly purchased.

Meeting Our Common Problems

From a historic point of view, the mere signing and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty were for our two countries steps unprecedented in time of peace. By these acts, we joined 10 other countries in agreeing that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Further, we agreed to join our resources with those of our 10 other allies to build our common defensive strength so as to prevent an attack or, if one should come, be prepared to meet it successfully. But, we did not limit our agreements to the building of a military shield to protect us from attack. We, also, agreed to work together on a positive program for improving the social and economic well-being of our peoples and to spread an understanding of the purposes for which we were joined together. Under this treaty, we have embarked on a broad program of common action to carry out its provisions. The main purpose now is to build collective security, but for the future and based on the experience of working together for defense, we will have an excellent foundation upon which to build common action for the well-being of our peoples when military matters no longer occupy the front of the stage. Now if, as I stated earlier, it is wrong to assume that any two great nations like Canada and the United States even though linked by a common destiny would always see eye to eye on every subject, think how much more difficult it is to find

a common basis of action for 12 nations, each sovereign and each dependent upon the processes of democracy to enforce decisions and think also that these nations are separated by vast oceans and distances. Think of the infinite patience which your distinguished and able Minister of External Relations and our Secretary of State must have to work out these problems.

But it is important to know that they and the leaders of the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are working them out. Our 12-nation organization for collective security is moving from a planning stage to an operating stage. Executive direction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on a day-to-day basis is being achieved through a Council of Deputies which meets on a permanent, full-time basis in London. Military planning for the Treaty Organization is conducted under the general guidance of a military committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the 12 nations. Agreement has been reached on a general strategic plan for the defense of the North Atlantic area and the forces required to carry out that plan are beginning to assemble under the Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Agreement has been reached that each nation will be called upon to contribute that which it is best qualified to send and that the high overhead and inefficiency of balanced national forces will give way to the new collective security concept of balanced collective forces. This is a momentous decision because it means that what each nation takes from its citizens to build the common defense will have the maximum impact to preserve the peace.

When you in Canada and we in the United States think of the burdens of raising military forces and of the proper sharing of those burdens, I think it is important for us to remember that every European country in the North Atlantic Treaty has already established universal military training. Every one of them has acted since the aggression in Korea last June to increase the length of initial service, and most of them have increased the periods for refresher training. For the training of some of these European officers and men, you in Canada and we in the United States have opened up our schools and are conducting specialized courses. Through the Military Assistance Program of the United States, extensive training is going forward abroad in the use of modern weapons.

Collective Defense Measures

When I spoke to you years ago in the midst of World War II, I used these words:

Your sons and ours on sea, on land, and in the air are fighting this war with the best weapons which modern science has yet produced . . . they are hitting the enemy before the enemy can hit them in most instances and their losses are going to be very considerably less than would be the case if we had to send them out to fight without this equipment.

These words illustrate another of the great problems which our plan of collective security must solve. Science has made war more and more costly in terms of equipment, and our biggest task is to develop large-scale production of modern weapons to equip our forces. In Europe, practically every country has doubled its expenditures for military production during the past year.

Help is being given from Canada and the United States in terms of patents and know-how for modern types of equipment and specialized machinery for munitions production. The abandonment of the concept of balanced national forces for the newer partnership arrangements called for by balanced collective forces makes it easier to agree upon standard types of weapons and to get production going. To cite one example, already a British model fighter aircraft is being produced under joint arrangements by which Britain furnishes the specifications, Belgium produces the engines, and Holland the airframe.

Another example is the project for the manufacture in Canada of 50,000 walkie-talkie sets for use by our collective security forces in Europe. In the United States, we are preparing to build military equipment on a scale approaching the highest rate reached in World War II. We are proposing to supply to our partners in collective security vast quantities of tanks, guns, planes, and other modern military equipment. We are proposing to help pay for military production in countries like France and England which have the capacity to increase their own military production but do not have the funds to pay the total cost. We are preparing to do our part and we know that you in Canada are engaged in a similar great effort. In furnishing equipment for three infantry divisions and other vitally needed supplies, your government is making a notable contribution to collective security. Through measures such as these and through standardizing the equipment of our own two military services, Canada and the United States are proving their common determination that communism shall not be the master and we the slave.

In conclusion, I should like to say that as we share our common destiny, as we move forward in partnership to build collective security, we in the United States will not minimize the difficulties, but we will strive for mutual understanding and the firmest possible basis of cooperation. We have a deep feeling that democracy can outstrip despotism and that the peoples of the free nations can develop the attitudes toward each other which support collective action. We are convinced that the free nations joined in arrangements for collective security have the skill and the leadership and the broad public support which is bound to win this struggle.

If we really build this security the Communist world is bound to learn that aggression doesn't pay, and we will be moving forward toward a just and lasting peace.

Decisions for American Citizens

*by President Truman*¹

The job of being an American citizen keeps growing more difficult and more important every day. In some countries, the important decisions are made by the rulers, and the citizens do what they are told. In our country, the citizens make the basic decisions, and the officials of the Government have to do what the people tell them—sometimes.

We must make the right decisions. You, as citizens, must make the right decisions. Never was there a time when the right decisions are so necessary as they are at this time.

As the problems before our country become more complicated and more dangerous, our citizens must give greater attention to their job of making the basic decisions. It is your country, as well as mine. It is your responsibility, as well as mine. If you do not assume that responsibility—and you are part of that responsibility—there is nobody to blame but yourselves when things go entirely wrong. There is less margin for error than there used to be making these decisions. Wrong decisions in this day and age may wreck the country—wreck it for all time.

There is a great deal of serious business before the Government of this country now. This business concerns our national defense and our national survival. The important decisions have to be made by the Congress, by the President, and the country, and they must be made soon. These decisions ought to be above petty politics, because the welfare of the country depends upon them.

Citizens should understand the facts. You know, the hardest thing in the world to find is a real fact. And the easiest thing to do is to garble and confuse the facts. I repeat, that the easiest thing to do in the world today is to garble and confuse the facts. We have a great deal of that going on right now.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the National Conference on Citizenship at Washington on May 17 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

I hope, when you leave this conference, you will take home with you an understanding of the major problems we face, and a sense of urgency about the decisions your Government has to make. If this understanding can be spread among all the citizens groups you represent, I believe these decisions will be made promptly, and I believe they will be made right.

If citizens know the facts, and let their elected representatives know that they want the national interest put above every political interest and every special interest, then there won't be any question about keeping our Nation strong and secure. This is one of the most important things that this conference can do.

We must face up to the major problems, face up to them and solve them—solve them in the interest of all the people and not in the interest of just a favored few.

I would like to outline for you a few of the major problems we have to face.

There is a lot of discussion nowadays about military strategy. That's all right. Military strategy is important, and everybody ought to be concerned about it. And I want to say to you that our Defense Department is headed by the ablest group of men that this or any other country ever had for planning and carrying out its defense policy.

But, there are a lot of other problems that are equally important. We have the hard problems of defense production, the problem of taxes, the problem of stabilization—these are just examples of a few of the problems that we have. Unless we face these problems, we won't be able to have any military strategy at all. No matter how able our Defense Department men may be, there won't be anything to plan for.

The dangers we face are very serious, the most dangerous we have ever faced in all our time. Our country faces the danger of war from an aggressive and imperialist foreign power. Meeting

this danger is all-important. And to meet that danger, we should all stand together.

There is a free world, and there is a slave world. We belong to the free world, and we are the head of the free world. We have got to accept that responsibility and carry out that responsibility.

Our defense program has two parts. One part is building up our own armed forces and our national strength. The other is helping our allies build up their strength so they can do their share in preventing war and stopping aggression. Both these parts of our defense program are essential to our security.

Unless we help our allies, we might have to face the real danger alone. Unless our allies are strong, the Kremlin might take them over, and the danger of war would increase. Without allies, our defense would be more difficult, and more costly—more costly in dollars, and what is much more important, most costly in lives. There is no economy in slashing our foreign-aid program. Penny-pinching now may mean throwing away the lives of our soldiers later on.

One of the reasons we are in this condition is because we did not accept our responsibility immediately after the war was over. In 1945, a universal service law was asked for by the President of the United States. That universal service law passed in 1945 or early in 1946 would have saved billions of dollars now. The people who prevented the enactment of a universal service law in 1945 are trying by every means at their command to prevent it now. We must not let them prevent it, because it is essential to the safety of the world—to our own safety.

We must build our economy for defense. We have the most amazingly prosperous economy in the history of the world, and we have got to keep it that way.

Now, I don't think people ought to have any trouble agreeing on the national interest. I think everybody—every citizen—is a patriot and that he believes that the national interest comes first and that at a time like this, when some of our young men are fighting and dying to stop Communist aggression, and when so many of our boys face a period of military service to prepare for whatever may lie ahead, it ought to be easy for this country to get together in unity of spirit and action. It ought to be the easiest thing in the world to agree upon a good defense program and a good foreign-aid program and a sound program to hold down the cost of living. But it is not easy. It is one of the most difficult things which any President has ever faced. I am going to face it, and with your help I am going to put it over. Now, we must get the facts to the people, and that is hard to do.

One of the main reasons, I think, is that most of our citizens—those who do the fighting and pay the bills and keep the country going—are just too

occupied to make their voices heard. If they had all the facts, and their representatives in Washington knew how they felt, I don't think we would have so much trouble with these great problems.

That is why the work of this conference means so much in the present crisis of the world. The future depends on the opinions and the decisions of the American people.

If you can develop ways of keeping our citizens better informed, of helping them to understand the increasing duties of their citizenship, I have no doubt that this country will make the right decisions, and that those decisions will lead the world to a just and lasting peace. And that is what we all want.

Travel by American Citizens to Czechoslovakia Prohibited

[Released to the press June 2]

Because of conditions now existing in Czechoslovakia the Department of State has decided that, until further notice, American passports of private travelers are no longer valid to proceed to that country. Passports issued or renewed in the United States or in any United States Foreign Service office will be stamped "not valid for travel in Czechoslovakia". Those not so stamped should not, however, be considered as valid for Czechoslovakia unless they have been presented for approval of special travel.

Point 4 Technicians Complete Training

The Department of State announced on May 31 that 19 technicians soon to undertake Point 4 work in 11 Latin American countries, India, Iran, and Liberia are completing a 3-week course at the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State.

Five of them are experts in agriculture, the others, in such basic fields as: health and sanitation, medical research, insect control, child welfare, health and vital statistics, social work, budgets, highways, rubber, and mineral development.

There are three women: a public health nurse, a child-welfare consultant, and a social-work education specialist.

The experts and wives are receiving final orientation, devoted largely to the understanding of foreign peoples, their customs, religion, culture, and languages.

U. K., French, and Soviet Foreign Ministers Invited To Meet at Washington

U. S. NOTE OF MAY 31 TO U. S. S. R.

[Released to the press May 31]

The following text of U. S. note regarding a proposed meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., France, and the U.S.S.R. was communicated to the Soviet Government on May 31, 1951.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the current Four Power negotiations in Paris.

Since March 5 the representative of the United States together with the representatives of France and the United Kingdom, has been engaged in discussions with the representative of the Soviet Union in a preliminary conference in Paris. This preliminary conference was agreed upon as a result of an exchange of notes which ended with the note of the United States Government dated February 19, 1951,¹ and the reply of the Soviet Government dated March 1, 1951. As indicated in that exchange of notes, the purpose of the conference was to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable agenda for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Such an agreement has not yet been reached.

In the course of the discussions, the views of the four delegations were brought out and clarified. Considering that the discussions had provided all the elements necessary for agreement on an agenda, the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France presented to the Soviet representative on May 2 a new proposal containing three alternative agenda. The purpose of these three alternatives was to assure the possibility of the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. It has been, and remains, the view of the United States Government that such a meeting is desirable in the interest of strengthening peace, which is the constant objective of the foreign policy of the United States.

In the course of the examination of these three alternatives the representatives in Paris were un-

able to reach full agreement. As regards the first alternative, the only difficulty was that the wording proposed by the three delegations for the sub-item concerning armaments was not acceptable to the Soviet delegation. The third alternative was not accepted by the Soviet delegation as a basis for agreement. In the second alternative, however, modifications were made in Item 1 and there is now agreement among the four delegations on the presentation of this item as well as on the inclusion of four other items in the agenda and on their wording. Apart from the final order of these four items, which remains to be determined, but ought not to present major difficulties, agreement could have been reached on the second alternative if the Soviet delegation had not insisted on the acceptance of their proposal relating to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The United States Government for its part considers that the amount of agreement so far reached on the agenda makes possible a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers which would permit discussion among others of all topics proposed by the Soviet Government in the exchange of notes preceding the Paris conference and on the 5th and 7th of March at the outset of that conference. Accordingly, the United States Government is pleased to invite the four Foreign Ministers to meet in Washington and suggests that the meeting begin on July 23. The United States Government is prepared to participate in such a conference not only on the agenda (alternative B) described above, but also on either of the two other agenda (alternatives A and C). The texts of these three proposals are enclosed.

The United States Government hopes to receive an early reply from the Soviet Government indicating its readiness to accept this invitation and stating which of the three agenda it finds acceptable for the purpose of holding a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. Any further arrangements for the meeting could be worked out on receipt of a favorable reply from the Soviet Government.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1951, p. 366.

Alternative (a)

I. Examination of the causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe and of the means to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom, and France, including the following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany; the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the U.S.S.R., United States, United Kingdom, and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces; fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.

II. Completion of the treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

III. Problems relating to the re-establishment of German unity and the preparation of a treaty of peace.

IV. Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary: agreements of the Four Powers concerning Germany and Austria.

V. Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.

Alternative (b)

Examination of the causes and effects of the present international tensions in Europe and of the means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union, the U.S., U.K. and France, including the following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany;

U.S., U.K. and France

the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K. and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces;

U.S.S.R.

measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the U. K., the U.S. and France, the existing level of armaments and armed forces and the establishment of an appropriate international control;

the demilitarization of Germany;² fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.

Completion of the treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

Problems relating to the re-establishment of German unity and the preparation of a treaty of peace.

Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary: agreements of the Four Powers concerning Germany and Austria.

Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.

Alternative (c)

I. Examination of measures for the elimination of the present international tensions in Europe, of the threat of war, and of the fear of aggression.

II. Questions concerning armaments and armed forces.

III. Questions concerning Austria.

IV. Questions concerning Germany.

V. Fulfillment of treaties and agreements.

²There is agreement that "the demilitarization of Germany" should be included in the agenda under item I. There is disagreement whether it should be the first or second sub-item. The Representatives of France, the U.K., and the U.S. propose that it should be placed after the sub-item "the existing level of armament . . ."; the Representative of the Soviet Union proposes that it should be placed before the sub-item beginning "measures for the reduction of armaments . . .".

U.S. Tariff Rates Increased on Certain Products

[Released to the press May 31]

Increases in United States tariff rates on three products will become effective July 6. These changes are the results of United States negotiations at Torquay. The products involved are dyed stencil silk valued over \$5.50 per pound, dehydrated onion powder, and women's and children's leather gloves, not lined and not trimmed with fur, other than those entirely machine-seamed or entirely hand-seamed.

The rates of duty on these items which are now to be superseded result from tariff concessions granted by the United States in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade giving effect to the Geneva negotiations in 1947. These concessions are now to be withdrawn as a result of negotiations at Torquay, effective July 6, and the products become dutiable, in the case of gloves, at the rates applicable under a modified concession granted at Torquay and in the case of the other two items at statutory rates applicable in the absence of a concession.

The rate on dehydrated onion powder (tariff paragraph 781) becomes 25 percent ad valorem instead of 12½ percent; that on dyed stencil silk valued over \$5.50 per pound (tariff paragraph 1205) becomes 60 percent ad valorem if not exceeding 30 inches in width or 55 percent ad valorem if exceeding 30 inches in width instead of 25 percent ad valorem in both cases; that on the women's and children's gloves described above (tariff paragraph 1532 (a)) becomes 30 percent ad valorem for gloves over 12 inches long and 35 percent ad valorem for gloves not over 12 inches long instead of 25 percent ad valorem in both cases.

Ambassador Dulles To Visit England and France

The following announcement was made orally at the White House on May 28.

The President discussed today with Secretary Acheson and John Foster Dulles the trip to England and France to be made by Mr. Dulles next month.

The discussions covered matters likely to come up in the course of Mr. Dulles' contemplated talks with Foreign Secretary Morrison in London, and Foreign Minister Schuman in Paris concerning the Japanese peace treaty. Mr. Dulles is the President's personal representative in this matter.

The Challenge of Today

*by Ambassador John Foster Dulles
Consultant to the Secretary¹*

You are graduating into the life of the nation when there is greater division than ever before, save during the Civil War period. For many months there has been going on what is popularly called "The Great Debate." If the words have carried into your academic halls, they have perhaps given you an impression of leadership that is distraught and confused. You would not, however, be justified in condemning or belittling our public leaders because of their disagreements. They are not lacking in normal wisdom or patriotism. They are confronted by a new type of challenge, for which the past provides no ready-made formula of solution.

Heretofore, we have either had peace or we have had war. When we have had peace we have had a large degree of individual freedom and an absence of regimentation and militarism. When we have had war there has been an enemy to conquer, by all possible violence, and a considerable surrender of individual choice, in order better to marshal our strength for a victory which would restore peace and freedom. There was an end that was in sight and a sure knowledge of how to reach that end.

Now, we face a condition of "not war, not peace." Trotsky coined that phrase in 1917, but only during recent years have we felt the full impact of its malignancy and subtlety.

Strategy To Meet the Triple Threat

The "not war, not peace," strategy carries a triple threat. There is first of all the threat that "not war" could, over night, become "war." The Soviet bloc maintain vast land forces in constant readiness and equipped with ample supplies of modern tanks, artillery, and planes. That force is poised at the hub of the Eurasian land mass, whence it could strike anywhere, east, south, or

west, along a periphery of 25,000 miles. Its very presence is a terror and petrifies creative efforts.

In the second place, there is the actuality of satellite and civil wars, with a potential of more such wars. We met one guerrilla war in Greece. It ended partly as a result of our aid, added to heroic Greek efforts and partly as a result of Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet Communist camp. But now, we and other members of the free world face warfare in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, and, in a lesser way, in the Philippines. Yugoslavia and West Germany face this satellite threat in acute form.

In the third place, there is political warfare against every free government. That warfare is conducted, in its initial stage, largely through propaganda and penetration designed to gain control of so-called "mass organizations" by promising great benefits through class warfare and the eradication of so-called "imperialist" influences. Iran is a case in point.

It is not easy to meet this triple threat. In the hope of deterring general war, we are greatly enlarging our political commitments. Also, we are diverting much of our economic effort into the production of war goods. This involves a serious inflationary threat. As we pay out tens of billions of dollars to those who produce war goods, the power to purchase is steadily increasing; but consumers' goods are steadily shrinking. Also, plans for construction for better material well being have to be postponed.

To meet the second threat, satellite wars, we are incurring in Korea casualties at the rate of perhaps 100,000 a year plus expenditures of perhaps 20 billion dollars a year. The French have for some years been putting much of their military and financial strength into the Indochina war, and the British are carrying a somewhat similar burden in Malaya.

To meet the third threat, political warfare, we try to match irresponsible promises with deeds, such as economic aid and Point 4 Programs which

¹Address made at the University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz., on May 30 and released to the press on the same date.

will invigorate the free world. We do so when meeting the other two threats requires us and others to prepare for war, to dislocate our economies, to risk inflation, and to retard social welfare advances. Thus, the measures being taken to meet threats one and two expose the free world to threat three.

Soviet Tactics To Defeat Peace Aims

The Soviet Union is dedicating about one-third of its economic productivity to implement the "not war, not peace" strategy of its rulers. That is a cruel cost. But the Russian people have become calloused by centuries of cruel masters; they have never had more than bare subsistence, and the present generation knows only complete regimentation. Therefore, the Russian leaders can exploit their people in ways which, happily, are not available to our leaders.

It seems that the Soviet Union, while posturing as a lover of peace, can go on indefinitely maintaining a formidable capacity for sudden armed aggression. It seems that the Soviet Union can go on indefinitely putting satellites into undeclared wars, first here, then there. It seems that the Soviet Communist Party, through its foreign affiliates can continue indefinitely to impair internal unity and security within the free nations and, wherever convenient, use strikes, sabotage, and terrorism to break down orderly government.

To sum it up, we are engaged in a gigantic sacrificial effort, of a kind which, in the past, we have made only in the face of obvious and dire peril and only to force an early decision which would end the necessity for such sacrifices. Today, the peril to our homeland seems to many to be somewhat speculative, while continuance of our present measures could impair the very foundations of our American way of life without forcing an abandonment of Soviet strategy.

These are some of the hard facets of the problem which provokes the great debate. There are other aspects of the situation which are encouraging from our standpoint and discouraging from the standpoint of the Soviet Union. But, I have deliberately chosen to present the problem in terms of what, to the American temperament, is its most baffling aspect, namely, indecisiveness.

Solution Requires Resourcefulness

You will, I think, admit that the problem is a difficult one, the solution of which calls for the greatest resourcefulness of which we are capable.

I am confident that we shall find the ways to paralyze the slimy, octopus-like tentacles that reach out from Moscow to suck our life blood. I shall not now attempt to forecast what those ways will be. To clarify the issues, as the present debate is doing, is already a large step toward solution. I will, however, go further and suggest to you

what, it seems to me, must be the principles of solution.

1. There are never quick or easy answers to the challenges which primitive forms of society recurrently hurl at the more highly developed societies. We must have patience and steadiness of will, even when no sure solution has yet emerged. Most defeats are inflicted upon those who have first suffered the self-defeat of discouragement. It is hard to go on walking, with poise and self-control, a narrow path, with precipices on both sides and no safe end in sight. But to plunge, merely to find an end, is no acceptable solution. Therefore let us be steady.

2. When an opponent is mounting a grandiose offensive, success is seldom won by accepting a purely defensive role. As between opponents that are even approximately matched, the one who can consistently choose his weapons and the time and place for using them, will win. It is necessary to throw the aggressor off balance, to create doubts and uncertainties in his mind, and to deny him untroubled leisure to consolidate his gains. We must not and will not take the military offensive of general war in which there could be no victory for anyone. But there are many other types of offensive. Atom bombs have, no doubt, a deterrent power. But the cause of human liberty can find positive expression without their use. Our dynamic faith in freedom has always been the nemesis of despots. Therefore, let us not be satisfied with plans which reflect merely a defensive mood.

3. We should plan in terms of our strength and our opponent's weakness, rather than in terms of our opponent's strength. A man does not defeat a gorilla by going to a gymnasium to develop his biceps. If the Russian type of society can conveniently produce 100,000 tanks a year that does not mean that we, automatically, must produce 100,000 tanks a year. Let us use the qualities we have and they have not, rather than feel bound to try to match their precise forms of strength. Despotic societies always look much more formidable than they are. From without they seem hard and invulnerable; in reality, their inner life is corrupted by the excessive power of a few, by fear and jealousy, and by the stifling of individual initiative and responsibility. I have spoken of what, it seems, is the capacity of the Soviet leaders indefinitely to wage "not war, not peace." I am confident that the apparent capacity could, in fact, quickly be disintegrated by skillfully applied pressures.

We need not dance to the tune of Russian strength. We are sufficiently versatile to invent some tunes of our own.

Freedom Can Prevail

As our Nation applies these tested principles, we shall gradually develop the ways whereby we

can peacefully bring an end to the present nightmare. I am absolutely confident of this. The resourcefulness of freedom can always prevail over the plottings of despotism. That is one thing that our free world has proved.

I appeal to you to help to prove it again. You have great advantages in the way of education and training. These came to you primarily as a legacy from your forebears, who not only found a path through the many perils and vicissitudes

which faced them, but who also provided insurance for the future by giving their youth such training as would enable them, in turn, to carry on.

Today, it is your turn. You, and others of your generation, will probably bear the heaviest burden of seeing our nation through its greatest peril. Tomorrow, the opportunity is yours, may you seize it; the responsibility is yours, may you discharge it.

German Federal Republic's Monthly Economic Review ¹

Latest reports of Western Germany's economic efforts indicate considerable industrial expansion despite continuing shortages. Industrial output figures for April recorded sizable gains in production with the index (excluding building, stimulants, and food processing) climbing four points to 139 percent of 1936, a new postwar record.

Total exports in April reached a postwar peak of \$275,000,000,* surpassing imports (by \$15,000,000) for the first time since the war. Basic materials prices dropped 0.4 percent in April while industrial producer prices and consumer prices rose 1.8 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. Unemployment, well below last year's level, continued to decline, but at a slower rate than March's drop.

In March and April, the Western German economy continued the spring upward trend, but at a pace somewhat slower than the earlier pronounced rises recorded in March. The March industrial production index rose three points, April labor market developments already compared with June 1950, and the April increase in exports and decrease in imports brought the first positive balance of trade (\$19,000,000) of the postwar era. The consumer price index, however, rose by three percent in March and another 1.5 percent in April, and raw material shortages were frequently reported in many industries. EPU trade again showed a surplus, but future policy to be adopted by the OEEC in regard to the German balance of payments has not as yet been determined.

Although the revision of the Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement (PLI) was anticipated and was well received by industry, present and potential raw material shortages loomed to offset immediate industrial expansion and resumption of hitherto restricted production. Coal, steel

sheets, metal scrap, non-ferrous metals and sulphur head the list of materials reported in short supply and affecting many industries, including iron and steel, electrical appliance, mechanical engineering, vehicle production, fine mechanics and optics.

The Schuman Plan was formally signed in April, but must be ratified within six months by the national parliaments of each participating country before becoming effective. The Allied High Commission gave official non-disapproval of the Schuman Plan later in the month. The Torquay trade and tariff negotiations have been completed, and announcement of concluded agreements will be made in May. Germany's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) might be considered the most important achievement of the Torquay conference. Most of the original GATT members had been unwilling to negotiate tariff concessions on products of which Germany was the main supplier, principally in the chemical field, until Germany herself could participate in the negotiations.

Of the many programs which have been forwarded to meet the problems of Western Germany's economy, all are in unanimous agreement on the necessity for finding immediate and adequate investment funds for the German basic material industries; on the necessity of export promotion, and on the urgency for stabilization of prices and wages. By the end of April, however, the exact methods to achieve these aims had not been defined clearly enough to consider drafting of a final program by the government.

Foreign Trade

The major trade developments in the first quarter of 1951 were: the maintenance of total exports at a high level, the sharp decline from the previous quarter in the trade deficit with the EPU countries, and the drastic curtailment of trade with the Soviet bloc.

Western Germany's exports during the first

¹ Reprinted from the June 1951 issue of the *Information Bulletin*; prepared by the Analytical Reports Branch of the Program Review Division of the Office of Economic Affairs, HICOO.

*At official rate of 23.8 cents to the Deutschemark, DM 1,113,445,000.

quarter of 1951, including the Soviet Zone, reached \$714,600,000, thus only slightly exceeding the preceding quarter and doubling the first quarter of 1950. Imports, however, decreased by 5.2 percent from \$941,300,000 in the fourth quarter of 1950 to \$892,800,000 in the first quarter of 1951 (\$616,300,000 first quarter of 1950). Apparently Western Germany's restrictions on imports from the EPU area have not yet affected the import total. There were sufficient import licenses issued prior to the imposition of restrictions in February which remained available for use through March.

On a country of payments basis, the trade deficit with the EPU area in January-March 1951 was \$113,200,000, compared with \$170,300,000 in the previous quarter. This substantial amelioration was mostly produced by the rise in exports to the OEEC participating countries both sterling and non-sterling, and a decline of imports from the non-sterling OEEC countries from \$489,200,000 in the fourth quarter of 1950 to \$448,300,000 in January-March 1951.

Trade with the Soviet bloc was characterized by decreasing exports (\$27,400,000 fourth quarter of 1950 to \$20,100,000 first quarter of 1951) and sharply reduced imports (\$32,500,000 fourth quarter of 1950 to \$22,600,000 first quarter of 1951). The same trend in an even more drastic fashion was noted in trade with the Soviet zone. Major reasons for the sharp cut interzonal trade in recent months have been the termination of the Frankfurt Agreement, the increasing efforts of the Federal Republic and East zone officials to scrutinize shipments to the other area, and retaliatory measures taken by the two trading partners.

Industry

The index of industrial production during March (excluding building, stimulants, and food processing) rose by three points (up 1.7 percent) to 135 of the 1936 level, thus equaling the postwar high reached in November 1950. The per capita rate of production rose to approximately 108 percent of 1936 (about 91 percent of 1938). Industrial demand continued on the upgrade as the value of orders received by manufacturers rose 7 percent in February, and sales increased nine percent. Total orders received in February averaged 22 percent higher than current sales, with investment goods orders averaging 135 percent of sales, production goods 121 percent, and consumer goods 109 percent. Orders booked for investment goods reached a new postwar high in February of 237 percent of the 1949 monthly average.

Monthly coal production for April continued at a high level—with daily average output at 394,481 metric tons and total production at 10,019,861 tons, including 157,845 tons produced in five Sunday shifts. Factors believed largely responsible for this sustained rate of production are interim agreements for extra shift pay and in-

creased employment since Jan. 1 by 5,500 underground workers (1,700 face workers) and 4,000 surface workers. During the first half of April, 1,231 underground and 4,268 surface workers were added to the mine books. There has been only little improvement in output per manshift during the last year, as it stood at 1.40 metric tons in March 1950; 1.46 MT in February 1951; 1.45 MT in March 1951, and remained approximately the same in April.

Second quarter of 1951 consumption and deliveries of coal should about balance (estimated by U.S. Element of Combined Coal Control Group—Federal Government's original allocations program estimated at 2,000,000 tons less), assuming that 22,000,000 tons are available and that industrial production will continue at its present rate. The danger lies in the low stockpile position of the economy and there is little hope of improving this position substantially in the second quarter. During the winter months (October 1950 to April 1951) industrial and public utility coal stocks decreased by some 2,000,000 tons. The present stock positions are better than anticipated last month, but are, nevertheless, at very low levels. On April 1, the railways had a seven days surplus on hand, power plants 12 days, gas plants 7 days, iron and steel 7 days, and other industry 11 days.

On April 3, 1951, the Allied High Commissioners signed the Agreement on Industrial Controls to replace the Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement (PLI) of April 1949, and thereby facilitated the production in Germany of items and materials for the common defense of the West. By terms of the new agreement, the limitations and restrictions hitherto in force concerning the size and speed or tonnage of merchant ships built or otherwise acquired by Germany, primary aluminum, synthetic ammonia, chlorine, styrene and certain types of machine tools are removed. In addition, the High Commission will authorize production of crude steel outside the limit of 11,100,000 tons per annum where such production will help provide steel for the common defense effort. The prohibition on the production of synthetic oil and rubber is removed and the restrictions upon the capacity of these and of the ball and roller bearing industries are now modified. Control is retained, but in a modified form, over the production of electronic valves.

It is the desire of the Allied High Commission to promote technological progress and modernization of production which will tend to reduce costs and promote economies in raw materials, power and fuel. Consequently, in those few industries where a limitation of capacity is maintained, the High Commission will authorize the substitution of more efficient equipment, the rearrangement of machinery and the introduction of new processes or other technical changes which

may involve a minor increase in the capacity of factory or equipment.

In authorizing the rehabilitation of plants (including the installation of new equipment) and the utilization of new processes for the production of synthetic rubber and synthetic oil from coal and coke, the High Commission will grant licenses only to the extent that solid fuel exports are not affected. Nevertheless, the application outstanding for the use of the Ruhr area plants at Bergkamen, Kiktor, Scholven, and Ruhroel will be granted promptly.

While a license is no longer required to manufacture certain machine tools listed under the PLI agreement, the High Commission does require that a system of declaration of manufacture by the producer (indicating the intended destination of each machine) and of reporting quantities of such machines in Germany shall be effected.

It is much too early to report on the effects of the new agreement even though the affected industries had anticipated certain revisions.

The ECA guaranty program to cover losses on American investment in Marshall Plan countries, which are incurred as a result of confiscation or expropriation by a totalitarian government, does not cover war damage or business risks. Germany is the first Marshall Plan country to give assurance that such claims filed with the U.S. Government by American business men will be settled by negotiations between the German and American Governments.

In April, the first industrial guaranty granted for investment in Western Germany was contracted by the Gardner-Denver Co. of Quincy, Ill., manufacturers of oil field and mining equipment, and the Maschinenfabrik A. Beien, a coal mining equipment manufacturer in Herne, Germany. This was also the first guaranty contract providing for royalty payments by a European firm for an American company's manufacturing processes and other technical know-how.

In Bavaria and in the upper Rhine district, melting snow in the Alps and heavy rains provided water for an all-time record hydroelectric power production. This increased hydro production has enabled the chemical industry in Bavaria, to continue to operate without restriction, and has provided power for present requirements of the aluminum industry. Also in Bavaria, the first unit in the lowest step of the Schluchsee project of Waldshut, which was completed recently with counterpart funds, will add 35,000,000 kw.-hr. yearly to the available storage capacity in Western Germany.

An estimated 2,750,000 kw.-hr. of electricity were used during the month, or 31 percent more than in April 1950—a record increase in consumption. Gas consumption also increased.

Low stocks and short falls in coal deliveries are still a matter of considerable concern to the power companies. Since consumption of both electricity

and gas is well above expectations, there is an immediate need for additional facilities and stocking of coal to meet next winter's demand.

Labor

The estimated number of employed wage and salary earners in the Federal Republic increased by 150,000 to about 14,400,000 at the end of April 1951, thus equaling the October 1950 postwar peak. Employment in non-manufacturing service establishments, in manufacturing, and in mining achieved a new peacetime high sparked primarily by the producer goods industries. Building activity, the principal factor in the April employment increase, was accelerated particularly in the three major agricultural-refugee states. By the end of March, these states had still not recovered much of their loss in building employment. Already in April estimated employment in building and construction had almost reached the June 1950 level. Employment also rose in trade and commerce and in agriculture.

Registered unemployment in the Federal Republic has shown a steady downward movement since mid-January, with a sharp drop of 120,000 during April reducing the total to 1,446,000. In terms of the wage and salary earning labor force, unemployment dropped to 9.1 percent from 9.9 percent in March 1951.

An amendment version of the Federal Government bill concerning labor participation (co-determination) in the management of the mining industry and the severed iron and steel-producing companies was enacted in April by the Federal Parliament. Passage of the measure was hailed "as a great success on the road toward social harmony" by the executive council of the Western German Trade Union Federation (DGB).

Organized labor continued the general wage drive as new collective agreements were negotiated without any major work stoppages. Approximately 1,000,000 building trades workers in the Federal Republic (excluding Bavaria which is subject to a special agreement) were granted a pay increase of 9.5 percent effective April 25 with another boost of 3.5 percent due on July 15. The wage dispute was settled by arbitration, as has been customary in this industry since 1949.

Wage increases were also obtained in the Wuerttemberg-Baden metal industry, for Bremen shipyard workers, in the entire clothing industry, for farm labor in several states and in the Bavarian woodworking and the Hesse chemicals industries. The Mining Union announced that it will seek a 14 percent pay raise for wage earners and salaried employes in the hard coal mining industry. Current pay agreements expired on April 30.

Prices

During March the three major price indexes continued to rise, and at a more accelerated rate than

in February. Even more spectacular was the increase of the three indexes during the first quarter of 1951, an increase which was greater for each index than during the last quarter of 1950, and, except for the basic materials price index, greater also than during the third quarter of 1950.

In March the index of industrial producer prices rose by 2.8 percent to 218 percent of 1938. The index of basic materials prices increased by 2.4 percent to 251 percent of 1938; the agricultural component rose by 1.6 percent and the industrial component by 6.3 percent. The index of consumer prices, which climbed by 3 percent to reach 161 percent of 1938—the largest month-to-month gain since October 1948, showed the highest jumps in food (up 5.1 percent); household goods (up 3.1 percent) and clothing (up 2.7 percent). Consumer prices are still rising although at a slower pace, and a 1 percent rise was expected in the April index.

Food and Agriculture

Since the new Federal measures to increase the breadgrain supply have been in effect only a few weeks, it is difficult to estimate any immediate results. Preliminary information indicates, however, that measures taken to encourage domestic deliveries and continue U.S. shipments will achieve favorable results. Although bread rationing will not be necessary, the year end (June 30, 1951) stocks of breadgrains will be substantially below last year's stock level. During April, the Federal Government took additional steps to conserve grain supplies, and is also considering new legislation to force increased farm deliveries which would prevent the use of breadgrains as fodder and prohibit the creation of large farm stocks for speculation.

During April, the edible fats and oils supply position continued to deteriorate. Stocks had fallen, and largely as a result of the EPU payment crisis, trade-agreement imports in March declined from the monthly average of approximately 50,000 tons to 29,000 tons. To stretch available stocks, the oil and margarine industries have agreed to make a substantial cut in production in April by 19,000 metric tons, and a reduction in May of 10,000 metric tons was planned. The Bank Deutscher Laender agreed to release by the end of April \$25,000,000 for food purchases, \$12,000,000 of which will be used in an "emergency program" for purchasing edible oils, mainly low-priced whale and fish oil from Norway.

Despite these measures, however, by June 30, 1951, stocks may be dangerously low—probably no higher than 40,000 tons. To reduce consumption somewhat and to enable importers to purchase higher-priced fats and oils from various trade agreement sources, the Federal Government is considering an immediate increase in the price of margarine.

Berlin

The value of deliveries of West Berlin industry (excluding construction and energy production) reached DM 208,500,000 (\$49,623,000) in March, a post-blockade record. February total delivery value amounted to DM 186,000,000 (\$44,268,000). The electrical, machinery, and clothing industry branches registered the largest gains. A part of the increase was probably due to price rises. No reliable general price index exists for the city, but a new cost of living index (1938=100) increased from 154.1 in February to 158.1 in March. This may give some indication of general price trends.

The index of industrial production (1936=100; excludes construction, energy production, and food and stimulants) reached a new postwar record level as it rose from 46 to 50, the producers goods section from 45 to 49, and the consumer goods section from 50 to 56. These averages, based on deliveries, rather than physical output, have not been corrected for recent price increases.

Receipts of iron, steel, and non-ferrous metal products, timber, paper and cardboard, and certain other categories of industrial raw materials continue to lag behind requirements. Although specific instances of shortages affecting plant output have been reported, the general situation appears to be no worse than in Western Germany.

Employment showed little net change during the first half of April. Unsubsidized employment increased by approximately 2,000 from March 31 to April 15. However, 5,000 fewer persons were given work under the GARIOA work relief program. As a result, total reported employment stood at 882,000, a decrease of just under 3,000 as compared with the end of March. The registered labor force also increased somewhat, so that total unemployment rose by approximately 6,500 during the first half of the month. Data on industrial employment are not yet available for April, but a slight increase was reported during March.

The Present Order of German Government

Letter From High Commissioner McCloy to Representative J. K. Javits¹

DEAR JAVITS: Thank you for your letter of February 8, 1951. Although I have replied to a later letter from you, which reply in part covers some of the material in this letter, I have thought it wise to go over the field covered in your earlier

¹ *Cong. Rec.* of May 10, 1951, p. A2812.

letter in some detail. I am sorry of the delay in answering, but these letters take time to prepare and the pressures have been particularly heavy in the past few months.

On the matter of a congressional investigation, I have already given my views. I still believe that such an investigation would not be in the American interest in the present situation.

Most of the specific points raised in your resolution will be fully reported on at the appropriation hearings in Congress in the next few weeks. They are all fair and important questions, but I think they can be satisfactorily answered either at that time or found in the carefully prepared reports which this office makes quarterly in Germany. As I have said before, it is of the greatest importance in Germany and Europe today that the United States avoid giving the impression of disagreement and lack of clarity about its foreign policy—and this I believe would be the inevitable effect of the investigation you propose. However, should it be decided to hold such an investigation, this office will naturally do everything to cooperate with you.

Before I go into details of your letter and the speech which you enclose, I should like to make a few general observations regarding the problem of Germany. I have now been fairly directly concerned with United States policy in this country since 1941 when I became Assistant Secretary of War. I think I have gained some understanding of the problems we have to contend with, and I have had some share in the development of the policy to meet those problems. Though in one or another respect there have been changes in policy, there has been no change regarding our over-all objective regarding the extirpation of nazism and the fostering of democracy in Germany. It has been very clearly realized that stamping out nazism is not only a matter of defeating it in a war—it means changing the social and cultural conditions out of which it developed, and creating conditions which will lead to democratic developments.

This I take to be our major objective still. Any policy which forgot what our stake in a democratic Germany is, or which assumed that our democratic objective could be sacrificed to other more expedient aims, would be criminally negligent and dangerous.

This brings me to your letter, in which you place great emphasis on General Eisenhower's report on Germany. You apparently believe that the policy as stated by General Eisenhower is different from the policy of HICOG in Germany. On this, as I indicated in my earlier letter, I am unable to agree with you. The policy of the United States in Germany, as I have understood and carried it out, has from the days of General Clay had as one of its aims what General Eisenhower admirably summed up in the words "eventual and

earned equality." The London Conference of 1948, that at New York, and then at Brussels, have all dealt with a Germany progressively regaining her place in the family of nations. The policy expressed by the Foreign Ministers at all these meetings has each time made clear that the progress which Germany makes toward equality depends upon the German people themselves.

The present discussions concerning German participation in western defense are wholly consistent with this policy. It is still our objective to prevent a militaristic Germany from coming into being. It is still a matter of grave concern to us that Germany be a peaceful and democratic nation. We have no need to sacrifice these objectives by proposing that Germany contribute to the defense of the west.

It is true that in some quarters, both American and German, there has arisen a feeling that the present situation is such that the United States is now inclined to "buy" or bid for German participation in European defense at the cost of our democratic objectives. I have taken every occasion to combat this notion in public statements and in practice. By this time, it is not a widespread notion any longer in Germany, though it still seems to be held in the United States, since even the Landsberg decisions were treated in this light by a section of the American press.

I should like to say a few words on this subject too, because in your press release of February 2 you refer to the decisions as though they were related to the political situation in Germany, and the issue of German participation in particular.

The fact is that I appointed the Clemency Board in March 1950, long before there was any thought of German participation. I appointed the Board because I considered it a fundamental principle of American justice that persons accused shall have a right of appeal. I call your attention to the fact that unlike criminal cases in the United States or England, there was no provision for these cases to have further court review for possible errors of law or fact after they had been passed on by the court of first instance.

The Board's report and my own examination of the cases were made entirely in the context of "justice American style," as you put it, and without regard to political pressures of any kind. I am sending you a copy of a pamphlet which we have prepared on the Landsberg decisions. I hope you will look through it. I recommend especially to your attention the introduction to the Clemency Board's report which begins on page 13. I also call your attention to the fact that the Board submitted its report in August 1950, a month before the matter of German participation was first raised at the New York Conference of Foreign Ministers.

As for the particular case of Alfried Krupp, I find it difficult to understand the reaction on any other basis than the effect of a notorious name. After a detailed study of this case, I was con-

vinced that Alfried Krupp deserved clemency. Certainly there was reasonable doubt that he was responsible for the policies of the Krupp Co., in which he occupied a rather junior position. I also found it very doubtful that he had any responsibility for the use of slave labor in the Krupp plant. It is true that the name of Krupp stands as a symbol of evil, of the German armaments industry. I was not concerned with a symbol. Instead, I had to decide on the extent of the guilt of a specific individual, Alfried Krupp. Others whose responsibility was greater than his had been given lighter sentences (and had been released) for the same crimes for which he was convicted. Moreover, it was this man's father, not the defendant, who helped finance Hitler and who was the directing force of the Krupp works. I am inclined to think that the son took his place in the dock largely because his father was on his death bed at the time. Certainly he would not have occupied as prominent a place if his father had likewise been tried.

Finally, I should like to say that by reason of the Landsberg decisions, I believe that the true nature of the Nazi crimes, their depth and extent and their motivation, are better known and understood today in Germany than they have ever been. We have sent out 780,000 copies of this pamphlet in Germany. More people have read and thought about the Nazi crimes than ever was the case during the trials, and the latter can no longer be dismissed as merely the law of the victor over the vanquished.

Germany is progressing. It has yet to meet the great tests of its final status. They may not come for 10 or 15 years. The new Government has been in existence for little more than 1 year. Nazis do not control the Government. It is controlled by resistance people, former Weimar people, large representations of labor, Socialists, and Conservatives, but they are far from Nazis and just as fine people as the Liberals. There are on the outer fringes some Communists and some old Nazis. That is the present order of the German Government.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. McCLOY.

Point 4 Agreement Signed With American Farm School in Greece

[Released to the press May 15]

An agreement providing a Point 4 grant of \$181,400 to the Thessalonica Agricultural and Industrial Institute, (American Farm School), of Greece, was announced today by Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett.

The agreement was signed by Dr. Bennett and President Craig R. Smith of the Board of Trustees

of the Institute. It provides scholarships for farm youths, specialized training courses for farmers, and an addition of two members to the school's teaching staff. The Point 4 grant also will enable the school to get badly needed vocational training equipment and provide additional scholarships for students.

Under today's agreement, covering a 2-year program, 100 farm youths will receive scholarships each year. A series of six 7-week courses will be offered to train an additional 300 students yearly in the use of farm equipment. Two technicians will be added to the school's staff, one an American and one a Greek, trained in American methods. They will outline the courses and will help the school to become a pilot plant for rural improvement throughout Greece.

Dr. Bennett expects the new program to become a factor in providing technical training in modern agricultural methods and skills required for handling farm machinery and operating canning and pasteurizing plants. Dr. Bennett stated:

Such skills will be spread among all the Greek villages, through demonstrations on the farms by students trained at the school. The short courses will teach the fundamentals of agricultural and industrial practices to a large number of people. Greece's immediate problem is to grow more food for its people. They have been living in hardship since before World War II. One of the most effective ways to help them raise their standard of living is to train agricultural leaders and teachers.

We hope and believe that the young men trained in the American Farm School will form a nucleus for a nation-wide farm extension service. Economic progress begins on the farm. Increased production can come only from spreading modern farm practices.

Today's agreement with the American Farm School marks the seventh Point 4 grant to private organizations with established reputations in technical and educational work. Three agreements have been made with the Near East Foundation for work in Iran and Syria, one with the Booker T. Washington Institute in Liberia, one with the American University of Beirut, and one with Athens College, in Greece.

The Institute was incorporated in the State of New York in 1904. Completely supported by voluntary contributions, it is a nonsectarian, nonpolitical, and nongovernmental agency for practical training. It provides a practical program to improve rural economy by training Greeks in agricultural sciences and vocational and technical skills.

The teacher and the student till the fields, select the seed, do the harvesting and marketing. The results have been outstanding. The graduates have settled in 193 communities where their skill is helping others. More than 80 percent are on farms, in Government agricultural work, or with private agricultural agencies. The Greek Government, in recognition of the services rendered, has exempted the school from all taxes and import duties. American specialists in economic reconstruction have praised its work and usefulness.

U.S.-Denmark Sign Defense Agreement for Greenland

[Released to the press May 18]

The following is the text of the United States-Danish agreement concerning the defense of Greenland which was signed on April 27, 1951, at Copenhagen. The agreement was today submitted to the Danish Parliament for approval. The agreement will come into effect upon notification by the Danish Government to the United States that parliamentary approval has been given.

Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Concerning the Defense of Greenland

Preamble

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, being parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

having regard to their responsibilities thereunder for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, desiring to contribute to such defense and thereby to their own defense in accordance with the principles of self-help and mutual aid, and

having been requested by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) to negotiate arrangements under which armed forces of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may make use of facilities in Greenland in defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area,

have entered into an Agreement for the benefit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in terms as set forth below:

Article I

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, in order to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Treaty area by uniting their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security and for the development of their collective capacity to resist armed attack, will each take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with Nato plans.

Article II

In order that the Government of the United States of America as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty may assist the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark by establishing and/or operating such defense areas as the two Governments, on the basis of Nato defense plans, may from time to time agree to be necessary for the development of the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and which the Government

of the Kingdom of Denmark is unable to establish and operate singlehanded, the two Governments in respect of the defense areas thus selected, agree to the following:

1. The national flags of both countries shall fly over the defense areas.

2. Division of responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the defense areas shall be determined from time to time by agreement between the two Governments in each case.

3. In cases where it is agreed that responsibility for the operation and maintenance of any defense area shall fall to the Government of the United States of America, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Danish Commander-in-Chief of Greenland may attach Danish military personnel to the staff of the commanding officer of such defense area, under the command of an officer with whom the United States commanding officer shall consult on all important local matters affecting Danish interests.

(b) Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark over such defense area and the natural right of the competent Danish authorities to free movement everywhere in Greenland, the Government of the United States of America, without compensation to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, shall be entitled within such defense area and the air spaces and waters adjacent thereto:

(i) to improve and generally to fit the area for military use;

(ii) to construct, install, maintain, and operate facilities and equipment, including meteorological and communications facilities and equipment, and to store supplies;

(iii) to station and house personnel and to provide for their health, recreation and welfare;

(iv) to provide for the protection and internal security of the area;

(v) to establish and maintain postal facilities and commissary stores;

(vi) to control landings, take-offs, anchorages, moorings, movements, and operation of ships, aircraft, and waterborne craft and vehicles, with due respect for the responsibilities of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark in regard to shipping and aviation;

(vii) to improve and deepen harbors, channels, entrances, and anchorages.

(c) The Government of the Kingdom of Denmark reserves the right to use such defense area in cooperation with the Government of the United States of America for the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and to construct such facilities and undertake such activities therein as will not impede the activities of the Government of the United States of America in such area.

4. In cases where it is agreed that responsibility for the operation and maintenance of any defense area

shall fall to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Government of the United States of America may attach United States military personnel to the staff of the commanding officer of such defense area, under the command of an officer with whom the Danish commanding officer shall consult on all important local matters affecting United States interests pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(b) The Government of the United States of America, without compensation to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, may use such defense area in cooperation with the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark for the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and may construct such facilities and undertake such activities therein as will not impede the activities of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark in such area.

Article III

1. The operation of the United States naval station at Grønneal will be transferred to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark as soon as practicable and thereupon the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark will take over the utilization of the United States installations at Grønneal on the following terms:

(a) United States ships, aircraft and armed forces shall have free access to Grønneal with a view to the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The same right of access shall be accorded to the ships, aircraft and armed forces of other Governments parties to the North Atlantic Treaty as may be required in fulfillment of NATO plans.

(b) The Government of the Kingdom of Denmark will assume responsibility for the operation, to the same extent as hitherto, of the meteorological reporting service at Grønneal, except for such future changes as might be mutually agreed upon. The Government of the Kingdom of Denmark likewise will assume responsibility for the maintenance of all United States buildings and equipment at Grønneal.

(c) Details regarding the use by the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark of United States property remaining at Grønneal, including provisions for reasonable protection, thereof, the servicing of United States ships and aircraft, and the disposition of fuels and other stores, will be the subject of separate negotiations between representatives of the two Governments. It is agreed in this connection that, provided notification is given in each case to the Danish Commander-in-Chief of Greenland, the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark will have no objection to inspections of United States property remaining at Grønneal, so long as that station is used by the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark.

2. If the obligations of either party under the North Atlantic Treaty should necessitate activities at Grønneal in excess of what the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark is able to accomplish alone it is agreed that the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark will request that this station shall become a defense area according to the provisions of Article II of this Agreement.

Article IV

In connection with activities for the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the defense areas will, so far as practicable, be made available to vessels and aircraft belonging to other Governments parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and to the armed forces of such Governments.

Article V

1. Under such conditions as may be agreed upon, the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark will, so far as practicable, provide such meteorological and communica-

tions services in Greenland as may be required to facilitate operations under this Agreement.

2. The Government of the Kingdom of Denmark agrees, so far as practicable, to make and furnish to the Government of the United States of America topographic, hydrographic, coast and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs, etc., of Greenland as may be desirable to facilitate operations under this Agreement. If the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark should be unable to furnish the required data, the Government of the United States of America, upon agreement with the appropriate Danish authorities, may make such surveys or photographs. Copies of any such surveys or photographs made by the Government of the United States of America shall be furnished to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark. The Government of the United States of America may also, upon similar agreement, make such technical and engineering surveys as may be necessary in the selection of defense areas.

3. In keeping with the provisions of Article VI of this Agreement, and in accordance with general rules mutually agreed upon and issued by the appropriate Danish authorities in Greenland, the Government of the United States of America may enjoy, for its public vessels and aircraft and its armed forces and vehicles, the right of free access to and movement between the defense areas through Greenland, including territorial waters, by land, air and sea. This right shall include freedom from compulsory pilotage and from light or harbor dues. United States aircraft may fly over and land in any territory in Greenland, including the territorial waters thereof, without restriction except as mutually agreed upon.

Article VI

The Government of the United States of America agrees to cooperate to the fullest degree with the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and its authorities in Greenland in carrying out operations under this Agreement. Due respect will be given by the Government of the United States of America and by United States nationals in Greenland to all the laws, regulations and customs pertaining to the local population and the internal administration of Greenland, and every effort will be made to avoid any contact between United States personnel and the local population which the Danish authorities do not consider desirable for the conduct of operations under this Agreement.

Article VII

1. All materials, equipment, and supplies required in connection with operations under this Agreement, including food, stores, clothing, and other goods intended for use or consumption by members of United States armed forces and civilians employed by or under a contract with the Government of the United States of America for the performance of work in Greenland in connection with operations under this Agreement, and members of their families, and the personal and household effects of such military and civilian personnel, shall be permitted entry into Greenland free of inspection, customs duties, excise taxes or other charges; and no export tax shall be charged on such materials, equipment, supplies or effects in the event of shipment from Greenland.

2. The aforesaid military and civilian personnel, and members of their families, shall be exempt from all forms of taxation, assessments or other levies by the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark or by the Danish authorities in Greenland. No national of the United States of America or corporation organized under the laws of the United States of America shall be liable to pay income tax to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark or to the Danish authorities in Greenland in respect of any profits derived under a contract made with the Government of the United States of America in connection with operations under this Agreement or any tax in respect of any service or work for the Government of the United States of America in connection with operations under this Agreement.

Article VIII

The Government of the United States of America shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over those defense areas in Greenland for which it is responsible under Article II (3.) and over any offenses which may be committed in Greenland by the aforesaid military or civilian personnel or by members of their families, as well as over other persons within such defense areas except Danish nationals, it being understood, however, that the Government of the United States of America may turn over to the Danish authorities in Greenland for trial any person committing an offense within such defense areas.

Article IX

The laws of the Kingdom of Denmark shall not operate to prevent the admission to or departure from the defense areas or other localities in Greenland of any military or civilian personnel whose presence in such defense areas or other localities in Greenland is required in connection with operations under this Agreement, or of members of their families.

Article X

Upon the coming into force of a NATO agreement to which the two Governments are parties pertaining to the subjects involved in Articles VII, VIII, and IX of this Agreement, the provisions of the said articles will be superseded by the terms of such agreement to the extent that they are incompatible therewith. If it should appear that any of the provisions of such NATO agreement may be inappropriate to the conditions in Greenland, the two Governments will consult with a view to making mutually acceptable adjustments.

Article XI

All property provided by the Government of the United States of America and located in Greenland shall remain the property of the Government of the United States of America. All removable improvements and facilities erected or constructed by the Government of the United States of America in Greenland and all equipment, material, supplies and goods brought into Greenland by the Government of the United States of America may be removed from Greenland free of any restriction, or disposed of in Greenland by the Government of the United States of America after consultation with the Danish authorities, at any time before the termination of this Agreement or within a reasonable time thereafter. It is understood that any areas or facilities made available to the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement need not be left in the condition in which they were at the time they were thus made available.

Article XII

Upon the coming into force of this Agreement, the Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland between the two Governments signed in Washington on April 9, 1941, shall cease to be in force.

Article XIII

1. Nothing in this Agreement is to be interpreted as affecting command relationships.

2. Questions of interpretation which may arise in the application of this Agreement shall be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Denmark and to the United States Ambassador to Denmark.

3. The two Governments agree to give sympathetic consideration to any representations which either may make after this Agreement has been in force a reasonable time, proposing a review of this Agreement to determine whether modifications in the light of experience or amended NATO plans are necessary or desirable. Any such modifications shall be by mutual consent.

Article XIV

1. This Agreement shall be subject to parliamentary approval in Denmark. It shall come into force on the

day on which notice of such parliamentary approval is given to the Government of the United States of America.

2. This Agreement, being in implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, shall remain in effect for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Signed in Copenhagen in duplicate in the English and Danish languages, both texts being equally authentic, this twenty-seventh day of April, 1951, by the undersigned duly authorized representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark.

For the United States of America :

EUGENIE ANDERSON
United States Ambassador

For the Kingdom of Denmark :

OLE BJØRN KRAFT
Foreign Minister

DDT to Iran for Malaria Control

[Released to the press May 29]

Twenty tons of DDT have left Idlewild International Airport in New York for Iran to be used in a malaria control program being conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Public Health in cooperation with the Point 4 administration. The air shipments are being pick up by truck or another airlift at Beirut and delivered in Iran in time to continue the fight against malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Additional shipments of DDT will be made at a later date to Beirut by ship, whence the DDT will either be trucked or airlifted to Iran.

Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett said that Point 4 is cooperating in the campaign against malaria in the area near the Caspian Sea at the request of the Iranian Government. Dr. Bennett said:

The program was started by the Iranian Ministry of Public Health last year, and it was extremely successful. However, a malaria control project falls short of its mark unless it is continued for at least 3 years, so Point 4 was called in to help in the second year of the operation.

About 2,500,000 people live in the affected area. This means that approximately a half million dwellings must be sprayed. Two Point 4 technicians, Dr. Emil E. Palmquist and Frederick A. Aldridge, both of Seattle, Washington, are cooperating with the Ministry in the program. Dr. Palmquist is Deputy Director of the Point 4 Village Improvement Program in Iran and Director of its public health activities. Mr. Aldridge is Chief Sanitary Engineer.

Last year's campaign cut the incidence of malaria from 88 to 35 percent in the Caspian area. Experts predict that the continuation of the fight for another 2 years will wipe out the malaria-carrying mosquito and greatly improve the health of the people of the district. At present malaria is sapping the energy of the people so that they cannot produce enough food.

Dr. Franklin S. Harris, of Logan, Utah, Technical Director of the Iranian-United States Joint Commission for Rural Development, said that malaria control is vital to economic progress of Iran, with which Point 4 is concerned.

Radio Moscow Increases Foreign Propaganda Output

The Department of State announced on May 26 that the new summer schedule of Radio Moscow—in spite of the immense cost of Russia's radio jamming operations—shows an increase in foreign propaganda output of more than 25 percent over a year ago.

Radio Moscow has doubled its English-language service to North America during the last 6 months and, also, has made substantial increases in its propaganda output to Western European countries.

One of the largest increases has been in Radio Moscow's German-language services for Germany, which also has been doubled in recent months.

Other principal increases in Western European output have been in English to the United Kingdom and in French programs.

The Kremlin appears satisfied with its propaganda operations in the satellite countries, for in those areas only the Hungarian-language service is increased, and that to only a slight extent.

In Spanish-language services to Latin America, there have been increases. However, the Portuguese service for Brazil remains at about its previous level.

Services in Indonesian Malay have been doubled in the last 6 months. Other details on South East Asian language services have not been reported.

In Yugoslav languages, the only reported increase is in Slovene, which was slightly increased.

To the Middle East, Radio Moscow has increased its Arabic broadcasts, while other language services to that area apparently remained unchanged.

VOA Broadcasts in Georgian Language

On May 24, the Department announced that the Voice of America will inaugurate a daily 15-minute broadcast to the Soviet Union in the Georgian language starting Saturday, May 26.

The program will consist of news and commentary and will supplement Voice of America broadcasts beamed to the Soviet Union in Russian and Ukrainian. Additional broadcasts to the Soviet Union will be added within the next few weeks in Tatar, Turkestani, Azerbaijani, and Armenian.

The Georgian program will be broadcast at 11:15 a.m. e.d.s.t. (7:15 p.m. Georgian time) with simultaneous relays by transmitters at Munich and Tangier. The program will be re-broadcast over Munich, Tangier, and BBC facilities at 9:30 p.m. Georgian time.

The Georgian program will increase the Voice of America broadcast output to approximately 46 program hours daily and its language service to 37.

New VOA Programs to South Asia

The Department of State announced on May 16 that the Voice of America has gained a new radio relay for broadcasts beamed to South Asia under an agreement just concluded between the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the United States.

Under terms of the agreement, the United States Government will furnish and install certain radio transmission and associated equipment for use by Radio Ceylon in return for certain facilities to be accorded by the Government of Ceylon for the broadcast of VOA programs over Radio Ceylon.

Starting May 15, the Radio Ceylon facilities will be used to relay daily 30-minute Voice of America broadcasts in Hindi to India, Urdu to Pakistan, and English to South Asia generally.

The inaugural programs included special messages from Vice President Barkley, Secretary Acheson, George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, and Foy D. Kohler, Chief of the State Department's International Broadcasting Division.

Vice President Barkley said:

As we endeavor to build a lasting peace, we realize more and more keenly the need for genuine understanding not only among Governments but also among people who support these Governments.

Secretary Acheson said:

I am confident that the more we know about each other the stronger will be the foundation for cooperation in establishing peace throughout the world and in enabling people everywhere to live happier and richer lives.

Mr. McGhee said:

It has been our experience in the past that Voice of America broadcasts create a two-way street for the exchange of ideas and the growth of friendship. It is my sincere hope that such a two-way street will develop between the people of the United States and the people of South Asia.

Mr. Kohler described the new programs as a milestone in the growth of international friendship.

The Voice of America also began new programs this week in Thai and Albanian and added programs in Finnish and in English to the Far East. The new programs increased the Voice of America broadcast output to approximately 45 hours daily in 37 languages and dialects.

In the inaugural Albanian program, Secretary Acheson said:

Your hopes for a free and sovereign country have yet to be realized. In helping you develop your future as a free and independent member of the community of nations, the United States Government through this radio program will bring you the tools of judgment—the facts. The Voice of America will bring you what you have been too long denied—truth from the free world.

The initial Thai program included messages from Vice President Barkley, Secretary Acheson,

Thai Ambassador Prince Wan Whet, and Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Rusk said:

The part Thailand is taking in the free world struggle to preserve the peace and independence of all people is a bright ray of hope in these dark hours.

VOA Inaugurates Programs to Estonia and Latvia

The Voice of America inaugurated daily 15-minute broadcasts in Estonian and Latvian on Sunday, June 3.

On the same day, broadcasts in a third Baltic language, Lithuanian, which began last February 16, were increased from 15 to 30 minutes daily.

The inaugural Estonian and Latvian programs included special messages from Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

The Estonian broadcast also included statements by Johannes Kaiv, acting Consul-General of Estonia in charge of the Legation; and Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois. The Latvian program will include statements by Jules Feldmans, Latvian Minister to Washington, and Representative O. K. Armstrong of Missouri. Senator Douglas' statement also was carried on the additional Lithuanian program.

The Estonian and Latvian programs will increase the output of the Voice of America to about 46½ program hours daily in 39 language services. Both programs will emanate from the United States with simultaneous Munich and Tangier relays. The Estonian program will start at 11:30 a. m. e. d. s. t. (6:30 p. m. Estonian time) and the Latvian program at 11:45 a. m. e. d. s. t. (6:45 p. m. Latvian time). The format of both includes news, features, and special events during the week.

The inaugural program in the expanded Lithuanian service will be beamed from the United States at 5:45 p. m. e. d. s. t. (12:45 a. m. Lithuanian time) with simultaneous Munich, Tangier, and BBC relays.

Raymond Swing Appointed to VOA Staff

The Department of State announced on May 26 that Raymond Swing, internationally known radio news commentator, will join the staff of the Voice of America in New York as special political commentator effective May 28.

In addition to writing and voicing political commentaries for overseas broadcasts, Mr. Swing will serve as adviser on the entire news and commentary output of the Voice of America.

Americans Detained in Communist China Denied Access to Legal Counsel

[Released to the press May 21]

The Department of State has been extremely concerned for an extended period of time over the imprisonment by Chinese Communist authorities of a number of American nationals, now believed to number more than 30. At least some are definitely known to have been allowed no communication with anyone outside. In most cases, the local Chinese Communist authorities have given no explanation of the arrests or any information concerning the welfare or whereabouts of the persons arrested. Access has been denied to legal counsel and to British officials, who have been representing American interests in Communist China since the closure of our consulates. This Government has been in constant communication on this subject with the British Government.

On April 30, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping, acting on instructions of the Foreign Office, made representations to the responsible Chinese Communist authorities at Peiping on behalf of all Americans arrested, as well as the United Kingdom, Canadian, and Australian nationals under arrest. He appealed to these authorities to take appropriate steps to permit those imprisoned to have access to legal counsel and to friends outside. It was hoped that their speedy release would be effected, on humanitarian no less than on equitable grounds. No reply has yet been received by the British Government from the Chinese Communist authorities.

The Department of State has also been concerned for some time over the continued denial by Chinese Communist authorities of exit permits to certain Americans, including a number of Shanghai businessmen, some of whom have been endeavoring for over a year to leave China. Arbitrary refusal to permit aliens to depart from a country is of course a violation of the elementary principles of international law and practice.

President of Ecuador To Visit U.S.

[Released to the press June 1]

Galo Plaza, President of Ecuador, has accepted President Truman's invitation to visit the United States. The invitation was presented to President Galo Plaza by Ambassador Paul C. Daniels.

President Galo Plaza will arrive in Washington on June 20, where he will remain until Sunday, June 24. He will then proceed to New York for several days and then fly to San Francisco on June 27, leaving the United States on June 29.

Twentieth Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 16-30, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2170
Transmitted May 25, 1951

I herewith submit report number 20 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 April, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 855-869, inclusive, provided detailed accounts of these operations.

Following an artillery preparation, Chinese Communist Forces, composed primarily of fresh troops, and massed along the western half of the front, launched the initial assaults of a general offensive during the night of 22-23 April. The main effort was made on the twenty-five mile front between Yonchon and Sachang. Simultaneously, to the west and southwest of this sector, the enemy bridged the Imjin River northeast of Seoul. To the east of his main effort he made moderately strong attacks whose only significant success was to drive a salient approximately four miles deep into United Nations lines to the east and southeast of Inje.

United Nations Forces conducted an orderly

withdrawal maintaining the integrity of major units and inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy. Artillery concentrations and aggressive local counter-attacks, including the use of Tank-Infantry Task Forces, contributed to the piecemeal destruction of the enemy's offensive potential. In no instance during the period of this report was the enemy able to achieve a significant penetration in force. In the area of the enemy's main effort, the British, Turkish and Greek contingents distinguished themselves in the forefront of the battle area. Ignoring casualties, the enemy strove unsuccessfully to isolate and entrap United Nations units. By 30 April, the hostile advance had carried up to thirty-five miles southward on a forty mile front extending from the immediate vicinity of Seoul to the Hongchon area in central Korea. Somewhat smaller gains had been scored to the east and west of this sector.

For the current offensive, the enemy concentrated nine Chinese Communist Force Armies on a fifty mile sector of the west, and established a reserve of three to five additional armies immediately in rear of this force, providing a total available force in the forward battle area of from thirty-four to forty Chinese Communist Force Divisions, plus four North Korean divisions on the extreme western flank. On the fifty mile front from Hwachon to the east coast, there were one Chinese Communist Force Army and three North Korean Corps, totaling twelve to fourteen divisions. It is thus apparent that the enemy has mustered almost the maximum forces available to him in Korea for a major effort in the west. Not counting the twelve badly mauled Chinese Communist Force Divisions, which are not considered immediately available for combat, the enemy has now expanded his effective forces in Korea to a total of more than seventy divisions.

Front lines at the end of the period ran gen-

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on May 25. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN, of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; and the nineteenth report in BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910.

erally almost due east from the Han River, passing three miles north of Seoul, to Munye, and thence northeast through Songdong, Chaun, and Sori to Habong near the east coast.

Enemy guerrilla units remained on the defensive, except for two minor incidents during the period, though groups up to battalion size were contacted by United Nations Security Forces in south-central Korea. The present strength of these forces is estimated at about 12,000.

Constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval Forces continued to deny to the enemy the use of Korean waters and to prevent enemy interference with the movements of United Nations shipping to and from Korea. The United Nations Fleet operating in Korean waters now includes ships from Australia, Denmark, Canada, The Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States.

A large United Nations Destroyer and Frigate group concentrated at Wonsan shelling bridges, highways and railroads as part of a highly effective program of interdiction of main enemy lines of communication. Further to the north Songjin and Chongjin were subjected to heavy naval gunfire with emphasis on bridges, tunnels, roads and rail crossings. On the west coast the United Nations Naval interdiction program ranged along the front northwest of Seoul and along the Korean coast from Incheon north.

The principal weight of United Nations carrier-based air attacks was shifted to close support of United Nations ground units as the enemy began his long expected ground offensive. As a result of these air operations, the enemy has suffered heavy losses of personnel and material.

Check minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment. Drifting mines continued to be sighted in substantial numbers.

Continuous attacks upon the enemy immediately confronting United Nations ground forces formed the predominant role of United Nations Air Forces during the period. Through intermittently poor weather, United Nations Air Forces attacked enemy forces exposed by movement in attack resulting in large numbers of enemy casualties.

There are continuing indications of possible enemy intent to employ air power offensively against the United Nations forces. For this reason, enemy airfields in Korea are kept under continuing surveillance. There is, of course, no means of preventing the enemy from launching attacks from Manchurian bases if he elects to do so.

Communications targets continued under attack with relatively light opposition by MIG-15's in northwest Korea.

Beginning in mid-April large quantities of United Nations leaflets were air-dropped over

enemy troops in front-line positions and in staging areas to the rear, warning that their Communist leaders were planning another massive attack in which thousands upon thousands of them would be sacrificed without purpose except to further the cause of aggression. When this attack was launched late in April, leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts were used to tell enemy soldiers of the exorbitant price in lives which their officers, all along the line, were expending for every mile of territory, and to show the enemy that the alternative to this certain death was surrender and humane treatment by the United Nations Forces. More than 355 million leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea. Radio broadcasts, in conjunction with leaflets, have kept the Korean people informed on the renewed Communist offensive and its significance to Korea in terms of added destruction of life and property.

In the past few weeks large numbers of enemy prisoners of war formerly interned in enclosures of United Nations prisoner of war camp number one in the Pusan area have been transferred to Koje-Do. At the present time there are over 90,000 prisoners of war interned at the Koje-Do prisoner of war camp. The new prisoner of war camp is nearing completion and many prisoners of war are engaged in construction work which is designed to improve living conditions and to raise the sanitary standards within the camp area. Koje-Do Island is a site which has been carefully selected from the standpoint of the health and welfare of prisoners of war. The geographical locations of the new enclosures have been transmitted to the enemy through the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, 12 August 1949.

Designs Selected for U.N. Stamps

Secretary-General Trygve Lie announced on May 17 the results of the work of the special committee he had appointed to give final approval to the designs for the first issue of United Nations postage stamps.

Eight designs were approved, six to be used for the eleven regular denominations and two for the four air-mail denominations. The regular stamps will be issued in 1¢, 1½¢, 2¢, 3¢, 5¢, 10¢, 15¢, 20¢, 25¢, 50¢, and \$1 values. The air-mail stamps will be 6¢, 10¢, 15¢, and 25¢ values.

The date of issue of United Nations stamps will depend on the time required for their production. It is expected that they will be ready by the middle of September of this year. However, all the denominations will not be issued simultaneously but in three groups with an interval of some weeks between issues.

Current Status of Contributions for Korean and Palestine Relief Programs

U.N. doc. A/1801
Dated May 16, 1951

Report by the Secretary-General to the Negotiating Committee on Contributions to Programmes of Relief and Rehabilitation

The Negotiating Committee on Contributions to Programmes of Relief and Rehabilitation in Korea and Relief and Reintegration of Palestine Refugees, in its report of 28 January 1951 (A/1769), recommended the following action by the Secretary-General:

"The Secretary-General should request all Governments to place written statements regarding their contributions to both funds in his hands not later than 20 February 1951, so that the results of both appeals may be made public as soon as possible thereafter.

"(a) Where representatives have made offers before the Committee, the Secretary-General should request their Governments formally to confirm and if possible to increase these offers by the above date.

"(b) Where Governments have not yet made offers to both funds, the Secretary-General should request them to communicate to him the amounts of their proposed contributions not later than the above date."

On or about 1 February 1951, the Secretary-General addressed letters to all Member States and a number of non-member States, enclosing the report of the Negotiating Committee, and making the requests recommended in it. A target date of 20 February 1951 was set though it was realized that this would provide too short a period for many Governments to take appropriate action.

The results to date can be summarized as follows, though a detailed list is attached to the present report as Annexes I and II.

Programme of Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea

A. Of the 13 Governments which made offers, 12 have formally confirmed them.

B. Of these contributions, one represents an increase over the amount advised to the Negotiating Committee and 2, while not changed in amount, are no longer subject to conditions which might have reduced their maximum value.

C. Eight additional Governments have replied to the Secretary-General's request by making new offers and formally confirming them at the same time.

EDITOR'S NOTE: For text of the United States reply see BULLETIN of March 19, 1951, page 469.

D. Including the offers made to the Secretary-General under the Security Council resolutions on Korea,* 43 Governments are to date participating in the Korea programme of relief and rehabilitation.

Programme of Relief and Reintegration of Palestine Refugees

A. Of the 14 Governments which made offers, 13 have formally confirmed them.

B. Of these, one offer to the Committee has been increased and one other, while not changed in amount, is no longer subject to conditions which might have reduced its value.

C. Seven additional Governments have replied to the Secretary-General's request by making new offers and formally confirming them at the same time.

D. A total of 21 Governments are therefore participating up to date in the Palestine programme.

Periodically during the past two months, the Secretary-General has publicized all confirmations of either old or new offers as they have been received. Similarly, special efforts have been made to obtain the widest publicity at the time of the actual receipt of major contributions. The Information Centres in both the areas to be assisted have also endeavoured to publicize the offers on every possible occasion.

The Secretary-General expresses the hope that the result of the Negotiating Committee's earlier work, as reflected in the present status of the financing for both programmes, is sufficiently encouraging to warrant the continuation of its negotiations throughout the present session of the General Assembly.

ANNEX I

Contributions Made or Offers Formally Confirmed Towards the Relief of the Civil Population of Korea, Under the Security Council Resolutions on Korea or General Assembly Resolution 410 (V) of 1 December 1950

The following should be noted:

1. This list does not include offers of military aid or related items, such as military hospitals and strategic material.

*S/1511, S/1588, and S/1657.

2. This list does not include the large amount of civilian relief and rehabilitation assistance supplied by the United States Government through the Unified Command, estimated to be approximately 85 million dollars.

3. All offers are shown in dollar equivalents, although most of them have been made in the currency of the contributing Government or in kind.

4. The indication "maximum" signifies that the full offers are conditional on the target figure of 250 million dollars being reached or are otherwise dependent on the contributions of other Governments.

5. In those cases where contributions in kind, made or promised under the Security Council resolutions on Korea, are marked by an asterisk*,

Member States:	Offers formally confirmed under General Assembly resolution 410 (V) of 1 December 1950	Offers to the Secretary- General under Security Council resolutions on Korea
1. Argentina	\$500, 000	
2. Australia	4, 020, 000	*\$380, 000
3. Belgium		*50, 000
4. Brazil		2, 700, 000
5. Burma	75, 000	
6. Canada	12 7, 250, 000	
7. China		*615, 000
8. Colombia		*500
9. Cuba		*259, 000
10. Denmark (Civilian use of hospital ship Jutlandia)		*238, 000
11. Dominican Republic	10, 000	
12. Ecuador		*63, 000
13. Egypt	28, 000	
14. Ethiopia		² 41, 000
15. France		*75, 000
16. Greece		*115, 000
17. Guatemala (several thou- sands tons of timber)		
18. Honduras		2, 500
19. Iceland		*45, 000
20. India		*171, 500
21. Indonesia	² 100, 000	
22. Israel	33, 600	*63, 000
23. Lebanon		50, 000
24. Liberia	15, 000	*10, 000
25. Luxembourg	² 10, 000	
26. Mexico		*350, 000
27. Netherlands	260, 000	
28. New Zealand		*131, 000
29. Nicaragua		*24, 000
30. Norway	900, 000	*90, 000
31. Pakistan		*380, 000
32. Paraguay		² 10, 000
33. Peru		65, 000
34. Philippines		*3, 734, 000
35. Saudi Arabia	² 10, 000	
36. Sweden	1, 000, 000	
37. Syria	³ 12, 000	
38. Thailand		*4, 368, 000
39. United Kingdom	⁵ 28, 000, 000	*200, 000
40. United States	162, 500, 000	
41. Uruguay		⁴ 2, 140, 000
42. Venezuela	70, 000	*100, 000

Nonmember State:

43. Italy: 200-bed hospital and necessary personnel.*

¹ Canadian.

² Funds already received.

³ Not yet confirmed.

⁴ Supplies to the estimated value of \$140,000 have already been shipped.

⁵ Maximum.

the contributions have either been delivered to the United Nations Command or are in process of delivery. Valuations may, in certain cases, be tentative.

ANNEX II

Contribution Offers Formally Confirmed for the Financing of the Programme for the Relief and Reintegration of Palestine Refugees

The following should be noted:

1. All offers are shown in dollar equivalents, although most of them have been made in the currency of the contributing Government or in kind.

2. The indication "minimum" signifies that the offer does not necessarily represent the entire contribution which will be forthcoming.

3. In addition to the contributions made before the Negotiating Committee and confirmed formally to the Secretary-General, the following information will be of interest:

(a) The Government of Israel also offered a contribution of 1,000,000 Israel pounds subject to conditions beyond the competence of the Committee. This offer is now the subject of negotiation between that Government and the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine as part of a general settlement of refugee compensation.

(b) The Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency reports that the direct aid to the refugees and services to the agency likely to be provided by Governments of the area for the period 1 July 1951-30 June 1952 (based on their own valuations) are estimated as follows:

Lebanon	\$1, 800, 000
Egypt	1, 800, 000
Syria	550, 000
Jordan	500, 000
Israel	50, 000
Iraq	800, 000

Member States:

1. Denmark	¹ \$53, 000
2. Egypt	390, 000
3. France	2, 856, 000
4. Greece	50, 000
5. Honduras	2, 500
6. Indonesia	² 30, 000
7. Israel	50, 000
8. Lebanon	33, 000
9. Luxembourg	² 2, 000
10. Mexico	110, 000
11. Norway	14, 000
12. Pakistan	90, 000
13. Philippines	10, 000
14. Saudi Arabia	³ 115, 000
15. Sweden	20, 000
16. Syria	¹ 60, 000
17. United Kingdom	8, 000, 000
18. United States	⁴ 25, 000, 000
19. Venezuela	20, 000
20. Yemen	(⁵)

Additional contribution:

21. Southern Rhodesia	19, 600
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¹ Not yet confirmed.

² Funds already received.

³ Cash portion of \$40,000 already received.

⁴ Minimum.

⁵ Large quantity of cereal.

Resettlement and Protection of Refugees

IRO GENERAL COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEET AT GENEVA

by George L. Warren

The General Council of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) held its seventh session at Geneva from April 9 through April 13, 1951. The Executive Committee met concurrently from April 4 through April 12, 1951.

Acting on recommendations of the Executive Committee, the General Council decided to provide resettlement services for those refugees, previously excluded by earlier decisions, who arrive in areas of Iro operations after October 1, 1950. Because of delays in processing refugees for admission to the United States and the possibility that the United States Congress may extend the expiring date of the United States Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, the Council authorized the Director General to continue the planned program of operations beyond September 30, 1951, for so long as available resources permit and there remain refugees for whom opportunities for resettlement are available. The Director General announced that in his judgment realizable resources available to the Organization would permit continuing operations until approximately December 31, 1951.

The Council was advised of the designation by Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, of J. Donald Kingsley, Director General of Iro, as Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). In view of the fact that the pattern of Iro operations has been substantially established and that Mr. Kingsley's responsibilities as Director General of Iro will decrease simultaneously with the increase in his responsibilities as Agent General for Korea, the Council decided that he should continue his services as Director General of Iro while acting as Agent General for Korea. Mr. Kingsley announced at the Council meeting the appointment of Sir Arthur Rucker, former Deputy Director General of Iro, as Deputy Resident Agent in Korea of UNKRA.

The Council noted with satisfaction that plans for the continuing care of 35,000 refugees includ-

ing family members who will require institutional treatment after the termination of Iro had either been concluded or were in process. At a previous meeting, 22 million dollars had been allocated for this purpose, of which over 19 million dollars had already been spent or committed by March 31, 1951.

In modifying the previously adopted plan of expenditure for the period from July 1, 1950, until termination of operations now expected on December 31, 1951, the Council approved total expenditures of \$100,356,962. This total provided \$43,873,220 for resettlement expenditures, \$19,435,082 for the care of refugees requiring institutional treatment, and \$1,300,000 for liquidation expenditures during the 3-month period following the termination of operations. The excess over previous authorized expenditures, \$13,448,929, was made possible by the sale of surplus stocks and equipment, the proceeds of which had not been included in previous estimates of income. Of the total expenditure authorized, \$100,356,962, \$43,870,056 had been expended or committed prior to December 31, 1950, leaving \$56,486,906 available for use in the calendar year 1951. No requests for further contributions by governments are to be made by the Organization.

The total numbers planned to be moved in resettlement were estimated at 222,400, of which approximately 130,000 had been moved by March 31, 1951, leaving 90,000 to be resettled in the remaining period. Of this latter number, it was expected that 62,300 would be admitted to the United States provided the Displaced Persons Act is extended beyond June 30, 1951; 13,750 to Canada, 4,300 to Australia; and the balance to New Zealand, Latin American, European, and other countries.

In its comments to the General Council on the semiannual report of the Director General for the period ending December 31, 1950, the Executive Committee devoted attention to problems of the termination of operations in outlying areas, such as the Philippines, China, Turkey, the Near East,

and Greece, and urged the Director General to intensify efforts to reduce the size of the remaining problem in Italy and Austria particularly.

The Council in considering the report of the Director General noted that substantial progress had been made toward termination and that with the planned extension of operations to December 31, 1951, the Iro will remove from Europe virtually all of the remaining refugees for whom resettlement opportunities become available. Progress toward termination was evidenced by the fact that 998,270 refugees had been repatriated or resettled by March 31, 1951, the number of camp installations had been reduced from 704 in July 1947 to 62, and the international staff from a peak of 2,400 to 1,291.

The function of the protection of refugees which Iro has performed since 1947 is in process of transfer to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees established by the General Assembly of the United Nations on January 1, 1951. An agreement has been concluded with the Allied High Commission for Germany under which the Commission has taken over the activities of the International Tracing Service which will be continued in operation under the direction of the Commission. The International Tracing Service under Iro has collected documents providing information on over 20 million allied nationals. Records of over a million persons were provided to interested governments concerning their nationals. This information has proved invaluable in establishing claims for indemnification and the receipt of benefits provided under the laws of the home countries concerned. Death certificates were issued with respect to 1,990 persons facilitating the administration of estates and the provision of assistance for dependent relatives.

The Iro still faces the responsibility of making final plans for 1,393 unaccompanied children registered on March 31, 1951. The great majority of these children, 1,088, remain in Germany. Of the total, 592 are in the care or custody of other agencies, sponsors, or guardians and do not receive care and maintenance directly from the Iro. 410 children are receiving temporary care only because their parents, guardians, or sponsors are ill and unable to provide for them or because they are waiting to join their parents who have already preceded them to countries of resettlement. The remaining 391 children are under the direct care of Iro. The Council was assured that plans for each individual child registered have been determined and that all children will be provided for adequately before December 31, 1951.

Fifteen member governments of Iro were represented at this session of the Council: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Guatemala, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.

China, the Dominican Republic, and Iceland were not represented. Representatives of the Governments of Austria, Israel, Mexico, and Sweden, of the United Nations, the Vatican, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization attended as official observers, and many voluntary agencies interested in refugees were represented.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, attended the meetings of the Executive Committee and the Council and participated on occasion in the discussions.

Robert Rochefort of France presided as chairman of the Council for the session. Prince del Drago of Italy served as first vice chairman, B. D. Zohrab of New Zealand as second vice chairman, and Erik Dons of Norway as rapporteur.

The Council will reconvene at Geneva for its final session on or about October 18, 1951. The Executive Committee will reconvene a few days prior to the meeting of the General Council in October.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is adviser on refugee and displaced persons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was United States representative to the meetings of the General Council and the Executive Committee.*

Training for Care of Handicapped Children

A course was held in the United Kingdom between March 3 and April 28, 1951 on the rehabilitation and after-care of the handicapped child and was attended by 49 fellows, coming from seven European countries: Austria (8), Finland (7), Greece (6), Germany (7), Berlin (7), Yugoslavia (6), France (6), Italy (2). Who financed and administered 15 fellows and administered an additional 5 fellows paid for by UNICEF. The United Nations financed and administered 13 fellows and administered an additional 16 fellows paid for by UNICEF. UNICEF financed the travel of 7 United Nations fellows.

The program for the course was under the direction of Dr. Harold Balme, acting on behalf of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, and the British Council acted as agents for the Ministries in regard to accommodation and internal travel. UNICEF is meeting the administrative expenses in the United Kingdom that are not covered by the allowance paid to the fellows.

The fellows attending the course were selected, as far as possible, as a team covering all the aspects of rehabilitation so that when they return to their countries, they will help their Governments to build up programs for physically-handicapped children, assist in training personnel in the most up-to-date methods, and the use of the equipment being supplied by UNICEF. The quality of the fellows was high, and they had a chance of seeing what can be done along modern lines for the treatment, the rehabilitation, the education, the vocational training, and the employment of physically handicapped children. The fellows should return to their home lands with their enthusiasm kindled and their knowledge greatly extended. It should be stressed that this course was organized as a joint enterprise between UNICEF, WHO, United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, Unesco, and ILO.

—From U. N. doc E/ICEF/174

International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Report on the First Meeting by Edward Castleman

The International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries was established in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries concluded at Washington on February 8, 1949. The United States served as host Government for the first meeting of the Commission in accordance with a recommendation contained in the final act of the conference at which the Convention was concluded.¹ The Convention, which entered into force on July 3, 1950, established an International Commission for the primary purpose of keeping under continuous review all pertinent information concerning the international fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. Among the major responsibilities of the Commission will be the coordination and dissemination of information concerning such fisheries and, based upon such information, recommendations to member governments on conservation action by them deemed necessary to maintain the international fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic at a maximum level of sustained production.

The United States has a substantial interest in this Convention and its work because the fisheries of the Convention area in most imminent need of action for their conservation are those off the New England coast. The United States fishing industry which relies upon those fisheries is of significant importance in the economy of the country. The United States catch in the area approximates over 900 million pounds a year valued at over 70 million dollars to the fishermen, and over 34 thousand fishermen are employed in these fisheries. The value of the capital investment in the fisheries in the New England States and New York is estimated at over 115 million dollars. During recent years, there has been increasing evidence of declines in abundance in important commercial species of fish on the banks off of New England, particularly the haddock. Since the fisheries involved are on the high seas, the only

effective method for their study and management is through international cooperation.

Of the original signatory Governments, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the United Kingdom, and the United States—having already deposited their instruments of ratification—were represented at the first meeting of the Commission by fully participating delegations. France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Spain, not having as yet taken the required action toward ratification, were represented by observer delegations. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea also sent observers.

Dr. Hilary J. Deason, Chief, Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of the Interior, and one of the three United States Commissioners, was elected chairman of the first meeting held at Washington from April 2–10, 1951. A. T. A. Dobson, Commissioner for the United Kingdom, was elected vice chairman. Both are to serve for a term of 2 years.

The Commission was primarily concerned at its first meeting with organizational questions and adopted rules of procedure, financial regulations, and certain fiscal and administrative resolutions. In accordance with the terms of the Convention, which divides the over-all Convention area into five subareas in order to make the studies and recommendations of the Commission more effective, five panels with primary responsibility for the five subareas also met, adopted rules of procedure, and elected officers.

The United States, at the moment, is particularly interested in subarea 5 (the banks off the coast of New England) and, accordingly recommended that this panel give attention to possible conservation action in the subarea as soon as possible. In accordance with this recommendation, the panel agreed to meet in the fall to consider all available data on the fisheries of the particular area and to determine what action might be recommended to the Commission, and then to the Governments of Canada and the

¹ For the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Apr. 9, 1951, p. 595.

United States, which Governments for the moment are the only members of this panel. At the next meeting the panel for subarea 5 will probably consider the possible establishment of minimum mesh-size regulations for the haddock fishery in that area. Francis W. Sargent, one of the United States Commissioners, was elected chairman of this panel.

In accordance with the terms of Public Law 845, 81st Congress approved September 27, 1950, which is the law designed to implement the International Convention, the United States Commissioners recently appointed an Advisory Committee of 14 members representing labor, management, the public-at-large, and the state Governments. At their first meeting with their Advisory Committee at Boston shortly before the international meeting, the United States Commissioners obtained the concurrence of the Committee for a discussion at the Commission meeting of the question of applying minimum mesh-size regulations for haddock in subarea 5. This concurrence was obtained with the understanding that no final decisions would be taken before further consultations had been held with the Advisory Committee. Since the meeting of the panel for subarea 5 will definitively consider the question of recommendations concerning mesh-size regulations for the subarea in question, it is contemplated that the United States Commissioners will consult with their Advisory Committee and perhaps hold open hearings at key New England ports prior to the fall meeting.

The Commission determined to establish temporary headquarters at St. Andrews, New Brunswick, Canada, and elected Dr. W. Robert Martin of Canada as acting executive secretary for the first fiscal year. Pending the assumption of such duties by Dr. Martin on July 1, 1951, Richard S.

Wheeler, assistant chief, Division of International Conferences, United States Department of State, was designated to serve as executive secretary *pro tempore*. A final decision for the Commission headquarters and for an executive secretary was deferred until the second annual meeting of the Commission to be held in June of 1952. During the interval between its annual meetings, headquarters offers made by Dalhousie University at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and by the Government of the Province of Newfoundland will be studied by the chairman and vice chairman for recommendation at the second meeting. After deciding that the Commission headquarters should be in Canada for the time being, the Commission declined with gratitude an offer by Harvard University.

In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the Commission will consider at its next meeting the question of affiliation with a specialized agency of the United Nations. During the period prior to the second annual meeting, the chairman and acting executive secretary will consult with officials of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea in order to develop recommendations as to the most effective method for cooperation between the Commission and those organizations, and the avoidance of duplication of effort between the organizations.

The first meeting is considered to have been highly successful, and the United States Commissioners are of the opinion that a firm foundation has been established for the effective operation of the Commission.

• *Mr. Castleman is Chief, Section of International Agreements Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior.*

U. S. Delegations to International Meetings

Economic Commission for Latin America Fourth Session

On May 25, the Department of State announced that Ambassador Merwin L. Bohan, United States representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, has been designated to serve as acting United States representative at the fourth session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America which is to open at Mexico City on May 28, 1951. Ambassador Claude G. Bowers, the permanent United States representative on the Commission, will be unable to attend the session.

Named to serve as advisers on the United States delegation to the session are:

Advisers

Winthrop G. Brown, Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
James C. Corliss, Adviser, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
John S. deBeers, Chief, Latin American Division, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury
Edmund H. Kellogg, Office of United Nations Economic Affairs, Department of State
Wilfred Malenbaum, Chief, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Department of State
Harold M. Randall, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, Mexico City
George Wythe, Chief, American Republics Branch, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.

Extensive study will be made at the forthcoming session both of recent developments and trends in the economy of Latin America and of the most important economic development and foreign-trade problems of the region. This study will be based on examination of an *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1950* and a number of reports which have been prepared on such subjects as effects of the United States Defense Program on Latin American countries, foreign investments in Latin America, the cotton textile industry in the region, immigration, and the technical assistance program. The economic survey contains, for example, (1) analyses of the most important economic developments in Latin America since World War II in the fields of agriculture, industry, mining, inflation, balance of payments, and foreign exchange; (2) studies of recent economic developments in 10 Latin American countries; and (3) a series of studies on certain basic raw materials.

The Commission will also deal with a number of other topics. They include: measures to increase the availability of educational, scientific and cultural materials; measures for the conservation and use of nonagricultural resources; coordination of the activities of the Commission and of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council; cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in the operation of a work program on food and agriculture problems in Latin America; adoption of a report by the Commission for submission to the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; and approval of the future work programs of the Commission.

Governing Body, 115th Session (ILO)

The Department of State announced on May 28 that the 115th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Office convened at Geneva, Switzerland on that date.

Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor, will attend the session in his capacity as United States Government representative on the Governing Body. Arnold L. Zempel, executive director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor, will also attend as the United States Government substitute representative on the Governing Body for this session.

Named to serve as advisers on the United States delegation are:

Robert M. Barnett, Economic Officer (Labor), American Legation, Bern, Switzerland
 Otis E. Mulliken, Officer in Charge of United Nations Social Affairs
 Edward B. Persons, Chief, ILO Division, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor
 Cleon O. Swayzee, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs

The Governing Body is composed of 32 persons—16 representing governments (of which the United States is one), 8 representing employers,

and 8 representing workers. Serving as the executive board of the International Labor Organization, the Governing Body, which normally meets four times annually, has general supervision of the International Labor Office and the various committees and commissions of the Organization.

At its 115th session, the Governing Body will be primarily concerned with the examination of reports by the Director General and those standing committees which have held meetings since the 114th session of the Governing Body, held at Geneva, last March. The reports deal with such matters as the application of conventions and recommendations, manpower, technical assistance, staff questions, and allegations concerning infringement of freedom of association. In addition, the Governing Body will consider reports prepared at a meeting of experts on systems of payment by results (Geneva, Apr. 10-20, 1951), the 16th session of the Joint Maritime Commission (Geneva, May 21-26, 1951), and the Third Inter-American Conference on Social Security (Buenos Aires, Mar. 12-13, 1951).

Military Medicine and Pharmacy, 13th Congress

On May 28, the Department of State announced that Maj. Gen. Harry G. Armstrong, Surgeon General, United States Air Force, has been designated chairman of the United States delegation to the 13th International Congress on Military Medicine and Pharmacy, which is to be held at Paris, June 17-23, 1951. Other members of the United States delegation are:

Maj. Gen. George E. Armstrong, (MC) USA, Deputy Surgeon General, United States Army
 Capt. Albert R. Behnke, Jr., (MC) USN, Staff Medical Officer, Commander Naval Forces, Germany
 Brig. Gen. Otis O. Benson, Jr., (MC) USAF, Commandant United States Air Force, School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
 Vice Adm. Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, (Retired), Chief Medical Director, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans Administration
 Dr. Van M. Hoge, Associate Chief, Bureau of Medical Services, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency
 Maj. Gen. Edgar E. Hume, (MC) USA, Chief Surgeon, Far East Command General Headquarters, Fec, Tokyo, Japan
 Dr. Walter G. Nelson, Medical Director, Foreign Quarantine Activities, Public Health Service, American Embassy, Paris
 Dr. Isadore S. Ravdin, Professor of Surgery, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania
 Capt. Hilton W. Rose, (MC) USN, Executive Secretary, Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

The principal agenda items for the forthcoming Congress relate to new military and social problems encountered by the military services. Attention will be given in particular to such matters as (1) the pathology and treatment of lesions resulting from the use of atomic weapons, (2) war psychosis, and (3) the care and evacuation of the sick and wounded.

The First Congress of Military Medicine and Pharmacy was sponsored by the Belgian Government in 1921 to bring together representatives of the military medical services of the participating states for the purpose of promoting the protection of human life in the armed forces. The Twelfth Congress of this series was held at Mexico, D.F., October 23-29, 1949.

Radio Consultative Committee, Sixth Assembly

The Department of State announced on May 28 that the sixth assembly of the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) of the International Telecommunication Union is to be held at Geneva, June 5-July 6, 1951. The United States Government will be represented at the sixth assembly by the following delegation:

Chairman

Harvey B. Otterman, Associate Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff

Vice Chairmen

Newbern Smith, Ph.D., D.Sc., Chief, Central Radio Propagation Laboratory, National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce
George Turner, Chief, Field Engineering and Monitoring Division, Engineering Department, Federal Communications Commission

Members of Delegation

Edward W. Allen, Jr., Technical Information Division, Federal Communications Commission
Dana K. Bailey, Consultant to Chief, Central Radio Propagation Laboratory, National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce
Edwin W. Bemis, Department of Operation and Engineering, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, New York, N. Y.
Warren B. Burgess, Electronics Scientist, Radio Techniques Branch of Radio Division Two, Naval Research Laboratory, Department of the Navy
John B. Coleman, RCA Victor Division, Radio Corporation of America, Camden, N. J.
William Q. Crichlow, Radio Engineer, Central Radio Propagation Laboratory, National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce
J. Howard Dellinger, Ph. D., RCA Frequency Bureau, Radio Corporation of America, Washington, D. C.
Donald G. Fink, Editor, *Electronics Magazine*, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, New York, N. Y.
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The CCIR was established through the action of the International Radiotelegraph Conference held at Washington, October 5-November 25, 1927. As a permanent organ of the International Telecommunication Union, the CCIR was directed in the International Telecommunication Convention of October 2, 1947 "to study technical radio questions and operating questions the solution of which depends principally on considerations of a technical radio character and to issue recommendations on them."

At the sixth assembly, the CCIR will consider the results of the work of 13 international study groups on such technical matters and, on the basis of that consideration, draw up recommendations as provided by the International Telecommunication Convention. Representatives of the United States Government have participated actively in the work of each of the 13 groups.

The CCIR was confronted, when its fifth assembly convened at Stockholm, Sweden, on July 12, 1948, with the need for developing new bases for carrying on its work. During the 11 years which had elapsed since the fourth assembly, and in particular as a result of the emergency needs of World War II, many radio services had been dislocated; radio practices had been altered or rendered obsolete; and tremendous technical advances had been made in the field of radio. As efficient use of the limited spectrum space was imperative, and as such use was dependent upon the continued study and development of new facilities and methods of operation, the fifth assembly formulated 33 recommendations and 37 questions for study and set up 13 international study groups to examine some of the outstanding problems before the convening of the sixth assembly.

The topics assigned to the international study groups were: (1) radio transmitters; (2) radio receivers; (3) complete radio systems employed by different services; (4) ground wave propagation; (5) tropospheric propagation; (6) ionospheric propagation; (7) radio time signals and standard frequencies; (8) monitoring; (9) general technical questions; (10) broadcasting, including questions relating to single sideband; (11) television, including questions relating to single sideband; (12) tropical broadcasting; and (13) operation questions depending principally on technical considerations.

To assist in the preparation of CCIR studies, the Department of State established a national preparatory committee early in 1949. That preparatory committee in turn established committees, corresponding to the various CCIR study groups, to study the assigned questions. The membership of these national committees was broadly representative of both government and private organizations concerned with radio matters.

The United States in the United Nations

[June 1-8, 1951]

Trusteeship Council

The ninth session of the Trusteeship Council convened on June 5 at United Nations headquarters. The members comprise: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, France, Iraq, New Zealand, Thailand, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and the United States. In addition, the Council welcomed a representative from Italy, Gastone Guidotti, to participate in its work as a nonvoting member. Francis B. Sayre is the United States representative.

Sir Alan Burns (U. K.) was elected President and Awni Khalidi (Iraq), Vice President.

Among the items on the adopted 15-point agenda are:

1. Examination of the following annual reports of administering authorities on the administration of trust territories: (a) First report on Somaliland under Italian administration, April-December 1950; (b) Tanganyika, for the years 1949 and 1950; (c) Ruanda-Urundi, 1949-50; (d) Cameroons under British administration, 1949-50; (e) Cameroons under French administration, 1949-50; (f) Togoland under British administration, 1949-50; (g) Togoland under French administration, 1949-50.

2. Examination of petitions. The Council will examine more than 100 petitions received from individuals and organizations in the various trust territories.

3. Arrangements for the United Nations visiting mission to trust territories in East Africa (1951).

4. Organization and methods of functioning of visiting missions: revised report of the Committee on Visiting Missions.

5. Rural economic development of the trust territories.

6. The Ewe problem.

7. Higher education in the trust territories in Africa.

8. Administrative unions affecting trust territories.

9. Adoption of the report of the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly covering the third special session and the eighth and ninth sessions.

In reply to the U.S.S.R. motion to seat a representative of the People's Republic of China in place of the Chinese Nationalist representative, Ambassador Sayre proposed that the Council postpone discussion of this question indefinitely. He said that the opposition of the United States to the U.S.S.R. motion had been made clear "time and again." Now he wished to reaffirm the view of his Government that it was out of the question to discuss the issue in an organ of the United Nations while the Chinese Communist regime was "at the very moment" engaged in aggression against the United Nations and while it was seeking to destroy United Nations troops in Korea. The United States proposal was adopted by a vote of 11-1 (U.S.S.R.)-0.

The Council, at the suggestion of the President, approved the appointment of the following six members to serve as the *ad hoc* Committee on Petitions: Argentina, Belgium, New Zealand, Thailand, U.S.S.R., and the United States. This Committee will not examine petitions relating to the Ewe problem.

The Council approved the membership of the East African Visiting Mission: Dominican Republic, New Zealand, Thailand, and the United States. Dr. Enrique de Marchena (Dominican Republic) was appointed chairman of the mission.

A resolution was adopted (11-0-1, U.S.S.R.) concerning the revision of the provisional questionnaire, which was submitted in the second interim report of the drafting committee. The resolution requests those administering authorities which have not yet submitted observations on the revised questionnaire to do so by October 31, 1951, and extends the time limit for submission of the committee's final report until the beginning of the Council's tenth session.

The present session is expected to last through July 31, 1951.

Specialized Agencies

International Labor Organization (ILO).—The 34th annual session of the ILO Conference opened June 6 at Geneva. The agenda includes the following items:

1. The annual report of the Director-General, David A. Morse. In the foreword to this report Mr. Morse states:

We need an open world. We need a wide understanding between all people, the meeting of man with man, of mind with mind. No barrier should exist to the free movement of people and of ideas. Without an open world we shall never be free from suspicion and fear, we shall never move toward a society of prosperity and peace.

His report proposes that particular attention be paid to the issue of wage policies to avoid inflation.

2. The Governing Body of the International Labor Office at its 115th session, which began on May 28, proposed the sum of \$6,196,922 for the 1952 budget for the Organization. This exceeds the 1951 budget by \$223,133 and must be approved by the Conference.

3. Information and reports on the application of conventions and recommendations.

4. Objectives and minimum standards of social security. The ILO Conference will examine a total of nine types of social security benefits, including medical, unemployment, old-age, family, invalidity and survivors' benefits.

5. Industrial relations, including collective agreements and voluntary conciliation and arbitration. Two recommendations are before the Conference for consideration—one on collective agreements and one on conciliation and arbitration.

6. Regulations to set up international standards of labor-management-government cooperation. The ILO has received replies from 32 countries to a questionnaire sent out to all members on this subject.

7. Equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value.

8. Minimum wage-fixing machinery in agriculture. A proposed convention would require governments to create or maintain machinery for the fixing of minimum wages in agriculture and related occupations.

9. Holidays with pay in agriculture. The delegates will discuss whether a convention or a recommendation on paid vacations for farm workers should be presented to next year's Conference.

The Conference will consider requests from the German Federal Republic and Japan for admission to membership in the International Labor Organization.

World Health Organization (WHO).—The WHO Executive Board opened its eighth session at Geneva on June 1. The Board is composed of a technical, nonpolitical body of 18-member nations elected for 3-year terms by the WHO Assembly. It gives effect to the decisions and policies of the Assembly. The present elected countries represented are Belgium, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.

Prof. Jacques Parisot, Dean of the Medical Faculty at Nancy University, France, was elected

chairman; A. L. Bravo (Chile) and J. N. Togba (Liberia) vice chairman; W. A. Karunaratne (Ceylon) and Nail Karabuda (Turkey) rapporteurs. H. van Zile Hyde is the United States representative.

The agenda includes (1) business arising from decisions of the recent World Health Assembly, including those on sanitary regulations for world travel and traffic, technical assistance, and financial problems; (2) review of reports of WHO expert committees, including those on alcoholism and nutrition which, if approved, will be released for publication; (3) consideration of applications from various nongovernmental organizations for official relations with WHO.

U.S. Armed Forces Elements for U.N.

The following is the text of a letter transmitted to Secretary-General Trygve Lie by Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, acting United States representative.

I have the honor to refer to paragraph 9 of Resolution 377 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950, and in accordance therewith to request you to advise the Collective Measures Committee of the measures taken by my Government in implementation of paragraph 8 of that Resolution.

1. At the present time, elements of the National Armed Forces of the United States are serving under the Unified Command in Korea pursuant to the recommendations of the Security Council and the General Assembly. A general description of these elements as now constituted follows:

Ground Forces: Three Army Corps and one Marine Division, with supporting elements.

Naval Forces: A fast Carrier Task Group with a blockade and escort force, an amphibious force, reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare units, and supporting ships.

Air Forces: One Tactical Air Force, one Bombardment Command, and one Combat Cargo Command, all with supporting elements.

The United States Government regards the maintenance of these forces as fulfillment at this time of the purposes of the recommendations of the General Assembly in the Uniting for Peace Resolution. After termination of hostilities in Korea and after the United States Armed Forces now opposing aggression in Korea have been withdrawn, the extent to which the United States will maintain armed forces which could be made available for United Nations service will be reviewed.

2. The United States is maintaining elements of its National Armed Forces in Europe, shortly to include the equivalent of six Army Divisions, and Naval and Air Force elements, in furtherance of the North Atlantic Treaty and as a part of the efforts of the parties to the Treaty for Collective Defense and for the preservation of Peace and Security. The Treaty by its terms comes within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, and the United States Forces maintained in furtherance of the Treaty could, in appropriate circumstances, pursuant to the Treaty and the Charter and in accordance with due constitutional process, participate in collective military measures to maintain or restore Peace and Security in the North Atlantic Area in support of United Nations action.

3. The United States will continue to keep this matter under constant review in the light of changing circumstances and in furtherance of the policy, of the United Nations to build up an effective collective security system.

Accept [etc.].

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American Policy Toward China

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

Chairman Russell. The Committee will be in order.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in your own way.

Secretary Acheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I will take advantage of the kindness of the Committee in permitting me to make a somewhat extended statement on United States policy in regard to China.

I should like to state at the outset what I am going to try to do, and that is I want to present to the Committee the problem which confronted the United States and China in 1945; and in doing that I shall have to give some of its roots in history.

I should like to point out what the times of decision were. There were moments in this period from 1945 on, moments of decision, and I should like to point out those moments. I should like to point out the considerations which were taken under advisement when decisions were made, and I should like to say what the decisions were and how they were made.

One further preliminary observation I think is important, and that is that American aid cannot in itself insure the survival of a recipient government or the survival of a people that this Government is trying to help against aggression.

What our aid must do and can do is to supplement the efforts of that recipient government and of that people itself. It cannot be a substitute for those efforts. It can only be an aid and a supplement to them.

The United States Government, in aiding another government, does not have power of decision within that country or within that government. That power of decision remains with the govern-

ment, the people in it. Those are thoughts I think we should have in mind.

Our Relations With China in 1945

With those preliminary statements, we come to the problem which faced the Chinese and American Governments in 1945.

The Japanese had been defeated. The Chinese Government was in the extreme southwestern part of China. The task which had to be solved by the Chinese Government was, in effect, how to create a nation, and how to have the authority of the Chinese Government exercised throughout that nation.

Now, I do not say recreate a nation; I say, advisedly, create a nation; because for almost an indefinite period in the past there had not been in our sense, a nation in the territory which we call China, and I will come to and explain to you why that is so, a nation in the sense of a government in control throughout that area.

Therefore, the question which had to be faced was how to create that nation and how to create the authority of the nation in that area.

Senator Wiley. Who was Secretary of State then at that time?

Secretary Acheson. The Secretary of State at that time was Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Stettinius was Secretary until the middle of—until the spring of 1945—and Mr. Byrnes became Secretary then.

The Chinese Government that we are talking about—the Nationalist Government—had not had authority—indeed, no Chinese Government had had authority, by which I mean substantial authority—throughout China since the period of the Manchus.

Here is the picture which confronted everybody at the time I am talking about. The great northern area of China, Manchuria, was occupied by the Soviet Union, with its own armed forces. In the second place, the north central and southeast parts of China were in the control of the Communists and the Japanese.

¹ Made on June 4 before the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees and released to the press on that date. Part 1 of the hearings on the military situation in the Far East covering May 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14 has been printed. Also printed as Department of State publication 4255 for sale at Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for 20¢.

I say both the Communists and the Japanese because the Japanese held the cities and the major lines of communication; whereas, the surrounding areas were occupied by the Communists.

That part of China included what we call North China, swinging down through central China, on to the southeast and coming quite far south and southeast in China.

The south central and southern part of China was occupied by the Japanese, who had troops along the coast and for considerable areas inland and the government itself was, as I said before, in the extreme southwestern part of China.

Another important fact, which must never be lost sight of in our consideration, is that, in addition to these facts as to who actually occupied and exercised authority in certain parts of China, all of China was in the grip of a very profound social revolution.

Senator Smith. Might I ask just one question to get my dates right?

I wanted to ask the Secretary whether this was prior to the Yalta conference, or afterwards?

Yalta was in February, '45, and this period you are speaking of was subsequent?

Secretary Acheson. I am talking about VJ-Day, about the problem which faced us at the end of the war.

Senator Smith. Thank you.

Secretary Acheson. General MacArthur has spoken to you about the depth and strength of this social revolution.

It grew out of a similar experience in almost all wars, that as the governments concerned have to make tremendous efforts, as, in some areas, the controls of government become weakened and promises are made, people move forward in social economic ways; at least they move forward in acquiring new social and economic rights; and this was going on in China, in the age-long battle between the peasants and the landlords.

The peasants had made advances and there was a new idea of profound importance.

Communist Control in China

If I may speak briefly, on the general area of Communist control:

The Communists controlled an area containing 116 million people, which was one-fourth of the population of China. The geographical area was 15 percent of the country we call China, exclusive of Manchuria.

This area included in it some of the most heavily populated areas of China, the area which had most of the railway communications, important industrial developments, and important cities.

Now, let us take a look at Manchuria.

Manchuria, except in a wholly nominal way, and then only for a period of 2 or 3 years, part of '28, '29, '30 and part of '31, had never been in any way under the control of the present Na-

tionalist government of China; and, until his death in 1927 or '28, the old Marshal had been the war lord of Manchuria, and controlled it absolutely.

Upon his death, the young Marshal took over his authority, and in 1928 after Chiang Kai-shek had taken Peking and defeated the Communists and the northern war lords, the young Marshal announced his adherence to the National Government. That was a pretty nominal adherence.

It meant that he recognized the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the National Government of China, but the administration in Manchuria did not change, and he continued to exercise the authority.

However, that authority continued for a very short period of time, and in 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and set up their puppet state, and all Chinese authority disappeared from Manchuria. I mention this to point out to you that the National Government had no roots of any sort in Manchuria, a very important thing for us to remember.

When we come to North China, we find that in 1927 the struggle between the left wing of the Kuomintang Party, which was established at Hankow, and the right wing of the party under Chiang Kai-shek came to a head. The Chiang Kai-shek forces won, the Russians, Borodin, who was then advising the Government, had to flee from China, and in 1928 Chiang Kai-shek moved into Peking and there announced the official unification of China. That was in 1928.

The battle with the Communists which began in 1927 in open warfare continued until '36, and in the period of '34 and '35 the Communists were forced to make their long march from the southeastern portion of China to the northwestern portion of China. There they established themselves in the period '34-'35.

In the meantime, however, the Japanese who were in Manchuria were moving into North China, and in 1935 the Japanese undertook to set up another puppet state in North China which would comprise the five northern provinces of China; and at that time they had sufficient physical control of the area to do that.

I point all of this out to make clear to you again that in North China the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's government, which was established in 1928, had been in very large part eliminated by 1935, and instead of his government having power in North China, that was in part controlled through Japanese puppets, Japanese, and in part was controlled by the Communists in the northwest.

With this review then, let us just mention once more the principal problems which confronted the Chinese Government and confronted the American Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

These were: The Soviets in Manchuria, the Japanese and the Chinese struggling against one

another to control a vast area in northwest, north central and southeast China—the Communists I have already mentioned—and at the same time this great problem of the revolution in thought and in social relationships which was going on throughout all China.

So the first period of decision, the first time after the war when important decisions were made and had to be made, was the period 1945 and 1946. Now, I do not mean for a moment that important decisions were not made before and after, but that was the first great moment of decision.

Recommendations of General Wedemeyer's Report

The situation was stated in a nutshell by General Wedemeyer in November 1945 very shortly after V-J-Day, and I should like to read, not very much, but I should like to read from General Wedemeyer's report in November 1945.

He says:

Chinese Communist guerrillas and saboteurs can, and probably will, if present activities are a reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly and extended campaign. Logistical support for the National Government forces, and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts, plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport, have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there, prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this concept.

Now, General Wedemeyer has five conclusions to this report of 1945:

1. That the Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China, provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians, and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent civilian officials.

2. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China for months, and perhaps, even years, unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is achieved, and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested in paragraph one—that is the paragraph which has just been talked about, the political, economic, and social reforms.

3. He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached with Russia and the Chinese Communists.

4. Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communist, and possibly their own plans, in North China and Manchuria. These activities are violations of the recent Sino-Soviet treaty and related agreements.

5. It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between Chinese Communists and the National Government.

Now, in short, what General Wedemeyer reported and advised was, first of all, that the Generalissimo must consolidate his own position in South China and to do that he must take into consideration this revolution that I have been talking about. And General Wedemeyer stressed then—and you will see over and over again he stresses—the same point, that there must be political, economic, and social reforms in order that the Chinese Government might put itself at the head of this great demand for improvement, which was existing in China, and not allow the Communists or anybody else to take that advantage away from them.

In the second place, he points out that to establish himself in North China he must come to agreement with the Communists.

In the third place, he points out the only way to establish himself in Manchuria is through agreement with the Russians.

He ends up by saying that the outlook on all of these fronts is dark, and he points out that force is not available to accomplish these efforts, partly because force cannot accomplish some of them, and secondly, because there is not enough force available to take on the problems which I have already mentioned.

Three Choices Open to United States

Now, in that situation the United States Government had three choices open to it.

One choice was to pull out of China and say, "We have defeated the Japanese. The Chinese from now on must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." That was an impossible choice to take because with the presence of 1,235,000 armed Japanese troops in China, exclusive of Manchuria, and of another 1,700,000 Japanese civilians—government officials, economic people, clerks, and businessmen, one thing or another—there was a Japanese force and a Japanese influence so great in China that by throwing its weight to either side in this civil war it could have taken over the administration of the country, and Japan in defeat would have found itself in actual control of China, a result which we could not, of course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese Government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreements which were so necessary

to enable the Chinese Government to reestablish itself in those parts of China where it had been before and to get, for the first time, into areas of China where it never had been.

Now, I should like briefly to talk about the Chinese Communist situation and the background of that as it existed in 1945, and then I will take up each of the other elements of this problem.

The relations between the Nationalist Government and the Communists have had a long history in China. I shall not take time to go through it all.

Prior to 1927, there was a period of collaboration. From 1927 to 1937 there was a period of war. From 1937 onward there was again a period in which the official attitude of both the Government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means; beginning in 1937 they worked out arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which never were very effective, but were agreements between them.

Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously at arrangements to bring about a settlement by negotiation in China. This official view was stated by the Generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said—and this is one of many times when he said this from 1937 on—

I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means.

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement did not work, and reports were made over and over again that a very large part of the Communist armed forces and a very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood facing one another and maneuvering against one another.

It was the effort of our Government throughout the war period to try and reach some kind of an arrangement so that these two forces instead of watching one another would both fight the Japanese. In they did that, there was a very important contribution to the war.

I will not go into all the efforts that were made by General Stillwell and others in the early period.

In the spring of 1944 Vice President Wallace went on a mission for President Roosevelt. Among other places, he went to China, and there he had talks with the Generalissimo, and they talked about two of the great important problems that I have been discussing. One was Manchuria and the other was the Communists.

The Generalissimo was most anxious to get help of the United States in improving relations, as he stated it, between China and the Soviet Union, because, without that improvement, the prospects for China were very difficult indeed. They discussed what could be done along that line.

They also discussed the Communist problem,

and the Generalissimo pointed out vigorously that the Communists were, as he stated it, not people of good faith, claimed that they were not Chinese, that they had their interests with an alien power. But, nevertheless, he said,

This is a political problem and we have got to settle it by political means.

He stated that he would not regard any help from the United States, in attempting that, to be meddling into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reversed the position which he had taken earlier in which he had opposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdrew his objection to that.

The Hurley Mission

Now in the fall of 1944 and after these discussions, the President sent another personal representative to China, and that was General Hurley. General Hurley was not then ambassador. He became ambassador in the early part of '45, but he went out as the personal representative of the President in order to try and unify this military effort, and there, with the consent and approval of the Generalissimo and of his cabinet, he undertook to act as mediator between the Yen'an Communist authorities and the Chungking Nationalist authorities, and they had meetings, some in Yen'an at which General Hurley was present, some in Chungking in which they worked out a series of agreements.

Some of these agreements had to do with the conduct of the war, and then some of them went beyond that, and a very important and basic agreement was worked out.

The beginning of it was under the mediation of General Hurley. It was announced on October 11, 1945, and that was the agreement on the general principles of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists.

It was announced after General Hurley's departure from China and was made public, as I said, on October 11. This called for the convening of the National Assembly and for a political consultative conference of all party and nonparty leaders.

It called for the inauguration of a constitutional government for all of China; for the formation of a committee of government and Communist representatives to discuss the reorganization of the armies and the reduction of all the armed forces in China.

Now, these agreements were of the greatest possible importance, and they established the basis for the efforts which General Marshall later took on.

May I just pause again for a moment to point

out that the problem between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists differed in one important respect from the relations between—from the problems of governments, say, in Europe after the war with Communists in their country, because in China the Communists were not scattered through the population as an element of the population. They were people who had a defined area, with a large population subject to their control, 116 million.

They had a government of their own; they had any army of their own; and, in effect, they had a separate country within China, and the task was to put these two things together so that there would be one country and one government. Now, that was what they were working on.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Secretary, I hate to interrupt, but you said October 11, 1945.

Secretary Acheson. 1945.

Senator Saltonstall. You meant that? That was a year after Hurley was there then?

Secretary Acheson. No; Mr. Hurley left in 1945; he left just before this.

Senator Saltonstall. Oh!

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Who signed those agreements—those agreements? You said they worked out agreements. Who signed them?

Secretary Acheson. They were agreements between the Chinese Government, the Nationalist Government, and the Communist authorities at Yen-an.

Senator Wiley. They both signed it?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Now, I have dealt with the background of this Communist business, and I am coming back to that, when we get to the mission of General Marshall.

I now want to go back and deal with a problem that has to do with another important aspect of this thing, and that is, Manchuria.

The Yalta Agreements

I want to talk about Yalta.

The Yalta agreements were made in the very early part of 1945. Later on, in August of '45, treaties were signed between the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Soviet Union, which grew out of and were based upon these Yalta agreements.

Now, first of all, the Yalta agreements, from the point of view of the wartime effort and the interest of the United States and its major fighting allies—I think this has been referred to many times and I shall make it brief—at the time these agreements were entered into at Yalta, we did not know whether we had an atomic bomb or not. That was not proved until some months later, that we had one, and it was not used until considerably later.

It was the then military opinion, concurred in by everyone, that the reduction of Japan would

have to be brought about by a large-scale landing on the islands of Japan, and the forecast of that fighting, which came from the fighting on the other islands in the Pacific, indicated that it would be a very bloody and terrible battle.

It was of the utmost importance that the Russians should come into the war in the Far East, in time.

Now, there was very little doubt that they would come in, but the grave danger was that they would really wait until the war was over and until we had expended our effort and blood to win the war, and they would come in and do what they wished.

It was very important, in the view of the military people, and the others, too, present, that they should come in in time, so that none of the 700,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria, and none, if possible, of the 1,235,000 Japanese troops in China, would come back to strengthen the troops on the main islands of Japan; but that they would be occupied with the Russian effort on the mainland.

That was the purpose, and in making the agreements, the price which was paid for the agreements was that 3 months after the end of the European war, the Russians would enter the Far East war; that they should have the southern half of Sakhalin, the Kuriles; that their former rights in Port Arthur and Dairen should be returned to them; and their former interest in the two railways in Manchuria.

The Russians took the same attitude toward these rights that the Chinese took toward their rights in Formosa.

The Russians had lost theirs to the Japanese by war in 1904; the Chinese had lost theirs to the Japanese by war in 1895.

Russia made its claim for those rights, and the claims were granted at this meeting at Yalta.

Senator Hickenlooper. Would the Secretary mind an interruption at this point?

Chairman Russell. He stated that he preferred not to be—

Secretary Acheson. If I could get through, first.

Chairman Russell. What is your preference in the matter, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Acheson. I would very much appreciate it if I could make my statement first, because I might get badly off, if I got into side discussions.

It is hard to keep so much material in one's mind.

One of the other things that I should like to point out about Yalta was that unquestionably the Russians had it in their power not only to take what was conceded to them, but much more, besides.

There was very little likelihood that anybody would have the will, and few people could have the power, to throw them out of any area on the mainland which they might occupy, and where they might wish to remain, so that this agreement gave them the basis for a legal claim to some-

thing considerably less than they might have taken without a legal claim.

I should also like to point out that at the time the Chinese entered into this treaty with the Russians, a few months after Yalta, that is, in August 1945, they regarded the arrangements which they had made with the Russians on the basis of Yalta, as very satisfactory.

Such statements were expressed by the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and by the Chinese Foreign Minister. In fact, in 1947 the Chinese Foreign Minister expressed grave apprehension that the Soviet Union might cancel the treaty with China of 1945, in which China had conferred these rights to the bases in Port Arthur, the interests in Dairen, and the interest in the railway.

They regarded that as a very valuable treaty because it also carried with it the obligation of the Russians to evacuate Manchuria, to recognize the Chinese Nationalist Government, and to aid in the reestablishment of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

Now these agreements, as I shall point out later on, did have a very important effect and bearing when it came to the question of the reoccupation of Manchuria by the Chinese, because it was on the basis of these agreements that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians agreed to occupation by the National Government's forces.

Now may I speak briefly about the problem of the Japanese, and here I shall have to get a little bit out of the chronological order and perhaps run this Japanese part through to its end.

I have pointed out to you the very great importance of the presence of the Japanese in China, the 1,235,000 troops, 1,700,000 civilians. It was decided very early in the game, between the Chinese Government, the Nationalist Government and ourselves, that one of our major efforts must be to get these people out of China and back into Japan.

That wouldn't have been too hard a job to do if they were all just marching on to ships. The great difficulty about it was that these armed soldiers controlled most of the important cities in central China, in southeast China and east China, and also the main lines of communication.

If they had been told to drop their guns on the ground and march to the coast at once, those areas would have been occupied by the Communists, and the Nationalist Government forces would never have gotten in there without fighting.

Therefore the task was to have the Japanese evacuate the areas which they held at the time when the Government forces could be moved and were moved by us into those areas. That was the task to perform.

In order to do that we landed 50,000 Marines in China. The function of these Marines was to occupy the principal seaports, to guard the principal rail lines close to those seaports, and later to take over the areas along the eastern coast where coal was produced and guard the lines along which

the coal came to the principal consuming centers. That was to allow the industrial life of China to continue, and those coal areas and the coal railroads were being constantly raided by the Communists.

So the Marines had to go in there, hold coal, which was the heart of the industrial life of China, hold the seaports so that they would not be captured by Communists, and then receive the Japanese as they were marched to the railheads and down their railroads, and put them on ships and take them back to Japan.

At the same time our armed forces airlifted Chinese armies, whole armies, from South China into the areas to be evacuated and which were being evacuated by the Japanese. Now that was a tremendous undertaking most skillfully carried out, and it was that undertaking which permitted the Chinese Government to really get back into areas of China which it would have had the utmost difficulty in even getting into without that colossal effort.

By the end of '46 we had removed 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand under 3 million, from China to Japan—one of the great mass movements of people.

After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes broke out again between the two parties; and both the government authorities, the Chinese Government authorities, and the American Government authorities, were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.

If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the Government forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese either disappeared or was gravely diminished.

The possibility of occupying North China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent; and the possibility of really getting any reforms in South China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished. So, the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese Government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

The Marshall Mission

It was in that situation that General Marshall was asked by the President to go to China at the end of 1945.

Senator Wiley. 1945?

Secretary Acheson. At the end of 1945. He went in December, arriving there early in January, I believe, 1946.

At the outset I will go into a matter of detail which really is quite out of place in the broad picture which I am trying to paint for you here; but, since it has been talked about a great deal, I think it is important to clear it up, and that is the preparation of the instructions which were issued to General Marshall.

I think he was questioned about that, and there have been various charges and countercharges having to do with the preparation of those instructions. The story is very simple.

At the end of November 1945, Secretary Byrnes and General Marshall met. This was after General Marshall had been asked to go to China.

Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum suggesting the outline of instructions for him. General Marshall did not approve of it.

General Marshall said that he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some of his associates, in drafting the instructions.

This he did; and a draft was prepared by him, in conjunction with four generals who were working very closely with General Marshall. This was submitted to Secretary Byrnes.

On the 8th of December Secretary Byrnes made his suggestions to General Marshall—that is, suggestions of changes or alterations or additions to the draft prepared by General Marshall.

General Marshall's draft, with Secretary Byrnes' suggestions, was discussed at a meeting in Secretary Byrnes' office on Sunday morning, December 9, 1945, by Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall, Mr. John Carter Vincent, General Hull, and myself. I was then Undersecretary of State.

Those of us went over the instructions. General Marshall approved the suggestions made by Secretary Byrnes, and we then had a completely agreed draft.

In the course of that meeting the outline of a letter from the President to General Marshall was discussed and directions were given for its preparation.

There was also approved at the meeting a memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War, requesting certain help in connection with the removal of the Japanese and the movement of Chinese armies into the North and laying down certain restrictions on those movements.

There was also agreed upon the form of a press release, I believe—it was agreed that day or a few days later—but the important papers were agreed at that meeting.

They were taken up by Secretary Byrnes with the President, who went over them; and they were put in final shape, unchanged from the agreements of December 9.

The President then had a meeting with General Marshall, at which I was present—there were three of us at that meeting, the President, General Marshall, and myself—and at that point the signed letter and the inclosures were handed to General Marshall.

It was ascertained by the President at that meeting that these papers were unanimously approved and agreeable to all concerned, and to himself.

Now, that is the account of the preparation of these instructions.

All the papers concerned are printed in the White Book, with one exception. The press release, which I mentioned a moment ago, which was given out on the 15th of December—everything in the press release was in General Marshall's instructions. In other words, the press release was a verbatim statement of what was in the instructions to General Marshall, except that certain paragraphs in the instructions were omitted from the press release.

One of those omissions had to do with what is printed in the White Paper and in the memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War. That was the discretion and authority given to General Marshall in not moving Nationalist Government troops into areas in which there was fighting until he thought that that was a wise thing to do.

That was not to be stated and released because obviously it wouldn't work if it were.

Another omission, two other omissions had to do with things which we would do if the Chinese Government asked us to do it. Obviously you do not print in the newspapers that you will do something if somebody else asks you to. You leave it to the other person to ask you to do that if they wish. That is the story of the instructions.

General Marshall arrived in China at the very end of December 1945. By February 1946, three major agreements had been reached between the Chinese Government and the Communists. These agreements grew out of the earlier agreements of October 11, 1945, which discussed the general principles for working out peacefully the differences between the Communists and the Government.

The agreements of January and February 1946 carried into considerable detail how this should be done. In regard to these three agreements which I shall describe, General Marshall had a part only in one, and that was in the first one.

The first agreement was for the cessation of hostilities.² It provided that all fighting should cease, and it provided for the setting up of an Executive headquarters in which there would be American chairmanship and Nationalist and Communist representation, the purpose of this Executive headquarters being to bring the fighting to an end, and these tripartite teams were set up which went to every area where there was any clashing between the troops, and together they brought that fighting

²Mr. Acheson made a correction in subsequent testimony, stating: "... I said, through inadvertence, that General Marshall participated only in the cessation of hostilities.

"He also participated in the reorganization of the Army . . .

"The one he did not participate in was the governmental reorganization and the constitutional."

to an end and tried to have that truce develop into a more substantial truce.

General Marshall played a very considerable part in working this out. The Executive headquarters was the really great instrumentality which set up and worked very well until the two parties fell apart—then nothing worked.

The second agreement was an agreement for governmental reorganization and for a constitutional government, and the third agreement was for a military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into those of the National Government.

As I said, General Marshall participated in the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, but he did not participate in working out the second or the third agreement.

The second agreement for working out a constitutional government recognized the preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the National Government. It provided that there was to be an interim state council, sort of a provisional government, which would govern until the new constitution was established and elections were held throughout China and a constitutional government was set up in which all the people of China would have their representatives, and which would function on a two-party or multiparty system.

The interim state council was to function in this interim period as the supreme organ of the state. The Kuomintang Party was given 20 of the 40 seats in this national council. The other 20 seats were distributed among the Communists and the other parties and to some nonparty people. It was provided that the Generalissimo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of China, should select all the members of the council, that is, he would select those from his own party and those from all the other parties. However, he would have to appoint a certain number from these other minority parties. That would leave him with 20 people whom he had selected from his own party, with 20 people whom he had selected from the other parties, including the Communists, and it would also leave him with a veto over any action of this council which could only be overridden by a three-fifths vote, which could not be done if his own party stayed with him.

Now, that, I say, was the temporary government. That was to continue until the constitution was to be agreed upon on May 4, through the National Assembly, May 4, 1946, and it was hoped that at an early date, sometime in '46 or '47, I believe it was, there could be an election, and they would then set up a regular constitutional government with legislative, judicial and executive branches, in which all parts of China would be represented, so that this country would have a government extending over all the area.

The third agreement had to do with the amalgamation of the forces, and that was the most im-

portant one. It provided that there should be a great reduction in forces on both sides, because China could not support the tremendous military establishment which existed on the Nationalist side and on the Communist side together.

The army was to consist of 60 divisions. Of those 60 divisions, 50 were to be National Government divisions and 10 were to be Communist divisions. These divisions were to be grouped together in armies, armies which would contain three divisions or whatever the Chinese military order of battle is. There would be several divisions in each army.

The divisions were to be stationed in certain numerical strengths in various parts of China.

The important thing here about the agreement, as we look back on it, was that so far as Manchuria was concerned, the agreement provided that in Manchuria there should be 15 divisions of the new government's troops. Of those 15 divisions, 14 should be national government divisions and one should be a Communist division. That was of the greatest possible importance. If that could have been carried out, the whole situation might have been very different.

In 1946 the situation of comparative peace which had been brought about as a result of the agreements in the early part of the year began to deteriorate. Fighting broke out in various places.

General Marshall, in trying to stop this fighting, through the Executive headquarters, got drawn into greater detail in some of the political negotiations between the two parties, because this fighting rapidly took on political aspects.

One side or the other would believe that it could gain an advantage by capturing this or that city or area, and believed it could strengthen itself in the negotiations; and then would start an attack. Either the Communists would attack the Nationalists or the Nationalists would attack the Communists, and in that way this situation became worse and worse; and General Marshall's efforts were unable to deal with it.

Therefore, the whole discussions between the Communists and the Nationalists in the attempt to work out the interim government, and the long-term constitutional government, got into more and more and more confusion and trouble.

The Prime Minister of China, Doctor Sun Fo, has an interesting comment on this period. In a New Year's message which he delivered on January 1, 1949, speaking of the period which I have been discussing, he said:

The Government had decided to call this conference because it was generally realized that the country and the people needed recuperation and peace, so that rehabilitation work could be started. Had these measures been carried out at that time all of us would have seen more prosperity and happiness in our midst. Unfortunately, all the parties concerned could not completely abandon their own selfish ends and the people in general did not exert sufficient influence in promoting this peace movement.

The result of the breakdown was that the situation developed into one of very considerable fighting by the end of 1946, and when General Marshall left China in 1947, January 1947, to return to Washington, the American effort to mediate in this struggle between the Government and the Communists ended.

General Marshall issued a long statement, which I shall not bother to read to you now, but it sums up very clearly his understanding of the difficulties which brought failure to his mission, and his understanding of the difficulties in the Chinese Government, which could not really permit it to function unless they were removed.

These difficulties, in some respects, had their roots in the fact that the liberal elements in the Kuomintang Party were the ones which were dealt with much more severely by the war and the inflation. Inflation and war tend to eliminate the middle class, and that is where the liberal elements came into the Kuomintang, and as the inflation and the war went forward, the power in the party shifted more to the extreme right wing; and General Marshall, in his farewell message, spoke of the importance of more liberal leadership in the Kuomintang Party itself.

But as I say, the effort to mediate came to an end with his departure. From then on we go into the military period of the struggle between the two Governments.

Military Struggle Between Nationalists and Communists

The National Government reached a peak of its military holdings toward the end of 1946. In the middle of '46 it had approximately 3,000,000 men under arms. These were opposed by something over 1,000,000 Communist troops of whom about 400,000 were not regulars but were guerrilla troops.

Until the end of '46 and the early part of '47, the gains, the military gains made by the Nationalist Government appeared to be impressive, but in fact they were not, and General Marshall repeatedly pointed out to the Government that what it was doing was overextending itself militarily and politically, since it neither had sufficient troops to garrison this whole area nor did it have sufficient administrators to administer the areas that it was taking over.

Therefore what it was doing by this military advance was weakening itself both militarily and through administrative ineptitude, because it didn't have the necessary administrators; it was not giving the people of the occupied areas what they had been led to expect when the National Government came in, so politically it was doing itself harm, and militarily it was doing itself harm.

General Barr points out it was during this period that what he calls the wall psychology took possession of the Chinese Nationalist Army. He had

pointed out over and over again that in modern warfare the most disastrous of all things to do is to retreat into a city behind walls and take a defensive position. Modern warfare must be a war of maneuver.

Therefore, time and time and time again, these Nationalist lines got pushed way forward; finally the troops at the end take up defensive positions behind some kind of walls, a long line of communication has to be guarded, which eventually is cut, and over and over again the troops at the end of the line either go over to the side of the enemy without firing a shot, or sufficient of them do so that those who want to fight can't fight.

That was the story of the war from 1946 on. At first, it looked very successful—lots of areas occupied, important cities taken—but the armies all go to garrison, they become immobilized, and maneuver and initiative is left with the Communists.

At the end of '46 the Government had 2,600,000 men under arms and the Communists had about 1,100,000 of regulars.

However, in firepower, in rifle firepower, the Government still enjoyed a superiority of 3 or 4 to 1 over the Communists.

In '46, when this fighting started, General Marshall was acting as mediator. He called on both sides to stop the fighting. Both professed to want to do it, but did not do it.

Therefore, General Marshall asked for and obtained from this Government an embargo on the shipment of combat matériel into China. That embargo lasted from the time it was imposed in '46, the exact date I do not have with me—

Senator Brewster. You don't have that date?

Secretary Acheson. I have it here. We will look it up and put it in in a minute—until May 1947. During that time the Nationalists were winning the battles, they won the fights they had, they occupied the cities, but they immobilized themselves.

Need for Reform in China

We have talked from time to time here about the great necessity for reform in China. General Marshall, during his mission to China, stressed that over and over again with the Generalissimo, pointing out that the whole possibility of any kind of armed action against the Communists must at last rest upon a belief in the country and their own belief that they had something which was worth fighting for, and was progressive and good, and that if we did not have reform in China, we were never going to get this spirit which was necessary to fight and defeat the Communists.

After General Marshall returned, in the summer of 1947, the President, on the recommendation of General Marshall, sent General Wedemeyer to China on a fact-finding mission. General Wedemeyer, before he left, stressed again, as he had in

1945, the great importance and the necessity for reform.

He said before he left China for the United States:

To regain and maintain the confidence of the people, the Central Government will have to effect immediately drastic and far-reaching political and economic reforms. Promises will no longer suffice. Performance is absolutely necessary. It should be accepted that military force in itself will not eliminate communism.

General Wedemeyer went to China and returned. He made recommendations, which are printed in the White Paper, in which he recommended assistance of economic and military equipment for a 5-year period, which would require Congressional authorization. Although his actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that.

However, General Wedemeyer recognized the desirability and importance of avoiding direct United States involvement in the civil war in China by stating:

Although advice indicated above [that is, technical military advice] does provide advice indirectly to tactical force, it should be carried on outside operational areas to prevent the criticism that American personnel are actively engaged in fratricidal warfare.

There are other recommendations in the Wedemeyer report which I shall not dwell upon at the present time. We are now directing our attention to the aid part of it.

Consideration of Aid to China

The Secretary of State, General Marshall, then had prepared, and with the approval of the President, sent to Congress a recommendation for aid to China. He made before the Foreign Relations Committee a very frank statement of the problems facing the United States Government in considering aid to China.

He made it clear that there were steps which had to be taken and could only be taken by the Chinese Government, which were essential to meet the Communist threat.

And, he took the position strongly that the United States Government had to be extremely careful that it did not commit itself to a policy involving the absorption of its resources to an unpredictable extent by assuming a direct responsibility for the civil war in China, and for the Chinese economy.

He also pointed out that we must be prepared to face the possibility that the Chinese Government might not be able to maintain itself against the Chinese Communist forces.

That was stated quite clearly by General Marshall. In fact, he said:

An attempt to underwrite the Chinese economy and the Chinese Government's military efforts will result in a burden on the United States economy and a military

responsibility which I cannot recommend as a course of action for this Government.

Now, the program of aid which General Marshall presented was a program of 570 million dollars in economic assistance over a 15-month period. He pointed out that the experience gained in the program would throw light on the possibilities of future programs.

The program was sufficient in size, it was thought, to free the major portion of the Chinese Government's own foreign exchange assets for the purchase of such military supplies, from foreign sources, as it might need.

It was not recommended that we should have military advisers in combat areas.

It was not recommended that we should take measures of military aid which would lead to United States military intervention in China or direct involvement in the civil war.

Now, this question was very carefully considered in the Executive branch, at a meeting in June 1948 attended by Secretary Marshall, Secretary of the Army Royall, General Bradley and General Wedemeyer, and the decision which I have just spoken of was taken.

There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1946, and in 1947 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the Generalissimo, advice of a strategic nature, but the United States was not willing to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of the war.

General Marshall in a message to General Barr pointed out one reason why. He said:

I think you will agree that implications of our accepting that responsibility would be very far reaching and grave, and that such responsibility is in logic inseparable from the authority to make it effective. Whatever the Generalissimo may feel moved to say with respect to his willingness to delegate necessary powers to Americans, I know from my own experience that advice is always listened to very politely but not infrequently ignored when deemed unpalatable.

Therefore we did not take responsibility for the strategic direction of the war, nor did we recommend that American officers should be with troops in combat areas.

This recommendation was considered by the Eightieth Congress. The Eightieth Congress—and I shall not go through a whole long story—the Senate bill reduced the period of time from 15 months to 12 months. It reduced, split the appropriations and recommended 338 million dollars for economic aid and 125 million dollars as a special grant to be used at the discretion of the Chinese Government.

The debate indicates that the Chinese Government would probably use this 125 million dollars for military aid. In the course of the legislative history, the House put in a provision authorizing military advice on the so-called Greek model, that

is having officers with troops in combat areas and strategic advice. That was stricken out by the Senate, and in speaking about it Senator Vandenberg said:

As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your committee recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available at China's option. Your Committee believes that as a matter of elementary prudence that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist Government.

And, as I say, the House provision was stricken out.

That was agreed to in conference, and the bill was passed chiefly as written by the Senate.

I said that the bill authorized 338 million dollars for economic aid. However, when it came to the appropriation process, Congress only appropriated 275 million dollars for economic aid and 125 million dollars for military aid. So a total was actually made available by the Congress of 400 million dollars as against 570 million dollars requested.

I shall not go in detail through the campaigns of 1947 more than I have already done. The real collapse of the government in a military way began in the latter part of 1948. The first large-scale defection and collapse occurred in September 1948 with the fall of Tsinan, where government forces without any effort at all went over to the other side and surrendered with all their matériel.

The *United States Army Intelligence Review of Military Developments* in 1948, in January 1949, sums it up this way:

The Nationalists entered 1948 with an estimated strength of 2,723,000 troops. Recruitment and replacement of combat losses kept this figure constant through mid-September. By February 1, 1949, however, heavy losses had reduced Nationalist strength to a million and a half, of which approximately 500,000 are service troops. This represents a reduction of 45 percent of the Nationalist Government's total strength in a 4½-month period.

Communist strength, estimated at 1,150,000 a year ago, has mounted to 1,622,000, virtually all combat effectives. Whereas the Nationalists began 1948 with almost a 3 to 1 numerical superiority, the Communist forces now outnumber the total Nationalist strength and have achieved better than a 1½ to 1 superiority in combat effectives.

The events of the last year, and more specifically those of the last 4½ months, have resulted in such overwhelming losses to the National Government that, acting alone, its military position has declined beyond possible recoupment.

On the other hand, these same events have so enhanced the position and capabilities of the Communists that they are now capable of achieving a complete military victory over the Communist forces.

Chairman Russell. Nationalist forces.

Secretary Acheson. I mean Nationalist forces.

In mid-November, 1948, General Barr, who was the head of the military mission to China, reported to the Department of the Army:

I am convinced that the military situation has deteriorated to the point where only the active participation of United States troops could effect a remedy. No battle

has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. Their military debacles, in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale-destroying factors that led to a complete loss of the will to fight.

In another report early in 1949, he explained some of the causes for the National Government negotiations for the cessation of hostilities but he defeats. He says the Government committed its first politico-military blunder by concentrating on the military reoccupation of former Japanese-held areas. It gave very little consideration to regional sentiments or the creation of efficient local administrations. Its strategy was burdened by an unsound strategy conceived by a politically influenced and militarily inept high command.

Throughout the structure and machinery of the National Government there are interlocking ties of interests, family, financial and political. No Chinese, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority because he is the best qualified man. He must have other backing. In too many cases, such backing was the support and loyalty of the Generalissimo and his army comrades, which kept them in posts of responsibility regardless of their qualifications. The direct result has been the unsound strategy and faulty tactics of the Nationalists in their fight against the Communists.

Senator Wiley. Whose report was that?

Secretary Acheson. That is General Barr, United States Army.

By the end of 1948 the struggle in North China had virtually ended with the complete collapse of the Nationalist armies. Eighty percent of all the matériel which we had furnished, both during the war and after, to the National Government, was lost; and 75 percent of that is estimated to have been captured by the Communists.³

One reason for this large capture, General Barr points out, when he says that the Chinese Nationalist Government never destroyed any—the troops never destroyed any of the matériel, when they were about to surrender or run.

He says,

The Chinese seemed inherently unable to destroy anything of value.

Summary of U. S. Policy in China

Now, at the very end of my remarks here, I briefly sum up some of the things, material and otherwise, which the United States did in aid of its policy in China.

Speaking, first, of things on which it is impossible to put a dollar value, first, is the aid rendered by the United States forces in China in planning and in carrying out the movement of the Chinese Government forces into the areas occupied by the Japanese.

³ Exclusive of ammunition.

Second, is the evacuation of the Japanese troops from those areas.

Third, is the aid rendered by the United States Marines in North China; in occupying key areas and maintaining control for the government of essential railway lines until the government was able to take over.

Fourth, the aid provided by the United States Military Advisory Group.

Apart from this, the United States Government, in the period from VJ-Day until early 1949, authorized grants and credits to China totaling approximately 2 billion dollars, of which approximately a billion, six, were grants, 4 hundred million were on credit terms.

This total is divided almost equally between military and economic aid. The amounts do not include United States surplus property, except where the sales were on credit terms.

Surplus property, with a total estimated procurement cost of over a billion dollars, has been sold to China for the agreed realization to the United States of 230 million dollars, of which 95 million were on credit terms.

By the spring of 1949, the military position of the Chinese Government collapsed to the point where the Chinese Communists controlled the major centers of population, and railways from Manchuria south to the Yangtze.

The military collapse of the Chinese Government had, for the most part, been the consequence of inept political and military leadership, and a lack of the will to fight on the part of its armies, rather than inadequate military supplies.

It was at that time the considered judgment of responsible United States Government observers in China that only the extension of unlimited American economic and military aid involving the use of our own troops and operations which might require the extensive control of Chinese Government operations would enable the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in South China.

It was believed that United States involvement in Chinese civil war under the existing conditions would be clearly contrary to American interests.

As the last note of this tragic story, I should like to read you the message of the Acting President of China, General Li Tsung-jen.

Senator Wiley. What is the date?

Secretary Acheson. May 5, 1949, in a letter which he addressed to President Truman. He says:

This policy—[he had described our help to China during the war, and then he had discussed our aid to China after the war as I have described it to you]—This policy of friendly assistance was continued when some years ago General Marshall under instructions from your good self took up the difficult task of mediation in our conflict with the Chinese Communists to which he devoted painstaking effort. All this work was unfortunately rendered fruitless by the lack of sincerity on the part of both the then government and the Chinese Communists.

In spite of this your country continued to extend its aid to our Government. It is regrettable that owing to the failure of our then government to make judicious use of this aid and to bring about appropriate political, economic and military reforms, your assistance has not produced the desired effect. To this failure is attributable the present predicament in which our country finds itself.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Fifth Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, Florence, Italy, May 22-June 17, 1950. International Organization and Conference Series IV; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 13. Pub. 4050. 136 pp. 35¢

Report of the United States delegation with selected documents.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Ecuador. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2147. Pub. 4063. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Quito September 15, 1950; entered into force September 20, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

Air Service: Facilities at Tan-Son-Nhut Airport in Indochina. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2150. Pub. 4067. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Signed at Saigon October 19, 1948; entered into force October 19, 1948.

Agricultural Mission in Nicaragua. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2152. Pub. 4071. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Nicaragua—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Managua January 25 and February 1, 1950; entered into force February 1, 1950.

Food Production: Cooperative Program in Haiti. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2153. Pub. 4072. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti modifying agreement of August 28, 1944, as modified and extended—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Port-au-Prince June 30, 1949; entered into force June 30, 1949.

Food Production: Cooperative Program in Haiti. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2154. Pub. 4073. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Port-au-Prince September 18 and 27, 1950; entered into force September 29, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Haiti. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2156. Pub. 4074. 5 pp. 5¢.

(Continued on page 998)

Latin America's Role in Thinking Ahead for Business

by Edward G. Miller, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

Few people in this country realize the importance of Latin America to United States business as a whole. Last year 35 percent of our imports came from Latin America and 27 percent of all United States exports went to Latin America. These exports totaled approximately 2.7 billion dollars, which was very nearly as much as our total of exports to Europe. United States exports to Western Europe in 1950 were valued at roughly 2.9 billion dollars, just 210 million dollars more than our Latin American exports, and nearly 2 billion dollars of United States trans-Atlantic exports were paid for out of Marshall Plan funds.

Similarly, Latin America is extremely important as a field for United States foreign investment. At the end of the year 1949, United States private investment in Latin America totaled over 5.8 billion dollars. Dollar investments have flowed to Latin America since the war at an unprecedented rate. In the 3 years from 1947 through 1949, 1.7 billion dollars was added to the total of private United States investment in Latin America. The 1950 year end figures are not yet complete, but it is safe to say we now have well over 6 billion dollars invested in Latin America. In comparison, private American investment outside the Western Hemisphere totals something over 7 billion dollars.

The scope of United States economic involvement in Latin America becomes particularly impressive when it is realized that the population of Latin America represents less than 7 percent of the population of the world, having recently, like the United States population, passed the 150 million mark.

Even more impressive is the fact that not only is the population comparatively small to have assumed such an important role for United States business, but that this importance has been attained despite the fact that these countries are still, in view of their great potential, only on the threshold of their industrial development. For

example, in 1949, United States national income was nine times as great as the combined incomes of all of the Latin American nations.

Comparing the United States and Mexico, for example, the Mexican per capita income was the equivalent of \$121 when United States per capita income was \$1,453, in 1949. There were 5.5 passenger cars in Mexico per thousand population in 1949. There were 243 per thousand in the United States.

But perhaps the most significant aspect of what we have been discussing from the standpoint of United States business for the future is that Latin America is not static; that economic growth is proceeding at a very rapid pace even in relation to this country. To my mind, this fact—that Latin America is developing at a fast pace—is the main fact in thinking ahead for business. In the case of Mexican automobiles, for instance, according to Mexican Government statistics, motor vehicle registrations have climbed 140 percent since 1937. Registrations have increased 50 percent in the United States in the same period.

The last 20 years have brought tremendous economic growth in Latin America, and in many ways more progress has occurred during this period than in the preceding century, at least in regard to industrial and commercial development.

It is reasonable to assume that this rate of growth will be maintained in Latin America, provided always that the necessary imports of capital equipment will be forthcoming during the period of shortages imposed by the present emergency. I will go further and say that since development in itself promotes development, the rate of growth in Latin America should be even greater in the future, all other things being equal. A necessary consequence is that the standard of living of Latin America and the per capita purchasing power should continually increase in relation to United States levels. An important factor in this connection is the progressive development of efficient labor forces in these countries as new industries are created. And, of course, as we

¹Address made before the Harvard Business School Association at Boston, Mass., on June 9 and released to the press on the same date.

all know from the history of this country, more growth means more opportunities.

A second fact to be remembered is that the growth which has occurred in Latin America is to a large extent the result of a factor which was not operative in the economic growth of the United States. In this country expansion of our economy has been fairly constant throughout our history and, except for periods of war and national emergency, has been a more or less "natural" process, individual initiative applied in an uncoordinated way to the development of resources. In Latin America there is no such record of steady growth. Rather, many of the economies were relatively static for a long time in regard to industrial development, the principal effort having been devoted to agriculture and real estate. In the last 20 years, in most countries, a radical change has occurred and industrial development has surged ahead suddenly. This surge has come about to an important degree by popular demand. The people in Latin America, as in other parts of the world, are not content with their lot and they are no longer apathetic about it. They want a greater share of the good things of life. They want their countries to be prosperous, to offer them greater opportunities for employment and broader horizons for their children.

These are pressures to which the governments of Latin America are subjected and, by and large, these governments have become increasingly responsive to the will of the people. I think they will become even more responsive in the future, for the critical problem for governments in many Latin American countries during the next few decades may well be whether or not living standards and social development will advance rapidly enough to keep discontent from boiling over into blind destruction or from being utilized by international communism for its own ruthless and antidemocratic ends.

Efforts Toward Economic Expansion

What can be seen now in many countries of the hemisphere are determined and conscious efforts to bring about economic expansion. In some cases, government agencies have been formed to cope with the problem, as in the case of the Chilean Development Corporation and the Mexican Nacional Financiera. In Puerto Rico, where the problem is the same as in the independent countries of Latin America, we have the notable example of Governor Munoz Marin's so-called "Operation Bootstrap," where the Government has not only taken direct action in stimulating industrial activity but has also sought to create the conditions which attract private capital investment from the United States.

It might be said parenthetically that our Government has seen fit on its own part to help economic expansion in Latin America through means appropriate for governmental activity. Our

programs of technical and economic cooperation through such agencies as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the Export-Import Bank, and the International Bank are too well known to be dealt with here. I shall only say that the activities of these institutions have been directed toward providing basic public services and participating in programs of basic development which in turn help promote private activity.

Recently our Government's efforts in the field of economic development have been subject to a searching review by a distinguished group of citizens under the chairmanship of Nelson Rockefeller. Their conclusions have been embodied in a report which, in substance, recommends a considerable intensification of this type of activity. The report also recommends new methods by which our Government can help stimulate the increased flow of private capital abroad. These include tax incentive measures, investment treaties, and limited guaranties by the Export-Import Bank of specific investment projects. These are all measures which have been receiving active study by our Government. A special value of the report is that it rationalizes the relative participation of public and private endeavor in the expansion of economic activity in underdeveloped areas.

There are, then, two main facts to be borne in mind in regard to the future in Latin America. First, that economic growth in this area has been proceeding rapidly and will probably continue even more rapidly; and, second, that this trend is in large measure the result of a new awakening and demand by the people for more economic activity.

Naturally, these trends are characterized by certain aspects which are not entirely in accord with classical doctrines of international economics. In a number of cases we have seen the creation of new industries which are economically unsound to the extent that they depend upon undue tariff protection or are uneconomic from the standpoint of accessibility of raw materials. There has been in some countries a tendency toward governmental ownership of industry, where, again, the results may be uneconomic from the standpoint of such indices as productivity per man-hour. In still other countries the climate may be hostile for the entrance of foreign capital. The people and the government of the country concerned may wish to reserve for themselves exclusively the task of developing their resources. There are numerous other problems of a similar nature which could be enumerated.

Attitude of U.S. Business

In considering the factors affecting private business in Latin America, what should be the attitude of United States business? First, of course, there is no question that there are tremendous opportunities in the hemisphere—opportunities

tunities for constructive assistance on the part of United States business in the sound development of the economy of these countries. On the other hand, the conditions under which foreign capital is going to be allowed to participate in these opportunities will depend upon the freely exercised sovereign will of the 20 independent countries which comprise this area of the free world. We in our Government, or you in business, may not approve of some of the economic theories and practices which we see in other countries. We may think they are unwise even from the standpoint of the long-range self-interest of the other country. We may deplore them in speeches and resolutions. We—and now I am speaking of the government alone—may do our best to bring about better understanding of our motives, of our views as to the functions of responsible capital investment in the modern world; we may and do try through representations in individual cases and through our efforts to negotiate economic treaties to bring about an improved climate for private activity. We have consistently pointed out that the problem of development is not one that can be solved by government activities, that true and balanced development can only happen by permitting full play to the forces of private initiative and skills, both domestic and foreign. We have emphasized, and we shall continue to emphasize that United States Government economic assistance can be more effectively brought to bear in countries where these conditions exist.

But I repeat: The terms and conditions under which foreign capital will be admitted into another country is up to that country. We as a government will most scrupulously respect the sovereign right of each juridically equal nation of the hemisphere to run its own affairs. We in the Department of State—as much as we may admire the achievements of individual enterprise—cannot undertake the functions of sponsors of United States capital investment. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States is not out to impose its systems on other countries.

Therefore, it seems to me that the wisest attitude business can assume in thinking about investment in Latin America is to try to see things as they are and to work within the existing scheme of things. This may mean that business will stay entirely out of situations that are precarious. In other cases, it will mean putting up with certain difficulties of the kinds which I have enumerated, but I suppose that nowhere in the world are the conditions for business exactly what business would like to see, and that goes for the laws of our own Federal Union and its 48 component States.

This also means, I think, that the most effective contribution to a favorable climate for private investment is for American business, both here and abroad, to show that it represents the best system in the world—the best system not only from the standpoint of productivity but in the light of the

desire of people everywhere to get a better share of the good things of life. All business, in short, must prove itself. You and I believe that United States private enterprise is the best system, but it does not follow automatically that other people—people with different habits and traditions—will necessarily think as we do about this particular aspect of our national life. The only way that other people can be brought to believe in this system is for them to be convinced that it works, and that it works not only here but in their country, whatever it may be. How, specifically, can business prove itself in this way? There would be no point in my lecturing you, who have wider experience than I have in this field, so I suggest that the best guides are found in the records of the American enterprises which have had the greatest success in Latin America.

Almost without exception, if they have done well, they have abided by the rules and regulations of the other country. This may seem an obvious precept, almost too obvious to mention. However, real doubt from time to time is engendered abroad as to the willingness of American capital to live within the rules of the game in a particular country.

Secondly, the American interests which have been most esteemed and in general have been most fairly treated in Latin America are those which have shown a genuine concern for the general welfare of the other country. It seems to have been particularly, and understandably, difficult for Americans to see eye-to-eye with Latin American governments on what constitutes “general welfare” where government-sponsored development programs were under way. But to date nothing has been achieved by bucking the plans of a sovereign government. American enterprise has made great contributions to the development of national steel enterprises in Brazil and Chile, and in the latter over 150 American technicians, furnished by American companies, are now contributing to the welfare of Chile and to our own relations with that country. In Colombia, an American oil company whose concession has expired is assisting the Colombian Government to continue to operate the concession. These examples will go far to promote the interest of private enterprise as a whole.

In some cases great strides have been made by improving public relations of American enterprises in general and labor relations in particular. A number of American enterprises have decided they could no longer content themselves with the claim that they pay better wages than other countries. At this point, personnel management programs and similar devices prove to be very valuable aids to successful operation. The effort that is being put forth by certain American interests to apply in Latin America the labor-management procedures which we have developed here is, to my mind, the most worthwhile effort of all.

It would be well to bear in mind that the interests of capitalism and labor, far from being irreconcilable, are in the true sense of the word identical. One of the most eloquent statements of this case is by William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, who on October 13, 1950 said:

Communism has sought to make a bogey of capitalism by painting it as a system of exploitation and oppression, imposed on the many for the benefit of the few. They preach that capitalism is doomed, since it bears within it the seeds of its own destruction.

Trade unionism, on the other hand, has demonstrated to the world that there has never been anything wrong with capitalism that higher wages and shorter hours could not cure. It has shown that capitalism can mean more democracy, not less, and that it can bring material, cultural and social progress and improvement to the many rather than the few. Modern trade unionism is an outgrowth of industrial capitalism and has provided the mechanism whereby the fruits of capitalism have been distributed over an ever widening area of the populace. Far from being foredoomed, capitalism has thus borne within it the seeds of its own salvation. This is the revolutionary message that American labor is placing before the workers of the world today.

If, in their Latin American operations, United States business can foster that type of labor philosophy, we have no reason to fear for the future of free enterprise, both local and foreign, in Latin America. And it must be obvious to any one who has been in Latin America that American concerns, if they are given the chance and if they will, can speed the growth of democratic labor leadership. It is fortunately true that attention to labor relations and personnel problems is coming to be another characteristic of the United States concerns in Latin America which have the most promising future. They abide by local laws, they evidence a broader concern that the short-range welfare of their own enterprise, and they put into practice at least some of the lessons in labor-management relations which business has learned here at home.

There are other developments which I think we should hope will become characteristic. There are the number of cases in which United States enterprises are working very hard to develop responsible local management and to reduce the number of United States citizens occupying top managerial positions, as well as top technical positions. There are the signs of increasing interest in incentive and bonus plans, as well as private retirement plans along the lines of those which have been successful in this country.

Also, American enterprises abroad are becoming more and more aware of the advantages of stock participation on the part of citizens of the other country. The enlightened self-interest involved in this type of program is evident when it is realized that one of the principal obstacles to development in Latin America has been the unavailability of local risk capital. It is all too evident that one of the principal deterrents to economic progress

in other countries is a tendency to invest in real estate or family businesses and to expect a rate of return on capital investment far higher than our own investors and many times higher than equity investors expect here. It is encouraging, therefore, to see an American-owned public utility in Brazil currently financing part of the local currency costs of a major expansion program through sales of common stock to small investors who are served by the company.

Finally, American businessmen abroad are becoming more flexible and are learning increasingly to adjust to the requirements of the local scene and to the shifts which occur from time to time. They are becoming more farsighted and are learning to keep on the move.

In substance, the lesson which American business abroad is teaching us is that business abroad must act as part of the local community, not as an absentee-owned organization interested only in deriving profit, particularly not as an organization seeking hit-and-run profits from its enterprise. The entire scope of our relations with our neighbors is helped by such farsighted ventures as the Pan American School of Agriculture at Zamorano in Honduras which is supported by the United Fruit Company and the work of the Rockefeller Foundation in many countries of this hemisphere.

Developing a Mutual Confidence

I hope what I have said will not be understood as a Government spokesman urging American capital to go abroad or urging other countries to accept American capital. Private capital will move only of its own free will—that is, only if the investor finds that the risks in a particular situation are compensated by the opportunities over the long pull. There are still many opportunities for investment within the United States, which will naturally have a higher priority for the investor if the attractiveness of a situation outside of the country is less than the hazards with which that situation is encumbered.

In other words, while it is true that all United States business abroad must prove itself to other countries, by the same token the other countries must show a real understanding of the problems of business. In some countries, even those which allege a desire for foreign capital, and even where American private investment has made great contributions to the general welfare, the conditions do not exist which are essential to attract American investment away from the investment opportunities which this country still presents and will always present. So long as there is discrimination in foreign countries, so long as foreign companies are made the butt of local political maneuvers, there will naturally be skepticism in the business community of this country in regard to any country in which such practices exist. In these cases American capital will not go.

The problem of private capital working abroad is, finally, one which depends upon mutual confidence. In many countries, excellent progress has been made in establishing a climate favorable for private initiative. In some countries of the hemisphere, the requisite mutual confidence is today a reality. In others, it exists to a lesser extent. In some, it does not exist at all. In thinking ahead for business, the great challenge is to prove over the long pull that the countries having confidence in United States private investment are following the right approach from the standpoint of their own self-interest.

Relations With Bolivia Resumed

[Released to the press June 7]

The Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States in La Paz, Thomas J. Maleady, has been instructed to resume diplomatic relations with the Bolivian Government today.

This action is being taken in conformity with the desire of the United States to carry on normal diplomatic relations with the Bolivian Government, and in accordance with our information that the new Government there has established effective control over Bolivian territory and has given satisfactory indication of its intention to fulfill the international obligations of Bolivia.

Letters of Credence

Australia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Australia, P. C. Spender, K. C., presented his credentials to the President on June 8, 1951. For a text of the Ambassador's remarks and for a text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 497 of June 8.

Colombia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Colombia, Cipriano Jaramillo Restrepo presented his credentials to the President on June 5, 1951. For a text of the translation of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 476 of June 5.

Guatemala

The newly appointed Ambassador of Guatemala, Carlos H. Aldana Sandoval, presented his credentials to the President on June 4, 1951. For a text of the translation of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 469 of June 4.

Point 4 Agreement With Lebanon

On June 5 the Department of State announced that a Point 4 general agreement between the United States and Lebanon was signed on May 29 in Beirut. American Chargé d'Affaires John H. Bruins signed for the United States and Foreign Minister Husayn Uwayni for Lebanon. The agreement becomes effective upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies of Lebanon.

In making the announcement, Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett explained that Point 4 is already at work in Lebanon under a project agreement, signed last February, for water-power and irrigation development of the Litani Valley, Dr. Bennett said,

The General Agreement paves the way for a broader program of economic development to further Lebanon's country-wide plans.

A mission of 10 specialists from the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Interior, headed by Robert F. Herdman, of Pueblo, Colorado, arrived in Beirut last month. They are technicians in hydroelectric power, irrigation, and reclamation. They are cooperating with the Government of Lebanon in surveying the 125-mile-long valley of the Litani River.

This work is of prime importance in a country only 4,000 square miles in extent (about the size of Connecticut) but with a population of 1,200,000 persons. Irrigation, reclamation, and hydroelectric power together can do much to increase both agricultural and industrial production and raise the standard of living of the people.

The contract with the American University of Beirut means the establishment of a training center for students from all the Arab states. The trainees are chosen by their Governments and approved jointly by the University and the Point 4 mission in Beirut. They must agree to spend at least a year in the public service of their countries, after completing their courses in the University. The 118 students graduated yearly will form a nucleus of experts and of teachers for the further spreading of technical knowledge.

More than two-thirds of Lebanon's people live on farms, and agriculture forms the principal support of the country. Fruits and garden products are grown in quantities sufficient for the needs of the people. Large quantities of cereals must be imported. Development of the Litani River Valley would bring more land into production and would supply the power and irrigation for agriculture, industry, and sanitation work.

Dr. Bennett also announced the approval of project requests for personnel to operate four experimental laboratories to study improvement in the selection of seeds, protection of plants against disease and pests, increasing the number of pedigreed livestock, introduction of plants of economic value, augmenting the cooperative movement, and the preparation of agricultural statistics. American technicians will be assigned to Lebanon in the fields of soil chemistry, plant protection, fruit growing, farm mechanics, geophysics, agricultural cooperatives, marketing, animal and poultry husbandry, fisheries, forage crops, and land taxation.

Organizing for Peace

by Thomas D. Cabot

*Director for International Security Affairs*¹

It would have been pleasant to come to Tufts today with some thoughts of new horizons and to encourage those of you who are graduating to work at the exciting problems of pioneering a bold, new world. But you and I know that today's horizons are cloudy and the future uncertain. Those of you who will shortly enter the armed services need no reminder that our nation and the other free nations of the world face tremendous problems which take precedence over our usual activities.

I do not want to imply that the days of pioneering are over. Nor do I wish to suggest that the kind of civilization we have now is good enough, or that the members of this graduating class will have no opportunity to improve it. I only wish to point out that there are certain grim realities which we must face before we can turn our attention to anything else. Our first task is to save our existing civilization.

You are aware of the present threat. We are confronted by a nation which makes no secret of its intent to dominate the entire world or of its faith in the inevitability of its victory. This nation, in pursuing its aggressive designs, does not restrict itself to any single method or tactic. It uses every trick in the books. It maintains the largest army on earth and threatens its neighbors with military destruction, while at the same time posing as a champion of peace. It seeks to undermine existing governments by political subversion and economic sabotage. It appeals to the legitimate aspirations of peoples in all lands for an improvement in social conditions, for freedom from economic tyranny, for national independence—and, having gained their allegiance, promptly subjects them to a tyranny and slavery many times worse than that which they sought to escape. Finally, it has now proved that, when other methods fail and when the circumstances seem appropriate, it is willing to resort to direct military aggression.

A few years ago, in discussions of the Soviet

timetable, 1952 and 1953 were generally regarded as the critical years. These years once seemed a long way off; now they are upon us. The Soviets are quickening the pace of their aggressive preparations; they are growing more reckless, more impatient, less subtle. It is already later than we think.

Our Two Major Tasks

Today, we Americans and our friends and allies throughout the world face two fundamental tasks. The first is to achieve and maintain peace, if peace is at all possible. The second is simply to survive.

Let us not regard lightly our first aim—the aim of maintaining peace. The entire program of our Government has been built around the principle that peace is both possible and infinitely desirable. At the same time, let no one make the mistake of believing that the American people are afraid to fight, or that we will accept peace at any price. Our enemies, especially, should avoid the fatal error of believing that our desire to avoid the sacrifice and destruction of war means that we are “soft” or unwilling to defend ourselves.

Our desire for peace is based upon our fundamental respect for the well-being of individual human beings and our knowledge that another world war would be more devastating and more terrible than anything the world has ever known. We know that there are millions of men now living who will die if war is forced upon us. Cities will be utterly wiped from the face of the earth, families will be broken, children will be left homeless. These things may be unimportant to the men in the Kremlin, but they are important to us. Therefore, so long as there exists a reasonable hope for an honorable peace, we must make the necessary effort.

But, if the men in the Kremlin cannot be persuaded that war will be as destructive for them as for ourselves—if they insist on offering us no choice except war or surrender—we will not choose

¹ Address before Tufts College at Medford, Mass., on June 10 and released to the press on the same date.

surrender. Nor will we choose the gradual surrender, the creeping surrender, represented by appeasement, by giving up our allies, by permitting the piecemeal conquest of the free world. Our primary aim is peace, but an even more basic aim is survival. We pray that the Soviet imperialists will not force us to choose between these aims, but if they do, we have left no doubt as to what our choice will be.

The problem of survival today is at once military, economic, and political. It is a problem for science, for ethics, for religion, and even for the arts. It is a problem of Europe, of Asia, of Africa, of the Americas, and of every area of the globe. In hard, cold, practical terms, the problem of survival today is a problem of strength—the total strength of the free world against the total strength of the Soviet slave world.

Fortunately, it is possible for us to pursue our two major aims—peace and survival—along the same road. We have come to realize that strength is both the best deterrent to a Soviet war and the only remedy if war is forced upon us. Several experiences we have had in the last few years helped us to come to this conclusion. The struggle in Greece, for example. Communist-inspired guerrilla warfare in Greece came to an end when the Greek Government, with United States aid, showed the strength to put it down. The Berlin blockade is another example. When the Soviet rulers saw they could not defeat our airlift, the blockade was abandoned.

Strength, the Critical Factor

There is no question but that strength is the critical factor in the Kremlin's aggressive designs. The Soviet rulers well know that their ambitions to conquer the world depend on the strength they can commandeer, and they have used and will use every ruthless method and technique to get the resources and the manpower they think is necessary.

In the free world, we cannot build strength that way. We must meet the threat of a ruthless dictatorship through voluntary cooperative action consistent with our philosophy of freedom. We must seek new allies while retaining and strengthening those we have. It is a job which will require great skill and wisdom. Our social and economic policies must appeal to those who still control their own destiny. We must attract strength by the appeal of our moral position.

Strength which is voluntarily mustered, and supported by strong moral convictions among all the contributing peoples, is a kind of strength that no slave society can produce. The Soviet rulers, in forcing their subjects into aggressive action, destroy the most important component of strength—the will of the people. What we need to meet Soviet strength is a greater sense of urgency and more rapid action in the free world.

Soviet rulers and their puppets dominate about 800 million people—about one-third of the world population. That is their greatest potential strength. There are roughly half as many people in the United States and free Europe, but these 400-some million people are the most highly skilled and the most productive in the world.

You all know how we lead the world in industrial production and how we, in the United States, are rapidly expanding our basic capacity while, at the same time, converting a considerable part of it to producing the weapons needed for defense. Europe, too, is expanding its production. Together, we have a capacity that far outtops anything the Soviet world can produce.

Steel is one of the most important measures of strength in either a peacetime or a wartime economy. Last year, the United States and free Europe produced more than four times as much crude steel as the Soviet Union and its European satellites. The use of electric power is another good measure of strength. The United States and free Europe turned out five times as much electric energy last year as Russia and her satellites.

We are fortunate. The free world has many resources and skills at its disposal and it has the moral and spiritual values to hold firm and inspire support. The problem is to convert our great assets into the only kind of strength which is an effective deterrent to attack. It has not yet been possible, either here or in Europe, to use our steel, electric power, and industrial productivity of all sorts for tanks and planes and guns to the full extent needed to meet our present danger. Here in the United States, despite the lessons of Korea, we are, even today, devoting to defense a far smaller percentage of our abundant income than is extracted by the Soviets from the austere economy of Russia. In Western Europe, productive capacity has been devoted to rehabilitation from the disasters of the last war and to building a viable economy. Now with our Marshall Plan aid skillfully administered, the people of free Europe have resolutely rebuilt their industries, and production already exceeds that of prewar times. But this capacity must and can be converted in larger part to the production of weapons needed for rearmament.

In the same way, the peoples of Europe have undertaken to convert their human and moral resources into active and effective armed forces. We know that they can do this. Prior to 1939, the countries west of the iron curtain had raised and equipped armies considerably larger than those now contemplated for its defense, and had done so without outside help and without destroying the economic foundations of their societies. I have little doubt that they could do the same today, again without outside help, provided they were assured of having enough time to complete the task.

But time is the key problem. During the course of World War II, the armies of many free European countries almost ceased to exist, making it necessary to rebuild them from scratch. Moreover, the economic devastation of the war and the occupation, and the slow and painful process of economic recovery, made it extremely difficult for these countries to initiate an adequate rearmament program. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, disregarding all human values and giving full priority to erecting a mighty military machine on the foundations of slave labor, gained an enormous and almost overwhelming military advantage.

It is clear, therefore, why the free peoples of Europe need our help. Given time, there can be no doubt that these peoples can defend themselves. It is our task to help them get started—to use our dollars to buy the precious time they need. Once the European defense effort is fully under way, we can expect ever greater reliance on their own resources and facilities, and less and less dependence on United States aid.

From a purely selfish standpoint, this is the cheapest and perhaps the only way that we Americans can protect ourselves. This does not mean that we expect the Europeans to fight our battles for us, any more than it means that we propose to fight the Europeans' battles for them. It means simply that we have recognized our mutual dependence and realize that it is good business on our part to help the free Europeans develop the strength to defend themselves. To give the needed impetus and to avoid the long disheartening delay which Europe would have to face if it attempted its own rearmament without our help, we have been sending quantities of defense weapons, equipment, and supplies across the Atlantic during the past year, and the need for this mutual defense aid during the coming year is frankly as great. The bulk of Europe's need right now is for this kind of assistance—tanks and guns and weapons and supplies. But I do not want to underestimate the need also for spiritual and moral help. We all have to know that we can depend on each other, that we are in this together, and that we have equal determination to see it through.

Other areas, too, need our help. In Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, people have lived for centuries amidst great natural riches of the earth, and yet lived in poverty and disease, in a vicious circle of circumstances which did not allow them to benefit from their resources. In the last few years, a great change has come over many of these areas. New means of communication have awakened people to new possibilities. Many of them have won political independence, and have established governments determined to win a new life for their peoples. In many of these areas, they do not have the technical wherewithal to break through the circle that has claimed them for

so long. They need technical help. They need the technical knowledge that the United States can supply.

How To Withstand Communist Pressure

Given a chance, there is every reason to believe that these people can conquer their problems and become stable and secure members of the free world, contributing to its strength and to its security. The Soviet rulers have their eyes on these areas, and on the manpower and strategic resources they would gain through capturing them. They are putting pressure on them now, and they will continue to put pressure on them to try to force them into the Soviet world. The Soviet rulers would like to convince the people of Asia and the Near East that the better life they want will flow from Communist control. They are using every propaganda device to put this lie across. They see in Asia, in the Near East, and in Africa a means to multiply their power.

To withstand the Communist pressure, these areas need support. The particular problems vary from area to area. In some places, military aid is needed. Technical aid is needed almost everywhere. Some economic aid is needed. They need this help to make their efforts toward economic development successful, and only if they are successful in their quest for independence and economic security will they become stable components of a free society. Our own security depends on the success they meet.

With Latin America, we have long had cooperative arrangements to build the hemispheric solidarity and friendship that insure mutual security; and we have been able to see the effects of the technical aid we have given. Over a period of years, the Latin American governments have made a great deal of progress in establishing new economic standards and new production levels. They still have many stubborn problems. They still need technical and economic aid. They still have problems of poverty, education, health and social services. And they have a great deal to do in building their defense. We are close neighbors—and our security is very much interdependent. Where we can help them, we are only helping ourselves.

The problems of these people all over the world are our problems as well as theirs. Where they fail to solve them, the free world loses strength; and wherever and whenever the free world loses strength, the men in the Kremlin move to accomplish their ambitions.

We cannot afford to go it alone. The path of isolation leads neither to peace nor to victory. It leads at best to a bleak existence in a storm cellar under attack by an insuperable power bent on world domination. We know that Russia prefers to obtain its aims without war. At the same time, we know that Russia will risk war if war appears to offer the best chance of success, and we know

that its willingness to take this risk may increase now that our monopoly of atomic weapons is ended. If, while there is still time, we can create new deterrents, barriers to easy expansion, we can keep the balance of power and expect peace and a reasonable degree of prosperity.

Coordinating the Aid Programs

An understanding of our danger has led to the establishment of the Marshall Plan, our participation in the North Atlantic Treaty, our Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and the Point 4 Program for technical assistance.

Because of the interdependence of these programs, and because of the need for coordination and flexibility in them, we are now proposing to combine our military, economic, and technical aid into one program—a Mutual Security Program—for the coming year. Under this proposed program, we would provide to other free nations the weapons, materials, economic and technical help they need. The Mutual Security Program is not new. It is essentially a continuation of the kind of help we have already given, but it coordinates our efforts and adapts them to the global problem. It includes provisions for strengthening our participation in the United Nations so that that organization can continue to work for collective security.

The Mutual Security Program is a frank recognition of the fact that our problem of survival involves every area of the world and involves the building of integrated economic, military, political, and moral strength.

The estimated cost of the program during the next year is 8½ billion dollars. This is an amount that is economical in comparison to what the taxpayers of the United States would have to spend if we ignored the need now. It is actually an investment in the resources and resourcefulness of other peoples, from which the dividends will be eminently worthwhile. It means that Americans will be somewhat more restricted in spending and in consumption of civilian goods, but we will still be living on a far higher standard than any other peoples in the world. In terms of the security we get, it is as solid an investment as the American people can make and if it protects our right to live the way we choose, its true value will be immeasurable.

I hope that these sober thoughts I am leaving with you do not prove discouraging. There is every reason to be encouraged when a dangerous situation is being met with boldness and courage. We have shown a capacity for extraordinary boldness and courage in meeting the dangers that have come before. I am confident the American people will show the same strength again. There is something about the way of life we have chosen that gives us the initiative and the enterprise to survive the pit falls of the dynamic world in which we live.

Korean Envoy Presents Credentials

[Released to the press June 6]

The translation of the remarks of the newly appointed Ambassador of Korea, Dr. You Chan Yang, upon the occasion of the presentation of his letter of credence follows.

MR. PRESIDENT: It is my great pleasure to deliver into your hands this letter of credence of the President of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, accrediting me as Korean Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America.

This ceremony today is further evidence of the bonds of sympathy and understanding existing between our two countries.

I come to you, Mr. President, from my embattled country where American troops and other forces of the United Nations are engaged with my countrymen, in resistance to the common foe of all free mankind—armed Communist aggression.

The people of Korea and the Government of Korea are proud to testify to the great debt they owe the people of the United States and you, sir, their President. For it was your inspired leadership which summoned the United Nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the lawless Communist invader and brought the free world to a consciousness of the danger confronting it.

Since then, it also has been your leadership and farsighted statesmanship which has produced the mobilization of this nation's resources and the rearming of the free world for defense and the insurance of peace. The Republic of Korea is anxious to play its full part in this program and my Government feels it can make a most substantial contribution if adequate arms or the manufacturing means thereof are made available to it.

Please be assured, Mr. President, of our desire to cooperate with your great people and Government to the fullest extent in your proclaimed aim to preserve and protect liberty and justice and democracy.

The President's reply to the remarks of the Ambassador of Korea follows.

MR. AMBASSADOR: It is with sincere pleasure that I accept from you, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the United States, this Letter of Credence from your President, Dr. Syngman Rhee.

This ceremony is indeed evidence of the continued and lasting friendship which exists between our two countries. The cementing of the bonds of this friendship and understanding has been one of the most gratifying of the milestones marking the road to the solidarity of the free world.

Mindful of its own history and traditions of

liberty, the United States of America has been deeply impressed by the determination of the Korean people to fulfill their aspirations to unity and independence. The many nations throughout the world which have sought the welfare of your country were greatly heartened by the progress made by the Korean people under a government of their own choosing. This very progress represented to Communist imperialism a threat to its program for the domination of Asia and undoubtedly influenced its decision to strike without warning at the very existence of the Korean nation.

The response of your countrymen to this aggression at once provided clear proof of their dedication to the defense of those high principles upon which the Republic of Korea has been founded and evoked an echoing and immediate response within the United Nations. The world will long remember what is happening in your country, and those who, anywhere, now struggle under oppression cannot fail to find hope and inspiration in the example of Korea.

United by the ties of a common understanding and a common purpose, I am confident that our two nations, together with the other freedom-loving peoples, will attain for Korea that peace with justice to which we are all dedicated and for which we fight. The American people are not unmindful of the incalculable hardships and suffering being endured by the Korean nation in its struggle for survival. They are both anxious and willing to assist in the alleviation of this suffering and in repairing the ravages of this cruel war.

On behalf of the people and the Government of the United States, may I convey to you, Mr. Ambassador, my deep appreciation for the expressions of understanding and friendship which you so generously have brought to me from the Korean people and their Government. I offer my sincere good wishes for your success in the performance of the important mission which has been entrusted to you. You may be assured that the Government of the United States and its officials are prepared to cooperate with you in every way.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2116, May 4; S/2128, May 8; S/2129, May 8; S/2133, May 8; S/2134, May 2; S/2144, May 10; S/2146, May 11; S/2147, May 14; S/2149, May 15; S/2154, May 17; S/2155, May 17; S/2156, May 18; S/2159, May 21; S/2160, May 21; S/2162, May 22; S/2163, May 22; S/2165, May 23; S/2166, May 23; S/2169, May 24.

Korean Memorial Day Observed for U.N. War Dead

On May 31, the United Nations Department of Public Information announced that the following information has been received from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) at Tokyo.

Men of the United Nations forces who lost their lives in Korea in the fight against aggression were honored on May 30 in a Memorial Day service at a rain-drenched United Nations cemetery near Pusan.

Lt. Gen. John B. Coulter, newly appointed personal representative to UNCURK of the Commander in Chief of United Nations forces, spoke briefly in memory of fallen United Nations fighting men and placed a wreath before an American flagstaff directly behind a United Nations flag. Ambassador A. H. C. Gieben of the Netherlands, UNCURK Chairman, and Andrew Cordier on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General, placed wreaths at a United States honor plot in the 15-country cemetery. Mr. Cordier, Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, and Dragoslav Protitch, Principal Director of United Nations Department of Security Council Affairs, are visiting Korea as part of their tour of United Nations missions in the field.

Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, American Ambassador John Muccio, and representatives of all United Nations army, navy, and air units also attended the military ceremony which closed when taps were sounded by two army buglers and echoed back by others at the far end of the cemetery.

Cambodian Minister Arrives in U.S.

The first Cambodian Minister to the United States, Nong Kimny, arrived in Washington on June 4. The Minister made the following remarks:

I wish to express the joy which I feel upon my arrival in Washington where I shall have the pleasure and duty to establish for the first time a Legation of the Royal Government of Cambodia in the United States of America.

I wish to thank the Department of State for the cordial welcome which it has accorded me upon arrival on American soil. I thank also the French missions at New York and Washington for their expressions of courtesy.

In such an atmosphere of confidence and friendship my mission can begin only in a most favorable manner. Independent Cambodia now entering into the family of nations, desires the peace and security which will permit, thanks to American economic and military assistance, as well as to the support of France and the French Union, the improvement of her national economy and the consolidation of her independence.

Designated as first Minister Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia at Washington, I feel honored indeed, and will do all in my power to serve the cause of friendship between Cambodia and the United States.

"Amerika" Popularity of Concern to U.S.S.R.

[Released to the press June 9]

Recent Soviet press attacks on the Department of State's Russian-language magazine *Amerika* are new evidence of its strong appeal for the Soviet people. Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett said today,

The Soviet articles—two within the last week—offer proof the magazine is continuing to make itself felt among Soviet peoples and that the Kremlin considers it necessary to counteract the true picture of the United States presented in *Amerika*.

These attacks merely corroborate a fact already proved by Soviet obstruction to *Amerika's* distribution—that the Soviet peoples want to read *Amerika*, but the Politburo does not want them to.

The attacks in question were a half-page article June 4 in *Pravda*, the leading newspaper of the Soviet Union, and a three-quarter page attack in the *Literary Gazette* on June 2. These attacks centered on a recent *Amerika* magazine lead article on wages and prices in the United States which was planned by the magazine's staff and the United States Embassy in Moscow to correct Soviet misconceptions about life in the United States.

The American Embassy in Moscow has now been requested to communicate with the Soviet distribution agency, saying it is obvious that the reading public in the U.S.S.R. would welcome a wider opportunity to see the magazine and to judge for themselves the accuracy of such criticisms as those in *Pravda* and the *Literary Gazette*.

On this basis, the Department is again urging the distributor to live up to its clear obligation and distribute the full 50,000 copies of each issue as called for by the existing agreement.

The *Amerika* article attacked by the Soviet Press appeared in issue No. 46. Titled "Wages and Prices in the United States, 1939-1950," the article emphasized that the average standard of living in the United States has risen 40 percent since the beginning of World War II.

The magazine said that perhaps the most striking feature of this new prosperity is that it is more widely and evenly shared than ever before and that there are fewer rich, fewer poor, and more people in the middle. This in turn has broadened mass markets, thus giving a new sta-

bility and strength to the economic system of the United States.

Charts developed by the magazine's art staff and based primarily on surveys by the United States Departments of Commerce and Labor show the relative movement of wages and prices from 1939 to 1950; number of families in the different income groups; growth of mass luxury income, as evidenced by increased consumption of such articles as automobiles, refrigerators, and television sets.

In their efforts to counteract this picture, the Soviet critics resorted to such extreme assertions as the following from *Pravda*:

Almost three-quarters of the population of the United States constitute indigent masses who are either starving or under threat of starvation . . .

In a similar vein, the *Literary Gazette* declared:

Seventy percent of all Americans are deprived of minimum living standards.

The *Pravda* article also stated that *Amerika* gives readers "America in saccharine syrup" which causes only "laughter and nausea," and the *Literary Gazette* stated that "from a mile away it smells of the rottenness of an unpardonable lie."

Pravda's leading critic, David Zaslavsky, called *Amerika* "miserable" and accused it of telling fairy tales of wages and prices to the Soviet people who, he says, "know no poverty or unemployment, but only grandiose peaceful construction."

The current attack on the magazine is regarded by the Department as a part of the campaign by which the Soviets are endeavoring to "jam" the magazine as well as VOA broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. The fact that the Department has succeeded since 1945 in distributing this official medium of American information in the Soviet Union is the result of the persistent efforts of three successive United States Ambassadors to Moscow. The original agreement to distribute 10,000 copies of a United States Russian-language publication in the U.S.S.R. was the result of negotiations carried on by Ambassador Harriman with the then Foreign Minister Molotov in 1944. Two years later Ambassador W. Bedell Smith reopened ne-

gotiations and gained a commitment from the Soviet Government to distribute 50,000 copies.

Since its inception, the magazine has enjoyed a wide popularity with Soviet readers. Even individual pages with color illustrations sold for as much as a dollar.

This popularity is obviously a source of concern to the Soviet authorities. But until 1950 official attacks on the magazine were limited to occasional press comments. In January 1950, however, the Soviet authorities made a direct move toward strangling the magazine. Although the distributor had regularly reported for 5 years previously that *Amerika* had sold out every issue, notification was received that "sales had dropped" from 50,000 copies per month to approximately 25,000, and that henceforth "unsold" copies would be returned to the United States Embassy in Moscow.

Although the Soviet "jamming" of distribution of *Amerika* has thus reduced its distribution, the Department is standing firm on its agreement with the Soviet Government and, accordingly, is con-

tinuing to deliver 50,000 copies a month to the Soviet distributor.

The Department is doing this because it believes it can insist on observance of the agreement only if it is delivering the full quota called for by the agreement and because a reduction in the number delivered would inevitably result in a reduction in the number offered for sale.

Returned copies are not wasted, but are utilized to reach the large Russian-reading groups in other areas of the world, such as Germany, Austria, etc.

The present circulation of 25,000 surpasses, of course, *Amerika's* original distribution of 10,000 copies. Even at the latter figure the magazine, as the sole United States publication directed to the Soviet people, was considered very valuable, since it reached at least 100,000 Soviet readers (estimates vary from 10 to 20 readers per copy). But the Department will continue to press for a restoration of the long-established figure of 50,000 copies distributed monthly.

Protest to U.S.S.R. on Killing of American Military Policeman

[Released to the press June 6]

The following is the text of a note protesting the recent killing of an American military policeman on duty in the international sector of Vienna by two unknown Soviet soldiers. The note was delivered to the Soviet Acting Foreign Minister, Valerian A. Zorin, by the United States Ambassador at Moscow, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, on June 4, 1951.

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, under instructions, has the honor to invite the attention of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the death of an American military policeman in Vienna on May 4, 1951.

Early on that date two United States military police were on patrol in the International District of Vienna in accordance with accepted quadripartite procedure for troops of the element exercising interallied command. When these police endeavored to establish identity and status of two armed Soviet soldiers behaving suspiciously, the latter opened fire without provocation and killed Corporal Paul J. Gresens. Immediately after the shooting the United States Provost Marshal attempted to report the tragedy to the Soviet Provost Marshal in an effort to expedite apprehension of the assailants and launch at once joint examination by the American and Soviet authorities of the evidence then available. Neither the Soviet member of the International Patrol nor the officer

on duty at the Soviet Kommandatura would assist in establishing this important liaison.

The proposal was advanced early the same day by the United States city commander to the Soviet city commander for a joint United States-Soviet investigation into the circumstances with the dual purpose of establishing responsibility for the occurrence and adopting measures to prevent possible repetition. This request, which was made in accordance with prior practice of interallied command, was reported by the United States High Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner on the same day, and subsequently reaffirmed by letter on May 7. In his reply to this communication May 9 Soviet High Commissioner rejected a proposal for a joint investigation on grounds that the Soviet soldiers themselves had been attacked without reason. The Soviet High Commissioner refused to participate in a joint investigation of the 11 witnesses who testified that the Soviet soldiers fired first. He refused to consider other available evidence or to make available for joint questioning the two Soviet soldiers involved in the killing.

After careful consideration of all available evidence the United States Government is convinced that Corp. Gresens was the victim of a sudden attack while engaged in the correct execution of his official duties. Refusal of the Soviet officials in Vienna to permit joint inquiry supports this conclusion.

The United States Government holds the members of the Soviet armed forces involved in the shooting responsible—either through deliberate intent or through negligence—of the death of Corporal Gresens and considers that the Soviet High Commissioner by his actions has condoned this crime. The United States Government requests, therefore, that the individual or individuals responsible be duly punished and that appropriate indemnification be made to the bereaved family of the slain soldier, as required by every consideration of humane treatment and customary usage between nations.

Consular Convention With U. K. Signed

[Released to the press on June 7]

On June 6, 1951, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Sir Oliver Shewell Franks, British Ambassador in Washington, signed a consular convention, with an accompanying protocol of signature, between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

This convention and the accompanying protocol are intended to be substituted for the consular convention and protocol of signature signed at Washington on February 16, 1949, and the exchange of notes of October 12, 1949, relating to the nonapplication of the convention to Newfoundland and Newfoundland citizens. The convention, protocol, and exchange of notes of 1949 were transmitted to the United States Senate with the President's message of January 9, 1950, for advice and consent to ratification and were printed in a Senate document.¹

In view of questions which have arisen, since the convention and related documents of 1949 were transmitted to the Senate, concerning the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the convention, and in view of the fact that appropriate legislative action taken in a number of territories under British jurisdiction has made it possible to amend the protocol so as to delete therefrom the names of those territories, the Governments of the two countries considered the desirability of reformulating the convention and protocol and substituting the new instruments for the 1949 instruments.

The newly signed convention differs principally from the 1949 convention in that article 18 of the latter, relating to the authority of consular officers in connection with the administration of estates, is deleted. This entailed also the deletion of references to that article 18, including such references in article 2 (3) (b) and (c) and article 20.

¹ The text of the convention and the protocol are printed in *Documents and State Papers*, March-April 1949, p. 717; the report by the Secretary of State, in *BULLETIN* of Jan. 30, 1950, p. 175; also see, S. Ex. A, 81st Cong., 2d sess.

Apart from those deletions, the deletion of references to Newfoundland and Newfoundland citizens (thereby eliminating the necessity for the exchange of notes), and the deletion from the protocol of the names of certain territories under British jurisdiction, the only substantive changes are the deletion of paragraph (3) from article 5 of the convention as signed in 1949 and the deletion from article 29 (new art. 28) of the reference to provisions in the 1899 property convention between the United States and the United Kingdom.

With a view to facilitating action toward ratification, the newly signed convention and protocol will be submitted to the Senate as soon as possible for consideration in place of the 1949 instruments.

Procedure for Filing War Claims With Belgium

[Released to the press June 7]

American nationals seeking indemnification from Belgium for war damage to private property have until September 2, 1951, to file claims with the proper Belgian authorities.

On March 12, 1951, the United States and Belgium agreed to grant reciprocal treatment to the nationals of the two nations for indemnification of war damage.

The Department has been informed that the agreement was officially published in Brussels on June 2 and that a 90-day limit was set for the filing of claims.

Reciprocal national treatment is given for indemnification of war damage sustained by American nationals in Belgium and by Belgian nationals within the territorial limits of the United States, including Hawaii and Alaska. In order to receive Belgian national treatment, the interested persons must qualify as American nationals, both on the date of the war damage and on March 12, 1951.

The benefits are extended also to persons who have the status of American nationals only on one of the above-mentioned dates and that of a national either of Belgium or one of the other countries with which Belgium has concluded a reciprocal agreement concerning war damage on the other date.

The Department is informed that the Belgian Government has concluded reciprocal agreements with Great Britain and Canada.

American nationals seeking indemnification for war damage sustained in Belgium may file their claims with the Ministry of Reconstruction, 46 rue de la Loi, Brussels, Belgium. Appropriate forms for filing a claim may be obtained at any Belgian Consulate or the Ministry of Reconstruction. Belgian Consulates are located in New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, New Orleans, and Dallas, Texas.

Persons who already have war damage claims on file with the Belgian authorities are not required to make new applications at this time.

Execution of Landsberg War Criminals

[Released to the press June 7]

Following is the text of a press release issued today by High Commissioner McCloy and General Handy on the execution of the seven war criminals at Landsberg prison.

United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy and Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, EUCOM, jointly announced today that the death sentences of seven war criminals in Landsberg prison have been carried out.

The war criminals were executed by hanging at Landsberg prison today between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 2:30 a.m. The sentences were carried out after appeals had been made to and denied by the United States federal courts.

Those executed were Oswald Pohl, Otto Ohlendorf, Erich Naumann, Paul Blobel, Werner Braune, Hans Schmidt, and George Schallermair.

These seven were the last prisoners at Landsberg prison under death sentence for war crimes and the carrying out of these sentences marks the last executions to be held at Landsberg for war crimes committed during the war.

Pohl, Ohlendorf, Naumann, Blobel, and Braune were sentenced by the military tribunals at Nürnberg established under the provisions of military government ordinance No. 7. Pohl was sentenced in the concentration camp case while the others were convicted in the Einsatzgruppen case. These sentences were reviewed by Mr. McCloy.

Schmidt and Schallermair were sentenced for war crimes by military government courts which were established by order of the Theater Commander in October 1946 and which functioned at Dachau. Their sentences were considered by General Handy.

Proclamation Signed on Results of Torquay Tariff Negotiations

On June 4, the Department of State announced that the President signed on June 2, 1951, a proclamation to give effect to the tariff negotiations undertaken by the United States at Torquay, England, from September 1950 to April 1951.¹ The results of these negotiations were made public on May 8, 1951.²

¹ Proc. 2929, 16 Fed. Reg. 5381.

² BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 816.

Pursuant to procedure provided for in the proclamation the President also signed on June 2 a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury identifying concessions in schedule XX (U. S.) to the Torquay Protocol, which will become effective on June 6, 1951. These are for the most part the concessions negotiated with the Benelux Customs Union, Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic, all of which countries have undertaken to give effect to their concessions to us on June 6. Further letters will be issued giving effect to other concessions as and when other countries with which we negotiated such concessions undertake to give effect to the concessions they granted to the United States.

The proclamation and the letter indicate certain resultant adjustments in the list of Cuban products entitled to preferential treatment pursuant to the exclusive agreement of October 30, 1947, between the United States and Cuba. In addition, the proclamation provides that adjustments will be made, effective July 6, 1951, in parts of three concessions negotiated at Geneva in 1947, with the result that duties on the products involved will increase. These products are dyed stencil silk, dehydrated onion powder, and certain leather gloves. It announces that, on account of the provision in the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 preventing the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Philippines at this time, the United States has invoked article XXXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to prevent the application of that agreement between the United States and the Philippines, which it is expected will accede to the agreement as a result of negotiations at Torquay.

Locust Threat in India To Receive Point 4 Aid

[Released to the press June 4]

The Governments of the United States and India signed an agreement on June 2, in New Delhi, for a cooperative locust-control campaign under the President's Point 4 Program.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, announced today that United States planes and experts are going to India to help repel an invasion of locusts threatening a 75,000 square mile area in Rajputana Province and neighboring states in northwest India. Two United States Air Force C-47 planes, now in Germany, and three Piper Cubs, now finishing a successful antilocust spraying operation in Iran, are being rushed to the threatened area, and will go into action there by July 1.

Two major food crops, jowar and bajra, are in danger. Both are types of millet, the staple food crop for this dry area of northern India. Large

crops of clover also lie in the path of the locusts. The loss of these crops would aggravate the food shortage conditions already prevalent in India.

Dr. Bennett said that United States Overseas Airlines, a private charter company, which supplied the planes and crews for spraying operations in Iran, under contract with the Technical Cooperation Administration, will undertake the same work in India.

William B. Mabey, leading Department of Agriculture expert on grasshopper control, now technical director of the Point 4 antilocus campaign in Iran, is expected to join the similar project in India early in June.

Ten tons of aldrin, the powerful new insecticide which was used with remarkable success in Iran, are being shipped to India. Two or three ounces of the poison, diluted with kerosene or Diesel fuel, are sufficient to spray an acre of land. Aldrin is produced by Julius Hyman and Company, Denver, and is distributed by the Shell Oil Company.

The Indian Government is providing ground crews, landing strips, and transportation for all members of the Point 4 spraying mission. It will cooperate in the project through the Indian Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

The operation is being carried out under the Point 4 general agreement signed by the United States and Indian Governments on December 28, 1950. Other Point 4 projects now underway in India are in the fields of food supply, agricultural research, mineral and water development, and child welfare.

Previous experience has shown that the Rajputana desert is a fertile breeding place of locusts. Its sandy soil and moisture conditions are ideal for locust breeding and egg laying. Swarms produced here during the summer monsoon rains fly from India to the Middle East where they multiply and migrate further.

Point 4 technicians will repeat the successful air-spraying methods employed in Iran where the same desert locust (*Schistocerca gregaria*) was destroyed. A Government of India observer in Iran will return to India to cooperate in the new program.

Locusts have caused great famines in India, China, and other countries. The locust, well-known in Biblical times, is still a periodic threat. At least 77 countries have been either permanently infested or frequently invaded. None of the five continents has escaped this threat.

Point 4 Leaders To Visit U. S.

[Released to the press June 8]

The Technical Cooperation Administration announced on June 8 the names of 15 leading citizens of India, Pakistan, and 4 Latin American countries who will spend 2 or 3 months in the United

States, under the Point 4 Program. The purpose of their visit is to observe American methods of agriculture, health work, education, industry, public administration, and other fields of Point 4 activity.

They will be the vanguard of 200 men and women from 38 countries who are guiding the economic development of their homelands. This Point 4 project constitutes an expansion of the existing leader program under the Smith-Mundt Act, with new emphasis on people responsible, in their own countries, for Point 4 cooperation with the United States.

The project is designed to give these leaders a first-hand impression of the American approach to technical problems. At the same time, they will have an opportunity to discuss with professional leaders here the best ways of adapting new methods and techniques to their own needs.

Their visits are being planned and their itineraries arranged by the agencies of the United States Government concerned with their special fields of interest. They will travel throughout the United States. Plans already include visits to Boston, New York, Detroit, Chicago, Denver, New Orleans, Atlanta, and the Tennessee Valley. Each leader will spend about 3 weeks in Washington at the beginning of the visit.

The first six—all agricultural leaders—are due to arrive in the United States on June 10. They are: Dr. Angel Florentin Pena, the Paraguayan Minister of Agriculture; and a Pakistani Committee on Agricultural Extension Activity consisting of Mohammed Said Khan, Director of Extension Service, Ministry of Agriculture; Abdul Mubin Chowdhury, Deputy Director of Agricultural Administration, Ministry of Agriculture; Mohammed Husain Sufi, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture; Mohammed Amin Bhatti, Assistant Professor of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, George V Institute of Agriculture at Sakrand, and Mrs. A. A. Hussain, Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies for Women in the Punjab. Their tour is being planned by the United States Department of Agriculture.

Others expected to arrive during the summer months, and the agencies responsible for planning their tours, are:

- M. S. Thacker, Director of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. (Department of Commerce)
- Dr. Eduardo Colcano, Director of the Cartografia Nacional of the Venezuelan Ministry of Public Works, Caracas. (Department of Commerce)
- José Antonio Jove, Chief Engineer, Division of Sanitary Engineering, Venezuelan Ministry of Health, Caracas. (Federal Security Agency)
- Dr. Luis Felipe Vegas, Chief of the Division of Geodesy, Venezuelan Ministry of Public Works, Caracas. (U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey)
- Federico Ruiz Huidobro, Peruvian Superintendent of Banks, Insurance Companies and Corporations, Lima. (Budget Bureau)
- Alberto Rodriguez R. Carpi, Assistant Director of the Peruvian Department of Finance, Lima. (Budget Bureau)

Osvaldo Torres Ahumada, Income Tax Consultant, Santiago, Chile. (Internal Revenue Bureau)
Dr. Roberto L. Petit, President of the Paraguayan Department of Lands and Colonization, Asunción. (Department of Agriculture)
Zafar Hosain Khan, Chairman of the Karachi Port Trust, Pakistan. (Department of Commerce)

Other countries which have been invited to send leaders in Point 4 fields of activity are Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay.

Agricultural Consultants Appointed

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, has appointed a seven-member board of consultants for the food and natural resources aspects of the Point 4 Program:

Harold B. Allen, Director of Education, Near East Foundation, N. Y.
Edward J. Bell, Administrator, Oregon Wheat Commission, Pendleton, Oreg.
Abner Bowen, Farmer and Businessman, Delphi, Ind.
John H. Reisner, Executive Secretary, Agricultural Missions, Inc., N.Y.
J. Stewart Russell, Farm Editor, *Des Moines Register*, Des Moines, Iowa.
Rev. L. G. Ligutti, Executive Secretary, *Catholic Rural Life*, Des Moines.
William A. Shoenfield, Organization Consultant, Corvallis, Oreg.

The board met yesterday with Clayton L. Whipple, chief of the Point 4 Food and Natural Resources Division, who explained current Point 4 operations and told of plans for their expansion. The board also heard from the directors of agricultural programs of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Department of Agriculture, Point 4 agents, and representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Dr. Bennett stated that the board has been set up under the Act for International Development, which stipulated that advice should be sought from competent authorities outside government. The Point 4 administrator said he is particularly pleased to obtain the assistance of outstanding leaders in the field of agriculture, which he considers one of the most important phases of the Point 4 Program.

The consultants were in continuous session on June 4 and 5 and will be available, both as a board and as individuals for consultation as problems arise. Most of the members have had wide foreign experience in fields in which the Point 4 Program is active. Their advice should be of great value in planning future projects and in evaluating those in operation.

Point 4 Contract for Water Development in Jordan

[Released to the press June 6]

The Point 4 Administration has contracted with the Knappen, Tippetts, and Abbott Engineering Company, of New York, to carry out a water development project in the Kingdom of Jordan, at the request of the Government of that country.

The company will send a team of experts, headed by Mr. R. D. Gladding, of New York, to Jordan to conduct a 6-months demonstration and training program for the restoration of existing underground cisterns. The team will also direct engineering work needed to restore and construct village reservoirs and small catch basins.

"The training phase of the contract," Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett said, "will provide local technicians to carry on the program as a permanent part of Jordan's economic development."

Some four centuries after the time of Christ, the Roman and Byzantine emperors had cisterns and small water storage basins constructed in the district lying east of the River Jordan for the use of tribesmen and their cattle. The rainfall in this district seldom exceeds 16 inches annually and the need for storage facilities was recognized centuries ago. The ancient wells and catch basins were allowed to deteriorate through neglect until most of them were filled with silt, vegetation, and debris or completely disintegrated.

The Government of Jordan requested Point 4 aid in rehabilitating this essential water supply system. Thirty-nine existing cisterns will be restored, 57 reservoirs will be cleaned and enlarged and a number of new cisterns, reservoirs, and catch basins will be constructed.

The Bedouin tribesmen feed their flocks on the grass which flourishes briefly during the rainy season and until the water holes are dry. Then they move on to permanent water holes. There the grass is sparse and overgrazed. As a result, cattle are scarce and those which survive the rigors of thirst and hunger provide inferior meat.

When the population pressure on East Jordan increases as a result of nomadic movements, the overflow presses into the drier areas east of the river. In years of low rainfall, this situation often leads to famine conditions.

The team of Point 4 experts expects to leave June 17. The rainy season in Jordan starts about December 1 and it is hoped, by then, trainees will have the technical knowledge to supervise the construction of catch basins for use in the dry season.

While the demonstration and training program is under way, the American engineers also will be drawing up a plan for long-term water conservation.

U.S. Urges New Commission for the Control of Armaments and Armed Forces

**STATEMENT BY FRANK C. NASH
DEPUTY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE¹**

The working paper which the United States delegation is formally introducing today, is I think, expressed in terms plain enough to carry their own meaning without the need of detailed explanation.

What may be desirable, however, is a word of explanation as to why we think this an appropriate time for introducing a proposal calling for the establishment of a new forum in which to go forward with renewed disarmament discussions.

Yesterday, the President of the United States sent a message to Congress recommending the enactment of legislation providing foreign military and economic assistance in a total amount of 8½ billions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.²

Today, the United States delegation is bringing forward a proposal which has as its aim the development of a fresh and invigorated approach to the problem of disarmament.

To many this presents a paradox beyond comprehension.

But this paradox is more apparent than real.

The program to which President Truman addressed himself in his message to Congress yesterday is a program for peace, not war—a program which the President said he was recommending to Congress “as another vital step along the road to real security and lasting peace.”

The struggle in Korea has made it plain that the sole aim and purpose of those members of the United Nations which are engaged in that struggle is to see to it that the principles of the Charter are maintained in fullest integrity.

The efforts of those nations to build their col-

lective strength are motivated solely by the firm purpose to restrain and outlaw aggression.

Those efforts are succeeding. We have good reason to hope that the resolute stand in Korea of the forces of peace will make it plain that aggression is not going to be tolerated. If any would-be aggressors can be convinced of this determination without having to go through the terrible waste and destruction of another world war to learn the lesson, then we may be approaching the day when we can get down to the task of putting an end to this costly business of having to maintain ourselves in the status of an armed camp.

In a very practical sense, therefore, our present efforts toward the achievement of collective security against aggression may be setting the stage for at last making some real progress toward disarmament.

It is the task of this Committee to help set the stage for this drama to go forward.

It is unfortunate that we have to go through the costly business of rearming in order to set the stage.

After World War II, we hoped it might be possible to set a much simpler stage for a less involved and protracted action. We hoped then that our efforts could be restricted to, and concentrated upon, a one act play to achieve some system for the effective control of atomic energy so as to insure its employment for purposes of peace rather than war. It was further hoped that the problem of disarmament in the related field of armed forces and nonatomic armaments would find a more or less automatic solution in the rapid demobilization of the allied forces.

That is why we urged as one of the very first acts of the First General Assembly the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission. We thought that the control of atomic energy was the problem of most pressing importance and that undivided attention should be devoted to it. We were then the only nation known to possess the atomic bomb and, therefore, would hardly be regarded as having any selfish aims in pressing for the development of some workable system under which we could turn over our atomic resources and facilities to international ownership and control.

¹ Made on May 25 before the Committee of Twelve and released to the press by the U. S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date. The Committee of Twelve was established by the General Assembly on December 13, 1950, and is considering the advisability of a merger between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The membership of the Committee includes the members of the Security Council plus Canada.

² BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 883.

As time went on, however, it became clear that the problem of the reduction and regulation of armed forces and nonatomic armaments was not going to be resolved through voluntary demobilization. Accordingly, it was decided to take up the problem in the United Nations, and for this purpose the Commission for Conventional Armaments was set up—more than a year after the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission. Although the establishment of a separate Commission was strongly opposed by some at the time, it was the view of most that to assign to the Atomic Energy Commission the problems of reduction and regulation of armed forces and nonatomic armaments would inevitably result in retarding the very substantial progress which that body was then making in the development of a plan for the control of atomic energy.

Events have borne out the wisdom of the decision to leave the Atomic Energy Commission free to devote its attention exclusively to the atomic field. The plan of control which the Commission succeeded in developing won the approval of the great majority of the United Nations in 1948—an approval which has several times been reaffirmed, and most recently by the last General Assembly in its peace-through-deeds resolution of November 17, 1950.

In the Commission for Conventional Armaments, somewhat less progress has been made, but the Commission has proceeded through the first two items of its plan of work; and during the past year it has carried on an examination of the problem of developing an effective system of safeguards which would insure compliance with an actual plan of disarmament—item 3 of its plan of work.

In the view of the United States, the work of the two present Commissions has proceeded far enough to demonstrate that it is possible to develop a comprehensive system of armaments control which would be both safe and practicable.

From the very beginning, it has been recognized that any system which might ultimately be developed would have to be a comprehensive one—that is to say, a system which would embrace all types of armed forces and extend to all kinds of weapons and instrumentalities of war. In the work of the two Commissions throughout the past several years, this fact has been constantly borne in mind, and it has been continuously recognized that at some point it would be both necessary and desirable to bring the efforts of the two Commissions into closer coordination under a comprehensive system of control.

In the view of the United States, the work of the two Commissions has now reached a point where it is appropriate to consider ways and means of initiating the requisite coordination and expansion into a comprehensive system of control. In proposing the establishment of a new and consolidated Commission to take over the work of the two present Commissions, the United

States delegation has in view the further important objective of possibly relieving the atmosphere of stalemate which has prevailed in the two Commissions for some time past.

We have, of course, no delusions that an impasse growing out of such fundamental disagreements as those which have prevailed in the past can be resolved by the adoption of any merely procedural device. It is, however, our hope that the demonstration by the peace-loving nations of the world of their determination to stand together, strengthened and united in effective opposition against any further aggression, may lead to a change in some of these fundamental disagreements. Then, as I have already said, we may have a chance of getting ahead with our work toward disarmament. At that time, in our view, it might prove to be of real advantage to have available a new and fresh forum for the pursuit of our objectives. It is to this end that the United States delegation has introduced this proposal here today.

WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED BY U.S.

U.N. doc. A/AC.50/1
Submitted May 25, 1951

General views of the United States with respect to the coordination of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments

Introduction

The United States believes that comprehensive plans to include the international control of all armaments and armed forces should be developed by the United Nations, and, accordingly, that present United Nations efforts should be directed towards the preparation of co-ordinated plans of control which would make possible with appropriate safeguards the regulations, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces. United Nations efforts in the field of armaments and armed forces have to date been assigned to two separate bodies, namely the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Much useful work has been accomplished by the two Commissions and, in the view of the United States, the appropriate time has now arrived for bringing the respective efforts of the two Commissions into closer co-ordination through the establishment of a single commission. In taking over the functions of the two present Commissions, the new commission would build upon the work already done by them. In particular, the United States believes that the United Nations plan for international control of atomic energy must continue to serve as the basis for the work of the new commission in the atomic energy phases of its work. Nevertheless, the commission should be empowered to consider any other proposals that

would be no less effective than the existing United Nations plan.

A. Organization

The United States believes that a new commission whose primary task would be the development of plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces—to be called the Commission for the Control of Armaments and Armed Forces—should be established in place of the existing two Commissions in accordance with the following terms and provisions:

1. *Status.* The new commission should be established under and report to the Security Council, which in turn should submit periodic progress reports to the General Assembly.

2. *Composition.* Membership on the new commission should correspond to the membership of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and hence would consist of the members of the Security Council, plus Canada when Canada is not a member of the Security Council.

3. *Sub-committees.* The new commission should be expressly authorized to establish such sub-committees as may be needed in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it, recognizing that the differences in the nature of atomic and non-atomic weapons, as well as in the nature of biological and other instrumentalities of warfare, require the development of varying, but co-ordinated, systems of regulation and control, specially adapted to meet the problems peculiar to the different types of weapons, or instrumentalities.

4. *Technical advice.* Technical advice should be provided as necessary by experts appointed by the member States to assist their representatives.

5. *The Secretariat.* The Secretariat of the new commission should be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

6. *Relationship to other organs of the United Nations.* As a sub-ordinate organ of the Security Council, the new commission should have the normal relationship of such a body to other organs of the United Nations.

7. *Rules of procedure.* With appropriate modifications, the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission would appear to be adequate to serve as the rules of procedure of the new commission.

B. Functions

1. The primary task of the new commission should be to prepare comprehensive and co-ordinated plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces, and accordingly, would provide for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces.

2. The new commission should build upon the

work already developed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for any plan for the control of atomic energy unless and until a better and no less effective system can be devised.

3. The new commission should take into account the inter-relationship of control systems and safeguards necessary to assure the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces, in order to assure that the respective systems of control complement each other.

4. The new commission should develop a comprehensive plan for phasing the implementation of the component systems of control and regulation of all armaments and armed forces.

5. The new commission should formulate a plan for the regulation of the international traffic in arms as part of the comprehensive plan for international control of all armaments and armed forces.

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Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Slavery (Second Session). E/1988, E/AC.33/13, May 4, 1951. 36 pp. mimeo.

Findings of Studies in the Relationships Between Population Trends and Economic and Social Factors. E/CN.9/86, April 23, 1951. 60 pp. mimeo.

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Trusteeship Council

Examination of Petitions; Trust Territory of the Pacific Island (Observations of the Administering Authority). T/837, February 16, 1951. 10 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Answer to Charges on Edith Cameron Wall's Interviews With Union Labor Officials

[Released to the press May 25]

Correspondence Between Deputy Under Secretary Humelsine and Representative Walter

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Deputy Under Secretary Carlisle H. Humelsine and Representative Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania concerning allegations regarding Miss Edith Cameron Wall appearing in the New York Daily Mirror of May 14, 1951, under the byline of Victor Riesel.

May 25, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. WALTER: I have your letter of May 14, 1951, in which you requested the Department's comment on an article appearing in the New York *Daily Mirror*, May 14, 1951, under the byline of Mr. Victor Riesel. This article alleges that Miss Edith Cameron Wall, "a representative of the State Department visited the most strategic waterfront union headquarters in this country and urged its leaders to have their followers refuse to load guns and ammo on ships rushing military supplies to our friends in Europe." A further allegation is that Miss Wall "presented a letter from Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin, which, in effect, urged union leaders to cooperate with her." The union official whom Miss Wall is supposed to have attempted to influence and to whom she is supposed to have presented the letter is identified in the Riesel article as Mr. Joseph P. Ryan, President of the International Longshoremen's Association.

The Department was considerably puzzled by the Riesel article, particularly inasmuch as his various charges against Miss Wall had never been called to our attention, either officially or unofficially, by Mr. Ryan or any other union official. Moreover, it is to be inferred from the article that the alleged incident occurred fairly recently—yet Miss Wall has been stationed in New Delhi, India since July 1950. However, the Department immediately instituted a thorough investigation of the matter.

This investigation established to the Department's complete satisfaction that Miss Wall did have an interview with Mr. Ryan on March 9, 1950, but except for this fact, there is no basis for Mr. Riesel's allegations. With regard to the March 9,

1950, interview, Mr. Ryan took exception to some of Miss Wall's questions as he understood them and on the following day he wired Dr. Steelman, evidencing dissatisfaction and inquiring of her background. This led to an immediate investigation of Miss Wall: the Departments of State and Labor not only examined her record—including her previous security investigation—but investigated with particular care her part in the interview with Mr. Ryan. As part of this investigation, other labor leaders with whom Miss Wall had talked during the week of March 7, 1950, were questioned. These officials were emphatic that Miss Wall had said nothing to them which would corroborate Mr. Ryan's reaction and indeed were high in their praise of her ability and conscientiousness.

On the basis of the State and Labor Departments' investigations, Dr. Steelman informed Mr. Ryan that he was convinced that Miss Wall was "entirely in the clear". Since Mr. Ryan evidenced no dissatisfaction with the report on the matter, either at that time or subsequently, and since the charges contained in the Riesel article of May 14 a year later were not specified in Mr. Ryan's complaint to Dr. Steelman, I submit that the Department's amazement at this article is understandable. As a matter of fact, the Department, in view of the facts which I shall show in this letter, is still at a loss to understand Mr. Riesel's motives in making these unjustifiable and damaging charges against an able and devoted public servant. The actual facts in the matter are the following:

Early in the spring of 1950, Miss Wall returned from her assignment in Copenhagen where she had demonstrated exceptional aptitude in reporting on foreign labor movements. The Department decided to give her further labor reporting training preparatory to reassigning her abroad as an Assistant Labor Attaché. Therefore, Miss Wall was given labor training both in the Department of State and by the Department of Labor. Part of this training involved acquainting

herself with the latest developments in the United States Labor Movement by visiting union headquarters and talking to union officials. In pursuing this course, she visited, among others, the International Longshoremen's Association in New York and talked to Mr. Ryan, the Association's President. This interview was arranged on Miss Wall's own initiative at the suggestion of several other union officials to whom she had talked.

Some of the questions Miss Wall asked Mr. Ryan apparently antagonized him. The day after the interview, March 10, 1950, Mr. Ryan telegraphed Dr. John R. Steelman, the Assistant to the President, as follows:

Was interviewed yesterday by one Ethel [Edith] Cameron Wall purporting to represent both State and Labor Departments. Her personal views on longshoremen in this country loading arms for France did not coincide with views of the A. F. of L., I. T. F., or American Labor Movement. What is her background?

At Dr. Steelman's request, both the Department of State and the Department of Labor thoroughly investigated the incident and established to their complete satisfaction that although Miss Wall might have asked some tactless questions in regard to the internal operations of the union, she had not expressed any views in regard to American longshoremen's loading arms for France nor in any way misrepresented United States policy in this matter. She did mention to Mr. Ryan that there had been strike threats in French ports in connection with Military Assistance Program shipments and that generally such Communist-directed action did not occur in isolated areas. In this connection she asked him if he anticipated agitation for sympathy strikes in American ports. (This question could hardly be judged as an expression of views or as improper.) Dr. Steelman then replied to Mr. Ryan who in turn acknowledged this reply. Copies of Mr. Ryan's telegram to Dr. Steelman, Dr. Steelman's reply and Mr. Ryan's acknowledgment are enclosed for your information. I am also enclosing a copy of Miss Wall's own report of her interview with Mr. Ryan.

Feeling that the case had been settled to the satisfaction of all concerned, and having established Miss Wall's part in the matter, the Department assigned her to New Delhi, India, as Assistant Labor Attaché. She has been in New Delhi since her arrival there, July 22, 1950. No more was heard of the case until the publication of Mr. Riesel's article on May 14, 1951.

The May 14, 1951 article charges, among other things, (a) that Miss Wall urged leaders of the longshoremen's union "to have their followers refuse to load guns and ammo on ships rushing military supplies to our friends in Europe"; and (b) that she presented to Mr. Ryan a letter from Secretary Tobin urging union officials to cooperate with her.

Both of these charges are especially serious when taken in the general context of the whole article for it might reasonably be inferred that Miss Wall

was conducting some sort of pro-Communist activity under the guise of official sanction. Yet none of the other American labor officials whom Miss Wall visited, either before or after her interview with Mr. Ryan, have given any indication whatsoever that her views, actions, or conduct were questionable. Furthermore, at the Department's request the United States Ambassador to India, Mr. Loy Henderson, questioned Miss Wall in regard to the charges and last week he wired the Department that Miss Wall categorically denies both charges. In this connection I should like to point out that during the week of her visits to various union headquarters last year, among the union officials Miss Wall interviewed in addition to Mr. Ryan were the following:

Mark Starr, Educational Director of International Ladies Garment Workers Union
Jay Lovestone, Director of International Activities of I. L. G. W. U.
Julius Hockman, Director of the Joint Dress Board of I. L. G. W. U.
Morris Iushewitz, New York City C. I. O. Council
Willy J. Dorchain, International Transport Workers
Joseph Curran, National Maritime Union
Florence Marston, Associated Actors and Artists—Screen Actors Guild
Eleanor Coit, Director, American Labor Education Service
Jacob S. Potofsky, Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union
Gus Tyler, I. L. G. W. U.
Hugh Brown, New England representative of the Textile Workers Union

The Department has made a point of again asking certain of these union officials whether anything Miss Wall said in her conversation with them would corroborate the charges contained in the Riesel article or the implications of the article. Again they have stated categorically that Miss Wall's statements and conduct during her visits with them could not possibly be construed to corroborate the charges.

It should be a matter of record that Miss Wall has had a complete security investigation, and I can say that her security file does not show a single derogatory reference. Miss Wall worked in various private companies prior to accepting employment with the State Department, including: Freeport Sulphur Company (New York); Arthur Andersen and Company (New York); Barrett Associates (New York); Francis H. Leggett and Company (New York); Montgomery Ward and Company (Illinois); Talon, Incorporated (Pennsylvania). All employees and officials of these companies interviewed, including her immediate superiors, speak well of her and her ability.

In view of the above, I should like to reiterate that the Department considers the allegations against Miss Wall, made by Mr. Riesel's article of May 14, 1951, to be unwarranted and without basis in fact.

I am enclosing for your information a chronology of pertinent events bearing upon Miss Wall's case, including certain documentation which may be of interest.

I am glad to make this report to you for it is

important for men in your position to be informed of the facts in matters of this kind and that attempts to besmirch conscientious and devoted public servants do not go unchallenged.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE

Enclosure:

Chronology of Events re Edith Cameron Wall with enclosures:

- A—Miss Wall's report on interview with Ryan.
- B—Telegram from Mr. Ryan to Dr. Steelman.
- C—Letter from Dr. Steelman to Mr. Ryan.
- D—Letter from Mr. Ryan to Dr. Steelman.
- E—Telegram from New Delhi to Secretary of State.

May 14, 1951.

DEAR MR. HUMELSINE: I have just read an article from the New York *Daily Mirror* by Victor Riesel in which he involves one of your employees, Edith Cameron Wall.

Before making further investigation into this matter I should like to have a detailed explanation from the Department with particular reference to Miss Wall's authority to speak for the Department, as well as any information which you may furnish as to the validity of the statement made in the article by Mr. Riesel.

Trusting I may have your prompt advice, I am,
Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS E. WALTER

Chronology of Events

1. Miss Edith Cameron Wall was born June 27, 1912; graduated from Senn High School, Chicago, 1928; from Northwestern University, 1933, (Phi Beta Kappa).

2. Assignments:

- a. Appointed clerk in the Foreign Service of the United States and assigned at Algiers, November 8, 1941.
- b. Assigned Rome, September 19, 1944.
- c. Assigned Copenhagen, May 12, 1947.
- d. Returned from Copenhagen to the United States early in spring of 1950.
- e. Assigned to New Delhi, India, as Assistant Labor Attaché and arrived in New Delhi, July 12, 1950.
- f. Still stationed in New Delhi as Assistant Labor Attaché. Her duties are reporting on labor conditions.

3. Miss Wall in the early spring of 1950 returned home from her assignment in Copenhagen where she had demonstrated exceptional aptitude in labor reporting. The Department of State felt that she should specialize in labor work and that her next field assignment should be as an Assistant Labor Attaché. Therefore, she was given labor training, both in the Department of State and by the Department of Labor. Part of this training involved acquainting herself with the new U. S. labor movement by visiting union headquarters and talking to various union officials. In pursuing this course of orientation, she visited the International Longshoremen's Association in New York and talked to Mr. Ryan, the President of the Association.

Some of the questions Miss Wall asked Mr. Ryan apparently antagonized him. It is reported that these questions had to do with matters of internal operations of the union. At any rate Mr. Ryan wired Dr. John R. Steelman on the day following the interview that Miss Wall's personal views on loading arms for shipment to Europe did not coincide with those of the A. F. of L.,

I. T. F., or the American labor movement and requested information on her background. The following chronology traces the incident from Miss Wall's interview with Mr. Ryan to the present:

a. *March 9, 1950*—Miss Wall interviewed Mr. Ryan in New York. Her report of the conversation between them is attached as Enclosure "A".

b. *March 10, 1950*—Mr. Ryan wired Dr. John R. Steelman reporting on his interview with Miss Wall. (Enclosure "B")

c. *March 10 or 11, 1950*—Dr. Steelman's office referred Mr. Ryan's telegram to the Departments of State and Labor for investigation.

d. *March 11–March 22, 1950*—The Departments of State and Labor conducted a thorough investigation and advised Dr. Steelman that they were convinced that Miss Wall may have asked some tactless questions in regard to internal operations of the International Longshoremen's Association but that otherwise she was clear of making any ill-advised statements or any misrepresentations. Deputy Under Secretary of State Carlisle H. Humelsine (then Deputy Assistant Secretary) personally made the investigation for the Department of State.

e. *March 23, 1950*—Dr. Steelman wrote to Mr. Ryan stating in essence that although Miss Wall might have asked some tactless questions, he felt that she was otherwise "in the clear." (Enclosure "C")

f. *March 25, 1950*—Mr. Ryan replied to Dr. Steelman's letter of March 23 in a tone which was interpreted as meaning that he was satisfied with Dr. Steelman's report on the matter. (Enclosure "D")

g. *May 14, 1951*—(over a year later)—A story by Mr. Victor Riesel appeared in the New York *Daily Mirror* alleging that Edith Cameron Wall, representing the State Department, urged Mr. Ryan to have the longshoremen "refuse to load guns and ammo on ships rushing military supplies to our friends in Europe." The news story further alleged that Miss Wall presented to Mr. Ryan a letter from the Secretary of Labor, urging union leaders to cooperate with her. It was to be inferred from the Riesel article that the incident had taken place very recently. (His account mentioned *March 13* as the date of the interview, but gave no year.)

h. *May 16, 1951*—The Department of State, although reasonably certain that the Riesel story was a distortion and an exaggeration of an incident which occurred the previous year, investigated the story and established (1) that Miss Wall has been in New Delhi, India since July 1950; (2) that she neither possessed nor presented a letter from Secretary Tobin at her interview with Mr. Ryan in March 1950 or previously or subsequently; (3) that the Riesel allegation in his May 14th article that Miss Wall had urged Mr. Ryan to have longshoremen refuse to load arms on ships has no basis in fact. (Ambassador Loy Henderson's recent telegram from New Delhi may be of interest. Enclosure "E")

Summary

The Department has thoroughly investigated the allegations made by Mr. Victor Riesel in his column of May 14, 1951, in regard to Edith Cameron Wall and has established to its complete satisfaction that the charges that (1) she attempted in any way to persuade Mr. Ryan to exert his influence to delay or stop the loading of arms and ammunition on ships destined for Europe, or (2) she presented to Mr. Ryan a letter of introduction or any other kind of letter from the Department of Labor are without basis in fact. To the best of the Department's knowledge, Miss Wall is an exceptionally capable officer of the Foreign Service, and the Department regrets that an attempt has been made to besmirch her well-established reputation as a conscientious and devoted public servant.

Enclosures:

- "A"—Miss Wall's report of the Ryan interview
- "B"—Telegram from Mr. Ryan to Dr. Steelman
- "C"—Letter to Mr. Ryan from Dr. Steelman
- "D"—Letter to Dr. Steelman from Mr. Ryan
- "E"—Telegram from Ambassador Loy Henderson (New Delhi) to the Secretary of State

**ENCLOSURE "A" REPORT OF INTERVIEW
WITH JOSEPH P. RYAN**

Boston, March 13, 1950.

I wish to report in detail my conversation with Mr. Ryan. This was an unpleasant experience which I should have reported immediately. However, in thinking it over it seemed to me that I had inadvertently, and awkwardly, touched on a very sore point with him, which resulted in a rude outburst. Apparently I underestimated the situation. Since the interview was relatively brief (around 30 minutes), the following is a rather full summary.

I had made an appointment to see Mr. Ryan, by telephone the day before, at 2:15 on Thursday, March 9. As I had another appointment at 3:00, I left shortly before the hour since he had not shown up. At 4:30 I telephoned his office and was told that he had been delayed at lunch but would see me then if I could come immediately. This I did.

After I had waited about 15 minutes in his office, Mr. Ryan walked in. He was very brusque and wanted to know why I wanted to see him. I stated that I had been acting as assistant labor attaché in Copenhagen and had been transferred to Paris in the same capacity but that before proceeding to the new post I was on a brief orientation program in the American labor scene. Mr. Ryan's only comment was what did that have to do with him. I then referred to the strike threats in French ports in connection with the MAP shipments and the Communist exploitation of economic union demands for wage increases for political ends. I made the comment that generally such Communist-directed action did not occur in isolated areas and asked if he anticipated agitation for sympathy strikes in American ports in connection with the loading of such ships.

Mr. Ryan replied that there were always agitators in port areas, but that the union's policy was to load the ships; the unloading problem in France was not their affair. He said that no local agitation would stop such loading of ships unless and/or until he received orders from the Secretary of State not to load the ships.

Mr. Ryan's tone of voice and general attitude put an end to any further discussion of this subject. Therefore, as a second topic, I said I was very much interested in his views on employment prospects within his union. I asked whether (a) union membership was in a recession from the peak of war and immediate postwar years and (b) what protective measures they were taking for the future.

Mr. Ryan stated that, contrary to the NMU for example, they had not increased membership during the war years but had allowed anyone able and available to work without joining the union or even issuing a work permit card. As a result, when cargo loading became lighter in the postwar years they were not faced with a swollen membership for the fewer jobs available. He said that the union in effect was a closed union because of the stiff initiation (\$50.00) and dues (\$7.50 quarterly). Although the 30-day clause of the T-H Act theoretically hurt them, actually the stevedores who did the hiring knew who were union members and who were not, and only union members ever got jobs.

I then asked if present port operations were sufficient to assure full-time jobs at least to all union members. Mr. Ryan said categorically no. I then asked how jobs were distributed—whether they were rotated or staggered or what. Mr. Ryan then stated as his and the union's view that, "It was better that some workers have enough work to live on while others went on relief than that all should be on relief." An equal distribution of the available work would not mean enough for any to live on and all would be on relief." He said that the stevedores who did the hiring knew the men, and that there was a difference between men with families and single men or those not too keen on working.

It was at this point that I made the awkward remark which hit a sensitive point. This was not done as a

criticism, but because I felt that I had not understood completely his exposition and wanted to clear up in my own mind what appeared to be such a blatant loophole. I therefore asked if he did not have many grievances among members as a result of favoritism or possible kick-backs to the hiring stevedores. He became quite incensed at this point and said that the fact that the union had this hiring system was proof in itself that it worked and that the men liked it. He added that he had been bothered enough by all kinds of reformists and investigators who had tried to prove graft and kick-backs but that they had gotten nowhere with their trouble.

In an effort to calm the waters I mentioned that on my way home a few weeks ago I had stopped off in Italy where the employment problem among seafaring trades was particularly acute and chronic. The Italian method of meeting the immediate situation was to impose forcibly rotation of jobs, but because the waiting period between jobs was so long this was in effect no solution.

At this point Mr. Ryan jumped up from his desk and shouted at me, "Is it the policy of the Department of State to impose a share-the-work program on me? Are you here to tell me how to run my union?"

His violence shocked me and I answered that I was not stating any official views but merely personal opinion. Before I could continue further, Mr. Ryan said:

"I am not the least interested in your personal views or opinions. I have received you as a representative of the Department of Labor. I don't know who you are and care less. I have already wasted too much time on you. So long!" With this he walked out of the room, into the adjoining file room where I could still hear his voice although I could not understand what he said. I was very upset at his discourteous treatment and the implied insult, but to avoid a further scene it seemed the best thing to leave without further ado. This I did.

I am attaching herewith a brief summary of all interviews thus far. Except for Ryan, I have been received very cordially in every case; the interviews have been extremely helpful, I have been furnished with all kinds of printed material, other contacts suggested, interviews arranged with other persons and I have been asked to call again whenever I was in town and to write if I ever needed anything. All in all, I think the tour has been quite successful.

EDITH WALL

**ENCLOSURE "B": TELEGRAM FROM MR. RYAN
TO JOHN R. STEELMAN**

TO: Dr. John R. Steelman (White House)
FROM: New York
DATE: March 10, 3:43 P. M., 1950

Was interviewed yesterday by one Ethel [Edith] Cameron Wall purporting to represent both State and Labor Departments. Her personal views on longshoremen in this country loading arms for France did not coincide with views of the A. F. of L., I. T. F., or American Labor Movement. What is her background?

JOSEPH P. RYAN,
President, International Longshoremen's Association.

**ENCLOSURE "C": REPLY FROM
DR. STEELMAN TO MR. RYAN**

THE LITTLE WHITE HOUSE
Key West, Florida, March 23, 1950.

DEAR JOE: Immediately upon receipt of your telegram of March 10, which was forwarded to me here at Key West, I returned it to Washington and asked the State Department, by whom Edith Cameron Wall is employed, to give me a report on the matter. I have now received that report and the views of the Labor Department and I have the distinct impression that she perhaps asked some tactless questions and did not make her position entirely clear in her conference with you. At least her record

and contacts with other people with whom she had talked seemed to put her entirely in the clear.

I am glad you called this to my attention. Although in this case the record appears to be on the favorable side there is always the possibility of something being amiss, and in such cases a little checking might be a very good thing.

Sincerely,

JOHN R. STEELMAN

**ENCLOSURE "D": MESSAGE FROM
MR. RYAN TO DR. STEELMAN**

DR. JOHN R. STEELMAN
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

FRIEND JOHN: Many thanks for your nice communication of March 23, 1950, regarding Edith Cameron Wall, and although I do not usually go in for reporting people, I felt it my duty in this case.

With best wishes, I remain,

Sincerely,

JOSEPH P. RYAN

**ENCLOSURE "E": TELEGRAM FROM
AMBASSADOR HENDERSON TO SECRETARY ACHESON**

May 1951

FROM: New Delhi
TO: Secretary of State

Wall had no letter from Secretary Tobin or other credentials from Department of Labor when she interviewed Ryan. Neither did she exhibit State Department credentials to Ryan. Appointment was arranged by phone conversation in which she described her State Department connection and duties. Upon arrival for the interview she presented ordinary personal card containing only her name.

Department cable is first she has heard of allegation made by New York *Daily Mirror* article that she requested Ryan to cancel orders to longshoremen, etc. Wall declares it completely untrue.

LOY HENDERSON

Continued from page 974

Recent Releases—

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Port-au-Prince September 18 and 27, 1950; entered into force October 12, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Uruguay. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2158. Pub. 4078. 13 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay supplementing and extending agreement of October 1 and November 1, 1943, as modified and extended—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Montevideo November 10, 1947, and January 3, 1948; entered into force January 3, 1948; operative retroactively January 1, 1948; and agreement between Uruguay and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs—Signed at Montevideo January 3, 1948.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Uruguay. Treaties and other International Acts Series 2159. Pub. 4079. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay modifying and extending agreement of October 1 and November 1, 1943, as modified and extended—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Montevideo June 25 and July 20, 1948; entered into force October 7, 1948; operative retroactively July 1, 1948.

Publications of the Department of State, January 1, 1951. Pub. 4098. 28 pp. Free.

A cumulative list published semiannually.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2186. Pub. 4120. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Signed at San José January 11, 1951; entered into force January 11, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2195. Pub. 4141. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Liberia—Signed at Washington December 22, 1950; entered into force January 22, 1951.

It Has Fallen to Us. General Foreign Policy Series 45. Pub. 4144. 8 pp. [BULLETIN Reprint]. Free.

A letter from the Secretary of State on the meaning of Korea.

Second Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, April 6 to October 6, 1950. General Foreign Policy Series 47. Pub. 4190. 50 pp. Limited Distribution.

Printed also as H. Doc. 119, 82d Congress, First Session.

Aid to the Palestine Refugees. Near and Middle Eastern Series 4. Pub. 4191. 18 pp. 10¢.

An over-all summary of the aid programs in the Near East, including map, chart, and pictures.

United States Government International Exchange Opportunities. International Information and Cultural Series 17. Pub. 4198. 24 pp. 10¢.

Discusses the various programs, qualifications, application instructions for both American individuals and foreign nationals. Illustrated.

Point Four Program. Economic Cooperation Series 26. Pub. 4203. 12 pp. Free.

The sixth of a series of progress reports designed to provide background information in summary form on developments in the President's program for world economic progress through cooperative technical assistance.

Analysis of Torquay Protocol of Accession, Schedules, and Related Documents, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Negotiated at Torquay, England, September 1950–April 1951. (Preliminary.) Commercial Policy Series 135. Pub. 4209. 474 pp. \$1.00.

A preliminary analysis was prepared on the basis of information supplied by the United States Government agencies participating in the negotiations at Torquay, England.

Mutual Security for the Free World. General Foreign Policy Series 49. Pub. 4210. 12 pp. 10¢.

A background summary of the purpose and aims of the Mutual Security Program. Map.

Why We Need Allies. General Foreign Policy Series 50. Pub. 4218. 7 pp. Free. [BULLETIN Reprint].

An address by President Harry S. Truman before the Civil Defense Conference at Washington on May 7.

New Jersey and Foreign Trade. 14 pp. Limited distribution.

One of a series of reports prepared by the Department of State in response to a large number of requests. Charts.

U. S. Delegations to International Meetings

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Fifth Session

On June 4, the Department of State announced that J. Paul Barringer, Deputy Director, Office of Transport and Communications and Rear Adm. Paul A. Smith, United States representative on the ICAO Council have been designated as delegates to the fifth session of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization which will convene at Montreal, June 6, 1951. Mr. Barringer and Admiral Smith will also serve as chairman and vice chairman respectively of the United States delegation to the forthcoming meeting. Other members of the delegation are:

Alternate Delegate

David M. French, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Advisers

G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., Chief, International and Rules Division, Bureau of Law, Civil Aeronautics Board
Charles O. Cary, Executive Secretary, Air Coordinating Committee

Alfred Hand, Assistant to Deputy Administrator for Program Planning, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Henry T. Snowden, Assistant Chief, Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State

Joan H. Stacy, Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State

The fifth session of the Assembly of ICAO will be of limited scope and will be concerned primarily with administrative, budgetary and fiscal matters necessary to the continuing operation of the Organization. Among the subjects to be considered will be: the budget for 1952; the apportionment of expenses among the contracting states for 1952; the election of a member state to fill a vacancy on the Council; a review of the section of the Council's report to the Assembly dealing with administrative and financial questions; and consideration of the character and scope of future sessions of the Assembly.

FAO Council, 12th Session

The Department of State announced on June 8 that Clarence J. McCormick, Under Secretary of Agriculture and United States member on the FAO Council will attend the twelfth session of the Council, which is to begin at Rome, Italy, on June 11, 1951. Other members of the United States delegation are:

Alternate United States Member

Fred J. Rossiter, Associate Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Associate United States Member

John W. Evans, Acting Deputy Director, Office of International Materials, Department of State

Advisers

James F. Anderson, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Philip V. Cardon, Administrator, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture

Howard R. Cottam, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Rome

Mrs. Ursula H. Duffus, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Ralph S. Roberts, Director of Finance, Department of Agriculture

Thomas E. Street, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, *Secretary of delegation*

Robert C. Tetro, Attaché, American Embassy, Rome

The forthcoming session, the first to be held since the transfer of the FAO headquarters to Rome, will review a statement, prepared by the Director General of the Organization, on the changes which have taken place in the world food and agriculture situation since the fifth session.

The Council will also make a detailed study of reports and proposals relating to such matters as the long-term objectives of FAO, international investment, full employment, commodity problems, technical assistance, plans for the 6th session of the FAO Conference next November, administrative and financial matters, and nominations for Director General and Chairman of the Council.

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U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

JUL 5 1951



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June 25, 1951

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Economic, Social, and Cultural Provisions in the Human Rights Covenant

REVISIONS OF THE 1951 SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

by James Simsarian

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, at the seventh session, which met at Geneva from April 16–May 19, 1951, drafted provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights for inclusion in the International Covenant on Human Rights.¹ The Commission acted in accordance with the decision of the 1950 General Assembly that provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights should be included in the covenant.

The Commission on Human Rights also revised the implementation machinery provided in the covenant with respect to the civil and political rights in the covenant. It did not have time, however, during the 5-weeks session to revise the other parts of the covenant.

At the end of the 1951 session, the Commission forwarded the covenant to the members of the United Nations and to the specialized agencies for their comments before the Economic and Social Council considered it at its next meeting at Geneva on July 30, 1951.

The Council will then submit the revised draft of the covenant to the General Assembly as requested by the General Assembly's resolution.²

After the draft covenant is finally reviewed and revised, it will be opened for signature and ratification and will come into force, when 20 countries ratify it. The covenant is in contrast to the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (approved by the General Assembly at Paris on Dec. 10, 1948) since the declaration was not drafted in the form of a treaty but as a declaration without legally binding force.

The basic civil and political rights set forth in the draft covenant are well known in American tradition and law and relate to the right to life, protection against torture, slavery, forced labor, arbitrary arrest or detention, freedom to leave a country, freedom to return to one's country, right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, protection against *ex post facto* laws, right to recognition as a person before the law, freedom of religion, expression, assembly and association, and equal protection of the law.

The Commission decided that the covenant on Human Rights should authorize only states to file complaints with respect to alleged violations of the covenant. The Commission rejected a proposal that individuals, groups, and nongovernmental organizations also be authorized to file complaints.

The draft covenant on Human Rights now consists of 5 parts. Parts I and II relate to civil and political rights, part III sets forth the economic, social, and cultural rights, part IV sets forth the complaint machinery, part V sets forth the new reporting requirements drafted at the 1951 session of the Commission, and part VI contains the federal state article, the territories article, and several procedural articles.

In the new part III articles were drafted on most of the economic, social, and cultural rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The provisions of this part of the covenant relate to the opportunity to work, conditions of work, social security, housing, standard of living, health, maternity, motherhood, children,

¹ For additional materials on human rights, see the following BULLETIN references: An International Bill of Human Rights, by James P. Hendrick, Feb. 15, 1948, p. 195; Progress Report on Human Rights, by James P. Hendrick, Aug. 8, 1948, p. 159; United Nations Actions on Human Rights in 1948, by James Simsarian, Jan. 2, 1949, p. 18; Human Rights: Draft Covenant Revised at Fifth Session of Commission on Human Rights, by James Simsarian, July 11, 1949, p. 3; Proposed Human Rights Covenant Revised at 1950 Session of Commission on Human Rights, by James Simsarian, June 12, 1950, p. 945. For the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951, p. 370.

² The General Assembly will convene at Paris the latter part of October or early in November 1951.

young persons, trade unions, education, culture, and science.

In drafting such provisions, the Commission recognized that they differed in a number of respects from the civil and political provisions of the covenant. Those differences were acknowledged in the covenant in a number of ways:

(1) The economic, social, and cultural rights were recognized as objectives to be achieved "progressively." In the case of the civil and political rights, states ratifying the covenant will be under an obligation to take necessary steps within a reasonable length of time to give effect to these rights. A much longer period of time is clearly contemplated under the covenant for the achievement of the economic, social, and cultural rights. The term "rights" is used with respect to both the civil and political provisions as well as the economic, social, and cultural provisions. This term is used, however, in two different senses. The civil and political rights are looked upon as "rights" to be given effect almost immediately. The economic, social, and cultural rights although recognized as "rights" are looked upon as objectives toward which states adhering to the covenant would undertake to strive.

(2) It was recognized that the economic, social, and cultural rights were to be achieved by many means and methods, private as well as public, and not solely through legislation. Article 19 provides that States will take steps "with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in this Part of the present Covenant." The phrase "with a view" was stressed as pointing to the achievement of conditions in a state whereby these rights could be secured through private action as well as governmental action. The obligation of a state ratifying the covenant will be to take steps for the promotion of conditions for economic, social, and cultural progress and development. The U.S.S.R. repeatedly urged that the economic, social, and cultural rights be stated in terms of state legislation only but the other members of the Commission rejected this approach.

(3) Simple implementation arrangements were drafted for the economic, social, and cultural rights in contrast to the implementation machinery drafted for the civil and political rights. In the case of the civil and political rights, the implementation machinery established authorized one state to complain against another state if the latter was violating the covenant. There was wide sentiment in the Commission that this complaint procedure would not be appropriate for the economic, social, and cultural rights since these rights were to be achieved progressively, and the obligations of states with respect to these rights were not so precise as those with respect to the civil and political rights. The Commission wished to stress the importance of assisting states to achieve economic, social, and cultural progress rather than complaints against states. Accordingly, a procedure was devised whereby states would furnish reports

concerning the progress made in the observance of the economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the covenant.

(4) The economic, social, and cultural rights were necessarily drafted in broad terms as contrasted to the provisions on civil and political rights. It was felt in the Commission that since these rights were stated in terms of broad objectives, general language would be adequate. For example, article 22 simply provides that—

The States Parties to the covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security.

In view of the many differences recognized by the Commission in drafting part III of the covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights as contrasted to parts I and II on civil and political rights, India urged at the end of the 1951 session that the General Assembly be requested to reconsider the decision that economic, social, and cultural rights should be included in the same covenant with civil and political rights.

The Indian representative proposed that the civil and political rights constitute one covenant and that the provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights be set forth in a separate one. This proposal was, however, rejected by a vote of 5-12, with 1 abstention. Countries voting to reject this proposal recognized the different character of the economic, social, and cultural rights as contrasted to the civil and political rights in the covenant but vigorously pressed the view that such provisions should be contained in the same covenant with the provisions on civil and political rights. This attitude was the same as that expressed in the 1950 General Assembly. The United States favored the separation of the two fields into two covenants in both the 1950 session of the General Assembly and the 1951 session of the Commission on Human Rights but was in a minority in both organs of the United Nations on this point.

Underdeveloped countries in particular expressed the view that it was important that the economic, social, and cultural rights be contained in the same covenant with the civil and political rights to stress the equal importance of these two fields. A separation of the two, it was felt, would indicate the lesser importance of the economic, social, and cultural rights.

The Commission adopted article 32 to recognize that such of the economic, social, and cultural rights as are provided by a state ratifying the covenant may be subjected by the state to certain limitations if necessary for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. The United States urged the inclusion of this provision in the covenant to make it clear that the economic, social, and cultural rights recognized would not be absolute but subject to reasonable limitations. In the case of social security for example, it is sometimes necessary to condition disability benefits payable to disabled work

ers on their willingness to take vocational rehabilitation courses.

Representatives of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco), and the World Health Organization (WHO) participated in the drafting of the provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights in the Commission. The Director Generals of the three organizations attended some of the meetings, David Morse, Dr. Torres Bodet, and Dr. Brock Chisholm, respectively. In addition, the ILO was represented by a tripartite delegation from the Governing Body of the International Labor Office consisting of Sir Guildhaume Myrrdin-Evans, representing the government group, Leon Jouhaux, representing the workers, Gustav Bergengstrom, representing the employers.

Articles on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

The following is a brief discussion of each of the economic, social, and cultural articles adopted by the Commission of Human Rights for inclusion in part III of the draft covenant.

RIGHT TO WORK

The first article considered in the field of economic, social, and cultural rights was the right to work. The U.S.S.R. proposed that this article read as follows:

The State shall ensure to everyone the right to work and a choice of profession, with the object of creating conditions which will remove the threat of death by hunger or by inanition.

This proposal was rejected by a vote of 10-2, with 6 abstentions. Instead, the Commission adopted the following as article 20 by a vote of 16-0, with 2 abstentions (U.S.S.R. and Ukraine):

Work being at the basis of all human endeavor, the States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right to work, that is to say, the fundamental right of everyone to the opportunity, if he so desires, to gain his living by work which he freely accepts.

Most of the members of the Commission and especially the United States representative were particularly anxious to counteract any concept of compulsion, i.e., forced labor, in the phrase "right to work." The Commission accordingly voted to include the phrase "if he so desires" and the word "freely" to stress the noncompulsory character of this provision. The U.S.S.R. asked for a separate vote on the inclusion of the phrase "if he so desires," but the effort to exclude this phrase was unsuccessful. The Commission rejected the initial Soviet proposal particularly because it gave unwarranted stress to the role of the state. The language adopted by the Commission is in terms of the recognition of the right of everyone, if he so desires, to gain his living by work which he freely accepts.

CONDITIONS OF WORK

Article 21 recognizes the right of everyone to just and favorable conditions of work, stressing safe and healthy working conditions, fair wages, equal pay for equal work and reasonable limitation of working hours, and periodic holidays with pay. The ILO urged that the language utilized in this article be as general as possible since detailed conventions on various aspects of this subject are being developed separately in that organization.

SOCIAL SECURITY

The following U.S.S.R. proposal was rejected:

Social security and social insurance for workers and salaried employees shall be provided at the expense of the State or of the employer, in accordance with each country's legislation.

The Commission decided instead to provide simply in article 22 that the states parties to the covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security. The ILO again urged that general language be used since a number of conventions in the field of social security are being developed in that organization.

HOUSING

The following U.S.S.R. proposal was rejected:

The State shall take all the necessary steps especially legislative measures, to ensure to everyone living accommodation worthy of man.

Instead, the Commission adopted article 23 providing that—

States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to adequate housing.

STANDARD OF LIVING

This article 24 was adopted to recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living and the continuous improvement of living conditions.

HEALTH

The WHO representative urged that provisions in the covenant on the right to health be couched in terms identical with those used in the Constitution of the organization, especially since they have been recognized by the 75 members of that organization. The first sentence of this article 25 was accordingly adopted to provide:

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest standard of health obtainable.

The United States supported this language, but objected to the inclusion of the second sentence of this article which provides:

With a view to implementing and safeguarding this right each State party hereto undertakes to provide legislative measures to promote and protect health.

The United States in opposing this sentence pointed out that it mentioned only legislative measures for the promotion and protection of health and that obviously the promotion and protection of health should be achieved through private means and methods also and not solely through legislation. This sentence was, however, adopted. It was recognized at the same time by the Commission that in approving this provision, it would be subject to review later in the light of the over-all general promotional article expected to be adopted with respect to all the provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights in the covenant. The over-all general promotional article (later adopted as art. 19) is not limited to legislation for the achievement of the objectives set forth in the field of economic, social, and cultural rights. The Commission, however, did not have time to review the various articles and to eliminate inconsistencies. Accordingly, the second sentence of article 25 was not eliminated at this session. It is anticipated that, in the further review of the provisions of the covenant, the United States will urge that this inconsistency be corrected and that the second sentence of article 25 be eliminated.

MATERNITY, MOTHERHOOD, AND CHILDREN

This article 26 was adopted to recognize (1) that special protection should be accorded to maternity and motherhood and (2) that special measures of protection should be taken on behalf of children and young persons and that in particular they should not be required to do work likely to hamper their normal development.

TRADE UNIONS

Although under article 16 of the draft covenant the right of association is already recognized, the Commission decided to include a separate provision on trade union rights under article 27 to recognize expressly the right of everyone to form and join local, national, and international trade unions of his choice for the protection of his economic and social interests. The Commission decided to omit any reference to the right to strike in this article. Several attempts were made to include the right to strike subject to certain limitations. It was felt, however, that to include such provision with the limitations proposed would be too restrictive. For example, Uruguay proposed the following text, which was rejected:

It shall be understood that the right to strike is restricted to circumstances where attempts at conciliation have been exhausted. In the same way, the right to strike may be restricted by legislative measures in the case of public officials.

EDUCATION

The first seven paragraphs of article 28 on education were adopted on the recommendation of

UNESCO representatives. Paragraphs 3 and 4 provide for compulsory primary education to be free and for secondary education to be progressively free. Paragraph 5 provides that higher education should also be made progressively free and equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. Paragraph 6 calls for fundamental education for adults who have not received or completed their primary education.

Paragraph 8 recognizes that the obligations of states to establish a system of free compulsory primary education should not be deemed incompatible with the liberty of parents to choose for their children schools other than those established by the state provided that they conform to minimum standards laid down by the state. Paragraph 9 provides that in the exercise of any functions which the state assumes in the field of education it should have respect for the liberty of parents to insure the religious education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

Under article 29, each state would agree to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action within 2 years after adherence to the covenant for the progressive implementation of the principle of free compulsory primary education if at the time it adheres to the covenant it has not already done so.

CULTURE AND SCIENCE

Article 30 was adopted to recognize the right of everyone to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. The proposal of UNESCO to include a provision on copyright was rejected by the Commission. It provided for the right of everyone—

to obtain protection for his moral and material interests resulting from any scientific or artistic production of which he is the author.

The Commission felt that this was a technical subject more appropriate for consideration in a separate convention than for inclusion in the Covenant on Human Rights.

EQUALITY OF MEN AND WOMEN

In accordance with the General Assembly resolution, the Commission included article 31 in part III of the covenant to recognize the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly those set forth in the covenant.

PROPERTY

The United States proposed that an article be included in the covenant recognizing the right of everyone to own property. The Commission decided for the present, however, not to include such an article. At the end of the session, the United States filed a statement in the report of the Commission calling attention to the desirability of including such an article.

Reports Concerning Economic Social and Cultural Rights

The Commission drafted a new part V to provide that states ratifying the covenant would submit reports concerning progress made in achieving the observance of economic, social, and cultural rights. At the same time, article 60 provides that these reports would be submitted in conformity with the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly in the exercise of their general responsibility calling upon all members of the United Nations to provide such reports.

There was strong sentiment in the Commission that all members of the United Nations should be called upon to submit these reports, whether or not they ratified the Covenant on Human Rights. It was recognized of course that only states ratifying the covenant could be obligated under the covenant to furnish these reports and that other members of the United Nations would not be under a similar obligation to do so. It was felt, however, that since it was being provided in the covenant that the reports would be considered by the United Nations, all members of the United Nations should be requested to submit the reports by the adoption of recommendations to this effect by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

Provision is made that reports concerning progress made in achieving the observance of the economic, social, and cultural rights would be submitted by states in accordance with a program to be established by the Economic and Social Council after consultation with these states and the specialized agencies concerned. It is contemplated that reports would be made to the specialized agencies as well as to the United Nations. Reports made by states through the specialized agencies and directly to the United Nations would be transmitted by the Economic and Social Council to the Commission on Human Rights for study and recommendations. The Commission would submit recommendations to the Council and the Council in turn would submit reports to the General Assembly indicating the progress made by states in achieving the observance of the economic, social, and cultural rights.

Implementation of Civil and Political Rights

The U.S.S.R. as usual proposed that all implementation machinery be omitted from the covenant. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, these provisions should be omitted "on the grounds that they envisage forms of control in implementing the draft Covenant on Human Rights which constitute an attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of States and violate their sovereignty." This Soviet proposal was rejected by the Commission by a vote of 2-15, with 1 abstention.

As pointed out earlier, the Commission re-

jected the inclusion of a provision in the covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups, and organizations. This proposal was rejected by a vote of 7-10, with 1 abstention. The seven countries voting in favor of this proposal were Chile, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Lebanon, Sweden, and Uruguay. The 10 countries voting against this proposal were Australia, China, France, Greece, Pakistan, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. Denmark abstained.

Guatemala proposed that a provision be included in the covenant referring to other international instrument authorizing complaints to be filed by individuals, groups, and organizations. This proposal was also rejected by a vote of 7-9, with 1 abstention.

The countries voting against and abstaining on the question of including provisions in the covenant to extend the right of complaint to individuals, groups, and organizations expressed the view that such provisions should be set forth in a separate protocol or protocols for separate ratification, except the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine who were against the drafting of any such provisions in any international instruments. The Commission intended to proceed with the drafting of a protocol or protocols authorizing individuals, groups, and organizations to file complaints of alleged violations of the covenant, but did not have adequate time to do so at its 1951 session. These protocols may be considered by the General Assembly at its 1951 session or by the Commission on Human Rights at its 1952 session.

In reviewing the provisions of the draft covenant providing for the establishment of a Human Rights Committee to receive complaints from states with respect to alleged violations of the civil and political rights in the covenant, the Commission decided to increase the membership of this Committee from 7 to 9 members. In addition, the Commission decided that the Committee should be elected by the International Court of Justice instead of by states parties to the covenant. It was felt that this method of election would tend to make the Committee a more impartial body. It was agreed, however, that the Court would elect members only from a list of persons nominated by states parties to the covenant. The nonjudicial character of the Human Rights Committee was stressed in a revision of article 33 to provide that consideration should be given in the composition of the Committee—

to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having judicial or legal experience.

This provision indicates that it is not contemplated that all the members of the Committee will be persons with judicial or legal experience.

Provision is made that the Human Rights Committee will meet at the permanent headquarters of the United Nations at New York or Geneva. The jurisdiction of the Committee was restricted

by the adoption of article 53 which provides that the Committee will not deal with any matter (1) for which an organ or a specialized agency of the United Nations competent to do so has established a special procedure or (2) with which the International Court of Justice is seized. Article 54 was retained without change to provide that normally the Human Rights Committee will deal with a matter referred to it only if available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case.

Article 56 was added to authorize the Human Rights Committee to recommend to the Economic and Social Council that the Council request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question connected with a matter with which the Committee is seized. This provision also stresses the nonlegal character of the Human Rights Committee.

Under article 57, the Committee is authorized to ascertain the facts in each case referred to it and to make its good offices available to the states concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights as recognized in the covenant. The Committee will in each case prepare a report to be sent to the states concerned and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for publication.

Federal State Article

The Commission on Human Rights had been requested by the General Assembly to study a federal state article and to prepare, for the consideration of the 1951 session of the General Assembly, recommendations which would have as their purpose "securing the maximum extension of the Covenant to the constituent units of Federal States" and at the same time meeting the constitutional problems of federal states. The Commission did not have sufficient time at its 1951 session to study or make such recommendations. Accordingly, the preparation of a federal state article was postponed. The United States, during the discussion of the economic, social, and cultural provisions, pointed out that, in its view, the federal state article should be applicable to these provisions as well as to the civil and political provisions in the covenant. Under the language proposed by the United States, the obligations undertaken under the covenant by a federal state such as the United States would be limited to matters which are determined in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States to be appropriate for federal action.

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

[As revised at the seventh session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, April-May 1951. The Commission at this session drafted the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights in part III and the implementation provisions in part V and revised the implementation machinery in part IV. Due to the lack of time, the Commission did not consider or make any changes in parts I, II and VI except with respect to article 72. This draft will be considered by the United Nations Economic and Social Council at its thirteenth session, July-September 1951.]

conomic, social and cultural rights in part III and the implementation provisions in part V and revised the implementation machinery in part IV. Due to the lack of time, the Commission did not consider or make any changes in parts I, II and VI except with respect to article 72. This draft will be considered by the United Nations Economic and Social Council at its thirteenth session, July-September 1951.]

Preamble

The States Parties hereto,
CONSIDERING the obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,

BEARING IN MIND the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

RECOGNIZING that the rights and freedoms recognized in this Covenant flow from the inherent dignity of the human person,

By this Covenant agree upon the following articles with respect to these rights and freedoms.

PART I

Article 1

[This article 1 was initially drafted by the Commission to be applicable only to the articles on civil and political rights in part II. The discussions in the April-May 1951 session of the Commission indicated that the Commission did not intend to have this article applicable to the articles on economic and social rights in part III, except possibly the nondiscrimination provisions of paragraph 1. Due to the lack of time at its April-May 1951 session, however, the Commission did not have an opportunity to clarify these matters by appropriate revisions in this article.]

1. Each State Party hereto undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in this Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of this Covenant, to adopt within a reasonable time such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in this Covenant.

3. Each State Party hereto undertakes to ensure:

(a) That any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) That any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent authorities, political, administrative or judicial;

(c) That the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

Article 2

1. In the case of a state of emergency officially proclaimed by the authorities or in the case of public disaster, a State may take measures derogating, to the extent strictly limited by the exigencies of the situation, from its obligations under article 1, paragraph 1 and Part II of this Covenant.

2. No derogation from articles 3, 4, 5 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 7, 11, 12 and 13 may be made under this provision. No derogation which is otherwise incompatible with international law may be made by a State under this provision.

3. Any State Party hereto availing itself of the right of derogation shall inform immediately the other States Parties to the Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General, of the provisions from which it has

derogated and the date on which it has terminated such derogation.

PART II

[Civil and Political Rights]

Article 3

1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.
2. To take life shall be a crime, save in the execution of a sentence of a court, or in self-defence, or in the case of enforcement measures authorized by the Charter.
3. In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence of death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious crimes, pursuant to the sentence of a competent court and in accordance with law not contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek amnesty, or pardon, or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.

Article 4

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected against his will to medical or scientific experimentation involving risk, where such is not required by his state of physical or mental health.

Article 5

1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
(b) The preceding sub-paragraph shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with "hard labour" may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of "hard labour" in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a competent court.
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
(i) Any work or service, other than work performed in pursuance of a sentence of "hard labour" required to be done in the course of detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court;
(ii) Any service of a military character or, in the case of conscientious objectors, in countries where they are recognized, service exacted in virtue of laws requiring compulsory national service;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.

Article 6

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.
3. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
4. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. Pending trial, detention shall not be the general rule, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial.
5. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided without delay by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
6. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or deprivation of liberty shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

Article 7

No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation.

Article 8

1. Subject to any general law, consistent with the rights recognized in this Covenant:
(a) Everyone legally within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to (i) liberty of movement and (ii) freedom to choose his residence;
(b) Everyone shall be free to leave any country including his own.
2. (a) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary exile;
(b) Subject to the preceding sub-paragraph, anyone shall be free to enter the country of which he is a national.

Article 9

No alien legally admitted to the territory of a State shall be expelled therefrom except on established legal grounds and according to procedure and safeguards which shall in all cases be provided by law.

Article 10

1. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The Press and public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order or national security or where the interest of juveniles so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interest of justice; but the judgment shall be pronounced publicly except where the interest of juveniles otherwise requires.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) To defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case where he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(c) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain compulsory attendance of witnesses in his behalf who are within the jurisdiction and subject to the process of the tribunal;
(d) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(e) In the case of juveniles, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
3. In any case where by a final decision a person has been convicted of a criminal offence and where subsequently a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated. This compensation shall be awarded to the heirs of a person executed by virtue of an erroneous sentence.

Article 11

1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is

made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.

2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for the commission of any act which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the generally recognized principles of law.

Article 12

Every one shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 13

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are pursuant to law and are reasonable and necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Article 14

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3. The right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may therefore be subject to certain penalties, liabilities and restrictions, but these shall be such only as are provided by law and are necessary for the protection of national security, public order, safety, health or morals, or of the rights, freedoms or reputations of others.

Article 15

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary to ensure national security, public order, the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Article 16

1. The right of association shall be recognized.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary to ensure national security, public order, the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948, to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

Article 17

All are equal before the law; all shall be accorded equal protection of the law without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Article 18

1. Nothing in this Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in this Covenant.

2. Nothing in this Covenant may be interpreted as lim-

iting or derogating from any of the rights and freedoms which may be guaranteed under the laws of any Contracting State or any conventions to which it is a party.

PART III

[Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights]

Article 19

The States parties to the present Covenant,

1. bearing in mind the link between the rights and liberties recognized and defined above, and the economic, social and cultural rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

2. resolved to combat the scourges, such as famine, disease, poverty, the feeling of insecurity and ignorance, which take toll of or degrade men, and prevent the free development of their personality;

3. resolved to strive to ensure that every human being shall obtain the food, clothing, shelter essential for his livelihood and well-being, and shall achieve an adequate standard of living and a continuous improvement of his living material and spiritual conditions;

4. undertake to take steps, individually and through international co-operation, to the maximum of their available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in this part of the present Covenant.

Article 20

Work being the basis of all human endeavor, the States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right to work, that is to say, the fundamental right of everyone to the opportunity, if he so desires, to gain his living by work which he freely accepts.

Article 21

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to just and favourable conditions of work, including:

- (a) safe and healthy working conditions;
- (b) minimum remuneration which provides all workers:
 - (i) with fair wages and equal pay for equal work, and
 - (ii) a decent living for themselves and their families; and
- (c) reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 22

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security.

Article 23

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to adequate housing.

Article 24

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living and the continuous improvement of living conditions.

Article 25

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest standard of health obtainable. With a view to implementing and safeguarding this right each State party hereto undertakes to provide legislative measures to promote and protect health and, in particular:

- (i) to reduce infant mortality and provide for healthy development of the child;
- (ii) to improve nutrition, housing, sanitation, recreation, economic and working conditions and other aspects of environmental hygiene;
- (iii) to control epidemic, endemic and other diseases;
- (iv) to provide conditions which would assure the right of all to medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.

Article 26

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize that:

- (1) special protection should be accorded to maternity and motherhood; and
- (2) special measures of protection should be taken on behalf of children and young persons, and that in particular they should not be required to do work likely to hamper their normal development.

Article 27

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone, in conformity with Article 16, to form and join local, national, and international trade unions of his choice for the protection of his economic and social interests.

Article 28

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize:

1. the right of everyone to education;
2. that educational facilities shall be accessible to all in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination enunciated in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Covenant;
3. that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;
4. that secondary education, in its different forms, including technical and professional secondary education, shall be generally available and shall be made progressively free;
5. that higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit and shall be made progressively free;
6. that fundamental education for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education shall be encouraged as far as possible;
7. that education shall encourage the full development of the human personality, the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the suppression of all incitement to racial and other hatred. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial, ethnic or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society;
8. the obligations of States to establish a system of free and compulsory primary education shall not be deemed incompatible with the liberty of parents to choose for their children schools other than those established by the State which conform to minimum standards laid down by the State;
9. in the exercise of any functions which the State assumes in the field of education it shall have respect for the liberty of parents to ensure the religious education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

Article 29

Each State party to the Covenant which, at the time of becoming a party to this Covenant, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory primary education free of charge for all.

Article 30

The States parties to the Covenant undertake to encourage by all appropriate means the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.

They recognize that it is one of their principal aims to ensure conditions which will permit everyone:

1. to take part in cultural life;
2. to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.

Article 31

The States parties to the Covenant recognize the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic,

social and cultural rights, and particularly of those set forth in this Covenant.

Article 32

The States Parties to the Covenant recognize that in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with this Part of the Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.

PART IV

[The implementation machinery set forth in this Part of the Covenant was initially drafted by the Commission at its March-May 1950 session with respect to the civil and political rights in Parts I and II. Due to the lack of time at its April-May 1951 session, the Commission did not decide whether this implementation machinery should also apply to the economic, social and cultural rights in Part III. The discussions in the April-May 1951 session indicated, however, wide sentiment in the Commission against the applicability of this Part of the Covenant to the economic, social and cultural rights.]

Article 33

1. With a view to the implementation of the provisions of the International Covenant on Human Rights, there shall be set up a Human Rights Committee, hereinafter referred to as "the Committee", composed of nine members with the functions hereinafter provided.
2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals of the States Parties to the Covenant who shall be persons of high moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having a judicial or legal experience.
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their personal capacities.

Article 34

1. The members of the Committee shall be elected from a list of persons possessing the qualifications prescribed in Article 33 and specially nominated for that purpose by the States Parties to the Covenant.
2. Each State shall nominate at least two and not more than four persons. These persons may be nationals of the nominating State or of any other State Party to the Covenant.
3. Nominations shall remain valid until new nominations are made for the purpose of the next election under Article 39. A person shall be eligible to be renominated.

Article 35

At least three months before the date of each election to the Committee, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a written request to the States Parties to the Covenant inviting them, if they have not already submitted their nominations, to submit them within two months.

Article 36

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nominated, and submit it to the International Court of Justice and to the States Parties to the Covenant.

Article 37

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, on behalf of the States Parties to the Covenant, shall request the International Court of Justice to elect the members of the Committee from the list referred to in Article 36 and in accordance with the conditions set out below.

2. On receipt of the list from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the International Court of Justice shall fix the time of elections for members of the Committee.

Article 38

1. No more than one national of any State may be a member of the Committee at any time.

2. In the election of the Committee consideration shall be given to equitable geographical distribution of membership and to the representation of the main forms of civilization.

The persons elected shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of all the members of the Court.

3. The quorum of nine laid down in Article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court shall apply for the holding of the elections by the Court.

Article 39

The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of five years and be eligible for re-election. However, the terms of five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years. Immediately after the first election the names of the members whose terms expire at the end of the initial period of two years shall be chosen by lot by the President of the International Court of Justice.

Article 40

1. Should a vacancy arise, the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 shall apply to the election.

2. A member of the Committee elected to fill a vacancy shall, if his predecessor's term of office has not expired, hold office for the remainder of that term.

Article 41

A member of the Committee shall remain in office until his successor has been elected; but if the Committee has, prior to the election of his successor, begun to consider a case, he shall continue to act in that case, and his successor shall not act in that case.

Article 42

The resignation of a member of the Committee shall be addressed to the Chairman of the Committee through the Secretary of the Committee who shall immediately notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.

Article 43

The members of the Committee and the Secretary, when engaged on the business of the Committee, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Article 44

1. The Secretary of the Committee shall be appointed by the International Court of Justice from a list of three names submitted by the Committee.

2. The candidate obtaining the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of all the members of the Court shall be declared elected.

3. The quorum of nine laid down in Article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court shall apply for the holding of the election by the Court.

Article 45

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee at the Headquarters of the United Nations.

Article 46

The Committee shall, at its initial meeting, elect its Chairman and Vice-Chairman for the period of one year.

Article 47

The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide that:

(a) Seven members shall constitute a quorum;

(b) The work of the Committee shall proceed by a majority vote of the members present; in the event of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have a casting vote;

(c) All States parties to the Covenant having an interest in any matter referred to the Committee under Article 52 shall have the right to make submissions to the Committee in writing.

The States referred to in Article 52 shall further have the right to be represented at the hearings of the Committee and to make submissions orally.

(d) The Committee shall hold hearings and other meetings in closed session.

Article 48

1. After its initial meeting the Committee shall meet

(a) at such times as it deems necessary;

(b) when any matter is referred to it under Article 52;

(c) when convened by its Chairman or at the request of not less than five of its members.

2. The Committee shall meet at the permanent headquarters of the United Nations or at Geneva.

Article 49

The Secretary of the Committee shall attend its meetings, make all necessary arrangements, in accordance with the Committee's instructions, for the preparation and conduct of the work, and carry out any other duties assigned to him by the Committee.

Article 50

The members and the Secretary of the Committee shall receive emoluments commensurate with the importance and responsibilities of their office.

Article 51

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the Committee and its members.

Article 52

1. If a State Party to the Covenant considers that another State Party is not giving effect to a provision of the Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State. Within three months after the receipt of the communication, the receiving State shall afford the communicating State an explanation or statement in writing concerning the matter, which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, references to domestic procedures and remedies taken or pending, or available in the matter.

2. If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both Parties within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Secretary of the Committee and to the other State.

3. Subject to the provisions of Article 54 below, in serious cases, where human life is endangered the Committee may, at the request of a State Party to the Covenant referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, deal forthwith with the case on receipt of the initial communication and after notifying the State concerned.

Article 53

The Committee shall deal with any matter referred to it under Article 52 save that it shall have no power to deal with any matter,

(a) for which any organ or specialized agency of the United Nations competent to do so has established a special procedure by which the States concerned are governed; or

(b) with which the International Court of Justice is seized other than by virtue of Article . . . of the present Covenant.

Article 54

Normally, the Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only if available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.

Article 55

In any matter referred to it the Committee may call upon the States concerned to supply any relevant information.

Article 56

The Committee may recommend to the Economic and Social Council that the Council request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question connected with a matter of which the Committee is seized.

Article 57

1. Subject to the provisions of Article 54, the Committee shall ascertain the facts and make available its good offices to the States concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights as recognized in this Covenant.

2. The Committee shall, in every case and in no event later than eighteen months after the date of receipt of the notice under Article 52, draw up a report which will be sent to the States concerned and then communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for publication. The Committee shall complete its report as promptly as possible, particularly when requested by one of the States Parties where human life is endangered.

3. If a solution within the terms of paragraph 1 of this article is reached the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached. If such a solution is not reached, the Committee shall state in its report its conclusion on the facts and attach thereto the statements made by the parties to the case.

Article 58

The Committee shall submit to the General Assembly, through the Secretary-General, an annual report of its activities.

Article 59

The States Parties to this Covenant agree not to submit, by way of petition, to the International Court of Justice, except by special agreement, any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Covenant in a matter within the competence of the Committee.

PART V

[The implementation provisions set forth in this Part of the Covenant were drafted by the Commission at its April-May 1951 session with respect to the economic, social and cultural rights in Part III. The Commission left open the question whether these implementation provisions should also apply to the civil and political rights in Parts I and II. Sentiment in the Commission was divided on this issue.]

Article 60

The States Parties to this Covenant undertake to submit reports concerning progress made in achieving the observance of these rights in conformity with the following articles and the recommendations which the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, in the exercise of their general responsibility may make to all the Members of the United Nations.

Article 61

1. The States Parties shall furnish their reports in stages, in accordance with a programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council after consultation with the States Parties to this Covenant and the specialized agencies concerned.

2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfillment of obligations under this part of the Covenant.

3. Where relevant information has already previously been furnished to the United Nations or to any specialized agency, the action required by this Article may take the form of a precise reference to the information so furnished.

Article 62

Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter in the field of human rights, the Economic and Social Council shall make special arrangements with the specialized agencies in respect to their reporting to it on the progress made in achieving the observance of the provisions of this part of the Covenant falling within their competence. These reports shall include particulars of decisions and recommendations on such implementation adopted by their competent organs.

Article 63

The Economic and Social Council shall transmit to the Commission on Human Rights for study and recommendation the reports concerning human rights submitted by States, and these concerning human rights submitted by the competent specialized agencies.

Article 64

The States Parties directly concerned and the specialized agencies may submit comments to the Economic and Social Council on the report of the Commission on Human Rights.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may submit from time to time to the General Assembly, with its own reports, reports summarizing the information made available by the States Parties to the Covenant directly to the Secretary-General and by the specialized agencies under Article . . . indicating the progress made in achieving general observance of these rights.

Article 66

The Economic and Social Council may submit to the Technical Assistance Board or to any other appropriate international organ the findings contained in the report of the Commission on Human Rights which may assist such organs in deciding each within its competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to contribute to the progressive implementation of this Covenant.

Article 67

The States Parties to the Covenant agree that international action for the achievement of these rights includes such methods as conventions, recommendations, technical assistance, regional and technical meetings and studies with governments.

Article 68

Unless otherwise decided by the Commission on Human Rights or by the Economic and Social Council or requested by the State directly concerned, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall arrange for the publication of the report of the Commission on Human Rights, or reports presented to the Council by specialized agencies as well as of all decisions and recommendations reached by the Economic and Social Council.

Article 69

Nothing in this Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Constitutions of the specialized agencies, which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in this Covenant.

Article 70

1. This Covenant shall be open for signature and ratification or accession on behalf of any State Member of the United Nations or of any non-member State to which an invitation has been extended by the General Assembly.

2. Ratification of or accession to this Covenant shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and as soon as twenty States have deposited such instruments, the Covenant shall come into force among them. As regards any State which ratifies or accedes thereafter the Covenant shall come into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the United Nations, and other States which have signed or acceded, of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 71

[The consideration of this article was postponed. The United States proposed the following language for this article in the Commission in 1950:

"In the case of a Federal State, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) With respect to any articles of this Covenant which are determined in accordance with the constitutional processes of that State to be appropriate in whole or in part for federal action, the obligations of the federal government shall to this extent be the same as those of parties which are not Federal States;

(b) With respect to articles which are determined in accordance with the constitutional processes of that State to be appropriate in whole or in part for action by the constituent states, provinces or cantons, the federal government shall bring such articles, with favorable recommendation, to the notice of the appropriate authorities of the states, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment."

Article 72

[Adopted by General Assembly at its 1950 session]

The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to or be applicable equally to a signatory metropolitan State and to all the territories, be they Non-Self-Governing, Trust, or Colonial Territories, which are being administered or governed by such metropolitan State.

Article 73

1. Any State Party to the Covenant may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to the States Parties to the Covenant with a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposal. In the event that at least one third of the States favour such a conference the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of States present and voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly for approval.

2. Such amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General Assembly and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the Covenant in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

3. When such amendments come into force they shall be binding on those Parties which have accepted them, other Parties being still bound by the provisions of the Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.

• *Mr. Simsarian is assistant officer in charge of United Nations and Human Rights Affairs and also adviser to the United States representative on the Commission on Human Rights.*

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Promulgating a Mutual Security Program

STATEMENT BY JAMES E. WEBB UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE¹

While you sit comfortably before your television, at this evening hour, it is already dawn of tomorrow, Saturday, June 9, in far-off Iran—5,000 miles from you and me. And, in a short time now, your Ambassador, Henry Grady, a distinguished California businessman, will go to his office at the United States Embassy in the capital city of that country. He will find there a message from your State Department at Washington which will tell him the important things he needs to know about happenings all over the world. He will also find instructions based on the best judgment of all the departments of your Government as to the things he should do to make known to the Iranian Government, and to have considered, the concern we all feel over the serious crisis that has developed in that country.

Now, it is important to remember that the present acute situation arises from the decision of the Iranian Government to nationalize its oil fields in spite of certain contractual obligations which are felt to be infringed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and by the Government of the United Kingdom.

From the standpoint of the United States, we must bear in mind that even though this situation is fraught with great danger to peace, which affects the whole world, it is primarily a situation for negotiation between Iran and the United Kingdom. The position your Government has taken is that everyone concerned must be as level-headed as possible and stretch every point to preserve peace. We must not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran or in the details of the controversy, but we have an obligation to make known to both the British and the Iranians our concern about this situation and to urge that they both approach the problem in a spirit of moderation.

In carrying out this decision of your Government, Ambassador Grady tomorrow will, I hope, play a part in helping to work out a solution based on patience and good faith. About the time you finish your breakfast tomorrow morning, it will

be twilight in Iran, and he will have completed another day's work. After he leaves his office, his staff in the Embassy, including perhaps someone from your home town, will work on into the night getting off to the State Department an estimate of progress made and suggestions for future action.

On the other side of the world is another crisis area—Korea—and your Ambassador there, John J. Muccio, from Rhode Island, with his staff at the United States Embassy, is dealing with a whole cluster of problems which are quite different from those faced in Iran. The instructions which will go out to Ambassador Muccio tonight through the State Department are also based on the best judgment of all the departments of your Government and are based on policies which are quite clear. I know you are asking, "How long will the fighting go on, and what about these rumors of peace negotiations?" Let me set the record straight. We have received no peace feelers from the Communists.

One of the most important things about Korea is that we and the other free nations are carrying on this fight in partnership. Aggression has been stopped in its tracks. It has been stopped not by one nation, but by the United Nations—by collective action for collective security. Of course, we are at all times looking to find a way to end the Korean fighting. When it ends, the next step is the long-term United Nations' objective of establishing a united, free, and independent Korea. We have made it clear that we believe this can be accomplished by peaceful means if the fighting is stopped.

Meantime, there are problems in other parts of the world. The French and Vietnamese are valiantly fighting the Communists in Indochina in a major conflict. The British have thousands of troops in Malaya fighting the Communists there. And there are continuing threats by the forces of international communism all along the periphery of the Soviet Union and its satellites. You know the trouble spots—Berlin, Western Germany, Yugoslavia, Greece, and so on. The threat of Communist aggression is seen everywhere. And our answer, together with other free nations, is collective action for collective security.

¹This statement and the one made by Ambassador Cowen were made over an NBC-TV program on June 8 and released to the press on the same date.

Our first job within our collective security system is to rebuild our military power. And we are already taking the actions required. The second job is to harness our power with that of other free nations. We have laid a good foundation through the Marshall Plan, Military Assistance, and the Point 4 Program.

The means of going forward from where we are is a program the President has called the Mutual Security Program. He has submitted this to the Congress and requested an authorization of 8½ billion dollars. This program includes many different things. By it, we will provide arms to free countries; we will give them some of the things they need to produce arms; we will share with them our vast store of technical know-how; we will provide economic help to some countries to achieve internal stability. We will keep on cooperating with underdeveloped countries whose peoples will be ripe for Communist promises if they have no hope for a better future.

Now this is not just a one-way street. It is not all give by the United States and all take by our friends abroad. They are making their contribution, too. Through this program, we are taking out insurance—insurance for the collective security we must have to keep our freedom.

We and our allies have the capacity to create the strength we need. We have the raw materials. We have the know-how, we have the manpower, we have the spiritual resources, and we have the determination. It is going to take our best effort.

If we carry out these policies we can face the future with confidence. Our strength and our partnership with other nations can have a tremendous impact to preserve the peace.

STATEMENT BY MYRON M. COWEN AMBASSADOR TO THE PHILIPPINES

As a result of 50 years of American tutelage and out of loyalty to and affection for the United States, the Philippines unfalteringly stood by us when Japan embarked on its program to conquer Asia. The surrender of Japan found the Philippines destroyed and laid waste to an extent which has happened to few countries in modern history, and of which few Americans can even begin to conceive. Against this background of death and destruction, the United States, in compliance with its undertakings, transferred sovereignty to the Philippines on July 4, 1946, and agreed to assist in its rehabilitation. It was to be expected that the first 5 years of Philippine independence would encounter the most serious difficulties, particularly in view of the growing menace of the international Communist conspiracy.

We should remember that the end of hostilities found the Philippines stripped of all producer and consumer goods. It will still take many long years to replace what was destroyed. It is difficult for us to realize what this meant to the economy of the country. Among other things, it meant spending its dollar resources in order to acquire once more the tools to produce wealth.

During this period, the Philippine economy was of course unable to produce enough to pay for necessary imports that it had to buy. The Philippine Government itself realized the danger of its position when its dollar reserves during 1949 decreased from 400 million to 248 million dollars. To remedy this situation the Philippine Government imposed the most stringent import regulations with the result that its reserves are now back to the 400 million-dollar level. In addition, improved collection of taxes and the imposition of new taxes in the face of serious political opposition give us confidence that the Philippine budget will be balanced this year.

And lastly, Philippine production, particularly of such strategic and important commodities as copra, abaca, sugar, lumber, and minerals is now encouragingly close to the prewar level. I maintain that, in view of the obstacles which had to be overcome and those which still remain, the record of Philippine self-help and American assistance is a good one. The purpose of the United States now is to extend the assistance necessary to preserve and extend the gains which have been made.

Last year, the Bell Mission made a most excellent survey and made recommendations for the improvement of the Philippine economy. The recommendations of the Bell Mission are now in process of implementation, both by the Philippines and by the United States.

With American military assistance, the rejuvenated Philippine armed forces are now making significant inroads on the strength and capabilities of the Communist-dominated Huk movement. The presence of the Seventh Fleet in Philippine waters has contributed significantly to Philippine morale. American naval and air bases are being expanded.

These specific measures are giving the Philippine people confidence that President Truman and the Secretary of State have meant exactly what they said when they categorically stated publicly that the United States would never tolerate aggression against the Philippines.

Philippine efforts at self-improvement and of cooperation with the free world persuade me that the Philippines is convinced the United States, as in the past, will keep its pledged faith. Philippine troops have been fighting alongside our boys in United Nations forces in Korea since last summer. In return, we can know that in Asia we have no more devoted or staunch friend and ally.

Fulfillment of U.S. Pledge to the Philippines

*Statement by Myron M. Cowen
American Ambassador to the Philippines*

[Released to the press June 15]

I should like to give you a progress report on developments in the Philippines and our relations with that gallant ally of ours. As a result of 50 years of American tutelage and out of loyalty to and affection for the United States, the Philippines unflinchingly stood by us when Japan embarked on its program to conquer Asia. The surrender of Japan found the Philippines destroyed and laid waste to an extent which has happened to few countries in modern history, and of which few Americans can even begin to conceive.

Against this background of death and destruction, the United States, in compliance with its undertakings transferred sovereignty to the Philippines on July 4, 1946, and agreed to assist in its rehabilitation. It was to be expected that the first 5 years of Philippine independence would encounter the most serious difficulties, particularly, in view of the growing menace of the international Communist conspiracy.

Altogether too much is heard in this country of what is wrong in the Philippines, and I would be less than fair to our Filipino friends if I denied that there is much wrong. Far more important, however, is that there is much that is right and, in all honesty, I can tell you that I am supremely confident the Philippines is well on the way to justifying the confidence we have placed in it.

Because of misleading publicity, I suspect that the first and automatic reaction of the average American when he thinks of the Philippines is, "What happened to the 2 billion dollars the United States gave the Philippines?"

I believe this is as good a time as any to dispel once and for all the misconceptions about this 2 billion dollars worth of American aid. The best way to do it is to show what the United States has done and what this 2 billion dollars really consists of.

In the first place, the United States paid out 400 million dollars for private war damage claims, of

which the majority were in amounts of less than 500 dollars each, and for the reconstruction of public buildings. At the same time, the United States spent roughly 118 million dollars in the reconstruction of such essential public services as roads and bridges, ports and harbors, public health, fisheries, weather services, coast surveys, interisland shipping, and civil air facilities.

Another category of American payments during the first 5 years of independence fell into a more strictly military category. An amount of 822 million dollars was paid out by the American armed forces as back pay for Philippine armed forces, civilian claims against the military, civil relief, redemption of the guerrilla currency, missing persons benefits, and other items for military pay and construction materials and services.

The Veterans Administration paid out 181 million dollars as compensation to Filipino veterans.

An arrangement was also made to transfer surplus property estimated at a fair value of 100 million dollars. Other kinds of equipment and material and technical assistance to the amount of 200 million dollars were also made available.

The foregoing adds up to a dollar value of less than 1.9 billion but it should be noted that it was all in the form of goods and services and payments to individuals. Not a single centavo of this total was paid to the Philippine Government in cash. The only direct financial aid has been an RFC budgetary loan of 60 million dollars and 89.5 million dollars of processing and excise taxes which the United States had collected on behalf of the Philippine Commonwealth.

Two billion dollars can be made to sound like a lot of aid if you interpret it to suit your own purposes. Honest analysis makes it look like something else. It is true that what the United States has done for the Philippines did make available to it substantial amounts of United States dollar exchange, much of which could undoubtedly have

been spent more wisely than it was. We should remember, however, that the end of hostilities found the Philippines stripped of all consumer goods. It will still take many long years to replace what was destroyed.

The Philippine Government itself realized the danger of its position when its dollar reserves, during 1949, decreased from 400 million dollars to 248 million dollars. To remedy this situation the Philippine Government imposed the most stringent import regulations with the result that its reserves are now back to the 400 million dollars level. In addition, improved collection of taxes and the imposition of new taxes in the face of serious political opposition give us confidence that the Philippine budget will be balanced this year.

And lastly, Philippine production, particularly of such strategic and important commodities as copra, abaca, sugar, lumber, and minerals is now encouragingly close to the prewar level. I maintain that in view of the obstacles which had to be overcome and those which still remain, the record of Philippine self-help and American assistance is a good one. The purpose of the United States now is to extend the assistance necessary to preserve and extend the gains which have been made.

Last year the Bell Mission made a most excellent survey and made recommendations for the improvement of the Philippine economy. Pursuant to the Quirino-Foster agreement, recommendations of the Bell Mission are now in process of implementation, both by the Philippines and by the United States.

With American military assistance, the rejuvenated Philippine armed forces are now making significant inroads on the strength and capabilities of the Communist-dominated Huk movement. The presence of the Seventh Fleet in Philippine waters has contributed significantly to Philippine morale. American naval and air bases are being expanded. These specific measures are giving the Philippine people confidence that President Truman and the Secretary of State have meant exactly what they said when they categorically stated publicly that the United States would never tolerate aggression against the Philippines.

Philippine efforts at self-improvement and of cooperation with the free world (for example, the splendid showing of Filipino troops in Korea) persuade me that the Philippines is convinced the United States, as in the past, will keep its pledged faith. In return we can know that in Asia we have no more devoted or staunch friend and ally.

Consular Offices

The combined American consulate and USIE Mission at Bari, Italy was officially opened to the public on April 19, 1951.

The American Legation at Vientiane, Laos was opened to the public on May 16, 1951.

Ambassador Griffis Claims Misinterpretation of Remarks

[Released to the press June 15]

The Department's attention has been brought to interpretations placed on reported remarks of Ambassador Stanton Griffis during the course of a press conference held in Barcelona, Spain, on May 7. The United States Ambassador to Spain is alleged to have implied that he held out no hope of the people now in slavery in satellite countries ever again regaining their freedom.

After communicating with Ambassador Griffis at Madrid, the Department wishes to make emphatically clear that the interpretation placed on the Ambassador's remarks has no validity whatsoever. The constantly reiterated policy of this Government is the desire to see established in the countries of Eastern Europe independent and democratic governments freely responsive to the will of the people concerned, and the United States Government regards these peoples themselves as being deeply devoted to the ideals of personal freedom and national independence. On May 3, 1951, on the occasion of the 160th anniversary of the Polish Constitution, President Truman, in a message to the Polish people carried by the Voice of America bespoke the confidence of this Government in the will of the Polish people ultimately to regain their freedom when he said in part:

For more than a century and a half, in bondage and in freedom, Poles have commemorated May 3 as the symbol of their unflagging devotion to human rights and of their indomitable resistance to foreign oppression. The Constitution of May 3 has an additional meaning for Americans because it was brilliantly defended against the foreign invader by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a hero of our own war for independence.

At the Barcelona press conference of May 7, questions and answers were handled through an interpreter. Correspondents asked questions in Spanish. Ambassador Griffis replied in English. During the course of the conference, Mr. Griffis, who has also served as United States Ambassador to Poland, was asked his opinion of the relative freedom of the average citizen behind the iron curtain. The Ambassador replied that peoples behind the curtain had relatively little control over their governments which were subservient to the will of Moscow. He added that in Poland, for example, present Russian domination was attempting to crush the Polish spirit of independence.

The Ambassador was then asked his opinion of the situation in the event of an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States. He replied that, as puppet governments, existing regimes behind the curtain would continue to follow the orders of Moscow.

In both responses, the Ambassador emphasized that he was speaking of the Soviet-controlled governments of these countries, and not of the peoples themselves. This emphasis, however, was not made in the reports carried in the Spanish press.

In certain quarters, reports of the Ambassador's alleged remarks have been interpreted as indicating that he had abandoned hope that peoples now under Soviet bondage will regain their independence. Ambassador Griffiths has informed the Department that at no time did he express or imply any such opinion. The Ambassador wishes to make clear that he fully shares the friendly interest and sympathetic understanding of the people of the United States in sustaining the spirit of the peoples behind the iron curtain.

Mr. Dulles Reports on Tripartite Views on Japanese Treaty

[Released to the press by the White House June 15]

John Foster Dulles, accompanied by Secretary Acheson, reported to the President on the results of the visit of the Japanese Peace Mission to Great Britain and France, from which he returned this morning.

His report covered the talks with the officials of the French Foreign Office which had enabled the Foreign Office publicly to announce that there were no differences between the two countries as regards all the questions of principle involved in the preparation of the peace treaty.

Mr. Dulles also reported fully on the full exchanges of views which he had with representatives of the British Government, including the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade, and the Minister of State.

These talks resulted yesterday in full agreement between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Morrison on the draft treaty and all other main problems outstanding. This agreement is subject to governmental confirmations.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that although there had been initially considerable differences of opinion on important matters, these had all been cleared away, as a result of the better understanding of the facts and the reasoning which underlay the attitudes of the two Governments. The agreement reached did not require any compromise of principle by anyone, but represents free agreement based upon mutual understanding and community of purpose.

The President expressed gratification at the progress which had been made and the enlargement of the area of agreement in relation to the prompt conclusion of a fair and just Japanese peace treaty. He expressed the view that this progress strikingly indicated the capacity of the free nations to work together and to prove that in matters of great moment they were able to unify on a basis of the free working of reason and judgment.

Missing Planes in Czechoslovakia

[Released to the press June 15]

The United States Air Force has issued a release on June 15, concerning two United States jet fighter planes which have been missing since they became lost on June 8 while on a normal training mission over the United States zone of Germany. Reliable reports have been received that the missing planes landed in Czechoslovakia.

The United States Embassy at Praha immediately upon receiving this information sent a note to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing the Czechoslovak authorities that the planes were missing and requesting assistance in locating them. The Embassy has pressed repeatedly with respect to both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense to obtain verification that the planes landed in Czechoslovakia and has stressed the responsibility of the Czechoslovak authorities to report the finding of lost planes. The only response has been an indication that the competent authorities had not yet replied to the request for investigating the whereabouts of the two planes and the promise that these authorities would be pressed for a reply.

No further word has been received from the Czechoslovak authorities. The United States Government cannot comprehend this dilatory action and lack of cooperation on the part of the Czechoslovak Government in dealing with the matter of lost aircraft and personnel.

Soviet Repatriation Commission Leaves U.S. Zone of Austria

[Released to the press June 9]

The Department of State released today the following statement in connection with the expulsion of the Soviet repatriation mission from the American zone in Austria.

On May 25, 1951, Ambassador Donnelly addressed the following letter to the Soviet High Commissioner.

DEAR GENERAL SVIRIDOV: I have recently had occasion to review the correspondence between our two offices regarding the Soviet Repatriation Mission in the United States Zone of Austria. I have also reviewed in some detail recent activities of the Mission, and my study has convinced me that their objectives have been largely achieved. I note that their initial purpose was to facilitate the return of Soviet citizens freed by forces operating under the United States Command in the concluding phases of the war and in the immediate postwar period. These objectives have long since been fulfilled, and I perceive no reasonable justification for continuation of a permanent mission in the United States zone now that six years have elapsed since the end of the war.

I am advised, for instance, that during 1950 only six voluntary cases of displaced persons of Soviet nationality were repatriated, and only one to date in 1951. This would indicate to me that the task of assisting individuals

displaced by the war to return to their homelands has been accomplished. Those who remain have had ample time in which to return, and no possible obstacle to their repatriation exists which could not have been overcome in that period of time.

As evidenced by the repeated complaints by our respective staffs, the prolonged and unfruitful maintenance of the Soviet Mission in the United States zone has proved a potential source of friction and misunderstanding both between our elements and among the Austrian population. By avoiding these tiresome incidents, its withdrawal would certainly contribute to better relationships between the United States and Soviet elements. Furthermore, the presence of the Mission provides a considerable burden to the United States military headquarters which is obliged to provide escort personnel and liaison service, quite aside from the question of furnishing quarters in an area where housing is acutely short.

The United States Government considers that resettlement, repatriation, and integration into the local population have substantially reduced the displaced persons problem, and looks forward to an early solution to the entire question. Both the United States element and appropriate international agencies have found it possible to reduce their activities in this respect, and it seems logical that the Soviet element might likewise find it opportune to do so. I recall that the Soviet Repatriation Mission was withdrawn from the United States Zone of Germany nearly three years ago.

I wish to make it clear that I would have no objection to individual trips to the United States zone to deal with specific repatriation cases, on much the same plan as United States Graves Registration activities are carried out in the Soviet zone. At the same time, I extend my assurance that any displaced person of Soviet nationality who elects to return to the U.S.S.R. is free to cross into the Soviet zone at any time.

I trust that you will find this arrangement acceptable; it would be convenient if the Soviet Repatriation Mission were withdrawn from permanent residence by June 8th when their present accreditation expires.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER J. DONNELLY,
U. S. High Commissioner for Austria.

On June 6, 1951, the Soviet High Commissioner replied to the United States request of May 25 for the withdrawal of the Soviet Repatriation Mission from the United States zone stating that he cannot agree with the United States proposal "since the activity of the mission to stay in the United States zone is determined not by an order of the United States authorities in Austria but by the agreement of the two Governments made on February 11, 1945." The United States High Commissioner answered this letter immediately, stressing that the 1945 United States-Soviet Yalta pact has long since been fulfilled and is unrelated to existing conditions. The second American letter emphasized the absence of the necessity for a resident mission and repeated the invitation for individual trips to the United States zone to deal with specific repatriation cases on the same basis as United States Graves Registration activities are carried out in the Soviet zone. The second United States letter concluded by extending an offer of assistance in closing out the mission and insisting upon evacuation by June 8, as originally specified.

On June 8, 1951, the United States High Commissioner received from General Sviridov a reply to his second letter again objecting to the termination of the Soviet mission and stressing again the validity and application of the 1945 Yalta protocol.

Ambassador Donnelly immediately dispatched a reply to this second Soviet letter reaffirming the United States position. The United States High Commissioner offered to discuss the applicability of the Yalta agreement but firmly insisted that the Soviet mission depart on June 8.

The Soviet Repatriation Commission has left Salzburg for the Soviet zone.

Sweden and Czechoslovakia Sign Torquay Protocol

[Released to the press June 11]

The United States Government has been notified by the headquarters of the United Nations that Sweden, on June 7, 1951, signed the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at New York. Czechoslovakia signed the protocol on June 8.

The protocol provides that the United States and Sweden shall put into effect on July 7, the thirtieth day following signature by Sweden, the tariff concessions negotiated between the two countries at the recent conference at Torquay, England. These concessions are in addition to those exchanged between the two countries at Annecy, France, in 1949.

Since the United States and Czechoslovakia did not negotiate any new concessions at Torquay, no changes in United States tariff rates will result from Czechoslovakia's signature of the protocol.

At Torquay, Sweden granted to the United States concession on 17 Swedish tariff items. On one item Sweden removed its import duty; on others it bound moderate rates of duty or duty-free treatment. On some items dutiable at specific rates, Sweden reserved the right to convert the duties to an ad valorem basis.

Concessions negotiated by Sweden at Torquay with a number of countries other than the United States will, when put into effect, benefit additional United States exports to Sweden.

Swedish concessions to the United States will apply to a variety of American products, including rubber, glass, and metal manufactures; machinery and appliances; newspapers and periodicals; and chemicals and miscellaneous products.

Products on which United States concessions to Sweden at Torquay apply include X-ray apparatus and parts; tobacco machinery; steel ingots, blooms, slabs, billets, bars, etc., valued at more than 16¢ per pound; calculating machines and parts, electrical and other; table and kitchen articles of blown glass, valued at \$3 or more each; and crude horseradish.

Four Power Meeting Proposed by U.S. to Soviet Union

[Released to the press on June 15]

Following is the text of the United States note to the Soviet Union regarding a proposed four-power meeting of Foreign Ministers.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the current four-power negotiations in Paris.

1. The United States Government communicated on May 31 to the Soviet Government a note designed to remove the deputies conference from the deadlock in which it has been for some weeks. To this end the United States Government proposed, together with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, that a conference of Ministers should meet on the basis of whichever one of the three agenda which had been submitted to it the Soviet Government should prefer.¹

The negative reply of the Soviet Government has put the deputies conference back to the point at which it was before May 31.

The Soviet Government stated in its note of June 4 that in its view it would be inexpedient to interrupt the work of the conference. The United States Government took account of this recommendation. As a result the deputies have held further meetings. These meetings have shown again that it is impossible to make any progress. The Soviet representative in fact continues to make the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs conditional on a demand which it knows to be unacceptable to the other delegates although the Soviet delegate has obtained satisfaction insofar as concerns the inclusion in the agenda of all the questions which the Soviet Government stated that it wished to have discussed in its notes leading up to the conference or in the proposals which it made for the agenda at the beginning of the conference.

2. If the insistence of the Soviet Government on including in the agenda some mention of "the Atlantic Treaty and the American military bases" is to be explained by its desire thus to secure di-

rectly or indirectly a decision of the Ministers calling into question a treaty concluded by twelve powers for the purpose of ensuring their common defense and to which the U.S.S.R. is not a party, it is clear that this insistence is entirely unjustified since such a decision does not come within the competence of the meeting of Ministers.

If on the other hand the purpose of the Soviet Government is solely to reserve the right of the Soviet Foreign Minister fully to give his interpretation of the causes and effects of international tension this insistence is unnecessary since it has been agreed that the agenda should contain a general heading which would permit each Minister to express his point of view on these matters.

3. Considering that the further discussions between the deputies on this question which the Soviet Government proposed in their note of June fourth have not advanced the prospect of agreement, the United States Government proposes that the Foreign Ministers of the four powers without further efforts by the deputies to complete an agreement on the agenda should meet on the basis of the large measure of agreement already reached by the deputies in Paris. Taking into account agenda B and the notes which have been exchanged between the Soviet Government and the other governments in which their respective points of view are recorded, the four Foreign Ministers should be able to proceed without delay to their task of seeking to reduce the existing tensions in Europe.

Proposal on Television for Purposes of UNESCO

[Adopted May 10, 1951]

Proposal

It is proposed that the U. S. National Commission pass the following resolution:—

Aware of the enormous potential of television for purposes consonant with the objectives of UNESCO here and abroad; and

Considering the special responsibility of the U. S. National Commission, in view of the phenomenal development of the medium in this country, for keeping UNESCO informed of its technical progress and promoting its application to education, science, and culture,

¹ BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 933.

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO *Authorizes:*
The establishment of a Panel on Television for the following purposes:

1. To advise the National Commission on all appropriate means for the use and development of television for purposes consonant with the objectives of UNESCO.
2. To advise the National Commission on policies which it should recommend to UNESCO for the development of television as a means of promoting the free flow of ideas, by word and image, including the international exchange of scripts, kinescopes and visual materials in UNESCO's fields of interest.
3. To advise National Commission organizations and affiliated bodies how to use television in attaining the objectives of UNESCO in this country.
4. To prepare for the consideration of the Executive Committee a statement of policy regarding the National Commission's appropriate role in relation to possibilities of obtaining private financial support for experiments with, and production of, educational television programs to be utilized by either commercial or educational facilities, or both.

Discussion

There has been a phenomenal expansion of television in this country, from 10,000 sets in January 1946 to an estimated 13 million sets today. Although the development in the United States has been the most spectacular, a dozen countries are now telecasting on regular or experimental basis. Several more have given consideration to the development and use of television for fundamental education, perhaps with the realization that a picture in the mind is one of the most effective ways of communicating an idea.

That television is likely to be tremendous force in education in this country is evidenced by the attention it is receiving from educators, industry, and foundations. The recent hearings of the Federal Communication Commission relating to the allocation of channels for educational purposes, while producing very divergent views on the way educational television should be developed, served to focus public interest on its importance.

Typical of the serious problems presented:

- how many television channels should be allocated for commercial use and how many should be reserved for educational television;
- how could any considerable number of educational television stations be financed;
- can commercial television devote sufficient and suitable time to educational purposes to meet what educators consider television's educational potentials;
- can educational programs be evolved which will attract sufficient audiences to enable commercial television stations to use them and survive financially;
- what possibilities are there of obtaining private funds for development of such programs or, at least, testing the possibilities?

Since it is on the scene of this development, the National Commission may be regarded as having a special responsibility for informing and advising UNESCO about the development and utilization of this new medium, especially in view of the interest expressed by UNESCO in the problem.

A number of Commission members and others affiliated with Commission programs have expressed strong interest in the use of television for UNESCO purposes, and have provided informational and other materials to UNESCO. Some have participated in television programs on UNESCO's behalf and stimulated the development of programs in UNESCO's fields.

The interest of UNESCO in television has been expressed by certain program resolutions, inquiries and requests from the UNESCO Secretariat, and additional emphasis on television found in technical facilities reports.

The following are the resolutions in which television now is specifically mentioned in the UNESCO Program:

"The Director-General is authorized:

(Draft Program for 1952: Mass Communication)

"6.15 To investigate the possibility of making an extensive use of television among the instruments of mass communication devoted to the cause of international understanding through education, science, and culture, and particularly to bring to the attention of Member States information and suggestions designed to stimulate the more rapid development and application of television for such a purpose."

(NOTE: The phraseology of this resolution was changed from "investigate the possibility of utilizing" to "investigate the possibility of making an extensive use of" after action by the Executive Board at its Twenty-fifth Session.)

"The Director-General is authorized:

(Program for 1951: Teaching and Popularization of Science)

"2.3333 To prepare popular scientific articles for publication in newspapers or magazines, scripts for broadcasting by radio or television, and filmstrips for use by lecturers to non-scientific groups, and continue to encourage the international exchange of such popular scientific articles, scripts or films."

(NOTE: In this connection, through the cooperation of Dr. Detlev Bronk, president of The Johns Hopkins University, and Mr. Lynn Poole, Director of Public Relations of the University, kinescopes of *The Johns Hopkins Science Review*, a half-hour weekly television network program (which just received the Peabody award for educational television) have been made available through the National Commission to UNESCO for use by television stations in other member states. An article "Education Via Television" has been prepared for the *Courier* by Mr. Poole, originator and producer of the program.

A number of scripts of the television program *Science in Action*, created and produced by the California Academy of Sciences, also are being sent to UNESCO in partial implementation of this resolution.)

Proposal on Foreign Area Studies

[Adopted May 10, 1951]

Proposal

(1) That the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO endorse the following statement and recommend that the Executive Committee seek, so far as feasible, to gain widespread consideration of this statement, and further,

(2) That the Executive Committee be alert to any opportunities for appropriate, effective, practical, and feasible action for forwarding the objective of the statement.

Statement

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO expresses its conviction that the people of the United States and especially their scientists, scholars, and educators have a special responsibility to contribute to peace and security by the increase of knowledge of the history and cultures of the other peoples of the world. Particularly, more efforts must be devoted to the coordinated study of the areas and peoples of the world of which our present knowledge is inadequate.

Progress in this direction will require the concerted attention by educational administrators on an intellectual and planning problem—how to assure to the American citizen of the coming generation the educational experience which will fit him to participate fully in the world of which a successful UNESCO must be an important part.

A body of knowledge, constantly increased by research and continually tested and revised is the only sure foundation of mutual understanding and sound policies. Such knowledge must include, for each people, their physical environment and conditions, their history from remote

times, their systems of thought, ideas, values, and behavior, their varied modes of self expression in language and the arts, and their folkways, the relations with other peoples and cultures, and the reciprocal influences of such relations.

To achieve and maintain such knowledge calls for the correlated efforts of scientists and scholars trained in the relevant disciplines and methods of research. It is chiefly upon such knowledge, so acquired and so tested, that educators can rely for the truth which it is their function to communicate.

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO believes that the concept of "foreign area studies" which has taken on substance and definition among the scientists, scholars, and educators of the United States during the past quarter of a century, and which is now finding a place in the curricula of many universities has a vital bearing upon the problems of understanding, objectively and sympathetically, peoples unlike ourselves and cultures which differ from our own.

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO expresses the hope that such "foreign area studies" may be advanced through continuing and progressive research, the development of improved methods of investigation, and the training of competent investigators, and that the results of such labors may be communicated through the various channels of education at all levels to increasing numbers of the people of the United States.

U. S. Delegations To International Conferences

Tripartite Commission on German Debts

On June 13, the Department of State announced the appointment of H. Struve Hensel, as a consultant to attend the meeting of the Tripartite Commission on German Debts which will be held in London, commencing June 25.

The London meeting will be attended by representatives of principal creditor interests of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by German Government officials and representatives of German debtors.

The meeting will take up in a preliminary and exploratory way the problem of the settlement of the German prewar external debt in order to prepare for a conference in the fall, at which all interested parties, both governmental and private, will be represented.

Mr. Hensel will advise on the problems which will arise from the standpoint of United States holders of German corporate dollar bonds.

Representation at the London meeting of other categories of United States creditors are:

James Grafton Rogers, President of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., will attend the meeting and represent holders of German Governmental bonds and corporate bonds which are governmentally guaranteed.

Andrew L. Gomory, Chairman, American Committee for Standstill Creditors of Germany, will

Judges Elected to Chamber of Summary Procedure

The following information from the Registry of the International Court of Justice at The Hague was communicated to the press on April 20, 1951.

On April 19th, 1951, the International Court of Justice constituted its Chamber of Summary Procedure for the period May 3d, 1951, to May 3d, 1952. The Court elected the following Judges to form the Chamber:

MEMBERS: President Basdevant
Vice-President Guerrero
Judges Sir Arnold McNair, Krylov,
Hsu Mo
SUBSTITUTES: Judges Hackworth and De Visscher

The members of this Chamber, the constitution of which is laid down in article 29 of the Court's statute, are elected for 1 year. The Court has to determine cases by summary procedure if the parties to a dispute that has been referred to the Court so request.

attend the meeting to represent United States holders of standstill credits. These credits were extended by a number of American banks. For some time prior to the war, payments on these credits were deferred under agreements entered into with the German Government.

General Conference (UNESCO), Sixth Session

On June 6, the Department of State announced that on May 29, the President had designated, subject to confirmation by the Senate, the United States representatives to the sixth session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which is to convene at Paris on June 18, 1951. They are:

Senior Representative

Howland H. Sargeant, Deputy Assistant, Secretary of State for Public Affairs; *chairman*,

Representatives

George D. Stoddard, President, University of Illinois, and Chairman of the United States National Commission for UNESCO; *Vice Chairman*,

Helen Crocker Russell, Director, Crocker First National Bank, San Francisco, Calif.; Vice Chairman of United States National Commission for UNESCO

Elvin C. Stakman, Vice Chairman, Division of Biology and Agriculture, National Research Council

George F. Zook, former President, The American Council on Education, Washington, D. C.

Congressional Adviser

Prince H. Preston, House of Representatives

Member of Executive Board and Adviser

Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Special Adviser to the Chairman

Richard Heindel, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State

Advisers

Jaime Benitez, Chancellor, University of Puerto Rico
John M. Cates, Jr., Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Alice T. Curran, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State

Emily Taft Douglas, Washington, D. C.

John M. Eklund, President, American Federation of Teachers

Frank Fernback, Associate Director, Department of Education and Research, CIO

Paul Eliot Green, Author and Playwright, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.

George M. Ingram, Chief, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Carol C. Laise, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Roscoe C. Martin, Chairman, Department of Political Science and Government, Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y.

Sammel De Palma, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Frederick D. G. Ribble, Dean of Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.

John Schulman, Attorney, 120 Broadway, New York City

Charles A. Thomson, Counselor of Embassy for UNESCO Affairs, American Embassy, Paris

Howard F. Vickery, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State

Executive Secretary

David Persinger, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

International Labor Conference, 34th Session

The Department of State announced on June 5 that the thirty-fourth session of the International Labor Conference will convene at Geneva, on June 6, 1951. The United States delegation to the Conference is as follows:

GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

Delegates

Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor, *Chairman*
James E. Murray, United States Senate

Alternate Delegate

Augustine B. Kelley, House of Representatives

Coordinator

Arnold Zempel, Executive Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Advisors

Arthur J. Altmeyer, Commissioner for Social Security, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency

John J. Babe, Assistant Solicitor in Charge of Trial Litigation, Department of Labor

B. Harper Barnes, Assistant Solicitor in Charge of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor
Robert M. Barnett, Economic Officer (Labor), American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, (resident at Geneva)
Clara M. Beyer, Associate Director, Bureau of Labor Standards, Department of Labor
James L. Case, Commissioner of Labor, State Department of Labor, Nashville, Tenn.
Louis J. Ducoff, Labor Economist, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture
Ida Klaus, Solicitor, National Labor Relations Board
Frieda S. Miller, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor

Otis E. Mulliken, Officer in Charge of United Nations Social Affairs, Department of State

Robert J. Myers, Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency

Edward B. Persons, Chief, ILO Division, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Cleon O. Swayzee, Labor Adviser, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

EMPLOYERS REPRESENTATIVES

Delegate

Charles P. McCormick, McCormick and Company, Incorporated, Baltimore 2

Advisers

William B. Barton, Director, Employer-Employee Relations, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington 6, D.C.

L. E. Ebeling, Director of Personnel, The Sherwin-Williams Co., Cleveland

Carroll French, Director of Industrial Relations, National Association of Manufacturers, New York City 20

L. Roy Hawes, Past Master, Massachusetts State Grange, North Sudbury, Mass.

Donald Knowlton, Hill and Knowlton, Cleveland 5

A. D. Marshall, Assistant Secretary, General Electric Company, Schenectady 5, N. Y.

W. L. McGrath, President, Williamson Heater Company, Cincinnati 9, Ohio

Charles B. Shaw, Director, Employee Relations Overseas, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, New York City

WORKERS' REPRESENTATIVES

Delegate

George Philip Delaney, International Representative, American Federation of Labor, Washington, D.C.

Advisers

William Collins, Regional Director, American Federation of Labor, New York City

Rudolph Faupl, Vice President, International Association of Machinists, American Federation of Labor, Washington, D.C.

Edward Hillock, Secretary-Treasurer, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, American Federation of Labor, Washington, D.C.

Martin Kyne, Vice President, Retail, Wholesale and Department Stores Union, Congress of Industrial Organizations, New York City

John T. O'Brien, Vice President, International Brotherhood Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, American Federation of Labor, Indianapolis

Jacob S. Potosfsky, President, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Congress of Industrial Organizations, New York City

Michael Ross, Director, Department for International Affairs, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.

Boyd Wilson, United Steelworkers of America, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Pittsburgh

Secretary of Delegation

Ronald M. Ayer, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Administrative Secretary

Mason A. LaSelle, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Documents Officer

Michael Mura, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Stenographers

Vivian L. Bombardier, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Sally Curtin, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

The agenda for the 34th session will include the following subjects: the Director-General's report; financial and budgetary questions; information and reports on the application of conventions and recommendations; objectives and minimum standards of social security; industrial relations, including collective agreements and voluntary conciliation and arbitration; cooperation between public authorities and employers' and workers' organizations; equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value; minimum wage-fixing machinery in agriculture; and holidays with pay in agriculture.

The International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, is an intergovernmental agency which seeks by international action to improve labor conditions, raise living standards, and promote economic and social stability.

The Organization, which has 60 member countries, has three basic parts. These are the International Labor Conference, its highest authority which usually meets each year; the Governing Body, its executive Council, which meets four times a year; and the International Labor Office, its executive organ, which provides the secretariat of the Organization.

Representation at the sessions of the Conference is tripartite in nature, with two of the four delegates from each member country serving as representatives of the government and one each representing employers and workers.

Historically, the principal function of the Organization has been the formulation of international social standards in the form of international labor conventions and recommendations. Since the last war, the Organization has, with strong United States support, greatly extended its operational activities, including technical assistance and direct advice to governments and employers and workers groups on labor and social matters.

Although the United States Government was actively concerned in the establishment of the ILO in 1919, it did not become a member until 1934.

**International Union of Crystallography
Second General Assembly**

On June 11, the Department of State announced that the second General Assembly of the International Union of Crystallography will be held at Stockholm, Sweden, June 27-July 5, 1951. The United States Government will be represented at the Assembly by the following delegates:

Dr. Ralph W. G. Wyckoff, Director, Division of Physical Biology, National Institute of Health, Federal Security Agency; *Chairman*

Dr. Lawrence O. Brockway, Professor of Chemistry, University of Michigan

Dr. Isidor Fankuchen, Professor of Applied Physics, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn

Dr. Arthur Lindo Patterson, Institute for Cancer Research, Philadelphia

Dr. William H. Zachariasen, Professor of Physics, University of Chicago.

Crystallography is one of the oldest and most basic of the physical sciences, but it has assumed considerable practical importance only during the last generation. Fundamentally, it is the science dealing with the properties of solids. Nearly all solids—whether metals, rocks, and minerals of inanimate nature, the purified products of synthetic chemistry, wood, and textile fibers from plants, or the bone, connective tissue, and muscle frameworks of animals—have their atoms and molecules in some measure of orderly array. The physical properties of these solids—their mechanical strengths, hardness, elasticity—depend on this order in particle arrangement and vary as it is altered. Modern research in crystallography has been important in such varied fields as the study of metals and alloys; the recognition and analysis of rocks and minerals; the development and analysis of such diverse industrial products as pigments, soaps, and greases; the production of substitutes for natural quartz for use in radios and electronic equipment; and, in the field of biology, the study of why teeth decay and muscles and tendons disintegrate as a result of disease and age.

The first General Assembly of the Union, held at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 28-August 3, 1948, reestablished the working relationships that had existed before World War II between the most important crystallographers of different countries and revived projects for the accumulation and publication of information needed by all workers in the field. One such project involved the preparation and publication of voluminous tables to serve as a basis for necessary mathematical and physical calculations. Another such project related to the collection and publication of critical summaries of all the crystallographic work done throughout the world.

The second General Assembly will assay the progress of the projects initiated at the Harvard meeting. In addition, it will appropriate from the moneys available to the International Union what is needed to carry out work over the next 3

years, elect a new group of officers to administer the affairs of the Union and supervise its projects, and hold scientific sessions, at which more than 100 papers will be given.

The International Union of Crystallography, which was accepted as a member of the International Council of Scientific Unions on April 7, 1947, was established pursuant to a proposal made at an informal meeting of crystallographers held at London in June 1946. Its work is directed by the General Assembly, which normally meets every 3 years and which consists of delegates appointed by the 15 member countries. The United States became a member in 1949.

International Wheat Council, Fifth Session

The Department of State announced on June 11 that the fifth session of the International Wheat Council will convene at London on June 13, 1951. The United States Government will be represented at the session by the following delegation:

United States Delegate

Stanley Andrews, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

Maurice M. Benidt, Chief, International Wheat Agreement Staff, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

James C. Foster, Assistant Director, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

L. Ingemann Highby, Agricultural Products Staff, Department of State

Paul O. Nyhus, Agricultural Attaché, and United States Representative on the Executive Committee of the International Wheat Council, American Embassy, London

Earl O. Pollock, Alternate United States Representative on the Executive Committee of the International Wheat Council, American Embassy, London

Adviser and Secretary

Robert L. Gastineau, Grain Division, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

The agenda for the fifth session provides for (1) adjustment of the quotas of guaranteed purchases and guaranteed sales stipulated in annexes A and B to article III of the International Wheat Agreement, (2) amendment of the rules of procedure of the Council, (3) review of reports by the Secretary of the Council and the Executive Committee, (4) action on applications from Japan and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to accede to the International Wheat Agreement, (5) consideration of proposals for preshipment and post-shipment against annual quotas, (6) discussion of special problems relating to the reporting and recording of transactions in wheat and to the renewal of the International Wheat Agreement, and (7) the election for the 1951-52 crop year of officers of the Council, officers of the Executive Committee, and members of the Executive Committee.

The International Wheat Council was established in 1949 pursuant to the terms of the Inter-

national Wheat Agreement of March 23, 1949, an instrument designed to assure supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices. Administration of the provisions of the Agreement is the primary function of the Council, which is composed of the exporting and importing countries parties to the Agreement. Each member country may be represented at sessions of the Council by a delegate, an alternate delegate, and such technical advisers as are necessary.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

Expressing the Sympathy of the Congress and of the People of the United States to the President and the People of El Salvador. H. Rept. 481, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 105] 2 pp.

Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 491, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 26] 2 pp.

Authorizing the Settlement by the Attorney General and the Payment of Certain of the Claims Filed Under the Act of July 2, 1948, by Persons of Japanese Ancestry Evacuated Under Military Orders. H. Rept. 496, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3142] 11 pp.

Department of State Appropriations for 1952. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 82d Congress first session. 1136 pp.

Newsprint. Report of the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary pursuant to H. Res. 95 (82d Cong., 1st sess.) Authorizing the Committee on the Judiciary to Conduct Studies and Investigations Relating to Matters Within Its Jurisdiction. H. Rept. 505, Part 1, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 132 pp.

Universal Military Training and Service Act. H. Rept. 535, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To Accompany S. 1] 27 pp.

Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. H. Rept. 537, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1612] 5 pp.

Second Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the second semiannual report on the mutual defense assistance program, covering the period from April 6, 1950, to October 6, 1950, pursuant to provisions of public law 329 (81st Cong. 1st sess., Stat. 714) 50 pp.

A Mutual Security Program. Message from the President of the United States. H. Doc. 147, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 13 pp.

Permitting Free Entry of Articles Imported from Foreign Countries for the Purpose of Exhibition at the Japanese Trade Fair, Seattle, Wash. S. Rept. 322, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 253] 2 pp.

Relating to the Transfer of Payment of Tax on Vodka. S. Rept. 320, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1613] 2 pp.

Amending the Tariff Act of 1930 so as to Extend to Flaxseed and Linseed and Flaxseed and Linseed Oil the Privilege of Substitution for Drawback of Duties. S. Rept. 323, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 2192] 2 pp.

Rider in Third Deficiency Appropriation Bill Called Defective

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House June 2]

I have today approved H. R. 3587, the third supplemental appropriation act for the fiscal year 1951. This act provides urgently needed funds for carrying on important activities of the Government.

Unfortunately, the act also contains a legislative "rider"—that is, a piece of legislation quite unrelated to the major purpose of the act, which is to appropriate funds. This rider—Section 1302—makes broad and sweeping changes in our procedures for restricting trade between the free world and the Soviet Union and its satellites. It is thus a major piece of legislation affecting our foreign policy, but it was never considered by the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

This rider is seriously defective. However, I have signed this act because the appropriations it carries are so urgently needed, and because Section 1302 does authorize exceptions from its provisions in the interest of national security. Unless the power to make exceptions is broadly used, this rider will result in weakening, rather than strengthening, the security of the United States and the collective security of the free world. I strongly urge the Congress to replace this hasty rider with more workable legislation at the earliest possible moment.

Briefly, Section 1302 provides, first, that no economic or financial assistance (other than military assistance) may be given to any country which exports to the Soviet Union and its satellites arms, armament, or military matériel.

Second, such aid may not be granted if a country exports any article or commodity which "may be used in the manufacture of arms, armaments or military matériel." And third, aid must be withheld if a country exports to the Soviet bloc any article or commodity the shipment of which to the Soviet bloc from the United States is prohibited.

The section further provides that in order for any country to be eligible for economic assistance from the United States, it shall certify monthly that it has not shipped any of these items to the Soviet bloc since the 15th day after the enactment of the act. The National Security Council is authorized to grant exceptions to these provisions in the security interests of the United States. Such exceptions are to be reported to six committees of the Congress.

I am sure that the Congress intended, in enacting this section, to strengthen the security of the United States and the rest of the free world by preventing the Soviet bloc from acquiring goods,

through trade, which will enlarge Soviet military strength in relation to that of the free world.

Section 1302

[Kem Amendment]

SEC. 1302. (a) During any period in which the Armed Forces of the United States are actively engaged in hostilities while carrying out any decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, no economic or financial assistance shall be provided, out of any funds appropriated to carry out the purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, or any other Act to provide economic or financial assistance (other than military assistance) to foreign countries, to any country which exports or knowingly permits the exportation of, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or any of its satellite countries (including Communist China and Communist North Korea), arms, or armament or military matériel or articles or commodities which the Secretary of Defense shall have certified to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation may be used in the manufacture of arms, armaments, or military matériel, or shipment of which to the Soviet bloc is embargoed by the United States in the interest of national security; and the Secretary of Defense is hereby authorized and directed to so certify to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation any article or commodity of the nature or class described: *Provided*, That after the 15th day following the date of enactment of this Act and prior to the termination of the period heretofore referred to no country shall be eligible for economic or financial assistance under any such Act unless within thirty days prior to the date on which such assistance is to be provided such country shall have certified to the United States that it has not, subsequent to the 15th day following the date of enactment of this Act, exported, or knowingly permitted the exportation of, arms, armaments, military matériel, articles, or commodities, which are subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, to any of the countries referred to in such provisions: *Provided further*, That such certification shall not relieve the Administrator for Economic Cooperation or any other officer of the United States Government of responsibility for enforcing the foregoing provisions of this section: *Provided further*, That exceptions to these provisions may be made upon an official determination of the National Security Council that such exception is in the security interest of the United States: *Provided further*, That the National Security Council shall immediately report any exception made with reasons therefor to the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the National Security Council shall at least once each quarter review all exceptions made previously and shall report its determinations to the foregoing committees of the House and Senate, which reports shall contain an analysis of the trade with the Soviet bloc of countries for which an exception is made.

(b) Section 1304 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951, is hereby repealed.

With that purpose, everyone agrees. The United States and other free nations have been pursuing this objective for a long time, and much greater progress has been made than has generally been realized.

Section 1302 is of little practical importance insofar as it applies to the shipment of arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic-energy materials. Long before the Korean conflict, shipments of these items to the Soviet bloc were prohibited by the United States, by the Western European countries, and by most of the other free nations of the world. Prohibitions on the shipment of these items are effective and complete.

The difficulties with Section 1302 arise out of its application to ordinary items of trade and commerce. As to these items, it is not well designed to achieve its ostensible purpose. In fact, in several important respects it will make it more difficult to achieve that purpose.

First, the section fails to recognize that trade is a two-way street.

Today, the free nations get from the Soviet bloc substantial amounts of such commodities as coal, grain, timber, manganese, chrome, asbestos and iron and steel products which are of major importance to the common defense of the free world. Principal exports to the Soviet bloc consist of some kinds, various foods and raw materials, and a diversified list of miscellaneous commodities.

It is obvious that many of these items, "may be used in the manufacture of arms, armaments or military matériel," in the words of Section 1302. But that is not sufficient reason for prohibiting their export to the Soviet bloc, if the free world receives in return goods of greater value.

Approach Oversimplified

Some free nations, as a result of trade patterns of many years' standing, are more dependent on imports from the Soviet bloc than others. Those free nations most dependent upon the Soviet bloc for imports contributing substantially to their food supply and defense effort, naturally have great difficulty in reducing exports to the Soviet bloc. They are in a much more difficult situation than are countries like the United States, which are not so dependent upon imports from the Soviet bloc.

The problem of trade between the Soviet bloc and the free world is thus a matter of evaluating, in terms of relative importance, what the free world gets from the bloc for what it must give in return. The oversimplified approach of Section 1302 is clearly wrong.

Second, Section 1302 attempts to achieve by coercion what must be achieved by cooperation. No one nation can successfully force its own system of controls upon every other nation. Our experience so far shows that effective controls can be accomplished by cooperation.

The United States strictly controls its own exports to the Soviet bloc. The shipment of many items is embargoed. All exports of any kind from the United States to any country in the Soviet bloc requires licenses. Their type and quantity are carefully scrutinized to make sure that they will not be of strategic value to the Soviet bloc.

In addition to the controls that apply generally to exports to countries in the Soviet bloc, shipment of all commodities to China is forbidden and United States ships are not allowed to call at Chinese ports.

The United States has also been a leader in urging other free nations to join in international control of exports to the Soviet bloc. Of necessity, publicity concerning control methods and results has been restricted. Much progress has been made, however. The countries of Western Europe which are cooperating with us in the common defense program have taken action to prohibit or control exports of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. These nations, together with Canada and the United States, substantially control most of the industrial products of the free world.

When aggression broke out in Korea, approximately 145 categories of articles had already been embargoed to the Soviet bloc from these Western European countries as well as from the United States and Canada. Many of these categories include dozens of individual articles. The quantities which could be shipped in numerous other categories were limited.

Through continuing cooperative efforts since that time, further restrictions have been worked out. At present, about 90 percent of the items which the United States regards as being of primary strategic significance are subject to virtual embargo by the Western European countries.

In addition to these steps, the United Nations on May 18, 1951, by a vote of 47 to 0, agreed to a complete embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China.¹ The United States will continue to work in the United Nations for increasingly effective international action to deny materials of value to the Chinese aggressors.

We have come a long way in our efforts to achieve international controls over exports to the Soviet bloc, and these controls are becoming increasingly effective.

A third major defect with Section 1302 is that if we cut off our aid to a friendly country, we might hurt ourselves more than we hurt the Soviet Union.

Free World Defenses Endangered

The indiscriminate approach of Section 1302 for cutting off economic aid to other countries ignores the vital interest which the United States has in the contribution that aid makes to the security of the whole free world. Cutting off this aid could

¹ BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 849.

strike a death blow at the tremendous defense effort in which the free nations are now engaged.

The success of our defense effort depends upon the ability of the free world to maintain and expand its economic strength. Our programs for economic and financial assistance are directed to that end.

In some countries, they are directed toward helping other nations build the industrial facilities required to produce weapons for defense. In certain underdeveloped countries, they are directed to assuring the basic economic stability which is essential if those countries are to resist both internal and external threats to their independence.

In other countries, they are aimed at expanding the capacity of the free world to produce vitally needed strategic materials—for example, copper, steel, aluminum and uranium.

The security of the United States, as well as the other free nations, is deeply involved in the success of these efforts. The defense structure we are striving to create—both here at home and in Europe under General Eisenhower—will rot and topple unless it rests on a sound economic foundation.

In addition to these major defects, Section 1302 also contains certain technical provisions which are unfortunate. For example, the provision for certification is complicated and difficult to apply and does not add to our ability to carry out the ostensible purpose of the section.

Because of the defects I have described, Section 1302 will make it more difficult for this country to make further progress in its effort to bring about effective international controls over trade with the Soviet bloc.

The National Security Council has been guiding the work of the Executive agencies in this effort. The council has been carrying on a continuous scrutiny of the trade of every country in the free world with the Soviet bloc. Information on the quantities and types of commodities shipped to and received from the Soviet bloc by every free country has been examined. The trade controls exercised by these countries have been considered.

Against this background, the council has decided the actions that the United States should take. In doing so, the council has viewed the United States security in its broadest terms. It has taken into account the security value of imports received from the bloc, the contribution of each country to the collective security of the free

world and the importance of United States aid in facilitating their defense efforts.

For the most part, there are very few articles left of any real strategic importance that are moving to the Soviet bloc in any significant quantity. There are still a number of trade situations with which we are not yet satisfied.

Control of trade at certain transshipment points is difficult of solution. As would be expected, not all friendly nations agree with us precisely as to which articles are of the most strategic value to the Soviet bloc. We are constantly endeavoring, however, to correct all of these weak spots and progress is constantly being made.

Improved Legislation Recommended

We will continue these endeavors and will make every possible effort to administer Section 1302 to accomplish the purposes which the Congress intended without impairing the security interests of the United States. In order to do this, I think it likely that the National Security Council will find it necessary to make exceptions on a broad scale until the Congress has an opportunity to give this matter further consideration.

I am sure that the Congress and the Executive have the same general objective in mind in prohibiting trade that is injurious to the security interests of the United States and in finding the most practical and effective method of doing so.

Because of the compelling objections to Section 1302 in its present form, I urge the Congress to enact improved legislation to replace it at an early date. Such improved legislation should be based, I believe, on the following principal considerations:

1. The purpose of the legislation should not be blindly to cut off as much trade as possible, but to cut off trade only when such action will add to the security of the United States and the rest of the free world.

2. The legislation should take account of the offsetting value of what we receive from the Soviet bloc as compared with what we send to them; it should take account of the differing importance of different commodities and not treat all commodities alike; and it should take account of the value to us of the increased strength for freedom which our economic aid brings about.

3. The legislation should provide for simple, effective, and straightforward administration.

Legislation of this type would be helpful to the Nation's security. I strongly urge that the Congress enact such legislation to replace Section 1302.

The United States in the United Nations

[June 15-21, 1951]

General Assembly

Additional Measures Committee.—In compliance with the embargo resolution adopted by the General Assembly on May 18 against the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities, reports have been received by the Committee from the following 37 countries: United Nations members—Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Byelorussia, Canada, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, India, Iran, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, South Africa, U. S. S. R., United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia; nonmembers—Cambodia, Italy, Rumania.

In submitting the United States report, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross commented:

The practical effectiveness of the collective effort to deprive the aggressors of imports useful to their war making power is clearly shown by reports such as this from the member countries. In addition, discussion and review by the United Nations of these reports are a positive method of achieving the purpose of the United Nations resolution.

... I believe that this procedure is an important expression of the United Nations in action. It will demonstrate to the world the effectiveness of collective action and the value of continuous collaboration through international machinery.

... By denying the aggressors the means to wage war, the 53 members of the United Nations who support United Nations action in Korea help bring closer the day when hostilities will be ended and United Nations objectives achieved through peaceful processes.

The report states, briefly:

The controls applied by the United States on shipments to the Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities are more comprehensive than those called for by Resolution 500 (V) and were placed in effect before that Resolution was passed. Exports from the United States of arms, ammunition, and implements of war and atomic energy materials to North Korea and to Communist China have not been authorized at any time, and exports of a number of other strategic articles were severely restricted and in some instances embargoed for some time prior to June 1950. Since the end of June 1950, the United States Government has permitted no shipments to North Korea

and applied an embargo on shipments to Communist China not only of arms and munitions but also of atomic energy materials, petroleum products, and other items of strategic value included in the United States Positive List.

The scope of the economic measures applied against the Chinese Communists by the United States was greatly extended when it became unmistakably clear that they were engaged in large-scale military operations against United Nations forces in Korea. Since December 1950, the United States has not exported any materials whatever to Communist China. . . . All Communist China and North Korea assets within the United States have been blocked and subjected to stringent controls. . . . The United States will prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States under the Resolution and cooperate fully with other States and the Additional Measures Committee in carrying out the purposes of this embargo.

New Appeal for Forces for Korea

On June 21, the acting representative of the United States to the United Nations presented to the Secretary-General in behalf of the unified command a communication concerning the need for additional ground troops from member governments of the United Nations for the collective effort in Korea. It states:

The unified command has conducted and is now conducting extensive bilateral conversations in connection with this problem with various member states and, in particular, is conducting conversations with states which have already contributed armed forces.

In order to further efforts of the unified command in this respect, the Secretary-General is requested to send communications on behalf of the unified command to member governments which previously gave a favorable reply either to the Security Council's resolution of June 25, 1950, or to its resolution of June 27, 1950, but which have not yet contributed armed forces for the collective effort in Korea, advising the aforementioned members of the need for further ground assistance in Korea. There is a real need for additional forces from member states in the light of massive Chinese Communist concentrations in the area and of their continuing aggression. . . .

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Delegations from 59 member nations are attending the 6th session of the General Conference of UNESCO which is being held June 18 to July 11 in Paris. The five countries which have submitted

applications for membership have been admitted as observers—Japan, German Federal Republic, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Three other non-members have also been admitted as observers, Iceland, Finland, and Spain. In addition representatives from United Nations specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and 93 international nongovernmental organizations representing the church, labor, social welfare, scientific, educational, and cultural groups are attending.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the United States delegation are Howland H. Sargeant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and George D. Stoddard, President, University of Illinois and Chairman of the United States National Commission for UNESCO.

Two important items on the agenda of the plenary meetings of the General Conference are the Director General's report on the activities of the Organization from April 1950 to March 1951, and the UNESCO draft program for 1952.

In his report, the Director General, Jaime Torres Bodet, states:

From now on the important thing is not so much how UNESCO should be run, but what it can do. Its activities are tending to become less generalized and more concrete.

In addressing the plenary meeting, he stated:

UNESCO is a technical institution and as such is not responsible for establishing political security, but it is responsible for establishing a more general form of security—peace in its deepest sense—without which political security is no more than a truce between wars. To fight for collective security means, therefore, that we must fight for something else at the same time—for universal progress, which means economic and social security.

The proposed 1952 program of activities are classified into seven major fields: education, natural science, social science, cultural activities, exchange of persons, mass communications, and relief assistance. Specific proposals include:

(1) The establishment over a 12-year period of six regional fundamental education centers in the Far East, India, the Middle East, Latin America, and Equatorial Africa, where teams of teachers would be trained and educational materials prepared.

(2) The sending of educational missions to various countries.

(3) Education of industrial workers. Specific recommendations call for the establishment of an international center for the training of specialists, the improvement of methods in workers' education, and the organization of educational courses for workers, particularly in relation to international understanding.

(4) Establishment of a new kind of public library in under developed areas of the world especially designed to meet the needs of readers using books for the first time in their adult lives.

Other items on the plenary agenda include:

1. Establishment of the other five units of the General Conference: Procedure Committee, Budget Committee, Program Commission, the Administrative Commission, and the Official and External Relations Commission.

2. Presentation by the Director General of the budget estimates for 1952. The proposed budget for the regular activities of UNESCO for 1952 amounts to \$9,666,500. This will be reviewed by the Conference and is subject to reduction.

3. Consideration of the world problem of newsprint and its effect of limiting the free flow of information and knowledge.

4. The creation of a European Regional Laboratory for Nuclear Physics.

Mr. Sargeant (U.S.) was unanimously elected president of the General Conference. He stated it was the United States view that UNESCO should not become a propaganda vehicle or the instrument of any nation or group of nations; that it should remain "a truly international agency" dedicated to the attainment of peace and security for mankind. He added:

It must develop a living sense of the interdependence of all peoples and of the identity of their common interests. UNESCO, among all of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, deals in ideas and in the influence of ideas on the behavior and attitudes of mankind. Ideas are far more potent than bullets. We do not need to be great prophets to see that now we must quicken our pace and synchronize the resources of UNESCO.

He stressed the support the United States gives to the UNESCO programs for abolishing illiteracy and improving education. He also pledged support of the proposed project for extending fundamental education and urged that UNESCO technical aid programs be stepped up.

Secretary-General Trygve Lie, who addressed the opening session, stated,

In the present state of the world, it is very important that the international agencies should close their ranks against the forces of skepticism and despair and should persist in their great—and seldom spectacular—task of making possible a peaceful world.

UNESCO has a key position in the effort which the United Nations organizations must now make to realize in an unsettled world the great purposes for which they were established. Through the wide scope and diversity of its activities, it has an immense range of contacts throughout the world. Through the nature of its work, it has the possibility of influencing the minds of men and the ideas which motivate men's actions. It has a vital role to play in support of the total United Nations effort for peace, a role with many different aspects.

Mr. LIE also noted that UNESCO is now being asked, in accordance with the proposal adopted by the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) at its twelfth session, to take appropriate measures to bring its relationship with the United Nations ever more closely into line with the collective security proposals adopted last year by the General Assembly in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.

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
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